Defense Trade
Better Information Needed to Support Decisions Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers
Gao ID: GAO-03-694 July 11, 2003
The heightened visibility of advanced U.S. weapons in military conflicts has prompted foreign countries to seek to purchase such weaponry. In 2001, transfers of U.S. weapons and technologies to foreign governments totaled over $12 billion. The potential loss of U.S. technological advantage has been raised as an issue in recently approved transfers of advanced military weapons and technologies--such as military aircraft that were reported in the media to contain superior radar and avionics than those in the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory. GAO looked at how releasability of advanced weapons is determined, how U.S. technological advantage is considered and protected, and what information is needed to make informed decisions on the potential release of advanced weapons.
Before transfers are approved, the U.S. government must first determine if classified weapons or technologies are releasable to the requesting country according to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP). The process for determining releasability is complex. A foreign government's request is first reviewed by the military department that owns the requested weapon or technology. In cases where the request exceeds NDP's approved classification level, the military department forwards the request to the National Disclosure Policy Committee for its review. For some sensitive technologies, such as stealth, the case is also forwarded to a special committee for review. The process requires coordination among different U.S. government entities--including DOD, the military departments, the State Department, and the intelligence community--which have varying perspectives. Adding to this complexity, determinations of releasability are governed by broad guidance, which allows latitude in interpreting the unique circumstances of each proposed transfer. In determining the releasability of advanced weapons and technologies, a number of factors are considered, including how U.S. technological advantage would be affected. To protect U.S. technological advantage, safeguards--such as lowering the capability of a transferred weapon and withholding sensitive information on how the system operates--are considered for proposed transfers. However, the effectiveness of some individual safeguards may be limited. For example, one safeguard--the ability of the United States to deny spare parts to former allies--may not be effective if these countries are able to obtain spare parts through other means. While certain individual safeguards may not be as effective as desired, DOD officials said they consider various safeguards to ensure technological advantage is maintained. Information needed to assess releasability is not always complete, up-to-date, or available. For example, DOD's centralized National Disclosure Policy System database that was used to make decisions during the last 4 years only contained information for that time period. DOD has recently deployed an upgrade to the system, but has not yet determined its effectiveness. Other information, such as Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments--which provide counterintelligence information and risks involved in releasing advanced weapons to a foreign country--are often outdated or nonexistent. Finally, some intelligence information that could have a direct bearing on whether an advanced weapon or technology should be released is prepared for other purposes and is not provided to decision makers involved in releasability determinations.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-03-694, Defense Trade: Better Information Needed to Support Decisions Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
July 2003:
Defense Trade:
Better Information Needed to Support Decisions Affecting Proposed
Weapons Transfers:
Defense Trade:
GAO-03-694:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-694, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The heightened visibility of advanced U.S. weapons in military
conflicts has prompted foreign countries to seek to purchase such
weaponry. In 2001, transfers of U.S. weapons and technologies to
foreign governments totaled over $12 billion. The potential loss of
U.S. technological advantage has been raised as an issue in recently
approved transfers of advanced military weapons and technologies”such
as military aircraft that were reported in the media to contain
superior radar and avionics than those in the Department of Defense‘s
(DOD) inventory.
GAO looked at how releasability of advanced weapons is determined, how
U.S. technological advantage is considered and protected, and what
information is needed to make informed decisions on the potential
release of advanced weapons.
What GAO Found:
Before transfers are approved, the U.S. government must first
determine if classified weapons or technologies are releasable to the
requesting country according to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP).
The process for determining releasability is complex. A foreign
government‘s request is first reviewed by the military department that
owns the requested weapon or technology. In cases where the request
exceeds NDP‘s approved classification level, the military department
forwards the request to the National Disclosure Policy Committee for
its review. For some sensitive technologies, such as stealth, the case
is also forwarded to a special committee for review. The process
requires coordination among different U.S. government entities”
including DOD, the military departments, the State Department, and the
intelligence community”which have varying perspectives. Adding to this
complexity, determinations of releasability are governed by broad
guidance, which allows latitude in interpreting the unique
circumstances of each proposed transfer.
In determining the releasability of advanced weapons and technologies,
a number of factors are considered, including how U.S. technological
advantage would be affected. To protect U.S. technological advantage,
safeguards”such as lowering the capability of a transferred weapon and
withholding sensitive information on how the system operates”are
considered for proposed transfers. However, the effectiveness of some
individual safeguards may be limited. For example, one safeguard”the
ability of the United States to deny spare parts to former allies”may
not be effective if these countries are able to obtain spare parts
through other means. While certain individual safeguards may not be as
effective as desired, DOD officials said they consider various
safeguards to ensure technological advantage is maintained.
Information needed to assess releasability is not always complete, up-
to-date, or available. For example, DOD‘s centralized National
Disclosure Policy System database that was used to make decisions
during the last 4 years only contained information for that time
period. DOD has recently deployed an upgrade to the system, but has
not yet determined its effectiveness. Other information, such as
Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments”which provide
counterintelligence information and risks involved in releasing
advanced weapons to a foreign country”are often outdated or
nonexistent. Finally, some intelligence information that could have a
direct bearing on whether an advanced weapon or technology should be
released is prepared for other purposes and is not provided to
decision makers involved in releasability determinations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the National
Disclosure Policy Committee Executive Secretariat to take several
actions to improve efforts for collecting and updating information
needed for the review process. DOD concurred with some of GAO‘s
recommendations but did not concur with others. DOD provided
additional information about recent actions it has taken, which lead
to the modification of some of GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-694.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Katherine V. Schinasi
at (202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Process to Determine the Releasability of Advanced Weapons and
Technologies Is Inherently Complex:
Technological Advantage and Various Safeguards Are Considered When
Determining Releasability:
More Complete, Current, or Available Information Would Better Support
Determinations of Releasability:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: National Disclosure Policy Criteria:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: NDP Criteria and Examples of Information to Consider for Each
Criterion:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S. Military Departments' Review Processes for Determining
the Releasability of Proposed Advanced Weapons and Technologies
Transfers:
Figure 2: NDPC Review Process for Considering Exceptions to NDP:
Figure 3: Example of a Special Committee Process: Low Observable/
Counter Low Observable:
Figure 4: Dates of CIA Risk Assessments for Countries with Exceptions
Approved between 1997 and 2002:
Figure 5: Dates of NDPC Security Surveys for Countries with Exceptions
Approved between 1997 and 2002:
Abbreviations:
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
LO/CLO: Low Observable/Counter Low Observable:
NDP: National Disclosure Policy:
NDPC: National Disclosure Policy Committee:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 11, 2003:
The Honorable Dennis Kucinich
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Kucinich:
The heightened visibility of advanced U.S. weapons[Footnote 1] in
military conflicts over the last decade has prompted foreign countries
to increasingly seek to purchase such weaponry. In 2001, transfers of
weapons from the U.S. government to foreign governments totaled over
$12 billion, or 46 percent of the world market share, representing a 15
percent increase in market share since 1997. According to the
Department of Defense (DOD), such transfers can help strengthen defense
coalitions and enhance interoperability between the United States and
its allies, as well as extend production lines and lower unit costs for
key weapon systems. Before transfers are approved,[Footnote 2] the U.S.
government must first determine if classified weapons or technologies
are releasable to the requesting country according to policies and
procedures stated in the National Disclosure Policy (NDP).[Footnote 3]
The potential loss of U.S. technological advantage has been raised as
an issue in recently approved transfers of advanced military weapons
and technologies--such as those to the United Arab Emirates and South
Korea of military aircraft that were reported by the media to contain
superior radar and avionics than systems in DOD's inventory. Therefore,
you asked us how the U.S. government protects technological advantage
when considering the transfer of advanced weapons. This report (1)
describes the process for determining the releasability of advanced
weapons and technologies, (2) describes how U.S. technological
advantage is considered and protected through this process, and (3)
assesses the types of information needed to make informed decisions on
the potential release of advanced weapons.
