Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks Gao ID: GAO-05-6 November 5, 2004Global Hawk offers significant military capabilities to capture and quickly transmit high-quality images of targets and terrain, day or night, and in adverse weather--without risk to an onboard pilot. Global Hawk first flew in the late 1990s as a demonstrator and supported recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, the Air Force began an acquisition program to develop and produce improved Global Hawks. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) restructured and accelerated the program to include a new, larger and more capable air vehicle. GAO was asked to review the program and discuss (1) the restructuring's effect on the Air Force's ability to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter and (2) whether its current business case and management approach is knowledge-based and can help forestall future risks.
The restructuring of the Global Hawk program impacts the acquisition program in multiple ways. More and accelerated funding: Funding, which previously spanned 20 years, now is compressed in about half the time. The restructured plan requires $6.3 billion through fiscal year 2012; the original plan would have needed $3.4 billion by that time. The budget request is now three times higher for some years. Immature technologies: Several critical technologies needed to provide the advanced capabilities are immature and will not be tested on the new air vehicle until late in the program, after which most of the air vehicles will already have been bought. New requirements, new costs: DOD's desire to add additional Global Hawk capabilities tripled development costs. The program acquisition unit cost increased 44 percent since program start, yet fewer vehicles are to be produced than originally planned. Challenges, trade-offs, and delays: The addition of new capabilities has led to space, weight, and power constraints for the advanced Global Hawk model. These limitations may result in deferring some capabilities. Some key events and activities--many related to testing issues--have been delayed. Global Hawk's highly concurrent development and production strategy is risky and runs counter in important ways to a knowledge-based approach and to DOD's acquisition guidance. The restructuring caused gaps in product knowledge, increasing the likelihood of unsuccessful cost, schedule, quality, and performance outcomes. Because the restructured program is dramatically different from the initial plan for the basic model, the business case now seems out of sync with the realities of the acquisition program.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-6, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
November 2004:
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES:
Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy Are Needed to Reduce
Program Risks:
GAO-05-6:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-6, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Global Hawk offers significant military capabilities to capture and
quickly transmit high-quality images of targets and terrain, day or
night, and in adverse weather”without risk to an onboard pilot. Global
Hawk first flew in the late 1990s as a demonstrator and supported
recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, the Air
Force began an acquisition program to develop and produce improved
Global Hawks. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) restructured and
accelerated the program to include a new, larger and more capable air
vehicle. GAO was asked to review the program and discuss (1) the
restructuring‘s effect on the Air Force‘s ability to deliver new
capabilities to the warfighter and (2) whether its current business
case and management approach is knowledge-based and can help forestall
future risks.
What GAO Found:
The restructuring of the Global Hawk program impacts the acquisition
program in multiple ways.
* More and accelerated funding: Funding, which previously spanned 20
years, now is compressed in about half the time. The restructured plan
requires $6.3 billion through fiscal year 2012; the original plan would
have needed $3.4 billion by that time. The budget request is now three
times higher for some years (see figure below).
* Immature technologies: Several critical technologies needed to
provide the advanced capabilities are immature and will not be tested
on the new air vehicle until late in the program, after which most of
the air vehicles will already have been bought.
* New requirements, new costs: DOD‘s desire to add additional Global
Hawk capabilities tripled development costs. The program acquisition
unit cost increased 44 percent since program start, yet fewer vehicles
are to be produced than originally planned.
* Challenges, trade-offs, and delays: The addition of new capabilities
has led to space, weight, and power constraints for the advanced Global
Hawk model. These limitations may result in deferring some
capabilities. Some key events and activities”many related to testing
issues”have been delayed.
Global Hawk‘s highly concurrent development and production strategy is
risky and runs counter in important ways to a knowledge-based approach
and to DOD‘s acquisition guidance. The restructuring caused gaps in
product knowledge, increasing the likelihood of unsuccessful cost,
schedule, quality, and performance outcomes. Because the restructured
program is dramatically different from the initial plan for the basic
model, the business case now seems out of sync with the realities of
the acquisition program.
Global Hawk‘s Annual Funding Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the Air Force revisit the decision to concurrently
develop and produce the newer Global Hawk and create a new business
case that defines warfighter needs and available resources. GAO also
recommends that production be delayed (other than those units needed
for testing) until the new business case is approved. DOD disagrees
that these actions are needed because it believes risks are being
managed effectively and GAO‘s approach would require more time and
money to implement the program.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-6.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at
(202) 512-4163 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Restructured Global Hawk Program Attempts to Do More in Less Time:
Global Hawk Program's Current Management Approach Sets Stage for
Additional Risks:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Knowledge Gaps at Critical Knowledge Points:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Key Characteristics of Global Hawk RQ-4A and RQ-4B Models:
Table 2: Global Hawk Program's Cost, Quantity, and Unit Costs:
Table 3: How Global Hawk Product Knowledge Compares with Three Critical
Points in the Knowledge-Based Approach:
Figures:
Figure 1: Global Hawk RQ-4A:
Figure 2: Global Hawk's Annual Funding Requirements:
Figure 3: Restructured 2004 Plan Is Highly Concurrent Compared with
Original Global Hawk Plan:
Figure 4: Global Hawk Program Is Not Fully Aligned with DOD's
Acquisition Policy and Knowledge-Based Approach:
Letter November 5, 2004:
The Honorable Curt Weldon:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Air Force's Global Hawk is a high-flying unmanned aerial vehicle
that can capture detailed images of targets as well as wide swaths of
terrain and transmit those images on a near real-time basis to
battlefield commanders and intelligence centers. With an ability to see
through clouds, sandstorms, and other inclement weather conditions day
or night and to fly for more than a day, Global Hawk can significantly
improve the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to gather
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance[Footnote 1] information
about potential adversaries without risking an onboard pilot. An early
model performed well in the ongoing global war on terrorism, and the
Secretary of Defense identified Global Hawk as having the potential to
transform military operations. The Air Force began the acquisition
program in 2001. With total program cost estimated at $6.3 billion,
Global Hawk is currently DOD's most expensive unmanned aerial vehicle.
The Navy is considering Global Hawk for a maritime surveillance
mission, and other federal agencies, several foreign countries, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization have all expressed an interest in
this aircraft system.
In 2002, DOD restructured the program, accelerating development and
production, and, more importantly, changing the design significantly to
a new, larger, heavier, and more capable air vehicle to handle both
imagery and signals intelligence missions.[Footnote 2] Given Global
Hawk's overall importance to DOD, you asked us to review the program.
This report discusses (1) the restructuring's effect on the Air Force's
ability to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter in terms of
funding, acquisition strategy, cost, and other related issues and (2)
whether the current business case and management approach is knowledge-
based and can help forestall future risks.
To determine the effects of restructuring on the Global Hawk program's
cost, schedule, and performance goals, we reviewed the original
acquisition strategy, two major restructurings, and the current
acquisition strategy. We assessed changes to funding, annual budget
requests, the number of vehicles to be procured, vehicle capabilities,
and program cycles for developing, testing, and procuring Global Hawk.
