Defense Management
Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness Gao ID: GAO-03-753 July 7, 2003The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion is causing military assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful life. The resulting increase in required repairs and replacements drives up costs and takes critical systems out of action, reducing mission readiness. GAO was asked to review military activities related to corrosion control. Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact of corrosion on DOD and the military services and the extent of the effectiveness of DOD's and the services' approach to preventing and mitigating corrosion.
Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services, current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion has a substantial impact on military equipment and infrastructure. In 2001, a government-sponsored study estimated the costs of corrosion for military systems and infrastructure at about $20 billion annually and found corrosion to be one of the largest components of life-cycle costs for weapon systems. Corrosion also reduces readiness because the need to repair or replace corrosion damage increases the downtime of critical military assets. For example, a recent study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army's approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. Finally, a number of serious safety concerns have also been associated with corrosion, including Navy F-14 and F-18 landing gear failures during carrier operations and crashes of several Air Force F-16 aircraft due to the corrosion of electrical contacts that control fuel valves. DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. They have had some successes in addressing corrosion problems on individual programs, but several weaknesses are preventing DOD and the military services from achieving much greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars in additional net savings annually. Each service has multiple corrosion offices, and their different policies, procedures, and funding channels limit coordination. Also, the goals and incentives that guide these offices sometimes conflict with those of the operational commands that they rely on to fund project implementation. As a result, proposed projects are often assigned a lower priority compared to efforts offering more immediate results. Together, these problems reduce the effectiveness of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion control activity and strategy, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will effectively address these weaknesses.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-753, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness
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Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2003:
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT:
Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness:
GAO-03-753:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-753, a report to Congressional Committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure
worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion is
causing military assets to deteriorate, shortening their useful life.
The resulting increase in required repairs and replacements drives up
costs and takes critical systems out of action, reducing mission
readiness.
GAO was asked to review military activities related to corrosion
control. Specifically, this report examines the extent of the impact
of corrosion on DOD and the military services and the extent of the
effectiveness of DOD‘s and the services‘ approach to preventing and
mitigating corrosion.
what GAO Found:
Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military
services, current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate
that corrosion has a substantial impact on military equipment and
infrastructure. In 2001, a government-sponsored study estimated the
costs of corrosion for military systems and infrastructure at about
$20 billion annually and found corrosion to be one of the largest
components of life-cycle costs for weapon systems. Corrosion also
reduces readiness because the need to repair or replace corrosion
damage increases the downtime of critical military assets. For
example, a recent study concluded that corrective maintenance of
corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the
Army‘s approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters. Finally, a
number of serious safety concerns have also been associated with
corrosion, including Navy F-14 and F-18 landing gear failures during
carrier operations and crashes of several Air Force F-16 aircraft due
to the corrosion of electrical contacts that control fuel valves.
DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to
prevent and mitigate corrosion. They have had some successes in
addressing corrosion problems on individual programs, but several
weaknesses are preventing DOD and the military services from achieving
much greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars in
additional net savings annually. Each service has multiple corrosion
offices, and their different policies, procedures, and funding
channels limit coordination. Also, the goals and incentives that guide
these offices sometimes conflict with those of the operational
commands that they rely on to fund project implementation. As a
result, proposed projects are often assigned a lower priority compared
to efforts offering more immediate results. Together, these problems
reduce the effectiveness of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in
the process of establishing a central corrosion control activity and
strategy, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will effectively
address these weaknesses.
What GAO Recommends:
The departmentwide strategic plan currently being developed should
contain clearly defined goals; measurable, outcome-oriented
objectives; and performance measures. The strategy should also
identify standardized methods for evaluating project proposals,
estimating resource needs, and coordinating projects in an
interservice and servicewide context. The military services should
develop overarching strategic plans consistent with the departmentwide
plan. In written comments, DOD agreed with all of these
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-753.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact William Solis at
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Impacts on Military Costs, Readiness, and Safety Indicate That
Corrosion Is an Extensive Problem:
DOD and Services' Approach to Corrosion Control Is Not Effective
but Has Achieved Some Successes:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have Not
Realized Their Full Potential:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Figures:
Figure 1: Corrosion on Army 5-Ton Truck in Hawaii:
Figure 2: Corroding Bridge Columns at Naval Station Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii:
Figure 3: Corrosion on Army UH-60L Black Hawk Helicopter:
Figure 4: Corroded 500-Pound Bombs at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam:
Figure 5: Cracked Runway at Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California:
Figure 6: Marine Corps Helicopter Rinsing Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii:
Figure 7: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation:
Figure 8: K-Span Shelter at Army Reserve Unit Fort Shafter, Hawaii:
Figure 9: Corroded Connectors on Air Force F-16 Main Fuel Shutoff
Valve:
Figure 10: Corrosion Inhibitor Application Facility at Army's Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii:
Figure 11: Corrosion on High Temperature Pipelines at Air Force Tracking
Facility Antigua, West Indies:
Figure 12: Corroded Air-Conditioning Valves at Quantico Marine Corps
Base, Virginia:
Abbreviations:
ASPRCS: Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and Corrosion Study:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
HMMWV: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles:
Letter July 7, 2003:
The Honorable John Ensign
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel Akaka
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains equipment and infrastructure
worth billions of dollars in many environments where corrosion, in one
form or another, is causing military assets to deteriorate, shortening
their useful lives. The resulting increase in needed repairs and
replacements drives up costs and takes critical systems out of action,
reducing mission readiness.[Footnote 1] Corrosion can also create
severe safety hazards leading to loss of life when, for example,
corroded electrical contacts in aircraft cause system failures during
flight. Because numerous advances in products and technologies have
been found to enhance efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion, it is
critical that DOD, as the steward of an enormous investment in military
assets, ensure that all appropriate measures are implemented to reduce
corrosion costs to the greatest extent possible.
The Congress, recognizing corrosion as a serious military concern,
enacted legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 which requires DOD to designate
a senior official or organization responsible for preventing and
mitigating the corrosion of military equipment and
infrastructure.[Footnote 2] The act requires the designated official or
organization to oversee and coordinate efforts throughout the
department, recommend policy guidance, and review the funding levels
proposed by each military service. The Secretary of Defense is required
to develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce the effects
of corrosion.
You requested that we review military activities related to the
prevention and mitigation of corrosion. In this report we address the
following questions: (1) What is the extent of the impact of corrosion
on the military services' equipment and facilities? (2) To what extent
do DOD and the military services have an effective approach to prevent
and mitigate corrosion?
To respond to these questions, we reviewed numerous studies and
discussed military corrosion impact issues with experts in and outside
DOD. To examine DOD and the military services' approach to corrosion
prevention and mitigation, we visited field installations and developed
several case studies on specific corrosion prevention and mitigation
efforts that are summarized in appendix II and referred to throughout
the report. More detailed information about our scope and methodology
is contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military
services, data on current cost estimates,[Footnote 3] readiness, and
safety indicate that corrosion has a substantial impact on military
equipment and infrastructure. For example, in 2001, a 2-year,
government-sponsored study estimated the direct costs of corrosion for
military systems and infrastructure at approximately $20 billion
annually and found corrosion to be one of the largest components of
life-cycle costs for military weapon systems.[Footnote 4] Another study
puts the cost at closer to $10 billion.[Footnote 5] Corrosion has also
been shown to substantially increase equipment downtime, thereby
reducing readiness. For example, a 2001 study concluded that corrective
maintenance of corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of
all of the Army's approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters;
the Army estimated in 1998 that approximately $4 billion was spent on
corrosion repair of helicopters alone. In 2001, DOD also reported that
more than two thirds of its military facilities have serious
deficiencies and are in such poor condition that they are unable to
meet certain mission requirements; corrosion was identified as a major
contributor to much of this deterioration. Finally, a number of safety
concerns have also been associated with corrosion. During the 1980s,
the crashes of several F-16 aircraft were traced to corroded electrical
contacts that caused uncommanded fuel valve closures. More recently,
Navy F-14 and F-18 aircraft have experienced landing gear failures
(collapses) during carrier operations that were attributed to
corrosion-related cracking.
DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to
prevent and mitigate corrosion. While the military services have
achieved some successes on individual corrosion prevention projects,
their overall approach to corrosion control has significant weaknesses
that have decreased the effectiveness of their efforts. For example,
DOD does not have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and
mitigation, and the services have either not developed such plans or
have not implemented them. While DOD is in the process of establishing
a central corrosion control office, no single office exists within each
of the military services to manage corrosion control over equipment and
infrastructure. Instead, each service has multiple corrosion offices
within various operational units and weapon systems programs. These
offices often have different policies, procedures, and funding channels
that limit coordination and standardization. In many cases, corrosion
control officials were not aware of the activities and achievements of
their counterparts in other commands and across the services. Further,
corrosion control offices act largely in an advisory role and are
guided by goals and incentives that sometimes conflict with those of
the operational commands that they rely on to fund project
implementation. As a result, many proposed projects--even those with
the potential for very large future-year cost savings--are often
assigned a low funding priority compared to operations and repair
projects offering more immediate results. These weaknesses combine to
reduce the overall effectiveness of DOD's approach to corrosion control
and result in the services missing important opportunities to achieve
greater benefits, including potentially billions of dollars in
additional net savings annually that would accrue from a long-term
reduction in corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure.
