Force Structure
Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing Gao ID: GAO-05-10 November 10, 2004The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by deploying ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that remain deployed for longer periods is an alternative the Navy could pursue to increase the utilization of ships. Senior Navy officials have also cited crew rotations as a way to reduce part of the Navy's plans for a larger force structure and reportedly free billions of dollars for other priorities. On its own initiative, GAO examined the Navy's efforts to evaluate and implement several rotational crewing options and the impacts of ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments.
The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to decision makers. However, the Navy has not established such an analytical framework--consisting of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics--that could be used to assess the feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. Further, the Navy has not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such information, the Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on surface ships, the extent to which the various options should be implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment. Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a ship's condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not provided comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most maintenance and repair is usually completed between 6-month deployments. While rotating crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for up to 24 months, the service has not fully examined all issues related to the best maintenance strategies that could affect a ship's condition and crew's morale. Absent effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition and discouraging crew support for rotational crewing.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-10, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2004:
Force Structure:
Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard Guidance for
Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing:
GAO-05-10:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-10, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by deploying
ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that remain deployed
for longer periods is an alternative the Navy could pursue to increase
the utilization of ships. Senior Navy officials have also cited crew
rotations as a way to reduce part of the Navy‘s plans for a larger
force structure and reportedly free billions of dollars for other
priorities. On its own initiative, GAO examined the Navy‘s efforts to
evaluate and implement several rotational crewing options and the
impacts of ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments.
What GAO Found:
The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews
aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible
alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively
institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a
comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to
decision makers. However, the Navy has not established such an
analytical framework”consisting of formal measurable goals, objectives,
and metrics”that could be used to assess the feasibility of various
rotational crewing options and determine their impact on operational
requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. Further, the Navy has
not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to
perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such information, the
Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on surface ships,
the extent to which the various options should be implemented, or
whether it is getting maximum return on investment.
Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative,
the Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the
practice and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned.
Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to
institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations. While the
Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for
ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a
ship‘s condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not
provided comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy
unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting
effectiveness and crew morale.
Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of
rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance
strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse
impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission
capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most
maintenance and repair is usually completed between 6-month
deployments. While rotating crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships
deployed for up to 24 months, the service has not fully examined all
issues related to the best maintenance strategies that could affect a
ship‘s condition and crew‘s morale. Absent effective strategies, the
Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition and discouraging crew
support for rotational crewing.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Navy to systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of rotational crewing alternatives; specify standard
policies and procedures to ensure consistent management and
accountability for ships during crew rotations; collect, record, and
disseminate lessons learned; and conduct a study of the maintenance
process that includes all ships involved in rotating crews. The
Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations and cited
actions it will take to implement the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-10.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and
Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships:
Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons
Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences:
Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts
Have Not Been Fully Assessed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance
Implementing 10 U.S.C. 7310:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the
Persian Gulf:
Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material
Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative:
Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships:
Table 4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer:
Figure 3: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground:
Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal:
Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift:
Figure 6: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation
Destroyer, DD(X):
Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship:
Abbreviations:
DD: destroyer:
DD(X): next generation guided missile destroyer:
DDG: guided missile destroyer:
DOD: Department of Defense:
HSV: high speed vessel:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 10, 2004:
Congressional Committees:
The Navy's fleet of surface ships represents a significant capital
investment to provide the forward presence desired. The Navy is also
facing an affordability challenge as it invests in new ships, supports
a high pace of operations, and manages rising personnel costs. The Navy
has traditionally maintained overseas presence by using standard
deployments whereby individual ships and their permanently assigned
crews are deployed for approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle
that includes time for training and ship maintenance. Rotating crews
aboard ships so that the ships can remain deployed for a longer period
is one of many alternatives the Navy could pursue to increase the
utilization or the operational on-station days,[Footnote 1] or both, of
Navy ships. Recently, senior Navy officials have also cited crew
rotations as one of the ways to partially mitigate the need for a
larger force structure and free billions of dollars for higher priority
areas, such as the capabilities needed to operate from the sea when the
United States is denied access to bases and ports abroad. As such, it
is prudent for the Navy to employ its ships in a manner that maximizes
its return on investment.
The Navy has rotated crews on ships in several ways, although its use
of this practice is not widespread and is still evolving. On its Ohio-
class Trident ballistic missile submarines, the Navy has used a "Blue-
Gold" crew concept since the 1960s, whereby two complete crews are
assigned to a single hull and rotate deployments. In the 1990s, the
Navy's Mine Warfare Command[Footnote 2] used a concept whereby four
crews rotated among three ships throughout the deployment cycle. More
recently, the U.S. Pacific Fleet[Footnote 3] has been demonstrating the
ability to rotate crews on some of its destroyers as part of a
"Sea Swap" demonstration project. Under this concept, there are the
same numbers of crews as ships, but the crews rotate for 6 months to
those ships that are forward deployed for extended periods of 18 months
or more. The Navy is also using this concept on its patrol coastal
ships operating in the Persian Gulf and the Blue-Gold concept to
support the high speed vessel experimental ship, the HSV-2 Swift.
We prepared this report under our oversight authority and are providing
it to you because of your oversight on defense issues. Recognizing the
Navy's need to explore ways for improving the use of its surface ships
and its plan for employing rotational crews on several types of surface
ships in the current and planned force (appendix I provides a
description of all ships included in our evaluation), this report
addresses the following questions: (1) Has the Navy systematically
evaluated the feasibility, including the cost-effectiveness, of
rotational crewing concepts for existing and future classes of surface
ships? (2) Have the Navy's experiences with rotational crewing been
effectively implemented? (3) How does ship maintenance affect
implementation of rotational crewing?
To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility
and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and
future classes of surface ships, we reviewed rotational crewing studies
performed by and for the Navy, including a recent study by the Center
for Naval Analyses;[Footnote 4] compiled and analyzed sailor
reenlistment data; interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy
Headquarters and fleet officials; met with cost analysis experts in the
government and the private sector; and reviewed key acquisition
documents and crew employment plans. To assess whether the Navy has
effectively implemented rotational crewing on surface ships and
leveraged lessons learned, we conducted over 40 focus group meetings
with rotational crews; interviewed Pacific and Atlantic Fleet[Footnote
5] officials responsible for personnel, operations, maintenance, and
training; and reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System instructions and
queried the system to determine relevant lessons recorded. We used the
strategic ballistic submarine community as a best practice based on its
long-standing successful use of rotational crewing. To assess how
maintenance on ships homeported in the United States might be affected
by extended deployments, we reviewed ship maintenance directives and
instructions, reviewed ship maintenance reports, and conducted focus
group meetings with the three crews on the Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers involved with the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project
and several crews that had rotated on patrol coastal ships.
While we did not validate the maintenance reports and sailor
reenlistment data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD
officials to determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our
analysis. We did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
conducted our review from July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The scope and
methodology used in our review are described in further detail in
appendix II.
Results in Brief:
The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews
aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible
alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. However, the
service has not institutionalized this change by employing a
comprehensive analytical framework that will systematically evaluate
all rotational crewing options for current and future classes of
surface ships. Best practices show that an analytic framework that
includes measurable goals and objectives, performance metrics, and
evaluation plans helps decision makers effectively implement change.
The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate that rotational crewing
aboard surface ships is feasible for increasing the forward presence.
But, the Navy has not established formal measurable goals, objectives,
and metrics that would be used to assess each of the rotational crewing
options to determine their impact on operational requirements, ship
condition, and crew morale. For example, one measure of crew morale is
the reenlistment rate. While the Navy did not assess the rates for
participants in rotational crewing, we found that reenlistments were
generally lower on the Sea Swap guided missile destroyers compared to
comparable Pacific Fleet ships. Further, the Navy has not
systematically collected or developed accurate cost data in order to
perform complete cost-effectiveness analyses. For example, cost
assessments have been limited to identifying fuel savings resulting
from fewer ship transits to and from homeports, costs for crew
transportation and berthing, and some additional maintenance and
training costs. A systematic cost-effectiveness assessment, according
to cost analysis experts, should include all costs for each of the
crewing alternatives, such as housing, training, maintenance, and ship
acquisition costs. This capability and cost information is critical for
comparing the different crewing options and evaluating which one most
effectively meets specific operational requirements. In the absence of
a systematic evaluation of the potential feasibility and
cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing options for its current
and future classes of surface ships, the Navy may make decisions
without knowing the full impact of the practice on surface ships or the
extent to which this practice should be implemented to meet operational
requirements. Consequently, the Navy does not know that it is getting a
maximum return on investment or the extent to which using rotational
crewing can economically offset future ship total ownership
costs.[Footnote 6]
The Navy's experiences with rotational crewing as an alternative to
standard deployments are still evolving, and thus the Navy has not
provided effective guidance for implementing the concept on surface
ships and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned to support
consistent management of the practice. Effective guidance and sharing
of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and
facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has conducted some
planning in support of rotational crewing on Sea Swap destroyers and
has well-established crew rotation guidance for fleet ballistic missile
submarines, it has not provided comparable guidance, including standard
policies and procedures, to conduct rotational crewing on other surface
ships. Consequently, management of rotational crewing on these ships
has been left to ship commanders, resulting in inconsistent
implementation and accountability. Further, the surface ship community
has not capitalized on lessons learned from past and current crew
rotation experiences. By not systematically recording and sharing
lessons learned from its rotational crewing experiences aboard surface
ships, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could
decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. For example,
experiences have shown the need to properly account for inventories of
equipment and supplies during crew turnover that affect operations and
general support of the crew, yet this inventory control problem during
crew turnovers persists.
The Navy has not fully assessed the impact of ship maintenance on the
implementation of rotational crewing because it has been focused on
demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed different
approaches to conducting maintenance without examining all related
issues that could affect success. Effective maintenance strategies help
to ensure that ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts
on crew morale or incurring unintended consequences. It is a challenge
to ensure the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer
periods (up to 24 months) because they must maintain mission capability
while deployed and forego standard maintenance periods that generally
occur every 6 months. According to the Center for Naval Analyses, a
more comprehensive Navy maintenance effort--including predeployment
inspections and more overseas mission-essential repairs--was required
to sustain the readiness of the two destroyers deployed in the Sea Swap
demonstration project than is typical. Even with these extra efforts,
the resulting impact on the condition of the ships was uncertain.
Although the Center concluded that maintenance was adequate to sustain
the ships at high readiness levels and that, upon return, the material
condition of one of the demonstration ships was comparable to another
recently deployed ship, Navy inspection data suggest otherwise. For
example, we found that the Sea Swap ship had significantly more
numerous deficiencies and lower inspection scores than the recently
deployed ship. Because of the importance of maintenance, the Center
concluded that if the demonstration project becomes a more standard
practice, the Navy should review the maintenance process and assess
maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. We found the
need for such an analysis was further supported by the experiences of
other deployed ships using rotational crews, such as the patrol coastal
ships. These ships did not receive such focused maintenance, and Navy
officials identified several maintenance problems that were not
corrected while deployed that could have affected the ships' mission
capability. Moreover, the Center and our focus groups reported concerns
about the extra workload to maintain ships at a high level of
readiness. In the absence of effective strategies, the Navy runs the
risk that it will degrade the long-term condition of ships as well as
discourage crew support for rotational crewing.
To ensure the Navy increases ship utilization in an effective and
efficient manner, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to systematically evaluate the
feasibility and cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing
alternatives; develop a rotational crewing program with effective
management oversight, standard procedures, and lessons learned; and
fully assess the maintenance strategies. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD concurred with the recommendations and cited actions
it will take to implement the recommendations.
Background:
The Importance of Having a Forward Military Presence Overseas:
Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter
threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national
military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military
Strategy[Footnote 7] notes that an overseas presence supports the
ability of the United States to project power against threats and
support the establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions
that foster extremist ideologies. The strategy also notes that keeping
an overseas presence serves to assure U.S. allies; improves the ability
to prosecute the global war on terrorism; deters, dissuades, and
defeats other threats; and supports transformation. The Chief of Naval
Operations earlier this year underscored the continuing importance of
forward-deployed forces, noting "Our forward rotations remain
critically important to our security, to strengthening alliances and
coalitions, and to the global war on terrorism. But it is clear we must
make these rotations with purpose, not just to fill the
calendar."[Footnote 8]
Current Operational and Budgetary Pressures on Ship Procurement and
Operational Accounts:
In early 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the challenge
of accomplishing the Navy's missions within its budget. In
February 2001, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations established a task
force to explore force structure options facing the naval service,
noting that in order for organizations to remain vital and competitive
"they maintain their options and seek innovative developments that may
provide simpler, more convenient, or less costly alternative solutions
to their needs." One of the task force's primary assumptions was that
the Navy leadership understands that there may be insufficient
procurement funds available to maintain current fleet size. Another
assumption was that the demand for naval forward presence would remain
greater than the supply, regardless of fleet size. Within a year, an
operational studies group within the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations noted that the need for alternative crewing approaches might
be necessary to sustain the pace of global operations, especially in
the global war on terrorism.
More recently, senior Navy officials have warned that budgets will
remain tight. In June 2004, the Secretary of the Navy stated that DOD
will have less money for recapitalization because the defense budget
will not continue growing at the rates it has in recent years. The
Navy's acquisition executive has also noted that the Navy is employing
multiple strategies that eventually may reduce the number of ships,
submarines, and aircraft it purchases, saving taxpayer dollars as it
seeks more effective ways of employing its forces so that fewer of them
can provide the capabilities needed to accomplish assigned missions.
Rotating Crews Is a Part of Force Structure Assessment:
One such effort that may enable the Navy to sustain a high pace of
operations within expected budgets involves the rotation of crews on
and off forward-deployed Navy surface ships. While the Chief of Naval
Operations stated earlier this year that the ideal fleet size would be
about 375 ships, he also said that he is no longer willing to commit to
any specific number of ships until the Navy completes a new assessment
of ship requirements. The assessment, which started this year, will
evaluate the potential impact on force structure requirements from
keeping ships at sea for longer than standard 6-month deployments by
rotating the crews on and off. He noted the Navy's recent experience
with keeping two destroyers on extended deployments, whereby these two
ships provided the presence overseas that is the equivalent of 8 to 10
ships on normal deployment schedules.