To evaluate the program's likelihood of meeting its objectives, we
compared the current acquisition strategy with criteria established in
DOD's acquisition policy[Footnote 3] and with best practices and
experiences of leading commercial firms and successful government
acquisitions. This methodology, which we call a knowledge-based
approach, enabled us to evaluate whether the program achieved product
knowledge at the right times in terms of technology, design, and
production maturity. We identified gaps in product knowledge, reasons
for those gaps, and risks associated with inadequate knowledge. We
performed our review from February 2004 to September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. More details
about our methodology are in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Global Hawk program has changed dramatically since the March 2001
decision to start both system development and low-rate production. The
program has been restructured twice to add the requirement for a
totally new and larger Global Hawk design to be developed and produced
in less time. Program funding, which previously had been stretched
relatively evenly across 20 years, is now compressed into roughly half
the time, tripling Global Hawk's budgetary requirements in some years.
In fiscal year 2006, for example, the program now plans to request
about $750 million from Congress, three times what was planned
originally. The restructurings expanded the development period by 5
years and compressed production by 9 years, creating significant
concurrency between development and production from fiscal year 2004 to
2010. Because of this concurrency, the Air Force plans to invest in
almost half of the total fleet of the new larger Global Hawks before a
production model is flight-tested and completed to show that the air
vehicle design works as required. Likewise, full-rate production will
begin before the airborne signals intelligence and multiplatform radar
(the two required capabilities justifying the new, larger model)
complete development and are flight-tested to prove the integrated
system will work as intended. The primary reason for building the RQ-4B
model was to integrate and carry the advanced sensors to provide added
capability to the warfighter. The program's total cost estimates have
increased by nearly $900 million, driven by a threefold increase in
development costs to pay for the development of a new and larger air
vehicle. As a result, the program acquisition unit cost increased 44
percent since the program started. Finally, in the past 2 years, the
program has deferred some key capabilities and experienced delays that
can impact getting capabilities to the warfighter.
The Air Force's restructured strategy does not fully follow the
evolutionary, knowledge-based approach espoused by best practices and
DOD's revised acquisition guidance. A knowledge-based approach
encourages managers to attain the necessary product knowledge at key
points to support investment decisions, ensuring, for example, that
technologies are mature before starting an acquisition program and that
the design is stable before beginning manufacturing. This approach
includes incremental or evolutionary development, which sets up a more
manageable environment for attaining and applying knowledge and is
intended to increase the chances of delivering a quality weapon system
to the warfighter quickly and cost effectively. While the original
acquisition strategy more closely adhered to this approach, the
restructured strategy has caused gaps in knowledge about technology,
design, and manufacturing at major investment decision points. These
actions changed the underpinnings of the program's original business
case and increased the likelihood of future cost increases and schedule
delays in delivering the capabilities expected by the warfighter. Air
Force and contractor officials have established a wide range of
management controls to help mitigate risks. While some of these
controls may increase visibility into risks, the history of successful
product development programs has shown that risk mitigation plans do
not work optimally unless they are based on knowledge appropriate for
decisions that must be made at critical junctures.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force
to revisit the decision to concurrently develop and produce the new
Global Hawk design. The Secretary should direct the Air Force to
conduct and present a new business case that defines the warfighter
needs that can be accommodated given current available resources of
technology, engineering capability, time, and money. To keep risks from
increasing beyond current levels in this program, we also recommend the
Secretary delay further procurement of the new Global Hawk, other than
units needed for testing, until a new business case is completed that
reduces risk and justifies further investments on a knowledge-based
acquisition strategy. DOD disagreed with both recommendations, stating
that risks are being effectively managed and that our approach would
take more time and more money to implement. We continue to believe that
our recommendations would improve congressional and DOD oversight,
reduce program risks, and save time and money over the life of the
program through a more rigorous and comprehensive application of
knowledge-based practices.
Background:
The Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle system is designed to support
warfighting and peacekeeping missions by providing decision makers with
up-to-date information about potential adversaries' locations,
resources, and personnel. Operators on the ground can change Global
Hawk's navigation and direct the onboard sensors to survey a geographic
area the size of Illinois within a 24-hour cycle. As a high-altitude,
long-endurance aircraft, Global Hawk was originally designed to reach
an altitude of 65,000 feet and fly for up to 35 hours.
Global Hawk began in 1994 as an acquisition concept technology
demonstration program, managed first by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency and, since 1998, by the Air Force. Seven demonstrator
aircraft were eventually produced; three have since been destroyed in
mishaps. The demonstrator models logged several thousand-flight hours
and effectively supported combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The system passed a military usefulness assessment, completed several
demonstrations and other tests, and DOD judged it a success. However,
testing identified that significant improvements in reliability, sensor
performance, and communications were needed before producing
operationally effective and suitable systems.
In March 2001, DOD approved the Global Hawk for a combined start of
system development and low-rate initial production of six air vehicles
based on the successful demonstrations and operational deployments of
demonstrator aircraft. The Air Force planned to slowly develop more
advanced capabilities and acquire 63 air vehicles. This model, now
called the RQ-4A, is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Global Hawk RQ-4A:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In March 2002, DOD restructured the acquisition strategy to include a
second Global Hawk model, the RQ-4B. The new strategy includes 51 air
vehicles, 10 ground stations, multiple intelligence sensors, support
equipment, and facilities at a cost of $6.3 billion. Of the 51 air
vehicles to be purchased, 7 are RQ-4As and 44 are RQ-4Bs. Separately,
the Navy is procuring 2 RQ-4As and a ground station for about $300
million (including development costs) to evaluate the vehicles'
potential for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Program. In December
2002, DOD restructured the program again. Instead of buying all RQ-4Bs
with multiple intelligence capability, the RQ-4Bs will now have a mix
of multimission and single-mission capabilities. The two restructurings
also increased low-rate initial production quantities to 19 (recently
increased to 20) air vehicles: 7 RQ-4As and 12 (now 13) RQ-4Bs.
Differences between the Two Global Hawk Models:
The RQ-4A and the RQ-4B differ significantly. The new RQ-4B model is
intended to have 50 percent greater payload capacity, a longer fuselage
and longer wing span and will be heavier than the A model. DOD
considered these changes necessary to carry new advanced sensor
payloads and to provide multi-intelligence capabilities on a single RQ-
4B. Even though the RQ-4B is bigger and heavier, it will use the same
engine as the RQ-4A. Table 1 shows the key differences in the two
models.
Table 1: Key Characteristics of Global Hawk RQ-4A and RQ-4B Models:
Key characteristics: Payload capacity;
RQ-4A: 2,000 pounds;
RQ-4B: 3,000 pounds.
Key characteristics: Take-off weight;
RQ-4A: 26,750 pounds;
RQ-4B: 32,250 pounds.
Key characteristics: Wingspan;
RQ-4A: 116.2 feet;
RQ-4B: 130.9 feet.
Key characteristics: Fuselage length;
RQ-4A: 44.4 feet;
RQ-4B: 47.6 feet.
Key characteristics: Endurance;
RQ-4A: 31 hours;
RQ-4B: 33 hours.
Key characteristics: Time at 60,000 feet;
RQ-4A: 14 hours;
RQ-4B: 4 hours.