To conduct our work, we reviewed and analyzed policies and procedures
and the relevant directives and guidance governing the potential
release of advanced weapons and technologies. To identify safeguards to
protect U.S. technological advantage, we reviewed and analyzed records
for selected weapon systems approved for release. We also analyzed data
on various assessments and information used in the releasability
process. We spoke with officials in DOD, the military departments, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the intelligence
community to understand how the process works, what safeguards are
considered to protect U.S. technological advantage, and what
information is used to support the decision-making process. Details on
our scope and methodology are provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The process for determining the releasability of advanced weapons and
technologies to foreign countries is complex because it involves
several multilevel reviews and coordination among different U.S.
government entities with varying perspectives. Each military department
has its own process for reviewing foreign governments' requests for
transfers. When the request exceeds the classification level approved
for release in NDP,[Footnote 4] the military department forwards the
request for an exception to the National Disclosure Policy Committee
(NDPC)--which includes members from DOD, the military departments, the
State Department, and the intelligence community--for its review. For
some sensitive technologies, such as stealth, the request is also
forwarded to special committees for review. Further, the releasability
process is governed by broad guidance, which allows latitude in
interpreting the unique circumstances surrounding each proposed
transfer.
In determining the releasability of advanced weapons and technologies,
NDPC members consider a number of factors, including how U.S.
technological advantage would be affected if a weapon or technology
were released. To protect U.S. technological advantage, committee
members rely on safeguards, which include general safeguards to help
accomplish military objectives and specific limitations and conditions
that are placed on a transfer. Limitations and conditions generally
include lowering the capability of a transferred weapon, withholding
sensitive information on how the system operates, or time-phased
delivery--that is, timing the contractual delivery date of a weapon
system to follow the expected fielding of a more capable weapon.
However, the effectiveness of some of these individual safeguards may
be limited for various reasons. For example, as we have previously
reported, projected time frames for fielding next generation weapons
systems are consistently underestimated, resulting in unexpected
delays. [Footnote 5] Such delays could negate the effectiveness of
time-phased delivery if the fielding of a more capable weapon or
technology does not coincide with the advanced weapon's contractual
delivery date to the foreign government. Some DOD officials told us
that while the effectiveness of certain individual safeguards may be
limited, various safeguards are considered to ensure that technological
advantage is maintained.
Finally, release decisions may not be fully informed because
information needed to assess the releasability of an advanced weapon or
technology, such as information on a foreign government's ability to
protect the weapon or technology, is not always complete, up-to-date,
or available. For example, DOD's centralized National Disclosure Policy
System database, which is intended to improve coordination by capturing
information on proposed transfers, contained limited historical data
and search capability needed to facilitate decision making. DOD has
developed a system upgrade to provide more search capability and more
historical data. After several delays, DOD had recently deployed the
upgraded system but its effectiveness will not be known for some time.
Other information, such as risk assessments and security surveys, that
could be useful in making releasability decisions is either outdated
or, in some cases, not prepared. In addition, some intelligence
information, such as information on illegal transfers of U.S. weapons
and technologies, could be germane to the decision-making process. This
information is used primarily for nonproliferation purposes and is not
provided to decision makers involved in the releasability process.
To ensure that decisions to release advanced weapons and technologies
are better informed, we are recommending that DOD take several actions
to collect and update information needed for the review process. In
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with several of our
recommendations but did not agree with others. Specifically, DOD
concurred with our recommendations to evaluate the upgraded system,
prioritize risk assessments, and identify additional information for
the process. However, DOD did not concur with other recommendations
regarding the upgraded system and a plan for security surveys. DOD
provided additional information in its comments about recent actions it
has taken, which led to modification of some of our recommendations.
The Department of State chose not to provide formal written comments.
Background:
The Arms Export Control Act, as amended,[Footnote 6] is the primary
statute governing exports of U.S. defense articles and services,
including advanced weapons and technologies, to eligible countries
through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales program and
sales made directly by U.S. companies.[Footnote 7] The act also
includes a statement of conventional arms transfer policy, which
provides that sales of defense items be consistent with U.S. national
security and foreign policy interests. The Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy, a Presidential Decision Directive last updated in 1995,
provides policy for weapons transfers.[Footnote 8] In addition to
stipulating that transfer decisions be made on a case-by-case basis,
the policy has several key goals that must be considered when
transferring weapons:
* Ensure U.S. military forces maintain technological advantage over
their adversaries.
* Help allies and friends deter or defend against aggression, while
promoting interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations
are required.
* Promote stability in regions critical to U.S. interests, while
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
missile delivery systems.
* Promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights,
democratization, and other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
* Enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S.
defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological
superiority at lower costs.
While the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy generally covers all arms
transfers, NDP[Footnote 9] specifically governs the releasability of
classified military information, including classified weapons and
military technologies.[Footnote 10] NDP establishes a framework for
policy decisions on proposed transfers to foreign recipients and is key
in governing the release of an advanced weapon or technology. These
decisions are made before weapons or technologies are approved for
transfer. As implemented by DOD Directive, this policy specifies that
releasability decisions must satisfy five criteria.[Footnote 11] For
example, the proposed transfer must be consistent with U.S. military
and security objectives and be protected by the foreign recipient in
substantially the same manner as the United States. The DOD Directive
also requires department officials to enter NDP case data, including
releasability decisions, into a centralized database to facilitate the
coordination and review of potential transfers of weapons.[Footnote 12]
In November 2002, the White House announced that it had begun a
comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. defense trade
policies to identify changes needed to ensure that these policies
continue to support U.S. national security and foreign policy goals. It
also aims to assess how U.S. technological advantage can be maintained.
The assessment is expected to cover such topics as the Arms Export
Control Act and the military departments' technology release policy, as
well as a determination of the effectiveness of the Defense Trade
Security Initiatives.[Footnote 13] The assessment is also expected to
cover issues related to the NDP process.
Process to Determine the Releasability of Advanced Weapons and
Technologies Is Inherently Complex:
The process governing the release of advanced weapons and technologies
is inherently complex because it involves multiple, multilevel reviews
by various U.S. government entities and individuals with varying
perspectives. A country's request for an advanced system initially is
sent to the military department that is responsible for--or "owns" the
weapon or technology, which then coordinates with various functional
units to arrive at a decision on whether to fulfill the request.
