Homeland Defense
DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions Gao ID: GAO-03-670 July 11, 2003The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states. GAO was asked to review DOD's domestic missions, including (1) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ; (2) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions have changed since September 11, 2001; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act affects DOD's nonmilitary missions; and (4) the extent to which DOD's organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the current mission approach.
DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example, as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command) and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess the adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed. DOD's force structure is not well tailored to perform domestic military missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of operations that preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. While on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training value. In addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-670, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
July 2003:
Homeland Defense:
DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military
Missions:
GAO-03-670:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-670, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The way in which the federal government views the defense of the
United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001.
Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its
strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional
military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the
asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists and
hostile states.
GAO was asked to review DOD‘s domestic missions, including (1) how
DOD‘s military and nonmilitary missions differ; (2) how DOD‘s military
and nonmilitary missions have changed since September 11, 2001; (3)
how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act affects DOD‘s nonmilitary missions;
and (4) the extent to which DOD‘s organizations, plans, and forces are
adequate for domestic military missions and the consequent
sustainability of the current mission approach.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles,
duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed.
The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For
example, as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace
Defense Command orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent
terrorist attacks.
The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal
military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where
authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has
expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations
such as to assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction.
DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command)
and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it
has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess
the adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the
organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan
was only recently completed. DOD‘s force structure is not well
tailored to perform domestic military missions and may not be able to
sustain the high pace of operations that preceded and followed the
attacks on September 11, 2001. While on domestic military missions,
combat units are unable to maintain proficiency because these missions
provide less opportunity to practice the varied skills required for
combat and consequently offer little training value. In addition, from
September 2001 through December 2002, the number of servicemembers
exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased
substantially, indicating that the present force structure may not be
sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military
missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable
pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat
missions and impact future personnel retention.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD assess domestic military mission requirements
and determine what steps should be taken to structure U.S. forces to
better accomplish domestic military missions while maintaining
proficiency for overseas combat missions. DOD generally concurred with
the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Raymond J. Decker at
(202) 512-6020 or deckerr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Key Differences Between DOD's Military and Nonmilitary Missions:
The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations:
The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD's Role in Civilian
Law Enforcement:
DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military Missions,
but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Key Differences between DOD's Military and Nonmilitary
Missions:
Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD's Usage of Stop
Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S. Northern Command's Area of Responsibility:
Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds:
Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense Command:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 11, 2003:
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense's (DOD) primary mission is to deter and
prevent aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This
is accomplished through military presence and power projection.
However, the federal government's view of the defense of U.S. territory
has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. DOD has adjusted its
strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional
military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the
asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists and
hostile states.
You requested us to review DOD's domestic missions. As agreed with your
office, we (1) determined how DOD's military and nonmilitary
missions[Footnote 1] differ; (2) determined how DOD's military and
nonmilitary missions have changed since September 11, 2001;
(3) determined how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act affects DOD's
nonmilitary missions; and (4) assessed the extent to which DOD's
organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for domestic military
missions and the consequent sustainability of the current mission
approach.
To address these objectives we assessed key national and defense
strategies; DOD plans, mission orders, documents (such as training
manuals), and directives; and laws governing DOD assistance to
U.S. civilian authorities. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable
officials including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
the services and their various commands; U.S. Northern Command; and met
with units performing domestic military missions at various locations
nationwide. We analyzed Army military police and other combat unit
installation security deployments, Air Force fighter wing operational
data, and personnel tempo data.[Footnote 2] We also attended
congressional hearings that addressed the establishment of new DOD
organizations and their roles and responsibilities. Appendix I has a
complete discussion of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles,
duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. In military
missions, DOD is the lead federal agency, operates without a predefined
end date, can not reject the proposed mission, and uses combat and
combat support capabilities for their intended purposes. In nonmilitary
missions, another agency is generally the lead, the mission has a
predefined end date, and DOD has some discretion to reject the
requested mission and uses military capabilities in a noncombat manner
to augment U.S. civil authorities' capabilities. Generally, military
missions are those primary warfighting functions that DOD performs in
defense of the nation at the direction of the President functioning as
the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD
provides military capabilities in support of U.S. civil authorities.
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of catastrophic terrorism has
altered some operations of military missions. Prior to September 11,
2001, DOD emphasized deterring and defeating military adversaries
through power projection overseas and still does. However, The National
Security Strategy of the United States, published in September 2002,
calls for the United States through its military forces, if necessary,
to act preemptively against terrorist threats before they materialize
or reach the United States. Moreover, some aspects of domestic military
missions have also changed since September 11, 2001. Before that day,
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) had planned to
order Air Force units to intercept military adversaries' bombers. NORAD
still plans to do so should these threats emerge in the future.
However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders combat air patrols
over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. Also, in April 2002, the
President approved a revision to DOD's Unified Command Plan,[Footnote
3] creating the new U.S. Northern Command, which has responsibility to
militarily defend the continental United States and other nearby areas.
Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil authorities for
nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001.
The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act[Footnote 4] prohibits the direct use of
federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except
where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has
expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations. For
example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment in response to
requests from civilian law enforcement to assist with drug interdiction
and some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction.[Footnote 5]
DOD has made progress in creating new organizations and a plan to
support domestic military missions, but it is too early to assess their
adequacy. However, DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force
structure to perform these missions. As a result of the events of
September 11, 2001, the new security environment required that DOD take
appropriate actions to defend the United States at home against
terrorists, which are nontraditional adversaries. Nonetheless, some
forces are generally not well tailored to perform domestic military
missions. As a result, service-members may not be able to sustain a
high personnel tempo under the current approach.
* The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
was created to provide overall supervision of DOD's domestic military
missions. In addition, U.S. Northern Command was created to provide
unity of command for domestic military operations. However, neither was
fully operational at the time of our review. Both organizations were
identifying key staff and organizing their operations.
* U.S. Northern Command has only recently completed its campaign plan
for domestic military missions, and therefore the services have had
little time to determine what adjustments to training or equipment are
required for these missions.
* DOD has not tailored its force structure to perform domestic military
missions and may not be able to sustain the high personnel tempo that
preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. First, while
on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain
proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice
the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little
training value. Second, from September 2001 through December
2002,[Footnote 6] the number of servicemembers exceeding two
established personnel tempo thresholds increased substantially,
indicating that present force structure may not be sufficient to
address the increase in domestic and overseas military missions. As a
result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable pace that could
significantly erode their readiness to perform combat missions and
impact future personnel retention.
We are making a recommendation that DOD assess domestic military
mission requirements and determine what steps should be taken to
structure U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions.
DOD generally concurred with the need to do an assessment that is
expressed in our recommendation. However, in its comments, DOD stated
that it does not believe that an independent force structure assessment
is required to better match force structure to perceived new domestic
support requirements; rather, DOD stated, force structure changes
should be determined through the ongoing force management processes
that will culminate with the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense
Review. If DOD can incorporate a force structure assessment as part of
its ongoing force management processes, then it would generally fulfill
the intent of our recommendation. However, we believe that DOD should
examine the merits of actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the
near term. DOD's comments are presented and evaluated at the end of
this letter following our recommendation and in appendix II.
Background:
Every 4 years, as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review,[Footnote 7]
DOD conducts a comprehensive examination of the national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plan, and other elements of the defense program, and establishes
a defense program for the next 20 years. This process helps ensure that
DOD can effectively support the broader national security strategy of
the United States. The 2001Quadrennial Defense Review Report was issued
shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and outlines a
new defense strategy to (1) assure allies and friends that the United
States can fulfill its commitments, (2) dissuade adversaries from
undertaking activities that threaten U.S. or allied interests,
(3) deter aggression and coercion, and (4) decisively defeat any
adversary, if deterrence fails.