Key characteristics: Average speed at 60,000 feet;
RQ-4A: 340 knots;
RQ-4B: 310 knots.
Key characteristics: Approximate range;
RQ-4A: 10,000 nautical miles;
RQ-4B: 10,000 nautical miles.
Sources: Northrop Grumman (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
In addition to the differences shown in table 1, the RQ-4B includes new
requirements for advanced sensors payloads,[Footnote 4] enhancements to
communications and ground stations, a new multiplatform common data
link, and an open systems architecture. The new design will use more
advanced technologies (such as lithium batteries and electric brakes),
will require a larger power-generating capability, and will incorporate
new landing gears that fold into the wing. Also, the design changes
require new manufacturing processes and investments in new production
tooling--the factory equipment and manufacturing items used to build
large quantities of major weapon systems, such as Global Hawk.
Restructured Global Hawk Program Attempts to Do More in Less Time:
Global Hawk's restructuring has impacted the acquisition program in a
number of significant ways: the time span for funding has been
compressed into roughly half the time and the overall funding amount
has increased; concurrent development and production is causing the Air
Force to invest in almost half the total fleet of the new and improved
Global Hawk vehicle before a production model has proven that it will
work as intended; and development costs have tripled because of the
need to develop a new and improved vehicle. In addition, the program
has deferred some capabilities and incurred delays that could affect
the Air Force's ability to deliver Global Hawk to the warfighter.
Annual Funding Needs Are Higher under Restructured Program:
The restructured program requires greater up-front investment, a faster
ramp-up in funding, and a larger total budget. The development period
was extended from 7 years to 12 years, and development funding
increased significantly to develop the RQ-4B and to integrate advanced
sensor and communication technologies. Procurement is now concentrated
into 11 years instead of the 20 years of relatively level procurement
set out in the original plan. The restructuring triples Global Hawk's
budgetary requirements in some years. Figure 2 illustrates the
restructuring's compression of the program and impact on annual funding
requirements.
Figure 2: Global Hawk's Annual Funding Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Compared with the original plan, the restructured plan has much higher
annual funding requirements, placing more budgeted funds at risk of not
being fully funded when competing for the defense dollar. In their
respective peak years of budget requirements, the original plan would
have required $353 million (fiscal year 2010), while the restructured
plan expects to request $781 million (fiscal year 2007). The upcoming
fiscal year 2006 requirement is currently about $750 million, three
times higher than the original plan for that same fiscal year.
Cumulatively, the restructured plan requires $6.3 billion to be
completed in fiscal year 2012, whereas the original plan would only
have needed $3.4 billion by that year.
Restructured Program Increased Concurrency between Development
and Production:
Significant concurrency now exists between development and production
that covers the period from fiscal years 2004 to 2010. The Air Force
now plans to invest in almost half of the total RQ-4B fleet before a
production model is flight-tested and operational evaluations are
completed to show that the air vehicle design works as required. Full-
rate production will begin before the airborne signals intelligence and
multiplatform radar complete development and are flight-tested to prove
the integrated system will work as intended. The primary reason for
building the RQ-4B model was to integrate and carry the advanced
sensors to provide added capability to the warfighter. Additionally,
schedule delays have already occurred in the restructured plan that
will continue to add pressure in the program.
Collectively, the actions to restructure the program have materially
changed the underpinnings in the original business case decision
developed to justify the start of system development and low-rate
production. The business case should provide sufficient evidence that
resources are available to meet warfighter needs. This case would
include technology and design demonstrations that added confidence that
the integrated product can be developed within time and money
constraints. The original plan was to first acquire basic RQ-4A systems
very similar to the demonstrators and then slowly and incrementally
develop and acquire systems with more advanced sensor capabilities
while using the same air vehicle. This strategy incorporated an
evolutionary approach in that a basic capability was to be produced in
a first block of aircraft and a second, more advanced block was to be
acquired once the new technologies were mature. Each block had separate
decision points and testing plans and significant risk was removed from
the program because the demonstrators had been built, tested, and
extensively flown (and later used successfully in actual combat
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq). While testing showed it needed
some improvements, the RQ-4A was significantly more mature and proven
than the RQ-4B model to begin production.
Figure 3 illustrates the significantly greater concurrency of
development and production activities resulting from the program's
restructuring compared with the original plan. Historically, programs
with high degrees of concurrency are at greater risk of cost, schedule,
and performance problems than programs with less overlap of development
and production. The original acquisition strategy planned to complete
most development testing prior to beginning production, thereby taking
advantage of product knowledge. The restructured program added the new
RQ-4B model, substantially increased low-rate production quantities,
and established highly concurrent development and production cycles to
acquire and test several different RQ-4B configurations over the life
of the program. The Air Force plans to invest in 20 RQ-4Bs before
completion of initial operational test and evaluation. The reason for
designing a larger and heavier Global Hawk was to satisfy warfighter
needs for the new advanced sensors. However, integration and
operational testing of the advanced sensors on the fully configured air
vehicle are not scheduled to be completed and reported on until fiscal
year 2009 for the advanced signal intelligence sensor and fiscal year
2011 for the multiplatform radar. By this time, the entire RQ-4B fleet
will already be produced or on order.
Figure 3: Restructured 2004 Plan Is Highly Concurrent Compared with
Original Global Hawk Plan:
[See PDF for image]
Note: In this figure, development includes both technology and system
development.
[End of figure]
Restructured Program Added Requirements and Increased Costs:
Global Hawk's development cost estimates have increased almost
threefold, from $906.2 million in March 2001 to about $2.6 billion in
March 2004, mostly due to the requirement for the new RQ-4B's inclusion
in the program. Total program costs have continued to increase,
including an increase of $466 million since March 2003. The program
acquisition unit cost increased 44 percent since program start, from
$85.6 million to $123.2 million. Increasing costs for Global Hawk
raises affordability issues and questions about employing the vehicle
in medium-and high-threat environments because of its high replacement
costs and limited numbers. Total procurement cost estimates decreased
from program start due to the cut in quantities from 63 to 51 and
inflation savings resulting from compressing the program and cutting 9
years of future procurement activities. Table 2 shows how costs have
changed since March 2001 in millions of then-year dollars.
Table 2: Global Hawk Program's Cost, Quantity, and Unit Costs:
Total cost[A]: Development;
March 2001 (original plan): $906.2;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): $2,311.0;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): $2,395.6;
March 2004 (status this year): $2,587.9.
Total cost[A]: Procurement;
March 2001 (original plan): $4,459.8;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): $4,388.9;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): $3,278.5;
March 2004 (status this year): $3,552.2.
Total cost[A]: Military construction;
March 2001 (original plan): $28.0;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): $146.7;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): $140.8;
March 2004 (status this year): $140.8.
Total program;
March 2001 (original plan): $5,394.0;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): $6,846.6;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): $5,814.9;
March 2004 (status this year): $6,280.9.
Quantity: Air vehicles;
March 2001 (original plan): 63;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): 51;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): 51;
March 2004 (status this year): 51.
Quantity: Ground stations;
March 2001 (original plan): 14;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): 10;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): 10;
March 2004 (status this year): 10.
Unit costs[A,B]: Total program;
March 2001 (original plan): $85.6;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): $134.2;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): $114.0;
March 2004 (status this year): $123.2.