Depending on the circumstances of the request and the outcome of this
initial review, the request may be submitted to an interagency
committee and other special committees for additional review. Further,
because the reviewers represent different agencies, they bring varying
perspectives to the process and must reconcile differences to reach a
unanimous decision on each request. Finally, the guidance governing the
process is broad and applied on a case-by-case basis, allowing decision
makers to use judgment and interpretation when considering each foreign
country's request for the release of an advanced weapon or technology.
Multiple Reviews Are Conducted:
A foreign government's request for the transfer of an advanced weapon
or technology is directed to the military department that is
responsible for the particular weapon or technology. Each military
department has its own review process for determining whether the
weapon or technology should be released (see fig. 1). To develop a
position, the military department receiving the request coordinates
with and obtains input from military experts[Footnote 14] in various
offices and divisions within those offices. For example, we were told
that the Air Force coordinates a proposed transfer of an Air Force
fighter aircraft to a foreign government with subject matter experts in
functional offices, such as acquisition, plans, operations, and weapons
systems division. These experts, in turn, may consult with other
experts within their divisions. For instance, the weapons systems
division may coordinate with its electronic warfare staff, its radar
staff, or both to obtain input.
Military department reviews can result in one of three outcomes:
concurrence, concurrence with limitations and conditions, or
nonconcurrence. If a consensus to approve a request cannot be reached,
the request is elevated within the military department for a final
decision. If the requested item (1) is not covered in NDP, (2) exceeds
the NDP classification level specified for a particular foreign
country, or (3) does not comply with NDP criteria, the military
department may seek an exception to NDP from the National Disclosure
Policy Committee, an interagency review forum.[Footnote 15] Timelines
for military departments' reviews of requests can vary. For example,
Army officials stated that some cases can be handled quickly while
others may require a major investment of time and resources.
Figure 1: U.S. Military Departments' Review Processes for Determining
the Releasability of Proposed Advanced Weapons and Technologies
Transfers:
[See PDF for image]
[A] The Navy board cochairs are the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition and the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations or the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (for issues
specific to the Marine Corps).
[B] The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence finalizes the position
package and serves as the Army's representative on NDPC.
[End of figure]
When NDPC receives a request for an exception, the Executive
Secretariat distributes the request to committee members and seeks a
unanimous vote within 10 days (see fig. 2). Each committee member
coordinates a position with various experts. For example, the Joint
Staff sends the request to the Combatant Command that has
responsibility for the country requesting the advanced weapon or
technology. The Combatant Command, in turn, coordinates the request
with various units within the Command, which may include the Scientific
Advisor, plans and operations division, weapons systems division, and
intelligence division to provide input on such issues as the impact of
the transfer on the region. These units may further coordinate with
other offices within their units. A final coordinated Command position
is then provided to the Joint Staff NDPC member.
If any NDPC member votes not to approve a request for an exception,
there is a negotiation period for no more than 20 days. During this
time, the member that has requested the exception may propose or accept
placing different or additional conditions on the request to gain
unanimity. If agreement cannot be reached, the request is elevated to
the Chairman for a decision. Members have 10 days to appeal the
Chairman's decision or it is accepted. If a committee member appeals
the decision, the request is elevated to the Deputy Secretary or
Secretary of Defense. However, of the 330 exceptions reviewed over the
last 4 years, only 1 had been appealed and 2 denied.[Footnote 16] The
appeal and denials covered requests for weapons and technologies and
intelligence information. In addition, 5 requests for exceptions
related to weapons and technologies were withdrawn before a decision
was reached.[Footnote 17] According to DOD officials, most exceptions
are approved with limitations and conditions.
Figure 2: NDPC Review Process for Considering Exceptions to NDP:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to the military departments' reviews and the NDPC exception
process, special committee processes are set up to review requests for
sensitive technologies that may be included in a proposed transfer. For
example, if a proposed transfer includes a stealth component, the
military department submits the case to the Director of Special
Programs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics who manages low observable/
counter low observable (LO/CLO) issues (see fig. 3). Precedent
decisions, which are contained in a database, are used to determine the
releasability of the technology. Based on the level of sensitivity of
the technology involved, the case may be elevated to the Tri-Service
Committee[Footnote 18] for further review. Some controversial or
extraordinarily complex cases may require exceptions to precedent LO/
CLO policy and further elevation to the LO/CLO Executive Committee for
final decision. If needed, the Tri-Service Committee can charter a "Red
Team," which, according to DOD officials, is composed of subject matter
experts, including those from industry, academia, and the military
department laboratories. The Red Team is convened to assess the risks
associated with the proposed transfer. The Tri-Service Committee and
the Executive Committee make their decision based on their assessment
of the information provided by the military department that is
responsible for the technology and the pros and cons presented by the
Red Team, if convened.
Figure 3: Example of a Special Committee Process: Low Observable/
Counter Low Observable:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Low Observable (LO) cases are referred to the Air Force; Counter
Low Observable (CLO) and ship LO cases are referred to the Navy; and
ground vehicle cases are referred to the Army.
[B] DOD Instruction S-5230.28, Low Observable, and Counter Low
Observable Programs, October 2, 2000, governs the LO/CLO process and
determines which cases to elevate.
[End of figure]
Varying Perspectives and Broad Guidance Governing Potential Transfers
Add to the Complexity of the Review Process:
The multilayered reviews involved in the process for determining the
releasability of an advanced weapon or technology can be particularly
complex because individual entities and decision makers have varying
perspectives. For example, the combatant commanders' position may
concentrate on such issues as the effects the proposed transfer could
have on coalition warfare, political-military relations in a region,
and their plans and operations. The State Department, concerned with
U.S. foreign policy goals, tends to focus on issues such as the
proposed transfer's potential effect on the stability of the region of
the requesting country. Others may deliberate the benefits and risks of
the proposed transfer. In addition, we were told that resource issues,
including turnover of officials involved in the releasability process,
can affect the reviews. As we previously reported, military personnel
rotate, on average, every 2 years.[Footnote 19]
The guidance governing releasability adds further complexity to the
review process because it is broad and implemented on a case-by-case
basis, allowing for judgment and interpretation of the unique
circumstances surrounding each transfer. Specifically, decisions on the
release of advanced weapons or technologies must satisfy five broad NDP
criteria that are subject to interpretation. (See app. II for a
discussion of all five criteria and examples of information to be
considered for each.) For example, one criterion decision makers must
consider is whether the proposed transfer is consistent with U.S.
military and security objectives. In examining this criterion, decision
makers must address multiple factors, including how technological
advantage would be protected if the weapon or technology were sold or
transferred. According to NDPC members, the broad criteria allow for a
certain level of flexibility that is needed in determining whether an
advanced weapon should be released to a foreign country. Some NDPC
members further pointed out that this flexibility is especially
critical in the current foreign policy environment in which many
different countries are working with the United States in the war on
terrorism.
Technological Advantage and Various Safeguards Are Considered When
Determining Releasability:
One criterion NDPC must consider when determining the releasability of
advanced weapons and technologies is that the transfer must be
consistent with U.S. military and security objectives. In satisfying
this criterion, military experts involved in the NDP coordination and
review process told us they consider the effect the transfer could have
on U.S. technological advantage, along with various safeguards--both
case-specific and general--to protect this advantage.[Footnote 20] The
effectiveness of individual safeguards may be limited; however, a
variety of safeguards may be considered.