Operation Noble Eagle was an immediate response to the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; is intended to directly
defend the homeland; and is ongoing.[Footnote 8] Operation Noble Eagle
missions include combat air patrols over major American cities and
enhanced security at federal installations. A combat air patrol is an
airborne air defense activity involving fighter aircraft patrolling a
given area. To support fighter coverage, other military activities have
included aerial refueling and airborne early warning; comprehensive
radio and radar coverage of the patrolled area; and command and control
centers to direct fighter pilots when a threatening aircraft is
detected. Concerns about terrorist threats to federal installations
increased following the 9-11 attacks; therefore, DOD enhanced
installation security to harden facilities against attacks and deter
future attacks through the deployment of additional personnel (such as
military police).
In April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD's Unified
Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern
Command was activated on October 1, 2002, and is scheduled to be
fully operational on October 1, 2003. Its area of responsibility
includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the
surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, which
includes Cuba, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and
Caicos.[Footnote 9] Figure 1 displays U.S. Northern Command's area of
responsibility as indicated by the darkened boundary line.
Figure 1: U.S. Northern Command's Area of Responsibility:
[See PDF for image]
Note: U.S. Northern Command is responsible for defending Alaska;
however, U. S. forces stationed in Alaska remain assigned to
U.S. Pacific Command.
[End of figure]
U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the air, land, and maritime
defense of the continental United States. Its mission is to conduct
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed
at the United States, its territories and interests within assigned
areas of responsibility, and as directed by the President or Secretary
of Defense, provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities,
including consequence management operations.
In June 2002, the President proposed creation of the Department of
Homeland Security and in November 2002, Congress approved legislation
consolidating 22 federal agencies within the new department. In July
2002, the administration published the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, which defines homeland security as a "concerted national
effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
recover from attacks that do occur."[Footnote 10] The National Strategy
for Homeland Security broadly defines DOD's contributions to national
homeland security efforts to include the prosecution of military
missions abroad that reduce the terrorist threat to the United States;
military missions conducted within the United States that DOD conducts
under extraordinary circumstances with support, as needed, by other
agencies; and support to U.S. civil authorities under emergency
circumstances, where DOD is asked to act quickly and provide
capabilities that other agencies do not have or for limited scope
missions where other agencies have the lead.
In August 2002, DOD proposed the creation of a new Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Congress approved
it with passage of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003.[Footnote 11] The new office establishes a senior
civilian officer within the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a
principal focus on the supervision of the homeland defense activities
of DOD (i.e., the assistant secretary supervises the execution of
domestic military missions and military support to U.S. civil
authorities and develops policies, conducts analyses, provides advice,
and makes recommendations for these activities as well as emergency
preparedness and domestic crisis management matters to the Under
Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense). The assistant
secretary also supports the development of policy direction to the
Commander of U.S. Northern Command and guides the development and
execution of U.S. Northern Command plans and activities. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is also responsible for
representing DOD when interacting with federal, state, and local
government entities.
In September 2002, the President released The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America.[Footnote 12] The strategy
identifies U.S. interests, goals, and objectives vital to U.S. national
security; and explains how the United States uses its political,
economic, military, and other elements of national power to protect or
promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives identified
above.
Key Differences Between DOD's Military and Nonmilitary Missions:
Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,
acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. Generally, military
missions are those primary warfighting functions that DOD performs in
defense of the nation and at the direction of the President functioning
as the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD
provides military capabilities in support of U.S. civil authorities as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Table 1 provides
more details on the key differences.
Table 1: Key Differences between DOD's Military and Nonmilitary
Missions:
Military missions: Acts as the lead federal agency and executes orders
issued by the President functioning as the Commander-in-Chief;
Nonmilitary missions: Supports a lead federal agency as directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense.
Military missions: Performs duties under extraordinary circumstances
that do not necessarily have defined end dates; Nonmilitary missions:
Provides support on a temporary or emergency basis normally with agreed
upon termination dates.
Military missions: Cannot reject these missions; Nonmilitary missions:
Has some discretion to accept or reject these requests based on six
established criteria and uses a review process guided by DOD Directive
3025.15.[A].
Military missions: Applies military combat capabilities that only DOD
possesses; Nonmilitary missions: Augments U.S. civil authorities'
capabilities with DOD's assets or capabilities, which are applied in a
noncombat manner.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Feb. 18, 1997.
[End of table]
Military missions involve warfighting functions, such as campaigns,
engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services' combat forces.
Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples
of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic
military mission started on September 11, 2001, and ongoing today. In
the latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), to order combat air patrols
to identify and intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United
States. Because this is a military mission, DOD is the lead federal
agency and is prepared to apply its combat power, if needed.
Requests for nonmilitary missions generally seek DOD support to help
after the impact of natural or man-made disasters, or assist indirectly
with law enforcement.[Footnote 13] These requests are evaluated against
criteria contained in DOD's Directive, Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities.[Footnote 14] DOD's directive specifies that requests for
nonmilitary support be evaluated against the following criteria:
* legality (compliance with laws),
* lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),
* risk (safety of DOD forces),
* cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),
* appropriateness (whether it is in the interest of DOD to conduct the
requested mission), and:
* readiness (impact on DOD's ability to perform its primary mission).
According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over
230 nonmilitary missions, in a variety of settings, such as assisting
in fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing
support for national security special events (such as the presidential
inauguration and 2002 Olympic Games), and for other purposes. According
to DOD, during this same period, it rejected several missions based on
the above criteria. For example, in November 2001, DOD declined a
request from the U.S. Capitol Police to provide military medical
personnel; however, DOD did not indicate which criteria were used to
reach this decision.
The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations:
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist
event has altered some military operations. Before September 11, 2001,
DOD generally emphasized deterring and defeating adversaries through
overseas power projection, and still does. Since then, DOD has deployed
U.S. forces overseas to prosecute the war on terrorism in Afghanistan
and elsewhere. Moreover, The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, published after September 11, 2001, emphasizes
preventing terrorist attacks against the United States. The strategy
states that the immediate focus of the United States will be those
terrorist groups having a global reach and any terrorist or nation that
sponsors terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass
destruction. Such threats may now be subject to a preemptive strike by
U.S. military forces if necessary, to prevent these threats from
materializing or reaching the United States.
Some operations associated with domestic military missions have
also changed to proactively respond to terrorist threats. Prior to
September 11, 2001, DOD's strategy defended air, land, and sea
approaches to U.S. territory from military adversaries presumed to
originate outside the United States. If necessary, DOD had planned to
deploy U.S. military forces within the United States to counter the
military threats. DOD still plans to do so should these threats emerge
in the future. However, the current defense strategy, published in the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, states that the highest
priority of the U.S. military is to defend the homeland from attack by
any enemy, which includes terrorists. An example of how domestic
military operations have changed to meet terrorists' threats can be
seen in NORAD operations. Before September 11, 2001, NORAD primarily
focused its attention on aircraft approaching U.S. airspace and acted
to prevent a hostile aircraft from entering U.S. airspace. Since then,
NORAD has expanded its focus so that it now also monitors aircraft
operating within the United States as well as aircraft approaching
U.S. airspace. Also, before September 11, 2001, NORAD had planned to
order Air Force units to intercept military adversaries' bombers. NORAD
still plans to do so if these threats emerge in the future. However, as
of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders combat air patrols over
U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. In another example, before
the attacks of 9-11, many federal installations operated at a normal
force protection condition or routine security posture that allowed for
open access to the installations, in many cases. However, since then,
DOD has used additional military personnel to enhance security by
verifying identification of all personnel and vehicles entering the
installation and conducting patrols of critical infrastructure on the
installation. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to
DOD's Unified Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command,
which has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United
States and other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support
U.S. civil authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to
September 11, 2001.
