Military Transformation
Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades Gao ID: GAO-03-801 June 30, 2003The Army is organizing and equipping rapidly deployable Stryker brigades as the first step in its planned 30-year transformation. Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between current heavy and light forces--heavy forces require too much time to deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power and mobility of the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able to deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world with 4 days. As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO assessed the Army's progress in (1) meeting its deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a deployed Stryker brigade in combat operations.
The Army has made significant progress in creating forces that can be more rapidly deployed than heavy forces with its medium weight Stryker brigades, but it cannot deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. Meeting the 4-day worldwide deployment goal of a brigade-size force would require more airlift than may be possible to allocate to these brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14 days, depending on brigade location and destination, and require over one- third of the Air Force's C-17 and C-5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one Stryker brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the Army is planning to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades. However, if sealift were used to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times to many global regions would be significantly longer than the 4-day goal the Army has set for itself. The Army's plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in combat operations is still evolving. The Army will not be able to finish its support plan until November 2003, when the results from an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade will be issued. Before it can fully implement the support plan, the Army will also need to make funding and other decisions relating to implementing some of the plan's logistical support concepts. Deployment goals may need modification should the brigades' design significantly change in response to direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to enhance the brigades' capabilities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-801, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2003:
Military Transformation:
Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades:
GAO-03-801:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-801, a report to Congressional Committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army is organizing and equipping rapidly deployable Stryker
brigades as the first step in its planned 30-year transformation.
Stryker brigades are to help fill a gap in capabilities between
current heavy and light forces--heavy forces require too much time to
deploy, and light infantry forces lack the combat power and mobility
of the heavy forces. The Army has a goal to be able to deploy a
Stryker brigade anywhere in the world with 4 days.
As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO
assessed the Army‘s progress in (1) meeting its deployment goal for
Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and sustaining a deployed Stryker
brigade in combat operations.
What GAO Found:
The Army has made significant progress in creating forces that can be
more rapidly deployed than heavy forces with its medium weight Stryker
brigades, but it cannot deploy a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world
within 4 days. Meeting the 4-day worldwide deployment goal of a
brigade-size force would require more airlift than may be possible to
allocate to these brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14
days, depending on brigade location and destination, and require over
one- third of the Air Force‘s C-17 and C-5 transport aircraft fleet to
deploy one Stryker brigade by air. Because airlift alone may not be
sufficient, the Army is planning to use a combination of airlift and
sealift to deploy the brigades. However, if sealift were used to
deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times to many global regions
would be significantly longer than the 4-day goal the Army has set for
itself.
The Army‘s plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in
combat operations is still evolving. The Army will not be able to
finish its support plan until November 2003, when the results from an
operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade will be issued.
Before it can fully implement the support plan, the Army will also
need to make funding and other decisions relating to implementing some
of the plan‘s logistical support concepts.
Deployment goals may need modification should the brigades‘ design
significantly change in response to direction from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to enhance the brigades‘ capabilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army work with the U.S.
Transportation Command and its components to set realistic deployment
timelines for the brigades that (1) reflect the use of both airlift
and sealift, size of the deployed force, brigade location, and
destination and (2) take into account any organizational or
operational changes resulting from modifications and enhancements
directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In commenting on a
draft of this report, the Department of Defense generally concurred
with the report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-801.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Progress Has Been Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve Its
Deployment Goal of 4 Days:
Army's Plan for Supporting and Sustaining Stryker Brigades in Combat
Operations Is Still Evolving:
Army's Plans for Deploying and Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could
Change:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
Capability Dates:
Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin
and Destination:
Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin
and Destination:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Percentages of U.S. Air Force's Total Airlift Inventory in
2005 Needed to Strategically Airlift One Stryker Brigade:
Figures:
Figure 1: Stryker Brigade Locations:
Figure 2: Comparison of Army's Stryker Brigades' Airlift Requirements
to That of Armored and Light Infantry Brigades:
Figure 3: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times to
Selected Global Regions:
Figure 4: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times:
Abbreviation:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2003:
Congressional Committees:
The capability to rapidly deploy and effectively sustain combat forces
over distant locations anywhere in the world is a major objective of
the Army's planned 30-year transformation. According to the Army,
current heavy forces lack strategic responsiveness and deployability,
and they have significant logistical support requirements. On the other
hand, the Army's current light infantry forces can be deployed rapidly
and are easier to support once deployed, but they lack the combat
power, survivability, and tactical mobility of the heavy forces. To
address this gap in capabilities between heavy and light forces, the
Army is organizing and equipping a rapidly deployable force, called
Stryker brigades, intended to provide the combatant commanders with
increased land power options, including the ability to execute and
sustain early-entry operations, potentially into remote areas of the
world.[Footnote 1] Stryker brigades will also validate new doctrine and
organizational structures and develop insights for subsequent
transformation to the Army's future force--the Objective
Force.[Footnote 2] To this end, the Army has established a goal to
deploy a combat capable Stryker brigade (including its 1,000 plus
vehicles and pieces of equipment as well as 3,900 personnel) anywhere
in the world within 4 days. Having realistic deployment goals is
important to the Army for measuring its progress in creating forces to
meet them, as well as to theater combatant commanders so that these
forces can be integrated into contingency planning.
This is the sixth in a series of reports identifying key challenges the
Army faces in implementing its transformation plans. (A list of related
GAO products appears at the end of this report.) As with the other
five, we initiated this review under the authority of the Comptroller
General. Our objectives were to assess the Army's progress in (1)
meeting its deployment goal for Stryker brigades and (2) supporting and
sustaining a deployed Stryker brigade in combat operations. We also
address potential changes in deployment and support plans the Army may
need to make in response to direction from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense to enhance the brigades' capabilities. We briefed your
offices on the results of our work in November and December 2002. This
report summarizes and updates those briefings and is being provided
because of your committees' oversight responsibilities for these
issues.