Traditional Ship Employment Cycle Provides Limited Time in Theater:
The amount of time a ship ultimately spends forward deployed in a
theater of operations is affected by several factors in its employment
cycle. These factors include length of a deployment, transit speeds and
port calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance
requirements, and maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces
during nondeployed periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the
United States and deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will
normally spend less than 20 percent of its time in theater and that the
Navy would need about 6 ships to maintain a continuous presence in the
region over a 2-year period.
As part of the transformation efforts to increase the fleet's
operational readiness and responsiveness, the Navy recently implemented
a new operational strategy--called the Fleet Response Plan--that
changes the manner in which it maintains, trains, mans, and deploys its
ships. The overall objective of the plan is to create a more responsive
force by sustaining a more level balance of training between
deployments, instead of dropping to minimum rates of readiness upon
return from deployment and then gradually rebuilding its state of
readiness throughout a 12-month training cycle that follows major
maintenance of the vessel. The plan also modifies long-standing forward
presence policy of predictable, 6-month deployments to predetermined
regions. This flexible deployment concept allows units that have
attained high readiness to embark on deployments of varied duration--
but still generally no longer than 6 months--in support of specific
national priorities, such as homeland defense, multinational exercises,
security cooperation events, deterrent operations, or prosecution of
the global war on terrorism. These deployments provide what the Chief
of Naval Operations calls "presence with a purpose," and are intended
to occur in less predictable patterns to keep potential adversaries off
guard.
Ship Crewing Options:
In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range
of Navy crewing options falls into four major categories: (1) Sea Swap,
(2) Horizon, (3) Blue-Gold, and (4) partial or graduated crew
swapping.[Footnote 9] Each of these options can be implemented in
varying ways and may have different advantages and disadvantages, but
the Navy's actual experience with nonstandard crewing concepts on
surface ships is limited.
Standard Crew Deployments:
Standard crew deployments use one crew per ship. Most of the
crewmembers are assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for
crewmembers to deploy overseas on the same ship more than once.
Standard ship deployments occur once every 27 months for a period of
6 months of which the ship and the crew are on-station for 3 to
4 months, depending upon whether the ship deploys from the east or west
coast of the United States.[Footnote 10] Most Navy ships and their
crews employ the standard crew deployment option.
Sea Swap:
The Sea Swap option uses the same number of crews as ships. Notionally
under this option, one of the ships deploys two, three, or four times
longer than the standard time by rotating crews every 6 months at an
overseas location. Ideally, all of the Sea Swap ships share an
identical configuration, so crew performance and capability are not
degraded because of ship differences.[Footnote 11] Because crews do not
return to the ships on which they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap
option, some crews could serve on three different ships in just over
6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on each one.
A limited number of destroyers and patrol coastal ships have employed
the Sea Swap option in recent years.
Horizon:
The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than hulls, such as
four crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve
for no more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or
more. Under a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least
two ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat
proficiency on each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship
for a period of time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training,
center. This crewing option was employed on mine countermeasure ships
during the 1990s.
Blue-Gold:
The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated "Blue" and
"Gold," to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a
ship for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on
the same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed
6 months and are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this
option includes the crews' familiarity with the ship. However, a
disadvantage is that the proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes
do not have a ship on which to train and must rely on mock-ups and
simulators. The Blue-Gold option has been employed by the strategic
submarine force and the HSV-2 Swift.[Footnote 12]
Partial or Graduated Crew Swapping:
Partial crew swapping has been employed on a limited basis. The most
notable use of this option involved the exchange of crewmembers between
a ship based in Japan with a ship based in the United States in 1999. A
variation on this theme is when portions of a ship's crew are swapped
out at regular intervals, for example, one-quarter of the crew every 2
or 3 months.
Rotational Crewing Believed to Provide Forward Presence Benefits:
The most significant advantage attributed to rotational crewing options
is the more efficient use of a ship in an overseas operating area. This
is accomplished by keeping the ship on extended deployments, ranging
from 12 to 36 months or longer, while at the same time not increasing
the crew's time away from home. Top Navy officials, including the Chief
of Naval Operations, believe that increased efficiencies from rotating
crews enable the Navy to perform the same number of missions with fewer
ships or to increase the number of missions with the same force size.
For example, the Navy's acquisition executive stated that if the
Sea Swap option is employed on its next generation guided missile
destroyer, the DD(X),[Footnote 13] the Navy might be able to reduce
requirements from 24 to 16 ships and apply the savings toward the next
generation cruiser.
Disadvantages often associated with rotational crewing include
increased infrastructure costs; deteriorating ship material condition
and lack of ready access to maintenance support while on extended
deployment; decreased readiness due to differences between ships; and
decreased quality of life and other sociological issues for
crew members, including the sense of less "ship ownership," fewer port
calls, and cultural changes.
Recent Sea Swap Destroyer Demonstration Project Assesses Feasibility:
The Navy recently conducted a 2-year demonstration to determine if two
destroyers could (1) provide more deployment time on-station and
(2) maintain sailor quality of life while rotating crews. The Navy
declared the demonstration a success, stating that the ships operated
well while increasing their operational capability. In its report on
the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Center concluded that the
feasibility of the concept clearly was a success.[Footnote 14] However,
the Center noted that there were problems and limitations. While none
of the problems was considered a showstopper, the Center stated that
the Sea Swap demonstration afforded the opportunity to learn lessons in
order to enhance the use of the practice in the future. Many of these,
such as the need for improved accountability, oversight, and
understanding of maintenance strategies, are discussed in this report.
Key Commands Responsible for Implementing Rotational Crewing on Surface
Ships:
The Chief of Naval Operations has charged the Commander, Naval Surface
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with being the primary proponent for
demonstrating the feasibility of rotating crews on surface ships as
well as assessing the cost of the various options and providing
oversight and accountability. To date the Command's emphasis has been
on using the Sea Swap demonstration as a "proof-of-concept" for
rotational crewing. It provided the guidance implementing the concept,
approved the assessment plan, and used Center support to collect and
analyze some data. However, other commands are involved in implementing
other rotational crewing options on surface ships; they include the
Mine Warfare Command and the Amphibious Group Two Command. See appendix
II for a more complete list of organizations involved.
The Navy Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Feasibility and
Cost-Effectiveness of Rotational Crewing for Surface Ships:
Although the Navy's senior leadership has initiated a change in how the
Navy can operate in the future by demonstrating that rotational crewing
is a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments, the
Navy has not systematically evaluated the feasibility and
cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing options for its current
and future classes of surface ships. The Navy has documented that
rotational crewing helps to increase the forward presence of its ships
beyond the traditional 6-month deployment periods, and officials have
indicated that they want to make greater use of rotational crew
options. While the Navy has conducted some limited assessments of the
Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project, it has not developed a
comprehensive common analytical framework to assess the potential
impact of all rotational crewing options on the material condition of
all of the ships, operational requirements, and the quality of life for
crews.
In addition, the Navy has not collected complete and consistent
information that is critical for comparing different crewing
alternatives for such factors as evaluating which alternative most
cost-effectively meets specific requirements and warfighting
effectiveness. In the absence of a common analytical framework, Navy
officials assigned to ships that have used or experimented with crew
rotations have been left to develop their own goals, objectives, and
metrics and the results have to date been uneven. As a result, the Navy
does not have complete and accurate data, including cost data that
reflect total ownership and operating and support costs, readiness, and
crew quality of life, making success or failure of the individual
options involving different types of ships difficult to determine. In
the absence of a systematic evaluation, the Navy also does not know the
extent to which rotational crewing options can provide maximum return
on investment and economically offset future ship total ownership
costs.
Navy Has Some Evidence to Show That Rotational Crewing Increases
Forward Presence and Is Considering Greater Use:
The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate that rotational crewing
helps to increase the forward presence of its ships beyond the
traditional 6-month deployment periods. Table 1 shows the percentage of
time a ship would be notionally forward deployed during the employment
cycle for each type of crew deployment option and the number of ships
that would be required to keep one vessel continuously operating in the
Persian Gulf.
Table 1: Comparison of Crewing Options during Deployments to the
Persian Gulf:
Crewing option: Standard;
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 17%;
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 6.
Crewing option: Sea Swap;
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 24%;
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 4.
Crewing option: Horizon;
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 32%;
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed: 3.
Crewing option: Blue-Gold;
Percent of ship's employment cycle forward deployed: 71%;
Number of ships required to continuously keep one forward deployed:
1.5.
Source: GAO's analysis of Navy data.
[End of table]
Given such promise for improving deployment efficiencies, Surface Force
Pacific Command[Footnote 15] officials have considered using rotational
crewing options on other ships. For example, in July 2004, the
Commander, Naval Surface Force, indicated plans to use the Sea Swap
option on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer based in the Atlantic Fleet
and an expeditionary strike group based in the Pacific Fleet, during
the spring and summer of 2005, respectively. In addition, Mine Warfare
Command officials informed us in July 2004 that it intends to rotate
crews on mine warfare ships based in the Persian Gulf later in the
year, but it had not yet determined which option it will use.
The Navy is also considering rotational crewing for operating future
ships and, as a result, it could change the number of new ships that
might be purchased. For example, the Navy is designing and procuring
the littoral combat ship[Footnote 16] and the DD(X), which will
cost billions of dollars. The Navy has suggested that if crew rotations
with an expeditionary strike group are as successful as with the
Sea Swap destroyers' demonstration, procurement plans for the number of
the DD(X) destroyers can be reduced and the savings applied to other
high priority ships.
No Established Framework and Limited Information for Comparing Crew
Rotation Options:
While the Center and the Surface Force Pacific Command have conducted
some assessments of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Navy did
not have an analytical framework or collect the information that would
be needed to assess and compare all crewing options. Lacking such a
framework, the Navy has not systematically assessed the effect that
rotational crewing has on such factors as the ships' material condition
and readiness or crew quality of life and training. Additionally, the
Navy has not systematically evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the
various crewing options.
Analytic Framework Would Improve Ability to Evaluate Crewing Options:
Best practices show that an analytic framework that includes measurable
goals and objectives, performance metrics, and evaluation
plans[Footnote 17] would allow decision makers and others to receive
consistent information needed to compare and assess different policy
options, measure implementation progress, and determine whether the
desired results were being achieved. Without such information for the
various crewing options, Navy managers do not have a clear picture of
the status of the crew rotation efforts, whether potential benefits
from different crew rotations are being achieved, which option might be
best in certain situations, and whether major issues need to be
resolved.
The Navy has not established formal criteria for evaluating the
implementation of the various rotational crewing options because its
focus has been on demonstrating the feasibility of the concept rather
than on assessing and formalizing the options. For example, the Navy
did not establish evaluation criteria prior to implementing Sea Swap,
and none was identified in the Center's Sea Swap assessment plan. As a
result, the Center lacked criteria for judging ship condition and crew
quality of life. According to the Center's September 2004 report, the
Navy had no intent to control the operational activities in the sense
of a scientific experiment, where one notionally scores a probability
of success or other such measure of effectiveness. It said the intent
was that general conclusions about the feasibility and difficulties of
pursuing the Sea Swap concept for future force employment planning
would be drawn from the experiment. Moreover, the Navy did not have
comparable assessments for the options employed on other ships such as
the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift.
More common data and analyses are not available for comparison because,
in the absence of a common analytical framework, individual commands
using crew rotations have been able to decide on their own what
(1) goals, objectives, and metrics to establish; (2) data to collect;
and (3) evaluations to do, if any. Such goals, objectives, and metrics
on ship condition and quality of life, which could affect crew
retention, were not established prior to deployment, and complete
information on these factors was not systematically collected during
and after deployments. As a result, while the Navy has reported that
the Sea Swap demonstration project was a success for the destroyers
involved, the Navy lacks clear criteria to objectively evaluate how
well the project did and the project's potential against other
rotational crewing options in two key areas we assessed--the condition
of the ship and the crew's quality of life.
Material Condition of Ships Not Systematically Assessed:
The Sea Swap demonstration project collected data on ship condition
that could be valuable. However, complete data were not systematically
collected on the ships before deployment and there were no clear
criteria for comparing the ships' condition upon return. For example,
the Navy conducted a total ship readiness assessment of the
U.S.S. Higgins, one of the two demonstration destroyers, in April 2004,
shortly after the ship returned from its 18-month deployment. This
post-deployment assessment of the combat, hull, mechanical, and
electrical systems was used to compare the U.S.S. Higgins's material
condition to the U.S.S. Decatur's. The U.S.S. Decatur, a guided missile
destroyer, had recently completed a standard 6-month deployment.
According to Surface Force officials, there was no significant
difference between the two ships' material condition upon return.
However, there is some disagreement about the criteria and
interpretation of the data used in reaching this conclusion. This is
discussed in more detail on pages 37-39. In its report, the Center
cautioned that further analyses of ship material condition are needed.
Comparable assessments of ship condition are not being performed on the
U.S.S. Fletcher, the other Sea Swap destroyer on extended deployment.
The Navy is missing an opportunity to collect data and more objectively
assess the impact of extended deployments on ship condition. A more
stringent independent inspection[Footnote 18] for the U.S.S. Higgins is
scheduled in January 2005, about 8 months after its return from
deployment and likely after having received significant shipyard
maintenance and modernization. Furthermore, Surface Force officials
also told us that a comparable pre-inactivation inspection, which is
normally performed, would not be done on the U.S.S. Fletcher because it
is being decommissioned and they do not want to spend the
money.[Footnote 19]
Quality-of-Life Issues Not Fully Assessed:
An objective of Sea Swap was to maintain the crews' quality of life.
The Center's study plan stated the Center would examine how the project
improved or degraded the quality of life and quality of work for Navy
personnel through surveys and interviews with crewmembers. However, the
Navy did not establish goals for determining the quality-of-life
success of the Sea Swap program. As a result, even though the Center
had collected data on morale, it could not conclude whether Sea Swap
had succeeded or failed in this regard. Also, the Navy has no plans to
monitor crews' quality of life for the patrol coastal ships and the
HSV-2 Swift. The need for such an analysis is borne out by the impact
of crew morale on reenlistment rates.
Quality of Life Is an Important Factor in Sailors' Career Choice:
Sailors' views of their quality of life is an important factor in
determining whether they will choose to continue their military career.
The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized the importance of people
in making the Navy successful in performing its mission and has
consistently made manpower and quality of service top priorities.