The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD's Role in Civilian
Law Enforcement:
The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act[Footnote 15] prohibits the use of the Army
and Air Force "to execute the laws" of the United States except where
authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Federal courts have
interpreted "to execute the laws" to mean the Posse Comitatus Act
prohibits the use of federal military troops in an active role of
direct civilian law enforcement.[Footnote 16] Direct involvement in law
enforcement includes search, seizure, and arrest.[Footnote 17] The act
does not apply to military operations at home or abroad, and it does
not apply to National Guard personnel when under the direct command of
states' governors.
Congress has authorized DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a
number of circumstances, for example, to:
* assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions:
* (10 U.S.C. §124 and 10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding 375));
* protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the
Insurrection Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334);[Footnote 18]
* assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes);
* protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving
nuclear materials (18 U.S.C. §831);
* assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction (10 U.S.C. §382); and:
* assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws
(42 U.S.C. §§97-98).
The President identified as a major homeland security initiative a
review of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic
security, which would include a review of the Posse Comitatus Act. The
President maintained that the "threat of catastrophic terrorism
requires a thorough review of the laws permitting the military to act
within the United States in order to determine whether domestic
preparedness and response efforts would benefit from greater
involvement of military personnel and, if so, how."[Footnote 19] In
addition to this review, Congress directed DOD to review and report on
the legal implications of members of the armed forces operating on
U.S. territory and the potential legal impediments affecting DOD's role
in supporting homeland security.[Footnote 20] In March 2003, the
Commander of U.S. Northern Command stated, "We believe the [Posse
Comitatus] Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our
job, and no modification is needed at this time."[Footnote 21]
According to DOD, on May 29, 2003, DOD informed Congress of the results
of its legal review, which concluded that the President has sufficient
authority to order the military to provide military support to civilian
law enforcement authorities, when necessary. DOD does not believe that
the Posse Comitatus Act would in any way impede the nature or
timeliness of its response.
DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military Missions,
but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made:
In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new
organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military
missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, required that the nation,
including DOD, take extraordinary actions on that day. In the new
security environment, DOD continues to defend the United States at home
against terrorists, which are nontraditional adversaries. We could not
assess the adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the
time of our review because the organizations were not yet fully
operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed.
However, DOD has not evaluated its force structure for domestic
operations and these forces remain organized, trained, and equipped to
fight overseas military adversaries. Domestic military missions provide
less opportunity to practice varied skills required for combat and
consequently offer limited training value; thus, some forces have not
been tailored to perform their domestic military missions. In addition,
servicemembers are experiencing high personnel tempo. These factors
indicate that the current mission approach may not be sustainable and
risks eroding readiness.
New DOD Organizations to Address Domestic Military Missions Were
Not Yet Fully Operational:
Two new organizations--the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command--together provide long-
term policy direction, planning, and execution capability, but were
not yet fully operational at the time of our review, because they had
only recently been established and were not fully staffed. First, the
Senate confirmed the President's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The assistant secretary
is to provide overall supervision for domestic military missions and
military support to U.S. civil authorities. This office was not fully
operational at the time our review was completed, with approximately
two-thirds of the staff positions vacant. Second, U.S. Northern Command
was activated only in October 2002 and was not planned to be fully
operational before October 2003. As of mid-April 2003, only 46 percent
of U.S. Northern Command's staff positions had been filled. According
to a U.S. Northern Command official, the command was grappling with the
need to conduct its ongoing missions while staffing the command's
remaining positions. The activation of U.S. Northern Command provides
unity of command for military activities within the continental United
States. Prior to U.S. Northern Command's activation, U.S. Joint Forces
Command provided military forces to defend U.S. territory from land-and
sea-based threats while NORAD defended the United States from airborne
threats (and still does). The Commander of U.S. Northern Command is
also the Commander of NORAD, thereby providing unity of command for
air, land, and sea missions.
The U.S. Northern Command Campaign Plan Was Recently Issued:
DOD's planning process requires DOD and the services to staff, train,
and equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign
plans and deliberate plans[Footnote 22] developed by the combatant
commanders, including the Commander of U.S. Northern Command.
U.S. Northern Command's campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and
is classified. Since the plan was only recently completed, the services
have had little time to determine if training and equipment adjustments
were needed to support the plan.
Forces Continue to Reflect an Overseas Emphasis and May Not Be Able to
Sustain Current Personnel Tempo:
DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally
remains organized, trained, and equipped to fight military adversaries
overseas. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform
domestic military missions. When performing domestic military missions,
combat units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat
skills[Footnote 23] through practice in normal training. Domestic
missions to date generally have required only basic military skills and
thus offered limited training value--which can have an adverse affect
on unit readiness. In our review, we found that four Army military
police combat units guarding federal installations in the United States
could not train for battlefield conditions, as the Army requires.
Similarly, Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air
patrols were inhibited from executing the full range of difficult,
tactical maneuvers with the frequency that the Air Force requires.
Moreover, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of
personnel exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds
increased substantially, an indicator that the present force structure
may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas
military missions. To prevent significant near-term attrition from the
force, a key concern during periods of high personnel tempo, DOD has
used its stop loss authority to prohibit servicemembers affected by the
order from leaving the service. Under high personnel tempo, U.S. forces
could experience an unsustainable pace that may lead to an erosion of
unit readiness for combat if servicemembers leave the service.
Forces' Skills Are Mismatched with Needs of Domestic Military Missions,
and Some Forces Lose Critical Training Opportunities:
While on domestic military missions, some servicemembers cannot
practice their primary combat training to maintain proficiency. During
Operation Noble Eagle, DOD provided enhanced domestic installation
security and combat air patrols, both of which generally require only
basic military skills but offer little opportunity to practice the
varied combat skills needed for wartime proficiency. As a result,
military readiness may erode. According to Army and Air Force
officials, because combat skills for these units are perishable, to
maintain or regain proficiency, a resumption of normal combat training
may be required before subsequent overseas deployment.
Army training focuses on combat mission performance that replicates
battlefield conditions. To acquire the skills necessary for combat,
each unit commander establishes a mission essential task list
consisting of critical tasks that the unit needs to be proficient on to
perform its overseas wartime mission. However, the four military police
units that we reviewed were often unable to train and, thus, they were
unable to maintain proficiency for their required mission essential
tasks due to the long Operation Noble Eagle deployments. For example,
one unit could not practice for two of its mission essential tasks--to
establish and sustain an internment and resettlement facility, and
process and account for internees--that it performs in combat. In
another example, two military police units could not practice their
combat skills, which include providing battlefield control of roads and
logistical pipelines. Instead, the four Army military police units from
the active, reserve, and National Guard we reviewed were generally
guarding gates, checking identification, inspecting vehicles, and
conducting security patrols of critical installation infrastructure,
such as command and control centers, and housing, shopping, and
recreation areas.
Moreover, we found that some Army servicemembers on Operation
Noble Eagle deployments used skills unrelated to their normal missions.
Consequently, their units' combat proficiency may be at risk.
Specifically, the Army provided over 8,100 Army National Guard
personnel from about 100 units to provide installation security at
domestic Air Force bases. However, only one unit, a military police
unit, had primary skills relevant to the mission; the remaining units
were comprised of field artillery, engineer, and infantry personnel
that have specialized combat skills such as providing fire support to
tactical combat units; rehabilitating the combat zone to enhance lines
of supply and communication; and destroying or capturing the enemy or
repelling enemy assaults by fire. None of these units needed its combat
skills on its Operation Noble Eagle missions.
Similarly, the domestic combat air patrol mission represents another
instance where servicemembers cannot always practice their primary
combat training for proficiency. To maintain their warfighting skills,
fighter pilots perform training sorties when not deployed abroad.