To strengthen DOD's approach to corrosion control, we are recommending
that it define and incorporate into its long-term corrosion mitigation
strategy measurable, outcome-oriented objectives and performance
measures that show progress toward achieving results. In addition, we
are recommending that the strategy include a number of elements to
address problems and limitations we identified in current corrosion
prevention efforts. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD
generally concurred with all our recommendations. The department also
provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
Background:
Corrosion affects all military assets, including approximately
350,000 ground and tactical vehicles, 15,000 aircraft and helicopters,
1,000 strategic missiles, and 300 ships. Maintenance activities--
including corrosion control--involve nearly 700,000 military (active
and reserve) and DOD civilian personnel, as well as several thousand
commercial firms worldwide. Hundreds of thousands of additional mission
support assets and thousands of facilities are also affected.
Corrosion is defined as the unintended destruction or deterioration of
a material due to interaction with the environment. It includes such
varied forms as rusting; pitting; galvanic reaction; calcium or other
mineral build up; degradation due to ultraviolet light exposure; and
mold, mildew, or other organic decay. It can be either readily visible
or microscopic. Factors influencing the development and rate of
corrosion include the type and design of the material, the presence of
electrolytes (water, minerals, and salts), the availability of oxygen,
the ambient temperature, and the amount of exposure to the environment.
The rate of corrosion increases exponentially when the ambient humidity
is over 50 percent. Corrosion can also occur in the absence of water,
but only at high temperatures, such as in gas turbine engines.
The effects of corrosion on DOD equipment and infrastructure have
become more prominent as the acquisition of new equipment has slowed
and more reliance is placed on the service of aging equipment and
infrastructure. The aging of military systems poses a unique challenge
for maintenance and corrosion control for all services.[Footnote 6]
A number of DOD and commercial studies have identified and evaluated
technologies and techniques for corrosion prevention and control. The
studies indicate that although effective corrosion prevention and
control methods and technologies are well known and have been
recommended for years, they have not been implemented effectively. The
studies also identify a number of relatively simple solutions--such as
covered storage, controlled environment, washing and rinsing, spray-on
rust inhibitors, and protective wrapping--to mitigate and control the
effects of corrosion.
Congress has recognized the need to significantly reduce the economic
burden on the military services of the damage caused by corrosion and
of the efforts to mitigate its adverse affects. In November 2002,
Congress passed the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003, which required the Department of Defense to take the
following steps:
* Designate a responsible official or organization within the
department to (1) oversee and coordinate corrosion prevention and
mitigation of military equipment and infrastructure; (2) develop and
recommend policy guidance; (3) review programs and funding levels; and
(4) provide oversight and coordination of the efforts to incorporate
corrosion control during the design, acquisition, and maintenance of
military equipment and infrastructure.
* Develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and
the effects of corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure
of the Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of the act.
* Submit to Congress an Interim Report regarding the actions taken to
date by the corrosion control office when the President submits the
budget for fiscal year 2004. On May 22, 2003, DOD submitted the report.
Impacts on Military Costs, Readiness, and Safety Indicate That
Corrosion Is an Extensive Problem:
Numerous studies in recent years have documented the pervasive nature
of corrosion and its various effects on military equipment and
infrastructure. Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be
quantified due to the limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD
and the military services, current cost estimates, readiness, and
safety data indicate that corrosion has a substantial effect on
military equipment and infrastructure. Costs are significant because
corroded military assets must often be repaired or replaced at great
expense. Readiness is also severely impaired because corrosion
increases the maintenance needed and, therefore, the downtime on a
large quantities of military equipment. The effects extend to
infrastructure, which, in turn, has an adverse impact on the military's
ability to meet mission requirements. Further, corrosion has an equally
profound effect on the safety of equipment and infrastructure.
Corrosion Costs Appear to Be Enormous:
Corrosion's impact on military costs appears to be enormous,
representing one of the largest life-cycle cost components of military
weapon systems. In a 2001 government-sponsored study, corrosion is
estimated to cost the Department of Defense at least $20 billion a
year. Another study done in 1996 puts the cost at closer to $10 billion
annually. The costs identified in these reports are direct costs such
as the manpower and material that are used primarily to inspect and
repair damage resulting from corrosion. However, there are also
indirect costs that, were they to be quantified, would significantly
increase the total reported costs. Indirect costs include the loss of
the opportunity to use equipment that is not in operating condition.
Although extensive equipment downtime results from corrosion, the
attendant financial impacts have not been fully captured. Even more
difficult to quantify is the cost of using equipment that, while not
inoperable, has diminished utility due to corrosion. Considering the
enormous total value of all of the equipment owned by the military
services, these costs are considerable, to say the least. Corrosion
also shortens the service life and accelerates the depreciation of DOD
facilities, which in a recent GAO report are estimated to have a
replacement value of over $435 billion.[Footnote 7] This impact on
facilities translates into costs that are not included in the
government corrosion cost study.
There are numerous examples of how profoundly corrosion affects costs.
For example, in 1993, the Army estimated spending about $2 billion to
$2.5 billion a year to mitigate the corrosion of wheeled vehicles,
including 5-ton trucks.[Footnote 8] (See fig. 1.):
Figure 1: Corrosion on Army 5-Ton Truck in Hawaii:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Corrosion was found to be so extensive on some of the trucks that the
repair costs were greater than 65 percent of the average cost of a new
vehicle. Cost impacts appear to be even greater on Army helicopters, as
evidenced by a 1998 analysis estimating costs of about $4 billion to
repair damage attributed to corrosion.[Footnote 9] Corrosion is also a
formidable cost driver to the Navy. As an illustration, the Navy's
Pacific and Atlantic Fleets estimate that about 25 percent of their
total combined annual maintenance budget is directed to the prevention
and correction of corrosion. Navy officials told us that the prevention
and removal of corrosion on shipboard tanks alone costs the Navy over
$174 million a year. Navy facilities such as waterfront structures are
also decaying because of corrosion, and these facilities will need to
be replaced at considerable cost. For example, naval military
construction projects estimated to cost $727 million are required to
restore 20 piers that have suffered extensive corrosion damage.
(See fig. 2.):
Figure 2: Corroding Bridge Columns at Naval Station Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In 1990, the Air Force estimated the cost of corrosion to be about
$700 million. Interestingly, even though the number of operational
Air Force aircraft decreased significantly, corrosion costs for the
Air Force increased to over $1 billion by 2001,[Footnote 10] or
$300 million more than previously reported.
Corrosion Substantially Degrades Equipment and Facilities Readiness:
Corrosion has been shown to substantially increase equipment downtime,
thereby reducing readiness. Whether it affects a truck, helicopter,
ship, or pipeline, corrosion is a major contributor to the amount of
maintenance required on military equipment and infrastructure.
Depending on the kind and severity of corrosion, the maintenance may be
performed as part of the scheduled maintenance cycle or as emergency
repairs, especially when it involves safety concerns. Whether scheduled
or not, maintenance translates into equipment downtime. As a result,
readiness is diminished because the equipment cannot be used for
training purposes or for other kinds of operations. In addition,
corrosion contributes to or accelerates the deterioration of equipment
and, therefore, reduces its service life. As a result, the condition of
some equipment is assessed to have deteriorated beyond repair
capability and the equipment is no longer usable.
The effects on readiness are extensive throughout the military
services, and they are clearly evidenced in regard to military
aircraft. For example, a 2001 study concluded that corrective
maintenance of corrosion-related faults has degraded the readiness of
all of the Army's approximately 2,450 force modernization helicopters.
(See fig. 3.):
Figure 3: Corrosion on Army UH-60L Black Hawk Helicopter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The effects on the Air Force's KC-135 are particularly pronounced, with
corrosion identified as the reason for over 50 percent of the
maintenance needed on the aircraft. While the Air Force has yet to
quantify the total impact, one study identified corrosion of avionics
equipment contacts to be a significant cause of failure rates on all
Air Force aircraft. Because these failure rates affect equipment that
is sophisticated and often occurs in hard-to-access areas, a
significant amount of time is needed for testing, inspection, and
repair. This extends aircraft downtime and reduces readiness levels.
Corrosion has also reduced the readiness levels for the Navy's P-3C
aircraft. According to Navy officials, corrosion has always been
responsible for a large part of maintenance required for the aircraft,
but the amount has doubled in recent years. While these officials do
not have specific information regarding the effects of corrosion, they
did note that in just the past year they had to ground two aircraft
specifically because of severe corrosion.
The effects on readiness extend well beyond aviation and include
virtually every type of equipment maintained and operated by the
military. Corrosion also severely affects the readiness of other types
of equipment, such as Army vehicles. In 1996, the Army identified
corrosion as the reason why 17 percent of its trucks located in Hawaii
were not mission capable. Earlier in 1993, the availability of the
Army's High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) had been
particularly diminished because of corrosion. While some of the
vehicles were out of service for as long as a year, others had such
severe corrosion that they had to be scrapped after 5 years, many years
short of their expected 15-year service life. The Air Force also
identified severe corrosion on its ground vehicles, resulting
in increased maintenance and downtime. Some of the vehicles showed
significant deterioration just months after being delivered to field
units.