In considering technological advantage, military experts said that they
first review relevant military department documents and policies to
determine if the requested weapon or technology exceeds the technology
thresholds specified for the country making the request. If the
requested weapon or technology exceeds this threshold, the experts may
consult and coordinate with military engineers, the contractor that
manufactures the weapon or technology, the system program office, and
other operational experts to incorporate appropriate safeguards--
typically in the form of case-specific limitations and conditions--to
protect U.S. technological advantage. These include (1) sanitized or
export variants, where the released weapon or technology has a lower
operational capability or less advanced technology than what the United
States has in its inventory; (2) anti-tamper measures, where features
are built into the weapon to prevent reverse engineering such as code
encryption, and protective coatings on internal weapon components; (3)
time-phased release, where the advanced weapon or technology is not
released until the United States has fielded a better capability; and
(4) withheld information and data, where the transfer does not include
information such as software source codes. Military experts said that
program offices, in some cases, conduct verification tests and the
Defense Contract Management Agency works with contractors to ensure
that limitations and conditions are implemented before the weapon is
transferred.
Military department officials told us that in addition to case-specific
limitations and conditions, they also consider other general safeguards
to preserve U.S. military superiority. These include (1) superior U.S.
tactics and training, where military tactics for maneuvers and
operations may not be shared with other nations; (2) control of system
spare parts, where the United States can stop providing spare parts to
former allies; and (3) countermeasure awareness, where the United
States has the ability to develop measures to defeat the released
system because of its knowledge of how the system functions.
However, the effectiveness of certain individual safeguards used to
protect technological advantage may be limited for various reasons. For
example, a time-phased release may not be effective if the fielding of
a more capable weapon or technology is delayed and does not coincide
with the contractual delivery date of the weapon to be released to the
foreign government. As we reported in January 2003, schedule delays
have been pervasive in certain major acquisition programs.[Footnote 21]
The Air Force's F/A-22, the next generation fighter aircraft, for
example, was initially expected to be fielded in September 1995. As
development proceeded, the estimated fielding date was pushed out 8
years to September 2003. According to a current estimate, the F/A-22
projected fielding date has slipped another 2 years to December 2005.
In addition, factors outside of U.S. control can diminish the
effectiveness of certain individual safeguards. For example, the United
States may stop providing spare parts to former allies, but these
countries may obtain needed parts through other means, such as
"cannibalizing" parts from other weapons or obtaining parts from other
countries at a higher cost through the "grey market." Some DOD
officials told us that while certain individual safeguards may not be
as effective as desired, they consider various safeguards for each
proposed transfer to ensure technological advantage is maintained.
More Complete, Current, or Available Information Would Better Support
Determinations of Releasability:
In addition to considering technological advantage when making
releasability decisions, NDPC considers other criteria such as a
foreign government's capability to protect U.S. classified military
information, including weapons or technologies. Information such as
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) risk assessments and NDPC security
surveys can be used to validate a country's capability to provide such
protection. DOD's centralized database contains some of this
information, as well as historical case data; however, it is not always
complete, up-to-date, or easy to access. In addition, some information
such as end-use monitoring reports, which may identify countries that
have not protected U.S. military information, is not provided to NDPC.
DOD's Centralized NDP Database Was Not Complete and the Effectiveness
of the Upgrade Is Unknown:
DOD requires that NDP exception cases be recorded in a centralized
automated system to assist committee members in reviewing,
coordinating, and reaching decisions on proposals to release classified
military information.[Footnote 22] This centralized system contains
several databases, including the National Disclosure Policy System,
which tracks and assigns exception cases, records releasability
decisions, and contains historical data on exceptions.[Footnote 23]
Historical data are important for identifying weapons or technologies
that have been released to the requesting country, as well as its
neighboring countries. However, the National Disclosure Policy System
that was used to make decisions during the last 4 years contained data
only for decisions made during that time period. It did not contain
data on exceptions that were decided in prior years. In addition, it
did not allow users to conduct full text searches or to search for
specific data elements, such as exceptions by country, weapon system,
or date.[Footnote 24]
Because of limited historical data in the National Disclosure Policy
System, NDPC members told us that they could not always use it to
analyze precedent cases. To obtain historical data and other
information, the military departments have relied on their own separate
databases containing information on their departments' prior requests
for transfers. Unlike the military departments, other NDPC members do
not have their own databases. For example, the State Department has
relied on manual reviews of paper files and discussions with country
experts or other officials with knowledge of prior cases--assuming the
files still exist and the experts and officials still work at the State
Department. Because of limitations in the National Disclosure Policy
System, the NDPC Executive Secretariat has also relied on manual file
reviews to identify information necessary for preparing its annual NDP
report to the National Security Council.[Footnote 25]
To add more capability to the National Disclosure Policy System, DOD's
Policy Automation Directorate developed an upgrade that is expected to
provide historical data from 1960 to the present and enhance data query
ability. According to NDPC officials, the upgrade has taken over 3
years to develop because of other priorities, technical issues, and
limited input requested from users on the requirements and improvements
for the upgraded database. In addition, deployment of the upgraded
system was delayed several months because the upgrade had been
experiencing technical problems. For example, NDP exception cases have
been mislabeled as "current" when they were 2 years old, some cases
were missing from the system, and certain queries did not always
provide accurate results. While the upgrade has recently been deployed,
the NDPC Executive Secretariat stated that it may take about 3 to 4
months to assess its effectiveness.
CIA Risk Assessments and NDPC Security Surveys Are Often Outdated:
As part of the NDP process, the DOD Directive requires[Footnote 26]
decision makers to determine whether foreign recipients of classified
military information are capable of providing substantially the same
degree of security protection given to it by the United
States.[Footnote 27] In addition to historical precedence, decision
makers can rely on CIA risk assessments and NDPC security surveys to
make these determinations.[Footnote 28] The National Disclosure Policy
System includes information such as security surveys, but it does not
include CIA risk assessments. CIA risk assessments provide
counterintelligence risk information, including the assessment of risks
involved in releasing classified material to a foreign government. NDPC
security surveys consist of reviews of the foreign government's
security laws, regulations, and procedures for protecting classified
information. These reviews include making certain that recipients (1)
have procedures to provide clearances to personnel, restrict access to
properly cleared individuals, and report promptly and fully to the
United States any known or suspected compromises and (2) agree not to
reveal to a third party any U.S. classified military information
without prior consent of the U.S. government.
Our analysis shows that of the approximately 70 percent of countries
covered by NDP that had exceptions approved for advanced weapons and
technologies between 1997 and 2002, most have outdated or no CIA risk
assessments.[Footnote 29] Specifically, of these, 66 percent were
conducted more than 5 years ago and 12 percent have not been completed
(see fig. 4). And while 22 percent of CIA risk assessments are
currently up-to-date, our analysis shows that an overwhelming majority
of these risk assessments will be out of date by the end of 2003.