To conduct our review, we analyzed planning data on military air and
sea mobility that the U.S. Transportation Command and the Military
Traffic Management Command developed.[Footnote 3] We also reviewed the
Army's concepts and plan for supporting Stryker brigades in an
operational environment. We limited our review of mobility requirements
to the strategic deployment of the brigades--we plan to address Stryker
brigades' tactical mobility requirements and capabilities in another
report we will be issuing later this year.[Footnote 4]
Results in Brief:
The Army has made significant progress in creating brigades that can be
more rapidly deployed than heavy armored brigades, but it cannot deploy
a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. By equipping
Stryker brigades with 19-ton armored vehicles and reducing support
structure and sustainment requirements, the Army will have achieved
close to a 50 percent reduction in the brigade's deployment
requirements compared to that of a heavier brigade equipped with
Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks weighing 33 to 68 tons--
along with their large logistical support structure. However, meeting
the 4-day worldwide deployment goal of a brigade-size force would
require more airlift than may be possible to allocate to these
brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14 days, depending on
destination, and require over one-third of the Air Force's C-17 and C-
5 transport aircraft fleet to deploy one Stryker brigade by air.
Because airlift alone may not be sufficient, the Army is now planning
to use a combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades. In
the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved forces that are more
rapidly deployable than heavy forces and more lethal and mobile than
light forces; however, without more realistic deployment goals, the
brigades cannot be effectively integrated into theater combatant
commanders' contingency planning efforts.
The Army's plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in
combat operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized
until a number of issues are resolved. The Army evaluated the Stryker
brigades' support and sustainment capabilities for the first time
during the congressionally mandated operational evaluation that was
completed at the end of May 2003.[Footnote 5] The results from the
operational evaluation will not be issued until November 2003, and they
may lead to adjustments in the Army's plan. Funding decisions relating
to implementing some of the plan's logistical support concepts,
including Stryker armored vehicles and digital equipment replacement
reserves, also will need to be made before the Army can fully implement
its plan.
In addition, the Secretary of Defense wants modifications to the
brigades to give them a higher level of combat capability and
sustainability so that they are capable of being employed independently
of higher-level command formations and support. Adding capabilities to
the brigades --such as aviation and air defense--could significantly
increase deployment and logistical support requirements, potentially
requiring more time to deploy a Stryker brigade as well as different
plans for supporting it.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of the Army for
examining alternative strategic deployment goals for Stryker brigades
and setting goals that are based on a brigade's expected deployment
timelines and possible modifications to the brigades.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
generally concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues
to maintain 96-hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for
Stryker brigade deployment and is working with the U.S. Transportation
Command to reduce constraints that limit the Army's ability to meet
that goal. We agree the 96-hour goal is a useful longer-term target and
the Army should continue to work with the U.S. Transportation Command
to reduce enroute constraints. However, without deployment timelines
reflecting near-term deployment variables and alternatives, the Army
does not have a reasonable baseline from which to measure its progress
toward achieving its 96-hour goal; nor do the combatant commanders have
information on expected Stryker brigade deployment capabilities.
Background:
In 1999 the Army announced its intentions to transform its forces over
a 30-year period into a more strategically responsive force that could
more rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of military
operations, whether small-scale contingencies or major theater wars.
Army transformation plans call for the ability to deploy a brigade
anywhere in the world in 4 days, a division in 5 days, and five
divisions within 30 days. The first step in this transformation is to
form and equip six Interim Brigade Combat Teams, now called Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams, as an early-entry force that can be rapidly
deployed, supported anywhere in the world, and capable of conducting
combat operations immediately upon arrival into a theater of
operations, if required. Initially, the Army established a requirement
for Stryker brigades of being capable of deploying anywhere in the
world within 4 days after first aircraft liftoff. The Army has since
made it a goal or target for the Stryker brigades, rather than a
requirement, to help set a vision and design metric for developing the
brigades.
According to the Army's organizational and operational concept for
Stryker brigades, the brigades are designed to have higher levels of
strategic and tactical mobility than existing Army forces.
Strategically, the brigades are being organized, equipped, and
configured to meet a 96-hour deployment standard. To help achieve the
envisioned rapid deployability, the Army is developing logistical
support plans and concepts that will permit Stryker brigades to deploy
with fewer quantities of supplies and smaller numbers of support
personnel and equipment than currently exists in heavier brigade-size
units. At the tactical level, the brigades are to be capable of
intratheater deployment by C-130 air transport. Key to their increased
mobility is their primary combat platform, the Stryker armored vehicle.
According to the Army, the Stryker armored vehicle will fulfill an
immediate requirement for a vehicle that is air transportable any place
in the world, arriving ready for combat. The Stryker is an eight-
wheeled armored vehicle that will provide transport for troops,
weapons, and command and control. The Stryker vehicle weighs about 19
tons, substantially less than the M1A1 Abrams tank (68 tons) and the
Bradley fighting vehicle (33 tons), the primary combat platforms of the
Army's heavier armored units.
The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one mechanized
infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first two of
six planned Stryker brigades. The Army completed a congressionally
mandated operational evaluation of the first of these brigades at the
end of May 2003, and it plans to report the results of the evaluation
by November 2003. At that time, the Secretary of Defense is to certify
to Congress whether or not the results of the operational evaluation
indicate that the Stryker brigade's design is operationally effective
and operationally suitable, at which time this brigade can be deployed
overseas for the first time. The Army plans to complete the formation
of the second of the two Fort Lewis brigades in 2004 and to form four
more Stryker brigades from 2005 through 2010. The planned locations of
the next four brigades (see fig. 1) are Fort Wainwright/Fort
Richardson, Alaska; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii;
and a brigade of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. Based on defense
planning guidance, the Army is planning for the relocation of one
Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal year 2007.