Training sorties involve the employment of tactical maneuvers, and the
use of weapons or weapons simulators against other aircraft or ground
targets. For example, an offensive counterair-training sortie is
designed to train for destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air
and missile threats located in enemy territory. When on a domestic
combat air patrol, a pilot may gain some training benefit by performing
certain activities, such as an aerial refueling or a night landing.
However, according to several Air Force officials, domestic combat air
patrols do not constitute adequate training for overseas combat
missions. For example, one Air Force official said that combat air
patrols involve little more than making left turns flying in a circle
in contrast to the difficult, tactical, defensive, and offensive
maneuvers performed while on a training sortie or possibly on a
combat mission.
Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols are
inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical
maneuvers with the frequency that the Air Force requires to maintain
proficiency for their combat missions. For example, in one of the seven
most heavily tasked Air National Guard fighter wings,[Footnote 24] the
average pilot was unable to meet training requirements in 9 out of 13
months between September 2001 and September 2002.[Footnote 25] Another
wing reported that Operation Noble Eagle had resulted in a 5-month
period when no training was performed. Even a short-term tasking can
inhibit training needed to maintain combat proficiency. According to
Air Force officials, three training sorties are generally lost for
every short-notice, 4-hour domestic combat air patrol performed.
To mitigate the impact on pilot readiness, the Air Force rotates the
units tasked to perform domestic combat air patrols when a continuous
airborne alert posture[Footnote 26] is required. In doing so, the Air
Force has sought to ensure that all fighter units are able to train
sufficiently for overseas combat missions, thereby preserving
flexibility in the use of these units for both domestic combat air
patrols and for combat missions overseas. However, it is unclear
whether managing the force structure in this way fully mitigates the
impact on pilot training, particularly during periods of frequently
performed domestic combat air patrol missions. According to one Air
Force official, under the current force structure, domestic combat air
patrols operating at levels experienced in the months after
September 11, 2001, would not be sustainable for more than a few weeks
before the units began suffering severe training effects and thus an
erosion in military readiness.
DOD is undertaking planned changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting
System, which are designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and
civil support missions on the readiness of forces to execute their
warfighting mission. In March 2003,[Footnote 27] we reported that as of
January 2003, DOD had not developed an implementation plan for the
Defense Readiness Reporting System that contained measurable
performance goals, identified resources, suggested performance
indicators, or included an evaluation plan to assess progress in
developing this system. Even though the new system may have the
potential to improve readiness reporting, without an implementation
plan there is little assurance that the new system will actually
improve readiness assessments by the time of its expected full
capability, in 2007. Without such a plan, it will also remain difficult
to gauge progress toward meeting the 2007 target date. DOD did not
agree with the recommendations from our March 2003 report that it (1)
develop an implementation plan with, among other things, performance
goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and (2) provide
annual updates to Congress on the new readiness reporting system's
development. However, as stated in the March 2003 report, we retained
those two recommendations because we continue to believe that it is
important for DOD to develop an implementation plan to gauge progress
in developing and implementing the new readiness reporting system and
to provide annual updates to Congress.
High Army and Air Force Personnel Tempo Also Indicates a Potential
Imbalance in Force Structure:
Personnel tempo data indicate that the current mission approach is
significantly stressing U.S. forces. Between September 2001 and
December 2002, personnel tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air
Force personnel due to ongoing missions or commitments around the world
and increasing support for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring
Freedom.[Footnote 28] DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too
much time away from home, a risk exists that they will leave the
service and that military readiness may ultimately suffer.
Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces
is engaged in their official duties that makes it infeasible to spend
off duty time at the member's home, home port (for Navy
servicemembers), or in the member's civilian residence (for reserve
components' personnel). The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000[Footnote 29] requires that DOD formally track and
manage for the number of days that each member of the armed forces is
deployed, and it established two thresholds--servicemembers deployed
more than 182 or 220 days away from home out of the preceding 365 days.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001[Footnote
30] established a third threshold, which requires that servicemembers
who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the preceding 730-day (2-
year) period receive a $100 high deployment per diem
allowance.[Footnote 31]
DOD data indicate that tempo is high and increasing for active,
reserve, and National Guard personnel. For example, in September 2001,
over 6,600 Army personnel had exceeded the first threshold, spending
182 to 219 days away from home during the previous 365 days. By
December 2002, that number had risen to over 13,000 (of which Army
Reserve and Army National Guard personnel represented about
20 percent). During the same period, the number exceeding the second
threshold and spending 220 to 365 days away had risen from about 800 to
over 18,000 (which was comprised of about 75 percent Army Reserve and
Army National Guard personnel), as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers
away from home in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of
the month indicated.
[End of figure]
The number of Army personnel exceeding the third threshold of 401 or
more days away from home in the preceding 730 days increased slightly,
starting at about 650 in September 2002 and rising to about 990 (of
which about 35 percent were Army Reserve and Army National Guard
personnel) in December 2002.
The Air Force reported similar trends. In September 2001, about 2,100
Air Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 to 219 days, but
that had risen to about 8,300 (which were comprised of about 75 percent
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel) by December 2002.
Also, as with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days
had risen from about 1,600 to over 22,100 (of which Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard personnel represented about 70 percent), as
shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers
away from home in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of
the month indicated.
[End of figure]
The number of Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo
threshold of 401 or more days away from home in the preceding 730-day
period also increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at
about 3,700 in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100 (of which
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel represented about
65 percent) in December 2002.
DOD believes that the potential exists for retention problems stemming
from high personnel tempo. To prevent servicemembers with key skills
from leaving the services, DOD issued 23 orders since September 11,
2001, to prevent erosion in combat capabilities that may stem from
attrition, an action known as stop loss authority.[Footnote 32] These
orders affected personnel with designated individual job skills or, in
some cases, all of the individuals in specific types of units that were
critical for overseas combat and domestic military missions. However,
many of the stop loss orders had been terminated since September 11,
2001. For example, the Navy's individual stop loss order went into
effect on April 27, 2003, and subsequently the Navy terminated this
order in mid-May 2003. Table 2 shows the estimated number of personnel
affected by the stop loss orders in effect as of April 30, 2003.
Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD's Usage of Stop
Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003:
Army unit orders:
Active; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 230,000; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past
their separation date: 3,500; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 17,000.
Reserve; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 66,700; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: [A]; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: [A].
National Guard; Estimated numbers of personnel under
stop loss orders: 80,100; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past
their separation date: [A]; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: [A].
Army individual job skill order[B]:
Active; Estimated numbers of
personnel under stop loss orders: 42,000; Numbers of personnel
involuntarily held past their separation date: 3,800; Services'
estimated numbers of additional personnel potentially affected by
stop loss orders who could retire or whose service contracts expire if
the orders remain in effect from May 1, 2003, through: September 30,
2003: 3,800.
Reserve; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 40,400; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: 10,000; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 12,300.
National Guard; Estimated numbers of personnel under
stop loss orders: 3,200; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past
their separation date: 1,400; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 1,600.
Air Force individual job skill order[B]:
Active; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 11,000; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: [C]; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 4,700.
Reserve; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 3,900; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: [C]; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 1,600.
Navy individual job skill order[B]:
Active; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 11,000; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: [D]; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 1,500.
Reserve; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 3,000; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: [D]; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: [D].
Marine Corps unit order:
Active; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 175,000; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past
their separation date: 3,000; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 14,400.
Reserve; Estimated numbers of personnel under stop
loss orders: 39,600; Numbers of personnel involuntarily held past their
separation date: 500; Services' estimated numbers of additional
personnel potentially affected by stop loss orders who could retire or
whose service contracts expire if the orders remain in effect from May
1, 2003, through: September 30, 2003: 1,100.
Source: Military services' data.
Notes: All estimates are rounded to the nearest hundred.
[A] The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not have
information management systems that can identify these numbers.
[B] Data on Army Reserve and Army National Guard for individual job
skill and unit stop loss orders are not maintained separately.
