Chemical Weapons
Sustained Leadership, Along With Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction Program
Gao ID: GAO-03-1031 September 5, 2003
Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization Program cost and schedule, and its management structure. In 2001, the program underwent a major reorganization. Following a decade long trend of missed schedule milestones, in September 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule, which extended planned milestones and increased program cost estimates beyond the 1998 estimate of $15 billion to $24 billion. GAO was asked to (1) examine the effect that recent organization changes have had on program performance and (2) assess the progress DOD and the Army have made in meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines.
The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a number of long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues remain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership at the upper management levels. For example, the program has had frequent turnover in the leadership providing oversight. Further, recent reorganizations have done little to reduce the complex and fragmented organization of the program. As a result, roles and responsibilities are often unclear and program actions are not always coordinated. Finally, the absence of a comprehensive strategy leaves the program without a clear road map and methods to monitor program performance. Without these key elements, DOD and the Army have no assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the chemical stockpile in a safe and timely manner, and within cost estimates. DOD and the Army have already missed several 2001 milestones and exceeded cost estimates; the Army has raised the program cost estimates by $1.2 billion, with other factors still to be considered. Almost all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 milestones because of schedule delays due to environmental, safety, community relations, and funding issues. Although neutralization sites have not missed milestones, they have had delays. DOD and the Army have not developed an approach to anticipate and influence issues that could adversely impact program schedules, cost, and safety. Unless DOD and the Army adopt a risk management approach, the program remains at great risk of missing milestones and CWC deadlines. It will also likely incur rising costs and prolong the public's exposure to the chemical stockpile.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-03-1031, Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along With Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction Program
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On January 5, 2004, this document was revised to add various footnote
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
September 2003:
Chemical Weapons:
Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is
Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction Program:
GAO-03-1031:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-1031, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization
Program cost and schedule, and its management structure. In 2001, the
program underwent a major reorganization. Following a decade long
trend of missed schedule milestones, in September 2001, the Department
of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule, which extended planned
milestones and increased program cost estimates beyond the 1998
estimate of $15 billion to $24 billion. GAO was asked to (1) examine
the effect that recent organization changes have had on program
performance and (2) assess the progress DOD and the Army have made in
meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule and Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) deadlines.
What GAO Found:
The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a
number of long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic
planning issues remain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership
at the upper management levels. For example, the program has had
frequent turnover in the leadership providing oversight. Further,
recent reorganizations have done little to reduce the complex and
fragmented organization of the program. As a result, roles and
responsibilities are often unclear and program actions are not always
coordinated. Finally, the absence of a comprehensive strategy leaves
the program without a clear road map and methods to monitor program
performance. Without these key elements, DOD and the Army have no
assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the chemical stockpile in a
safe and timely manner, and within cost estimates.
DOD and the Army have already missed several 2001 milestones and
exceeded cost estimates; the Army has raised the program cost
estimates by $1.2 billion, with other factors still to be considered.
Almost all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 milestones
because of schedule delays due to environmental, safety, community
relations, and funding issues. Although neutralization sites have not
missed milestones, they have had delays. DOD and the Army have not
developed an approach to anticipate and influence issues that could
adversely impact program schedules, cost, and safety. Unless DOD and
the Army adopt a risk management approach, the program remains at
great risk of missing milestones and CWC deadlines. It will also
likely incur rising costs and prolong the public‘s exposure to the
chemical stockpile.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD develop an overall strategy for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program that would articulate the program‘s mission,
identify the long-term goals and objectives, delineate the roles and
responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, and establish near-term
performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk management
approach that anticipates and influences internal and external factors
that could adversely impact program performance.
DOD concurred with GAO‘s recommendations and said it is taking steps
to implement them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1031.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Ray Decker at (202)
512-6020.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Long-Standing Management and Organization Weaknesses Continue to Hamper
Program Progress:
Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Program's Inability to
Anticipate and Influence Issues:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with
Chemical Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Stockpile Sites, Type of Agent, Original Agent Tonnage, and
Percentage of Original Stockpile:
Table 2: CWC Deadlines:
Table 3: Comparison of DOD's 1998 and 2001 Milestones for Starting and
Finishing Agent Destruction Operations:
Table 4: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and
the Army, 1986-Present:
Table 5: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities within the
Army, 1986-Present:
Table 6: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration
Site:
Table 7: Program Cost Increases Resulting from Delays at Incineration
Sites:
Table 8: Status of Chemical Demilitarization Facilities:
Figure:
Figure 1: Comparison of 1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program
Cost Estimates:
Abbreviations:
ACWA: Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment:
CMA: Chemical Materials Agency:
CSEPP: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program:
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because
this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission
from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce
this material separately.
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 5, 2003:
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The United States, along with many other countries, is committed to
ridding the world of chemical weapons. In fiscal year 1986, Congress
directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy the nation's
chemical weapons stockpile in a safe manner, and DOD designated
the Army to set up and operate the demilitarization program. On an
international level, the United States and more than 150 countries
since 1997 have become parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which prohibits the use of these weapons and mandates a deadline
of April 2007 to destroy the existing stockpiles.[Footnote 1] With the
events of September 11, 2001, heightened concerns over weapons of mass
destruction have further raised the awareness of these chemical weapons
and their potential danger to the public.
Since its inception, DOD's Chemical Demilitarization Program has been
plagued by frequent schedule delays, cost overruns, and continuing
management problems. In 2001, DOD and the Army[Footnote 2] once again
undertook a major reorganization of the program's complex management
structure and revised its schedule, extending the projected milestones
beyond the 2007 CWC deadline. The revisions also increased the
estimated costs for destroying the chemical weapons stockpile by 60
percent, from $15 billion to $24 billion. Because DOD and the Army have
had long-term problems in meeting past schedule milestones and are now
entering a demanding phase of the program--the planned start of agent
destruction operations at multiple sites, using both incineration and
alternative (neutralization) technologies--there are growing concerns
in Congress over DOD's ability to accomplish its mission.
In the House Report to the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization
budget,[Footnote 3] Congress mandated that we review and assess the
management and status of the program. In February 2003, we briefed your
staffs on our preliminary findings. As agreed with your offices, this
report (1) examines the effect that recent organizational changes have
had on the program's performance and (2) assesses the progress that DOD
and the Army have made in meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule
estimates and the 2007 CWC deadline.
Leading organizations embrace principles for effectively implementing
and managing programs. Some key aspects of these principles include
promulgating a comprehensive mission statement, long-term and annual
performance goals, measurable performance indicators, and evaluation
and corrective action plans. Combined with effective leadership, these
principles provide decision makers with a means to manage risk,
understand a program's evolution and implementation, and determine
whether initiatives are achieving their desired results.
In assessing the program's management performance, we compared the
elements of program management documents to the general tenets and
management principles, such as those supported by the Government
Performance and Results Act, to determine if the program has a
framework to produce results. We also compared previous and current
program organizational structures and obtained a rationale for changes
from program officials and documents to determine if lines of authority
were clear and if roles and responsibilities were articulated. To
assess DOD's progress in meeting revised schedule and cost estimates,
we reviewed current program estimates, destruction schedules, CWC
provisions, and other documents. We determined issues that had caused
delays and ascertained approaches being used to reduce the potential
for delays in the future. We also met with DOD and Army program
officials and interviewed officials at several destruction sites and
state environmental offices. We conducted our review from August 2002
to June 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is
included in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While DOD and the Army have recently initiated some organizational
changes in the Chemical Demilitarization Program, the program remains
in turmoil, affecting management performance because of long-standing
and unresolved leadership, organizational, and strategic planning
issues. The lack of sustained leadership at both the upper levels of
oversight and at the program-manager level confuses the decision-making
authority and obscures accountability.[Footnote 4] Moreover, the recent
reorganization has done little to reduce the program's complex
management structure. It continues to have multiple lines of management
authority within the Army and separation of program components between
the Army and DOD. These separations leave roles and responsibilities
for the different parts of the program unclear. Finally, the absence of
an overarching, comprehensive strategy has left the program without a
clear, top-level road map to closely guide and integrate all activities
and to monitor program performance. Without key elements such as
effective leadership, streamlined organization structure, and
important management tools including strategic planning, DOD and the
Army have no assurances that they will be able to meet the program's
principal goal--to destroy the chemical stockpile in a safe manner and
by the Chemical Weapons Convention 2007 deadline.