Figure 1: Stryker Brigade Locations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Progress Has Been Made, but the Army Cannot Currently Achieve Its
Deployment Goal of 4 Days:
Although Stryker brigades will be more rapidly deployable than Army
heavy armored brigades, the Army cannot currently achieve its goal of
deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world within 4 days. The
Army has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the Stryker
brigades' deployment requirements compared to that of a heavier armored
brigade, but the Stryker brigade's airlift requirements--which include
moving about 1,500 vehicles and pieces of equipment and 3,900
personnel--are still sizable. Deployment times for Stryker brigades
from their planned continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii home
stations to any one of several potential overseas locations would range
from 5 to 14 days, depending on destinations. While the Army set out to
design Stryker brigades to be a rapidly air deployable force, Army
officials now recognize that airlift alone will not be sufficient and
that some combination of airlift and sealift will likely be used to
deploy the brigades. However, if sealift were used to deploy the
Stryker brigades, deployment times to many global regions would be
significantly longer than the 4-day goal the Army has set for itself.
Stryker Brigades' Deployment Requirements One-Half of Heavy Armored
Brigades' but Still Sizable:
By equipping Stryker brigades with armored vehicles weighing about 19
tons, the Army has achieved close to a 50 percent reduction in the
Stryker brigades' deployment requirement compared to that of a heavy
armored brigade equipped with 68-ton Abram tanks and 33-ton Bradley
fighting vehicles, along with their larger numbers of support vehicles,
equipment, and personnel. Deploying a heavy armored brigade would
require airlifting almost 29,000 tons of armored vehicles, equipment,
and supplies and about 4,500 personnel. Deploying a Stryker brigade
would require airlifting about 15,000 tons of vehicles, equipment, and
supplies and about 3,900 personnel. Consequently, the amount of airlift
that would be needed to deploy a Stryker brigade would be about one-
half of the airlift aircraft needed to deploy a heavy armored brigade.
Based on deployment planning assumptions the Army uses, about 243 C-17
strategic airlift sorties[Footnote 6] would be needed to airlift a
Stryker brigade, compared to about 478 C-17 sorties needed to airlift a
heavy armored brigade.
While the airlift requirement of a Stryker brigade is significantly
less--about one-half that of a heavy armored brigade, moving a
brigade's over 300 Stryker armored vehicles, over 1,200 trucks, utility
vehicles, and support equipment, and 3,900 personnel is about twice the
deployment requirement of an Army light infantry brigade. Deploying an
Army light infantry brigade would require airlifting about 7,300 tons
of materiel and about 3,800 personnel, requiring about 141 C-17 airlift
sorties. Figure 2 shows a comparison of Stryker brigades' airlift
requirements to that of Army heavy armored and light infantry brigades.
Figure 2: Comparison of Army's Stryker Brigades' Airlift Requirements
to That of Armored and Light Infantry Brigades:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Airlift Not Sufficient to Meet Army's Four-Day Worldwide Deployment
Goal for Stryker Brigades:
The Army will likely not have the amount of airlift it would need to
meet its goal of deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the world
within 4 days. Deployment times from any one of the four planned
Stryker brigade locations in the continental United States, Alaska, and
Hawaii to selected representative locations in South America, the
Balkans, South Asia, South Pacific, and Africa would range from about 5
days to destinations in South America to about 14 days to destinations
in Africa.[Footnote 7] The minimum time it would take to airlift a
Stryker brigade would be about 5 to 6 days to South America and the
Balkans, 7 days to South Asia and South Pacific regions, and 13 days to
Africa. While these timelines are short of the Army's 4-day deployment
goal, meeting them would offer joint task force commanders or theater
combatant commanders more rapidly deployable forces than currently
exists in heavy armored brigades and more lethal and mobile forces than
currently exist in light infantry brigades. Figure 3 shows estimated
ranges of Stryker brigade air deployment times from the four current
and planned Stryker brigade locations to selected global regions. (See
app. III for a summary of Stryker brigade deployment times by origins
and destinations.):
Figure 3: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times to
Selected Global Regions:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Air deployment time is from the first aircraft's wheels-up at an
aerial port of embarkation to the last aircraft's wheels-down at an
aerial port of debarkation.
[End of figure]
According to the U.S. Transportation Command's Stryker brigade air
mobility deployment analysis, the Army's deployment goal for Stryker
brigades has significant implications for the U.S. Transportation
Command and the defense transportation system. According to this
analysis, the Army must reduce its transportation requirements and
simultaneously work with the U.S. Transportation Command and the
services to improve deployment timelines.
A 2002 Rand report of Stryker brigade deployment options, sponsored by
the U.S. Air Force, also concluded that Stryker brigades cannot be
deployed by air from the continental United States to distant overseas
locations in 4 days. The study found that it is possible to achieve
global air deployment timelines on the order of 1 to 2 weeks by using a
combination of continental United States based brigades, a Stryker
brigade forward-based in Germany, and regional preposition sites.
According to the study, prepositioning of equipment or overseas basing
of forces is the single most effective way to increase the
responsiveness of Army forces for operations in key regions.
Under the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Army is planning for the
relocation of one Stryker brigade to Europe in fiscal year 2007. By
air, a brigade based in Germany, for example, could reach some global
regions in less time than it could from the four currently planned
brigade locations. From Ramstein Air Base in Germany, minimum air
deployment times to sub-Saharan Africa would be 7 to 9 days, compared
to a minimum of 13 days to 14 days from the other brigade locations.
