Reserve Forces
Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions Gao ID: GAO-05-21 November 10, 2004The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have triggered the largest activation of National Guard forces since World War II. As of June 2004, over one-half of the National Guard's 457,000 personnel had been activated for overseas warfighting or domestic homeland security missions in federal and state active duty roles. In addition to increased usage, the Guard has also experienced long deployments and high demand for personnel with specific skills, such as military police. The high pace of operations and the Guard's expanded role since September 11 have raised concerns about whether the Guard is capable of successfully performing its multiple missions within existing and expected resource levels, especially given the challenges it faces in meeting future requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Guard is: (1) adapting to meet warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland security needs.
The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National Guard. To deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for war. The Army has developed plans, such as the Army Campaign Plan, to restructure its forces to better prepare them for future missions. However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying equipment needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the Army is still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to deploy in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to continue to provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3 to 5 years. The Air National Guard is also adapting to meet new warfighting requirements, but it has not been as negatively affected as the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain the same high level of operations. In addition, the Air National Guard generally maintains fully manned and equipped units. While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also supported the nation's homeland security needs, the Guard's preparedness to perform homeland security missions that may be needed in the future is unknown because requirements and readiness standards and measures have not been defined. Without this information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation's homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired effect. Since September 11, the Guard has been performing several unanticipated homeland missions, such as flying patrols over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, states have concerns about the preparedness and availability of Guard forces for domestic needs and natural disasters while overseas deployments continue at a high pace. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a comprehensive strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. However, DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state authorities on the Guard's role in such missions. Also, the National Guard Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard's homeland security capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are at an early stage and will require coordination and approval from other stakeholders, such as DOD and the states. In the absence of clear homeland security requirements, the Guard's preparedness to perform missions at home cannot be measured to determine whether it needs additional assets or training.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-21, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2004:
Reserve Forces:
Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas
and Domestic Missions:
GAO-05-21:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-21, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the global war on
terrorism have triggered the largest activation of National Guard
forces since World War II. As of June 2004, over one-half of the
National Guard‘s 457,000 personnel had been activated for overseas
warfighting or domestic homeland security missions in federal and state
active duty roles. In addition to increased usage, the Guard has also
experienced long deployments and high demand for personnel with
specific skills, such as military police. The high pace of operations
and the Guard‘s expanded role since September 11 have raised concerns
about whether the Guard is capable of successfully performing its
multiple missions within existing and expected resource levels,
especially given the challenges it faces in meeting future
requirements.
GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Guard is:
(1) adapting to meet warfighting requirements in the post-September 11
security environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland
security needs.
What GAO Found:
The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to
meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but
some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the
readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National
Guard. To deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National
Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying
units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National
Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of
May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment
items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National
Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for
war. The Army has developed plans, such as the Army Campaign Plan, to
restructure its forces to better prepare them for future missions.
However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying equipment
needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the Army is
still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does
not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to
deploy in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to
continue to provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3
to 5 years. The Air National Guard is also adapting to meet new
warfighting requirements, but it has not been as negatively affected as
the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain the
same high level of operations. In addition, the Air National Guard
generally maintains fully manned and equipped units.
While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also
supported the nation‘s homeland security needs, the Guard‘s
preparedness to perform homeland security missions that may be needed
in the future is unknown because requirements and readiness standards
and measures have not been defined. Without this information, policy
makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation‘s
homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority
needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired effect.
Since September 11, the Guard has been performing several unanticipated
homeland missions, such as flying patrols over U.S. cities and guarding
critical infrastructure. However, states have concerns about the
preparedness and availability of Guard forces for domestic needs and
natural disasters while overseas deployments continue at a high pace.
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a comprehensive
strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. However,
DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state
authorities on the Guard‘s role in such missions. Also, the National
Guard Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard‘s
homeland security capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are
at an early stage and will require coordination and approval from other
stakeholders, such as DOD and the states. In the absence of clear
homeland security requirements, the Guard‘s preparedness to perform
missions at home cannot be measured to determine whether it needs
additional assets or training.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense submit a plan to
Congress on how DOD will improve the Army National Guard‘s structure
and readiness for overseas operations and to clearly define the
National Guard‘s role in homeland security. DOD generally agreed with
the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting
Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future Operations:
National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its Readiness
for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity
under Title 10:
Figure 2: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized,
or Deployed for Federal Missions as of June 2, 2004:
Figure 3: Percent of Air National Guard Soldiers Mobilized or Deployed
for Federal Missions as of May 31, 2004:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
SINCGARS: Single Channel Ground Air Radio System:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 10, 2004:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations:
House of Representatives:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent launch of the
global war on terrorism have resulted in the largest activation of
National Guard forces--both Army and Air--since World War II. Within 1
month of the September 11 attacks, the number of Army National Guard
members activated for federal missions more than quadrupled, from about
5,500 to about 23,000. By June 2004, over 50 percent of the National
Guard's nearly 350,000 Army and 107,000 Air National Guard members had
been activated for overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or homeland
missions, such as guarding active Air Force bases. These operations
have resulted in a high demand for Guard members overall and especially
for those trained with certain skills, such as security personnel and
tanker pilots. As a result, National Guard personnel have experienced
lengthy and repeated deployments since the September 11 terrorist
attacks.
The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs
federal missions under the command of the President and state missions
under the command of the state's governor. After September 11, the
Guard's duties were expanded to include supporting new homeland
missions,[Footnote 1] such as flying combat air patrols over U.S.
cities, securing borders, providing radar coverage for the continental
United States, and protecting civilian airports, Air Force bases, and
other critical infrastructure. Governors also activated the Guard to
perform additional missions, such as guarding bridges and nuclear power
plants. Guard involvement in state missions almost tripled in the year
after the attacks, and it has remained well above pre-September 11
levels. The Guard spent about 236,000 days performing state missions in
fiscal year 2001, and that number increased to about 645,000 days in
fiscal year 2002. State mission involvement subsequently declined to
almost 433,000 days in fiscal year 2003, more than twice the level
before September 11.[Footnote 2] This high pace of operations has
raised concerns about the National Guard's ability to perform
warfighting and homeland missions successfully within its existing
resources and the challenges it faces in meeting these requirements in
the future.
The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which the
National Guard is (1) adapting to meet current and future overseas
warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security
environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland
security needs.[Footnote 3] We testified before the Committee on
Government Reform on April 29, 2004, and provided observations on high
Guard usage and the challenges the Guard faces in adapting to the
demands of the new security environment.[Footnote 4] This report
updates information contained in our testimony and concludes our work
in response to your request.
To assess the objectives, we analyzed data on National Guard
utilization and readiness prior to and after September 11, 2001. We
interviewed officials in the Departments of Defense (DOD), Army, and
Air Force and the National Guard Bureau and supplemented this
information with visits to Army and Air Force commands and Army
mobilization stations. We also developed case studies of recent federal
and state National Guard operations in four states--Georgia, New
Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. We selected these states because they
represent a mix of geographic areas, Army and Air National Guard units
with different specialties, and units that had been or were expected to
be activated for federal and/or state missions. In each of these
states, we visited the Adjutant General and National Guard
headquarters, as well as Army and Air National Guard units that had
been or will be involved in overseas or domestic missions. We also
reviewed documents on planned changes to the Army Guard's force
structure, such as the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Transformation
Roadmap. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards between April 2003 and September 2004 and
determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our
objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are described
in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Army and the Air National Guard have been adapting their forces to
meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 terrorist
attacks, but some measures taken to meet immediate needs have made
providing forces for future operations more challenging for the Army
National Guard. Unlike the Air National Guard, the Army National Guard
is still organized according to a post-cold war military planning
strategy that provides it only a portion of the resources needed to
perform warfighting missions, with the assumption that its units will
have sufficient time to obtain the additional personnel and equipment
before deploying. However, recent operations have required that Army
National Guard units be fully manned and equipped to deploy, sometimes
within short time frames. To meet warfighting needs, DOD has retrained
some Army National Guard soldiers and units to perform key functions
and changed the missions of some units, issuing them new equipment for
their new activities.[Footnote 5] For example, to respond to a
continuing demand for military police, the Army has changed some field
artillery units to security forces and retrained over 7,000 soldiers to
perform new duties. In addition, because the Army National Guard units
do not have all of the resources they need for warfighting missions,
the Army National Guard has had to transfer personnel and equipment
from nondeploying units to prepare deploying units. As of July 2004,
the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers,
shifting soldiers from one unit to another, to meet warfighting needs.