Unit costs[A,B]: Procurement only;
March 2001 (original plan): $70.8;
March 2002 (1st restructuring): $86.0;
March 2003 (2nd restructuring): $64.2;
March 2004 (status this year): $69.6.
Sources: Air Force (data); GAO (analysis).
[A] All costs are expressed in millions of then-year dollars, which
include inflation and represent the Air Force's budget plans.
[B] Total program unit cost is calculated by dividing the total cost of
development, procurement, and system-specific military construction
for the acquisition program by the quantity of air vehicles to be
produced. Procurement unit cost is the total amount for procurement
divided by the number of air vehicles to be procured. It does not
include costs for development and military construction.
[End of table]
The following factors caused the Global Hawk program's cost estimates
to change between 2001 and 2004:
* March 2001 cost estimate: Based on the original acquisition strategy
to slowly and incrementally develop and acquire improved versions of
the demonstrator model. The RQ-4B model was not yet part of the
acquisition strategy.
* March 2002 cost estimate: Reflects changes for the first
restructuring of the program, which introduced the RQ-4B. Development
costs increased significantly because of plans to quickly build
advanced capabilities into the RQ-4B. While the quantity of air
vehicles--the RQ-4A and RQ-4B models--and ground stations decreased
because of revised user requirements, total procurement costs increased
because of the higher cost for the RQ-4Bs and the plan at that time to
equip all the larger platforms with multi-intelligence mission
capabilities.
* March 2003 cost estimate: Reflects a second restructuring for
affordability reasons. In December 2002, DOD officials decided to
switch from all multimission capabilities to a mix of multimission
and single-mission RQ-4Bs. This switch lowered procurement costs by
decreasing the required number of sensors.
* March 2004 cost estimate: Between March 2003 and March 2004,
total program cost increased by $466 million, and officials added
another 18 months to the development program to accomplish requirements
deferred from prior years and to accommodate new requirements.
Development costs increased to cover the extended schedule and
additional requirements. Procurement costs increased primarily because
of higher costs for structural components and for labor to build the
RQ-4B.
Restructured Program Has Created Other New Challenges:
Space, weight, and power constraints of the RQ-4B limit what
capabilities can be included now or added in the future. Some
capabilities have already been eliminated or deferred to later years.
For example, the warfighter wanted a defensive subsystem for Global
Hawk, but development has been delayed and may be dropped because of
weight limitations in the air vehicle, already at or near capacity with
some of the new advanced sensor payloads. Also, the RQ-4B configured
with the airborne signals intelligence payload is projected to have no
capacity for future growth because this payload weighs more than
allocated in the design of the air vehicle. Other development tasks
have similarly been delayed or pushed out beyond the budget years,
including efforts related to demonstrating that Global Hawk can operate
in areas with extreme temperatures.
The Air Force's overall acquisition approach to add new technologies
whenever they are deemed ready was designed to allow flexibility in
responding to changes in priorities and new requirements. However,
Global Hawk's vehicle limitations and changing requirements have
increased development challenges. For example, despite the space,
weight, and power limitations of the RQ-4B, Air Force officials stated
that Global Hawk users and other DOD officials continue to identify
potential future technologies and capabilities for possible
incorporation into Global Hawk. Absent major downsizing of the advanced
sensors or other payloads, the Air Force will need to consider
dedicating the RQ-4B to an increasing number of single and specific--
rather than multi-intelligence--missions, if the goal is to utilize new
and unproven emerging technologies not currently part of the Global
Hawk plan.
Delays in Key Events Since Restructuring Can Impact Delivery of New
Capability:
The new schedule for some key events and activities has slipped because
of programmatic, budget, or external issues. Air Force and contractor
officials say that a significant contributor to schedule delays was the
episodic deployment of Global Hawk's earlier model in Afghanistan and
Iraq. The Global Hawk system--including considerable numbers of Air
Force and contractor personnel, ground stations, and supporting
equipment--has been used to support combat operations and is subject to
future deployment orders.
Some examples of program events that have been delayed and others whose
future schedules have slipped include:
* government acceptance of the second RQ-4A production aircraft due to
quality and performance problems identified during tests;
* delivery of the equipment and support needed to begin initial
operations at the Global Hawk's home base, Beale Air Force Base in
California;
* the operational assessment of the RQ-4A;
* completion of the first phase of combined developmental and
operational testing of Global Hawk;
* acquisition of production tooling, establishing manufacturing
processes, and delivering parts needed for production;
* delivery schedules projected for RQ-4B air vehicles; and:
* the expected start of initial operational test and evaluation to
support the full-rate production decision.
Delays and deficiencies in scheduled development testing could
compromise upcoming decisions in the program. According to test
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the first of five
phases of Global Hawk's combined development and operational testing is
not as robust as originally planned and is taking significantly longer
than expected. As of July 2004, only about 10 percent of the required
flight test points had been completed and nearly 70 percent of the
remaining test points were either on hold or not fully defined. The
approved test plan required this testing to be completed by September
2004, but testing officials do not expect it to be completed until
March 2005. Test delays are occurring due to late delivery of key
subsystems, lack of resources, deployments in support of the global war
on terrorism, other program priorities, and unexpected testing
problems. Test officials told us that the lack of quality test data is
hampering their ability to provide meaningful oversight.
The results from this first phase of development testing were to be
used in the operational assessment of the first two production RQ-4A
aircraft starting in September 2004 to assess the Global Hawk's mission
readiness and suitability. Because of phase one delays, the start of
the assessment has slipped until at least March 2005. Test officials
believe further delays are likely because of other higher priorities,
including the start-up activities at Beale Air Force Base. At this
time, a firm date for the testing has not been scheduled and the
unapproved test plan still lacks the necessary details to ensure
effective testing. Test officials believe the operational assessment is
in jeopardy of being cancelled or cut back in order to start the
dedicated initial operational test and evaluation on time. The
officials say that eliminating the operational assessment, or reducing
its scope, would add risk to the program. Entering the next phase
involves testing the new, larger RQ-4B aircraft and advanced sensor
payloads, and, without having the assurances the production aircraft
are mission-ready, additional tests will likely be required.
Global Hawk Program's Current Management Approach Sets Stage for
Additional Risks:
In attempting to get advanced capabilities to the warfighter sooner,
the Air Force's restructured acquisition strategy for the Global Hawk
program does not fully follow best practices and DOD acquisition
guidance for an evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition process. DOD
recently rewrote its acquisition policy specifically to encourage
acquisitions to develop and deliver increased capability to the
warfighter incrementally (or on an evolutionary basis), only when
appropriate knowledge concerning technology, design, and manufacturing
has been attained. Compared with the original strategy, the new Global
Hawk acquisition strategy has yielded less product knowledge in each of
these areas, thereby raising the likelihood of future negative impacts
on cost, schedule, and performance. Air Force and contractor officials
acknowledge that--with its highly compressed and concurrent schedule--
the program is risky and presents major management challenges. The Air
Force has established management controls and processes intended to
mitigate risks; however, without a disciplined process to capture and
base investment decisions on key technology, design, and manufacturing
knowledge, the controls are less robust and the risks remain high.