From Germany to the Balkans, it would take 5 days to airlift a Stryker
brigade, compared to about 6 days to 7 days from the other locations.
Although the Army recognizes that some prepositioning of Stryker
brigade equipment overseas would add to a brigade's strategic
responsiveness and is considering it as a future option, Army officials
told us that it would be too costly to do so at this time.
Based on our analysis of the U.S. Transportation Command's air
deployment planning factors and airlift allocation
assumptions,[Footnote 8] achieving the 5 to 14 day air deployment
timelines would be difficult because it would require the Air Force to
dedicate about one-third of its projected 2005 primary strategic
airlift aircraft fleet of C-17s and C-5s for transporting only one
Stryker brigade. Obtaining this amount of airlift for deploying one
Stryker brigade would require allocating 31 percent of the Air Force's
total 2005 inventory of C-17 aircraft and 38 percent of its C-5
aircraft inventory.[Footnote 9] Obtaining an airlift allocation larger
than this would be possible--if airlifting a Stryker brigade is a
National Command Authority top priority and absent competing demand
elsewhere for airlift aircraft. Table 1 shows the U.S. Transportation
Command's estimated airlift allocation[Footnote 10] and the percentages
of the projected 2005 total airlift inventory of C-17 and C-5 aircraft
needed to strategically airlift one Stryker brigade.
Table 1: Percentages of U.S. Air Force's Total Airlift Inventory in
2005 Needed to Strategically Airlift One Stryker Brigade:
Airlift aircraft: C-17 Globemaster; Projected total 2005 aircraft
inventory: 136; Estimated airlift allocation: 42; Percent of total
inventory[A]: 31.
Airlift aircraft: C-5 Galaxy; Projected total 2005 aircraft inventory:
113; Estimated airlift allocation: 48; Percent of total inventory[A]:
38.
Airlift aircraft: Total; Projected total 2005 aircraft inventory: 249;
Estimated airlift allocation: 90; Percent of total inventory[A]: 36.
Sources: U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Air Force.
[A] Percentages are rounded.
[End of table]
Army Plans to Use a Combination of Airlift and Sealift to Deploy
Stryker Brigades:
Because it may not always be possible to obtain sufficient airlift to
deploy an entire Stryker brigade, Army officials anticipate using a
combination of airlift and sealift to deploy the brigades, although sea
deployment time would be slower than the Army's 4-day worldwide
deployment goal to most locations. Army officials told us that current
plans are to deploy about one-third of a Stryker brigade by air and the
remainder of the brigade would be deployed by sea. While some areas in
South America could be reached by a Stryker brigade located at Fort
Polk, Louisiana, via gulf coast ports in about 4 days, sea deployment
times to South America and other global regions from the three other
planned Stryker brigade locations would take longer. For example,
sailing time for a Fort Lewis-based Stryker brigade from Seattle/
Tacoma, Washington, would be about 10 days to ports in northern regions
of South America and more than 2 weeks to ports in West Africa. From
Alaska, sailing time to any of the eight overseas destinations we
included in this analysis would take from 12 days to 24 days.
Similarly, sailing times to the Balkans from any one of the four
planned Stryker brigade locations would take a minimum of 2 weeks to
over 3 weeks. With a Stryker brigade forward based in Europe, sea
deployment times to the Balkans from seaports in Germany, for example,
could be reduced to about 7 days. Figure 3 shows estimated ranges of
Stryker brigade sailing times from the four current and planned Stryker
brigade locations to selected global regions. (See app. IV for a
summary of sea deployment times by origins and destinations.):
Figure 4: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Sea deployment times are sailing days from a port of embarkation
to arrival at an overseas port of debarkation.
[End of figure]
In addition to the sailing times needed to reach overseas destinations,
it would take days to transport a Stryker brigade and all of its
vehicles and equipment from its home installation to a seaport. For
example, the Stryker brigade to be located in Alaska would need to
travel about 350 miles by rail or highway from Fort Wainwright, near
Fairbanks, to seaports in or near Anchorage. In addition, loading and
unloading cargo transport ships take much longer than loading and off-
loading aircraft. According to Army deployment planning data, it would
take about 2 days for loading ships and another 2 days to unload them
after arrival, compared to hours for loading and unloading aircraft.
Furthermore, many areas of the world in which Stryker brigades are
anticipated to operate have no access to a seaport, and not all
seaports would have the capacity to handle large deep-draft vessels.
Additional time would also be needed for Army forces deployed by sea to
move from a seaport to an in-land area of operations, although a
Stryker brigade would be able to move to in-land locations faster than
a heavy armored brigade because Stryker armored vehicles can be driven
while heavier armored vehicles and tanks might require rail or truck
transport. Also, a deployed Stryker brigade would need less time than a
heavy armored brigade would need to unload at a seaport, assemble, and
begin operations: Stryker brigades are organized and equipped to begin
operations soon after arrival in an operational theater, carrying up to
3 days' supplies of the fuel and ammunition and sustainment items,
allowing the brigades to immediately conduct a combat mission. This
contrasts with an Army armored or mechanized brigade, which would need
days to draw the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies it would need
before it can begin operations.
Army's Plan for Supporting and Sustaining Stryker Brigades in Combat
Operations Is Still Evolving:
The Army's plan for supporting and sustaining Stryker brigades in
combat operations is still evolving and cannot be considered finalized
until a number of issues are resolved. These issues include the results
from the operational evaluation of the first brigade, funding
questions, and decisions relating to implementing some of the plan's
logistical support concepts.