According to the Chief, "Quality of work includes everything that makes
your workplace a great place to be--from getting the spare parts you
need in a timely manner to working spaces that are up to current
standards."
Sea Swap's Implementation May Have Been Key to Quality-of-Life
Concerns:
Information collected by the Center, and by us during our review,
indicated that implementation of the Sea Swap demonstration project had
a negative effect on crewmember quality of life. While noting that
Sea Swap had been successful technically, the Center's pre-and post-
surveys of the crew showed that Sea Swap adversely affected morale
because of the increased workload, fewer opportunities for liberty port
calls, and crewmembers' general impression that the Sea Swap deployment
was worse than their previous deployment. For example, the Center asked
crews about their expectations for Sea Swap compared to previous
deployments. The survey results showed that 65 percent of the arriving
crews expected that Sea Swap would be a worse experience than their
last deployment and of departing crews; 84 percent said participating
in Sea Swap was worse.
Our focus groups with crews on the U.S.S. Higgins and the patrol
coastal ships also revealed a negative quality of life. The Center and
we both identified several factors that contributed to sailors'
feelings, including workload, training and professional development
opportunities, quantity and quality of port visits, and several
sociological issues (e.g., culture, ship "ownership," sense of pride
and recognition, predictability, or Navy tradition). The Center also
noted that Navy leadership would need to understand which features of
Sea Swap cause negative perceptions.
We addressed quality-of-life issues in each of our 43 focus group
meetings. All 26 of our focus group meetings with Sea Swap destroyer
crews that served on the U.S.S. Higgins and with crews on patrol
coastal ships attested to a highly negative quality of life, a
decreased morale, and a strong desire to not participate on any more
crew rotations implemented like their most recent experience. Many
crewmembers indicated that rotational crewing might have had a more
positive effect if the following conditions were met:
* crew swapping had been better managed to ensure work accountability
to reduce the workload,
* there had been time for individual training and professional
development,
* promises had been kept on designated port calls,
* port calls had been phased throughout the deployment instead of at
the end when sailors just wanted to return home,
* return flight schedules had been better coordinated, and:
* proper recognition had been given to each crew.
A small number of crewmembers indicated that their Sea Swap experience
was positive in that they liked knowing they would be on a finite
deployment period of 6 months.
In contrast, the 17 focus groups we conducted with Blue-Gold
crewmembers from the HSV-2 Swift and the strategic submarine force
found that these crewmembers had a generally positive crew rotation
experience. They attributed their positive experiences to a level
workload, management accountability, predictable schedules, individual
training and professional development opportunities, and sufficient
amounts of personal time during the interdeployment cycle, despite the
ships' high operational tempo.
Negative Morale Impacted Reenlistment Rates:
Lower reenlistment rates for sailors with less than 6 years of
service[Footnote 20] that served on Sea Swap guided missile destroyers
and patrol coastal ships reinforced the Center's survey results and our
focus group findings. Both Pacific Fleet and Surface Force Command
officials identified reenlistment data as a key indicator of whether
crews are satisfied with rotations. The Center's survey and our
analysis showed that negative morale associated with participating in
Sea Swap had an adverse impact on reenlistment rates. The Center's
conclusion was based on a series of crew surveys. According to the
Center,
* 55 percent of the crew said after the deployment that they thought
that Sea Swap would make them less likely to stay in the Navy, versus
39 percent before the deployment, and:
* 73 percent stated that if all deployments were like Sea Swap, they
would be less likely to stay in the Navy.
Our analysis of overall reenlistment data for sailors with less than 6
years of active service indicated that the crews on all three
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers involved in the Sea Swap demonstration
experienced 50 percent reenlistment rates. These rates were below the
Navy-wide reenlistment goal of 56 percent for this group and the actual
64 percent reenlistment rate for non-Sea Swap Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers based in the Pacific Fleet.[Footnote 21] Because the first-
term reenlistment rates for the three Sea Swap destroyer crews were as
low as 23 to 37 percent during their Sea Swap cycle, these ships were
among the few that did not meet the Navy-wide reenlistment goal. If the
Navy expands rotational crewing with out understanding its full impact
on crews, the results could affect retention and crew support.
Cost-Effectiveness of Crew Rotation Options Not Systematically
Evaluated:
The Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Navy commands using
crew rotations have not systematically collected cost data for
assessing the return on investment or cost-effectiveness of all surface
ship rotational crewing options for current and future ships. The Navy
testified to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2002 that
it would determine the true cost and potential savings of one
rotational crewing option, Sea Swap, to provide a firm analytical basis
in order to decide whether to expand use of that option or look for
other alternatives.[Footnote 22] Recently, the Commander, Naval Surface
Force, initiated a limited effort to collect and model costs. However,
to date, data collection and analyses comparing the cost of all the
crew rotation options have not been completed. Cost-effectiveness is a
method used by organizations seeking to gain the best value for their
money and to achieve operational requirements while balancing costs,
schedules, performance, and risks. The best value is often not readily
apparent and requires an analysis to maximize value.
A cost-effectiveness analysis is used where benefits cannot be
expressed in monetary terms but, rather, in "units of benefit," for
example, days of forward presence. Such an analysis would be of
particular importance when making return on investment decisions about
how many ships to buy and how to operate them.
Moreover, officials in DOD's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
told us that they have not conducted a basic cost-effectiveness
analysis of rotational crewing alternatives. Nonetheless, they believe
that rotational crewing is a good concept, that the Navy needs to
perform these analyses, and that they were not aware of any such
analyses having been conducted in the Navy. The Naval Cost Analysis
Division cited DOD cost analysis guidance and procedures that would be
applicable to a cost-effectiveness study of rotational crewing
alternatives.[Footnote 23] According to Division officials, this
guidance is to be used as the basis for preparing program life-cycle
cost estimates, and provides information on the scope of the cost
analysis, the procedures, and the presentation of the estimates.
Division officials also told us they have not participated in any
rotational crewing cost-effectiveness studies nor are they aware of
any. Officials in both DOD and Navy offices indicated that the cost
analyses for crew rotation alternatives should include the development
of a cost structure for identifying all the relevant cost elements in
the program, including depot level maintenance, fuel, training,
infrastructure costs, and other costs unique to the program.
While Surface Force Pacific officials had developed limited information
on costs and savings unique to the Sea Swap destroyers, it was not
complete, and they have not developed comparable data for the patrol
coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. Examples of information collected
included the estimated fuel savings from ship transits that were not
needed; transportation, room and board for flying the crews to turnover
cities; and special training. These officials told us that they plan to
collect additional data to help evaluate Sea Swap costs, but that they
are still determining what cost data should be collected and how to
establish a baseline for control group comparison purposes.
Furthermore, they told us that collection of the data will be
challenging because there is no central database or automated system
for coding rotational crewing-related expenses that could be used for
documenting the unique costs associated with rotational crewing. The
officials were also concerned that Navy management and accounting data
systems are not integrated, making it difficult to collect complete and
actual cost information that could be helpful in identifying the costs
of the Sea Swap initiative.
Surface Force Pacific officials have also determined that they have
responsibility for assessing the costs of crew rotation in the patrol
coastal ships as well, but they had not been doing so. Amphibious Group
Two[Footnote 24] officials told us in October 2003 that they have not
systematically evaluated costs and are not aware of any
cost-effectiveness analyses of rotational crewing being conducted.
Surface Force officials said that more complete costs for patrol
coastal ships have to be collected and analyzed to allow for cost-
effective comparisons.
Notwithstanding the limitations in the available cost data, Naval
Surface Force Pacific officials told us they recently developed and are
refining a model that presents information that is more comprehensive.
For example, in a July 14, 2004, briefing, the Force's commanding
officer presented costs of the Sea Swap demonstration, including a cost
comparison for both the U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins to other
ships in their respective classes, including the average costs per
deployed day. Surface Force Pacific officials said that this model is
also used to present similar data for the future littoral combat ship.
However, we were informed that much of the data used in the model is
based on estimates rather than actual costs and that some costs
integral to evaluating rotational crewing options, such as maintenance
and training infrastructure, were not included. Furthermore, the model
has not been tested or validated by the Navy.
Navy Has Not Provided Effective Guidance or Capitalized on Lessons
Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences:
The Navy has done some planning in support of rotational crewing on
surface ships, such as for the Sea Swap demonstration project, but
because the concept is evolving as an alternative, the service has not
provided effective guidance during implementation on all ships to
ensure proper oversight and accountability. Furthermore, the Navy has
not systematically leveraged lessons learned to effectively support
rotational crewing. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned
are key management tools to overcome challenges associated with
institutionalizing change and facilitating efficient operations. The
Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for
ballistic missile submarines for use as best practices that include
appropriately documenting the ship's condition and using advanced teams
to help prepare for crew turnover and help ensure accountability.
However, the Navy has not provided comparable guidance with policies
and procedures to ensure proper crew turnover and accountability to all
surface ships using rotational crewing. Consequently, the management of
surface ship crew rotations has been informally delegated to each
ship's incoming and outgoing commanding officers. This has resulted in
inconsistent management of and accountability for operational factors,
such as the ship's condition and ship inventories, when one crew
replaces another. In addition, the surface ship community has not
systematically collected, recorded, or disseminated lessons learned
from all rotational crewing experiences. Although the Navy has a formal
system to record lessons learned from fleet operations, experiences
from crew rotations are not being recorded in the system so that they
could be routinely shared among the surface ships and commands using
rotational crewing. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating
past mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew
morale.
Navy Conducted Some Planning in Support of Rotational Crewing:
Because rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments
differs from the traditional 6-month ship deployment, it is important
that planning be effective to increase institutional knowledge and gain
acceptance for implementing the change. The Navy has performed
extensive planning in support of rotational crewing on ballistic
missile submarines. However, crew rotation planning for the surface
ship community has been limited and less formal.
Submarine Community Has Established Planning Elements:
The submarine community has a well-established concept for conducting
Blue-Gold crew rotations, based on 40 years of experience on fleet
ballistic missile submarines. As a result, we analyzed the community's
concepts, procedures, and processes to identify "best practices." We
found that three key elements of this concept are:
* formalized turnover policies and procedures;
* a training plan that maintains proficiency of crews that are in port;
and:
* a maintenance plan that includes crew and incremental maintenance.
Formalized Crew Rotation Turnover Policies and Procedures Help Ensure
Accountability:
The Navy's Submarine Forces Command developed formal policies and
procedures for crew turnover in order to develop a comprehensive status
of a ship's material condition and accountability of controlled
material and documents, scheduled maintenance, and supply. The turnover
process takes place over 2 to 3 days, during which the on-coming
crewmembers from each department and division meet with their off-going
counterparts to review detailed turnover checklists that cover issues
such as personnel, training, administration, maintenance logs,
classified material, ship operational funds, parts, and food supplies.
For example, both crews review the status of preventative and
corrective maintenance repairs that are recorded in equipment status
logs, which help document the material condition of the ship. This
information is passed from one crew to another during turnover to
maintain continuity of maintenance. Both crews also review an inventory
of provisions, medicines, hazardous material, and information
technology equipment. Crewmembers from both crews are required to sign
the checklists, and the two ship commanders are ultimately responsible
for ensuring accountability of the material condition of the ship. By
taking these steps, the on-coming ship command has the opportunity to
note unsatisfactory conditions--including significant personnel,
training, operational readiness, habitability, and material deficiency
issues--on an exchange-of-command report. Turnovers can be delayed if
both crews do not agree on the ship's material status. Members from one
crew we met mentioned that they take pride in conducting the turnover
because they want to set the standard for their partner crew.
Training Programs Maintain Proficiency of the Crew While Ashore:
Maintaining the operational proficiency of the crew that is in port
without a submarine is the main challenge to the strategic submarine's
Blue-Gold system. In response, the strategic submarine force has
developed a training program to maintain crew proficiency in core
competencies while ashore. This program is designed to update crews on
recent procedural changes, allow crews to perform maintenance
operations, and refresh personnel who have been away from their duties
for several months. Crews receive classroom instruction and maintain
their skills in simulators at the Trident Training Facility.[Footnote
25] Crews are monitored and evaluated through graded individual and
group exercises. Officers and crewmembers stated that they generally
received adequate and sufficient training at the training facility to
perform their mission. Nevertheless, they stated that simulated
training is not the same as training on a ship and that crew readiness
is lower during the first week of deployment as they try to
refamiliarize themselves with the ship and their mission.
Crew and Incremental Maintenance Plan Designed for Rotational Crewing:
The ballistic missile submarine maintenance concept was specifically
designed to accomplish incremental maintenance over a 42-year life
cycle. The concept consists of crews working together to conduct
maintenance repairs and incremental maintenance that is planned or
unplanned corrective maintenance during an in-port maintenance period.
The submarine community has formal guidance for the in-port maintenance
period during which both crews jointly conduct maintenance
repairs.[Footnote 26] One main purpose is to enhance the efficiency and
productivity of the maintenance period. During this time, both crews
operate under one chain of command; the off-going crew reports directly
to the on-coming ship commander. Once the submarine is at sea, the off-
crew works with the maintenance facility and the on-crew to develop a
work package of needed preventive and corrective maintenance repairs.
As a result, during the next in-port maintenance period the crew that
has just taken command knows what to expect. Officers and crewmembers
in our focus groups stated that this approach was key to completing
required maintenance repairs in a short period. It also helps ensure
that items that may not have been captured during turnover are
identified according to officers on one submarine. In addition, crews
stated that this concept decreases the incentives for pushing off work
to the other crew because both crews conduct the needed maintenance
repairs.
The incremental maintenance plan involves routine maintenance based on
a set schedule common to all submarines and corrective repairs, which
include those items that break or are in a degraded condition as a
result of operations. The Trident Planned Equipment Replacement
Program, another aspect of incremental maintenance, provides for
repairs on hull, mechanical, electrical, or combat control system
equipment that require maintenance beyond the ability of the ship's
crew. The incremental overhaul relies on an extensive shore-based
maintenance infrastructure, including dedicated full-time maintenance
personnel, maintenance facilities that provide a full range of repair
and maintenance services, and dry docks that provide the support
necessary to conduct required equipment repairs and replacements.