Restructured Acquisition Strategy Does Not Fully Capture Product
Knowledge at Key Decision Points:
By approving the start of system development and low-rate production at
the same time, Global Hawk's restructured acquisition strategy skipped
the critical decision points that require the capture of key product
knowledge used to inform decisions to move forward in an acquisition
program. Skipping the necessary steps to capture technology, design,
and manufacturing knowledge has added risk to the program. The Air
Force would have captured more knowledge under the original March 2001
strategy, which more closely followed the knowledge-based approach.
At that time, the plan was to acquire basic air vehicles and ground
systems very similar to the demonstrators that had already been built,
extensively flown, and (later) used in combat. The Air Force then
planned to upgrade sensor and performance capabilities for the next
production lot as the technologies matured while retaining the same
airframe. Since the decision to start the program, additional
information and experience have closed some of the gaps, but a
substantial lack of knowledge continues to add risk to the RQ-4B
acquisition.
GAO has a body of work focused on best practices in product development
and weapon systems acquisition.[Footnote 5] We have found that when
program managers capture key product knowledge at three critical
knowledge points during a major acquisition, the probability of meeting
expected performance within cost and schedule objectives increases.
Each of the points builds on previously attained knowledge. The
acquired knowledge is used to identify and reduce any risks before
moving a weapon system to the next stage of development. This approach
to developing new products--commercial and defense--has been shown over
time to continually produce successful outcomes in terms of cost,
schedule, and performance.
In recent years, DOD revised its acquisition policy to embrace an
evolutionary and knowledge-based approach, which we believe provides a
sound framework for the acquisition of major weapon systems. This
policy covers most of DOD's major acquisition programs. As noted in our
November 2003 report,[Footnote 6] this revised policy is a step in the
right direction. The acquisition policy states that program managers
shall provide knowledge about the key aspects of the system at key
decision points in the acquisition process[Footnote 7] and an
evolutionary or incremental development approach should be used to
establish a more manageable environment for attaining and applying
knowledge. The customer may not get the ultimate capability right away,
but the initial product is available sooner and at a lower cost. The
policy adopts the essence of the following points from the knowledge-
based approach:
* Knowledge point 1: Should occur when the acquisition program is
scheduled to start, when the customer's requirements are clearly
defined, and resources--proven technology, engineering capability,
time, and money--exist to satisfy them. This match should support the
business case for starting system development and demonstration.
Technology should be mature before starting a program, and, therefore,
the technology development phase of an acquisition should be separate
from the system development phase.
* Knowledge point 2: Should occur at the design readiness review,
about halfway through the system development phase, when the product's
design is determined to be capable of meeting product requirements--the
design is stable and ready to begin initial manufacturing of
prototypes.
* Knowledge point 3: Should occur when managers commit to starting
production, when information is available to determine that a reliable
product can be produced repeatedly within established cost, schedule,
and manufacturing quality targets.
Figure 4 shows a generalized depiction of DOD's acquisition policy,
where DOD's key milestones are anchored along a typical program's
acquisition path and where the three knowledge points from the
knowledge-based approach fit along this path. Also shown in figure 4 is
how the Global Hawk program overlaps technology and system development
and begins production before the necessary knowledge is achieved.
Figure 4: Global Hawk Program Is Not Fully Aligned with DOD's
Acquisition Policy and Knowledge-Based Approach:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Global Hawk's new strategy approved initial production of the improved
RQ-4B well in advance of completing technology maturation and approved
developing and integrating the vehicle's design with the various sensor
payloads desired by the warfighter. Furthermore, low-rate production
was approved without ensuring the quality and reliability of
manufacturing processes. This approach added significant risk in that
sensor technologies and final design may not meet the space, weight,
and power limitations of the RQ-4B, which is in low-rate production,
and may not satisfy the warfighter's requirements. By not closing
knowledge gaps in the integrated product design (air vehicle, sensor
payloads, and data links) needed to meet requirements, there is
increased risk that sensor development schedules may need to be
extended to achieve form, fit, and function for an integrated Global
Hawk system. Otherwise, the program office may have to go back to the
warfighter and further negotiate requirements. Table 3 compares the
product knowledge available to support key decision points under the
original plan in March 2001 with the knowledge obtained at the start of
RQ-4B production in July 2004. A black dot indicates product knowledge
meets best practice standards from knowledge-based approach.
Table 3: How Global Hawk Product Knowledge Compares with Three Critical
Points in the Knowledge-Based Approach:
Global Hawk program status:
Date: March 2001;
Status: At combined system development and limited production decision
for RQ-4A;
Date: July 2004;
Status: At start of RQ-4B production for basic RQ-4B air vehicle design
with limited signals intelligence.
Three critical points of knowledge-based approach and best practice
standards:
Knowledge point 1: Technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment, and the producer has completed a preliminary design of the
product.
Technologies matured to high readiness levels;
Date: March 2001: Yes;
Date: July 2004; No.
Preliminary design established;
Date: March 2001: Yes;
Date: July 2004; Yes.
Knowledge point 2: Design is stable and has been demonstrated through
prototype testing. Ninety percent of engineering drawings releasable to
manufacturing organizations.
90 percent of engineering drawings released;
Date: March 2001: Yes;
Date: July 2004: [A].
Prototype demonstration that design should meet requirements;
Date: March 2001: Yes;
Date: July 2004: [B].
Reliability targets and growth curve established;
Date: March 2001: No;
Date: July 2004; No.
Knowledge point 3: Product is ready to be manufactured within cost,
schedule, and quality targets. All key manufacturing processes have
come under statistical process control and product reliability has been
demonstrated.
Fully integrated system representative prototype demonstrated to work
in operational environment;
Date: March 2001: Yes;
Date: July 2004; No.
Critical processes capable and in statistical control;
Date: March 2001: No;
Date: July 2004; No.
Reliability demonstrated;
Date: March 2001: No;
Date: July 2004; No.
Sources: Air Force (data); GAO (analysis).
Note: A black dot (*) indicates product knowledge meets best practice
standards from knowledge-based approach.
[A] 75 percent of drawings released at design readiness review in April
2004.
[B] System representative prototype will not be built. Since the basic
design evolved from RQ-4A, the Air Force and contractor are conducting
modeling efforts and component tests, such as wind tunnel testing of
the new wing, to validate that the RQ-4B air vehicle design should meet
requirements.
[End of table]
The table shows that the level of product knowledge approached best
practice standards when the decision was made in March 2001 to start
system development and low-rate production of the RQ-4A. The program's
restructurings in 2002, however, created substantial gaps in
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge that have not yet been
closed by the start of RQ-4B production. Lack of product knowledge
increases risks of poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes.
Appendix III includes a more detailed discussion of knowledge gaps at
each knowledge point. Following are brief examples of knowledge gaps as
they relate to each of the three critical knowledge points.