Corrosion and its impact on readiness are especially a concern for the
Navy, because its ships operate in highly corrosive salt water and in
high-humidity locations. A notable example of these effects occurred in
2001 on the aircraft carrier USS John F Kennedy. Maintenance problems,
including many that were corrosion-related, were so severe that the
carrier could not complete its planned operations. Even more recently,
the carrier USS Kitty Hawk returned from a series of deployments,
including Operation Enduring Freedom, with significant maintenance
problems that also included topside corrosion. As a result, the carrier
is expected to undergo extensive maintenance.
Such effects are found Navy-wide, and the Navy estimates that about
25 percent of its fleet maintenance budget goes toward corrosion
prevention and control. This and other kinds of maintenance are largely
completed at a Navy depot and require an average of 6 months. During
this extended period of time, the ship is not available for service.
The amount of time the ship is in the depot is due in part to the
repairs needed because of corrosion; Navy officials told us this amount
of corrosion-related maintenance is understated because it does not
include the vast amount of manpower and resources spent on corrosion
removal and repainting while the ships are on operations. These
repairs, too, have an impact on readiness, because crew members who
would normally be undergoing training or other kinds of operations are,
instead, required to perform maintenance.
Corrosion also impairs the readiness of military armament. For example,
the Army reported a significant number of failures due to corrosion on
the 155 mm medium-towed howitzer so severe that they resulted in
aborted missions. The study estimates that between 30 to 40 percent of
the aborts are direct results of corrosion. Corrosion is also
identified as accounting for 39 percent of all unscheduled maintenance
for the howitzer, further reducing the readiness levels of the
equipment. In addition, corrosion has affected the readiness of the Air
Force's general purpose iron bombs. (See fig. 4.):
Figure 4: Corroded 500-Pound Bombs at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to Air Force records, of the approximately 450,000 bombs of
this type in the Air Force inventory, more than 107,000 (or over
24 percent) have varying levels of deterioration caused by corrosion
and, as a result, are not mission capable. While many of these bombs
are repairable, a certain level of maintenance is needed to restore
most of them to acceptable operational condition. Some of the bombs,
however, are too severely corroded to be salvageable.
Military facilities are also decaying due to corrosion and, as a
result, readiness is affected adversely. In 2001, the Department of
Defense reported that more than two-thirds of its military facilities
have serious deficiencies and are in such poor condition that they are
unable to meet certain mission requirements. The department identifies
corrosion as a major contributor to much of this deterioration.
According to military service officials, the most significant area of
concern may be the condition of military airfields. Each of the
military services has reported runway cracking so severe that the
runways were judged unusable. Deterioration of this kind was even
identified in airfields used for operations during Enduring Freedom.
For example, runway cracks at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, were
so extensive that several C-130 cargo planes and A-10 fighters heading
for Afghanistan were diverted to other U.S. installations. Further,
Navy facilities officials told us that infrastructure deterioration is
so significant that it has adverse impacts on the service's ability to
perform required maintenance on its equipment. For example, they said
that parts of the ceiling of an aircraft hanger located at North Island
Naval Air Station, California, had crumbled as a result of corrosion.
Because of the safety hazard and potential damage to aircraft, the
hanger had to be closed down for several months for repairs and the
aircraft relocated to other storage facilities. Corrosion of facilities
and the impacts on readiness go well beyond problems experienced at
airfields and hangars. The Pacific Air Force Command cited corrosion as
the cause of failures of numerous critical infrastructure, including
aircraft refueling, fire protection, electrical, and command and
control facilities. The Command noted that this kind of deterioration
can significantly impact its ability to perform its mission.
Corrosion Poses Numerous Safety Risks:
Corrosion also poses numerous safety risks and is a source of major
concern to all military services. This concern is particularly acute
when associated with the safety of military aircraft. According to an
Army study, from 1989 through 2000 the Army experienced 46 mishaps,
9 fatalities, and 13 injuries directly related to corrosion. During
calendar year 2001, the Army issued four Safety of Flight messages for
its rotary wing systems due to corrosion-related material deficiencies
that adversely affected 2,100, or over 88 percent, of its force
modernization helicopters. As recently as March 2002, the Navy
suspended carrier operations for F-14 aircraft when one aircraft
crashed because its landing gear collapsed due to corrosion. Just 2
years earlier, the Navy had identified corrosion as the cause of a
landing gear failure on a F-18 that occurred during carrier operations.
Despite regular inspections, stress cracking in the landing gear evaded
detection, and the problem was not revealed until after the accident
when the equipment was examined under an electron microscope. Perhaps
even more difficult to detect, but nevertheless just as significant,
are the safety risks corrosion presents on F-16 avionics connectors.
This aircraft has sophisticated electronics equipment that is housed in
Line Replaceable Units. Although these containers provide considerable
protection from the elements, they cannot entirely eliminate moisture
from entering, and even microscopic amounts of moisture can cause
catastrophic accidents. For example, during the 1980s, uncommanded fuel
valve closures caused several F-16 aircraft crashes. The equipment
failures were believed to be the result of corrosion on the
avionics connectors.
Corrosion also poses major safety hazards at military facilities.
Perhaps the greatest safety risk, according to facilities officials, is
the cracking of concrete runways at airfields operated by all of the
military services. (See fig. 5.):
Figure 5: Cracked Runway at Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
One of the causes of this deterioration results from a corrosive
chemical process called alkali-silica reaction, which occurs when
alkalis react with water in ways that cause cracking, chipping, and
expansion of concrete. As airfields continue to decay and crumble, more
pieces of concrete are left on the runway, and these pieces have been
absorbed by military aircraft and cited as the causes of innumerable
aircraft safety incidents and accidents. Airfield cracking due to
corrosion and the safety risk that it presents is so extensive that all
the military services have experienced serious incidents resulting from
this hazard. Examples of this kind of damage have been reported at Osan
Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army Airfield, Kentucky; Naval Air
Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni,
Japan. The foreign object debris hazard was so severe at the Little
Rock Air Force Base that the Air Mobility Command assessed a taxiway as
unsuitable for operations. At Naval Air Station Pensacola, several
recent incidents were reported of Navy aircraft penetrating cracked
airfield pavement and jeopardizing pilot safety.
Pipelines that contain natural gas and other kinds of fuel also pose a
safety risk at military facilities. A majority of the pipelines are
quite old and are constructed largely of metal that is susceptible to
corrosion, which is the major cause of pipeline ruptures. Air Force
facilities officials told us that some of the pipelines were installed
as far back as the 1950s, and older pipelines pose an even greater
hazard because they have a higher probability of rupturing from
corrosion. The services are gradually replacing many of the metal
pipelines with pipelines made of high-density polyethylene plastic
and other materials that are more corrosion resistant. The use of
cathodic protection devices also helps to prevent corrosion. Facilities
officials told us that despite these measures and periodic inspections,
they have experienced numerous pipeline ruptures they attribute to
corrosion. They said that until all of the existing pipelines are
replaced, such ruptures will continue to be a source of major concern.
However, replacing pipelines is very expensive, and facilities
officials said that it would take many years to obtain enough funds to
replace all of them. Facilities officials at Marine Corps Base Camp
Pendleton, California, said that they have experienced several fuel
line ruptures, many of them caused by corroded pipe valves. They said
fuel lines that run alongside base housing pose the greatest safety
concern, and they have begun to replace these lines first. Eventually
they hope to replace all of them throughout the base.
Full Impact of Corrosion Unknown Due to Incomplete Cost, Readiness, and
Safety Data:
For more than a decade, a number of DOD, military service, and
private-sector studies have cited the lack of reliable data to
adequately assess the overall impact of the corrosion problem. Studies
done in 1996 and 2001 on DOD corrosion data collection and analysis
found that, while individual services have attempted to quantify the
cost of corrosion, neither the mechanisms nor the methodologies exist
to accurately quantify the problem.[Footnote 11] A 2001 Army study
found that no single data system provides aggregate corrosion data
related to cost, maintenance, and readiness, and that the existence of
many separate databases restrict the ability to collect standardized
data reflecting consistent characteristics.[Footnote 12] The study,
which focused on Army aviation, concluded that existing automated
information systems do not provide decision makers with complete,
accurate, or timely corrosion repair and replacement data. An Air Force
study came to similar conclusions.[Footnote 13] Navy officials told us
that information regarding the cost of corrosion is incomplete because
these costs are difficult to isolate from overall maintenance costs.
They said these data limitations make it difficult to determine the
severity of the problems and to justify the funding needed to prevent
corrosion problems in the future. Facilities officials at Marine Corps
Base Camp Pendleton said that their databases do not specifically
identify data as corrosion related. They told us they would prefer to
have better data for making investment decisions but instead must rely
primarily on information obtained from periodic and annual corrosion
inspections.
We identified many examples of how the lack of reliable and complete
information impeded the funding and progress of corrosion prevention
projects. In addition, military officials at the unit level told us
that they had trouble obtaining sufficient data and analysis to justify
the cost effectiveness of prevention projects. They cited the lack of
information as one of the main reasons why corrosion mitigation
projects were not being funded. For example, Air Force officials told
us that an aircraft rinsing facility at Hickam Air Force Base is no
longer operable, and they need about $4 million for a new facility.