The program has missed most schedule milestones and cost estimates
following a decade long trend. Nearly all of the incineration sites
will miss the DOD-approved 2001 schedule milestones because of
substantial delays that stem primarily from a number of problems that
DOD and the Army have not been able to anticipate or influence. These
problems include plant safety issues, difficulties in meeting
environmental permitting requirements, public concerns about emergency
preparedness plans, and budgeting shortfalls. Although the
neutralization sites have not missed their milestones yet, they too
have experienced delays. Program officials told us that they have
already raised preliminary total program cost estimates by
$1.2 billion, and other factors, yet to be considered, could raise
these estimates even more. DOD and the Army have not developed an
approach to anticipate and address potential problems that could
adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. Until DOD and
the Army adopt a comprehensive risk management approach, the program
remains at great risk of not meeting its schedule milestones and the
Chemical Weapons Convention deadline, leading to rising costs and
unnecessarily prolonging the potential risk to the public associated
with the storage of the chemical stockpile.
We are recommending that DOD develop an overall strategy for the
Chemical Demilitarization Program that would articulate the programís
mission, identify the long-term goals and objectives, delineate the
roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, and establish
near-term performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk
management approach that anticipates and influences internal and
external factors that could adversely impact program performance.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and said it is taking steps to implement them.
Background:
In fiscal year 1986, Congress directed DOD to destroy the U.S.
stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions.[Footnote 5] DOD
designated the Department of the Army as its executive agent for the
program, and the Army established the Chemical Demilitarization (or
Chem-Demil) Program, which was charged with the destruction of the
stockpile at nine storage sites. Incineration was selected as the
method to destroy the stockpile.[Footnote 6] In 1988, the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) was created to enhance
the emergency management and response capabilities of communities near
the storage sites in case of an accident; the Army and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) jointly managed the program. In
1997, consistent with congressional direction, the Army and FEMA
clarified their CSEPP roles by implementing a management structure
under which FEMA assumed responsibility for off-post (civilian
community) program activities, while the Army continued to manage
on-post chemical emergency preparedness. The Army provides CSEPP
funding to FEMA, which is administered via grants to the states and
counties near where stockpile sites are located in order to carry out
the program's off-post activities.
Agent destruction began in 1990 at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
Subsequently, Congress directed DOD to evaluate the possibility of
using alternative technologies to incineration. In 1994, the Army
initiated a project to develop nonincineration technologies for use at
the two bulk-agent only sites at Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport,
Indiana. These sites were selected in part because their stockpiles
were relatively simple--each site had only one type of agent and this
agent was stored in bulk-agent (ton) containers. In 1997, DOD approved
pilot testing of a neutralization technology at these two sites. Also
in 1997, Congress directed DOD to evaluate the use of alternative
technologies and suspended incineration planning activities at two
sites with assembled weapons in Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass,
Kentucky. Furthermore, Congress directed that these two sites be
managed in a program independent of the Army's Chem-Demil Program and
report to DOD instead of the Army. Thus, the Assembled Chemical Weapons
Assessment (ACWA) program was established. The nine sites, the types of
agent, and the percentage of the original stockpiles are shown in
table 1.
Table 1: Stockpile Sites, Type of Agent, Original Agent Tonnage, and
Percentage of Original Stockpile:
Site: Johnston Atoll; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original
agent tonnage: 2,031; Percent of original stockpile: 6.
Site: Tooele, Utah; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original agent
tonnage: 13,616; Percent of original stockpile: 44.
Site: Anniston, Ala; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original
agent tonnage: 2,254; Percent of original stockpile: 7.
Site: Umatilla, Oreg; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original
agent tonnage: 3,717; Percent of original stockpile: 12.
Site: Pine Bluff, Ark; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original
agent tonnage: 3,850; Percent of original stockpile: 12.
Site: Aberdeen, Md; Type of agent[A]: Blister; Original agent tonnage:
1,625; Percent of original stockpile: 5.
Site: Newport, Ind; Type of agent[A]: Nerve; Original agent tonnage:
1,269; Percent of original stockpile: 4.
Site: Pueblo, Colo; Type of agent[A]: Blister; Original agent tonnage:
2,611; Percent of original stockpile: 8.
Site: Blue Grass, Ky; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original
agent tonnage: 523; Percent of original stockpile: 2.
Site: Total; Original agent tonnage: 31,496;
Percent of original stockpile: 100.
Source: DOD data.
[A] The stockpile includes two nerve agents, GB and VX, and blister
agents.
[End of table]
In 1997, the United States ratified the CWC, which prohibits the use of
these weapons and mandates the elimination of existing stockpiles by
April 29, 2007.[Footnote 7] A CWC provision allows that extensions of
up to 5 years can be granted. The CWC also contains a series of interim
deadlines applicable to the U.S. stockpile[Footnote 8] (see table 2).
Table 2: CWC Deadlines:
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 1; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2000; Date United States met deadline: September 1997.
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 20; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2002; Date United States met deadline: July 2001.
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 45; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2004; Date United States met deadline: NA.
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 100; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2007; Date United States met deadline: NA.
Sources: CWC and U.S. Army.
Legend: NA - Not applicable.
[End of table]
The United States met the 1 percent interim deadline in September 1997
and the 20 percent interim deadline in July 2001. As of June 2003, the
Army was reporting that a total of about 26 percent of the original
stockpile had been destroyed.[Footnote 9]
Three other countries (referred to as states parties)--India, Russia,
and one other country--have declared chemical weapons stockpiles and
are required to destroy them in accordance with CWC deadlines as well.
As of April 2003, two of these three countries (India and one other
country) had met the 1 percent interim deadline to destroy their
stockpiles.[Footnote 10] Of the three countries, only India met the
second (20 percent) interim deadline to destroy its stockpile by April
2002. However, Russia, with the largest declared stockpile--over 40,000
tons--did not meet the 1 percent or the 20 percent interim deadlines,
and only began destroying its stockpile in December 2002. In 2001,
Russia requested a 5-year extension to the 2007 deadline.[Footnote 11]
Russia did destroy 1 percent of its stockpile by April 2003, although
it is doubtful that it will meet the 2012 deadline if granted.[Footnote
12]
Traditionally, management and oversight responsibilities for the
Chem-Demil Program reside primarily within three levels at DOD--the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who
is the Defense Acquisition Executive for the Secretary of Defense, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, Technology)
who is the Army Acquisition Executive for the Army, and the Program
Manager for Chemical Demilitarization--because it is a major defense
acquisition program.[Footnote 13] In addition to these offices, since
August 2002, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical
Demilitarization and Threat Reduction), has served as the focal point
responsible for oversight, coordination, and integration of the Chem-
Demil Program.
In May 2001, in response to program cost, schedule, and management
concerns, milestone decision authority was elevated to the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). DOD
stated that this change would streamline future decision making and
increase program oversight. DOD indicated that the change was also
consistent with the size and scope of the program, international treaty
obligations, and the level of local, state, and federal interest in the
safe and timely destruction of the chemical stockpile.
In September 2001, after more than a yearlong review, DOD revised the
programís schedule milestones for seven of the nine sites and the cost
estimates for all nine sites[Footnote 14] These milestones represent
the target dates that each site is supposed to meet for the completion
of critical phases of the project. The†phases include design,
construction, systemization, operations, and closure. (Appendix II
describes these phases and provides the status of each site.) The 2001
revision marked the third time the program extended its schedule
milestones and cost estimates since it became a major defense
acquisition program in 1994. The 2001 revision also pushed the
milestones for most sites several years beyond the previous 1998
schedule milestones and, for the first time, beyond the April 2007
deadline contained in the CWC. Table 3 compares the 1998 and 2001
schedule milestones for starting and finishing agent destruction
operations at the eight sites with chemical agent stockpiles in
2001.[Footnote 15] The planned agent destruction completion date at
some sites was extended over 5†years..
Table 3: Comparison of DOD's 1998 and 2001 Milestones for Starting and
Finishing Agent Destruction Operations:
Site: Tooele; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Ongoing;
Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Ongoing[B]; Change (no.
of months): NA; Planned agent destruction completion date:
1998: Oct. 2003; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: Feb.
2008; Change (no. of months): + 53.
Site: Anniston; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Jan.