Limited Planning for Surface Ship Crew Rotations:
Despite the challenges of implementing this change in crewing practice,
the surface ship community's planning in support of crew rotations has
been less formal and limited to several areas, including crew training
on different systems used on participating ships, use of advanced crew
turnover teams, and location and timing of port calls. Crews in our
focus groups also identified some limitations to these planning
efforts.
Planned Training for Different Equipment and Systems between Ships
Had Limitations:
A Naval Warfare College study of several crew rotation options
identified the crew's unfamiliarity with equipment and systems between
different ships as a potential challenge for conducting the program. As
part of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Commander, Naval
Surface Force, sought to address differences in ship design,
construction, and modernization between forward-deployed and
nondeployed ships by providing crews with predeployment training
specific to the forward-deployed ship they would join.[Footnote 27] The
Command planned for the training to account for many of the differences
between the destroyers, with emphasis on training systems and equipment
on the forward-deployed ship, and set-up training classes in the United
States and Sea Swap cities.[Footnote 28] For example, one on-coming
crew received training to ensure its proficiency in areas such as
critical weapons systems and engineering prior to the ship's turnover.
Amphibious Group Two also provided training to patrol coastal ship
crews to help them bridge the engineering differences they would face
on the deployed ship.
However, in our focus group discussions, ship crews participating in
Sea Swap and on the patrol coastal ships cited concerns about the
adequacy of this training. The crewmembers indicated that proficiency
improved with practice drills, but sufficient proficiency was not
achieved prior to deploying, even though they had received their
certifications. The delay in achieving proficiency was accentuated for
the crew that swapped in the Persian Gulf because the crewmembers did
not have the opportunity during a transit to become familiar with their
new ship. For example, crewmembers for one ship stated that they only
received partial training for operating a new radio that is necessary
for conducting strike operations. This partial training degraded the
crew's ability to shoot Tomahawk land attack missiles. Crewmembers also
stated that they did not receive training to operate damage control
radios, which meant the crew would have been unable to use the radios
in an emergency.
Patrol coastal ship crewmembers also indicated that they faced
challenges in training to operate the deployed ship's different
equipment. For example, crewmembers stated they did not receive weapons
training for Stinger missiles prior to overseas deployment because
these weapons systems are not typically used while on deployment in the
United States. Patrol coastal ship focus group comments revealed that
the crews compensated for training deficiencies with self-initiated
training during deployment. These crews also received some training
from the Coast Guard while in theater. They felt the deficiencies in
training on different systems compromised their ability to perform
their respective mission.
Value of Some Advanced Turnover Teams Was Limited:
The Surface Force Pacific Command established advance turnover teams to
assist ships participating in the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration
project, but their assistance was sometimes constrained. These teams
were comprised of approximately 15 to 20 members of the on-coming crew
who were sent to the forward-deployed ship 2 weeks in advance of the
turnover to conduct inventories and observe ship operations. The use of
an advanced turnover team was an effort to expedite the turnover
process from one crew to another. A Command official cited the work
performed by these teams as instrumental in reducing the amount of time
required for the turnover as well as for increasing their familiarity
with the new ship. However, crewmembers in our focus groups stated that
advance teams were not as effective as they could have been in some
turnovers because they were denied access to areas and equipment in the
ship at the time of turnovers. For example, a regional support office
assumed control of a Sea Swap destroyer in the United States, locked up
the workspaces, and did not grant the advance team access. In another
instance, the advance team arriving on the ship overseas was not given
access until the new crew assumed responsibility for the ship, which
limited the team's time and ability to expedite an effective turnover.
Navy Crew Rotation Efforts Have Lacked Standard Guidance to Ensure
Oversight and Accountability:
The Navy's implementation of surface ship crew rotation efforts lacked
effective guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. Because the
practice differs from the traditional crewing approach, such guidance
is a key to ensuring successful implementation. In the absence of such
guidance, including standard policies and procedures similar to those
used in the ballistic missile submarine community, officers and crews
on Sea Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and the HSV-2 Swift
developed their own turnover procedures. This caused inconsistency
between crews conducting the turnovers, which in turn, led to problems
in documenting ship condition and accounting for ship inventories. As a
result, surface ship crews cited the need to develop and implement
standard turnover procedures, including checklists.
Crewmembers said there was no document to sign during the turnover to
hold crews accountable for recording necessary maintenance repairs. For
example, crews reported that Navy systems for tracking maintenance
requirements and accomplishments were not systematically used to record
maintenance repairs. Officers and enlisted crews on Sea Swap destroyers
and patrol coastal ships indicated that, as a result, the ship
maintenance logs did not accurately reflect the material status of the
ships. One Sea Swap crew reported that the prior crew did not document
that the forward-fueling station had a hole, which took the entire
deployment to fix. In another instance, one crew stated that although
three portable fire pumps were required to be on board the vessel, the
crew only found two pumps, of which only one worked. Additionally, a
patrol coastal ship crew indicated that the previous crew reported only
a few needed maintenance repairs in the maintenance log. However, after
turnover, the on-coming crew said that it noted about 50 repair items,
including all 6 main engines that could not operate simultaneously. In
another case, the electronic preventive maintenance log was not working
during turnover, which the on-coming crew reportedly spent 3 weeks in
repairs to make it function.
A ship commander mentioned that there is a challenge associated with
properly tracking maintenance logs, which are not valued by all crews.
Those logs can be valuable tools when used, but he stated that the
maintenance logs did not reflect the material status of the ship. Some
patrol coastal ship officers stated that every crew emphasizes
different maintenance priorities, which can contribute to perceptions
of inadequate material condition of the ship during and after turnover.
Notwithstanding different perceptions of the material condition of the
ship, Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crewmembers raised concerns
about the lack of accountability, in particular oversight of
documenting the material condition of the ship. Crewmembers from the
Sea Swap destroyers and patrol coastal ships cited the need to
establish turnover standards and checklists and to conduct an
independent inspection to monitor the turnover and review the material
condition of the ship.
Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crews also mentioned that
accountability for ship inventories was inadequate. Naval supply
guidance cites the need to conduct physical inventories of equipment
and materials to the extent necessary to ensure effective control of
those materials normally required for performing the mission or which
require special management attention.[Footnote 29] Crewmembers told us
that guidance on conducting inventories was not always followed in
preparation for and during turnovers. Some crews mentioned that the
time to review supply inventories, a time-consuming activity during
turnover, was a problem. There were several instances on Sea Swap
destroyers of missing equipment--maintenance assistance modules
estimated at $90,000--and tools. One Sea Swap destroyer crew also
reported that the crew discovered during an inventory a pair of missing
night vision goggles. In another case, the on-coming crew lacked basic
supplies, such as cleaning materials, light bulbs, and toilet paper.
Crewmembers also reported items missing on their assigned ships upon
return that were not identified during turnover. In another example,
crewmembers of a patrol coastal ship crew stated that, upon return to
the United States, they found that 10,000 rounds of ammunition were
missing on their assigned ship. Sea Swap destroyer and patrol coastal
ship crews cited the need for an independent authority to hold crews
accountable for ship inventories.
Surface Ship Community Did Not Capitalize on Past and Current
Lessons Learned:
The surface ship community also has not capitalized on existing and
evolving lessons learned to more effectively plan and conduct crew
rotations. Capturing and sharing such lessons serve to further
institutionalize change by improving its implementation. While the Navy
has a formal system to record lessons learned, experiences from current
rotational crewing efforts are not being systematically collected and
recorded in that system. As a result, the Navy is missing an
opportunity to record lessons learned that could be leveraged by crews
involved in current and future crew rotation experiences. Further,
surface ships and commands have not capitalized on the lessons learned
in the system to plan and conduct crew rotations. Consequently, crews
experienced similar difficulties to those that the previously recorded
lessons learned sought to correct.
Navy Lessons Learned System Created as a Central Repository to Preclude
the Loss of Knowledge:
The Navy created a lessons learned database in 1991 to provide a system
for units to benefit from collective Navy experiences, identify
deficiencies, and take corrective measures in all aspects of fleet
operations. A lesson learned is defined as information that increases
the efficiency of Navy processes and improves the execution of future
operations. According to the Navy, it should provide value to existing
Navy policy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, organization,
training, systems, or equipment.[Footnote 30]
The Navy Warfare Development Command is responsible for administering
the system, and its officials indicated that information for current
rotational crewing efforts should be submitted to the system, as it is
the best way for lessons to be shared across the Navy community. Anyone
in the Navy can submit a lessons learned report through the immediate
chain of command. Fleet commands process and validate the proposed
report, which is then forwarded to be officially entered into the
system. Navy personnel ashore and at sea can access lessons learned
contained in the system through a classified Internet site.[Footnote
31] Use of this central repository would preclude the loss of lessons,
such as those lost by the Mine Warfare Command in the late 1990s due to
a computer failure.
Surface Ship Commands Have Not Made Systematic Efforts to Collect and
Record Lessons Learned for the Navy's Central System:
The Naval Surface Force Command recognized the need for a comprehensive
list of lessons learned in order to examine the Sea Swap initiative,
but the Command has not made a systematic effort to collect or record
lessons learned, nor did it task Sea Swap crews to identify and submit
them. Aside from 78 lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations that
took place in 1999 on Forward Deployed Naval Forces[Footnote 32] in the
Seventh Fleet area of operations, no lessons learned directly related
to crew rotations had been posted regarding the Sea Swap destroyers,
patrol coastal ships, and HSV Swift experiences as of July 30, 2004.
Absent guidance, Sea Swap crews' efforts to record lessons learned have
been inconsistent. Some crews developed lists of lessons learned that
were distributed to other rotational crews and the Command, including
some that related to manning, personnel, supply, predeployment
maintenance, training, turnover preparations and execution, turnover
time, and advance parties. In one case, a Sea Swap ship undertook a
concerted effort to document lessons learned prior to deployment, but a
majority of those documents were later discarded because the crew
wanted to create additional workspace. By not systematically recording
and providing valuable experiences from crew rotations to the Navy
Lessons Learned System, the Navy is missing an opportunity to more
effectively plan and conduct current and future crew rotations.
In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request on the status
of one of the Sea Swap ships,[Footnote 33] the Command identified a
preliminary set of lessons learned as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Selected Preliminary Lessons Learned Regarding the Material
Condition of U.S.S. Fletcher during the Sea Swap Destroyer Initiative:
Topic: More efficient forward presence;
Issue: A standard deployment of
a ship from San Diego to the Central Command requires a 40-day period
(30 days transiting and 10 days of quality-of-life port calls) at the
start and end of a deployment. Given a normal, 180-day deployment, this
provides 100 days of overseas presence in the Central Command per crew.
The lesson learned was that by employing Sea Swap and conducting only
one transit to the Central Command and one return to San Diego, the
four crews rotating on the U.S.S. Fletcher will provide 518 days of
forward presence. To achieve this number with standard deployments,
five-plus ships would have had to deploy.
Topic: Crew training certifications;
Issue: Sea Swap crews conducted their predeployment training and
achieved their certifications on their own hulls, prior to turnover.
These certifications remained with the crew. The lesson learned was
that Sea Swap crews met all operational taskings; therefore, the
certifications should remain with the crews, not tied to the hull.
Topic: Naval cultural issues;
Issue: There is a sense of ownership that a crew feels for their ship.
Sea Swap has personnel leaving their ship for another of the same
class. The lesson learned was the need to fully educate the crew on
the overall benefits of participating in an experiment such as Sea
Swap and ensure a positive attitude of the crew.
Topic: Maintenance of the forward-deployed ship;
Issue: Casualty reports are tracking on both classes of ships involved
in Sea Swap and are compared to previous ships of both classes. The
numbers of those reports have spiked each time a new crew embarks but
have settled following a short period. The lesson learned was that the
spikes that occur when a crew assumes the ship are somewhat expected
due to new eyes reviewing the equipment.
Topic: Follow-on orders for Sea Swap crews;
Issue: As Sea Swap crews would assume the hull of the crew who had just
relieved them, it was necessary to change their code. Detailed
coordination was required with the Bureau of Naval Personnel to ensure
personnel with incoming orders went to the proper crew as they rotated
ships. The lesson learned was that early and detailed coordination is
mandatory.
Source: Naval Surface Force Pacific Command.
[End of table]
A final report will be provided to the Committee once the initiative is
completed. None of these lessons learned from the Sea Swap initiative
have been reported to the Navy Lessons Learned System.
Efforts to gather lessons learned in the patrol coastal community have
been inconsistent. Amphibious Group Two similarly did not provide
direction to collect and record lessons learned and stated that crews
involved in rotations passed on lessons learned to one another. A
patrol coastal ship commander stated that crew efforts to gather
lessons learned were informal. We identified one lessons learned report
sent by a ship commander to the ship's command, Amphibious Group Two,
that contained lessons related to maintenance funding, ownership, and
maintaining good ship inventories. However, none of these lessons
learned had been recorded in the Navy Lessons Learned System as of
July 30, 2004.
The Mine Warfare Command directed the HSV-2 Swift commanding officers
to develop lessons learned reports on five issues. Only two of those
lessons learned reports had been posted to the Navy Lessons Learned
System as of July 30, 2004, and neither addressed ship crewing issues.
Many Past Lessons Learned Available in Formal System Are Not Being
Systematically Leveraged:
The surface ship community has not capitalized on the Navy lessons
learned database to plan and conduct crew rotations. A Naval Surface
Force Pacific Command official told us that the Command did not
systematically solicit available lessons learned from the Navy Lessons
Learned System to help plan for crew rotations. We found that
participants in our focus groups reported experiencing similar problems
that several of the formal lessons learned reported by the Forward
Deployed Naval Forces in 1999 had addressed. For example, two important
lessons not leveraged were:
* reviewing the automated process for the transfer of crew
identification codes when assigned to a new ship and:
* establishing and abiding by a written agreement between both ship
commanders that clearly defines transfer and accountability procedures
for equipment turnover.
When crews for Forward Deployed Naval Forces were rotated in 1999,
the Navy recognized that the ships were not timely in properly updating
crewmembers' records to show the ship to which crewmembers were
assigned. This resulted in incorrect enlisted master files and the
inability to process pay transactions. The lesson learned report stated
that the Navy should instantly transfer personnel from one code to
another automatically in a timely manner, which is crucial to avoid
incorrect master files and the potential loss of certain pay and
entitlements. Numerous Sea Swap destroyer, patrol coastal ship, and
HSV-2 Swift officers and crews we met experienced similar difficulties.