Similarly, as of May 2004, it had transferred over 35,000 pieces of
equipment to deploying units. While the Army National Guard has
provided ready units thus far, the cumulative effect of these personnel
and equipment transfers is that the readiness of nondeployed forces has
declined, challenging the Army to continue to provide ready Guard
forces for future missions. The Army has taken steps to begin to
restructure its active, Guard, and Reserve forces into more versatile
units to improve its ability to respond to the dynamic security
environment, but it is still in the process of developing plans for
restructuring Army National Guard forces. Under preliminary plans,
Guard restructuring would not be completed until 2010. In addition,
current plans do not address how the Guard's equipment will be
modernized to make it compatible with active Army equipment or provide
detailed time frames and costs for converting all Guard equipment.
Until plans on how the Guard will fit into overall Army reorganization
plans are finalized and shared with Congress, it is uncertain how they
will transform the Guard for a new operational role. Further, the Army
has not reevaluated its resourcing policy for the Army National Guard
to mitigate the effects of increased usage on its nondeployed forces,
and current Army funding plans call for continuing to maintain
nondeployed Army National Guard forces with only a portion of the
personnel and equipment required for warfighting operations. Like the
Army National Guard, the Air National Guard has also had to adjust to
the demands of recent operations and has provided forces to support
current military operations by extending tours of duty. Although its
readiness has declined as a result of the high use of personnel and
equipment, the Air National Guard has not been as negatively affected
as the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain
the same high level of activations and is funded to maintain more fully
manned and equipped units.
While the Army and the Air National Guard have supported the nation's
homeland security needs by providing personnel and equipment for
unanticipated missions, the Guard's preparedness to perform the
homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the
future is unknown because (1) its role in these missions is not defined
and requirements have not been established and (2) preparedness
standards and measures have not been developed. Since September 11, the
Army National Guard has provided security for borders, airports, and
other key assets, while the Air National Guard has taken on missions
such as flying air patrols over U.S. cities. The Army and the Air
National Guard have conducted these missions largely using existing
forces and equipment that were provided for warfighting missions.
However, state officials have expressed concern about the Guard's
preparedness to undertake state missions, including supporting homeland
security missions, given the increase in overseas deployments and the
shortages of personnel and equipment among the remaining Guard units.
Moreover, some homeland security missions could require training and
equipment, such as decontamination training and equipment, that differ
from that provided to support warfighting missions. Because DOD,
specifically the U.S. Northern Command and the Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,[Footnote 6] has not clearly
defined what the Guard's role will be or analyzed what personnel,
training, and equipment may be required to support homeland missions in
conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, it is difficult
to measure the Guard's preparedness for potential missions. DOD and
Congress have taken some actions to strengthen the Guard's homeland
capabilities, such as establishing Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Teams,[Footnote 7] to support civil authorities in identifying
whether chemical and biological events have occurred and the type of
agent used. Moreover, the National Guard Bureau is implementing pilot
programs to strengthen other capabilities to respond to weapons of mass
destruction events and improve critical infrastructure protection.
However, these pilot programs are in the early stages of implementation
and were developed by the Guard to respond to pressing needs. They are
not based on a comprehensive analysis of the full spectrum of the
Guard's role and requirements for homeland security missions. Without
such a comprehensive analysis, DOD and congressional policy makers may
not be in the best position to assess whether additional investments
are needed, and Guard personnel may lack the type of training and
equipment that would facilitate an effective and timely response to
future homeland security threats.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop and submit a
strategy to Congress for improving the Army National Guard's structure
and readiness and clearly define the Guard's role in homeland defense
and providing support to civilian authorities. DOD generally agreed
with our recommendations and cited several actions it is taking to
develop a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's future
roles and requirements.
Background:
The National Guard of the United States, which performs both federal
and state missions, represents about 52 percent of the armed services'
selected reserve[Footnote 8] and consists of approximately 457,000
members: about 350,000 in the Army National Guard and about 107,000 in
the Air National Guard. Overall, the Army National Guard makes up more
than one-half of the Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its
support forces (e.g., military police or transportation units) and has
units in more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S.
territories. Air National Guard personnel make up 20 percent of the
total Air Force, with 88 flying units and 579 mission support units at
more than 170 installations throughout the United States. The majority
of Guard members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training
1 weekend per month and 2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some
full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative,
training, and maintenance tasks. The National Guard Bureau is the
federal entity responsible for the administration of the National
Guard.
National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three
different authorities: Title 10 or Title 32 of the United State Code or
pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. Personnel in a
Title 10 status are federally funded and under federal command and
control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active
duty in their status as federal Reserves, either voluntarily or under
appropriate circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization).
Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state
control. Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel
typically perform training for their federal mission. Personnel
performing state active duty are state-funded and under state command
and control. Under state law, the governor may order National Guard
soldiers to perform state active duty to respond to emergencies,
disasters, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by
state law.
National Guard Federal Missions:
The Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions,
which take priority over state missions. As we reported in our April
2004 testimony, the National Guard's involvement in federal operations
has increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Three days after the attacks, the President, under Title 10, authorized
reservists to be activated for up to 2 years.[Footnote 9] This
authority was subsequently used to activate reservists for overseas
warfighting and stabilization missions in Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as for domestic missions, such
as flying patrols and supporting federal civilian agencies in guarding
the nation's borders. As figure 1 illustrates, as of May 2004, about
102,800 Army and Air National Guard members--the vast majority of whom
were Army National Guard members--were on active duty. Although both
Army and Air National Guard activations increased in the aftermath of
September 11, the Air National Guard activations had declined to pre-
September 11 levels by October 2003, while Army National Guard
activations continued to rise.
Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity
under Title 10:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Army National Guard data represent the number of soldiers
mobilized. Air National Guard data represent the number of Air National
Guard personnel who are mobilized, including those who volunteered for
duty.
[B] Because Army National Guard data for January 2003 were not
available, chart data point was estimated based on trend.
[End of figure]
When activated under Title 10, the National Guard is subject to the
Posse Comitatus Act,[Footnote 10] which prohibits the military from law
enforcement activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution
or law.
The Army and the Air Force have different strategies for structuring
and providing resources for their Guard components that reflect each
service's planned use and available resources. While the Army National
Guard's structure requires 375,000 personnel to be fully manned, in
fiscal year 2004, the Army National Guard was authorized 350,000
soldiers resulting in many units being manned below wartime
requirements. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard units
are provided varying levels of resources according to the priority
assigned to their warfighting missions. Because much of the Army
National Guard was expected to be used as a follow-on force in the
event of an extended conflict, many of its units were structured with
fewer personnel and lesser amounts of equipment than they would need to
deploy, with the assumption that there would be time to supply
additional personnel, equipment, and training before these units would
be needed. For example, Army National Guard divisions, which include
over 117,000 soldiers and provide the majority of the combat capability
in the Army National Guard, are supplied with 65 to 74 percent of their
required personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment,
and are less ready for their missions. This approach to managing
limited resources is referred to as "tiered readiness." In contrast,
the Air National Guard was integrated into the Air Force's operational
force and maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active
component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard to
be ready to deploy on short notice.