2002; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: July 2002; Change
(no. of months): + 7; Planned agent destruction completion
date: 1998: Nov. 2005; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001:
May 2011; Change (no. of months): + 67.
Site: Umatilla; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Feb.
2002; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: July 2003; Change
(no. of months): + 18; Planned agent destruction completion
date: 1998: June 2005; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001:
Jan. 2011; Change (no. of months): + 68.
Site: Pine Bluff; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: June
2002; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Oct. 2003; Change
(no. of months): + 17; Planned agent destruction completion
date: 1998: Oct. 2005; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001:
Nov. 2009; Change (no. of months): + 50.
Site: Aberdeen; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Jan.
2004; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Mar. 2005; Change
(no. of months): + 15; Planned agent destruction completion
date: 1998: Dec. 2004; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001:
Mar. 2008; Change (no. of months): + 40.
Site: Newport; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Jan.
2004; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Dec. 2006; Change
(no. of months): + 36; Planned agent destruction completion
date: 1998: Dec. 2004; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001:
Nov. 2009; Change (no. of months): + 60.
Site: Blue Grass; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: NA[C].
Site: Pueblo; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: NA[C].
Sources: DOD and U.S. Army.
[A] The 2001 schedule milestones reflect both Army and DOD changes.
[B] Tooele was already conducting destruction operations when the 1998
and 2001 estimates for this phase were made.
[C] NA - Not available. Schedules are to be determined after technology
decisions for Blue Grass and Pueblo are made.
[End of table]
DOD extended the schedule milestones to reflect the Armyís experience
at†the two sitesóJohnston Atoll and Tooeleóthat had begun the
destruction process prior to 2001. It found that previous schedule
milestones had been largely based on overly optimistic engineering
estimates. Lower destruction rates stipulated by environmental
regulators, and increased time needed to change the facilityís
configuration when switching between different types of chemical agents
and weapons, meant destruction estimates needed to be lengthened.
Moreover, experience at Johnston Atoll, which began closure activities
in 2000, revealed that previous closure estimates for other sites had
been understated. In addition, DODís Cost Analysis Improvement Group
modified the site schedules based on a modeling technique that
considered the probabilities of certain schedule activities taking
longer than anticipated. In particular, the group determined that the
operations phase, where agent destruction takes place, has the highest
probability for schedule delays and lengthened that phase the most.
Because the costs of the program are directly related to the length of
the schedule, DOD also increthe projected life-cycle costs, from
$15 billion in 1998 to $24 billion in 2001 (see fig. 1).ased:
Figure 1: Comparison of 1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program
Cost Estimates:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In December 2001, after the program schedule and costs were revised,
the Army transferred primary program oversight from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Environment). According to the Army, this move
streamlined responsibilities for the program, which were previously
divided between these two offices. In January 2003, the Army reassigned
oversight responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) for all policy and direction
for the Chem-Demil Program and CSEPP. The Secretary of the Army also
directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology) and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command,
to jointly establish an agency to perform the chemical demilitarization
as well as the chemical weapons storage functions. In response to this
directive, the Army announced the creation of a new organization--the
Chemical Materials Agency (CMA)--which will merge the demilitarization
and the storage functions.[Footnote 16] During this transition process,
the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization was redesignated as
the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons and will
report to the Director of CMA and have responsibility for each site
through the systemization phase. The Director for Operations will
manage the operations and closure phases. As of June 2003, the Program
Manager for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons was providing day-to-
day management for the sites at Anniston, Umatilla, Newport, and Pine
Bluff; the Director for Operations was providing day-to-day management
for the sites at Tooele, Aberdeen, and Johnston Atoll, and the Program
Manager, ACWA, was managing the sites at Pueblo and Blue Grass.
Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports that have focused on
management, cost, and schedule issues related to the Chem-Demil
Program. For example, in a 1995 testimony we cited the possibility of
further cost growth and schedule slippage due to environmental
requirements, public opposition to the baseline incineration process,
and lower than expected disposal rates. We also testified that
weaknesses in financial management and internal control systems have
hampered program results and alternative technologies were unlikely to
mature enough to meet CWC deadlines.
In 1995, we noted that the emergency preparedness program had been slow
to achieve results and that communities were not fully prepared
to respond to a chemical emergency. In 1997, we found high-level
management attention was needed at the Army and FEMA to clearly define
management roles and responsibilities. In 2001, we found that the Army
and FEMA needed a more proactive approach to improve working relations
with CSEPP states and local communities and to assist them in preparing
budgets and complying with program performance measures.
In 2000, we found that the Chem-Demil Program was hindered by its
complex management structure and ineffective coordination between
program offices. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to clarify the management roles and
responsibilities of program participants, assign accountability for
achieving program goals and results, and establish procedures to
improve coordination among the program's various elements and with
state and local officials.
A detailed list of these reports and other products is included in
Related GAO Products at the end of this report.
Long-Standing Management and Organization Weaknesses Continue to Hamper
Program Progress:
Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the
organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program continues to falter
because several long-standing leadership, organizational, and
strategic planning weaknesses remain unresolved. The absence of
sustained leadership confuses decision-making authority and obscures
accountability. In addition, the Army's recent reorganization of the
program has not reduced its complex organization nor clarified the
roles and responsibilities of various entities. For example, CMA
reports to two different offices with responsibilities for different
phases of the program and left the management of CSEPP divided between
the Army and FEMA. The ACWA program continues to be managed outside of
the Army as directed by Congress. Finally, the lack of an overarching,
comprehensive strategy has left the Chem-Demil Program without a top-
level road map to guide and monitor the program's activities. The
absence of effective leadership, streamlined organization, and
important management tools, such as strategic planning, creates a
barrier to the program accomplishing the safe destruction of the
chemical stockpile and staying within schedule milestones, thereby
raising program costs.
Shifts in Leadership Confuse Decision-Making Authority and Obscure
Accountability:
The Chem-Demil Program has experienced frequent shifts in leadership
providing oversight, both between DOD and the Army and within the Army,
and frequent turnover in key program positions. These shifts have led
to confusion among participants and stakeholders about the program's
decision making and have obscured accountability. For example, program
officials were not consistent in following through on promised
initiatives and some initiatives were begun but not completed. Also,
when leadership responsibilities changed, new initiatives were often
introduced and old initiatives were abandoned, obscuring accountability
for program actions.
Changes in Oversight Responsibilities Confuse Decision-Making Role:
The program has lacked sustained leadership above the program level
as demonstrated by the multiple shifts between DOD and the Army
for providing oversight that affects consistent decision making. The
leadership responsible for oversight has shifted between the Army and
DOD three times during the past two decades, with the most recent
change occurring in 2001. Table 4 summarizes these changes. As
different offices took over major decision authority, program emphasis
frequently shifted, leaving initiatives pursued but not completed,
consistency of initiatives was not maintained, and responsibility for
decisions shifted. For example, we reported in August 2001 that the
Army and FEMA had addressed some management problems in how they
coordinated emergency preparedness activities after they had
established a memorandum of understanding to clarify roles and
responsibilities related to CSEPP.[Footnote 17] However, according to
FEMA officials, DOD did not follow the protocols for coordination as
agreed upon with the Army when making decisions about emergency
preparedness late in 2001. This led to emergency preparedness items
being funded without adequate plans for distribution, which delayed the
process. These changes in oversight responsibilities also left the
stakeholders in the states and local communities uncertain as to the
credibility of federal officials.
Table 4: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and
the Army, 1986-Present:
Year: 1986; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD designates the Army
as the executive agent for the Chem-Demil Program.
Year: 1994; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD makes the program a
major defense acquisition program and oversight is elevated to control
cost and schedule increases and to raise program visibility.
Year: 1998; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD delegates decision-
making authority to the Army, primarily as part of its overall effort
to reduce responsibilities and staffing of its offices.
Year: 2001; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD reinstates its
position as the program's top decision maker. According to DOD, this
was done to streamline decision making, which is consistent with the
cost of the program and national and state interest in the safe and
timely destruction of the stockpile.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Leadership responsibilities for the program within the Army have
also transferred three times from one assistant secretary to another
(see table 5). During this time, there were numerous CSEPP issues that
the Army took positions on with which FEMA did not concur. For example,
in August 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and
Environment) officials committed to funding nearly $1 million to study
building an emergency operations center for a community near Umatilla
with additional funds to be provided later. Since the program shifted
to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology) in 2003, program officials have been reconsidering this
commitment. The problem of Army and FEMA not speaking with one voice
led to confusion among state and local communities. Further, dual or
overlapping authority by the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and the Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Installations and Environment) in 2001 was not clarified.
