Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program
Gao ID: GAO-03-879R August 11, 2003
The recent emergence of software-defined radio technology offers the potential to address key communications shortfalls and significantly improve military capabilities. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program was initiated in 1997 to develop and apply this technology and to bring together separate service-led programs into a joint software-defined radio development effort. JTRS radios are intended to interoperate with existing radio systems and provide the war fighter with additional communications capability to access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command, and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. As such, the JTRS program is considered a major transformational effort for the military and is expected to enable information superiority, network-centric warfare as well as modernization efforts, such as the Army's Future Combat Systems. Although total program costs have yet to be determined, the Army's effort to acquire and field close to half of the estimated 250,000 JTRS radios that are needed is expected to cost $14.4 billion. Congress asked us to review the JTRS program to determine if there are either management or technical challenges and risks that could jeopardize a successful program outcome.
We found that the JTRS Program has made considerable progress to date in planning and developing key aspects of the JTRS radios. At a fundamental level, a Joint Program Office has been established to bring together the services' individual efforts to develop software-defined radios. The program office was instrumental in developing a standard software communications architecture that provides a foundation for building JTRS radios and evolving an open systems approach to facilitate technology insertion. The program office has reduced risk by employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy, whereby improved communications capabilities will be delivered in increments. However, the program still faces several managerial and technological challenges that could affect the Department of Defense's (DOD's) ability to develop and procure JTRS radios successfully. These include managing requirements and funding, maturing key technologies, integrating system components, testing, and developing secure communications. The most significant challenge we identified is the lack of a strong, joint-management structure. The current JTRS management structure is made up of a Joint Program Office, designated service-led program clusters, and other DOD organizations carrying out several related acquisition activities. The Joint Program Office is responsible for developing the communications architecture, radio waveforms, and security components, while the services are primarily responsible for developing, acquiring, and funding the actual radios. This structure, while preferable over individual service efforts, is still fragmented, making it difficult to resolve interservice differences involving requirements and funding, and hampering the production of key program documents, as in the following examples: it has been difficult to get the services to commit the funding necessary to execute the JTRS program; the program management structure has been unable to get the services to reach agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously; and key program documents, such as the Concept of Operations and Migration Plans, have not effectively provided a joint vision for how JTRS capabilities will be developed and used. As a consequence, several program development efforts, such as handheld radios, have been delayed by more than a year. In the meantime, the Army has purchased more existing radios with fewer communications capabilities, which may further delay the delivery of JTRS capabilities to users. Technology maturity is another significant challenge facing the JTRS program. Our work on best practices has shown that programs that move to product development with immature technologies have greater difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements than programs that mature technologies before moving into product development. The initial JTRS radio development, for helicopters and ground vehicles, was allowed to proceed into the Systems Development and Demonstration phase with technology readiness levels lower than those recommended by best practices. Further, technologies that are critical to several JTRS variants--such as miniaturized components, batteries, and multimodal antennas--are not sufficiently advanced to meet requirements and will take several more years to mature. Examples of other technological challenges include the development of complex software, the difficulty of integrating radios with host platforms, and a compressed testing schedule. In addition, developing encrypted capabilities and secure communications will be difficult because of the complex nature of the radio.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Paul L. Francis
Team:
Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Phone:
(202) 512-2811
GAO-03-879R, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program
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August 11, 2003:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio
System Program:
The recent emergence of software-defined radio technology offers the
potential to address key communications shortfalls and significantly
improve military capabilities. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
program was initiated in 1997 to develop and apply this technology and
to bring together separate service-led programs into a joint software-
defined radio development effort. JTRS radios are intended to
interoperate with existing radio systems and provide the war fighter
with additional communications capability to access maps and other
visual data, communicate via voice and video with other units and
levels of command, and obtain information directly from battlefield
sensors. As such, the JTRS program is considered a major
transformational effort for the military and is expected to enable
information superiority, network-centric warfare as well as
modernization efforts, such as the Army's Future Combat
Systems.[Footnote 1] Although total program costs have yet to be
determined, the Army's effort to acquire and field close to half of the
estimated 250,000 JTRS radios that are needed is expected to cost $14.4
billion.
You asked us to review the JTRS program to determine if there are
either management or technical challenges and risks that could
jeopardize a successful program outcome. We briefed your staff on May
5, 2003, on the results of our review. This report summarizes that
information and transmits the briefing itself (see enc. I).
Challenges Facing the JTRS Program:
We found that the JTRS Program has made considerable progress to date
in planning and developing key aspects of the JTRS radios. At a
fundamental level, a Joint Program Office has been established to bring
together the services' individual efforts to develop software-defined
radios. The program office was instrumental in developing a standard
software communications architecture that provides a foundation for
building JTRS radios and evolving an open systems approach to
facilitate technology insertion. The program office has reduced risk by
employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy, whereby improved
communications capabilities will be delivered in increments.
However, the program still faces several managerial and technological
challenges that could affect the Department of Defense's (DOD's)
ability to develop and procure JTRS radios successfully. These include
managing requirements and funding, maturing key technologies,
integrating system components, testing, and developing secure
communications. The most significant challenge we identified is the
lack of a strong, joint-management structure.