National Guard State Missions:
Since September 11, Guard members have also been activated for missions
under the authority of state governors in both Title 32 and state
active duty statuses. Title 32 status is generally used to train
National Guard units and personnel to perform their federal mission.
National Guard personnel also may perform operational (nontraining)
missions in Title 32 status when authorized by federal statute.
[Footnote 11] According to DOD, after September 11, the Guard performed
other operational (nontraining) duties such as providing airport
security in Title 32 status in response to presidential direction.
National Guard personnel in Title 32 status have also provided support
for events such as the G-8 Summit and the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions. Also, National Guard personnel have served in a
state active duty status in response to natural disasters.
Additionally, the National Guard performs state missions under the
command and control of the governor, with costs for these missions
borne by the state. Guard missions typically performed in this status
include providing assistance in response to natural disasters such as
fires and storms that have not been declared federal disasters.
Since September 11, governors have increasingly used this authority to
activate Guard members to protect key assets in the states.
National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting
Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future Operations:
Both at home and overseas, the Army and the Air National Guard have
been adapting in several ways to meet the demands of current
warfighting requirements, but some of the measures taken may challenge
the Army National Guard's efforts to provide ready forces for future
operations. While the Army National Guard has met new warfighting
requirements by retraining some units to acquire in-demand skills,
tailoring others to provide particular capabilities, changing unit
missions in some cases, and transferring personnel and equipment to
meet combatant commander needs, these adaptations have reduced the
readiness[Footnote 12] of its nondeployed units, in turn challenging
the Army National Guard to prepare for future operations. The Army
recognizes the need to restructure its active, Reserve, and Guard
forces to respond more effectively to the new global security
environment and is in the process of developing plans to make its
forces more modular. However, its plans for restructuring Army National
Guard forces are not finalized and do not provide detailed information
on time frames for restructuring all the Guard's units, whether the
Guard's equipment will be compatible with that of active units, or the
costs of implementing these plans. The Air National Guard has also
adapted to meet new warfighting requirements, but its readiness has not
been as negatively affected because it has not experienced continued
high usage as the Army National Guard has and because its units are
more fully equipped and manned for war.
Army National Guard Adaptation to Warfighting Requirements Reduced
Readiness of Nondeployed Units:
The Army National Guard has been adapting to the demands of current
warfighting requirements but faces future challenges in providing ready
forces for future operations. The recent increased and expanded use of
the National Guard illustrates the shift from the post-cold war
military planning strategy, in which much of the Guard represented a
force to follow the active military in the event of extended conflict,
to an operational force similar to the Air National Guard. Using this
strategy, the Army has generally maintained most Army National Guard
units at lower readiness levels under the assumption that additional
personnel and equipment would be provided prior to deployment. While
the Army National Guard's adaptations since September 11 were intended
to make deploying units more useful for current operations, these
adaptations have caused the overall readiness of nondeployed Guard
units to decline, which may hamper the Guard's ability to meet the
requirements of future warfighting operations overseas, particularly in
Iraq.
Army Has Retrained Some Guard Units and Made Other Adjustments:
To meet the high demand for Army National Guard personnel for recent
operations, the Army has alerted or mobilized over one-half of the Army
National Guard's personnel since September 11. In June 2004, Army
National Guard activations peaked with almost 81,000 Army National
Guard members--more than one-quarter of the Army National Guard's
force--activated for overseas military operations such as in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Personnel with certain skills have been in
particularly high demand. For example, as of June 2004, 95 percent of
military police units had deployed, with 23 percent having deployed
more than once, and at least 50 percent of units with specialties such
as transportation, aviation, medical, and special operations had been
activated.
To alleviate the stress on these forces, the Army has retrained
personnel in units with less needed skills, such as field artillery, to
provide skills in higher demand. For example, the Army recently changed
the mission of 27 artillery units and retrained over 7,000 personnel to
meet the need for additional military police and security forces. Some
of these soldiers have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions
such as convoy security.
The Army has also adapted Guard units to meet the specific requirements
of current overseas missions by tailoring units for particular
purposes. In some cases, the Army took personnel with key capabilities
from existing units and created new, smaller units whose personnel had
skills specifically tailored to provide the capabilities required by
the combatant commander. For example, the Army extracted 55 soldiers
with military police skills from an armored battalion of about 600
soldiers to perform a security mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. More
than 35,000 Army National Guard soldiers--almost one-fifth of all
soldiers utilized--deployed in these newly created, tailored units to
support recent military operations. Over one-half of these tailored
units (about 57 percent) were small, containing 10 or fewer soldiers.
In addition to extracting key capabilities, tailored units have also
been used to address personnel shortages in deploying units.
The Army has also changed the mission, organization, and tactics of
some deploying units, issuing them new or different equipment and
adding personnel to meet combatant commander requirements. For example,
the 30th Infantry (Mechanized), an enhanced separate brigade[Footnote
13] that deployed to Iraq in the spring of 2004, was directed to deploy
as a motorized brigade combat team with humvees instead of with all of
its assigned heavy-tracked equipment such as Bradley fighting vehicles
and tanks. To accomplish this change, the unit required an infusion of
personnel because "light" units require more personnel than "heavy"
units. In addition, the unit underwent additional training on operating
and maintaining the newly issued equipment. This unit was operating in
Iraq in its new, lighter configuration at the time of this report.
Personnel Transfers into Deploying Units Have Degraded Personnel
Readiness for Future Operations:
To ready deploying units, the Army National Guard had to transfer
personnel from nondeploying units, but in doing so, it has degraded
their readiness. This, in turn, challenges the Guard's efforts to
provide ready forces for future operations. To be ready to deploy,
units need to have a sufficient number of soldiers who are qualified to
deploy. According to the tiered-readiness policy, many National Guard
units do not have all the qualified soldiers they need to be ready for
their missions. However, in recent operations, the Army's deployment
goal for Guard combat units has been to be fully manned and for unit
personnel to be fully qualified for their positions. To meet the
requirements for units fully manned with qualified personnel, the Guard
transferred qualified soldiers from nondeployed units. By July 2004,
the National Guard had initiated over 74,000 personnel transfers to
meet the combatant commander's needs.
There are a number of reasons that Army National Guard units may not
have all of the personnel they need to deploy for their warfighting
missions. First, the Army National Guard is not funded to fully man all
its units to deployment standards. Second, some soldiers assigned to a
unit may not have completed required training.[Footnote 14] As of May
2004, over 71,000 Army National Guard soldiers were not fully trained
for their positions. Finally, soldiers may be unable to deploy overseas
for personal reasons, such as medical or dental problems, family
issues, or legal difficulties. As of June 2004, there were over 9,000
soldiers in the Army National Guard who were identified as
nondeployable. When two of the Army National Guard's enhanced separate
brigades, some of its most ready units, were activated for rotation to
Iraq in 2003, only 74 percent of their required personnel were
qualified for their assigned positions and deployable, leaving a
shortfall of over 2,100 soldiers that had to be filled from other
units.
To minimize transfers of qualified soldiers from other units, the Army
Guard ordered 700 untrained soldiers between April and June 2004 to
report for training so they could become fully qualified in their
positions before their units were activated for overseas operations.
However, the Guard has not been able to address all of its shortfalls
in this manner. For example, the Army National Guard is preparing a
combat division headquarters and a number of its support units for
deployment to Iraq in 2005. When the 42nd Infantry Division was
alerted,[Footnote 15] it lacked 783 qualified personnel--about
18 percent of the total personnel required--to meet deployment
requirements. As of June 2004, the National Guard was only able to fill
415 of these positions through transfers of personnel from other units,
leaving 368 positions unfilled. Army National Guard officials expect
that the active Army will have to find personnel to address these
shortfalls. According to National Guard officials, additional soldiers
with medical, dental, legal, or family issues may be identified as
nondeployable after they are mobilized, so the number of personnel
needed may rise.