Without clear lines of authority, one office took initiatives without
consulting the other. As a result, stakeholders were unclear if
initiatives were valid.
In addition to these program shifts, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Chemical Demilitarization)--an oversight office moved from
DOD to the Army in 1998--reported to the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) from 1998 until 2001,
then to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and
Environment) until 2003, and now again to the Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). These many shifts in
this oversight office with responsibility for programmatic decisions
left stakeholders confused about this office's oversight role and about
the necessity of funding requests it made. As a result, the
accumulation of extra funding ultimately caused Congress to cut the
program's budget.[Footnote 18]
Table 5: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities within the
Army, 1986-Present:
Year: 1986; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Environment); Action: The Secretary of the Army
assigned oversight of the Chem-Demil Program to the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Installations and Environment).
Year: 1994; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Research, Development, and Acquisition); Action: When DOD designated
the program a major defense acquisition program, the Army transferred
oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research,
Development, and Acquisition).
Year: 2001; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Environment); Action: To streamline the program's
organizational structure, the Army transferred oversight back to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment).
Year: 2003; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); Action: The Army transfers
the program back to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) when CMA was established.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of table]
Frequent Changes in Key Program Officials Obscure Accountability:
The Chem-Demil Program has experienced a number of changes and
vacancies in key program leadership positions, which has obscured
accountability. This issue is further compounded, as discussed later,
by the lack of a strategic plan to provide an agreed upon road map for
officials to follow. Within the Army, three different officials have
held senior leadership positions since December 2001. In addition, five
officials have served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Chem-Demil) during that time.[Footnote 19] The program manager's
position remained vacant for nearly 1 year, from April 2002 to February
2003, before being filled. However, in June, after only 4 months, the
program manager resigned and the Army named a replacement.
Frequent shifts in key leadership positions led to several instances
where this lack of continuity affected decision making and obscured
accountability. For example, in June 2002, a program official promised
to support future funding requests for emergency preparedness equipment
from a community, but his successor did not fulfill this promise. This
promise caused communities to submit several funding requests that
were not supported. The lack of leadership continuity makes it unclear
who is accountable when commitments are made but not implemented.
Moreover, when key leaders do not remain in their positions long enough
to develop the needed long-term perspective (on program issues) or to
effectively follow through on program initiatives, it is easy for them
to deny responsibility for previous decisions and avoid current
accountability.
Recent Reorganization Has Not Reduced Organizational Complexity:
The recent reorganization by the Army has not streamlined the program's
complex organization or clarified roles and responsibilities. For
example, the Director of CMA will now report to two different senior
Army organizations, which is one more than under the previous
structure. This divided reporting approach is still not fully
developed, but it may adversely affect program coordination and
accountability. The reorganization has also divided the responsibility
for various program phases between two offices within CMA. One
organization, the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical
Weapons, will manage the first three phases for each site and a newly
created organization, the Director of Operations, will manage the final
two phases. This reorganization changes the cradle-to-grave management
approach that was used to manage sites in the past and has blurred
responsibities for officials who previously provided support in areas
such as quality assurance and safety. Moreover, the reorganization did
not address two program components--community-related CSEPP and ACWA.
CSEPP will continue to be jointly managed with FEMA. ACWA, as
congressionally directed, will continue to be managed separately from
the Army by DOD.
During the transition process, no implementation plan was promulgated
when the new organization was first announced in January 2003. As of
June 2003, the migration of roles and responsibilities formerly
assigned to the office of the Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization into the new CMA had not been articulated. For
example, several key CMA officials who had formerly been part of the
former program office told us that they were unsure of their new roles
within CMA and the status of ongoing program initiatives. Furthermore,
past relationships and responsibilities among former program offices
and site activities have been disrupted. Although the establishment of
CMA with a new directorate responsible for operations at Tooele and
Aberdeen is underway, former program office staff told us they did not
know how this new organization would manage the sites in the future.
Program Lacks Strategy and Implementation Plan:
While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance
documents for the Chem-Demil Program, they have not developed an
overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide
the program and monitor its progress. Leading organizations embrace
principles for effectively implementing and managing programs. Some key
aspects of this approach include promulgating a comprehensive strategy
to include mission, long-term goals, and methods to accomplish these
goals and an implementation plan that includes annual performance
goals, measurable performance indicators, and evaluation and corrective
action plans. According to DOD and Army officials, the Chem-Demil
Program relies primarily on guidance and planning documents related to
the acquisition process.[Footnote 20] For example, the former program
manager drafted several documents, such as the Program Manager for
Chemical Demilitarization's Management Plan and Acquisition Strategy
for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, as the cornerstone of his
management approach. Our review of these and other key documents showed
that they did not encompass all components of the program or other
nonacquisition activities. Some documents had various elements, such as
a mission statement, but they were not consistently written. None
contained all of the essential elements expected in a comprehensive
strategy nor contained aspects needed for an implementation plan, such
as an evaluation and corrective action plan. Further, all documents
were out of date and did not reflect recent changes to the program.
DOD and Army officials stated that the program's strategy would be
articulated in the updated program's acquisition strategy to be
completed by the new Director of CMA. According to the draft
acquisition strategy, the focus is to acquire services, systems, and
equipment. Again, this approach does not address all components of the
Chem-Demil Program, such as CSEPP and ACWA.
More importantly, a strategic plan would ensure that all actions
support overall program goals as developed by the appropriate senior-
level office with oversight responsibility for the program. An
implementation plan would define the steps the program would take to
accomplish its mission. Further, a strategy document, coupled with an
implementation plan, would clarify roles and responsibilities and
establish program performance measurements. Together, these documents
would provide the foundation for a well-managed program to provide
continuity of operations for program officials to follow.
Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Program's Inability to
Anticipate and Influence Issues:
The program continues to miss most milestones, following a decade long
trend. Nearly all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001
scheduled milestones because of substantial delays during their
systematization (equipment testing) or operations (agent destruction)
phases. Delays at sites using incineration stem primarily from a number
of problems that DOD and the Army have not been able to anticipate or
control, such as concerns involving plant safety, difficulties in
meeting environmental permitting requirements, public concerns about
emergency preparedness plans, and budgeting shortfalls. The
neutralization sites have not missed milestones yet but have
experienced delays as well. DOD and the Army have not developed an
approach to anticipate and address potential problems that could
adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. Neither DOD nor
the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk management approach to
mitigate potential problems. As a result, the Chem-Demil Program will
have a higher level of risk of missing its schedule milestones and CWC
deadlines, incurring rising costs, and unnecessarily prolonging the
potential risk to the public associated with the storage of the
chemical stockpile.
Substantial Delays at Incineration Sites Led to Missed Milestones:
Most incineration sites will miss important milestones established in
2001 due to schedule delays. For example, delays at Anniston, Umatilla,
and Pine Bluff have already resulted, or will result, in their missing
the 2001 schedule milestones to begin chemical agent destruction
operations (operation phase). [Footnote 21] Johnston Atoll will miss
its schedule milestone for shutting down the facility (closure
phase).[Footnote 22] The Tooele site has not missed any milestones
since the 2001 schedule was issued; however, the site has undergone
substantial delays in destroying its stockpile primarily due to a
safety-related incident in July 2002.[Footnote 23] If additional delays
occur at the Tooele site, it could also exceed its next milestone as
well. Table 6 shows the status of the incineration sites that will miss
2001 schedule milestones.
Table 6: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration
Site:
Site: Anniston; Next project milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date
to begin next milestone: July 2002; Estimated[A] date to begin next
phase: July 2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of
months): +12.
Site: Umatilla; Next project milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date
to begin next milestone: July 2003; Estimated[A] date to begin next
phase: Dec. 2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of
months): +5.
Site: Pine Bluff; Next project milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule
date to begin next milestone: Oct. 2003; Estimated[A] date to begin
next phase: Apr. 2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate
(no. of months): +6.
Site: Johnston Atoll; Next project milestone: End of closure; 2001
schedule date to begin next milestone: Sept. 2003; Estimated[A] date to
begin next phase: Jan. 2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and
estimate (no. of months): +4.
Sources: DOD and the U.S. Army.