They reported that because their respective code was not changed to
reflect they had changed ships, some crewmembers experienced problems
receiving pay and others were ordered to the wrong ship. Officers and
crew from a Sea Swap ship stated that creating codes for each crew
would help alleviate similar problems. Assigning crews codes is a
standard practice in the ballistic missile submarine community. This
practice was also used by the mine warfare community during their crew
rotations in the mid-1990s. The systematic use of an effective lessons
learned system could have alerted the Navy to the need for a mechanism
to ensure the effective transfer of crews and ships from one code to
another in a timely and an accurate manner.
Establishing and abiding by written agreements between both ship
commanders involved in a crew rotation enable both crews early in the
planning phase to determine what equipment stays with the ship or the
crew and improves accountability for tool equipment transfer. The
Navy's lessons learned database identified the need for such
agreements. However, despite both ship commanders agreeing during the
planning phases of one of the turnovers that each ship's tools, parts,
and material would remain with the respective ship and that both crews
would review an inventory checklist during turnover, both crews did not
follow the agreement. One crew removed many of the tools and other
equipment before leaving the ship. As a result, the on-coming crew did
not have the needed tools and other equipment to perform maintenance
and repairs and had to spend $150,000 to buy the needed tools. Officers
and crews from two patrol coastal ships also indicated that absent an
agreed-upon written inventory identifying which items stay with the
ship and what items stay with the crew, one of the crews took needed
ship items back to the United States, in part, to ensure the crew had
necessary items on the new ship. Officers from one patrol coastal ship
stated that there is a need for a standard set of inventory items that
should stay on a ship. Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship officers and
crewmembers stated that an independent authority is needed to monitor
the turnover process, including an inventory of tools, to hold both
crews accountable.
Maintenance Strategies for Alternative Crewing and Potential Impacts
Have Not Been Fully Assessed:
The impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational
crewing has not been fully assessed. This is because the Navy has been
focused on demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed
ships to use different approaches to conducting maintenance without
capturing all needed information and examining all related issues that
could impact success. A full assessment of maintenance issues on all
ships employing this practice would be important in identifying and
addressing possible impediments to effectively implementing rotational
crewing. Navy destroyers and patrol coastal ships using rotational
crews on extended deployments have faced maintenance challenges to
ensure the mission capability of ships while overseas. To help minimize
the adverse effects on the material condition of forward-deployed
Sea Swap destroyers, the Navy expanded the scope of predeployment
maintenance and sent maintenance support representatives in theater to
provide additional technical support to crews. Despite concluding that
the condition of the returning ship, U.S.S. Higgins, was comparable to
that of another ship that had recently returned from a deployment, the
results of such efforts on maintaining ship material condition are
uncertain. The Center recommended that a review of maintenance support
might be necessary prior to expanding Sea Swap to other ships. We found
the need for such an analysis was further supported by the experience
of patrol coastal ships, which did not receive such focused maintenance
and identified several maintenance problems that were not corrected
while deployed that could have affected their mission capability.
Moreover, both the Center and our focus groups with rotational crews
found that increased maintenance tasks contributed to diminished crew
morale. Therefore, while the Navy used rotational crews to keep ships
on station for up to 24 months, in the absence of a careful analysis of
alternative maintenance strategies, the Navy runs the risk that some
maintenance approaches will degrade the long-term condition of ships,
diminish crew morale, and discourage crew support for using the
practice.
Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Is a Challenge:
Navy vessels using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced
maintenance challenges to ensure the vessels' mission capability while
overseas. Normally, most ship maintenance and repair is completed
between 6-month deployments. For instance, Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers normally receive continuous maintenance[Footnote 34]
annually and 2-month Selected Restricted Availabilities[Footnote 35]
every 22 months. However, ships employing rotational crews on extended
deployments do not return to the United States for periods of 12 or
more months, so crews must maintain ship capability while deployed in
compliance with law[Footnote 36] and Navy guidance on overseas
maintenance (see appendix III for details on Navy guidance).
According to the Center, each Sea Swap destroyer received more
maintenance support and more intensive support than typically received
by ships on routine deployments. This support included numerous
predeployment inspections and maintenance on their power, electrical,
steering, combat, and other systems to eliminate many potential
required maintenance activities during deployment. For example, the
predeployment maintenance on one of the Sea Swap ships, the
U.S.S. Fletcher, began with the identification of all time-driven
maintenance requirements that were scheduled during the extended
deployment. Examples included calibration, assessments, and
inspections of equipment to renew time-driven certifications. (Such
actions are comparable to checking a car's timing belt or inspecting
brakes and tires before taking a long trip.) Numerous other inspections
were also conducted prior to deployment on selected ship systems and
equipment to identify and repair problems and ensure the good working
order of the ship. The U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins each
received inspections for hull, mechanical, and electrical systems, as
well as combat systems. The U.S.S. Higgins also received inspections of
its Aegis radar system.
Sea Swap destroyers also received overseas maintenance support beyond
that available to ships on a typical deployment. The Surface Force
Pacific Command sent U.S.-based ship engineering material assessment
teams, ranging from 3 to 11 members, to perform maintenance on the
Sea Swap destroyers while the ships transited from their operational
area of responsibility to overseas locations where crew turnovers
occurred. The teams also assisted the crews while the destroyers were
in port at the crew turnover city and were comprised of senior-level
maintainers capable of performing a variety of maintenance jobs at the
ship's organizational[Footnote 37] and intermediate levels.[Footnote
38] According to Navy maintenance officials, the team's presence during
transit from the theater of operations to the Sea Swap city and in port
facilitated the completion of preventative maintenance, particularly
repairs associated with ship habitability. Surface Force Pacific
Command also assigned a Sea Swap destroyer port engineer to help ship
officials develop maintenance plans during port visits, which is not
typical for ships on normal deployments.
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command[Footnote 39] officials also noted
that Sea Swap destroyers experienced material degradation over time. As
a result, both destroyers required maintenance that was not readily
supportable during operations. Navy officials said that Sea Swap
destroyers were given preference for port visits in support of crew
turnovers and maintenance as compared to other ships. They also said
that maintaining ships deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility for long periods would continue to be a challenge.
During our review, we found that patrol coastal ship rotational crews
also faced challenges in maintaining ship material condition. Like the
Sea Swap destroyers, the patrol coastal ships received system
inspections prior to deployment. Patrol coastal port engineers and
maintenance support teams checked key systems--such as engines, weapons
packages, and the bridge--to hedge against wear and tear the ship would
experience on an extended deployment. However, unlike the Sea Swap
destroyers, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command officials indicated that
patrol coastal ships were not given preferential treatment to support
maintenance. The patrol coastal ship community deployed a maintenance
support team with the crews in an effort to address overseas
maintenance needs, however, these teams are not unique to rotational
crewing and typically support any patrol coastal ship deployment. The
team consisted of five members located in theater who performed limited
maintenance, ordered and stored parts, and provided administrative
support. The scope of the maintenance performed by the teams was
limited to organizational, intermediate, and select depot-level
maintenance.[Footnote 40]
According to focus groups with patrol coastal ship crews, the
maintenance support teams were usually the only personnel in theater
capable of rectifying frequently occurring maintenance problems. If a
maintenance support team was not available, the crew had to contact a
technical support representative in the United States for assistance or
try to conduct the maintenance itself. Some patrol coastal ship
crewmembers indicated that the size of the maintenance support teams
was insufficient to support both patrol coastal ships on extended
deployments and suggested expanding the maintenance support teams to be
comparable to the system used by the Coast Guard. According to patrol
coastal ship crews, the Coast Guard had four ships similar to the
patrol coastal ships in theater and provided approximately 50
maintenance personnel to perform the same function as the patrol
coastal maintenance support team. The increased size of the Coast
Guard's maintenance support allowed its crews to stand down and live in
barracks during maintenance periods. By contrast, a patrol coastal
officer noted that, during maintenance availabilities, maintenance
support teams only assisted the crew and did not take over the work
effort and the crews remained on board throughout the repair process
and performed maintenance.
Full Impact of Navy Maintenance Strategy for Destroyers and Other Ships
Using Crew Rotations Is Not Clear:
The results of the different maintenance strategies used to sustain the
two destroyers that were apart of the Sea Swap demonstration project
and other ships using rotational crewing are uncertain. While the
Center judged that the condition of the U.S.S. Higgins was comparable
to another ship that had recently returned from a routine 6-month
deployment, others in the Navy disagreed based on inspection results.
We did not identify any similar effort to determine the impact on the
patrol coastal or other ships that would provide the Navy with
additional insights into the impact of the extended deployment on their
condition.
The Center's judgment was based in part on a total ship readiness
assessment conducted by Pacific Fleet maintenance personnel, in which
Surface Force Pacific officials judged the U.S.S. Higgins' ship
material condition after a 17-month deployment to be comparable to the
U.S.S. Decatur's. However, officials from the Fleet Technical Support
Center Pacific that performed the assessment thought there were some
significant differences in the condition between the two ships. These
officials found that the U.S.S. Higgins had 697 noted deficiencies out
of 3,370 items tested (21 percent), whereas the U.S.S. Decatur had 465
out of 3,231 items tested (14 percent). While the number of
deficiencies alone does not necessarily indicate the significant
material differences between the ships, some of the items deficient on
the U.S.S. Higgins included data links for controlling operations
between a ship and an aircraft and another was the nonoperational extra
high frequency communication system[Footnote 41] on the U.S.S. Higgins
that was operational on the U.S.S. Decatur.
Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific officials also assessed the
operational functionality of each ship's equipment and found that the
U.S.S. Higgins was not as capable. This assessment measured the
equipment operational capability[Footnote 42] of each ship in order to
quantitatively determine whether the ship's systems were performing in
accordance with Navy requirements. The assessment results showed that
the U.S.S. Higgins received an overall score of .70, while the
U.S.S. Decatur received a score of .85. According to the Navy handbook,
an equipment operational capability score of 1.0 indicates the
equipment is fully capable of performing its function as designed,
while a score of 0 indicates the equipment is totally unable to perform
its function as designed. The handbook provides that any score between
.70 and .80 indicates ship equipment is unable to obtain optimum
operational standards, while scores above .80 indicate ship equipment
passes all operational tests.
A further breakdown of the scores indicates the U.S.S. Higgins may have
had problems that were more serious. The .70 score for the
U.S.S. Higgins was arrived at by assessing two categories of equipment:
the combat system-related equipment[Footnote 43] and the hull,
mechanical, and electrical systems-related equipment.[Footnote 44] The
combat system-related equipment score for the U.S.S. Higgins was .77,
while the U.S.S. Decatur received a score of .83. Since the combat
system portion of the score was higher than the total for the
U.S.S. Higgins, the hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment score
was at a minimum below .70.[Footnote 45] According to the handbook,
scores above .50 and below .70 indicate that equipment has
significantly reduced output or restricted operability. By contrast, we
found that the hull mechanical and electrical equipment score for the
U.S.S. Decatur was at least .85, given an overall score of .85 and a
combat system score of .83, which indicated that equipment was fully
operable.
Even though it concluded that the U.S.S. Higgins' condition was
comparable, the Center recognized the importance of maintenance to the
success of rotational crewing and proposed the Navy further assess
maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. Specifically,
the Center suggested that if Sea Swap becomes a more standard practice,
"it will be necessary to conduct a holistic review of the overall
maintenance process, including technical services and training." This
review would assess the responsibilities and interrelationships among
the many players, such as the ship's force, ship repair units, port
engineers, and ship engineering maintenance teams. In addition, the
Center added that the Navy should conduct a careful assessment to
determine which maintenance support aspects are essential costs and
which are dispensable. As of July 2004, the Navy had not started such
an assessment.
We found that the experience of other ships on extended deployments,
such as patrol coastal ships, bore out the need for such an analysis.
Patrol coastal ships did not receive focused maintenance comparable to
Sea Swap destroyers, and ship officials identified several maintenance
problems aboard one or more ships (see table 3) that were not corrected
while deployed that could have affected their mission capability.
Table 3: Examples of Maintenance Problems on Patrol Coastal Ships:
Repair needed: Severe hull cracks identified on ships;
Action needed and effect of not receiving repair: Hull needed
reinforcement. This class of ships is prone to hull cracking in heavy
seas. If cracks are repaired quickly, the damage can be mitigated; if
not, more severe cracking can cause the ship to break into pieces and
sink. Installation of hull strengthening alteration eliminates the
cracking problem but requires drydocking.
Repair needed: Ship service diesel generator fuel system clogged;
Action needed and effect of not receiving repair: The fuel system,
including fuel lines, pumps, and filters, needed industrial cleaning.
Excessive biological growth in the fuel tanks due to the environment in
which the ships are operating causes the system to clog. The potential
impact is the loss of ship service diesel generator control and
electrical power.
Repair needed: Rotating crane leaked and operated erratically;
Action needed and effect of not receiving repair: The rotating crane
needed repairs. A rotating crane is required to launch and recover a
ship's rubber hull inflatable boat. Continued loss of the crane's
operational capabilities will result in a major degradation to the
primary mission area.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of table]
Patrol coastal ships on extended deployments did not have extra
in-theater maintenance support comparable to Sea Swap destroyers. For
instance, patrol coastal ships did not have ship engineering
maintenance teams to aid the crew in achieving maintenance. As a
result, according to the maintenance support team coordinator for
patrol coastal ships, routine continuous maintenance often could not be
accomplished and, subsequently, the overall material condition of
patrol coastal ships deployed overseas slowly degraded. The official
explained that repairs authorized overseas are very narrow in scope and
only cover maintenance absolutely necessary for the ship to conduct its
mission. As a result, the official commented that organizational-and
intermediate-level planned maintenance and preservation work are left
to the crew and deployed maintenance support teams to take on over
short periods in port, typically 5 days or less. In addition, according
to a patrol coastal ship port engineer, each forward-deployed patrol
coastal ship had received about 4 weeks of maintenance in port over the
last 18 months and added that this level of maintenance does not equal
what a traditionally deployed patrol coastal would receive. Port
engineers and other maintenance staff noted challenges in keeping the
patrol coastal ships operationally ready. For instance, in our focus
group discussions with patrol coastal ship crews, they explained that
the ship's rotating crane that launches and retrieves the ship's rigid
inflatable boats broke down during a patrol and the ship had to rely
upon the Coast Guard to help with its repair. A Navy official also
explained that the extendedly deployed patrol coastal ships have a very
high operational tempo, which also impacts the ability of the ship's
force to conduct organizational maintenance and increases the overall
degradation of the ship over time. The official stated that onboard
maintenance efforts have been able to keep the patrol coastal ships
running, but that the Navy will pay a heavy price once the ships return
to homeport for extensive overhauls, since repairs that are more
serious will be necessary.