As overseas operations continue, it is becoming increasingly
challenging for the Army National Guard to ready units because the
number of soldiers who have not been deployed and are available for
future deployments has decreased and the practice of transferring
qualified personnel to deploying units has degraded readiness of
nondeployed units. Our analysis of the decline in Army National Guard
readiness between September 2001 and April 2004 showed that the most
frequently cited reasons for the decline in personnel readiness of
nondeployed units were that personnel were already deployed or not
available for deployment. Of the almost 162,000 soldiers who are
available for future deployments, almost 36,000 are in nondeployable
units that provide maintenance, medical, and legal support to the Army
National Guard. Approximately 9,000 additional soldiers have medical or
other conditions that prevent deployment, and about 28,000 soldiers
will need required training before they will be available for
deployment. This leaves approximately 89,000 soldiers who are currently
available to deploy for overseas operations. Because DOD expects the
high pace of operations to continue for the next 3 to 5 years and
estimates that operations will require 100,000 to 150,000 National
Guard and reserve personnel each year, the Army National Guard will
likely have to alert and mobilize personnel who have been previously
deployed.
Equipment Transfers to Deploying Units Have Degraded Equipment
Readiness for Future Operations:
Because the combatant commander has required Army National Guard units
to have modern, capable, and compatible equipment for recent
operations, the Army National Guard adapted its units and transferred
equipment to deploying units from nondeploying units. However, this
adaptation has made equipping units for future operations more
challenging. The Army equips units according to when it expects them to
be needed in combat; thus, the "first to fight" units are given the
priority for modern equipment. Based on post-cold war plans, it was
assumed that most Army National Guard units would follow active units
and that there would be sufficient time to provide them with the
equipment they need for their missions before they deployed. However,
when National Guard units were alerted for recent operations, they
generally did not have sufficient amounts of equipment or equipment
that was modern enough to be compatible with active units and to meet
combatant commander requirements.
For recent operations, the Army National Guard has had to fill the
shortages of equipment among deploying units by transferring equipment
from nondeploying units. National Guard data showed that in order to
ready units deploying to support operations in Iraq between September
2002 and May 2004, the National Guard transferred over 18,000 night
vision goggles, 1,700 chemical monitors, 900 wheeled vehicles, 700
radios, and 500 machine guns, among other items, from nondeploying
units. As a result, by June 2004, the Army National Guard had
transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment and had critical
shortages[Footnote 16]of about 480 different types of items, including
machine guns and heavy trucks. In total, the Army National Guard's
nondeployed force lacks 33 percent of its essential items[Footnote 17]
and, as of June 2004, its stocks had been depleted to the point where
it had to request that the Army provide about 13,000 pieces of
equipment for its deploying units.
Equipment shortages were worsened when the combatant commander and the
National Guard Bureau barred Army National Guard units from deploying
with items that were incompatible with active Army equipment or that
could not be supported with spare parts in the area of operations. For
example, Army National Guard units equipped with 20 to 30-year-old
radios were barred from taking them to the Iraqi area of operations
because they cannot communicate with the Single Channel Ground Air
Radio System (SINCGARS) used by other Army units. Likewise, some of the
older rifles the Guard uses for training have been barred because they
use different ammunition than those of the active Army units. Moreover,
Guard units alerted for the earlier deployments were not equipped with
the most modern body armor and night vision goggles that the combatant
commander subsequently required for deploying units. After units were
identified for mobilization and deployment, the Army took some steps to
augment existing Guard equipment using supplemental wartime funding.
Our analysis of DOD data showed that the equipment readiness of
nondeployed units has continued to decline and, as overseas operations
continue, it has become increasingly challenging for the National Guard
to ready deploying units to meet warfighting requirements. As reported
by the National Guard,[Footnote 18] 87 percent of the 1,527 reporting
units in fiscal year 2001 met their peacetime equipment readiness
goals, which are often lower than wartime requirements. By fiscal year
2002, only 71 percent of the nondeployed reporting units met their
peacetime equipment goals. The report attributed this decrease in
readiness posture to equipment shortages and transfers among
nondeployed units to fill shortages in other units.
Initially, the Guard managed these transfers so that nondeploying units
shared the burden of providing resources to deploying units and could
remain at their planned readiness levels. However, this became
increasingly difficult as the number of activations mounted, and, in
November 2003, the Director of the Army National Guard issued a
memorandum to the states directing them to transfer equipment to
deploying units regardless of the impact on the readiness of remaining
units.
Plans to Restructure Army National Guard Are Not Fully Developed
or Funded and May Not Address Future Readiness Challenges:
The Army and the National Guard have recognized that the post-September
11 security environment requires changes to the Guard's structure and
an improvement in its readiness posture. However, in the near term, the
Army National Guard will have difficulty improving its readiness for
projected operations over the next 3 to 5 years under current plans,
which assume the Guard will be funded at peacetime readiness levels.
Over the longer term, DOD, the Army, and the National Guard have
initiated, but not completed, several restructuring efforts, including
moving some positions with high-demand skills out of the Guard and into
the active force, creating new standardized modular units that are
flexible to respond to combatant commander needs, and establishing
predictable deployments for units. To improve readiness, the Army
National Guard seeks to increase the amount of full-time support and
qualified personnel in its units. However, these measures will require
additional funding. At this time, it is not clear whether these planned
actions will fully address the difficulties the Army National Guard has
experienced in supplying the numbers and types of fully ready forces
needed for the global war on terrorism.
The Guard may be challenged in the near term to deploy units and
sustain the high pace of operations required by the global war on
terrorism with its current resources. While the costs of activated Army
National Guard units in wartime are borne by the active Army with funds
provided through supplemental appropriations, for recent operations the
Guard has had to ready its forces for mobilization using its existing
resources. The Army National Guard received $175 million in
supplemental funding in fiscal year 2003, for personnel and operation
and maintenance, but it did not receive additional fiscal year 2004
funding to ready nondeployed units so they can train and gain
proficiency before they are mobilized. In fiscal year 2004, $111
million was reprogrammed from Army National Guard personnel to Army
National Guard operation and maintenance appropriation accounts to
support requirements for units before they were mobilized. These funds
were available because mobilized Army National Guard personnel are paid
by the active Army military personnel appropriation. The 2005
President's budget submission and long-term funding plan are still
based on the tiered-readiness approach. Because the Army is in the
process of developing a new budget and long-term funding plan, it is
not clear at this time whether future budget submissions will include
funding to support increased readiness levels.
For the long term, DOD and the Army are changing some units' missions
to increase the availability of certain high-demand Army National Guard
units, such as military police and transportation units. They have also
taken steps to rebalance skills among the active and reserve forces to
decrease the burden of repeated deployments on reserve personnel who
have skills that are in great demand. To make more efficient use of its
forces, DOD is also planning to move military personnel out of
positions involving duties that can be performed by civilians or
contractors and into high-demand specialties, as well as taking
advantage of technological advances to reduce personnel needs. However,
these initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and the
extent to which they will alleviate the strain on Army National Guard
forces due to the continuing high pace of operations is uncertain.
In April 2004, the Army published The Army Campaign Plan that sets out
some specific objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to be
taken to plan and execute ongoing operations and transform forces for
the future. A key element of the Army's plan to transform its forces,
including National Guard units, is to restructure into "modular" units
that can be tailored to the specific needs of combatant commanders in
future operations. After restructuring, the Army National Guard expects
to have 34 smaller, lighter brigades instead of its current 38
brigades.[Footnote 19] Current plans call for converting Army National
Guard units as they return from overseas operations into brigades that
share a common basic organization with their active counterparts by
2010. Further, the Army has a goal of restructuring its forces so that
units will be authorized the qualified personnel they require. However,
the Army's current plans do not completely address how the Guard's
equipment will be modernized to make it compatible with active Army
equipment or include a detailed schedule and funding needs for
restructuring all Guard units, including support units.