[A] Program manager's official estimate for Pine Bluff and Johnston
Atoll; unofficial estimates for other sites based on discussions with
site officials as of June 2003.
[End of table]
The delays at the incineration sites have resulted from various
longstanding issues, which the Army has not been able to effectively
anticipate or control because it does not have a process to identify
and mitigate them. An effectively managed program would have an
approach, such as lessons learned, to identify and mitigate issues.
Although the program now has extensive experience with destroying
agents at two sites, the Chem-Demil Programmatic Lessons Learned
Program has been shifted to individual contractors from a headquarters
centralized effort. In†September 2002, we reported on the effectiveness
of the centralized lessons learned program and found it to be generally
effective, but it should be improved and expanded.[Footnote 24] By
decentralizing the program, it is uncertain how knowledge will be
leveraged between sites to avoid or lessen potential delays due to
issues that have previously occurred. In addition, program officials
told us that they were concerned that lessons from the closure at
Johnston Atoll were not being captured and saved for future use at
other sites.
Many delays have resulted from incidents during operations,
environmental permitting, community protection, and funding issues.
This†continues to be a trend we identified in previous reports on the
program. The following examples illustrate some of the issues that have
caused delays at incineration sites since 2001:
* Incidents during operations: Agent destruction operations at Tooele
were suspended from July 2002 to March 2003 because of a chemical
incident involving a plant worker who came into contact with a nerve
agent while performing routine maintenance. Subsequent investigations
determined that this event occurred because some procedures related to
worker safety were either inadequate or not followed. A corrective
action plan, which required the implementation of an improved safety
plan, was instituted before operations resumed. Since it resumed
operations in March 2003, Tooele has experienced several temporary
shutdowns. (These shutdowns are discussed further in app. II.):
* Environmental permitting: The start of agent destruction operations
at Umatilla and Anniston sites has been delayed because of several
environmental permitting issues.[Footnote 25] Delays at the Umatilla
site have resulted from several unanticipated engineering changes
related to reprogramming software and design changes that required
permit modifications. An additional delay occurred at the Umatilla site
when the facility was temporarily shut down in October 2002 by state
regulators because furnaces were producing an unanticipated high amount
of heavy metals during surrogate agent testing. The testing was
suspended until a correction could be implemented. Delays at the
Anniston site occurred because state environmental regulators did not
accept test results for one of the furnaces because the subcontractor
did not follow state permit-specified protocols.
* Community protection: Destruction operations at the Anniston site
have been delayed because of concerns about emergency preparedness for
the surrounding communities. These concerns included the inadequacy of
protection plans for area schools and for special needs residents.
Although we reported on this issue in July 1996[Footnote 26] and again
in August 2001 and a senior DOD official identified it as a key concern
in September 2001, the Army was unable to come to a satisfactory
resolution with key state stakeholders prior to the planned January
2003 start date. As of June 2003, negotiations were still ongoing
between the Army and key public officials to determine when destruction
operations could begin.
* Funding: Systemization and closure activities were delayed at Pine
Bluff and Johnston Atoll sites, respectively, because program funds
planned for demilitarization were redirected in fiscal year 2002 by DOD
to pay for $40.5 million for additional community protection equipment
for Anniston. This was an unfunded budget expense, and the Army reduced
funds for the Pine Bluff site by $14.9 million, contributing to
construction and systemization milestones slipping 1 year. The Pine
Bluff site was selected because the loss of funding would not delay the
projected start of operations during that fiscal year. Program
officials told us that the total program cost of this schedule slip
would ultimately be $90 million. Additionally, funds were reduced for
the Johnston Atoll site by $25.1 million because it was in closure.
According to an Army official, delays increase program costs by
approximately $250,000 to $300,000 a day or about $10 million per
month. Since 2001, delays have caused cost increases of $256 million at
the incineration sites shown in table 7.
Table 7: Program Cost Increases Resulting from Delays at Incineration
Sites:
Dollars in millions.
Johnston Atoll; Cause of delay: Funding; Cost increase: $26.
Tooele; Cause of delay: Incident during operation; Cost increase: 75.
Anniston; Cause of delay: Environmental permitting; Cost increase: 45.
Umatilla; Cause of delay: Environmental permitting; Cost increase: 20.
Pine Bluff; Cause of delay: Funding; Cost increase: 90.
Total; Cost increase: $256.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
Note: Data as of March 2003.
[End of table]
Due to the delays, the Army is in the process of developing new
milestones that would extend beyond those adopted in 2001. According to
an Army official, the program will use events that have occurred since
2001 to present new cost estimates to DOD in preparation for the fiscal
year 2005 budget submission. Program officials told us that they
estimate costs have already increased $1.2 billion. This estimated
increase is likely to rise further as additional factors are
considered.
Delays at Neutralization Sites Have Not Led to Missed Milestones:
The two bulk-agent only sites, Aberdeen and Newport, have experienced
delays but have not breeched their milestones. The schedules were
revised in response to concerns about the continued storage of the
chemical stockpile after the events of September 11, 2001. In 2002, DOD
approved the use of a modified process that will accelerate the rate of
destruction at these two sites. For example, the Army estimates that
the modified process will reduce the length of time needed to complete
destruction of the blister agent stockpile at Aberdeen from 20 months
to 6 months. The Army estimates that this reduction, along with other
changes, such as the off-site shipping of a waste byproduct, will
reduce the scheduled end of operations by 5 years, from 2008 to 2003.
Similarly, projections for agent destruction operations at Newport were
reduced from 20 months to 7 months, and the destruction end date moved
up from 2009 to 2004.
While the Aberdeen site did begin destruction operations, as of June
2003, it had only achieved a peak rate of 2 containers per day, which
is far less than the projected peak daily rate of 12, and had
experienced unanticipated problems removing residual agent from the
containers. After 2 months of processing, Army officials said it had
initially processed 57 of the 1,815 containers in Aberdeen's stockpile
and will have to do additional processing of these containers because
of a higher amount of unanticipated hardened agent. Even if the peak
daily rate of 12 is achieved, the site will not meet the October 2003
Army estimate.
At the Newport site, construction problems will delay the start of
operations, missing the program manager's October 2003 estimate for
starting agent destruction operations. Another possible impediment to
starting operations is the program's efforts to treat the waste
byproduct at a potential off-site disposal facility in Ohio. These
efforts have met resistance from some community leaders and residents
near the potential disposal site. If the Army is unable to use an off-
site facility, the disposal may have to be done on site, requiring the
construction of a waste byproduct treatment facility, further causing
delays and increasing costs.
Schedule milestones were not adopted for the Pueblo and Blue Grass
sites in the 2001 schedule because DOD had not selected a destruction
technology. Subsequently, DOD selected destruction technologies for
these sites; however, these decisions were made several months beyond
the dates estimated in 2001. For example, while program officials
indicated that the technology decision for the Kentucky site would be
made by September 2002, the decision was not made until February 2003.
Significantly, DOD announced initial schedule milestones for these
two sites that extended beyond the extended April 2012 deadline of the
CWC. According to DOD officials, these schedules are preliminary and
will be reevaluated after the selected contractors complete their
initial design of the facilities. Plans for these sites are immature,
and changes are likely to occur as they move closer to the operations
phase still at least several years away.
Risk Management Approach Needed to Reduce Schedule Delays:
DOD and the Army have not implemented a comprehensive risk management
approach that would proactively anticipate and influence issues that
could adversely affect the programís progress. The program managerís
office drafted a risk management plan in June 2000, but the plan has
not been formally approved or implemented. According to program
officials, a prior program official drafted the plan and subsequent
officials did not approve or further develop the plan. The draft plan
noted that DODís acquisition rules require program managers to
establish a risk management plan to identify and control risk related
to performance, cost, and schedule.[Footnote 27]
Such a plan would allow managers to systematically identify, analyze,
and influence the risk factors and could help keep the program within
its schedule and cost estimates.
DOD and Army officials have given several reasons for not having an
overall risk management plan. A DOD official indicated that the
approach that has been used to address program problems has been crisis
management, which has forced DOD to react to issues rather than control
them. The deputy program manager stated that the programís focus has
been on managing individual sites by implementing initiatives to
improve contractor performance as it relates to safety, schedule, and
cost. The official also said that establishing a formal, integrated
risk management plan has not been a priority. However, an official from
the program managerís office said the infrastructure is in place to
finalize an integrated risk management plan by October 2003, which
coincides with the date CMA takes over leadership of the program.