The Challenge of Maintaining Ships on Extended Deployment Contributed
to Crew Morale and Quality-of-Life Problems:
The Center and we found that crews expressed concern about the extra
workload they endured to maintain high ship readiness. Specifically,
the Center concluded that while the Sea Swap demonstration showed a
benefit for the Navy--saving dollars and increasing forward presence--
many sailors spoke of the burdens and loss of traditions. According to
the Center, Sea Swap crews performed more work and experienced fewer
benefits and traditions than what may have originally drawn them to the
Navy. For instance, the Center's report noted that some Sea Swap
crewmembers found that the maintenance workload was high throughout the
entire deployment. Other complaints were that whenever the Sea Swap
ships pulled into an Arabian Gulf port, other ships' sailors left on
liberty while the Sea Swap crews remained on board doing maintenance.
This intense maintenance schedule was a morale problem and a frequent
topic that arose during the Center's crew interviews.
Our focus groups with Sea Swap destroyer crews identified similar
concerns. For instance, extra maintenance work related to painting and
preserving the ship was left to the ship's crew to accomplish. In
addition, Sea Swap officers in our focus groups indicated that
unreported work and high workloads disrupted sailor quality of life and
that there was no increase in time or resources to get maintenance
done. They also told us that more equipment inspections by in-theater
support teams were needed while in port. The officers explained that
the ship's crew had to inspect and fix different equipment throughout
the ship because in-theater support teams were not available. According
to the Sea Swap officers and crew, this affected their quality of life
since liberty time was reduced to accommodate ship maintenance needs.
Our focus groups with patrol coastal ship rotational crews also
indicated that increased maintenance tasks and workloads adversely
affected crew morale and quality of life. Patrol coastal ship senior
chiefs told us that rotational crews had difficulty meeting ship
preservation requirements, loading supplies, and documenting ship
maintenance logs for non-working items during port visits of 5 days or
less. In addition, crewmembers on each rotational patrol coastal ship
complained that they received no liberty ports; that all port visits
became working ports due to the ship's maintenance needs; and that,
given the small size of the ships, they needed time away from other
crewmembers to decompress. Furthermore, a patrol coastal ship
commanding officer said that his deployed patrol coastal ship required
too many maintenance demands and noted that the ship was maintenance-
intensive from the day his crew took over.
Conclusions:
Rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments appears to
be a feasible alternative to the traditional way the Navy operates that
could enhance its effectiveness. Successfully overcoming issues that
could impede using this alternative and to gain support for
implementing this change require knowledge of the various rotational
options and their impact on operational requirements, ship condition,
and crew morale. However, the Navy has not taken several key steps that
could help it better plan, manage, and monitor the implementation of
this crewing approach and therefore may not realize its full potential.
For example, the Navy has not established the analytical framework to
evaluate all rotational crewing options and related costs. In the
absence of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for
assessing feasibility, cost, and other factors, including crew quality
of life, the Navy does not have clear criteria for deciding when to use
rotational crewing and which option best fits the situation.
Furthermore, until the Navy more systematically collects data on
current and potential surface ship rotational crewing options,
including complete and accurate cost data for cost-effectiveness
analyses, it will lack valuable information for making informed
decisions about the potential for applying rotational crewing to
current and future ships as well as whether it can get maximum return
on investment and offset billions of dollars in future total ownership
costs.
The Navy's implementation of crew rotations also lacks effective
guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. For example, the Navy
does not provide guidance that specifies standard policies and
procedures for rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and
accountability for ship operations during crew rotations. Until it
does, crews may continue to have problems consistently documenting ship
condition and accounting for ship inventories during ship turnover,
which could lead to additional work burdens on the on-coming crew and
potentially affect readiness. Furthermore, without more formal guidance
built on systematically collected, recorded, and disseminated lessons
learned from all rotational experiences that specify standard policies
and procedures, the Navy may repeat mistakes.
Finally, the Navy does not know enough about the implications of
maintenance on ships using rotational crews as a means to extend their
deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses noted in its report on the
Sea Swap demonstration that if that option is to become a more standard
practice, the Navy needs to further review the overall maintenance
process. However, until the Navy fully assesses the additional
maintenance demands and related crew quality-of-life issues experienced
by all ships implementing this crewing approach, and evaluates
alternative maintenance strategies, it runs the risk that it will
degrade the long-term condition of ships and discourage crew support
for rotational crewing.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the nation's multibillion-dollar investment in Navy
ships yields the greatest possible benefits at the lowest possible
total cost, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Navy to take the following four actions:
* Systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-effectiveness for
current and potential application of several rotational crewing
alternatives for its surface forces by:
* establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for
assessing feasibility, costs, and other factors, including crew quality
of life, and:
* systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost
data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform
accurate cost-effectiveness analyses.
* Provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for
rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability
for ship operations during the rotation.
* Systematically collect, record, and disseminate lessons learned
pertaining to rotational crewing in the Navy Lessons Learned System to
enhance knowledge sharing.
* Conduct a study of the maintenance processes used for all ships
involved in rotating crews and examine, as part of the study,
opportunities to mitigate the crews' concerns about maintenance
workload to improve their quality of life.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the
recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the
recommendations.
DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key
staff members that contributed to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable James L. Talent:
Chairman:
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Seapower:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joel Hefley:
Chairman:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Chairman:
The Honorable Vic Snyder:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Total Force:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett:
Chairman:
The Honorable Gene Taylor:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Projection Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, also known as
Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of the triad of
U.S. strategic deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike
capability. There are 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines in the
fleet, homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Each
submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted personnel. The average
procurement unit cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine
is $2 billion (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing
concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a "Blue" Crew
and a "Gold" Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship
deploys with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2-to 3-day
crew turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a
Blue Crew deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat after a
3-day turnover process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in
conducting maintenance repairs. During the Gold Crew's patrol, the Blue
Crew stands down and enters a training cycle in its homeport.
Figure 1: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Spruance-Class Destroyer:
The DD-963 Spruance-class destroyer has multimission offensive and
defensive capabilities, and it can operate independently or as part of
other naval formations. These ships were developed for the primary
mission of antisubmarine warfare. Many of these ships were subsequently
modernized with a vertical launch system[Footnote 46] and a Tomahawk
cruise missile capability that greatly expanded the role of the
destroyer in strike warfare.[Footnote 47] The crew consists of 30
officers and 352 enlisted personnel. The average procurement unit cost
is $489.6 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
The Pacific Fleet conducted Sea Swap rotational crewing with four ships
of this class, with the U.S.S. Fletcher being the forward-deployed
unit. The three other destroyers were decommissioned coincident with
the crew exchange. That is, each on-coming crew decommissioned its ship
prior to swapping with the off-going crew of the U.S.S. Fletcher. As a
result, after their 6-month deployment, the off-going crewmembers
dispersed to a variety of new assignments, just as if their own ship
were being decommissioned. Further, the Spruance-class destroyer swap
rotation was initially planned on three ships but was extended by
adding a fourth destroyer. As a result, the U.S.S. Fletcher remained
deployed for over 22 months. All of the Spruance-class destroyers will
be decommissioned by the end of fiscal year 2006.
Figure 2: The U.S.S. Fletcher, a Spruance-Class Destroyer:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyer:
The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers--first
commissioned in July 1991, with primary homeports in San Diego and
Norfolk--provide multimission offensive and defensive capabilities,
operating independently or as part of other naval formations. The
DDG-51 is equipped with the Aegis combat system, a vertical launching
system for launching antiaircraft and Tomahawk missiles, and an
advanced antisubmarine warfare system. Each destroyer crews 23 officers
and 300 enlisted personnel, and has a procurement average unit cost of
$976 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
Navy plans call for a force of 62 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile
destroyers. At the end of fiscal year 2004, this force will total 43
ships. The Navy is conducting a Sea Swap rotational crewing system to
rotate entire crews from one hull to another on selected ships in the
Naval Surface Force Pacific Command's fleet of Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers.
Figure 3: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal:
The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to
conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in
support of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of
foreign shores. The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship first entered
into service in 1993. The patrol coastal force consists of 13 ships--4
stationed in San Diego, California, and 9 in Little Creek, Virginia.
The crew consists of 4 officers and 24 enlisted personnel. The
procurement average unit cost is $19.4 million (in fiscal year 2004
dollars).
The Navy is using a crew swap model in which the entire crew of
28 crewmembers rotates from one hull to another. The rotations are
occurring between patrol coastal ships in the United States and those
deployed in the Arabian Gulf to increase operation days and reduce
transit times. Operational requirements have delayed the
decommissioning of 8 ships and the transfer of 5 ships equipped with
loading ramps to the Coast Guard.
Figure 4: The U.S.S. Firebolt, a Cyclone-Class Patrol Coastal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
High Speed Vessel Two (HSV-2) Swift:
The HSV-2 Swift is a high speed (almost 50 knots), wave-piercing
aluminum-hulled catamaran that was acquired as an interim mine
warfare command and support ship and a platform for conducting joint
experimentation, including Marine Corps sea basing.[Footnote 48] The
Navy leased and accepted delivery of the catamaran from the builder,
Incat Australia, in Australia, in August 2003. The Swift was leased for
1 year at a cost of $27 million, with a 4-year option ($58 million).
The Swift employs two crews of 41 members each and uses the Blue-Gold
crewing option. The Gold Crew is based out of the Naval Amphibious Base
Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. It operates the ship as a joint
experimental platform with Marine Corps troops embarked, testing
experimental and near-shore combat ship concepts. It also conducts
special operations warfare.[Footnote 49] The Blue Crew is based out of
Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas. This crew operates the ship as a mine
warfare command and control ship. The Mine Warfare Command is in charge
of coordinating overall mission scheduling for the ship and crews. The
crews are responsible for the ship, but not its mission equipment. Each
command that brings modules aboard ship must supply personnel to
operate the modules. The Swift operates on a nominal 117-day cycle
(plus or minus 10 days), including a 3-to-4 day turnover between crews,
with a 4-month on/4-month off cycle. Crew exchanges take place in the
crews' respective homeports or at overseas locations.
Figure 5: The High Speed Vessel Experimental Craft, HSV-2 Swift:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Next Generation Guided Missile Destroyer, the DD(X):
The DD(X) is a next generation, multimission surface combatant ship
tailored for land attack that has not been built. The Navy intends to
operate the DD(X) independently or as part of other naval formations.
The DD(X) is expected to provide precision firepower at long ranges in
support of forces ashore using two 155-mm advanced gun systems and
80 vertical-launch system tubes for the Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other weapons.
For fiscal year 2005, the Navy is requesting $221 million to begin
building the first DD(X) and $1.2 billion for research and development
for the program. The first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in
2012. The Navy estimates that the first DD(X) will cost about
$2.8 billion, including about $1.0 billion in detailed design and
nonrecurring engineering costs for the class. The Navy earlier
indicated it was planning to procure 24 DD(X) vessels through fiscal
year 2017, before shifting to procurement of the next generation
cruiser in fiscal year 2018. Recently, however, the Navy indicated it
might accelerate the start of the cruiser procurement to sometime
between fiscal year 2011 and 2014 and reduce the number of DD(X)
destroyers it intends to buy to between 10 to 16.
Current DD(X) design planning anticipates a crew size of 125 to
175 persons. The procurement contract establishes the requirement to
consider deploying ships up to 3 years and requires the design agent to
conduct and complete an analysis of crewing options that would support
extended forward deployments, including standard, Sea Swap, Horizon,
and Blue-Gold crewing options. The contract also requires the design
agent to ensure that the DD(X) system can be effectively operated with
an optimized crew and provide the crew with the highest quality of
life, while minimizing total ownership cost.
Figure 6: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation
Destroyer, DD(X):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Littoral Combat Ship:
The littoral combat ship--a new class of Navy surface combatants and
the smallest member in the DD(X) family of next generation surface
combatant ships--is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable,
and tailored for specific missions, such as antisubmarine, antisurface,
or mine warfare in heavily contested littoral, or near-shore, waters,
and it will use interchangeable mission modules[Footnote 50] tailored
for specific missions. The Navy's goal is to develop a platform that
can be fielded in relatively large numbers to support a wide range of
joint missions, with reconfigurable mission modules to assure access to
the littorals for the Navy forces in the face of threats from surface
craft, submarines, and mines. It is also expected to have the
capability to deploy independently to overseas littoral regions and
remain on station for extended periods either with a battle group or
through at-sea replenishment. Baseline ship planning is for a single
crew; rotational crewing concepts are being explored as a secondary
option. Crew size is expected to range between 15 to 50 core
crewmembers, which do not include the crew for the mission package.
The Navy has plans to build 56 ships, with the first to be delivered in
fiscal year 2007 for an estimated cost of $20 billion. Each sea frame
hull has an average unit cost of $147.5 million to $216.4 million (in
fiscal year 2004 dollars). The mission modules' average procurement
cost is $177 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars) per ship set. The
resulting average cost for a littoral combat ship platform is
$324.6 million to $393.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars).
Figure 7: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility
and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and
future classes of surface ships, we interviewed Department of Defense
(DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet officials, met with cost analysis
experts in the government and the private sector, reviewed key
acquisition documents and crew employment plans, and reviewed
rotational crewing studies performed for and by the Navy. Studies we
reviewed included:
* "Future Force Operational Plan," Executive Summary of the Horizon
Concept Generation Team, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies
Group XVI (June 1997);
* "Crew Rotation: The MCM-1 Experience," Center for Naval Analyses (May
1998);
* "Alternative Naval Crew Rotation Operations," Center for Naval
Analyses (October 2001):
* "Task Force Sierra Force Structure For The Future Phase One," Naval
War College (undated);
* "Alternative Approaches to Meet New Operational Commitments,"
Briefing by the Deep Blue Team, Chief of Naval Operations (undated);
* "Sea Swap," Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Naval War College
(June 2003); and:
* "Sea Swap Assessment," Center for Naval Analyses (September 2004).