Figure 4: Dates of CIA Risk Assessments for Countries with Exceptions
Approved between 1997 and 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to the NDPC Executive Secretariat, CIA officials have been
unable to respond to some requests to update risk assessments because
of resource reductions and other agency priorities. Responding to a CIA
request, the Secretariat prioritized the top four or five assessments
that were needed in 1999. However, NDPC would like to have all
assessments updated every 2 years.
In addition, while NDPC has set a goal to perform security surveys
every 5 years, some of them are outdated while others were not
conducted. Specifically, 23 percent of these surveys are 5 years or
older and 7 percent have not been completed for countries that had
exceptions approved for advanced weapons and technologies between 1997
and 2002, (see fig. 5). And while 70 percent of security surveys are
currently up-to-date, our analysis shows that over half of these
surveys will be out of date by the end of 2003.
Figure 5: Dates of NDPC Security Surveys for Countries with Exceptions
Approved between 1997 and 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some NDPC security surveys have not been completed in a timely manner
because of lack of foreign government cooperation, and other unforeseen
circumstances, such as country unrest and limited resources. According
to NDPC officials, the scheduling of NDPC security surveys is a time-
consuming effort performed by one staff member who has other
responsibilities. In addition, security surveys are performed as a
collateral duty by the Executive Secretariat. Depending on their
availability, committee members also volunteer to assist the Executive
Secretariat in conducting the surveys.
NDPC officials also noted that in some cases, assessments and surveys
may not be needed because the system or technology requested is not
significant and the country makes infrequent requests. For example, a
country may request one weapon requiring an exception in a 20-year time
frame, negating the need for expending resources to regularly update or
conduct a CIA risk assessment or security survey for that country.
However, NDPC members told us that the CIA risk assessments and the
NDPC security surveys provide different information that is often
important for making NDPC decisions. CIA risk assessments are
particularly important for exception cases because they provide an
evaluation of a country's security forces and the risk environment of a
country that will potentially receive U.S. advanced weapon systems.
However, because the assessments are outdated, they likely do not
reflect the current conditions of the countries and therefore cannot be
relied on for deciding exception cases. Further, the upgraded National
Disclosure Policy System does not include CIA risk assessments--which
NDPC members have said would be useful to have in the new upgraded
system. According to some NDPC members, having outdated or no NDPC
security surveys may hamper efforts to determine whether a country
could protect advanced weapons and technologies from compromise.
Specifically, without these surveys, NDPC members may not be able to
identify weaknesses in the country's current systems or areas that need
improvement. In addition, the NDPC Executive Secretariat said, in some
cases, when security surveys were not prepared, decisions were made to
grant exceptions because benefits were deemed to outweigh risks.
Some Intelligence and Other Information Not Currently Provided to NDP
Decision Makers:
Once weapons have been transferred to other countries, the State
Department and the intelligence community track information on their
use and disposition. For example, a State Department-chaired committee
collects intelligence information on the illegal transfers of weapons
to third parties and transfers of non-U.S. weapons among foreign
countries. However, according to some NDPC members, this information is
used by the State Department primarily for nonproliferation purposes
and is not provided to NDPC. This information could assist NDPC members
in determining the releasability of a weapon or technology to a foreign
country because it indicates how well the country has protected
previously transferred advanced weapons and technologies. Further, this
information can provide a more accurate assessment of the types of
weapons the country receiving the illegal transfers has in its arsenal.
In addition, information from DOD's recently initiated end-use
monitoring program[Footnote 30] could also be useful in making
releasability decisions.[Footnote 31] The program will include
monitoring of sensitive defense articles, services, and technologies
that have special conditions placed on them when transferred through
the Foreign Military Sales program. However, DOD has not yet determined
the resources needed to conduct the end-use monitoring requirements
outlined in the program's policy. The end-use monitoring program
manager is expected to provide reports on end-use violations to NDPC.
Committee officials said that this information would be useful because
it would indicate how well a country is protecting the weapons and
technologies that have been transferred through the Foreign Military
Sales program.
Finally, the intelligence community sometimes obtains derogatory
information on countries that may be of interest to NDPC in making
determinations of releasability. For example, NDPC officials said that
in a recent instance an intelligence agency discovered that a country
requesting the release of an advanced weapon system did not have the
security capabilities to protect U.S. classified military information,
but did not provide this information to NDPC during the review process.
These officials stated that while such cases are not typical, this type
of information would have been useful in evaluating whether the country
provided the same degree of protection that would be provided by the
United States--a key criterion governing NDP decisions.
Conclusions:
The U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the
research and development of advanced weapons and technologies. To
protect this investment, it is important for decision makers to be
fully informed of the benefits and risks associated with the release of
such weaponry. The process for determining the releasability of
advanced weapons and technologies is necessarily complex because the
integrity of the process relies on multiple layers of decision makers
who consider numerous factors in assessing the risks involved if a
weapon is compromised or ends up in unfriendly hands. To minimize the
risks, it is critical that the decision makers have ready access to
reliable and complete information on such factors as the recipient
country's ability to protect the advanced weapon or technology. Yet the
process does not always include a systematic sharing of up-to-date
information with NDPC members. Given the turnover of military officials
involved in the NDPC process, it is especially critical that complete
and readily accessible data from the National Disclosure Policy System
database, up-to-date CIA assessments and NDPC security surveys, and
relevant intelligence information from other agencies are available to
make fully informed decisions.
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
To ensure that NDPC members have complete and accurate information in a
centralized database that facilitates coordination and decision making
on the potential release of advanced weapons and technologies, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the NDPC Executive
Secretariat to:
* evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of the upgraded National
Disclosure Policy System,
* determine with NDPC members the additional capabilities, such as
inclusion of CIA risk assessments, needed for the upgraded National
Disclosure Policy System, and:
* work with the DOD Policy Automation Directorate to address user
comments and technical problems related to the upgraded system as they
arise.
* To ensure that useful and timely information is available for making
informed release decisions, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Defense direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to:
* work with CIA to prioritize risk assessments that need to be updated,
establish a schedule for performing these assessments, and
systematically distribute the assessments to NDPC members through the
automated system or other means;
* develop a plan to be used as a business case for determining the
appropriate level of resources required to conduct needed security
surveys or if a survey cannot be conducted, ensure that an alternative
analysis of or information on the foreign government's security
capability is made available to NDPC members; and:
* identify what additional information, such as end-use monitoring
reports, would be useful to NDPC members, and establish a mechanism for
requesting this information from appropriate sources, and
systematically distribute it to NDPC members.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with a number
of our findings and recommendations but did not agree with others.
Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendations to evaluate the
upgraded National Disclosure Policy System, prioritize CIA risk
assessments that need to be updated or conducted, and identify
additional information needed to facilitate decision making. DOD did
not concur with our recommendations to investigate further the
capabilities of the upgraded National Disclosure Policy System or
establish a firm schedule for addressing technical problems with the
upgrade. DOD also did not concur with our recommendation to develop a
plan for NDPC security surveys. Further, DOD stated that our depiction
of the NDP process appears to mislead the reader about the information
available to committee members when making decisions.
At the time of our review, DOD had taken 3 years to develop an upgraded
system primarily because of limited input requested from users, which
resulted in a major redesign of the system. In addition, deployment of
the upgrade was delayed a number of times because of technical
problems. This system was deployed after our review was completed, and
we have since modified our recommendations to reflect the current
situation. In commenting on our original recommendations, DOD stated
that improvements to the upgrade cannot be identified at this time.