Technology maturity: Using best practices, at the start of system
development, a program's critical technologies should be in the form,
fit, and function needed for the intended product and should be
demonstrated in a realistic environment. The RQ-4B development program
is struggling to meet these criteria for several of its most critical
technologies. Nearly 2 years after development began, the technologies
required for the RQ-4B to perform its operational mission including
enhanced imaging sensors, signals intelligence, multiplatform radar,
and open system architecture are immature, basically at a functional
rather than form or fit configuration. For example, the airborne
signals intelligence payload and multiplatform radar technology
insertion program are still in development under separate Air Force
programs. These subsystems are key to providing the advanced
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for which
the RQ-4B is being developed. At the time of our review, neither of
these technologies had been demonstrated in an operational environment
using a system prototype. Air Force officials expect them to be mature
by the time they begin buying sensors to incorporate them into the
Global Hawk production line in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. However, by
this time most of the air vehicles will have already been bought. Also,
operational testing to evaluate performance in a realistic operating
environment is not scheduled until late fiscal year 2008 for the
signals intelligence sensor and late 2010 for the radar. Nevertheless,
the Air Force continues to build the RQ-4B platform lacking solid
assurance that these critical subsystems will work as planned.
Design maturity: The program had completed 75 percent of RQ-4B model
drawings by the design readiness review in comparison with the 90
percent completion standard for best practices. While the Air Force
anticipated the design and experience on the RQ-4A would add assurances
and speed efforts to mature the new RQ-4B design, the two vehicles
ultimately had only about 10 percent commonality. While drawings
completed were approaching best practice standards, the Air Force did
not build a prototype of the RQ-4B design to demonstrate a stable
design. Demonstration of the design is a key factor in ensuring a
stable design. The Air Force had not established a reliability growth
goal or plan and had not identified critical manufacturing processes,
both essential to the next phase of production and needed to ensure
quality and cost targets can be met.
Production maturity: Officials have started to identify the critical
manufacturing processes for the RQ-4B but do not intend to collect and
use statistical process control data to ensure the manufacturing could
deliver quality products. The new RQ-4B requires new manufacturing
processes because of major differences from the RQ-4A. In addition,
Officials from the program office, the prime contractor, and the
Defense Contract Management Agency continue to identify problems and
concerns about the performance and quality of work by several key
subcontractors, including those producing the wing, the advanced sensor
suite, and the vertical tail and aft fuselage parts. This latter
subcontractor is new to large-scale manufacturing using advanced
composite materials and has experienced significant start-up and
quality problems. According to best practices, the subcontractor's
critical processes must be demonstrated to ensure good quality and
limit rework. The prime contractor and DOD sent special teams of
advisors to help develop the firm's manufacturing processes and to
train employees. Creating another gap in production maturity, a fully
integrated system representative prototype was not tested before
starting production and will not have been demonstrated before full-
rate production, scheduled in 2007. By then, 45 percent of the RQ-4B
planned quantities will be under contract.
Joint Efforts Will Help Manage Risk in the Global Hawk Program:
Air Force and contractor officials agree that the restructured program
significantly increased program and technical risks. They acknowledge
that the use of the approach to insert technology periodically affects
all aspects of the program, making it more challenging to manage
functional areas, including logistics support, contracting, program
integration, and testing. To better manage the risks and challenges
created by this acquisition approach and environment, the Global Hawk
management team provided the following as examples of actions they are
taking:
* better teaming practices between the government and contractor to
manage the program at all levels;
* better controls for the release of funds on both development and
production contracts;
* allocation of higher amounts of management reserve funding during
contract performance;
* use of a "buy to budget" concept that limits activity in the program
to a ceiling amount of funds planned for the total program; and:
* use of a risk management database to focus the attention of
management on the most critical risks facing the program.
These are all management practices that can be used to manage any
product development program and will likely identify and help manage
risks in the Global Hawk program. Nevertheless, using a knowledge-based
approach that captures critical knowledge at key junctures in a program
has been shown time and again in both commercial and defense
acquisition programs to consistently produce successful outcomes--
cost, schedule, quality, and performance.
Conclusions:
In March 2001, DOD approved the start of development and production for
Global Hawk on the basis of a business case that matched requirements
with resources--technologies, engineering capabilities, time, and
funding. The first increment of Global Hawk was based on mature
technologies and a design proven to meet the warfighter's need through
actual combat use of the technology demonstrator. The plan included a
reasonable funding profile and embraced a knowledge-based acquisition
strategy that completed development before entering production. The
plan included future improvements to the baseline capability as
technologies and funding became available. By December 2002, the Air
Force had dramatically changed the Global Hawk's acquisition plan and
the knowledge-based foundation for the earlier decision to proceed into
development and production. This change created large gaps between
Global Hawk's requirements and the resources available to meet them.
The new plan required a new, larger, and heavier air vehicle with only
10 percent commonality with the previous proven design; increased
development time; and accelerated production time, creating significant
concurrency between development and production. To accommodate the
changes, the plan calls for twice the annual funding amounts in peak
years over the old plan. Overall, the new plan has increased risks
significantly. Subsequent reviews by DOD have acknowledged the changes
in the program have increased uncertainty. The new design has not been
demonstrated to work using a prototype model; technologies to support
the advanced sensor payloads that drove the need for a new Global Hawk
design are still immature; and the Air Force will be requesting about
$750 million in funding next year for the program. Yet, the Air Force
has awarded a contract to start the production of the new, larger
Global Hawk B model with the hope that simulations and analysis will be
sufficient to allow decision makers to manage risk. The history of DOD
managed programs suggests otherwise.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To decrease risks of poor outcomes and to increase the chances of
delivering required warfighter capabilities with the funds available,
we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to take the
following two actions:
* direct the Air Force to revisit the decision to begin concurrent
development and production of the Global Hawk B design and direct the
Air Force to create and present a new business case that defines the
warfighter's needs that can be accommodated given current available
resources of technology, engineering capability, time, and money, and:
* delay further procurement of the Global Hawk B, other than units
needed for testing, until a new business case is completed that reduces
risk and justifies further investments based on a knowledge-based
acquisition strategy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments appear in appendix II. DOD stated that it did not concur with
our two recommendations. Separately, DOD provided one technical comment
that we incorporated in this report to more accurately characterize the
issue of affordability and use of Global Hawks in threat conditions.
Regarding our first recommendation on completing a new business case to
justify and guide concurrent development and production of the RQ-4B
model, DOD stated its belief that the Global Hawk's acquisition
strategy balances acquisition risks with the department's demands to
rapidly field new capabilities to the warfighter, thereby obviating the
need for a new business case. Furthermore, by following what officials
call an evolutionary development process, DOD said it is providing
transformational warfighting capabilities to ongoing military
operations without disrupting Global Hawk's current development and
production activities. DOD said it is effectively managing risk with
the help of regular oversight meetings and by requiring monthly and
quarterly activity reports.
We continue to believe that a new business case is needed to support
further investments and to improve oversight by Congress and DOD
decision makers. The program today is much different than the one
supported by the original business case. The Air Force started with an
advanced concept technology demonstration program that proved the
capability of a smaller and lighter Global Hawk air vehicle. Use of
this vehicle on numerous occasions in actual combat situations has
saved lives, according to Air Force and contractor officials. However,
this is not the vehicle that the Air Force now plans to produce.