They also said that although they do not have sufficient data to
accurately estimate expected cost savings from reduced maintenance,
they believe it would far exceed initial investment costs. They added
that their inability to move forward stems largely from a lack of the
data and analysis needed to justify the projects. The Marine Corps
faced similar obstacles in justifying the installation of a helicopter
rinsing facilities at Marine Corps Air Facility, Kaneohe Bay. (See
fig. 6.):
Figure 6: Marine Corps Helicopter Rinsing Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officials told us that the corrosion maintenance costs they would avoid
in the first year alone would exceed the total amount of funding needed
to build an additional facility, but they do not have the data or
resources to support the necessary analysis, and without it they cannot
justify the project or obtain approval for the funds.
DOD and Services' Approach to Corrosion Control Is Not Effective
but Has Achieved Some Successes:
While the military services have achieved some successes on individual
corrosion prevention projects, significant weaknesses in their overall
approach to corrosion control have decreased the effectiveness of their
efforts. An important limitation is the lack of a strategic plan that
includes long-term goals and outcome-based performance measures. In
addition, coordination within and among the services is limited, and
the priorities of organizations that plan corrosion prevention projects
and those that implement and fund them are frequently in conflict. As a
result, promising projects often fall far short of their potential, and
many are never initiated at all.
Some Corrosion Prevention Improvements Are Being Introduced during and
after Acquisition Production Process:
Major commands, program offices, and research and development
centers servicewide have made and continue to make improvements
in the methods and techniques for preventing corrosion. Corrosion
prevention improvements can either be introduced during the design and
production phases or some time after equipment is fielded. For example,
durable coatings, composite materials, and cathodic protection are
being incorporated to an increasing extent in the design and
construction of military facilities and equipment to reduce corrosion-
related maintenance. Systems as diverse as the joint strike fighter,
the DD-X destroyer, amphibious assault vehicles, and HMMWV trucks plan
to use composite materials and advanced protective coatings to increase
corrosion resistance. The military services estimate that as much as 25
to 35 percent of corrosion costs can be eliminated by using these and
other corrosion prevention efforts, which would amount to billions of
dollars in potential savings each year. Our recent report on total
ownership costs of military equipment discusses some of the approaches
DOD is using to incorporate maintenance reduction techniques, including
corrosion mitigation, into the design and development of new
systems.[Footnote 14]
Regarding the maintenance of existing equipment and infrastructure, we
have identified several examples of projects that show potential for a
high return on investment and advances in the technologies of corrosion
prevention but which have not, for various reasons, been fully
implemented. For example, the Naval Sea Systems Command has developed
durable coatings that increase the amount of corrosion protection for
various kinds of tanks (such as fuel and ballast tanks) on Navy ships
to 20 years instead of the 5 years formerly possible. The installation
of the coatings started in fiscal year 1996. However, by the end of
fiscal year 2002, the Navy had installed these coatings on less than
7 percent of the tanks, for an estimated net savings of about
$10 million a year. The tank preservation effort has not been widely
implemented because, Navy officials told us, the fleet has other needs
that have a higher priority. Navy officials told us they frequently
have to defer the installation of the new coatings because of the
limited availability of ships due to the increased pace of Fleet
operations and more pressing maintenance requirements. As a result, the
Navy estimates that it is about $161 million short of achieving the
total annual net cost savings projected for this corrosion prevention
effort. The Command has numerous other projects that have fallen short
of their potential because the fleet had higher priorities. While these
projects have total projected annual net savings of another
$919 million, they have achieved about $33 million in yearly savings to
date. Once implemented, the benefits of these efforts extend well
beyond cost savings because they have the potential to significantly
reduce ship maintenance, thereby increasing the availability of ships
for operations.
The Army National Guard's Controlled Humidity Preservation project
represents another example of a high potential savings effort that has
not been fully realized. Under this project, dehumidified air is pumped
into buildings or equipment to reduce the rate of corrosion. (See
fig. 7.):
Figure 7: Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Project officials claimed net savings of $225 million through the end
of fiscal year 2002. While officials state the project has proven to be
a success so far, they now estimate that it will take about 15 years to
achieve the total projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally
planned. Army National Guard officials told us they could achieve
greater savings if they receive additional funding earlier than is
currently planned.
The Air Force's bomb metalization project is also not achieving its
full cost savings potential. According to an Air Force study, treating
cast iron, general-purpose bombs with a special protective metallic
spray coating would save the Air Force at least $30 million in
maintenance costs over 30 years, although one study estimated the
savings to be as much as $100 million. The Air Force stores about
450,000 of this type of bomb in locations throughout the world. Air
Force officials told us that the total investment costs for the project
are about $5 million, which, based on the higher cost savings estimate,
translates into a return on investment ratio of 20 to 1. After several
years of planning and implementation, about 15,000 bombs, or 3 percent,
have received the treatment.
Appendix II provides more detailed information about these and other
examples of projects that are not reaching their full potential.
Strategic Plan Lacking for DOD and Service Corrosion Efforts:
DOD does not currently have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention
and mitigation, and the services either have not developed such plans
or have not implemented them.
However, DOD is required within 1 year of enactment of the
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(i.e., by December 2, 2003) to submit to Congress a report setting
forth its long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of
corrosion on military equipment and infrastructure.[Footnote 15] The
act requires DOD include in its long-term strategy performance measures
and milestones for reducing corrosion that are compatible with the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).[Footnote 16]
GPRA offers a model for developing an effective management framework to
improve the likelihood of successfully implementing initiatives and
assessing results. Under GPRA, agencies at all levels are required to
set strategic goals, measure performance, identify levels of resources
needed, and report on the degree to which goals have been met. Without
implementing these critical performance-measuring elements, management
is unable to identify and prioritize projects systematically, allocate
resources effectively, and determine which projects have been
successful. As a result, managers are not in a position to make sound
investment decisions on proposed corrosion control projects.
The military services either have not established effective strategic
plans that include goals, objectives, and performance measuring
systems[Footnote 17] or they have not implemented them. The limitations
to the military services' efforts to establish strategic plans are as
follows:
* The Army created a comprehensive corrosion control program plan--
including goals, objectives, and performance measures--but the plan was
never fully implemented.[Footnote 18] As part of the plan, the Army
defined specific performance measures to track the progress of
corrosion mitigation efforts, but these were not put into effect. The
strategy called for the creation of panels comprised of top government
and industry corrosion experts who would use performance metrics to
evaluate proposed and ongoing projects against approved goals and
objectives. However, the panels were never established and the metrics
were not implemented. Army corrosion control officials told us that
they have very little performance data, such as return on investment or
annual savings, for any of their corrosion control initiatives.
Officials at the Army Center for Economic Analysis told us they have
not measured performance for the purpose of determining the return on
investment for any corrosion control project for many years; the last
performance evaluation was carried out in 1997.
* In 1998, the Air Force published a business plan for equipment
corrosion control, but the plan was implemented for a short time and
did not contain all of the elements of a strategic plan. For example,
it identified three management goals,[Footnote 19] but did not include
performance measures. Also, the Air Force Equipment Maintenance
Instruction that identifies responsibilities for the Air Force
Corrosion Prevention and Control Office does not identify goals or
performance measures. Although an Air Force Instruction on Performance
Management states that performance management, including goals and
performance measures, is the Air Force's framework for a continual
improvement system, officials told us that the business plan was no
longer being used. They said that, in the past, there has been more
emphasis on creating goals and monitoring performance, but because of
limited resources, reductions in personnel, and increased optempo these
activities are no longer performed.
* The Navy commands (Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems
Command) have engaged in some strategic planning for corrosion control,
but the Navy does not have a servicewide strategic plan in this area,
and its corrosion control offices lack the information and metrics
needed to track progress. The Naval Air Systems Command planned to
establish a corrosion control and prevention office but the plan--which
included goals and objectives and outlined how progress would be
measured--was never approved. The corrosion control and prevention
activity at Naval Sea Systems Command is also not a formal program, and
it lacks clearly defined overall goals and objectives. This office has
identified cost avoidance projects and tracks the amount of
savings achieved to date. However, more could be done to monitor
performance. For example, there was no analysis of the reasons why
specific projects were proceeding at a slow pace. Without this
information, the office is not in a position to know what actions can
be taken to improve the effectiveness of these projects.
* The Marine Corps has a corrosion control plan that includes long-
term, broadly stated goals but does not include measurable, outcome-
oriented objectives or performance measures. Marine Corps officials
told us that they are in the process of revising the plan to include
measures that will track progress toward achieving servicewide goals.
Corrosion control officials said they measure progress through a
combination of field surveys, special corrosion assessments, and
Integrated Product Teams.[Footnote 20] They also rely on the
evaluations of operational and installation commands and program
offices but readily acknowledge that this is not sufficient. They told
us that they would prefer to have more systematic performance measures
and that these tools would improve the success of individual projects
and the corrosion effort as a whole.
Limited Coordination Within and Among the Services:
DOD has multiple corrosion control efforts--with different policies,
procedures, and funding channels--that are not well coordinated with
each other; as a result, opportunities for cost savings have been lost.
DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion control
office in response to the authorization act, but no single office
exists within each of the military services to provide leadership and
oversight for corrosion control of equipment and infrastructure.
Although the services have attempted to establish central corrosion
control offices, the responsibility largely falls on numerous commands,
installations, and program offices to fund and implement projects.
Military officials told us the offices were not fully established,
primarily because of limited funding. The Army, for example, has
established a central office for corrosion control of all service
equipment; the chain of command for the Army corrosion office for
facilities is separate from this office. Although a central office for
equipment exists, each Army command also has separate corrosion control
offices that are responsible for certain types of equipment--for
example, tanks/automotive, aviation/missiles, armaments, and
electronics. Further, individual weapon system program offices within
each command may have their own corrosion control functions. In
addition, installations implement their own corrosion control projects
with the assistance of the Army Department of Public Works and the Army
Corps of Engineers. The recently established Army Installation
Management Agency provides overall management and funding for upkeep on
Army installations.
The Navy and Air Force also have multiple corrosion prevention and
mitigation offices. The Navy manages them through the materials offices
within the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Aviation Command.
The Air Force Materiel Command manages the Air Force's efforts at an
office located at Robins Air Force Base. Like the Army, these commands
have multiple weapon systems program offices that also plan and
implement corrosion projects. The Navy and Air Force also have separate
organizations that are responsible for corrosion prevention and
mitigation efforts related to infrastructure. The Naval Facilities
Engineering Center at Port Hueneme, California, provides this service
for both the Navy and Marine Corps and, in turn, relies on the
individual installations to manage and implement their own efforts. The
Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency provides this service for
the Air Force.
This fragmentation of corrosion prevention efforts minimizes
coordination and limits standardization within and among the services,
as evidenced by the following examples:
* A June 2000 corrosion assessment of the Army's Pacific area of
operations concluded that no standard corrosion control program,
policy, or training exists for any Army commodity, which reduces the
effectiveness of the Army's efforts to control corrosion on vehicles,
tanks, and other equipment.
* Even when the services are in a severely corrosive environment
in which they operate relatively near to one another, few formal
mechanisms exist to facilitate the exchange of corrosion information.
For example, in Hawaii Army officials for the Reserve and National
Guard and active units stated that they had limited knowledge of one
another's corrosion control activities or the activities of other
services. Army officials told us they cannot afford to miss an
opportunity to use the latest corrosion control products and practices,
and it would be unfortunate to be deprived of any advances, especially
if they are available and being used elsewhere. In addition, Air Force
facilities officials in Hawaii told us that they are not aware of any
formal process for sharing corrosion prevention and control information
with other services.
* Officials at Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, an area
of high humidity and salt, told us that temporary shelters can be a
very cost-effective way to reduce the corrosion of equipment such as
vehicles, transformers, and aviation ground equipment that are
currently stored outside because of limited space. (See fig. 8.):
Figure 8: K-Span Shelter at Army Reserve Unit Fort Shafter, Hawaii:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
These officials were unable to acquire the shelters because they did
not have the time or resources to undertake the analysis necessary to
support the purchase. They were aware that temporary shelters are being
used at other Marine Corps and Army installations, but they did not
know how the installations acquired the shelters or justified their
purchase. The officials suggested a standard mechanism for gathering
and communicating the information necessary to justify purchase of
the shelters.
* The Air Force conducted a series of multiyear studies that found that
using inexpensive corrosion-inhibiting lubricants on aircraft
electrical connectors has the potential to save hundreds of millions of
dollars annually. (See fig. 9.):
Figure 9: Corroded Connectors on Air Force F-16 Main Fuel Shutoff
Valve:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Air Force officials estimate that using corrosion-inhibiting lubricants
could save more than $500 million annually on the F-16 fleet alone.
Although the use of these lubricants is recommended in a joint
technical manual on avionics corrosion control,[Footnote 21] their use
is not required. The Air Force and Navy have developed different
product specifications for the lubricants. The Navy's specification
covers the lubricants' use on both metal surfaces and electrical
connectors, and more than a dozen products have qualified for use under
the specification. However, Air Force studies determined that while
some of the products work well on electrical connectors, others are
detrimental. As a result, the Air Force created a new specification for
lubricant use, limiting it to electrical connectors. Air Force
officials want the Navy to modify its specification so that only the
appropriate products can qualify; otherwise, Air Force officials
believe, those who refer to the joint manual containing both
specifications could order a product detrimental to electronic systems.
An Air Force contractor has drafted specification revisions for the
Navy, but due to differing requirements and changes of personnel, the
Navy has apparently decided to conduct further studies before revising
its specifications. According to Air Force officials, these and other
difficulties in coordinating with the Navy have prompted the Air Force
to consider withdrawing from participation with the Navy in joint
service manuals on corrosion control of aircraft and avionics.
* Army National Guard officials in Hawaii told us that they were not
aware of the status of the Army's nearby corrosion inhibitor
application center. (See fig. 10.) The facility currently has the
capacity to apply corrosion inhibitors to about 6,000 vehicles per
year. National Guard officials told us that they often store vehicles
for long periods of time, and corrosion is always a problem. They
indicated interest in finding out more about the Army's facility and
any opportunities for participating with the Army if the corrosion
inhibitors can reduce corrosion cost effectively.
Figure 10: Corrosion Inhibitor Application Facility at Army's Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The services have created some valuable mechanisms, including
special working groups[Footnote 22] and annual corrosion conferences,
which make important contributions to corrosion prevention efforts and
help facilitate intra-and inter-service coordination. However, these
mechanisms do not represent a systematic approach to coordination. The
effectiveness of these mechanisms is often dependent on the individual
initiative of those who participate directly, as well as on the funds
available to initiate corrosion-related activities. For example, each
of the services hosts an annual corrosion conference, but individuals
attend only to the extent that available time and travel funds allow.
Furthermore, the dissemination of conference information relies to a
large extent on attendees taking the initiative to use the information
or communicate it to others. Limited follow-up is carried out to
determine the extent to which this information is used in new
applications. Several of the officers acting as corrosion coordinators
in Hawaii indicated that their commands were often unable to allow them
the time or travel funds to attend corrosion conferences. They added
that some, but not all, of the conference papers and briefings were
available to them.
Conflicting Incentives and Priorities Limit Corrosion Project
Implementation:
Because of the differing priorities between short-term operational
needs and long-term preventative maintenance needs, corrosion projects
are often given a low priority.
Corrosion control offices act largely in an advisory role, providing
guidance, information, and expertise on initiatives and practices. They
have limited funding and authority, and they promote initiatives with
benefits that may not become apparent until a project is far along in
its implementation, which may be years in the future. These priorities
and incentives are very different from and sometimes conflict with
those held by the operational or installation commands and their
subordinate units. While these commands also strive for better
corrosion prevention, they place a greater emphasis on more immediate,
short-term needs that are directly tied to current operations.
Because the corrosion control offices generally receive only limited
start-up funding for corrosion prevention projects, they must rely
heavily on operational commands and other program offices to provide
the necessary resources and implementation. However, these commands
often have limited resources beyond those needed to carry out their
immediate mission objectives, and the military services have not
established sufficient incentives for the commands (which have the
approval and funding authority) to invest in the long-term, cumulative
benefits of corrosion prevention and control efforts. As a result, many
proposed corrosion control projects--even those with large cost saving
potential and other benefits, such as increased readiness and enhanced
safety--often remain underfunded because they are a low priority to the
commands compared to operational and repair projects that offer more
immediate results.
These conflicting incentives and priorities are demonstrated by the
fact that the services have sacrificed the condition of their
facilities and infrastructure by using base maintenance accounts,
including funds for corrosion prevention and control, to pay for
training and combat operations. We were told at many of the bases we
visited that the problem with maintaining the infrastructure was that
base commanders siphon off infrastructure maintenance and repair funds
for other operational priorities. For example, at Fort Irwin we were
told that only 40 percent of infrastructure requirements were funded
and that most preventative maintenance is deferred. Officials at Marine
Corps Base Camp Pendleton said that they have an infrastructure
maintenance backlog totaling over $193 million and many of the projects
are to repair facilities that have deteriorated due to corrosion. The
backlog is not limited to this location, as the Navy reports an
infrastructure backlog of $2 billion Navy-wide. Navy officials said
they do not have accurate data but estimate that a large percentage of
the deferred maintenance is corrosion related. Hickam Air Force Base
facilities officials also told us that they often have to defer or
reduce corrosion prevention projects because the base continually needs
funds for higher priorities, usually those associated with operations.
At the same time, the Army, in its 2002 Annual Report to Congress,
stated that it cannot continue to fully fund its Combat Arms Training
Strategy without further degrading its infrastructure and related
activities. The Army recently established a new agency that centralizes
all installation management activities to ensure that maintenance
dollars, including those for corrosion control, are disbursed equitably
and efficiently across installations. Officials of the new Installation
Management Agency said that the goal of centralization is to halt the
trend of major commands transferring funding from infrastructure
maintenance accounts to pay for other operations.
The Navy's corrosion projects are similarly affected by a tendency to
postpone maintenance projects to address more immediate demands.