The Army will not be able to finish its support plan until November
2003, when results from the operational evaluation of the first Stryker
brigade will be issued. The Army conducted the operational evaluation
in April and May 2003 to assess the first Stryker brigade's overall
operational effectiveness and suitability. The operational evaluation
included the logistical support plan and processes that augment the
brigade's limited capabilities to perform basic maintenance, supply,
and transportation services. To make Stryker brigades easier to deploy
and support, the Army designed the brigades with a support structure
that is only about one-third the size of that found in a heavy armored
brigade. Thus, Stryker brigades do not have the capability to sustain
operations without the assistance of external support organizations and
resources. Contractors will provide a key part of this external support
to service and maintain newly fielded Stryker armored vehicles and
complex digital command, control, communications, and computer
equipment. Contractor logistics support will be needed to support the
Stryker vehicles and digital systems at least until these systems are
fully fielded. Also, instead of transporting large inventories of
ammunition spare parts, and other supplies into an area of operation--
as a heavy armored brigade would do--Stryker brigades are to sustain
themselves in extended operations by having these items delivered from
numerous locations outside the area of operation, such as Army depots
and theater support bases, where they will be stored and configured for
rapid shipment and distribution to the brigades as they are needed.
Because these support and sustainment processes are new concepts and
key elements of the Army's support plan for Stryker brigades, the Army
will complete the plan after it has reviewed the results and lessons
learned from the operational evaluation. Based on the results, the Army
plans to make any adjustments or modifications it determines are
necessary before the plan becomes final. Before it can fully implement
the support plan, the Army will need to determine the cost and decide
whether it will fund the acquisition of vehicles and equipment
replacement reserves. The brigades are designed to do only limited
maintenance for vehicles and equipment on the battlefield; therefore,
the Army's support plan calls for rapidly evacuating and replacing
items needing major maintenance or repair with what the Army calls
ready-to-fight replacements. The plan depends on having in reserve and
readily available sufficient numbers of vehicles and essential
equipment, such as digital components, for rapid shipment into an area
of operation. Before the Army can make a final funding decision, it
will first need to determine the types, amounts, and total cost of the
ready-to-fight replacements that would be needed. As of May 2003, the
Army had not made a final decision as to the number, types, and
configuration of the ready-to-fight vehicles, nor the method of their
delivery to an area of operations. Additionally, to reduce the amount
of materiel that is deployed and stockpiled within an operational
theater, the Army's Stryker brigade support plan includes measures for
rapidly distributing directly to the brigades pre-configured loads of
essential sustainment supplies such as food, repair parts, and
ammunition, as they are needed. Before the Army can implement the plan,
it will need to finish the instructions and guidelines that will
identify the types and amounts of supplies to be distributed in
configured loads and the locations and facilities (including defense
supply depots, Stryker brigade installations, and theater support
bases) where configured loads are to be built and stored. The Army also
still will need to identify the personnel and obtain the equipment,
supplies, and funding that will be needed to manage and carry out its
planned configured load distribution system.
Army's Plans for Deploying and Sustaining Stryker Brigades Could
Change:
The Army's current plans for deploying and sustaining Stryker brigades
could change after the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reviews
options it directed the Army to provide for enhancing the brigades'
capabilities. OSD wants the Army to modify the brigades to be more like
the Objective Force units the Army is developing. OSD has directed the
Army to present a plan by July 8, 2003, that provides options for
adding to the brigade's enhanced combined arms capabilities. Currently,
the brigades do not have capabilities such as aviation and air defense.
Such changes would enhance the overall organizational effectiveness of
the brigades, but they also could increase deployment and support
requirements, potentially making the brigades more difficult to deploy
by air and to support.
OSD directed the Army to provide options for enhancing the Stryker
brigades to ensure that they would provide a higher level of combat
capability and sustainability across a broader spectrum of combat
operations than those for which they were originally conceived, along
with the capability of being employed independently of higher-level
command formations and support. According to OSD, this additional
capability will result in Stryker brigades that are more prototypical
of the combined arms Objective Force units the Army is developing and
would enhance the transformation of the Army by fielding added
capabilities sooner. OSD has directed the Army not to expend funds in
fiscal year 2004 for the fifth and sixth Stryker brigades until the
Army presents a plan to provide options for enhancing all but one of
the brigades.[Footnote 11] OSD wants the Army to remodel the brigades
to be distinctively different than their original design, with enhanced
combined arms capabilities that might include aviation, air defense,
sensors, and armor.
Many factors--including the numbers, size, and types of equipment--
affect the Stryker brigades' deployment and logistical support
requirements. Based on the U.S. Transportation Command's deployment-
planning factors, every additional 1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted
reduces aircraft range by 250 nautical miles and adds another 15
aircraft loads. If Stryker brigades were redesigned to include an
aviation unit, for example, transporting the unit's helicopters from
the continental United States to overseas destinations would most
likely need to be done by sea, and it would take days to unload them
after arrival into a theater of operations. In addition, adding
aviation maintenance personnel and the equipment that is needed to
support an aviation unit would also substantially increase deployment
requirements. Once deployed, the requirements for logistical support,
such as fuel and spare parts, would increase well beyond that for which
the Army's current Stryker brigade support plan anticipates.
Furthermore, the Stryker brigades' support structure as currently
designed does not have the levels of supply and support personnel or
the necessary equipment to move and distribute the fuel, spare parts,
and ammunition a brigade would need to support an aviation unit in
combat operations.