However, due to the transition that the organization is undergoing, the
status of this effort is uncertain.
The Army defines its risk management approach as a process for
identifying and addressing internal and external issues that may have
a†negative impact on the programís progress. A risk management
approach†has five basic steps, which assist program leaders in
effective decision†making for better program outcomes. Simply stated,
the first step is to identify those issues that pose a risk to the
program. For example, a problem in environmental permitting can
significantly delay the program schedule. The second step is to analyze
the risks identified and prioritize the risks using established
criteria. The third step is to create a plan for action to mitigate the
prioritized risks in some order of importance. The fourth step is to
track and validate the actions taken.
The last step is to review and monitor the outcomes of the actions
taken to†ensure their effectiveness. Additional remedies may be needed
if actions are not successful or the risks have changed. Risk
management is†a continuous, dynamic process and must become a regular
part of the leadership decision process. Without developing such an
approach, the Chem-Demil Program will continue to manage by addressing
issues as they†arise and not by developing strategies or contingency
plans to meet†program issues. As the program complexity increases with
new technologies and more active sites, a comprehensive risk management
approach, as the acquisition regulations require, would facilitate
program success and help control costs. Such a proactive approach would
allow the program to systematically identify, analyze, and manage the
risk factors that could hamper its efforts to destroy the chemical
stockpile and help keep it within its schedule and cost estimates.
Conclusions:
For more than a decade, the Chem-Demil Program has struggled to meet
schedule milestones--and control the enormous costs--for destroying
the nation's chemical weapons stockpile. The program will also miss
future CWC deadlines. Despite several reorganizations of its complex
structure, the program continues to flounder. Program leadership at
both the oversight and the program manager levels has shifted
frequently, contributing to the program's continued instability,
ineffective decision making, and weak accountability. The repeated
realignments of the program have done little to resolve its awkward,
hydra-like structure in which roles and responsibilities continue to be
poorly defined, multiple lines of authority exist, and coordination
between various entities is poor. These shifts and realignments have
taken place without the benefit of a comprehensive strategy and an
implementation plan that could help the program clearly define its
mission and begin working toward its goals effectively. If the program
had these key pillars, such as a strategy to guide it from its
inception and an implementation plan to track performance, it would be
in a better position to achieve desired outcomes. The program will have
a low probability of achieving its principal goal of destroying the
nation's chemical weapons stockpile in a safe manner within the 2001
schedule unless DOD and Army leadership take immediate action to
clearly define roles and responsibilities throughout the program and
implement an overarching strategic plan.
The Chem-Demil Program is entering a crucial period as more of its
sites move into the operations phase. As this occurs, the program faces
potentially greater challenges than it has already encountered,
including the possibilities of growing community resistance,
unanticipated technical problems, and serious site incidents. Unless
program leadership is proactive in identifying potential internal and
external issues and preparing for them, or in reducing the chances that
they will occur, the program remains at great risk of failing to meet
its scheduled milestones and the deadlines set by the CWC. These
problems, and subsequent delays, are likely to continue plaguing the
program unless it is able to incorporate a comprehensive risk
management system into its daily routine. Such a proactive approach
would allow the program to systematically identify, analyze, and manage
the risk factors that could hamper its efforts to destroy the chemical
stockpile and help keep it within its schedule and cost estimates.
Without the advantage of having a risk management tool, the program
will continue to be paralyzed by delays caused by unanticipated issues,
resulting in spiraling program costs and missed deadlines that prolong
the dangers of the chemical weapons stockpile to the American public.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction
with the Secretary of the Army, to:
* develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical
demilitarization program that would: :
* articulate a program mission statement,
* identify the program's long-term goals and objectives,
* delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices,
and:
* establish near-term performance measures, and :
* implement a risk management approach that anticipates and influences
internal and external factors that could adversely impact program
performance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. In concurring with our recommendation to develop an
overall strategy and implementation plan, DOD stated that it is in the
initial stages of developing such a plan and estimates that it will be
completed in fiscal year 2004. In concurring with our recommendation to
implement a risk management approach, DOD stated that the CMA will
review the progress of an evaluation of several components of its risk
management approach within the next 120 days. At that time, DOD will
evaluate the outcome of this review and determine any appropriate
action.
We believe these actions should improve program performance provided
DOD's plan incorporates a clearly articulated mission statement, long-
term goals, well-delineated assignment of roles and responsibilities,
and near-term performance measures and the Army's review of its risk
management approach focuses on anticipating and influencing internal
and external factors that could adversely impact the Chem-Demil
Program.
DOD's comments are printed in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
comments that we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretary of the Army;
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
For any questions regarding this report, please contact me at
(512) 512-6020. Key contributors to this report were Donald Snyder,
Rodell Anderson, Bonita Oden, John Buehler, Pam Valentine,
Steve Boyles, Nancy Benco, and Charles Perdue.
Raymond J. Decker
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Raymond J. Decker:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
This report focuses on the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-Demil)
Stockpile Program, one of the components of the Chem-Demil program.
Other components, such as the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program, were only discussed to determine their effects on the
destruction schedule.
To determine if recent changes in the stockpile program's management
and oversight have been successful in improving program progress, we
interviewed numerous officials and reviewed various documents. Through
a review of previous and current organizational charts, we noted a
number of changes in the program from 1986 to the present. We
interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Army officials to determine
what effect organizational changes and management initiatives had on
the program and to determine if a strategic plan had been developed to
manage the program. We identified organizational changes between DOD
and the Army, determined the rationale for changes, and ascertained the
effect of these changes on program performance. We reviewed Defense
Acquisition System directives to determine the roles and
responsibilities of DOD and the Army in managing the Chemical
Demilitarization Program. We assessed Chem-Demil Program's Acquisition
Strategy and Management and Program Performance plans to identify
elements of a strategic plan and evaluated and compared them to the
general tenets and management principles embraced by the Government
Performance and Results Act. Additionally, we interviewed Office of
Management and Budget officials to discuss their assessment of the
program's performance and its adherence to a results-oriented
management approach and reviewed DOD directives and regulations to
determine the criteria for strategic planning.
To determine the progress that DOD and the Army have made in
meeting revised 2001 cost and schedule estimates and Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) deadlines, we interviewed relevant program officials
and reviewed a number of documents. We reviewed the Army's current
program office estimates to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile and
weekly and monthly destruction schedules to understand how sites will
perform and synchronize activities to meet milestones. We interviewed
DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group to determine how DOD developed
estimates for the 2001 milestone schedules for each site. However, we
did not independently evaluate the reliability of the methodology the
Cost Analysis Improvement Group used to develop its estimate. Further,
we interviewed program officials to determine the status of the
destruction process at incineration and neutralization sites and the
impact of delays on schedule and cost.
We reviewed Selected Acquisition Reports and Acquisition Program
Baselines to identify the increase in program cost estimates in 1998
and 2001 and to determine the relationship between changes to schedule
milestones and increased program cost. Our analysis identified the
effect that schedule delays would have on schedule milestones at
incineration and neutralization sites. Additionally, the analysis also
identified types of schedule delays and the impact on program cost.
Through interviews with program officials, we discussed the status of
factors that increase program life-cycle cost estimates. We examined
the Chem-Demil Program's draft risk management plans to determine if
the Army had developed a comprehensive risk management approach to
address potential problems that could adversely affect program
schedules, cost, and safety. Through an analysis of other risk
management plans, we identified elements of a risk management process.
We reviewed CWC documents to determine deadlines for the destruction of
the chemical weapons stockpile. We interviewed program officials to
discuss the potential implications of not meeting interim milestones
and CWC deadlines.
During the review, we visited and obtained information from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries of the
Army (Installations and Environment) and (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology); the Office of Management and Budget, the Department
of State, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the DOD
Inspector General in Washington, D.C. and met with the Director of
Chemical Materials Agency and the Program Managers for Chemical
Demilitarization and Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment in Edgewood,
Maryland. We also met project managers, site project managers, state
environmental offices, and contractors associated with disposal sites
in Aberdeen, Maryland; Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine
Bluff, Arkansas. We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management
Agency officials concerning funding of emergency preparedness program
activities.
We conducted our review from August 2002 to June 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with
Chemical Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status:
When developing schedules, the Army divides the demilitarization
process into five major phases. The five major phases are facility
design, construction, systemization, operations, and closure. Some
activities of one phase may overlap the preceding phase. The nine sites
are at different phases of the process.