Consequently, the estimates for Army National Guard and reserve stop
loss under individual job skills and unit orders may reflect double
counting of individuals and we could not correct for the double
counting.
[C] We provide estimates for the Air Force stop loss order as of May 2,
2003, because the order went into effect on that date and no service
member was held past their separation date on April 30, 2003.
[D] In mid-May 2003, the Navy terminated its individual job skill stop
loss order that had gone into effect on April 27, 2003. Even though the
Navy terminated its stop loss order, we provide the Navy's estimates to
demonstrate the impact if the order had remained in effect. Also, if
the Navy's stop loss order had remained in effect, according to a Navy
official, mobilized Navy reservists would not have had separation dates
from May 2003 through September 2003 because they must be able to serve
13 months on active duty, and the order went into effect on April 27,
2003.
[End of table]
Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these
orders cautioned that they are short-term tools designed to maintain
unit-level military readiness for overseas combat and domestic military
missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be
used as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in
capabilities and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine
recruiting, induction, and training of new servicemembers.
Conclusions:
DOD must balance domestic and overseas missions with a renewed emphasis
on homeland defense. Moreover, current operations both home and abroad
are stressing the forces, as shown in personnel tempo data.
Complicating the situation is the fact that some units are not well
structured for their domestic missions, cannot practice the varied
skills needed to maintain combat proficiency while performing domestic
missions, and receive little training value from their assigned
domestic duties. Therefore, military force readiness may erode and
future personnel retention problems may develop, if action is not taken
to address these problems.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess domestic military
mission requirements and determine if steps should be taken to
structure U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions
while maintaining proficiency for overseas combat missions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our
recommendation. DOD stated that our draft report provides an accurate
assessment of DOD's need to balance its domestic and overseas mission
with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense. DOD added that our draft
report describes the stress that high operational tempo could have on
personnel. However, in its comments, DOD stated that it does not
believe that an independent force structure assessment is required to
better match force structure to perceived new domestic support
requirements; rather, DOD stated that force structure changes should be
determined through the ongoing force management processes that will
culminate with the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD
can incorporate a force structure assessment as part of its ongoing
force management processes, then it would generally fulfill the intent
or our recommendation.
However, we believe that DOD should examine the merits of taking
actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term rather than
wait until the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review because the
missions causing the stress are continuing. Based on our analysis of
personnel tempo trends through December 2002 and on discussions with
officials conducting domestic military missions, we believe that U.S.
military force readiness may erode because of the poor match between
the types of forces needed for the domestic military missions we
reviewed, the forces available, and the limited training value derived
from the missions. Moreover, future personnel retention problems may
develop in the meantime due to the pace of operations, which
consequently may become unsustainable. Additionally, current
operations in Iraq, which were not considered in our analysis of
military personnel tempo data, can be expected to impact a significant
portion of the military force structure for the foreseeable future.
Lastly, homeland defense missions are another factor of military
personnel tempo because these missions are ongoing. Therefore, we
believe our recommendation is valid as originally drafted. DOD's
comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our evaluation of
them. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
We conducted our review from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that
time, we will send copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also
make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report please call
me at (202) 512-6020 or e-mail me at deckerr@gao.gov. The GAO contact
and key contributors are listed in appendix III.
Raymond J. Decker
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Raymond J. Decker:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the Department of Defense's (DOD) military
and nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since
September 11, 2001, we conducted in-depth interviews with officials
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited
to the Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the Special
Assistant for Homeland Security,[Footnote 33] the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the General
Counsel; the Joint Staff's J-3 Directorate for Operations and J-5
Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy; U.S. Joint Forces Command's
Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security;[Footnote 34] the
Director of Military Support; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; the
National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the Army and Air
National Guard. We visited and met with officials from U.S. Northern
Command, who also provided detailed responses to our written questions,
which we analyzed and used to continue a dialogue with the officials.
We also analyzed documents prepared by U.S. Northern Command and the
Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security. We reviewed DOD
directives that govern civil support missions, including DOD Directive
3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities issued January 15, 1993,
and DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
issued February 18, 1997. Also, we analyzed Director of Military
Support data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to learn about the types of
nonmilitary support that DOD provided to federal agencies. To better
understand DOD's missions, we reviewed key documents such as the
Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and the Congress
for 2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, The National
Security Strategy of the United States, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, and the defense strategy issued as part of the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
To more fully understand the legal context of DOD's civil support
missions in the United States, we reviewed laws and defense directives
relevant to DOD's civilian support activities. We also examined the
1878 Posse Comitatus Act and its restrictions on direct DOD assistance
to civilian law enforcement. We identified and examined a series of
statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. In addition, we
reviewed DOD's directives governing civil support missions and
assistance to law enforcement to identify DOD's criteria for accepting
or rejecting requests for such assistance.
To assess whether DOD's organizations, plans, and force structure are
adequate to address domestic military missions, we identified DOD's new
organizations and responsibilities with DOD officials and visited the
U.S. Northern Command, reviewed plans, and compared the types of
domestic missions performed by the forces with their primary missions.
Specifically for DOD's organizations, we reviewed appropriate
documents, including the U.S. Northern Command Campaign Plan and the
April 2002 revision to the Unified Command Plan, and we discussed
organizational changes with knowledgeable officials throughout DOD. We
also attended several congressional hearings that addressed the
establishment of new organizations and their roles and
responsibilities. With respect to understanding how plans address DOD's
domestic missions, we reviewed our prior audit work related to the
review of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and risk
management. Also, we discussed DOD's planning process with an official
at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at U.S. Northern Command
and we discussed the development of the campaign plan with
U.S. Northern Command officials. To obtain an understanding of whether
forces performing domestic military missions are tailored to perform
these missions, we selected two Operation Noble Eagle missions
performed in the continental United States by DOD forces since
September 11, 2001. Specifically, we reviewed installation security
provided by Army military police units and combat air patrols flown by
Air Force fighter units. We selected these specific missions because:
(1) Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security officials indicated
that Army military police combat units were deploying at high rates due
to the events of September 11, 2001, and (2) the combat air patrol
mission was the first domestic military mission performed under
Operation Noble Eagle.
* To understand installation security missions, we interviewed
officials at U.S. Forces Command; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. We also visited and
interviewed officials at military police combat units that deployed for
these missions, including an Army active duty combat support
company, an Army Reserve internment and resettlement battalion, and
an Army National Guard guard company. We also conducted a 2-day
videoconference with command officials from an Army National Guard
combat support company. We analyzed documentation such as briefings,
mission orders, and training documents from the four units. We selected
these military police units judgmentally based on the deployment data
received from U.S. Forces Command, taking into consideration the number
of days the units had performed installation security; the number of
personnel deployed on the missions; the type of military police unit
involved; whether the unit was from the active Army, Army Reserve, or
Army National Guard; and whether the unit completed its mission or
would do so prior to the conclusion of our review. To better understand
whether the skills required for installation security were well matched
to the unit's primary wartime missions, we compared the required combat
training for these units to the types of duties they routinely
performed for enhanced installation security. Further, we reviewed Army
training regulations and manuals. We also analyzed data pertaining to
the Army National Guard deployments to Air Force installations in the
continental United States. We determined the types of units that
deployed on these missions, including those most frequently deployed,
and we examined the primary combat training requirements these units
must perform to maintain combat proficiency in their particular
specialties.
* To gain first-hand information about the combat air patrols, we
interviewed officials at active duty Air Force and Air National Guard
units that performed combat air patrol missions, and analyzed extensive
operational, training, and maintenance data. To gain an understanding
about operational requirements and command and control issues for
combat air patrol missions, we interviewed officials at the Department
of the Air Force; the Air National Guard; the Air Force Reserve
Command; the Air Combat Command; the Continental United States Region,
North American Aerospace Defense Command; and North American Aerospace
Defense Command. We selected units to visit based on their
participation in combat air patrols since September 11, 2001. We
obtained and analyzed flying hours and sortie data for fiscal years
2001 and 2002 for fighter (F15 and F16) wings from Air Combat Command,
the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. We also
obtained and reviewed Air Force training instructions and unit training
performance reports.