For example, the Navy's efforts to reduce corrosion on more than
11,700 tanks on Navy ships are very time-consuming and expensive.
(See app. II for more details of this case study.) To reduce costs, the
Navy developed advanced coatings that are intended to last much longer,
require less maintenance, and result in net savings of over
$170 million annually. As of the end of fiscal year 2002, the Navy has
only been able to install the new coatings on about 750 tanks, or less
than 7 percent. Navy officials attribute the slow pace to the fact that
shipyards place a higher priority on maintenance that requires
immediate attention. These officials told us that the shipyards are
hard-pressed to complete even necessary repairs and have little
incentive to undertake prevention projects that will not show any
benefits for many years.
Conflicting priorities are also evidenced by Navy and Marine Corps
efforts to prevent the corrosion of underground pipelines. Navy
officials informed us that pipeline corrosion is one of their major
facilities maintenance concerns. According to these officials, many
pipelines at multiple Navy installations are several decades old and
made of metal that is highly susceptible to corrosion. (See fig. 11.):
Figure 11: Corrosion on High Temperature Pipelines at Air Force
Tracking Facility Antigua, West Indies:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center officials told us that they
do not have accurate data, but they estimate that several million
dollars are being spent each year to fix leaks and ruptures that result
from corrosion. They further stated that they could save significant
maintenance costs if they were to aggressively start replacing existing
pipelines with pipelines made of high-density polyethylene plastic and
other nonmetallic material that is much more corrosion resistant. Naval
facilities officials said that while this replacement project would be
a big money-saver in the long run, the strategy would require a
substantial investment, and they need to place a higher priority on
fixing more immediate problems that disrupt or impair current
operations. The Marine Corps is faced with similar conflicting
pressures. At Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, officials told us
that they have old and decaying pipelines and valves throughout the
installation. To save significant repair costs, they would prefer to
replace them with pipelines and valves made of high-density
polyethylene plastic as quickly as possible. (See fig. 12.):
Figure 12: Corroded Air-Conditioning Valves at Quantico Marine Corps
Base, Virginia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, the process is labor-intensive and, therefore, very expensive.
They said that as a rule they must attend to more immediate problems,
and only when resources permit are they able to invest in projects that
have more long-term benefits.
Conclusion:
At present, DOD and the military services do not systematically assess
proposals for corrosion control projects, related implementation
issues, or the results of implemented projects, and they disseminate
project results on a limited, ad hoc basis. Without a more systematic
approach to corrosion problems, prevention efforts that have a high
return on investment potential will likely continue to be
underresourced and continue to proceed at a slow pace. As a result, DOD
and the military services will continue to expend several billion
dollars annually in avoidable costs and continue to incur a significant
number of avoidable readiness and safety problems. Since corrosion that
is left unmitigated only worsens with time, costs will likely increase
as weapon systems and infrastructures age. Perhaps this is why the
adage "pay now or pay more later" so appropriately describes the
dilemma with which the military services are repeatedly confronted when
making difficult investment decisions. The military services will
continue to pay dearly for their limited corrosion prevention efforts
and will be increasingly challenged to find the funds for ongoing
operations, maintenance, and new systems acquisitions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In an effort to improve current military approaches to corrosion
control, the Bob Stump Defense Authorization Act of 2003 requires the
department to develop and implement a long-term strategy to mitigate
the effects of corrosion in military equipment and infrastructure. If
properly crafted, this strategy can become an important means of
managing corrosion control efforts and addressing the problems and
limitations of these efforts as described in this report.
To craft an effective strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct that the department's strategic plan for corrosion
prevention and mitigation include the following:
* develop standardized methodologies for collecting and analyzing
corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data;
* develop clearly defined goals, outcome-oriented objectives, and
performance measures that show progress toward achieving objectives
(these measures should include such elements as the expected return on
investment and realized net savings of prevention projects);
* identify the level of resources needed to accomplish goals
and objectives;
* establish mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and
mitigation projects in an interservice and servicewide context.
To provide greater assurances that the department's strategic plan will
be successfully implemented, we recommend that the secretaries of each
of the services:
* develop servicewide strategic plans that are consistent with the
goals, objectives, and measures in the departmentwide plan and:
* establish procedures and milestones to hold major commands and
program offices that manage specific weapon systems and facilities
accountable for achieving the strategic goals.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. The comments are included in this report in
appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate. In its technical comments, DOD did not
concur with our finding that the department does not have an effective
approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. DOD noted that the
department develops and incorporates prevention and mitigation
strategies appropriate to DOD's national defense mission within various
constraints associated with operational needs, affordable maintenance
schedules, environmental regulations, and other statutory
requirements. DOD noted that corrosion is one of many issues that must
be managed and incorporated into an overall defense mission. DOD also
noted that it continually endeavors to improve its ability to manage
corrosion through advanced research, upgrading of systems and
facilities, application of new materials, processes and products and
continuous information sharing. Our report recognizes and mentions
DOD's efforts and successes with corrosion mitigation. However, we
believe that DOD lacks an effective approach to deal with corrosion
since it lacks an overall strategy, has limited coordination within and
among the services, and conflicting incentives and priorities. As we
noted in our report, the current DOD approach has led to readiness and
safety issues as well as billions of dollars of corrosion-related
maintenance costs for DOD and the services annually.
:
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense;
the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were
Allan Roberts, Allen Westheimer, Dorian Dunbar, Sarah Prehoda, Sandra
Sokol, and Susan Woodward.
William M. Solis,
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by William M. Solis:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our study focused on how the military services implement and manage
corrosion prevention and control efforts for both equipment and
infrastructure. To perform our review, we contacted corrosion control
offices and officials in each of the four military services. We also
reviewed studies and discussed military corrosion issues with experts
within and outside the Department of Defense (DOD). To develop an
in-depth understanding of how corrosion prevention projects are
initiated and managed, we visited field installations and developed
case studies on corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts. We also
contacted and obtained information from DOD, services headquarters,
materiel management, research and development, logistics, systems
acquisitions, safety, and installation management and
maintenance organizations.
To determine the extent of the military services' corrosion problems,
we reviewed numerous studies and contacted experts in both government
and private industry. We contacted and obtained information from
DOD, military service headquarters, strategic planning, research and
development, systems acquisitions, materiel management, logistics,
safety, and installation management and maintenance organizations.
We also attended the U.S. Navy and Industry Rust 2002 Corrosion
Technology and Exchange Conference, and we reviewed papers and
presentations of other service and private industry corrosion
conferences and forums. In addition, we contacted private industry
suppliers, consultants, and research organizations. We contacted the
following research organizations to obtain information regarding the
extent of military service corrosion problems:
* National Research Council:
* National Materials Advisory Board:
* NCI Information Systems, Inc.
* CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc.
* American Power Jet Company:
* Science Applications International Corporation:
* Battelle Laboratories:
* Calibre Systems, Inc.
* Sandia National Laboratories:
* Metals Information Analysis Center:
* Center for Army Analysis:
* Joint Council on Aging Aircraft:
* Services Command Corrosion Assessments and Surveys:
* Services Corrosion Prevention and Advisory Boards:
* Services Science and Technology Advisor Programs:
* Services Corrosion Conferences and Forums:
To determine the extent to which DOD and the military services have an
effective approach to corrosion control, we interviewed officials and
obtained documentation from the four military services' corrosion
control program offices for equipment and infrastructure. For
equipment, these included the Army Corrosion Prevention and Control
Program, the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office, the
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Corrosion Prevention and Control Programs, and the
Marine Corps Corrosion and Prevention Program. For infrastructure we
contacted the Army Corps of Engineers and Department of Public Works,
the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, and the Naval Facilities
Engineering Service Center Command. We also contacted and obtained
information from DOD, service headquarters, strategic planning,
materiel command, and field command officials. We reviewed corrosion
prevention and control plans, policies, procedures, instructions,
regulations, studies, trip reports, memos, and other forms
of documentation. We also visited selected military bases, where we
held discussions with unit commanders, facilities engineering and
maintenance officials, and users of DOD equipment such as aircraft,
ships, tanks, trucks, and support equipment, including discussions with
operators, logistics, and maintenance personnel. We interviewed
officials and gathered data at the following installations in
California and Hawaii:
California:
* Fort Irwin Army Base:
* Los Angeles Air Force Base:
* March Air Force Reserve Base:
* North Island Naval Air Station:
* Point Mugu Naval Air Station:
* Port Hueneme Naval Base:
* Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton:
* Marine Corps Air Station Miramar:
Hawaii:
* Fort Shafter Army Base:
* Schofield Barracks Army Base:
* Wheeler Army Air Field:
* Diamond Head Complex, Hawaii Army National Guard:
* Pearl City Unit Training and Equipment Site, Hawaii Army
National Guard:
* Hickam Air Force Base:
* Pearl Harbor Naval Complex:
* Lualualei Naval Magazine:
* Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay:
* Marine Corps Camp H.M. Smith:
We conducted our review from August 2002 through April 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have
Not Realized Their Full Potential:
Durable Coatings for Tanks on Navy Ships:
The Navy has over 11,700 tanks, such as ballast, fuel, and potable
water tanks, on all of its surface vessels and submarines. Because of
their constant exposure to salt and moisture, these tanks rapidly lose
their exterior and interior protective coatings and begin to corrode.