The Army's Demilitarization Process:
Design:
During the design phase, the Army obtains the required environmental
permits. The permits are required to comply with federal, state, and
local environmental laws and regulations to build and operate chemical
disposal facilities. The permits specify construction parameters and
establish operations guidelines and emission limitations. Subsequent
engineering changes to the facility are incorporated into the permits
through formal permit modification procedures. During this phase, the
Army originally solicited contract proposals from systems contractors
to build, and operate, the chemical demilitarization facility and
selected a systems contractor. Now, the Army uses a design/build
approach, whereby the contractor completes both phases. The Army
originally provided the systems contractors with the design for the
incineration facilities; however, systems contractors developed the
facility design for the neutralization facilities.
Construction:
During the construction phase, the Army, with the contractor's input,
develops a master project schedule that identifies all major project
tasks and milestones associated with site design, construction,
systemization, operations, and closure. For each phase in the master
project schedule, the contractor develops detailed weekly schedules to
identify and sequence the activities necessary to meet contract
milestones. Army site project managers review and approve the detailed
schedules to monitor the systems contractor's performance. After
developing the schedules, the contractor builds a disposal site and
acquires, installs, and integrates the necessary equipment to destroy
the stockpile and begins hiring, training, and certifying operations
staff.
Systemization:
During systemization, the systems contractor also prepares and executes
a systemization implementation plan, which describes how the contractor
will ensure the site is prepared to conduct agent operations. The
contractor begins executing the implementation plan by testing system
components. The contractor then tests individual systems to identify
and correct any equipment flaws. After systems testing, the contractor
conducts integrated operations tests. For example, the contractor uses
simulated munitions to test the rocket processing line from receipt of
the munitions through incineration. Army staff observe and approve key
elements of each integrated operations test, which allows the
contractor to continue the systemization process. Once the Army
approves the integrated operations test, the contractor tests the
system by conducting mini and surrogate trial burns. During minitrial
burns, the contractor adds measured amounts of metals to a surrogate
material to demonstrate the system's emissions will not exceed
allowable rates. In conducting surrogate trial burns, the contractor
destroys nonagent compounds similar in makeup to the agents to be
destroyed at the site. By using surrogate agents, the contractor tests
destruction techniques without threatening people or the environment.
Both the minitrial burn test results and the surrogate trial burn test
results are submitted to environmental regulators for review and
approval. When the environmental regulators approve the surrogate trial
burns, the contractor conducts an Operational Readiness Review to
validate standard operating procedures and to verify the proficiency of
the workforce. During the Operational Readiness Review, the workforce
demonstrates knowledge of operating policies and procedures by
destroying simulated munitions. After systemization, the contractor
begins the operations phase; that is, the destruction of chemical
munitions.
Operations:
The operations phase is when weapons and agents are destroyed. Weapons
are destroyed by campaign, which is the complete destruction of like
chemical weapons at a given site. Operations for incineration and
alternative technologies differ. The following examples pertain to an
incineration site. In its first campaign, Umatilla plans to destroy its
stockpile of M55 rockets filled with one type of nerve agent. Then a
second campaign is planned to destroy its stockpile of M55 rockets
filled with another type of nerve agent. After each campaign, the site
must be reconfigured. The Army refers to this process as an agent
changeover. During the changeover, the contractor decontaminates the
site of any prior nerve agent residue. The contractor then adjusts the
monitoring, sampling, and laboratory equipment to test for the next
nerve agent. The contractor also validates the operating procedures for
the second agent destruction process. Some operating procedures may be
rewritten because the processing rates among chemical agents differ.
Although the operations staff have been trained and certified on
specific equipment, the staff are re-trained on the operating
parameters of processing VX agent.
In the third and forth campaigns at Umatilla, the contractor plans to
destroy 8-inch VX projectiles and 155-millimeter projectiles,
respectively. Because the third campaign involves a different weapon
than the second campaign (i.e., from rockets in the second campaign to
projectiles in the third campaign), the contractor will replace
equipment during the changeover. For example, the machine that
disassembles rockets will be replaced with a machine that disassembles
projectiles. Additionally, a changeover may require certain processes
to be bypassed. For instance, if a changeover involved changing
processes from weapons with explosives to weapons without explosives,
the explosives removal equipment and deactivation furnace would be
bypassed. For the changeover to the fourth campaign at Umatilla, the
contractor will adjust equipment to handle differences in weapon size.
For example, the contractor will adjust the conveyor system to
accommodate the 155-millimeter projectiles. The contractor also will
change the location of monitoring equipment.
Closure:
After destruction of the stockpile, the systems contractor begins
closing the site. During the closure phase, the contractor
decontaminates and disassembles the remaining systems, structures, and
components used during the demilitarization effort, and the contractor
performs any other procedures required by state environmental
regulations or permits. The contractor removes, disassembles,
decontaminates, and destroys the equipment, including ancillary
equipment such as pipes, valves, and switches. The contractor also
decontaminates buildings by washing and scrubbing concrete surfaces.
Additionally, the contractor removes and destroys the surface concrete
from the walls, ceilings, and floors. With the exception of the
Umatilla site, the structures will remain standing. Any waste generated
during the decontamination process is destroyed.
Status of the Demilitarization Sites:
The Army's nine chemical demilitarization sites are in different phases
of the demilitarization process. The Johnston Atoll site completed the
destruction of its stockpile and closure is almost complete. The sites
at Tooele, Utah, and Aberdeen, Maryland, are in the operations phase,
each using different technologies, to destroy chemical agent and
munitions. The remaining six facilities are in systems design,
construction and/or systemization. Table 8 provides details on the
status of each of the nine chemical demilitarization sites.
Table 8: Status of Chemical Demilitarization Facilities:
Incineration site: Johnston Atoll; Current phase: Closure; Status as of
June 30, 2003: * The Army completed operations in November 2000 and
began closure activities in January 2001; * The DOD schedule milestone
to complete closure is September 2003; however, the Army expects to
complete closure in January 2004.
Incineration site: Tooele, Utah; Current phase: Operations; Status as
of June 30, 2003: * The Army began operations in August 1996; * After
a 9-month shutdown, operations resumed in March 2003. Operations were
suspended from July 2002 to March 2003 because a worker was exposed to
chemical agent; * Subsequent to resuming operations in March 2003, the
Army suspended agent operations five times, for a total of 12 days. The
suspensions occurred because of various operational problems including:
contamination of an agent collection tank, air monitors erroneously
reporting the presence of agent, problems associated with processing
spent decontaminate solution, a power outage, and a chemical event; *
The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is February 2008;
however, the Army expects to complete operations in January 2006; *
The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is September 2010;
however, the Army expects to complete closure in May 2008.
Incineration site: Anniston, Ala; Current phase: Systemization; Status
as of June 30, 2003: * The Army completed systemization in January
2003. However, due to congressional concerns that the Chemical
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) had not adequately
prepared the community for an accidental release of agent, the Army did
not begin agent operations as planned and agreed to address the
following four CSEPP issues before beginning operations: (1)
overpressurize schools and community facilities located within a 12-
mile radius of the stockpile, (2) establish protection for individuals
who are unable to carry out protective action recommendations because
of disability, illness, inability to understand instructions in
English, or are underage and unattended, (3) assume responsibility for
turning on the sirens for zones located closest to the Anniston Army
Depot, and (4) use the Environmental Protection Agency's new Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels; * On June 5, 2003, the Army sent official
30-day notification, as required, to Congress that the site is ready to
begin operations; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations
is May 2011; however, the Army expects to complete operations in July
2009; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is December
2013; however, the Army expects to complete closure in November 2011.
Incineration site: Umatilla, Oreg; Current phase: Systemization;
Status as of June 30, 2003: * The DOD schedule milestone to start
operations is July 2003; however, the Army now expects to begin
operations in December 2003 because of a minitrial burn failure; * The
Army is conducting surrogate trial burns, which are expected to be
complete in August 2003; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete
operations is January 2011; however, the Army expects to complete
operations in May 2009; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete
closure is June 2014; however, the Army expects to complete closure in
February 2012.