In addition, one of the Army National Guard's initiatives to improve
readiness by increasing the amount of full-time support personnel
within its units is still based on its tiered-readiness model, which
resources some Guard units well below requirements. With this
initiative, the Army National Guard plans to increase the percentage of
full-time personnel gradually to about 71 percent of the personnel it
needs by 2012. Full-time Guard members enhance unit readiness by
performing tasks such as monitoring soldiers' readiness, recruiting and
training personnel, and maintaining aircraft, supplies, and equipment.
However, for fiscal year 2003, the Army National Guard was only funded
for 59 percent of the full-time personnel it needs to be fully manned,
as compared to the Air National Guard, which is staffed at 100 percent
of its required full-time support personnel. Without sufficient full-
time personnel, these tasks, which are critical to unit readiness,
suffer.
The Army National Guard also has plans to increase the number of
qualified personnel in each unit by spreading its soldiers over fewer,
in some cases smaller, units. According to Army National Guard
officials, using this strategy could increase the number of qualified
personnel to an estimated 85 percent of unit requirements. However,
Army deployment goals for combat units are for 100 percent of deploying
soldiers to be qualified in their positions. Therefore, the Guard will
likely still need to transfer personnel when units are called to
deploy.
To avoid overtaxing the force and improve deployment predictability,
the Army has developed a proposal to establish a rotational deployment
cycle for its Army National Guard units that would meet the Secretary
of Defense's goal of no more than one deployment every 6 years. In
conjunction with this proposal, preliminary Army plans propose
equipping Guard units that are 4 to 5 years away from an expected
deployment well below wartime readiness standards. However, this model
may be difficult to achieve while the high pace of operations
continues.
Air National Guard Efforts to Adapt to New Warfighting Requirements
Facilitated by Its Structure and Funding at High-Readiness Levels:
The Air National Guard, like the Army National Guard, has also adapted
to meet new warfighting requirements since September 11. It made
several adjustments to accommodate the higher pace of operations,
including extending tours of duty for some Guard personnel, calling up
others earlier than expected, and recently extending its rotational
cycle to lengthen the amount of time personnel are available for
deployment. However, the demands of ongoing operations have not been as
detrimental to the Air National Guard for two reasons. First, along
with the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard is funded to
maintain readiness levels similar to that of the active Air Force and
is expected to be able to deploy within 72 hours. Second, the Air
National Guard has not been required to sustain the same high level of
activations as the Army National Guard. Air National Guard activations
declined to pre-September 11 levels of about 10,000 by October 2003,
and have since declined to about 6,000, while the Army National Guard's
activations have continued to rise. Between 2001 and 2003, the Air
National Guard unit readiness declined as a result of its high
utilization of personnel and equipment, but Congress provided
additional funding to stabilize Air National Guard readiness.
To meet increased personnel requirements during the initial phases of
current operations, Air National Guard officials activated and deployed
personnel earlier than planned under their standard rotational
deployment cycle.[Footnote 20] In January 2003, Air Force officials
said that over 320 personnel, including some Air National Guard
members, deployed about 45 days earlier than usual. In addition, the
Air Force also disrupted the normal rotation cycle by extending tour
lengths to meet increased requirements. Air Force officials extended
the duty tours of selected Air National Guard personnel from the usual
90 days up to 179 days. For example, during the preparation phase for
Operation Iraqi Freedom the Air Force extended the tours of almost
2,400 personnel, including some Air National Guard personnel. To
accommodate ongoing operational requirements, in June 2004, the Air
Force announced that most Air National Guard personnel scheduled to
deploy in future cycles would spend 120 days in the deployment phase of
their cycle. To accommodate the increased tour lengths, the new
rotational cycle will be 20 months in length, and Guard personnel will
train for 16 months and be eligible for deployment for 4 months.
Overall, Air National Guard unit readiness has declined since
September 2001 due to the increased demands for people and usage of
equipment. Our analysis of DOD data showed that commanders attributed
this decline in readiness primarily to personnel and equipment
shortages, damaged or inoperative equipment, and incomplete training.
In addition, Air National Guard officials in states we visited told us
that meeting current operational demands has resulted in fewer aircraft
available to be used for training at home and increased maintenance
requirements on aircraft being used in current operations. However, Air
National Guard officials told us that equipment readiness rates have
remained steady during fiscal year 2004, and they attributed this
stabilization to supplemental funding of $20 million in fiscal 2003 and
$214 million in fiscal year 2004 for operation and maintenance
activities.
National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its Readiness
for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured:
While Army and Air National Guard forces have, thus far, supported the
nation's homeland security needs, the Guard's preparedness to perform
homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the
future cannot be measured because its role in these missions is not
defined, requirements have not been identified, and standards have not
been developed against which to measure preparedness. Since September
11, the Guard has performed a number of missions, including flying
patrols over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However,
state and National Guard officials voiced concerns about preparedness
and availability of Guard forces as overseas deployments continue at a
high pace. Even though plans and requirements for the homeland missions
the Guard will support are not fully developed, DOD and the National
Guard Bureau have taken some actions to address potential needs.
Guard Forces Have Supported Homeland Security Missions, but States Have
Concerns about Readiness for Future Missions:
Since September 11, Army and Air National Guard forces have supported a
range of homeland security missions, primarily with the equipment DOD
has provided for their federal missions. For example, Army National
Guard units helped guard the nation's borders and airports in the
aftermath of September 11, and they continue to guard key assets such
as nuclear power plants. Also, the Army National Guard is currently
providing security at U.S. military installations, including about
5,500 Army National Guard soldiers guarding Air Force bases in the
United States as of June 2004. Similarly, Air National Guard units
continue to fly patrol missions over the United States.
We performed case studies in four states to examine how the Guard has
supported new homeland security missions. In all four states we visited
(New Jersey, Oregon, Georgia, and Texas), Guard officials reported that
their units supported homeland tasks for both state governors and
federal authorities. The following are examples of how the Army
National Guard has supported homeland missions since September 11:
* The New Jersey Army National Guard provided security for bridges,
tunnels, and nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003
and continues to provide security at two nuclear power plants.
* The Oregon Army National Guard provided security at federal
installations, such as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Fort Lewis,
Washington, in 2002 and 2003.
* The Texas Army National Guard performed border security, assisting
U.S. Customs agents from October 2001 to November 2002, and provided
security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from
October 2001 to October 2002.
* The Georgia Army National Guard provided airport security almost
immediately after September 11 and was still guarding Army bases and
Air Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003.
The Air National Guard has also been called on to perform new missions,
such as air patrols and providing radar coverage for the continental
United States. Air National Guard units in the states we visited played
key roles in homeland defense missions. For example:
* The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located
near major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore,
and Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying patrols
over these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th had flown
1,458 air patrol missions.
* The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 patrol missions
over New York City and Washington, D.C., between December 2001 and
March 2002. Since September 11, the unit has also flown patrols over
Houston, the Gulf Coast, and in support of special events such as the
Super Bowl and the Winter Olympics.
Despite the Guard's response to homeland needs, officials in all of the
states we visited expressed concerns about their Guards' preparedness
for homeland security missions, especially given the high level of
National Guard deployments to operations outside of the United States.
As figure 2 illustrates, at the beginning of June 2004, one-half of the
50 states and 4 territories had more than 40 percent of their Army
National Guard forces alerted, mobilized, or deployed for federal
missions. Montana and Idaho both had high numbers of soldiers alerted,
mobilized, or deployed with 80 percent and 96 percent,
respectively.[Footnote 21]
Figure 2: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized,
or Deployed for Federal Missions as of June 2, 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of Air National Guard personnel who
volunteered or were mobilized or deployed as of the end of May 2004. In
contrast to the Army National Guard, only two states, New Hampshire and
Nevada, had more than 20 percent of their Air National Guard mobilized
or deployed, while 43 of the 54 states and territories had less than
10 percent of their Air National Guard activated.