Although maintenance personnel spend considerable time and resources
removing as much of the visible corrosion as possible and repainting
while the ship is deployed, some of the work cannot be accomplished
until the ship returns to its home port and undergoes scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance. Maintaining the tanks is labor intensive,
costly, and extends the amount of time ships must spend undergoing
maintenance, thereby reducing their operational availability. Naval Sea
Systems Command has developed coating systems that are expected to last
20 years instead of the 5 years that existing coatings last. According
to the Navy, the effort could potentially save more than $170 million a
year in maintenance costs. The initiative appears to be somewhat
successful, because the Navy reports that it has achieved net savings
of about $10 million a year. However, in the past several years, the
Navy has installed the new coatings on only about 750 tanks, or less
than 7 percent of the total. Navy officials attribute the slow pace to
the fleet placing higher priorities on other needs, and explained that
they often must defer the installation of the new coatings because of
the limited availability of ships due to increased optempo and more
pressing maintenance requirements. Navy officials added that because of
higher operational and maintenance priorities, resources in the form of
funding and manpower usually go to these needs instead of prevention
efforts such as tank coatings. These officials told us that the
shipyards that perform most of the maintenance for the fleet have
difficulty trying to complete the work currently scheduled with
available resources and would be further challenged by having to add
the application of new coatings to their existing workload. In
addition, the officials told us that there is limited incentive for
shipyard maintenance workers to carry out preventive projects that show
benefits only in later years instead of completing more immediate
repairs that show more immediate benefits.
Army National Guard Controlled Humidity Preservation:
The Army National Guard maintains a wide range of equipment that
includes M1 tanks, howitzers, air defense artillery systems, and
radars. This equipment is susceptible to corrosion, and one of the
primary causes of corrosion is humidity. The Army National Guard
estimates it could achieve cost savings totaling more than $1.6 billion
over 10 years by storing its equipment in short-and long-term
controlled-humidity preservation centers. Depending on the type of
equipment, some will be stored in long-term facilities and some will be
stored for the short-term. Equipment that is not required for regular
training use will be preserved in metal shelters for an average of 3
years, while equipment for which there is a recurring need will be
preserved by installing dehumidifying air ducts in crew compartments
and other vehicle spaces. The project, which started in 1997, is
expected to have a return on investment of over 9 to 1. According to
Army National Guard officials, through the end of fiscal year 2002, the
project has achieved a total of $225 million in cost savings. While
Army officials state that the project has proven to be a success so
far, they now estimate that it will take about 15 years to accomplish
the total projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned.
They attribute the delay to other needs being given a higher priority
and, as a result, not receiving the necessary funds and having to defer
the installation of some controlled-humidity centers. These officials
still expect to acquire and install all of the facilities, but at a
slower pace. They acknowledge that the delay will likely mean deferring
a significant amount of cost savings--perhaps as much as $100 million-
-for several years.
Fly Ash in Concrete Airfields:
Concrete airfield pavements for all of the military services have
experienced cracking and expansion that pose significant safety
hazards, impair readiness, and increase maintenance costs. One of the
causes of this deterioration results from a corrosive chemical reaction
called alkali-silica reaction, which occurs when alkalis react with
water in ways that cause cracking, chipping, and expansion of concrete.
Examples of this kind of damage have been reported at facilities for
all military services, such as Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army
Airfield, Kentucky; Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California; and
Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan. The foreign object debris
hazard caused by cracking and crumbling concrete was so severe that the
Air Mobility Command assessed a taxiway at Little Rock Air Force Base
as unsuitable for use. While the military services do not have cost
estimates, DOD facilities officials told us that significant resources
are spent each year on mitigating the effects of alkali-silica
reaction.
The Navy determined that one way to mitigate the effects of alkali-
silica reaction in the future is to substitute fly ash for a certain
amount of cement. According to a Navy study, the use of fly ash
increases the strength and durability of cement structures such as
airfields. Navy officials told us that this mitigation would increase
the operational availability of airfields because the facilities would
experience less cracking and chipping and, therefore, pose fewer
foreign object debris hazards. While the Navy did not perform the
analysis, these officials told us that perhaps the greatest benefit
would be the savings that would result from a marked reduction
in manpower needed for maintenance. The study did not include cost
savings or a return on investment analysis because its focus was on the
causes of and methods for mitigating the deterioration. The study did
note that fly ash substitution could save the Navy about $4 million a
year in construction costs because the material is less expensive than
the kinds of cement currently being used. Navy officials told us that
their understanding of the overall benefits is convincing enough that
the use of fly ash is required for all Navy and Marine Corps
construction projects that include pavements.
The Air Force recommends the use of fly ash, but only in certain
circumstances. Air Force officials told us that requiring the use of
fly ash for all construction projects is not feasible because fly ash
is not available at all locations where the Air Force has facilities,
and the additional cost and time involved in transporting the material
to these places may be greater than the benefits from using it.
However, Air Force officials acknowledge that they have not done a
return-on-investment analysis that includes construction and
maintenance costs, and additional information like this would be very
useful in making decisions regarding the use of fly ash.
The services continue to study the effects of alkali-silica reaction
and what to do about them. However, due to limited funding, efforts to
identify feasible comprehensive solutions to the entire problem for all
military services have been delayed. In the meantime, airfields
continue to decay, resulting in high maintenance costs as well as
restricted use.
Army Corrosion Inhibitors:
Corrosion damage to tactical wheeled vehicles and ground equipment is
costly and prolongs equipment downtime. According to officials of the
Army Materiel Command, seawater that seeps into the inner cavities of
equipment that is being transported overseas causes serious corrosion
damage and represents the highest risk to the command. The equipment
then decays rapidly in humid environments.
This kind of corrosion damage was so extensive that in 1998 the
Commanding General U.S. Army Pacific requested that all ground
vehicles shipped to his command be treated with rust inhibitors. Army
data indicated that 17 percent of the Army trucks in Hawaii were so
corroded that performance of their missions was impaired. In 1999, the
Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii indicated
that unit readiness was in serious jeopardy and requested funding for
several corrosion control projects, including one to treat an estimated
3,000 remaining vehicles with corrosion inhibitors. Army testing had
demonstrated that corrosion inhibitors, compared to other products,
provided a high degree of corrosion protection and enough corrosion-
reducing potential to warrant beginning their limited use. Initial
estimates indicated a return on investment of 4 to 1 for every dollar
spent.
In 2000, the Army awarded a contract for approximately $400,000 to
treat 3,000 vehicles over a period of 12 months. The contract was later
doubled, increasing costs to nearly $900,000 for 6,000 vehicles over a
period of 24 months. Army officials plan to analyze the information
obtained on the performance of the product before deciding whether to
continue using it or expand the effort to other locations. The Army has
over 341,000 tactical vehicles and pieces of ground support equipment
worldwide, as well as 3,770 airframes, and a significant amount of this
equipment is exposed to harsh, corrosion-inducing environments.
The Army originally planned to establish an all-purpose, full service
corrosion control center to repair corrosion damage, as well as provide
preventative corrosion-inhibitor treatments. The center, which would
have had multiple service bays and wash racks would have processed more
than 15,000 vehicles per year, was to have been used by all the
military services in Hawaii. However, the center is currently only
being used by the Army as a corrosion-inhibitor application
facility.[Footnote 23] In addition, a lack of coordination exists
within the individual services. For example, at an Army National Guard
facility in Hawaii officials told us that they were not aware of the
status of the Army's corrosion-inhibitor application facility but that
they would be interested in finding out more about it, the application
of corrosion inhibitors, and participating in the project.
Air Force Bomb Metalization:
The Air Force stores about 450,000 cast iron general-purpose bombs
in locations throughout the world. The bombs are estimated to have
a replacement cost exceeding $1 billion. Many of the locations are in
high-humidity environments that contribute to corrosion. As of
February 2003, more than 107,000 of these bombs, or 24 percent,
have been assessed as being no longer mission capable because of
excessive corrosion. The Air Force acquires new bombs and repairs
existing ones so that it will have enough mission-capable bombs to meet
its requirements. The Air Force spends about $7 million a year for
corrosion protection of cast iron general-purpose bombs. Until 1996,
all the bombs were renovated by maintenance personnel who removed any
signs of corrosion and recoated them with liquid paint. The bombs would
undergo this labor-intensive process every 3 to 8 years. In 1996, the
Air Force converted a bomb renovation plant at Kadena Air Base, Japan,
from a facility that used liquid paint to one that used a metal wire
arc spray technique that is otherwise known as metalization. The plant
conversion cost about $3 million. A metal wire arc spray coating is
expected to preserve cast iron bombs for 30 years, or about 25 years
longer than liquid paint. By using this preservation method, the Air
Force estimates saving maintenance costs of $30 to $100 million over 30
years, resulting in a return on investment ratio of 20 to 1. The plant
successfully renovated about 8,000 bombs. Based on previous successes,
the Air Force decided to acquire and install mobile versions of the
Kadena unit in other locations. In 2000, a prototype of the Mobile Bomb
Renovation System was acquired and installed at Andersen Air Force
Base, Guam, at a cost of about $2 million. About 500 bombs received the
metal arc spray coating at Guam before the system experienced equipment
failures. To date, the system remains inoperable. The Army has also
refurbished and metalized about 6,500 bombs for the Air Force.