* To determine if military personnel experienced increases in time away
from home while performing official military duties, we reviewed data
for personnel tempo for each of the military services and their
respective reserve components for the period October 1, 2000, through
December 31, 2002 (the latest data available). The services report
their data to the Defense Manpower Data Center under the direction of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We obtained
the Army's data directly from the Army Personnel Command because at the
time of our review, the Defense Manpower Data Center did not have the
Army's recent data in its information management system. To gain
further insight into the personnel tempo data, we conducted in-depth
interviews with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and the
Departments of the Army and the Air Force. We also reviewed DOD's use
of stop loss authority by obtaining the stop loss orders and estimates
of affected personnel from officials in the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, and each of the military
services. We discussed the estimates with the officials to determine
the most appropriate way to demonstrate the impacts of stop loss
orders.
We reviewed the data provided by the Army, Army Reserve, Army National
Guard, Air National Guard, Air Force, Defense Manpower Data Center, and
Army Personnel Command for completeness and reliability. For the
analysis of flying hours and military police deployments, we found and
corrected some errors in the data. Specifically, we found errors in the
Air Force's flying hour records and corrected the data by incorporating
data provided by the affected unit. For military police deployments we
found duplicate deployments in some cases and eliminated the duplicate
records.
For the analysis of Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Navy personnel
tempo data, we found and corrected some errors where possible, and did
not use the data or specific fields where the data were unreliable or
we could not correct the problems. Specifically, for the Air Force
data, we eliminated duplicate records and deleted all records of
personnel who had overlapping duty dates. For all services, where the
personnel tempo end date was missing, we assumed the personnel were
still away from home and set the end date to a date after our analytic
period. To the extent that the missing date represents completed duties
where the end date had not been entered, we are overstating the number
of personnel and the extent of days away from home.
Through corroborating evidence from comparisons with other DOD data
files and our corrections, we confirmed that the data we used present a
reliable depiction of the active Army, Army Reserve, Army National
Guard, active Air Force, and Air National Guard units involved in
Operation Noble Eagle activities; and Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps personnel deployments from October 1, 2000, to December 31, 2002.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Assistant Secretary of Defense
2600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2600
Mr. Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities & Management
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
30 JUN 2003:
Mr. Decker:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on your draft report,
"Homeland Defense: DoD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions." The Department of Defense generally agrees
with your assessment of DoD's need to balance its domestic and overseas
missions with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense, and your
recognition of the stress that high operational tempo can have on
personnel. However, DoD is now studying and implementing significant
changes in the force structure to better support civil authorities
during domestic events.
It is important for the report to note that DoD military forces are not
first responders. Rather, DoD provides support as directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense using defense capabilities to
assist other federal, state, and local authorities in response to their
requests. Accordingly, DoD is not the primary or long-term solution to
the nation's domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements.
As the Congress has directed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, this
is a role more appropriate for other federal departments and agencies.
Such authorities must be encouraged and assisted to build a more robust
response structure of their own.
Additionally, the report does not mention the planned changes to the
Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). The DRRS changes are
designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and civil support
missions on the readiness of forces to execute their warfighting
mission. DoD requests that the report be updated to reflect this
information.
To assist you in finalizing the report, we have attached comments and
technical corrections for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Paul McHale:
Signed by Paul McHale:
DoD comments on GAO Job Code 350225/GAO-03-670 "Homeland Defense: DoD
Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S Forces for Domestic Military
Missions":
RECOMMENDATION: GAO recommends that DoD assess domestic military
mission requirements and determine if steps should be taken to
structure U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions
while maintaining proficiency for overseas combat missions.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. In general, the draft report makes an
accurate assessment of DoD's need to balance its domestic and overseas
missions with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense. It also points
out the stress that high operational tempo can have on personnel.
However, DoD does not believe that an independent force structure
assessment is required to better match force structure to perceived new
domestic support requirements. Rather, changes to force structure
should be determined through the ongoing force management processes
that will culminate with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) FY05.
* The NORTHCOM Commander has only recently identified requirements. The
Command's campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and the Services
have had little time to determine if structure adjustments are
necessary to support the plan. The Command will not be fully
operational until October 2003.
* Requirements and adjustments will be addressed in recurring strategic
documents such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the
Forces For the Unified Commands document (Forces For). The JSCP FY04
will apportion forces to NORTHCOM based on the campaign plan, and the
entire defense strategy. Forces For FY04 will assign forces to NORTHCOM
based on the Commander's requirements and the Service capabilities.
* The QDR FY05 will address the shortcomings identified throughout this
process, for the long term. DoD conducts the QDR, in part, to examine
force structure in light of the defense strategy. Over time, force
structure will better match requirements, to include homeland security
requirements, as a result of the ongoing force management processes.
GENERAL COMMENTS:
* The report's title and language on page 13 imply that the DoD has not
conducted studies or recommended changes in force structure to support
civil authorities in the past. DoD has several ongoing efforts looking
at the homeland security mission as well as reviewing our global
engagement posture in light of the change to our National Security
Strategy. DoD has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to
encompass traditional military threats from hostile states, asymmetric
threats posed by terrorists, and asymmetric threats posed by hostile
states.
* The report uses non-standard terminology. It refers to military
missions (what DoD calls homeland defense) and non-military missions
(support to civil authorities). In fact, the military/non-military
distinction is not always so clearly delineated.
* DoD believes that it is not clear that homeland defense and support to
civil authorities missions are key factors in high personnel tempo.
Since 9/11/01, increased requirements:
have been driven more significantly by overseas operations such as
those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the global war on
terrorism.
* The Services typically have dealt with the problem of operational
tempo by rotating units to maintain combat readiness.
* Specifically, the Navy is implementing its Fleet Response Plan (FRP).
The FRP is a significant change from the past focus on rotational
deployments and forward presence, to one of providing a responsive
force capable of surging to meet the tasking of the President and
Secretary while maintaining a forward presence.
* Activities such as mobilization and preparation for war will almost
certainly have an impact on the resources available to respond to
homeland defense and support to civil authorities missions. The report
leaves the inaccurate impression that this situation is the norm. It is
important to note that even during Operation Iraqi Freedom, over
200,000 soldiers and airmen were still available after the
mobilization.
* The report fails to emphasize that DoD military forces are not first
responders and that DoD is not the long-term solution to the nation's
domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements. DoD is
engaged in domestic incidents only when directed by the President or
the Secretary of Defense. The report also fails to take the opportunity
to recommend a solution involving the fostering of a more robust state
and local response structure.
* When identifying Title 10 statutes that allow federal forces to
perform domestic law enforcement missions, the report does not make
clear that these missions are based on worst case scenarios and are not
the norm. DoD undertakes support to civil authorities missions only at
the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
* The report does not mention the planned changes to the Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). The DRRS changes are designed to
assess the impact of homeland defense and civil support missions on the
readiness of forces to execute their warfighting mission. The DRRS is
programmed for implementation this year with an initial operating
capability of FY04 and full operational capability for FY07. The
changes to the readiness reporting system will provide visibility on
the readiness of all our forces, to include the joint community and the
defense agencies, and the impact of current missions assigned on the
readiness to those forces. DoD requests that the report be updated to
reflect this information.
* Language on page 14 states that "Domestic missions to date generally
have required only basic military skills and thus offered limited
training value..." DoD disagrees. Basic military skills require
practice just as do the more sophisticated skills. Domestic missions do
not degrade readiness as long as they remain limited in scope and
duration. There is ample time to perform proficiency training on more
sophisticated skills prior to operational employment in non-domestic
situations.