Figure 3: Percent of Air National Guard Soldiers Mobilized or Deployed
for Federal Missions as of May 31, 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some Guard officials also expressed concerns that their states' Guards
had not received additional federal funding to support homeland
security missions, even as homeland security missions are continuing
and as the homeland security advisory system threat level has risen.
While the states have funded some homeland security activities, such as
guarding critical infrastructure, and purchased some equipment, such as
decontamination equipment, officials said that homeland security
requirements must compete with other needs in limited state budgets.
Furthermore, state officials said that the Guard is not generally
eligible for funding from the Department of Homeland Security because
its grants are limited to "first responders," such as police or
firefighters. Officials in all four states we visited raised concerns
about their Guards' readiness for homeland security and other state
missions. For example:
* New Jersey Guard units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in
December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment,
such as humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical
protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some
essential equipment for its Guard forces during this time on an
emergency basis. At the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to
deploy large numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was
determining how it would respond to another terrorist threat with
almost 60 percent of its forces unavailable.
* Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International
Economic Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations, known as the G-8
Summit, in June 2004, increased Georgia's security missions such as
aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, at a time when its Army
National Guard aviation units were deployed overseas. National Guard
units from 12 other states participated. The state also received
federal funds for the G-8 Summit, which reimbursed the state for costs
of activating Guard personnel. In addition, recognizing the Guard's
unique role in homeland security, active component forces were
commanded by a National Guard general for this operation--a new
arrangement designed to provide unity of command for homeland missions
that defense officials stated might serve as a model for the
future.[Footnote 22]
* In 2002, the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army National
Guard soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a
century. Oregon officials said that because many of the state's Guard
forces and equipment were deployed and the state had only limited
engineering capability left, it would not be able to provide the same
level of support to civilian authorities if similar circumstances were
to occur.
* All of the Texas Guard's aviation assets that would be needed to
fight fires and all of the state's military police were deployed at the
time of our visit. However, Texas officials said that the state had
been able to meet their homeland security needs, even at the height of
its Guard's overseas deployments, because its largest Army National
Guard unit had not been fully deployed and, as a large state, it had
ample state emergency response capability.
States are developing plans and examining resources currently available
to them to address homeland security needs. For example, each state is
developing a plan for protecting its infrastructure sites.
Additionally, most states have entered into mutual assistance
agreements that may provide them access to another state's National
Guard forces in times of need. These agreements, known as Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts, are typically used to facilitate access
to additional forces for natural disaster response. However, it is not
clear whether these arrangements will always meet the states' needs for
forces or capabilities for homeland security because, under Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts, states can withhold their forces if
they are needed in their home state. This situation occurred in one of
our case study states. According to state officials, New Jersey has
faced an elevated terrorist threat due to specific threats against the
state as well as its proximity to New York City. The officials said
they requested access to another state's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Support Team on three occasions prior to 2004. On two occasions,
the request was not granted because officials in the team's home state
determined that it was needed at home. When New Jersey made a third
request, in response to a specific and credible terrorist threat,
access was approved.
DOD Lacks Plans and Requirements to Measure Preparedness for Homeland
Missions but Is Taking Some Actions to Prepare:
DOD's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and the Northern Command are charged with leading DOD's efforts in
homeland defense, and while they have taken some actions, they have not
completed developing requirements or preparedness standards and
measures for the homeland missions in which the National Guard is
expected to participate. DOD plans to publish a comprehensive strategy
for the homeland defense.[Footnote 23] Until the strategy is finalized,
the Northern Command will not be able to complete its planning to
identify the full range of forces and resources needed for the homeland
missions it may lead or civil support missions in which active or
reserve forces should be prepared to assist federal or state civilian
authorities. Without this information, policy makers are not in the
best position to manage risks to the nation's homeland security by
targeting investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that
the investments are having the desired effect.
While the Guard has traditionally undertaken a wide variety of missions
for states, it is organized, trained, and equipped to perform a
warfighting mission. DOD measures the readiness of its forces for
combat missions by identifying the personnel and equipment required to
successfully undertake the mission and assessing the extent to which
units have the resources they need. Typically, Guard forces are
expected to perform civil support missions with either the resources
supplied for their warfighting missions or the equipment supplied by
the state. Guard officials said that units have supported state
missions with capabilities such as aviation, military police, medical,
and others, as needs have arisen.
However, in the post-September 11 environment, Guard forces may be
expected to perform missions that differ greatly from their warfighting
or traditional state missions and may require different equipment,
training, and specialized capabilities than they currently possess.
Homeland missions, such as providing large-scale critical
infrastructure protection or responding to weapons of mass destruction
events in the United States, could differ substantially from conditions
expected on the battlefield or from more traditional state missions,
such as responding to natural disasters or civil disturbances. For
example, New Jersey units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in
December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment such
as humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical
protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. In addition, state
officials said that other items, such as pepper spray, which are not
routinely supplied to all types of units for their warfighting mission,
might be useful for potential homeland missions involving crowd
control. New Jersey subsequently paid for some essential equipment for
its forces during this time on an emergency basis. Until the
requirements for personnel and equipment are better defined, DOD cannot
measure how prepared Guard forces are for the missions they may be
called to undertake. To finalize its plans, the Northern Command will
have to coordinate with federal agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security, and state emergency management offices to ascertain
their needs for Guard support. Furthermore, it will have to balance the
needs for National Guard forces at home and overseas.
Since 1999, DOD has maintained full-time Guard forces in Weapons of
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams that are dedicated to homeland
security missions. These teams are comprised of 22 full-time personnel
and are maintained at the highest readiness levels and can respond
rapidly to support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of
mass destruction. Their role is to assist local officials in
determining the nature of the attack, provide medical and technical
advice, and help to identify follow-on federal and state assets that
might be needed. Congress has authorized at least one team for each
state and territory. Currently, 32 teams are fully operational, with
the remaining 23 estimated to be operational by 2007. These teams are
federally funded and trained but perform their mission under the
command and control of the state governor.
The National Guard Bureau has proposed some additional initiatives that
are in varied stages of implementation, which are intended to further
prepare states for meeting homeland security needs. For example, the
National Guard Bureau has:
* Set up a pilot program in April 2004 in 6 states (California,
Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia) to jointly
assess with state officials critical infrastructure protection policy,
tactics, procedures, and implementation.
* Established a regional task force to provide the capability for 12
states to respond to a weapon of mass destruction event. These Guard
forces are designed to locate and extract victims from a contaminated
environment, perform mass casualty/patient decontamination, and
provide medical triage and treatment in response to one of these
events. The 12 participating states are New York, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Missouri, Florida, Texas,
Colorado, California, Washington, and Hawaii.
* Proposed an initiative to distribute Guard personnel with key
capabilities, including aviation, military police, engineering,
transportation, medical, chemical, and ordnance, to each state and
territory. When stationing personnel with these capabilities in a state
or territory is not possible, the National Guard Bureau will try to
maintain all capabilities within the geographical region.
* Developed a proposal for rotational deployment of Guard forces that
would enable each state to retain 50 percent of its Guard in the state
to respond to homeland security missions and to support civil
authorities, while 25 percent of the state's forces deploy, and
25 percent prepare for future deployments.