Instead, the Air Force dramatically changed the acquisition strategy
for the Global Hawk program and is not gaining some key knowledge
before production. The Air Force plans to concurrently design and
produce a new Global Hawk air vehicle that is significantly larger and
heavier than the earlier version used in combat. The larger air vehicle
is intended to accommodate new, heavier, and larger sensors that will
not be available until the 2008 to 2009 time frame. In implementing the
restructured strategy, the Air Force is not fully following a
knowledge-based approach for developing the RQ-4B Global Hawk as called
for by best practices and DOD's new defense acquisition guidance. The
new guidance clearly states that knowledge reduces risks, and we agree.
While the Air Force believes it can manage the risk of a concurrent
development and production program by holding regular meetings with
acquisition executives and by issuing management reports, DOD's own
experience has shown this to be risky and a factor that led DOD to
change its acquisition policy to a knowledge-based approach. History
has shown concurrency usually delays the delivery of a needed
capability and results in higher costs. From March 2003 to March 2004,
estimated program costs have increased by $466 million, and the sensors
and the new air vehicle are still being developed. Stepping back from
this rush to produce the new air vehicle and establishing a new
business case designed to capture key product knowledge before costly
investments in production would better inform DOD decision makers and
Congress about what is feasible with available technology and dollar
resources to meet warfighter needs and to better assess the extent and/
or severity of program acquisition risks.
Regarding our second recommendation to delay further procurement of the
RQ-4B (other than units needed for testing) until a new knowledge-based
and risk-reducing business case is prepared, DOD stated that its
current acquisition strategy effectively manages risk and fosters the
rapid delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. DOD said we
overstated risks from RQ-4B development, design changes, and insertion
of advanced sensor capabilities. DOD further stated that our
recommendation would result in a production break with serious cost and
schedule complications and that GAO's sequential knowledge-based
approach does not consider real-world events, such as the September 11,
2001, terrorist attack in the United States or issues related to North
Korea and Iraq.
We believe the risks in the Global Hawk program are real and continue
to support delaying the near-term procurement of air vehicles not
needed for testing. We think this is a prudent way for the program to
gain knowledge before significantly increased resource investments and
to reduce risks until a new air vehicle integrated with the advanced
signals intelligence payload and the multiplatform radar can be
demonstrated through testing to meet warfighter requirements. Our
report notes that operational testing of the air vehicle's performance
and suitability will not take place until almost half the fleet is
already purchased and that integration and testing of the advanced
sensors will not occur until late in the program after the full-rate
production decision is made and most systems are bought. DOD's comments
appear to decouple the air vehicle from the advanced sensors by stating
that, if a sensor diverges from its current plan, alternate future
payloads could fill the RQ-4B's greater payload capacity. However, the
need for designing a new larger air vehicle was predicated on its
ability to carry these specific sensors to meet the warfighter's
requirements. Therefore, we believe that knowledge based on a
demonstration of the integrated capability is key to supporting
production and delivery of the product within estimated cost and
schedule. Additionally, the new Global Hawk program strategy requires
significantly greater amounts of funding earlier, putting that
investment at risk should changes occur as development and testing is
completed.
Regarding a potential break in production, our analysis indicates that
a break is neither impending nor certain if our recommendation were
adopted. We are not recommending that DOD stop production or reduce the
total quantity but rather a near-term delay in procuring the portion of
annual buys for air vehicles not needed for testing. Funds currently on
contract and approved appropriations for fiscal year 2005 would
continue production on the Air Force's planned schedule through mid-
fiscal year 2007 at least. Only then would a production break or
slowdown happen, and only if the Air Force has not yet prepared a
business case to justify its investments beyond that point based on
demonstrated product knowledge of the new air vehicle. If the current
acquisition strategy and financial plan are feasible and appropriate,
the Air Force would be able to prepare and justify a comprehensive
business plan for the RQ-4B well in advance of a potential break.
DOD indicated that our knowledge-based acquisition approach was
untimely and not adaptive to fast-changing world events. When we
developed the knowledge-based approach, our high priority was to focus
on better ways to deliver capability to the warfighter more quickly
through incremental, or evolutionary, development. Our approach is
based on a careful study of historical DOD acquisition programs and the
best efforts in the private sector. Our prior work shows that
proceeding without requisite knowledge ultimately costs programs more
money and takes longer to complete than those adopting a more rigorous
and comprehensive strategy basing investment decisions on key product
knowledge--technology, design, and production maturity levels. DOD
agreed with our findings and changed its acquisition guidance to
reflect a knowledge-based approach. We note in this report that the
original Global Hawks were produced through a successful demonstration
program that effectively and quickly provided the warfighter with
transformational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities. Defense Contract Management Agency reports, contract cost
reports, corporate briefings, design drawing changes, new tooling and
new production processes, and the evident need for Air Force and prime
contractor task teams to be extensively deployed to subcontractor
facilities, all indicate that the RQ-4B program entails higher degrees
of risk, greater management challenges, and significant changes from
production of the RQ-4A and earlier demonstrators.
We believe that our recommendation to delay further procurement of the
RQ-4B until a new knowledge-based and risk-reducing business case is
prepared prudently balances real-world internal investment risks with
military demands from real-world external events. The Air Force could
have continued to deliver the capability of the Global Hawk that was
the direct outgrowth of the demonstration program while allowing the
sensor and radar technology time to mature before investing in a new
larger and more risky Global Hawk program. This would have allowed
continued delivery of the enhanced RQ-4A capability to the warfighter
while minimizing the impacts of design changes that come out of normal
development and testing and that grow more costly as a product enters
the production environment. The heavy cost of design changes after
production is underway could impact DOD's ability to respond to other
warfighter needs in the post-9/11 world.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be available on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4163 or Michael J. Hazard at (937) 258-7917.
Other staff making key contributions to this report were Lily J. Chin,
Bruce D. Fairbairn, Steven M. Hunter, Matthew B. Lea, Charlie Shivers,
and Adam Vodraska.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director (Acting):
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the effects of Global Hawk's restructuring on cost,
schedule, and performance goals, we compared the original acquisition
strategy, two major revisions, and the current acquisition strategy as
implemented. We identified changes in cost, quantity, fleet
composition, and sensor capability mixes as well as overall
consequences of restructuring on total funding requirements, annual
budget requests, and program cycles for developing, testing, and
producing the Global Hawk. We reviewed management plans, cost reports,
contract files, progress briefings, and risk data to identify program
execution efforts and results to date. We identified cost changes,
schedule delays, and performance issues.
To evaluate whether the current acquisition approach can help forestall
risks, we applied GAO's methodology for assessing risks in major weapon
systems. This methodology is derived from the best practices and
experiences of leading commercial firms and successful defense
acquisition programs. We reviewed program office and prime contractor
organizations, processes, and management actions. We extracted and
evaluated program and technical risks maintained in a risk database
used by the program office and contractor to identify major risks and
the steps taken to mitigate risks. We compared the program office's
plans and results to date against best practice standards in achieving
product knowledge in terms of technology, design, and production
maturity information and in applying knowledge to support major program
decisions. We identified gaps in product knowledge, reasons
contributing to those gaps, and the elevated risks expected as a
consequence of inadequate product knowledge. We further analyzed
original and current acquisition approaches to demonstrate the high
concurrency of development, production, and testing and the elevated
risks imposed as a result.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed
officials from the Global Hawk System Program Office, Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base, Ohio; 452nd Flight Test Squadron, Air Force Flight Test
Center, and Detachment 5, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center, Edwards Air Force Base, CA; Defense Contract Management Agency,
San Diego and Palmdale, CA; Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems, Rancho
Bernardo and Palmdale, CA; and offices of the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Planning Office, which
are part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C.