However, in our discussions with NDPC members, they have already
identified capabilities they would like to have in the upgrade, such as
inclusion of CIA risk assessments. Additionally, DOD stated that NDPC
personnel will identify problems with the system and bring them to the
attention of the software developers. We believe all users of the
system, including committee members and not just NDPC personnel, should
participate in the identification of technical problems to ensure that
the system is meeting user needs. Further, DOD said that developers
have quickly fixed minor software problems. We, therefore, are no
longer recommending that a firm schedule be established but rather that
technical problems be addressed as they arise.
With regard to our recommendation on a plan for NDPC security surveys,
DOD stated that it already develops a schedule for completion of such
surveys. Implementation of the schedule is largely dependent on
committee members volunteering to conduct the surveys. However, the
plan we envisioned in our recommendation would include not only a
schedule but also information such as the reason each security survey
is needed and the level of resources necessary to schedule and conduct
the survey. We believe the plan would provide an opportunity to develop
a business case to determine if dedicated resources are needed to
complete security surveys on a prioritized basis, instead of largely
relying on committee volunteers. We have modified our recommendation to
clarify its intent.
We disagree that our report misleads the reader about the sufficiency
of the information available to make decisions. Committee members we
spoke with stated that information, such as more timely CIA risk
assessments and security surveys, would allow them to make more
informed decisions. Our recommendations are intended to enhance the
information needed for the decision making process. DOD's letter and
our detailed evaluation of its comments are reprinted in appendix III.
The Department of State did not provide formal written comments;
however, a senior State official said that the report was informative.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days after its issuance. At that time, we will send copies of
this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House
Committees on Government Reform, on International Relations, and on
Armed Services and Senate Committees on Governmental Affairs, on
Foreign Relations, and on Armed Services. We will also send copies to
the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Anne-Marie Lasowski at (202)
512-4146 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this
report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Katherine V. Schinasi
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by Katherine V. Schinasi:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To ascertain the process for determining the releasability of an
advanced weapon or technology, we conducted a literature search,
reviewed the related law and regulations, and analyzed policy,
directives, and guidance governing the process. We interviewed
officials in the Departments of Defense and State, the military
departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three Combatant Commands, and
the intelligence community to understand how the interagency committee
process works for reviewing exceptions to the National Disclosure
Policy (NDP). We also obtained briefings on special committee processes
such as the Low Observable/Counter Low Observable Executive Committee
process. We analyzed military department policies and procedures for
reviewing requests for the transfer of weapons and technologies and
discussed the review and coordination processes with pertinent military
officials.
To determine if U.S. technological advantage is considered and
protected in the review process, we reviewed selected weapons transfers
records, including pertinent initial country requests; military
department, Joint Staff, and other National Disclosure Policy Committee
(NDPC) members' input and positions on the requests; and limitations
and conditions included in the final committee positions. We analyzed
the types of limitations and conditions used to protect technological
advantage and discussed these and their effectiveness with military
department experts, as well as Joint Staff officials. Through
discussions with these officials, we also identified other safeguards
that committee members consider to preserve U.S. military advantage. We
reviewed GAO and Department of Defense (DOD) reports related to these
various safeguards and specific limitations and conditions.
To identify and assess the types of information used in the process, we
reviewed the NDP and DOD's and the military departments' releasability
regulations. We interviewed officials in the Executive Secretariat for
the NDPC, the military departments, Joint Staff, and State Department
to obtain their perspectives on information required for NDP exception
decisions. We also obtained a briefing and demonstration on DOD's
centralized National Disclosure Policy System database and its upgrade
and discussed the capability of this system with various users. We
analyzed data on Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments and NDPC
security surveys performed over the last 25 years. We determined the
number of assessments and surveys that were performed more than 5 years
ago or were not completed for countries that had received exceptions to
NDP for potential weapons transfers during 1997 through 2002. We
identified additional information that may be useful to the National
Disclosure Policy Committee and discussed this with committee members.
We performed our review from June 2002 through May 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: National Disclosure Policy Criteria:
The National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) considers five criteria
when determining the releasability of classified military information,
including weapons and technologies. These criteria are broad and are
implemented on a case-by-case basis. Table 1 provides the criteria and
the types of information that decision makers consider when assessing
each criterion.
Table 1: NDP Criteria and Examples of Information to Consider for Each
Criterion:
NDP criterion: Proposed transfer must be consistent with U.S. foreign
policy and national security objectives; Examples: Officials must
reference presidential, National Security Council, or other high-level
policy decisions to justify how this criterion would be met. These
officials can consider how:; * The prospective recipient government
cooperates with the United States in pursuit of foreign policy and
political objectives; * A specific U.S. national, diplomatic, or
military purpose will be served; * The proposed release will be used
in support of mutual defense objectives.
NDP criterion: Proposed transfer must be consistent with U.S. military
and security objectives; Examples: Officials must explain how the
transfer, if compromised, will not constitute an unreasonable risk to
U.S. military technology and operational capabilities, regardless of
the intended recipient. If officials determine that risks outweigh
gains, alternatives are considered to minimize or prevent damage to
U.S. technological advantage. They consider such issues as:; * The type
of technology involved; * The impact of possible compromise; * The
susceptibility of the item to reverse engineering; * The capability of
the foreign recipient to reverse engineer the item; * The foreign
availability of the technology or equipment involved, as well as other
governments to whom similar equipment or technology has been released.
NDP criterion: Proposed transfer must result in benefits to the U.S.
equivalent to the value of the transfer; Examples: Officials must
consider contributions to U.S. political, military, or economic
objectives. They consider such contributions as:; * Standardization and
interoperability of equipment or increased defensive capability for an
ally; * Access to bases and ports owned by the recipient nation; *
Positive impacts on the U.S. industrial and technology bases when the
recipient nation funds research and development of an advanced weapon
or technology that the United States can also use; * A foreign
government's support or participation in a specified military objective
that is advantageous to the United States.
NDP criterion: Proposed transfer must depend on the foreign recipient
providing the items substantially the same degree of protection as
provided by the United States; Examples: Officials must evaluate the
proposed recipient government's intent and capability to protect U.S.
classified military information. To establish a recipient government's
intent, the U.S. government enters into a General Security of
Information Agreement or a similar security arrangement with the
recipient government. To validate the capability of the recipient
government to provide the necessary degree of protection, DOD relies
on; * embassy security assessments,; * historical precedence,; *
Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments, and/or; * NDPC security
survey reports; In the absence of an NDPC security survey, efforts
shall be made to obtain, through intelligence channels, a
counterintelligence risk assessment or security analysis of the foreign
government's security capabilities.
NDP criterion: Proposed transfer must be limited solely to information
needed to fulfill the purpose for which the transfer is made;
Examples: Officials must limit the transfer of the weapon to
information for operating and maintaining that weapon, as well as for
training on the equipment. However, other information, such as research
and development data and production data, would not be provided.