The current JTRS management structure is made up of a Joint Program
Office, designated service-led program clusters, and other DOD
organizations carrying out several related acquisition
activities.[Footnote 2] The Joint Program Office is responsible
for developing the communications architecture, radio waveforms, and
security components, while the services are primarily responsible for
developing, acquiring, and funding the actual radios. This structure,
while preferable over individual service efforts, is still fragmented,
making it difficult to resolve interservice differences involving
requirements and funding, and hampering the production of key program
documents, as in the following examples:
It has been difficult to get the services to commit the funding
necessary to execute the JTRS program.
The program management structure has been unable to get the services to
reach agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously.
Key program documents, such as the Concept of Operations and Migration
Plans, have not effectively provided a joint vision for how JTRS
capabilities will be developed and used.
As a consequence, several program development efforts, such as handheld
radios, have been delayed by more than a year. In the meantime, the
Army has purchased more existing radios with fewer communications
capabilities, which may further delay the delivery of JTRS capabilities
to users.
Technology maturity is another significant challenge facing the JTRS
program. Our work on best practices has shown that programs that move
to product development with immature technologies have greater
difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements than
programs that mature technologies before moving into product
development.[Footnote 3] The initial JTRS radio development, for
helicopters and ground vehicles, was allowed to proceed into the
Systems Development and Demonstration phase with technology readiness
levels lower than those recommended by best practices. Further,
technologies that are critical to several JTRS variants--such as
miniaturized components, batteries, and multimodal antennas--are not
sufficiently advanced to meet requirements and will take several more
years to mature. Examples of other technological challenges include the
development of complex software, the difficulty of integrating radios
with host platforms, and a compressed testing schedule. In addition,
developing encrypted capabilities and secure communications will be
difficult because of the complex nature of the radio.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
While significant accomplishments have been realized, management and
technological challenges exist that could impair JTRS's success. We
recommend the Secretary of Defense take steps to strengthen the joint-
program management structure to facilitate program funding and
requirements outcomes and assure configuration management of JTRS. In
strengthening the structure, the Secretary should consider (1)
establishing centralized program funding, (2) realigning the Joint
Program Office under a different organizational arrangement, and (3)
placing the cluster development programs under the Joint Program Office
control. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense take action to
ensure the JTRS Program realizes its full potential by (1) directing
the completion of key program documents detailing the program's vision;
(2) making sure key enabling technologies, such as networking
capabilities, are adequately addressed; and (3) assessing the impact
that the continued purchase of existing radios may have on JTRS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments to a draft of this report (see enc. II), DOD
concurred with our findings and both of our recommendations. However,
DOD disagreed with one of the options we suggested for implementing our
recommendation on strengthening the JTRS joint management structure.
While DOD supports consolidation of all research, development, test,
and evaluation funding for JTRS, it believes that procurement and
integration funding is best left in the individual service budgets. We
agree that this would be a good first step, but we also believe funding
needs to be closely monitored as the program progresses towards
procurement.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess the status of the program, we reviewed relevant DOD and
service program documents and interviewed key officials. In examining
the program, we analyzed technological and management factors that
could affect the program's success and key program development efforts
as well as projected funding and schedule profiles. We conducted our
work from October 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
- - - --:
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense;
Secretary of the Air Force; Secretary of the Army; Secretary of the
Navy; Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me on (202) 512-2811 or John Oppenheim at
(202) 512-3111. Principal contributors to this report were Joel
Christenson, Gary Middleton, John Swain, Hai Tran, and Nicole Volchko.
Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by Paul L. Francis:
Enclosures:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000:
July 29, 2003:
NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management US General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "Challenges And Risks Associated With The Joint Tactical Radio
System Program," dated June 23, 2003 (GAO Code 120182/GAO-03-879R).
The DoD has reviewed the findings of the GAO and appreciates the
efforts of the GAO staff to present different viewpoints regarding the
management and implementation of the JTRS program. We have reviewed the
draft report and, with the inclusion of the below comment, concur with
the GAO findings and recommendations.
The DoD concurs with the recommendation to strengthen the joint program
management structure. The DoD supports the consolidation of all related
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, but does
not agree with the consolidation fo procurement and integration
funding. These latter funding elements are best left in the individual
Service budgets. We concur with the recommendation to take action to
ensure the JTRS Program realizes its full potential.
My Point of Contact for GAO Code 120182/GAO-03-879R is Mr. Vic Russell,
assigned to Communications Programs Directorate. He can be reached at
703 607-0274 or e-mail vic.russell@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Dr. Michael S. Frankel:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3, Space and IT Programs):
Signed by Dr. Michael S. Frankel:
[End of section]
(120182):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Future Combat Systems program is a major Army transformational
effort, comprised of 18 networked weapon systems that will replace
several current combat systems.
[2] Clusters are radio development efforts that are organized around
weapons platforms, such as ground vehicles and helicopters, as well as
fixed-wing aircraft and maritime systems.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of
Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-
288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).