Air Force studies show that although the metal arch spray coating
process is more expensive than the use of liquid paint, it greatly
minimizes the risk that bombs will need costly maintenance or
deteriorate so severely that they will need replacing. Despite these
benefits, about 3 percent of Air Force bombs have been treated with
this coating process. While Air Force officials recommended that a much
higher percentage of bombs receive this treatment, they explained that
their role is mostly advisory, and the Air Force Material Command and
Pacific Air Force Command together must determine the relative
importance of the project, given other competing priorities.
F-16 Aircraft Corrosion Inhibitors:
Although not visible, the corrosion of connectors on aircraft
electronics equipment is prevalent throughout DOD and a significant
safety risk for aircraft in all military services. The resources spent
on this kind of corrosion are so vast that it is estimated that the Air
Force spends perhaps as much as $500 million a year on corrosion
control on the F-16 fleet alone. The costs are high because of the
significant amount of labor that is involved in locating and
eliminating the often microscopic sources of corrosion on very
sophisticated avionics equipment. Avionics corrosion has been a topic
of major interest to the Air Force for several decades. This concern
was particularly heightened in 1989, when the Air Force reported
several F-16 accidents caused by uncommanded fuel valve closures that
were believed to have been caused by corrosion.
For several decades, the Air Force has conducted extensive studies on
the corrosion of aircraft avionics connectors and what should be done
about it. In the 1990s, several studies recommended the use of certain
lubricants that have the potential of eliminating connector corrosion
on F-16 aircraft, with estimated savings exceeding $500 million a year.
Although the Air Force did not complete a return on investment
analysis, the return would be very impressive, given the low cost of
purchasing this off-the-shelf product. The Air Force has yet to take
full advantage of these corrosion-inhibiting lubricants, even though
they appear to be widely available. While the use of such lubricants is
recommended in the joint service technical manual on avionics corrosion
control, it is not required. We were told that the Air Force would need
to amend in detail more than 200 specific technical orders and job
guides to require the use of lubricant to protect F-16 aircraft
electrical connectors, but progress in this area has been sluggish at
best.[Footnote 24] For every year that the Air Force does not require
the use of the lubricants, the service loses the opportunity to avoid
annual expenses that total hundreds of millions of dollars.
Army Helicopter Rinse Facilities:
Conflicting incentives also impeded the Army's efforts to obtain modern
helicopter rinse facilities called "birdbaths." According to the Army
Aviation Corrosion Prevention and Control office, these facilities are
expected to extend the life of costly aircraft components, reduce
contractor man-hour expenditures, increase aircraft fleet readiness,
and provide an added margin of crew safety. The project is estimated to
cost $12 million for startup and $400 thousand per year in operating
costs. Even more notable was the analysis showing a 31 to 1 return on
investment, with the investment costs recouped within 2 years. Citing
opportunities to implement and promote effective corrosion control, the
Army recommended identification of locations and deployment areas for
establishing birdbath rinse facilities. Despite the potential benefits,
the project has not received funding to date. Army officials told us
that the project cannot compete with efforts that have a higher
priority, and they have deferred the request for funds until fiscal
year 2005. The Army's attempt to obtain funding for a birdbath facility
in Hawaii suffered the same fate. During our field visit to Hawaii, we
were told that for a number of years a birdbath facility was included
in a list of projects that required funding, but the facility never
received the funds because other operational needs were considered to
have a higher priority. Army officials said that funding more pressing
operational needs almost always takes precedence over funding projects
that have a strong potential to avoid future maintenance costs.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
Mr. William M. Solis Director:
US General Accounting Office Washington DC 20548:
June 11, 2003:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-03-753, "DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Opportunities to reduce
Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness," dated May 9, 2003 (GAO Code
350219GAO-03-753). The Department appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the draft report.
The Department considers corrosion to be an important issue associated
with cost, readiness, and safety of its weapons systems and facilities.
As a result, the DoD and the Military Departments have in the past and
will continue in the future to combat corrosion in its many:
forms and to focus on means to prevent and mitigate corrosion within
its overall mission and obligations. We hope that the inclusion of GAO
in the recent strategic planning activities related to corrosion has
been beneficial to both of us in helping to place corrosion within our
national security context.
The GAO report makes two broad "Recommendations for Executive Action,"
each of which contain several more specific recommendations. The
Department concurs with the Recommendations for Executive Action in the
report and is committed to meeting the requirements of Congress and, to
the extent compatible with its core mission, the positive
recommendations of the GAO report.
The Department offers specific comments and recommendations (enclosed)
directed towards improving the accuracy and balance of the report. We
believe we are insitutionalizing a cross-cutting DoD-wide corrosion
mitigation and prevention control program for both facilities and
equipment. We are prepared to discuss these comments with you in more
detail should you desire. The undersigned may be considered the
Department's primary point of contact.
Sincerely,
Daniel J. Dunmire:
Corrosion Policy and Oversight:
Signed by Daniel J. Dunmire:
Enclosure:
(350219):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Readiness is generally defined as a measure of the Department of
Defense's ability to provide the capabilities needed to execute the
mission specified in the National Military Strategy. At the unit level,
readiness refers to the ability of units, such as Army divisions, Navy
ships, and Air Force wings, to provide capabilities required of the
combatant commands.
[2] P.L.107-314, section 1067.
[3] Cost estimates were not audited.
[4] Koch, Gerhardus H. et al., Corrosion Cost and Prevention Strategies
in the United States, CC Technologies and NACE International in
cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, Sept. 30, 2001.
[5] Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I),
Harold Mindlin et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February
1996.
[6] For example, the average age of the Air Force aircraft fleet is 22
years. By fiscal year 2020, the average age will increase to nearly 30
years, with current programmed investments. This would translate to 60-
year-old tankers, 47-year-old reconnaissance/surveillance platforms,
and 44-year-old bombers. (The B-52 would be nearly 60 years old.)
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in
Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the
Condition of Military Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2003).
[8] Corrosion Prevention for Wheeled Vehicles, DOD Inspector General
Audit Report, Number 93-156, August 13, 1993.
[9] U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC communication referenced in Corrosion Costs
and Preventative Strategies in the United States, Gerhardus H. Koch,
Ph.D., et al.; CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc., September 30, 2001.
[10] Cost of Corrosion: Final Report, prepared for Air Force Research
Laboratory, NCI Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, March 26, 2003.
[11] Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I),
Harold Mindlin, et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February
1996; and Corrosion Costs and Preventative Strategies in the United
States, Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph.D. et al.; CC Technologies Laboratories,
Inc., September 30, 2001.
[12] Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and Corrosion Study
(ASPRCS), Ken Mitchell, Study Director, Center for Army Analysis, 2001.
[13] A Study to Determine the Annual Direct Cost of Corrosion
Maintenance for Weapon Systems and Equipment in the United States Air
Force, prepared for the Air Force Corrosion Program Office, NCI
Information Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, February 6, 1998.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting
Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems' Total Ownership
Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: February 2003).
[15] No later than 18 months after date of enactment of the act GAO is
required to submit to Congress an assessment of the extent that DOD has
implemented its long-term strategy to reduce corrosion.
[16] P.L. 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993.
[17] Performance measures can include such data as return on
investment, frequency of required corrosion maintenance, equipment
availability, readiness rates, and mean time between failures.
[18] The plan included three main objectives: decrease life-cycle costs
by 40 percent, increase readiness by reducing downtime, and reduce the
maintenance burden on diminishing active and reserve workforce
resources.
[19] The goals are as follows: (1) identify, advance and apply emerging
materials and processes to existing and future weapon systems;
(2) identify current corrosion traits of weapon systems and logistics
processes, and (3) maintain data and technical manuals related to
corrosion control and provide expert consultation and technical support
to field and depot activities.
[20] Integrated Product Teams are comprised of individuals representing
a variety of competencies or disciplines such as material science,
system engineering, logistics, and environmental management. These
teams are assembled to take a multidisciplinary approach to finding
solutions to routine and nonroutine maintenance and acquisition
problems.
[21] Technical Manual Organizational/Unit and Intermediate
Maintenance, Avionics Cleaning and Corrosion Control, NAVAIR 16-1-540,
Air Force TO-1-1-689, Army TM-1-1500-343-23; September 1, 2000.
[22] Special working groups--within and across the services--have been
established, such as the Joint Council for Aging Aircraft, Air Force
Corrosion Prevention and Advisory Boards, and various Science and
Technology Advisor programs. DOD has also established working groups
such as the Maintenance Technology Senior Steering Group, Joint
Technology Exchange Group, and the Joint Logistics Commanders to share
information on acquisition and maintenance issues, including
corrosion control.
[23] The services could not reach agreement on location, funding, and
standard application procedures.
[24] The F-15 aircraft program has established a pilot program
requiring use of corrosion inhibiting lubricants on electrical
connectors during flightline depot maintenance by simply mandating the
recommended use as stated in the joint service avionics technical
manual.
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