* The conclusion (page 24) states that "some units are not well
structured for their domestic missions, cannot practice the varied
skills needed to maintain combat proficiency while
performing domestic missions, and receive little training value from
their assigned domestic duties." Temporary reduction of a unit's
effectiveness for its primary mission due to homeland security or
peacekeeping mission assignments is not necessarily a bad thing. The
ability of units to prepare for and execute a variety of missions with
inherent capabilities adds flexibility and enhances responsiveness to a
wide range of possible scenarios and contingencies.
Numerous references throughout the report confuse the interpretation
and application of the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to the use of
the military to enforce the laws of the United States. The President or
Congress may authorize the use of the military to enforce the law.
* The report indicates that DoD did not complete a congressionally
directed legal review on the use of military forces in the U.S. and any
legal impediments affecting DoD's role in supporting homeland security.
DoD has completed this review, and informed the Congress on May 29,
2003 that the working group concluded that the President has sufficient
authority to order the military to provide military support to civilian
law enforcement authorities, when necessary. DoD does not believe that
the Posse Comitatus Act would in any way impede the nature or
timeliness of its response.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated June 30, 2003.
GAO Comments:
1. DOD stated that it is now studying and implementing significant
changes in the force structure to better support civil authorities
during domestic events. First, during our audit we were not presented
with evidence of such studies as they relate to either civil support or
homeland defense missions. Second, in our follow-up conversation with a
DOD official concerning this statement, the DOD official did not
provide specific information about the scope, content, or completion
dates of the studies. Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its
strategic and operational focus to encompass traditional military
threats from hostile states, asymmetric threats posed by terrorists,
and asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. Our draft report
acknowledged the shifts for traditional military threats and the
asymmetric threats posed by terrorists. Based on DOD's comment, we
added asymmetric threats posed by hostile states.
2. DOD stated that it is important for the report to note that DOD
military forces are not first responders. Rather, DOD provides support
as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense using defense
capabilities to assist other federal, state, and local authorities in
response to their requests. Additionally, DOD stated that our report
fails to emphasize that DOD is not the long-term solution to the
nation's domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements. Our
report clearly states that DOD assesses requests from civil authorities
based upon its own criteria from DOD Directive 3025.15, Military
Assistance to Civil Authorities, and that DOD has some discretion to
accept or reject these requests. Moreover, DOD suggested that we use
this opportunity to recommend a solution involving the fostering of a
more robust state and local response structure. We disagree. We did not
comment on such a solution in our draft report because this type of
assessment was outside the scope of our review. Ultimately, the
President and Congress will determine the future role of DOD, if any,
in domestic response missions.
3. DOD commented that our draft report does not mention the planned
changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting System. According to DOD,
the system's changes are designed to assess the impact of homeland
defense and civil support missions on the readiness of forces to
execute their warfighting mission. At DOD's request, we have
incorporated information about this system on page 17. However, in
March 2003,[Footnote 35] we reported that as of January 2003, DOD had
not developed an implementation plan for the Defense Readiness
Reporting System that contained measurable performance goals,
identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included an
evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system.
4. DOD commented that our draft report used non-standard terminology,
referring to military missions (what DOD calls homeland defense) and
nonmilitary missions (support to civil authorities). We added language
on page 1 (see footnote 1) to establish the meaning of the terms used
in our report.
5. DOD stated that it believes it is not clear that homeland defense
and support to civil authorities missions are key factors in high
personnel tempo. On the contrary, our draft report acknowledges that
overseas missions as well as domestic missions contribute to high
personnel tempo. Indeed, current personnel tempo could be even higher
than is depicted in our draft report because the data displaying high
personnel tempo stemming from participation in homeland defense
missions or other deployments after December 2002, or from Operation
Iraqi Freedom, were not yet fully available at the time of our review.
In addition, the personnel tempo data we received from DOD did not
record a servicemember's assigned operation--for example, Operation
Noble Eagle. However, we added a statement to footnote 28 in our report
that acknowledges this limitation in the personnel tempo data we
received.
DOD also commented that since 9/11/01, increased requirements have been
driven more significantly by overseas operations in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. While DOD may be correct, our
report discussed personnel tempo, not requirements. Personnel tempo
refers to the amount of time during which a member of the armed forces
is engaged in official duties at a location that makes it infeasible to
spend off duty time at the servicemember's home, homeport (for Navy
servicemembers), or civilian residence (for reserve components'
personnel). Therefore, we stand by our finding that high personnel
tempo is an indicator that present force structure may not be
sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military
missions and could lead to an erosion of unit readiness.
Lastly, because the assessment of rotating units to maintain combat
readiness was outside the scope of our review, we could not evaluate
DOD's statements.
6. DOD commented that activities such as mobilization and
preparation for war would almost certainly have an impact on the
resources available to respond to homeland defense and support to civil
authorities missions. DOD added that our draft report leaves the
inaccurate impression that this situation is the norm. However, DOD did
not specifically point out where the report suggested such
an interpretation. We disagree that our report leaves an inaccurate
impression, because it does not have statements implying this cause and
effect. However, because servicemembers cannot be in both domestic and
overseas locations at the same time, we believe that mobilization and
preparation for any one mission, even including war, will necessarily
make them unavailable for other missions.
DOD also commented that it is important to note that, even during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, over 200,000 soldiers and airmen were
still available after the mobilization. We agree that a significant
number of personnel have not been mobilized even during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, but it is unclear what DOD's figure means. DOD did not provide
evidence to support this figure, and we believe that, in any case, it
is tangential to our point--that, in general, some forces are not
optimally suited to perform domestic military missions. We found that
some forces' skills are mismatched with the needs of domestic military
missions and that these forces lose critical training opportunities.
Thus, DOD's statement that 200,000 servicemembers were available does
not necessarily signify that these members are well suited for the
missions at hand.
Lastly, we did not discuss overseas missions at length in this report,
because the report reviewed DOD's domestic military missions.
7. DOD commented that when identifying Title 10 statutes that allow
federal forces to perform domestic law enforcement missions, the report
does not make clear that these missions are based on worst case
scenarios and are not the norm. We agree that the use of federal forces
to perform law enforcement missions is not the norm. As suggested by
each of the authorized uses of federal forces in domestic law
enforcement roles that we identified, such uses are in fact the
exception rather than the rule. DOD is correct when it states that it
undertakes missions to support civil authorities at the direction of
the President or the Secretary of Defense, and, as DOD has pointed out,
these missions may be undertaken upon requests for assistance from
civil authorities.
8. DOD disagreed with our statement on page 14 that domestic military
missions to date have offered limited training value because these
missions generally have required only basic military skills. DOD stated
that basic military skills require practice, just as do the more
sophisticated skills. We agree that basic skills also need practice,
and our report made clear that, while performing Operation Noble Eagle
missions (such as domestic installation security and combat air
patrols), forces are able to employ basic military skills. However, our
discussions with service officials revealed that servicemembers were
inhibited from executing the full range of difficult tactical maneuvers
or from replicating battlefield conditions while deployed on Operation
Noble Eagle missions. Moreover, we reviewed DOD training requirements
for all the military skills of these forces, both basic and advanced,
as well as the DOD requirements for their frequency of practice in
order to ensure proficiency. Also, DOD asserts that there will be ample
opportunity to increase readiness prior to operational employment.
However, DOD did not explain how it could predict the amount of time
available to prepare for a future contingency. In any case, based on
DOD's requirements, we have concluded that overall combat readiness may
erode.
In addition, based on the length or frequency for Operation Noble Eagle
deployments that we reviewed, we concluded that although basic military
skills have been frequently practiced, combat skills have not generally
been practiced. As a result, the combat proficiency of many
servicemembers could be jeopardized. Moreover, because DOD did not
provide specific criteria for what constitutes the limited scope and
duration of domestic missions, we cannot address these comments.