We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding and executive
officers of the Sea Swap destroyers, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected
patrol coastal ships and strategic ballistic missile submarines.
To assess whether the Navy has effectively managed rotational crewing
on surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we visited Naval
Surface Force Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California;
Submarine Group Nine Command, Bangor, Washington; Mine Warfare Command,
Corpus Christi, Texas; and Amphibious Group Two Command, Norfolk,
Virginia. We also met with officials from the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Naval Warfare (Plans, Policies, and Operations; Surface
Warfare; and Submarine Warfare) to review Navy guidance and plans for
conducting crew rotations. We also conducted over 40 focus group
meetings with Navy officers and crews involved in crew rotations on the
guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins, selected ballistic missile
submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol coastal ships
(see page 58 for more information on the objective, scope, and
methodology of the focus groups). Further, we reviewed Navy Lessons
Learned System instructions and visited the Navy Warfare Development
Command, Newport, Rhode Island, to query the Navy Lessons Learned
System to determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to crew
rotations.
To assess how ship maintenance may impact implementation of rotational
crewing, we reviewed relevant laws and Navy regulations pertaining to
maintenance of U.S. Navy ships. We discussed ship material condition
and associated sailor workload in over 25 focus groups with crews from
the Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and from selected patrol coastal
ships that had participated in crew rotations. We also obtained ship
material condition assessments, called Total Ship Readiness
Assessments, for the U.S.S. Higgins and the U.S.S. Decatur. We
discussed the methodology and results of the assessments with officials
from the Fleet Technical Support Center, San Diego, California; the
Southwest Regional Maintenance Center, Commander Pacific Fleet, San
Diego, California; the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division,
Corona, California; and the Naval Surface Force Pacific, San Diego,
California. We met with and obtained maintenance guidance and reports
from Navy officials at Combined Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk,
Virginia; Surface Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Surface Force
Pacific, San Diego, California; Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu,
Hawaii; Amphibious Group Two Command, Little Creek, Virginia; and
maintenance experts in the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Chief of Naval
Operations, Washington, D.C. We also obtained written responses to our
questions from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. In addition, we
reviewed the Center for Naval Analyses's Sea Swap Assessment report and
discussed the report's findings with officials from the Center.
To compare reenlistment rates for crews on Sea Swap guided missile
destroyers and non-Sea Swap guided missile destroyers in the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, we obtained Unit Honor Roll reports, derived from the
Enlisted Master File, from the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu,
Hawaii. We did not analyze Spruance-class destroyer data for two
reasons: (1) we did not conduct focus groups with these crews and (2)
the rotational crewing experience was not as complete or complicated as
that experienced by crews on Arleigh Burke-class guided missile
destroyers. Based upon discussions with Pacific Fleet officials we also
excluded selected ship crews from our non-Sea Swap guided missile ship
analysis because we wanted the ships we analyzed to reflect the
standard ship and crew option as closely as possible. The ships and
crews we excluded were: (1) precommissioning crews because of their
small sample sizes and nondeployed status, (2) the U.S. Milius and its
crew because it was an optimal manning experiment ship, and (3) the
U.S. Paul Hamilton because this crew was on an extended, 10-month
deployment. We compiled reenlistment averages for the ships we analyzed
in 6-month blocks that roughly corresponded with Sea Swap guided
missile destroyer program and crew deployments, beginning November 1,
2001, and ending on April 30, 2004, and that included pre-deployment,
deployment and post-deployment data for these crews.
While we did not validate the casualty report and sailor reenlistment
data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to
determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We
did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the
data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our
review from July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships:
We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers
and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus
groups involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more
in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be
obtained from single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group
methodologies, our design included multiple groups with varying group
characteristics but some homogeneity--such as rank and responsibility-
-within groups. Each group involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions
were held in a structured manner, guided by a moderator who used a
standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their
thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus group
approach was to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine
and ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations.
Scope of Our Focus Groups:
To gain broad perspectives, we conducted over 40 separate focus group
sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted
personnel involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer
U.S.S. Higgins, selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift,
and selected patrol coastal ships. Table 4 identifies the composition
of the focus groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups,
participants were selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers,
enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts
traveled to each naval station to conduct the majority of the focus
groups. Six of the focus groups were conducted on board the
U.S.S. Higgins while it transited to its homeport after its extended
deployment.
Table 4: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform:
Personnel groups: Junior enlisted personnel;
Strategic submarines: 3;
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 6;
Patrol coastal ships: 3;
HSV-2 Swift: 2;
Total groups: 14.
Personnel groups: Lead petty officers;
Strategic submarines: 4;
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 3;
Patrol coastal ships: -;
HSV-2 Swift: 1;
Total groups: 8.
Personnel groups: Chief petty officers;
Strategic submarines: 1;
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 3;
Patrol coastal ships: -;
HSV-2 Swift: 1;
Total groups: 5.
Personnel groups: Senior enlisted personnel;
Strategic submarines: 1;
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: -;
Patrol coastal ships: 2;
HSV-2 Swift: 1;
Total groups: 4.
Personnel groups: Officers;
Strategic submarines: 2;
Arleigh Burke- class destroyers: 3;
Patrol coastal ships: 3;
HSV-2 Swift: 1;
Total groups: 9.
Personnel groups: Advanced party;
Strategic submarines: -;
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 3;
Patrol coastal ships: -;
HSV-2 Swift: -;
Total groups: 3.
Personnel groups: Total;
Strategic submarines: 11;
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 18;
Patrol coastal ships: 8;
HSV-2 Swift: 6;
Total groups: 43.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Methodology for Our Focus Groups:
A guide was developed to assist the moderator in leading the
discussions. The guide helped the moderator address several topics
related to crew rotations: training, maintenance, infrastructure and
operations, management and oversight, readiness, crew characteristics,
quality of life, lessons learned, and overall satisfaction with the
rotational crewing experience. Each focus group discussion began with
the moderator describing the purpose of our study and explaining how
focus groups work. Participants were assured anonymity of their
responses, in that names would not be directly linked to their
responses in write-ups of the sessions and that all of the responses
for the session would be summarized. The participants were then asked
open-ended questions about the impact of crew rotations on each of the
topics. All focus group questions were moderated by a GAO analyst who
was assisted by a GAO subject matter expert, while two assistants took
notes.
Content Analysis:
We performed a systematic content analysis of the open-ended responses
in order to categorize and summarize participants' experiences with
crew rotations. Based on the primary topics developed in the focus
group guide, individual GAO analysts reviewed the responses from one of
the crews and created their own respective lists of subcategories
within each of the primary focus group topics. The analysts then met
collectively to generate a proposed list of topic primary categories
and subcategories.
To ensure inter-rater reliability, one of our analysts reviewed the
responses from each vessel type and assigned each comment to a
corresponding category. Another analyst also reviewed each response and
independently assigned the same comment to a corresponding category.
Any comments that were not assigned to the same category were then
reconciled and adjudicated by the two analysts, which led to the
comments being placed into one or more of the resulting categories.
Agreement regarding each placement was reached between at least two
analysts. All initial disagreements regarding placement into categories
were discussed and reconciled. The responses in each category were then
used in our evaluation of how the Navy's experiences with rotational
crewing have been effectively managed and the effect of maintenance
overseas on ships homeported in the United States during extended
deployments.
Limitations of Focus Groups:
Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the
extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population,
(2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make
decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically
representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead,
they are intended to generate in-depth information about the focus
group participants' reasons for the attitudes held toward specific
topics and to offer insights into the range of concerns and support for
an issue.
The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is
limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of
Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel from more than 40 selected
groups. Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to
assure a distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority,
and ship departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third,
participants were asked questions about their specific experiences with
crew rotations. The experiences of other Navy ship officers and
personnel involved in crew rotations, who did not participate in our
focus group, may have varied.
Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups,
but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and
support our conclusions to objectives two and three.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary List of Department of the Navy Guidance
Implementing 10 U.S.C. 7310:
Department of the Navy guidance related to the implementation of
Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restrictions on overseas
maintenance, or that define terms used in the law, is noted below.
Chief of Naval Operations:
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4700.7K (July 2003), "Maintenance
Policy for U.S. Navy Ships," defines voyage repairs as "corrective
maintenance of mission-or safety-essential items necessary for a ship
to deploy or to continue on its deployment."
Naval Sea Systems Command:
Naval Sea Systems Command Fleet Modernization Program Management and
Operations Manual (June 2002, Rev. 2), SL720-AA-MAN-010, Glossary,
defines voyage repairs as "emergency work necessary to repair damage
sustained by a ship to enable the ship to continue on its mission and
which can be accomplished without requiring a change in the ship's
operating schedule or the general streaming notice in effect."
Military Sealift Command:
Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 4700.15A
(February 2, 2000), "Accomplishing Ship Repair in Foreign Shipyards,"
states that voyage repairs include:
* corrective maintenance on mission or safety essential items necessary
for a ship to deploy, to continue on its deployment, or comply with
regulatory requirements;
* scheduled maintenance, only to the extent that said maintenance is
absolutely necessary to ensure machinery and equipment operational
reliability or comply with regulatory requirements; and:
* voyage repairs do not include corrective maintenance actions that may
be deferred until the next scheduled regular overhaul and drydocking
availability in the United States or Guam without degrading operational
readiness, habitability standards, or personnel safety, or adversely
impacting regulatory compliance.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
OCT 25 2004:
Ms. Janet Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational
Crewing, "dated September 23, 2004 (GAO Code 350383/GAO-05-10).
DoD concurs with the draft report. Responses to the four GAO
recommendations and additional comments to the draft report are
contained in Enclosure (1).
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure:
1. Department of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 GAO CODE 350383/GAO-05-10:
"FORCE STRUCTURE: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide
Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to systematically evaluate the
feasibility and cost-effectiveness for current and potential
application of several rotational crewing alternatives for it surface
forces by:
* Establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for
assessing feasibility, costs and other factors, including crew quality
of life;
* Systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost
data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform
accurate cost-effectiveness analysis. (Page 41/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Navy should
systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost effectiveness of
various alternative crewing schemes prior to making decisions that will
impact force structure. Established metrics, along with a systematic
process to collect and assess program objectives, will allow for the
accurate analysis of alternative rotational crewing options.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to provide guidance that specifies
standard policies and procedures for rotating crews to ensure
consistent management of and accountability for ship operations during
the rotation. (Page 41 /GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. Standard policies
and procedures are required to ensure consistent management and
accountability for ships during crew rotations. The Sea Swap Experiment
facilitated the collection of data and lessons learned to develop and
validate the policies and procedures to be used in rotational crewing.
It also demonstrated the ability to conduct Sea Swap over a long period
in an operational environment. Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic
is in the process of developing these for the ongoing Patrol Craft (PC)
Sea Swap program as well as the upcoming Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)
Sea Swap.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to systematically collect, record, and
disseminate lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing in the
Navy Lesson Learned System in order to enhance knowledge sharing. (Page
41/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs that capturing Lessons Learned is an
important process for any new initiative. Commander, Naval Surface
Force has collected Lessons Learned and is in the process of collating
them into the Navy Lessons Learned Data Base. These Lessons Learned
have been "pushed" to ships involved in future Sea Swaps.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a study of the maintenance
processes used for all ships involved in rotating crews, and examine as
part of the study opportunities to mitigate the crews' concerns about
maintenance workload to improve their quality of life. (Page 41/GAO
Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Navy is
continuing its review of ship rotational crewing, to include all
maintenance processes used to support deployed Surface Force units in
support of voyage repairs, requirements to comply with Title 10 USC and
other governing directives and maintenance workload. To-date,
Commander, Naval Surface Force experience with Sea Swap hulls has
proven implemented maintenance processes were and are sufficient to
support the continuance of a successful Sea Swap program.
DoD Additional RESPONSES:
Pages 8/20: The statement "while the Navy did not assess the rates for
participants in rotational crewing, we found that reenlistments were
generally lower on the Sea Swap destroyers compared to comparable
Pacific Fleet ships" and the reenlistment data collected by Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) is only for the period of deployment and does not
tell the whole story. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has
not seen the reenlistment data collected by GAO and would welcome its
delivery for comparative review. This data is significantly different
from that analyzed by Commander, Naval Surface Force for retention on
Sea Swap ships. Commander, Naval Surface Force did collect Zone A
reenlistment data from all seven destroyer Sea Swap crews as well as
all Pacific Fleet destroyers that deployed during the same time as the
Sea Swap. This data covered the entire deployment period, as well as
six months immediately following deployment. The results were:
Destroyer Sea Swap Crews: 124 sailors reenlisted out 199 sailors
eligible for a total Zone A reenlistment rate of 62.3%. Pacific Fleet
destroyers deploying during the Destroyer Sea Swap period (USS DECATUR,
USS MILIUS, USS LASSEN, USS OKANE, USS HOPPER, and USS FITZGERALD) had
129 sailors reenlist out of 212 eligible for a total Zone A
reenlistment rate of 60.8%. This data is per the Navy Enlisted Master
File. Also of note is that the CNA study found the retention statistics
inconclusive and struck it from its final report.
Page 17: With regards to the returning material condition between USS
HIGGINS and USS DECATUR, concur that this data must be further examined
to see what lessons learned are available to improve maintenance
strategies. This study should be conducted in close coordination with
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).
Page 18: With regards to the upcoming January 2005 Board of Inspection
and Survey (INSURV) inspection of USS HIGGINS, when compared to other
Sea Swap ships, particular attention must be focused on when the
inspection is conducted, and results weighed accordingly. The process
of reviewing the material condition of Sea Swap ships must be
standardized, ensuring that same type equipment are inspected to obtain
better comparisons between ships of the same class.
Page 33: The increased maintenance received by Sea Swap ships prior to
deployment is not unreasonable, however, a clearly defined process must
be established to delineate those increased requirements above what a
normal deployer receives and not an adhoc process. Additionally, the
increased maintenance requirement must be properly identified and
budgeted for.
Nonconcur with the statement "Moreover, both the Center and our focus
groups with rotational crews found that increased maintenance tasks
contributed to diminished crew morale." There are many other factors
beside organizational level maintenance workload which contribute to a
decline in Sailors' morale. The connection between increased workload
and crew morale do not justify the overall conclusion drawn in the
draft report.