Conclusions:
With the Stryker brigades, the Army has achieved its intent to create
rapidly deployable yet lethal forces, but currently the brigades'
requirements for airlift are too large for airlift alone to be a
practical option for strategically deploying an entire brigade within
its goal of 4 days. The Army plans to use some combination of strategic
airlift and sealift, but it has not established strategic deployability
timelines for a Stryker brigade that reflect the modes of
transportation to be used, the wide range of deployment times that vary
in terms of the size of the deployed force, and the brigades' location
and destination. In addition, deployment goals may need further
modification should the brigade's organizational and operational design
significantly change in response to direction from OSD to enhance the
brigade's capabilities. While the 4-day deployment goal has created a
strategic purpose and vision, and is serving as a constructive design
metric for developing the brigades, such a goal is not a realistic
standard by which to measure the considerable progress the Army is
making toward creating more rapidly deployable forces. Without
deployment goals that reflect the wide range of deployment variables
and alternatives, the Army does not have a reasonable baseline from
which to measure its progress toward achieving desired deployment
timelines for Stryker brigades as well as for the future Objective
Force; nor do the theater combatant commanders have information on
expected deployment capabilities they would need in order to plan for
the use of a Stryker brigade in their theater.
Before the first Stryker brigade is certified for overseas deployment,
the Army will need to complete its support plan and make any necessary
adjustments or modifications to the plan based on the results of the
operational evaluation.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army examine alternatives to the
96-hour worldwide deployment goal for Stryker brigades and work with
the U.S. Transportation Command and its components to set realistic
deployment timelines for the brigades that:
* reflect the use of both airlift and sealift, the size of the deployed
force, a brigade's location, and its destination and:
* take into account any organizational or operational changes to the
brigades resulting from modifications and enhancements directed by OSD.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
generally concurred with the report and stated that the Army continues
to maintain 96-hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal for
Stryker brigade deployment, and is working with the U.S. Transportation
Command to reduce constraints that limit the Army's ability to meet the
goal.
In responding to our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army
examine alternatives to the 96-hour worldwide deployment goal for
Stryker brigades and work with the U.S. Transportation Command to set
realistic deployment timelines, the department stated that the Army is
committed to its 96-hour goal as a target that it needs to continue to
work toward in order to provide the necessary capabilities to combat
commanders within required response times. The department noted that
achieving this goal requires a concerted effort on the part of all
services and the U.S. Transportation Command to ensure that enroute
constraints are reduced. We agree that the 96-hour goal is a useful
longer-term target and that the Army should continue to work in concert
with the Transportation Command and the other services to achieve it.
However, we continue to believe other alternatives to the 96-hour goal
should be considered for measuring progress in the near-term. As we
noted in the report, the Army cannot currently air deploy a Stryker
brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours and if sealift were used
to deploy the Stryker brigades, deployment times would be significantly
longer than the 96-hour deployment goal. We believe that without
deployment timelines reflecting near-term deployment variables and
alternatives, such as brigade locations and the use of sealift, the
Army does not have a reasonable baseline from which to measure its
progress toward achieving its 96-hour deployment goal; nor do the
combatant commanders have information on expected Stryker brigade
deployment capabilities. Thus, we continue to believe our
recommendation has merit.
In responding to our recommendation for setting realistic deployment
timelines for Stryker brigades that take into account organizational or
operational changes to the brigades resulting from any modifications
and enhancements directed by OSD, the department said the Army should
maintain its 96-hour deployment goal, as it is a goal and not a
deployment standard. The department also noted that when the results of
the OSD-mandated study are approved and published, the Army would work
with the combatant commanders and the U.S. Transportation Command to
update the standing contingency plans. We agree the Army should work
with the combatant commanders and the U.S. Transportation Command to
update contingency plans based on the final outcome of the OSD-mandated
study. However, if the results of the study significantly increase the
Stryker brigades' deployment and logistical support requirements, the
Army would need to reexamine brigade deployment goals as we have
recommended.
Appendix I contains the full text of the department's comments.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Army's progress in meeting its 96-hour deployment goal
for Stryker brigades, we obtained documents and interviewed officials
from the U.S. Transportation Command, the Air Mobility Command, and the
Military Traffic Management Command. To determine Stryker brigade air
deployment times and airlift allocation estimates, we used data from a
U.S. Transportation Command's air mobility deployment analysis
conducted for the Army in April 2002. To determine sea deployment
times, we analyzed data from the Military Traffic Management Command's
Transportation Engineering Agency. In addition, we interviewed
officials and obtained documents from the Army's Deployment Process
Management Office and from Army headquarters staff elements responsible
for operations and plans and logistics. We performed site visits to
Stryker brigade home installations at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort
Richardson and Fort Wainwright, Alaska; we also interviewed U.S. Army I
Corps and U.S. Army Alaska and Garrison Command officials at these
locations. We also toured deployment processing and airfield facilities
and obtained information about infrastructure improvements planned at
these locations to validate key assumptions of the U.S. Transportation
Command's air mobility analysis regarding air deployment infrastructure
capabilities. We did not visit Fort Polk, Louisiana; Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii; or the Pennsylvania National Guard. These locations
are the last three of the six-planned Stryker brigades that are to be
formed from 2006 through 2010. Because it is not planned to become
operational until 2010, we excluded from our review the planned
Pennsylvania National Guard Stryker brigade. We also did not consider
possible future developments in lift assets such as High Speed Vessels
or Ultra Heavy Lift Aircraft in our assessment of Stryker brigade
deployability.