While these initiatives would provide enhanced capability for homeland
security in the National Guard, they will require coordination with the
Army and the Air Force as well as with the states, and they might face
implementation challenges. For example, the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau has developed a proposal to station a mix of forces with skills
useful for state missions within each state and presented the proposal
to state governors. However, the Army, the Air Force, Congress, and
others are also involved in making such decisions. Similarly,
implementing the National Guard's proposal to retain 50 percent of a
state's Guard at home for homeland security and civil support missions
has not been implemented and could be difficult to achieve during
periods of high-military operations. Officials from the U.S. Army
Forces Command, the Army command that selects Army Guard personnel for
federal activation, said that while they try to minimize the impact of
federal mobilizations on the states, this becomes more and more
difficult as the level of federal activations increases.
Conclusions:
The September 11 terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have
placed new demands for ready forces on the National Guard--especially
the Army National Guard--for overseas, homeland security, and homeland
defense operations. At the same time, it is apparent that the Army
National Guard's structure as a follow-on force to the active Army is
not consistent with its current use as an operational force. The
current demands for large numbers of fully manned and equipped forces
to support overseas operations have forced the Guard to transfer
personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to deploying units,
degrading the readiness of the nondeployed units. This continued
decline in readiness of nondeployed units hinders the Army National
Guard's ability to continue to provide the ready forces in the short
term that DOD estimates will be needed to meet operational needs over
the next 3 to 5 years. However, DOD's current budget continues to fund
the Guard at peacetime levels, and it is not clear whether future
budgets will include funding to improve readiness. In the longer term,
while DOD is reevaluating its strategy for the new security
environment, it is important for it to decide what the role of the
National Guard will be in the 21st century. This decision is important
because it will determine the missions for which the Guard will have to
prepare, the number and types of units it will need, and how much
personnel, equipment, and training it should be provided. Furthermore,
until DOD establishes the Guard's role in the post-September 11
environment and develops a strategy to prepare its forces to meet new
demands, it cannot be sure that it is best managing risks by investing
its resources to target the highest priority needs and Congress, in
turn, will not have detailed information on which to base funding and
policy decisions. Continuing to structure and fund the Guard under
current policy will result in continued personnel transfers and
readiness declines for its units that may hamper its ability to sustain
much needed Guard involvement in the global war on terrorism over the
long term.
At the same time that the Guard's overseas missions have increased--
reducing the personnel and equipment available for state missions--
homeland security needs have also increased. However, DOD has not fully
defined what role the National Guard will have in the homeland missions
DOD will lead or support and how it will balance this role with its
increased participation in overseas operations. Absent a clearly
defined role for all its homeland missions, the Guard cannot identify
requirements for successfully executing this role and the standards and
measures it will use to assess preparedness for all its homeland
missions. Until it has these standards and measures, DOD does not have
the means to determine whether the Guard is prepared to meet homeland
security needs with its current structure and assets. As such, policy
makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation's
homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority
needs and ensuring that they are having the desired effect.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the
Army National Guard's needs for the global war on terrorism, including
the Army National Guard's anticipated role, missions, and requirements
for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The
near-term portion of the strategy should address the current decline in
readiness for overseas missions and the Army National Guard's plans to
provide the ready forces needed for the global war on terrorism over
the next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it should include:
* an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the
readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas
and domestic missions and:
* a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of
nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding
for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable
levels of risk.
The long-term portion of the strategy should detail how the Army plans
to restructure and provide the Guard resources--personnel, equipment,
and training--consistent with its 21st century role, including:
* how the Army National Guard will be restructured to support future
missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces and:
* the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources
needed to achieve compatibility with active forces and the appropriate
level of readiness for their missions.
As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern Command
refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense and
support to civil authorities and defines requirements, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretaries of Defense
for Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern
Command, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army
and the Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and
appropriate officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to take
the following four actions:
* Establish the full range of the National Guard's homeland missions,
including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian
authorities.
* Identify the National Guard's capabilities to perform these missions
and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to
perform these missions successfully.
* Develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment,
and training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time
frames for implementing the plan, and identifies required funding.
* Establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard's homeland
security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be
systematically measured and accurately reported.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department generally agreed
with our recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement
them. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop and
submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's
short-and long-term needs for the global war on terrorism, including
the Army National Guard's role, missions, and requirements for
personnel and equipment, and its plans to manage the risk associated
with the declining readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces.
In its comments, DOD said that the Army has conducted the recommended
analysis, developed a plan as outlined in the Army Campaign Plan, and
communicated its plan to numerous members of Congress. We agree
that the Army Campaign Plan is a significant step in planning to
address National Guard readiness problems because it identifies goals
and objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to plan for
transforming its forces. However, we believe the Army Campaign Plan
does not fully meet the intent of our recommendation because it lacks
specificity about how the Army will address the readiness of
nondeployed Army National Guard forces in the near term, how all Guard
units will be converted to the modular design, or how the Guard's
equipment will be modernized to make it compatible with active Army
equipment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified the funding needed for
restructuring all Guard units, including support units. Therefore, we
believe the Army should develop more detailed plans to fully implement
our recommendation. In its comments, DOD said that the Army agrees that
it should continue its analysis to identify and minimize readiness
impacts to the current force.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish the full range of
the National Guard's homeland missions, to identify the capabilities
needed to perform those missions and develop a plan to address any
shortfalls, and to establish readiness standards and measures for the
Guard's homeland security missions. However, in its comments, DOD said
it would take a different approach to accomplishing the tasks than we
recommended. Rather than having the Assistant Secretary for Homeland
Defense take the lead in all four areas as we recommended, DOD said
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, working in close coordination,
should take the lead in implementing the actions we recommended. We
believe the approach DOD proposes meets the intent of our
recommendation, and we have modified the wording of our recommendation
to reflect the proposed change in organizational responsibilities.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 7 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to
the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air
Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We interviewed officials in the Army National Guard, the Air National
Guard, the National Guard Bureau, and the Department of the Army
and Department of the Air Force headquarters. We supplemented this
information with visits to several Department of Defense (DOD) offices,
including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs; the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Joint
Force Headquarters, Homeland Security. We also developed case
studies of recent federal and state National Guard operations in
four states--Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. The states were
chosen to represent a mix of geographic areas, Air and Army National
Guard units with different specialties, and units that had been or
expected to be activated for state or federal missions. In each state
we visited the Adjutant General and offices within the Joint National
Guard headquarters. We also interviewed leaders from a field artillery
battalion, an armor battalion, two enhanced brigades, an air control
wing, an airlift wing, an air-refueling wing, and three fighter wings.
To examine the National Guard's warfighting requirements in this
post-September 11, 2001 security environment, we obtained and analyzed
data on state and federal activations of the Army and the Air National
Guard before and after September 11, 2001. We supplemented this with
interviews, briefings, and documentation from officials from the four
case study states and from the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army
Forces Command, First Air Force, and the U.S. Air Force Air Combat
Command and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center. To examine the
ways in which the National Guard has adapted for its new missions, we
interviewed officials in the four case study states and officials at
Army mobilization stations at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Benning, Georgia,
and Fort Dix, New Jersey, and at the First and Fifth Continental United
States Armies. To identify Guard usage trends and stressed
capabilities, we analyzed DOD's personnel tempo database, Army National
Guard and Air National Guard data on the types of units mobilized, and
information from the Army National Guard on the transformation of field
artillery and other support units into military police and security
force units. We obtained information on personnel and equipment
transfers from the National Guard Bureau and information on equipment
shortages from DOD publications and reports. We reviewed equipment
data, interviewed data sources, and obtained information on data
collection methods and internal control measures applied to the data.
We determined the equipment data were sufficiently reliable for our
objectives. We also reviewed documents on planned changes to the Army
Guard's force structure, such as the Army Campaign Plan and the Army
Transformation Roadmap. We also discussed personnel, training, and
equipment issues with unit, state, Guard Bureau, and mobilization
station officials and force providers.