Incineration site: Pine Bluff, Ark; Current phase: Systemization;
Status as of June 30, 2003: * The DOD schedule milestone to begin
operations is October 2003; however, because of funding reductions, the
Army expects to begin operations in April 2004; * The Army is
conducting systems testing, which is expected to be complete in August
2003; * The Army expects to begin surrogate trial burns in June 2003
and complete the trial burns in April 2004; * The DOD schedule
milestone to complete operations is November 2009; however, the Army
expects to complete operations in January 2009; * The DOD schedule
milestone to complete closure is December 2011; however, the Army
expects to complete closure in December 2010.
Neutralization site:
Neutralization site: Aberdeen, Md; Current phase: Operations; Status as
of June 30, 2003: * The Army began operations in April 2003 and the DOD
schedule milestone to complete operations is March 2004; however, the
Army expects to complete operations in September 2003; * The DOD
schedule milestone to complete closure is December 2006; however, the
Army expects to complete closure in July 2005.
Neutralization site: Newport, Ind; Current phase: Systemization; Status
as of June 30, 2003: * The Army began systemization in September 2002
and the DOD schedule milestone to complete systemization is February
2005; however, the Army expects to complete systemization in October
2003; * The DOD schedule milestone to start operations is February
2005; however, the Army expects to start operations in October 2003.
The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is January 2006;
however, the Army expects to complete operations by April 2004; * The
DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is April 2009; however, the
Army expects to complete closure in September 2006.
Neutralization site: Pueblo, Colo; Current phase: Design; Status as of
June 30, 2003: * The Army awarded a systems contract in September 2002
to design a demilitarization site; * The Army is reviewing a proposed
design and build plan with the systems contractor. After the Army
approves the design and build plan, the contractor will begin site
preparation activities; * The DOD schedule estimates operations will
be completed by April 2010. (The Army has not developed an estimated
destruction schedule.).
Neutralization site: Blue Grass, Ky; Current phase: Design; Status as of
June 30, 2003: * The Army solicited systems contractor proposals in
February 2003; * The Army selected a systems contractor in June 2003;
* The DOD schedule estimates operations will be completed by May 2014.
(The Army has not developed an estimated destruction schedule.).
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS:
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON,
DC 20301-3050:
18 AUG 2003:
Mr. Raymond J. Decker:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Decker:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-03-1031, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Sustained Leadership Along With
Key Strategic Management Tools Are Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction
Program, dated July 30, 2003.
Thank you for providing us the opportunity to review your draft report.
We understand your stated concerns, and will weigh each recommendation
during all upcoming management and programmatic reviews. We reviewed
the subject document and provide the attached comments to the
recommendations and recommended administrative changes.
Patrick J. Wakefield
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Demilitarization
& Threat Reduction):
Signed by Patrick J. Wakefield:
Enclosure:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JULY 30, 2003 GAO CODE 350255/GAO-03-1031:
"CHEMICAL WEAPONS: SUSTAINED LEADERSHIP ALONG WITH KEY STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT TOOLS ARE NEEDED TO GUIDE DOD'S DESTRUCTION PROGRAM":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, to develop an
overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical
demilitarization program that would:
* articulate a program mission statement,
* identify the program's long-term goals and objectives,
* delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices,
and
* establish near-term performance measures. (p. 28/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD is in the initial stages of planning this
document. Preliminary estimated completion date is second quarter
fiscal year 2004.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, to implement
a risk management approach that anticipates and influences internal and
external factors that could adversely impact program performance. (p.
28/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army Chemical Materials Agency is evaluating
several components of their risk management approach and will review
their progress within the next 120 days. DoD will evaluate the outcome
of this review and determine the appropriate action.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could
Be Improved and Expanded. GAO-02-890. Washington, D.C.: September 10,
2002.
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States
for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program
Accountability and Financial Management. GAO/NSIAD-00-80.
Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2000.
Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address Low-Level
Exposures. GAO/NSIAD-98-228. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1998.
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the
Emergency Preparedness Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-91. Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 1997.
Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and
Schedule. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1997.
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama
Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses. GAO/NSIAD-96-150.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1996.
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD's Management. GAO/T-
NSIAD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1995.
Chemical Weapons: Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has Financial
Management Weaknesses. GAO/NSIAD-95-94. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 1995.
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review. GAO/NSIAD-95-66R.
Washington, D.C.: January 12, 1995.
Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile. GAO/NSIAD-95-67.
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 1994.
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare
Materiel Can Be Improved. GAO/NSIAD-95-55. Washington, D.C.: December
20, 1994.
Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies. GAO/T-
NSIAD-94-159. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 1994.
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of
Alternatives to Destruction. GAO/NSIAD-94-123. Washington, D.C.:
March 18, 1994.
Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical
Weapons Convention. GAO/NSIAD-94-136. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 1994.
Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has
Been Slow to Achieve Results. GAO/NSIAD-94-91. Washington, D.C.:
February 22, 1994.
Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to
Emergencies. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1993.
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule,
and Performance. GAO/NSIAD-93-50. Washington, D.C.: January 21, 1993.
Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental
Permitting and Testing Experience. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43.
Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1992.
Chemical Weapons Disposal. GAO/NSIAD-92-219R. Washington, D.C.:
May 14, 1992.
Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and
Schedule Slippages Are Likely to Continue. GAO/NSIAD-92-18.
Washington, D.C.: November 20, 1991.
Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile.
GAO/NSIAD-91-200. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1991.
Chemical Warfare: DOD's Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From
Germany. GAO/NSIAD-91-105. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 1991.
Chemical Weapons: Status of the Army's M687 Binary Program. GAO/NSIAD-
90-295. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 1990.
Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Army's Prototype
Disposal Facility. GAO/NSIAD-90-222. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1990.
Chemical Weapons: Obstacles to the Army's Plan to Destroy Obsolete
U.S. Stockpile. GAO/NSIAD-90-155. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 1990.
FOOTNOTES
[1] In April 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention. S. Res. 75, Apr. 24, 1997.
[2] DOD reorganized the program by elevating its oversight while the
Army consolidated functions at the Assistant Secretary level
(Installations and Environment).
[3] Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
H.R. Rept. No. 107-436, May 3, 2002.
[4] For purposes of this report, upper level refers to the offices of
the assistant secretary or above in the Departments of the Army and
Defense.
[5] The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986,
P.L. 99-145 (Nov. 8, 1985), sec. 1412(a).
[6] The Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization was originally
referred to as the U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation
Activity.
[7] The CWC implementing legislation, P.L. 105-277 (Oct. 21, 1998),
provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the
convention's provisions.
[8] This report solely focuses on the weapons the convention defines as
category 1, which are the most dangerous chemicals in the stockpile.
[9] As of June 2003, agent had been destroyed at Johnston Atoll,
Tooele, and Aberdeen.
[10] One other state party is not included in this assessment because
it is expected to submit a detailed declaration of the chemical weapons
stockpile that was recently discovered on its territory.
[11] The CWC's implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, is in the process of negotiating future Russian
destruction deadlines.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to
Improve Security of Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
24, 2003).
[13] DOD Directive 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition System, May 12,
2003, and DOD Instruction 5002.2, Operations of the Defense Acquisition
System, May 12, 2003.
[14] The cost estimates for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites were based
on incineration technology pending a technology decision.
[15] Johnston Atoll is not included because its stockpile has been
destroyed.
[16] According to Army officials, CMA is provisional, but the Army
expects to have this agency fully established by October 2003.
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army
Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies GAO-01-850
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Disposal:
Improvements Needed in Program Accountability and Financial
Management, GAO/NSIAD-00-80 (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2000).
[19] This position is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Elimination of Chemical Weapons).
[20] Acquisition programs establish program goals for cost, schedule,
and performance parameters over the program's life cycle.
[21] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, all three of these
sites were in the systemization phase; thus, their next milestone was
to begin agent destruction operations.
[22] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, agent destruction
operations had been completed and its next milestone was to complete
closure of the facility.
[23] According to Army officials, the United States will not meet the
45 percent interim CWC deadline by April 2004.
[24] U.S General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned
Program Generally Effective but Could Be Improved and Expanded, GAO-02-
890 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2002).
[25] We have reported on permitting delays in Chemical Weapons And
Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-
97-18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 1997).
[26] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile:
Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management
Weaknesses,GAO/NSIAD-96-150 (Washington, D.C: July 23, 1996) and
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States
for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).
[27] Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Oct. 30, 2002 (formerly DOD
5000.2-R, Apr. 5, 2002).
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