To obtain information on the Army's plan for supporting Stryker
brigades in combat operations, we analyzed Army information on the
organizational design and operational concepts for Stryker brigades to
gain an understanding of the logistical challenges of supporting and
sustaining the brigades. We interviewed officials at Fort Lewis and
U.S. Army Alaska for information relating to support and sustainment
plans for the first three Stryker brigades. In addition, we reviewed
documents and interviewed officials from Army headquarters staff
elements responsible for operations and plans, logistics, and force
development. We also interviewed and obtained documents from the Army's
Forces Command, the Combined Arms Support Command, and the Tank-
automotive and Armaments Command to learn about support and sustainment
options for the Stryker brigades.
Our review was conducted from April 2002 through March 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, and the Director of Management and Budget. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald
L. Furr, Jr.; Kevin C. Handley; Karyn I. Angulo; Pat L. Seaton; Frank
C. Smith; and Susan K. Woodward.
William M. Solis
Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by William M. Solis:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
JUN 23 2003:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: Realistic Deployment Timelines
Needed for Army Stryker Brigades," dated May 28, 2003 (GAO Code
350163IGAO-03801).
The Department generally concurs with the report. The Army continues to
maintain the 96-hour worldwide deployment as an overall program goal
for Stryker deployment, and is working with the U.S. Transportation
Command to reduce constraints that limit the Army's:
ability to meet that goal. Detailed DoD comments on the draft GAO
recommendations are provided in the enclosure. The DoD appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Beckett:
Principal Assistant:
Signed by Allen W. Beckett:
Attachment As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MAY 28, 2003 GAO CODE 350163/GAO-03-801:
"MILITARY TRANSFORMATION" Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for
Army Stryker Brigades":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army
examine alternatives to the 96-hour worldwide deployment goal for
Stryker brigades and work with the U. S. Transportation Command and its
components to set realistic deployment timelines for the brigades that
reflect the use of both airlift and sealift, the size of the deployed
force, a brigade's location, and its destination. (p. 18/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DOD partially concurs. The Department agrees that the 96-
hour goal should not be construed as a standard. The 96-hour goal is a
target the Army needs to continue to work to achieve in order to
provide the necessary capabilities to Combatant Commanders within the
required response times that they set. The Army is committed to its 96-
hour goal to ensure that the Army is capable of meeting any Combatant
Commanders' deployment requirement. Achieving this goal requires a
concerted effort on the part of all services and U. S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) to ensure that enroute constraints are reduced.
Examples of these constraints include the number of "hot pads"
available at aerial points of embarkation (APOEs), most on the ground
(MOG) constraints at Aerial Points of Debarkation (APODs), and the
inability to position the Global Reach package (refueling, tanker
airlift control element (TALCE), maintenance). The Army and TRANSCOM
continue to pursue methods of overcoming these barriers.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army
examine alternatives to the 96-hour worldwide deployment goal for
Stryker brigades and work with the U. S. Transportation Command and its
components to set realistic deployment timelines for the brigades that
take into account any organizational or operational changes to the
brigades resulting from modifications and enhancements directed by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. (p. 18/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Army should maintain its 96-hour
deployment goal as it is a goal and not a deployment standard. As the
draft report states, the 96-hour goal has provided a most useful
"forcing function" to define and shape the Interim Force, contributing
to the Army's developing more rapidly deployable forces. The Army
remains focused on its requirement to provide the necessary combat
capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in 96 hours. The Army
continues to pursue remedies to reducing constraints as mentioned above
with TRANSCOM. When the results of the OSD-mandated study are approved
and published, the Army will work with the Combatant Commanders and
TRANSCOM to update the standing contingency plans.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Stryker Brigade Locations and Planned Initial Operational
Capability Dates:
Brigade: 1; Location: Fort Lewis, Washington; Planned initial
operational capability dates: 2003.
Brigade: 2; Location: Fort Lewis, Washington; Planned initial
operational capability dates: 2004.
Brigade: 3; Location: Fort Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska; Planned
initial operational capability dates: 2005.
Brigade: 4; Location: Fort Polk, Louisiana; Planned initial operational
capability dates: 2006.
Brigade: 5; Location: Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Planned initial
operational capability dates: 2007.
Brigade: 6; Location: Pennsylvania National Guard; Planned initial
operational capability dates: 2010.
[End of table]
Source: U.S. Army.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Air Deployment Times By Origin
and Destination:
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Brigade no.: 1 & 2;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Origin installation and
airport: Ft. Lewis/; McChord Air Force Base; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: 5.3; Destinations and air deployment times in
days: South America: Venezuela: 6.7; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: West Africa: 13.4; Destinations and air deployment times
in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 13.6; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 13.9; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: South Asia: 8.1; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: South Pacific: 7.3; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: Europe: 6.3.
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Brigade no.: 3;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Origin installation and
airport: Ft. Wainwright/; Eielson Air Force Base; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: 5.6; Destinations and air deployment times in
days: South America: Venezuela: 5.6; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: West Africa: 13.6; Destinations and air deployment times
in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 13.7; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 14.0; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: South Asia: 7.3; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: South Pacific: 7.0; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: Europe: 5.9.
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Brigade no.: 3;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Origin installation and
airport: Ft. Richardson/; Elmendorf Air Force Base; Destinations and
air deployment times in days: 5.6; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: South America: Venezuela: 5.6; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: West Africa: 13.6; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 13.7; Destinations and
air deployment times in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 14.0;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: South Asia: 7.3;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: South Pacific: 7.0;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Europe: 5.6.
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Brigade no.: 4;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Origin installation and
airport: Ft. Polk/; Alexandria Airport; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: 5.1; Destinations and air deployment times in days:
South America: Venezuela: 5.2; Destinations and air deployment times in
days: West Africa: 13.2; Destinations and air deployment times in days:
Sub-Saharan Africa: 13.3; Destinations and air deployment times in
days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 13.6; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: South Asia: 9.7; Destinations and air deployment times
in days: South Pacific: 8.2; Destinations and air deployment times in
days: Europe: 5.6.