To assess the National Guard's emerging homeland security needs, in
each of the four case study states we interviewed Guard homeland
security officials and leaders from Army and Air National Guard units
with recent homeland security experience. We also met with officials
from the National Guard Bureau (Homeland Defense), the Department of
the Army, three Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, the
Air Combat Command and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, the
Army Forces Command, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs (Military Assistance to Civilian
Authorities) (now part of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland
Defense)), the Joint Director of Military Support, and the Joint Task
Force, Civil Support. We also obtained information from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command and reviewed unclassified, publicly available documents
from the U.S. Northern Command. In addition, we reviewed the National
Guard's role in rotation plans for future operations. We identified the
challenges facing DOD, the states, and Congress in organizing and
equipping the Guard for both overseas and homeland security missions
based upon our analysis of the Guard's current status and discussions
with National Guard officials.
We conducted our review between April 2003 and September 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our
objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they
ensured their own data accuracy and reviewed their data collection
methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control
measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and
reliability.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
"RESERVE FORCES: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard
for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions," dated September 16, 2004
(Code 350546/GAO-05-21). The Department partially concurs with
recommendation 1 and 2 and concurs with recommendation 3. Detailed
comments on the GAO recommendations and report are enclosed.
The point of contact for this office is Colonel Cora Jackson-Chandler,
OASD/RA (RT&M), at (703) 695-4126.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
T.F. Hall:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO-05-21/GAO CODE 350546:
"RESERVE FORCES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER PREPARE THE NATIONAL GUARD
FOR FUTURE OVERSEAS AND DOMESTIC MISSIONS":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a
strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global
war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role,
missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the
near-and the long-term. The near-term portion of the strategy should
address the current decline in readiness for overseas missions and the
Army National Guard's plans to provide the ready forces needed for the
global war on terrorism over the next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it
should include:
* an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the
readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas
and domestic missions, and:
* a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of
nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding
for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable
levels of risk. (Page 28/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Army has conducted this analysis,
developed a plan (the Army Campaign Plan) and briefed the results to
numerous members of Congress. The Army is taking steps to posture the
Army National Guard for prolonged operations. A cyclical construct has
been developed to ensure that reserve component units of the Army
returning from operations Outside the Continental United States reset
and/or reorganize into modular formations and are placed on a ramp to
combat readiness over a five-year period. The Army agrees that this
analysis should continue to identify readiness impacts to the current
force, both deployed and non-deployed. The Army also agrees that
measures should be identified to minimize those impacts in the near-
term for non-deployed force.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a
strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global
war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role,
missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the
near-and long-term. The long-term portion of the strategy should detail
how the Army plans to restructure and provide the Guard resources-
personnel, equipment, and training-consistent with its 21st century
role, including:
* how the Army National guard will be restructured to support future
missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces, and:
* the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources
needed to achieve compatibility with active forces, and the appropriate
level of readiness for their missions. (Page 28/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Army has included a strategy for
Army National Guard modularity and restructuring in the Army Campaign
Plan. Included in this plan are the timelines and funding priority
necessary to achieve a modular Army National Guard. The report focuses
on the Army National Guard's structure and readiness for overseas
operations and the need for clear definition of the National Guard's
role in homeland security. Similarly, the Air Force must embrace
innovative organizational constructs to respond to a decrease in
platforms due to modernization and reduced infrastructure. To this end,
the Future Total Force office was created in October 2003 at the
direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the purpose of
leveraging the collective expertise of the Total Force:
RECOMMENDATION 3: As DoD completes its homeland defense strategy and
the Northern Command refines its concept and operational plans for
homeland defense and support to civil authorities and defines
requirements, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander
of the U.S. Northern Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force,
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate officials in
the Department of Homeland Security, to take the following four
actions:
* Establish the full range of the National Guard's homeland missions
including those led by DoD and those conducted in support of civilian
authorities.
* Identify the National Guard's capabilities to perform these missions
and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to
perform these missions successfully.
* Develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment,
and training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time
frames for implementing the plan, and identifies required funding.
* Establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard's homeland
security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be
systemically measured and accurately reported. (Page 29/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under
Secretary for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary for
Policy to take the lead for specific actions directed by Recommendation
3. The two OSD organizations responsible for the four actions will work
in close coordination with all of the organizations listed in
Recommendation 3.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402:
Margaret G. Morgan (202) 512-8975:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the persons named above Suzanne Wren, Barbara Gannon,
James Lewis, Tina Morgan, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern Saavedra,
Alissa Czyz, Kenneth Patton, Jennifer Popovic, and Jay Smale also made
major contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of
Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security is a
broad term that encompasses efforts to reduce America's vulnerability
to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to an
attack that might occur. The Department of Defense refers to its
contributions to the overall homeland security effort as "homeland
defense," and support to civil authorities.
[2] A National Guard official who maintains data on the extent of
support to civil authorities explained to us that because some state
data may not be reported, this figure might underestimate the days
spent supporting state missions.
[3] We are conducting a separate effort examining the roles and
readiness of the Army Reserve.
[4] GAO, Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in
Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges, GAO-04-670T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2004).
[5] We previously reported that forces' skills are not well matched
with the needs of domestic military missions. See GAO-04-670T.
[6] The U.S. Northern Command is responsible for executing homeland
defense activities and supporting civilian authorities when requested.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
assists the Secretary of Defense in providing policy and guidance to
combatant commanders regarding air, ground, and maritime defense of
U.S. territories and supporting civilian authorities.
[7] The Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams are
each comprised of 22 full-time personnel and maintained at the highest
preparedness levels so as to respond rapidly to support civil
authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass destruction. Their
role is to assist local officials in determining the nature of the
attack, provide medical and technical advice, and assist with requests
for additional support.
[8] The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army
National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United
States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The
selected reserve consists of military members assigned to organized
reserve units and reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled
drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for
training of not less than 14 days during each year.
[9] 10 U.S.C. § 12302.
[10] 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
[11] Examples include counterdrug support (32 U.S.C. § 112) and Weapons
of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (10 U.S.C. § 12310(c)).
[12] Readiness is generally defined as a measure of DOD's ability to
provide the capabilities needed to execute the mission specified in the
National Military Strategy. At the unit level, readiness refers to the
ability of units, such as Army divisions and Air Force wings, to
provide capabilities required by the combatant commands. Details of DOD
readiness data are classified.
[13] Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers
and are the Army National Guard's highest priority combat units. These
15 brigades receive specialized training and higher priority than other
National Guard units for personnel and resources during peacetime. Once
called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to deploy overseas
within 90 days.
[14] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs To Address Long-
Term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and
Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).
[15] DOD has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a
minimum of 30 days written notification, referred to as "alert," before
they are mobilized for active duty.
[16] A critical shortage is defined as having five or less of an item
in the total Army National Guard inventory.
[17] Essential items are defined as a unit's principal weapon/mission
systems and equipment that are critical to accomplishment of primary
mission tasks and critical mission support items.
[18] Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report
for Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, D.C.: February 2002) and National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington,
D.C.: February 2003).
[19] This includes the Army National Guard's 15 enhanced separate
brigades, 2 separate brigades, and 21 brigades in its 8 divisions.
[20] The Air Force divides its forces into 10 groups, each containing a
mix of active, Guard, and reserve forces, and until June 2004, operated
on a 15-month rotational cycle. The 15-month cycle included a 90-day
period when a unit was eligible for deployment.
[21] Since the data in figure 2 were reported, forces in several other
states, including Hawaii, Nevada, and South Carolina, have been alerted
or mobilized. Deployed forces from other states have also returned
home.
[22] The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act authorized National
Guard officers in Title 32 status to retain that status if called to
active duty under Title 10. This arrangement requires agreement between
the President and the governor to be in effect and allows a National
Guard officer to command federal as well as National Guard troops in
state status.
[23] We previously reported on the Northern Command's activities in a
classified report. GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing
to Achieve Northern Command's Mission but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-
622C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004).
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