Source: DOD Directive 5230.11, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Support International Programs Security Handbook,
and discussions with NDPC members.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000:
In reply refer to: 1-03/008742-IS
June 24, 2003:
Ms. Katherine V. Schinasi:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Schinasi:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-03-694, "DEFENSE TRADE: Better Information Needed to Support
Decisions Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers," dated May 28, 2003
(GAO CODE 120151).
The National Disclosure Policy (NDP) serves as effective guidance for
developing U.S. Government positions on requests from foreign
governments and international organizations for U.S. classified
information and weapon systems. It has proven to be flexible in
responding to changes in U.S. foreign policy objectives and
international security developments by providing general guidance and
specific policy statements to the DoD Components. It is reviewed
annually by the interagency National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC)
to ensure that it conforms with changes to United States foreign policy
and that it is responsive to current international developments.
While the GAO report in general provides good marks to both the arms
transfer process and the NDP process, it appears to mislead the reader.
It indicates that the NDP process is seriously lacking an effective
automated database and updated reports and that information needed to
assess releasability is not always complete, up-to-date, or available.
This is far from true. Every request that the National Disclosure
Policy Committee (NDPC) considers during its deliberations must stand
on its own merits. All required supporting information on the issue
must be furnished to each member of the Committee for review. Issues
considered by the Committee that do not have sufficient information on
which Committee members can base a decision are returned to the
requestor without action.
In addition, the GAO report indicates that the DoD's centralized
National Disclosure Policy System database, which captures information
on proposed transfers, only contains historical data from the past four
years. The report fails to indicate that the system is a follow-on
system to a database which has been around in one form or another since
1975 with the last update activated on May 23, 2003. The GAO report
does not indicate that during its investigation that this most recent
version of the automated system was in development and had not even
been accepted for operational use. Therefore, it can only be expected
that there were glitches or problems. For the most part, many of the
system pre-deployment problems have been solved.
In view of the above, it is suggested that your team meet again with my
Director, International Security Programs to resolve any omissions or
to correct differences concerning this report. Please see the enclosed
for more detailed comments. If you have any questions concerning this
matter please contact Mr. Peter R. Batten at (703) 695-7141 or via e-
mail at battenp c@osd.pentagon.mil.
Kenneth E. deGraffereid
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Support):
Signed by Kenneth E. deGraffereid:
Enclosure As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED MAY 28, 2003 GAO CODE 120151/GAO-03-694:
"DEFENSE TRADE: Better Information Needed to Support Decisions
Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) Executive
Secretariat to determine with NDPC members what additional capabilities
and enhancements are needed for the upgraded National Disclosure Policy
System. (Page 21/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The deployment of the upgraded National
Disclosure Policy system occurred on May 23, 2003. As NDPC Executive
Secretariat personnel have used the system, they have encountered only
minor technical problems related to the system or its database. As
Committee members use the software, there is expected to be needed
improvements but those cannot be identified at this time. Overall the
system is proving to be very reliable and efficient and it has very
advanced capabilities that will help decisionmakers.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to establish a firm schedule with
the DoD automation office for addressing technical problems and user
comments related to the upgrade that have not been addressed before
deployment. (Page 21/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The deployment of the upgraded National
Disclosure Policy System occurred on May 23, 2003. There were many
difficulties encountered in achieving deployment of the system, (i.e.,
communicating and translating needs into software, reconciling multiple
databases, and personnel recalled to active duty for the war with
Iraq). However, the system employs a high integrity database and is
user-friendly. As NDPC personnel work with the system and identify
problems or required fixes, these will be brought to the attention of
the software developers. It is anticipated that the first formal post-
deployment review will be held the first week in September 2003. In the
interim, the developers have quickly fixed minor software problems.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to evaluate the accuracy and
effectiveness of the upgraded system once deployed. (Page 22/GAO Draft
Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The first formal NDPS post-deployment review is
scheduled for the first week of September 2003.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to work with the Central
Intelligence Agency to prioritize assessments that need to be updated,
establish a schedule for performing those assessments, and distribute
the assessments to NDPC members through the automated system or other
means. (Page 22/GAO Draft Report):
ENCLOSURE:
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. CIA Risk Assessments can be an important tool in
determining a country's capability to protect classified information.
These counterintelligence risk assessments are prepared by the Central
Intelligence Agency as an adjunct to the security surveys. These
assessments, which provide an evaluation of a country's security
forces, the threat and a prognosis of the risk involved in releasing
classified material, are of great assistance to the NDPC Members during
the disclosure decisionmaking process. Should resource or political
constraints preclude the NDPC from sending an NDPC security survey team
to a particular country, these risk assessments may be used as a basis
for disclosure decisions.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to develop a plan to identify the
number of surveys to be conducted annually and assess what resources
are needed to conduct the surveys or if a survey cannot be conducted,
ensure that an alternative analysis of the foreign government's
security capability be performed and made available to NDPC members.
(Page 22/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The NDPC sends teams of counterintelligence
and security professionals from member agencies and departments on
official visits to foreign countries to assess the basis for the
protection of classified information in the recipient country and to
determine whether the country has the capability to protect U.S.
classified military information in a manner that is substantially
equivalent to the protection afforded it by the United States. Security
surveys are updated periodically in order that they provide a current
basis on which the NDPC can make decisions to delegate levels of
authority to disclose classified military information. Further,
security surveys are used in formulating specific disclosure policies
pertaining to individual nations and in evaluating requests for
exception to the National Disclosure Policy. As a goal, the NDPC seeks
to survey foreign government security programs every five years. If
personnel are not available, or a mutually acceptable time for a survey
cannot be agreed upon, the period between surveys might be extended. In
cases where significant new U.S. disclosure programs with a foreign
country are taking place, or, for instance, when there are significant
changes in a foreign government's laws or political leadership, the
NDPC may seek to advance the survey schedule. The National Disclosure
Policy Committee establishes a schedule of proposed security survey
visits annually. The list of proposed security survey visits includes
the country to be visited, and the NDPC members required to support the
visit. The proposed security survey schedule covers a two-year period.
At the current time there is no known alternative analysis that can be
done that would parallel or be of similar content and use as the NDPC
security survey.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to identify what additional
information, such as end-use monitoring reports, would be useful to
NDPC members and establish a mechanism for requesting this information
from appropriate sources and distributing it to NDPC members. (Page 22/
GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. However, it should be understood that every issue
presented to the NDPC for decision must stand on its own merits. All
required supporting information on each issue must be furnished to each
member of the Committee before an issue can be deliberated. End Use
Monitoring reports and other specially prepared intelligence reports
would be a good supplement to assist in Committee deliberations on some
but not all issues.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated June 24, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. We disagree with DOD's statement that our depiction of the National
Disclosure Policy (NDP) process appears to mislead the reader about the
sufficiency of the information available to make decisions. We
accurately describe the process, but found that the information
supporting the decisions was not always complete, up-to-date, or easy
to access. We further acknowledge in the report that each request is
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. While DOD states that supporting
information must be furnished to each member of the Committee for
review, committee members we spoke with stated that information such as
more timely National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) security
surveys and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) risk assessments would
facilitate the process, thus allowing members to make more informed
decisions.