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Brigade no.: 5;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Origin installation and
airport: Schofield Barracks/; Hickam Air Force Base; Destinations and
air deployment times in days: 5.6; Destinations and air deployment
times in days: South America: Venezuela: 5.6; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: West Africa: 13.7; Destinations and air
deployment times in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 14.0; Destinations and
air deployment times in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 14.1;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: South Asia: 7.5;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: South Pacific: 6.9;
Destinations and air deployment times in days: Europe: 6.9.
Source: GAO's analysis of U.S. Transportation Command data.
Note: Air deployment time is from the first aircrafts' wheels-up at an
aerial port of embarkation to the last aircrafts' wheels-down at an
aerial port of debarkation.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Stryker Brigade Sea Deployment Times by Origin
and Destination:
Destinations and sailing time in days: Brigade no.: 1 & 2; Destinations
and sailing time in days: Origin installation and airport: Ft. Lewis/;
Seattle-Tacoma, Wash.; Destinations and sailing time in days: 9.5;
Destinations and sailing time in days: South America: Venezuela: 10.5;
Destinations and sailing time in days: West Africa: 17.3; Destinations
and sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 21.3; Destinations and
sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 20.4; Destinations and
sailing time in days: South Asia: 18.3; Destinations and sailing time
in days: South Pacific: 13.2; Destinations and sailing time in days:
Europe: 21.5.
Destinations and sailing time in days: Brigade no.: 3; Destinations and
sailing time in days: Origin installation and airport: Ft. Wainwright &
Ft. Richardson/; Anchorage, Alaska; Destinations and sailing time in
days: 12.0; Destinations and sailing time in days: South America:
Venezuela: 12.9; Destinations and sailing time in days: West Africa:
19.8; Destinations and sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 23.8;
Destinations and sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 22.9;
Destinations and sailing time in days: South Asia: 16.5; Destinations
and sailing time in days: South Pacific: 11.9; Destinations and sailing
time in days: Europe: 24.0.
Destinations and sailing time in days: Brigade no.: 4; Destinations and
sailing time in days: Origin installation and airport: Ft. Polk/;
Beaumont, Tex.; Destinations and sailing time in days: 4.0;
Destinations and sailing time in days: South America: Venezuela: 4.3;
Destinations and sailing time in days: West Africa: 10.3; Destinations
and sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 14.4; Destinations and
sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 13.4; Destinations and
sailing time in days: South Asia: 21.4; Destinations and sailing time
in days: South Pacific: 20.5; Destinations and sailing time in days:
Europe: 13.5.
Destinations and sailing time in days: Brigade no.: 5; Destinations and
sailing time in days: Origin installation and airport: Schofield
Barracks/; Honolulu, Hawaii; Destinations and sailing time in days:
10.7; Destinations and sailing time in days: South America: Venezuela:
11.6; Destinations and sailing time in days: West Africa: 18.5;
Destinations and sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: 22.5;
Destinations and sailing time in days: Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo: 21.5;
Destinations and sailing time in days: South Asia: 15.8; Destinations
and sailing time in days: South Pacific: 8.2; Destinations and sailing
time in days: Europe: 22.7.
Source: GAO's analysis of Military Traffic Management Command,
Transportation Engineering Agency data.
Note: Sea deployment times are sailing days from a port of embarkation
to arrival at an overseas port of debarkation.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3
Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily
Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should
Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28,
2003.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 16, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems
Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Army plans to establish six Stryker brigades. Appendix II lists
the brigades' locations and their planned initial operational
capability dates.
[2] Beginning in 2010 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to
transition to its Objective Force. The Objective Force is the force
that achieves the objectives of the Army's transformation. This future
force will capitalize on advances in science and technology enabling
the Army to equip its forces with significantly advanced systems such
as the Future Combat System.
[3] The U.S. Transportation Command and its component commands (Air
Mobility Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military
Sealift Command) manage the Department of Defense's transportation
system.
[4] Strategic mobility is the movement of forces over long distances,
such as from the continental United States to overseas locations.
Tactical mobility is the movement of forces in an operational
environment over shorter distances within an operational theater.
[5] The operational evaluation was mandated by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).
[6] In air operations, a sortie is defined as an operational flight by
one aircraft.
[7] For the purpose of our analysis of deployment times we used four of
the five current and planned brigade locations--Fort Lewis, Alaska,
Fort Polk, and Hawaii. We treated the Alaska brigade as one brigade
location, although this brigade will be split-based between Fort
Richardson and Fort Wainwright. The bulk of the brigade is to be
located at Fort Wainwright. We did not include the planned Pennsylvania
National Guard brigade because it is not expected to become operational
until 2010.
[8] Some of the significant strategic air mobility and aircraft
allocation assumptions the U.S. Transportation Command used in its
analysis include the Stryker brigade is the primary airlift claimant in
a surge operation; the airlift fleet does not include aircraft withheld
for maintenance, high priority missions, or training; air mobility
infrastructure will support 20-minute departure intervals; and
sufficient reserve augmentation is available to provide support for
increased airlift requirements.
[9] According to Air Force budget documents, these are the total
numbers of C-17 and C-5 aircraft expected to be in the Air Force's
aircraft inventory through 2005.
[10] According to the U.S. Transportation Command, this allocation is a
reasonable approximation of the airlift a Stryker brigade could claim
if it was the principal ground force to move early in a small-scale
contingency operation.
[11] The fourth Stryker brigade will be the 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment (Light) located at Fort Polk, Louisiana. According to Army
plans, this brigade is already being designed to have some of the
combined arms capabilities that OSD wants the Army to add to the five
other brigades.
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