Finally, Operation Noble Eagle began on 9/11/01, is continuing, and has
no known end in sight, which raises questions about whether this is a
"limited duration" mission. Therefore, we stand by our report as
originally drafted.
9. In its comments, DOD pointed out that we concluded (now on p. 23)
that some units are not well structured for their domestic missions,
cannot practice the varied skills needed to maintain combat proficiency
while performing domestic missions, and receive little training value
from their assigned domestic missions. DOD then asserts that a
temporary reduction in a unit's effectiveness for its primary mission
due to homeland security or peacekeeping missions is not necessarily a
bad thing. A key DOD official explained to us that effectiveness refers
to the extent to which a unit was successful in completing a mission to
which it was assigned. However, we did not evaluate the extent to which
any military units were successful in completing assigned missions,
thus DOD's comment missed our point. We believe that a unit's readiness
may erode in the future from performing a mission for which it was not
designed. DOD also asserted that the ability of units to prepare for
and execute a variety of missions with inherent capability adds
flexibility. While DOD is apparently asserting that the missions we
reviewed are adding flexibility and enhancing responsiveness, DOD did
not explain how practicing the basic skills of flying aircraft and
standing guard adds flexibility. Consequently, we stand by our
conclusion.
10. DOD commented that the report confused the interpretation and
application of the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to the use of the
military to enforce the laws of the United States. We disagree. Our
report identified and summarized laws associated with the 1878 Posse
Comitatus Act. We explained the laws' impact on requests for DOD
assistance in domestic law enforcement operations. We also reported
that DOD does not believe the act impedes the nature or timeliness of
its response.
11. DOD commented that our report indicated that DOD did not complete a
congressionally directed legal review on the use of military forces in
the United States and any legal impediments affecting DOD's role in
supporting homeland security. We have updated our report to reflect
information that DOD has recently provided to us, although DOD did not
provide this report to us.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K.
Geiger, Kevin L. O'Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward,
Michael C. Zola, Rebecca Shea, and Arthur L. James Jr. also made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic
Missions Impact DOD Forces. GAO-03-677T. Washington, D.C.: April 29,
2003.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.
GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations
between Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.:
June 13, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown
but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington, D.C.:
January 26, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied
Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-14.
Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. GAO/
T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical
and Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism
Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-
98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.:
December 1, 1997.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Policy and Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-97-254. Washington, D.C.:
September 26, 1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] We define domestic military missions as DOD activities to protect
the U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical
defense infrastructure from external threats and aggression (i.e.,
homeland defense). We define nonmilitary missions as military
assistance to U.S. civil authorities--federal, state, and local
governments.
[2] Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed
forces is engaged in their official duties at a location that makes it
infeasible to spend off duty time at the member's home, homeport (for
Navy servicemembers), or in the member's civilian residence (for
reserve components' personnel). We reviewed personnel tempo for
each of the military services and their respective reserve components
for the period October 1, 2000, (when DOD started collecting data)
through December 31, 2002 (the latest data available).
[3] Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and
establish their missions, responsibilities, force structure,
geographic area of responsibility, and other attributes.
[4] 18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002). The act expressly prohibits the use of the
Army or the Air Force to execute the laws. As a matter of policy, DOD
applies the law to the Navy and Marine Corps through DOD Directive
5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
Officials and Navy Instruction (SECNAVISNT) 5820.7B, Mar. 28, 1988,
Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
[5] 10 U.S.C. §124 (2002), and 10 U.S.C. §382 (2002).
[6] For two thresholds, DOD measures the time that servicemembers spend
away from home in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of
any month indicated. Therefore, if a servicemember spent time away from
home that exceeded a threshold in September 2001, the measurement
period is October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2001.
[7] As directed by 10 U.S.C. §118 (2002).
[8] Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Feb. 5, 2002.
[9] U.S. Southern Command retains certain responsibilities for
contingency planning, operations, security cooperation, and force
protection for these islands.
[10] National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland
Security, Washington, D.C.: July 2002), 2.
[11] P.L. 107-314 (Dec. 2, 2002), §902.
[12] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(The White House, Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2002).
[13] DOD Directive 5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, provides specific guidance on
responding to requests for law enforcement assistance.
[14] DOD Directive 3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997, establishes DOD policy and
assigns responsibility for providing military assistance to civil
authorities.
[15] 18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002).
[16] See, for example, United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916
(D.S.D. 1975).
[17] DOD Directive 5525.5 provides other examples of prohibited direct
involvement.
[18] DOD Directive 3025.12, Feb. 4, 1994, Military Assistance for Civil
Disturbances, identifies policy and responsibilities governing the
planning and response by DOD for its assistance to civil authorities,
including law enforcement.
[19] National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland
Security, Washington, D.C.: July 2002), 48.
[20] P.L. 107-314, (Dec. 2, 2002), §921(7) Report on Establishment of
the United States Northern Command and §1404(11) Report on the Role of
the Department of Defense in Supporting Homeland Security.
[21] Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander,
U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,
before the House Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 13, 2003.
[22] Campaign plans represent the combatant commander's vision of the
arrangement of operations to attain strategic objectives. Deliberate
plans are designed to use forces and apportion resources for potential
contingencies.
[23] Combat skills are critical tasks that every servicemember must be
able to perform to fight and win in war.
[24] Seven Air National Guard fighter wings accounted for 50 percent of
the Operation Noble Eagle flying hours performed by all Air National
Guard fighter wings from September 1, 2001, through September 30, 2002.
[25] Similar data from other wings were not available. According to Air
National Guard and Air Combat Command officials, there is no
requirement for wings to maintain or report this metric to higher
authorities. Moreover, Air National Guard officials said that providing
us with this metric would entail a significant undertaking by the
affected units; therefore, we did not attempt to obtain it.
[26] Airborne alert posture is a state of aircraft readiness when
combat-equipped aircraft are airborne and ready for immediate action.
This posture is designed to reduce reaction time.
[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting
System Is Intended to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better
Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
[28] Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing military mission in
Afghanistan. The data did not include the impact on personnel tempo
stemming from participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is not
yet fully available. While the Navy and Marine Corps did not experience
high levels of personnel tempo--as we measured it--during the October
2000 to December 2002 time frame, their tempo may have subsequently
increased due in part to deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
personnel tempo data we received from DOD did not record a
servicemember's assigned operation, for example, Operation Noble Eagle.
[29] P.L. 106-65 (Oct. 5, 1999), §586(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §991).
[30] P.L. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000), §574(c) (codified at 37 U.S.C.
§436).
[31] We used the three thresholds to measure days away from home, which
includes deployments and activities such as individual training.
Although the 401-day threshold was established for high deployment per
diem allowance, we analyzed data to determine whether servicemembers
exceeded this threshold for the purpose of measuring the pace
of operations. On October 8, 2001, DOD suspended the counting of
deployed days for payment purposes as permitted by law. Moreover, the
additional statutory requirement for general and flag officers to
personally manage the deployment of servicemembers exceeding the 182-
and 220-day thresholds was also suspended at the same time. However,
according to DOD, as a matter of policy, the services continue to track
and report requirements as established by the acts.
[32] Stop loss authority is provided by 10 U.S.C. §12305 (2002). It
authorizes the President to suspend any provision of law relating to
the promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the armed
forces when members of a reserve component are called to active duty
and the President determines the forces are essential to the national
security of the United States.
[33] During our review, the Senate confirmed the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The Special Assistant
for Homeland Security became the principal deputy for the recently
established assistant secretary.
[34] During our review, the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland
Security was transferred from U.S. Joint Forces Command to
U.S. Northern Command when U.S. Northern Command reached its initial
operational capability on October 1, 2002, and assumed responsibility
for the defense the United States.
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting
System Is Intended to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better
Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
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