Page 34: There is no reason to revise Title 10 requirements to restrict
repairs for naval vessels outside the United States based on where the
ship is home ported and the nature of the repairs to be performed.
Current and evolving maintenance strategies are adequate to meet
operational commitments.
Page 39: Crew's concerns over quality of life impacts due to Sea Swap
driven maintenance workload are not well quantified but are a continued
area of interest for the Commander, Naval Surface Force Maintenance
community. As a mitigating factor during the FLETCHER and HIGGINS Sea
Swap experiments, Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific opted to
"push" limited equipment grooming and assessment CONUS teams in-
theater to assist ship's force. The tasks of these teams were to assist
in both identifying maintenance issues and accomplishing ship's force
maintenance actions. (Hence, improve the quality of life of ship's
force personnel from the perspective of maintenance workload.) During
the evolution of this experiment, select commanding officers elected to
cancel these support visits due to confidence in their crews to be
self-sufficient in these matters. Both approaches achieved satisfactory
results in meeting operational requirements. Due to this lesson
learned, Commander, Naval Surface Force approach to future Sea Swap
events will be to shift from a "push" to a "pull" process and allow
the respective crew to take the lead in identifying the requirement for
such assistance.
Page 44: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates the "average
unit procurement cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine
is $2 Billion (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars)." The report does not state
that the average unit procurement cost for the each Ohio-class SSBN is
based on the initial acquisition cost inflated to FY2004 dollars. In
the data submission for the report, NAVSEA SEA017 indicated, "The
inflated initial acquisition cost is not to be interpreted as a
replacement cost. A replacement value for the specific ship would have
to take into account changes in productivity, specifications,
legislative, and contracting environment."
Page 45: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates that the
"average unit procurement cost for a Spruance-class destroyer is $489.6
million (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars)." The report does not state that
the average unit procurement cost for a Spruance-class destroyer is
based on the initial acquisition cost inflated to FY2004 dollars. In
the data submission for the report NAVSEA SEA017 indicated that "The
inflated initial acquisition cost is not to be interpreted as a
replacement cost. A replacement value for the specific ship would have
to take into account changes in productivity, specifications,
legislative, and contracting environment."
Page 46: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates that the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer"has a procurement average unit cost of $976
million (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars)." In the data submission for the
report, NAVSEA SEA017 indicated that the DDG 51 Program Office required
the $976M DDG Program AUC be implied with the statement "Program
Average Unit Costs estimates have been base-lined in FY04 dollars for
comparison purposes."
Page 47: Appendix I, Paragraph 1: The report indicates that the
"procurement average unit cost is $19.4 million (in Fiscal Year 2004
dollars)" for a Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship. The report does not
state that the average unit procurement cost for a Cyclone-class PC is
based on the initial acquisition cost inflated to FY2004 dollars. In
the data submission for the report, NAVSEA SEA017 indicated, "The
inflated initial acquisition cost is not to be interpreted as a
replacement cost. A replacement value for the specific ship would have
to take into account changes in productivity, specifications,
legislative, and contracting environment."
GAO's Comments:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated October 25, 2004.
1. We have added a discussion of the methodology we used in our Sea
Swap destroyer reenlistment analysis. See appendix II.
2. No change needed in report.
3. No change needed in report.
4. We agree that expanded scope predeployment inspections and
maintenance for ships scheduled for extended deployments are prudent.
We also agree that ships scheduled for extended deployments would
benefit from a clearly defined process to delineate those increased
requirements.
5. Our report noted that increased maintenance tasks contributed to
diminished crew morale. We agree with DOD's comment that many other
factors also contributed to the diminished morale for sailors crewing
on rotational crewing ships.
6. Our report did not recommend revising Title 10 requirements.
7. No change needed in report.
8. No change needed in report.
9. No change needed in report.
10. No change needed in report.
11. No change needed in report.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
Jim Bancroft, Kelly Baumgartner, Larry Bridges, Lee Cooper, Corrie
Dodd-Burtch, Joseph Kirschbaum, Kate Lenane, Elizabeth Morris, Richard
Payne, Charles Perdue, Terry Richardson, Roderick Rodgers, Bill
Russell, Rebecca Shea, Jennifer Thomas, Julie Tremper, John Van Schaik,
and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Operational on-station days are defined as those days a ship spends
forwardly deployed in the designated theater of operations.
[2] The Navy's Mine Warfare Command is responsible for developing and
evaluating mine warfare doctrine, tactics, and equipment. The Command
also ensures readiness of mine warfare forces to conduct offensive and
defensive mine warfare operations through training and operational
experience.
[3] The U.S. Pacific Fleet provides trained and combat-ready naval
forces to combatant commanders. Pacific Fleet ships are at sea in the
Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans, from the west coast of the United
States to the Arabian Gulf. The Pacific Fleet encompasses approximately
200 ships, 2,000 aircraft, and over 239,000 sailors, Marines, and
civilians.
[4] The Center for Naval Analyses is the Department of the Navy's
Federally Funded Research and Development Center. The Center's analysts
provide direct support to operating forces and senior staffs across the
spectrum of Navy and Marine Corps activities.
[5] The mission of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet is to provide combat-ready
naval forces and to ensure that those forces are supplied the
leadership, manpower, equipment, maintenance, training, and material
needed to perform their assigned missions. The Fleet commander
determines readiness and training requirements for assigned forces and
ensures that deploying units meet prescribed readiness standards.
[6] Total ownership costs include the costs to research, develop,
acquire, own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and support
systems; the costs of other equipment and real property; the costs to
recruit, retrain, separate, and otherwise support military and civilian
personnel; and all other costs of DOD's business operations.
[7] "National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 -
A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow," The Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
[8] Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval
Operations, before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 10,
2004.
[9] For the purposes of this report, we are not including Navy ships
operated by the Military Sealift Command and crewed by civilian
mariners. The Command provides sea transportation of equipment, fuel,
supplies and ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide during
peacetime and in war.
[10] A ship based in San Diego, California, would spend a greater
portion of its deployment in-transit to the Persian Gulf-operating area
than a ship based in Norfolk, Virginia, because of the distance. As a
result, a ship based in San Diego may spend about 14 percent of its
time in the Persian Gulf area whereas a ship based in Norfolk would
spend closer to 20 percent of its time in the Persian Gulf area.
[11] Surface ships are continuously having their combat and other
systems upgraded or replaced so maintaining "identical" configurations
is a challenge. Also, despite surface ships with the same "design"
being built within years of each other, no two ships are exactly alike
and even more differences are likely when these ships are built in
different shipyards.
[12] The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed aluminum-hulled catamaran acquired
as an interim mine warfare command and control ship. For a picture and
details on the ship, see appendix I.
[13] The DD(X) is the Navy's next generation, multimission destroyer,
tailored for land attack missions.
[14] Center for Naval Analyses, Sea Swap Assessment (Alexandria,
Virginia: September 2004).
[15] Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, located in San
Diego, California, ensures surface ships of the Pacific Fleet are
properly trained, maintained, and crewed to support military
operations. The Command is responsible for the readiness of 81 ships,
including cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships,
logistics, and fleet support ships.
[16] The littoral combat ship will be a new class of Navy surface
combatants. It is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and
tailored for specific missions such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or
mine warfare in heavily contested coastal area waters, and will use
interchangeable mission modules tailored for specific missions.
[17] The Government Performance and Results Act offers a model for
developing an effective management framework to improve the likelihood
of implementing initiatives and assessing results.
[18] Known as a trials and material inspection, this more stringent
inspection is conducted by an independent Navy organization whose
responsibilities include conducting material inspections of all naval
ships at least once every 3 years, if practicable, for the purpose of
determining and reporting upon a ship's fitness for further service and
material conditions that limit her capability to carry out assigned
missions and periodically ascertaining and reporting on the material
condition and performance capabilities or limitations of Navy ships.
[19] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4770.5F, May 29, 1991,
"General Instructions for Inactive Ships and Craft," states that a
Board of Inspection and Survey will inspect a ship to determine and
document the material condition of the ship prior to inactivation.
[20] These sailors are commonly called first termers. These enlisted
personnel eligible for reenlistment are from what DOD calls "Zone A"
and cover reenlistments falling between 17 months and 6 years of active
service. This group was selected as a proxy for crew morale because the
personnel are less likely to reenlist if their experience is not good
since they have little investment in a career at this point. Sailors
with more than 6 years of experience are more likely to remain in the
Navy.
[21] Based on our request, the Navy provided reenlistment data for all
DDG-51 class ships by 6-month increments from 11/1/01 through 4/30/04.
We excluded from our analysis two ships that experienced low
reenlistment rates, the U.S.S. Milius, a ship experimenting with
reduced manning, and the U.S.S. Paul Hamilton, a ship that was on an
extended 10-month deployment, because we wanted to compare destroyers
on normal deployments with destroyers in the Sea Swap initiative.
[22] "Navy On-Station Enhancement Options," Statement of Rear Admiral
(Lower Half) Miles B. Wachendorf, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategy &
Policy Division, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sea Power
Subcommittee (March 19, 2002).
[23] Department of Defense Manual 5000.4-M, "Cost Analysis Guidance and
Procedures," December 1992.
[24] Amphibious Group Two provides squadrons, ships, and supporting
elements that are manned, trained, and materially and operationally
ready to deploy. The Group, part of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is located
in Norfolk, Virginia. The Group has responsibility for the patrol
coastal ships.
[25] The Trident Training Facility provides basic, advanced,
functional, refresher, and team training to ballistic missile submarine
officers and crews in order to build competence and proficiency in
operating and maintaining these submarines.
[26] This concept is generally referred to as an "integrated crew
refit."
[27] This type of training is commonly called difference training.
[28] Sea Swap cities are the cities where destroyer crew rotations took
place.
[29] Examples include classified and hazardous items, security type
medical supplies such as narcotics, laptop computers, depot level
repairables, and maintenance assistance modules.
[30] Criteria for submitting a lesson learned include one or more of
the following: (1) identify problem areas, issues, or requirements, and
if known, recommend solutions; (2) contribute new information on
existing or experimental tactics, techniques, procedures, policy, or
doctrine; (3) provide an innovative technique or a procedure that
successfully accomplishes the task; and/or (4) provide information of
interest in planning, execution, application, or employment of an
organization, system, process, or procedure.
[31] The site can be accessed from the Command Web page at
www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.
[32] Ships homeported overseas are considered part of the Forward
Deployed Naval Forces. This force structure is negotiated with each
respective host nation, with each host nation having ultimate decision
authority regarding U.S. vessels assigned to their port. Therefore, if
ships on extended deployment were considered homeported overseas,
negotiations with the pertinent host nation would be required prior to
starting each deployment.
[33] S. Rept. No. 108-46, at 309 (2003).
[34] Continuous maintenance is surface ship depot level work performed
while in port to keep ship systems fully operational between scheduled
shipyard maintenance periods.
[35] Selected Restricted Availability is defined as a short, labor-
intensive industrial period for the accomplishment of maintenance and
selected modernization.
[36] Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restricts repairs of
naval vessels outside the United States based on where the ship is
homeported and the nature of the repairs to be performed. Specifically,
any naval vessel or any other vessel under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of the Navy with its homeport in the United States may not be
overhauled, repaired, or maintained in a shipyard outside the United
States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs. Under Navy
guidance, voyage repairs generally consist of emergency work that is
necessary to enable a ship to continue its mission and that can be
accomplished without a change to the ship's deployment schedule.
[37] Organizational (shipboard) maintenance consists of corrective and
preventive maintenance, which is performed by the ship's crew on its
assigned equipment. Repairs normally consist of inspecting, servicing,
lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and
subassemblies.
[38] Intermediate maintenance consists of preventive and corrective
maintenance, which is the responsibility of and performed by qualified
personnel with specialized facilities such as fleet support activities.
Repairs normally consist of calibration, repair or replacement of
damaged or unserviceable parts or assemblies, and emergency manufacture
of nonavailable parts.
[39] U.S. Naval Forces Central Command supports all naval operations in
the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. This area includes the
Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean.
[40] Depot-level maintenance consists of maintenance performed by
designated maintenance activities to support organizational-and
intermediate-level maintenance activities by the use of more extensive
ship facilities, equipment, and personnel of higher technical skill.
Repairs may consist of inspection, test, repair, modification,
alteration, modernization, conversion, overhaul, and rebuild of parts,
assemblies, subassemblies, equipment end items, and weapon systems.
Depot-level maintenance is normally accomplished in fixed shops,
shipyards, and other shore-based facilities, or by depot field teams.
[41] This communications system connects ships, submarines, and shore
facilities. The system enables survivable, worldwide command and
control communications to strategic and tactical naval forces through
all levels of conflict.
[42] The readiness of ship equipment is quantified with a value called
an Equipment Operational Capability score. The score is a number
between 0 and 1, which is assigned to the lowest level of equipment
being tested and reflects its ability to pass selected planned
maintenance system tests and provide functional capability, as
perceived by the assessing technician.
[43] Combat system-related equipment consists of command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence systems, detection
systems, electromagnetic compatibility systems, guns, launchers, and
other fire control systems as well as supporting equipment.
[44] Hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment examples include items
related to a ship's engine and propulsion systems, safety equipment,
and habitability systems such as air conditioners.
[45] We were able to obtain the combat system-related equipment scores
for both ships, however, the Navy did not report a total hull,
mechanical, and electrical system score.
[46] A vertical launch system is a missile storage and firing system
aboard a ship that enables the vessel to perform multiple warfighting
capabilities, including antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, ship
self-defense, strike warfare, and antisurface warfare.
[47] Strike warfare is the use of tactical aircraft and/or cruise
missile strikes against land targets in an offensive power projection
role.
[48] Sea basing is the concept of placing capabilities critical to
joint and coalition operational success, such as offensive and
defensive firepower, maneuver forces, command and control, and
logistics, at sea.
[49] The five principal mission areas of special operations are
unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign
internal defense, and combating terrorism.
[50] Mission packages would provide the main warfighting capability and
functionality for specific missions and would consist of a combination
of manned and unmanned off-board vehicles, deployable sensors, and
mission manning detachments. A mission module would be used in multiple
mission packages and, conversely, several mission modules would
constitute a mission package. Mission modules are typically used to
transport, support and house mission components (sensors or weapons),
which would, in turn, be deployable or stationary aboard the ship.
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