2. The National Disclosure Policy System that was used to make
decisions during the last 4 years contained data only for decisions
made during that time period. DOD indicated that this system was a
follow-on to another database containing historical data. However, some
committee members and officials told us that this older database is not
easy to use and contains only summary information. In addition, one
committee member does not have access to this database. The report
clearly states that an upgraded system has been developed. DOD asserted
that glitches and technical problems are to be expected for a system in
development. We understand that such technical problems can occur with
an upgrade. However, at the time of our review, the system had taken
over 3 years to develop, and deployment was delayed a number of times
because of technical problems and limited input requested from users.
As DOD has acknowledged, the effectiveness of the upgrade is yet to be
determined.
3. We believe that it is too early for DOD to assert that the upgraded
system has proven to be reliable and efficient, given that it will not
formally assess the effectiveness of the system until September 2003.
DOD's response acknowledges that improvements are expected but cannot
be identified at this time. However, NDPC members told us about
capabilities they wanted included in the upgrade, such as inclusion of
CIA risk assessments. We believe that DOD should be proactive in
seeking input from users about such additional capabilities needed for
the upgraded system. We have clarified our recommendation to indicate
that this information should be obtained from members after they have
had an opportunity to use the system and can assess the need for
improvements.
4. DOD acknowledged that as NDPC personnel identify problems with the
upgraded system, they will bring these problems to the attention of the
software developers. However, our recommendation was directed toward
obtaining input from all NDPC members who are users of the system, not
just NDPC personnel, to ensure that user needs are met. In addition,
DOD said that developers have quickly fixed minor software problems.
We, therefore, are no longer recommending that a firm schedule be
established but rather that technical problems be addressed as they
arise.
5. While DOD indicates that it already develops a schedule for
completion of NDPC security surveys, our recommendation is intended to
include not only a schedule but also additional information.
Specifically, we believe that a plan should also identify surveys to be
conducted and the reasons each survey is needed; establish time frames
for completing these surveys; and estimate the resources needed to
schedule and conduct these surveys. Based on this information, DOD can
develop a business case to determine if dedicated resources, instead of
committee volunteers, are needed to ensure that surveys are completed
on a prioritized basis. We have modified our recommendation to clarify
this point.
Finally, DOD states that no known alternative analysis currently exists
that would provide information comparable to that provided through the
security surveys. However, the department has acknowledged that the CIA
risk assessments may be used as the basis for decisions when a security
survey cannot be conducted. This is the type of alternative analysis
that we are referring to in our recommendation.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments:
Acknowledgments:
Anne-Marie Lasowski, Marion Gatling, John Ting, Ella Mann, Shelby S.
Oakley, Karen Sloan, Marie Ahearn, and Stan Kostyla made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] For this report, advanced weapons primarily refer to the weapons
and related technologies that DOD has designated as classified. Some
DOD officials acknowledged that unclassified items can also contain
advanced technology, such as night vision devices. However, this report
does not focus on unclassified items that are subject to U.S. export
control restrictions.
[2] Arms transfers can generally be approved through the U.S.
government's Foreign Military Sales Program or the U.S. export control
system.
[3] NDP governs the releasability of classified military information,
including classified weapons.
[4] NDP provides the classification levels for various countries that
may receive certain types of classified military information. If a
foreign country's request for advanced weapons exceeds the
classification level specified for the country, an exception to the
policy is required. In addition, exceptions are required when the
requested item is not covered in the NDP or does not comply with NDP
criteria.
[5] Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[6] 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq.
[7] According to DOD Directive 2040.2, International Transfers of
Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions, dated January 1984, direct
commercial and government sales are two methods for transferring
weapons and military technology to foreign governments. Other methods
include licensing and data exchange agreements, codevelopment and
coproduction agreements, and international meetings and symposia on
advanced technology.
[8] The Conventional Arms Transfer Policy is classified; however,
details of the policy were made publicly available through White House
Fact Sheets in February 1995.
[9] NDP was established by National Security Decision Memorandum 119,
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments
and International Organizations, July 20, 1971, as approved by the
President. It was amended by a White House memorandum dated June 6,
1978.
[10] There are eight categories of classified military information,
including military materiel and munitions, which covers advanced
weapons and technologies; intelligence information; and research and
development information.
[11] DOD Directive 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,
June 16, 1992, enclosure 3.
[12] DOD Directive 5230.11, section 4.7.
[13] For a discussion of the initiatives see Defense Trade: Analysis of
Support for Recent Initiatives, GAO/NSIAD-00-191 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 31, 2000.)
[14] Military experts are officials from various functional units such
as acquisition, plans, and weapons systems division that provide
technical input on proposed transfers.
[15] National Security Decision Memorandum 119 gives implementing
responsibility for controlling the release of classified military
information to the Secretaries of State and Defense, consulting as
appropriate with other agency heads, including the Director of Central
Intelligence.
[16] The majority of these exceptions cover requests for weapons and
technologies. The remainder includes other categories of classified
military information covered by NDP.
[17] According to DOD officials, requests are withdrawn when additional
information is needed or concerns cannot be addressed during the review
process.
[18] The Tri-Service Committee consists of colonel-level officers that
meet weekly to discuss any sensitive cases that need to be elevated to
the LO/CLO Executive Committee.
[19] Military Personnel: Longer Time Between Moves Related to Higher
Satisfaction and Retention, GAO-01-841 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3,
2001).
[20] U.S. military superiority is also addressed when NDP officials
assess criteria on U.S. military and security objectives.
[21] GAO-03-98.
[22] DOD Directive 5230.11, last updated in 1992, requires the use of
the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System, now called the
Security Policy Automation Network.
[23] Other databases include the Foreign Visit System, which contains
requests by foreign governments to visit U.S. government facilities,
and the Classified Military Information database, which contains
decisions made by disclosure officials on classified information or
material. However, the Classified Military Information database is not
kept up-to-date.
[24] Full text search capability will allow users to enter keywords and
retrieve documents on the system containing those words, thus providing
a wider search capability.
[25] This annual report discusses the effectiveness of NDP and
exceptions granted to the policy. For example, it enumerates
disclosures of classified military information to foreign recipients
that were known not to possess the capability to protect classified
military information in a manner comparable to the United States.
[26] DOD Directive 5230.11. This requirement is also specified in
U.S.C. section 2753 (a)(3) and the National Security Decision
Memorandum 119.
[27] DOD Directive 5230.11 also requires that decision makers determine
the foreign government's intent for protecting classified military
information. To establish this intent, the U.S. government enters into
a General Security of Information Agreement or a similar security
arrangement with the foreign government.
[28] DOD Directive 5230.11 also indicates that embassy security
assessments can be used to make these determinations. However, NDPC
officials we spoke with said that these assessments have not been used
because they are often not prepared.
[29] Based on discussions with NDPC officials, we define outdated
assessments to be those that are 5 years or older.
[30] End-use monitoring refers to the procedures used to verify that
foreign governments are using and controlling U.S. defense articles and
services in accordance with U.S. terms and conditions of the transfer.
Verification measures range from contacting the appropriate foreign
government representative for information to physical inspection by
U.S. personnel.
[31] Foreign Military Sales: Changes Needed to Correct Weaknesses in
End-Use Monitoring Program, GAO/NSIAD-00-208 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
24, 2000).
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