We conducted our work from February to September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
[OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
OCT 19 2004:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition
Strategy Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks," dated September 17, 2004
(GAO Code 120296/GAO-05-6).
The DoD non-concurs with the draft report's recommendations. The
Department is using the spiral development process to produce Global
Hawk. This process allows risks to be understood and effectively
managed. The GAO's more sequential development, test, analyze, and
procurement process would delay, by several years, capabilities proven
through our spiral development process, and increase overall program
cost. The rationale for the DoD's position is attached.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further
questions concerning this report, please contact Dyke Weatherington,
Deputy, UAV Planning Task Force, 703-695-6188.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated September 17, 2004 GAO CODE 120296/GAO-05-6:
"UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: CHANGES IN GLOBAL HAWK'S ACQUISITION
STARTEGY ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE PROGRAM RISKS"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Air Force to revisit the decision to begin concurrent
development and production of the Global Hawk "B" design. The GAO
recommends that the direction should be for the Air Force to create and
present a new business case that defines the warfighter's need and can
be accommodated given current available resources of technology,
engineering capability, time, and money (p. 18/GAO Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Non-concur. The Global Hawk's evolutionary acquisition
strategy balances acquisition risk with military need. The Department's
intent is to rapidly field war-winning capability through the use of
risk management as opposed to risk avoidance. As such, the business
case that links the acquisition strategy to the warfighter's need is
appropriate for this program.
By using the spiral development process, the Global Hawk program will
achieve Initial Operating Capability approximately five years after
program initiation, fielding even greater capability than initially
planned. In addition, this process has enabled the Department to
provide transformational war-winning capability (using Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) aircraft and ground stations)
to on-going military operations without significant disruptions to on-
going development and production activities. The GAO's more sequential
development, test, analyze, and procurement process would delay, by
several years, capabilities already proven through our spiral
development process, and increase overall program cost.
The Department effectively manages Global Hawk program risk through
regular oversight meetings with the Milestone Decision Authority (three
in the last four years, with another planned for 2005), annual Selected
Acquisition Reports, quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary
reports, and Monthly Activity Reports to the Service Acquisition
Executive.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
delay further procurement of the Global Hawk "B", other than units
needed for testing, until a new business case that reduces risk by
using a knowledge-based acquisition strategy to justify further
investment, is completed (p. 18/GAO Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The Department is effectively mitigating risk
as it migrates from the single-intelligence RQ-4A configuration to the
larger, multiple-intelligence RQ-4B configuration. The GAO asserts that
without following its sequential knowledge-based approach (technology
maturity, design maturity, production maturity), the Global Hawk
program proceeds without the necessary knowledge to effectively manage
risk. Global Hawk's spiral development acquisition strategy in fact
fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation, and is
designed to include the necessary controls the Department considers
essential to manage program risk, achieve effective program results,
and continue delivering transformational war-winning capability to on-
going military operations.
The report incorrectly characterizes RQ-4B development risk. The RQ-4B
is a larger configuration of the successful RQ-4A airframe. This is an
evolutionary design change, and not a new airframe as the GAO asserts.
The Department's seven ACTD and four production RQ-4A aircraft provide
significantly improved "knowledge-based decision points" for the RQ-4B
configurations. Over 4,960 RQ-4A flight hours, extensive RQ-4B wind
tunnel data, and other testing results reflect a level of airframe
knowledge more representative of a configuration update than a new
airframe development. The Department verified the RQ-4A design model
through flight-testing and then used it for RQ-4B design validation.
While the redesign work represents a significant amount of effort, the
aircraft updates are not technically challenging. The RQ-4B uses a
larger wing (with the same airfoil), larger V-tail, slightly longer
fuselage, and the same RQ-4A engine - the prime contractor successfully
performed all of these design tasks for the RQ-4A, and, again, they are
not technically challenging.
The report incorrectly relates the number of changed engineering
drawings to the level of redesign complexity. The number of updated
drawings is as much influenced by configuration management
administrative requirements as by actual redesign effort. Risks
associated with the RQ-4B's design and manufacturing preparations have
been mitigated. The prime contractor's confidence in building the RQ-4B
was demonstrated when they accepted a firm fixed price production
contract for the first RQ-4B lot.
The report also inaccurately assumes that the RQ-4B aircraft, and the
Advanced Signals Intelligence Program (ASIP) and Multi-Platform Radar
Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) sensors, must all succeed on
schedule or the program will fail. The Department takes exception to
this high-risk characterization. Should a sensor program diverge from
its current plan, the more likely course of action would reflect
effective oversight and action. The RQ-4B's payload capacity is a
valuable resource for planned and alternate future payloads. If
necessary, payload configurations can be adjusted to balance risk,
resources, and military need.
While not addressed in detail, the report's evaluation of the two
advanced sensor programs - MP-RTIP and ASIP - appears out of step with
our understanding of the technical and programmatic risks. The
Department agrees that related and major acquisition programs pose
significant acquisition management challenges. We have accepted that
challenge as the price of fielding technologically superior weapon
systems. Fielding the RQ-4B with the MP-RTIP and ASIP capabilities on a
realistic schedule will require continued, coordinated and
comprehensive management oversight by the Department.
The MP-RTIP program fully addresses the risks associated with a major
sensor development effort. The report overstates risk related to this
new radar capability. In particular, the Department's December 2002
program approval ensures significant ground and flight test activity
occurs before production decisions are made. The close management and
technical working arrangement of the Global Hawk and MP-RTIP
contractors ensures that critical platform and radar interface
definitions are established at the earliest date possible to produce
the maximum synergy. Additionally, as a risk reduction move, MP-RTIP
will first be integrated and flown in a Global Hawk configuration on
the Proteus in FY07, a high altitude manned aircraft. This activity is
specifically designed to reduce risk for integration onto the Global
Hawk.
The ASIP acquisition is managed by an office dedicated to developing
and deploying multiple sensor and electronic payloads in a variety of
aircraft. The ASIP sensor evolved from a previous successful signals
intelligence payload and is an evolutionary acquisition of that
technology. The ASIP and Global Hawk programs benefit from being
organized into the same Capability Wing within AFMC and housed in the
same building. This close association results in better harmonization
of program requirements and development than reported. ASIP will first
be integrated and flown on the high altitude U-2 manned aircraft in the
summer FY07. This affords the Global Hawk program another significant
risk reduction step for this system.
The report recommendation results in a production break without
addressing impacts of that action. In fact, the Department has
determined a production break would have a significant negative impact
in cost and capability. The contractor's rough estimate of the
quantifiable impact is about $400 million (then year dollars). Not
included in this rough estimate is the likely catastrophic financial
impact to small business vendors and subcontractors, and costs to
mothball and restart production facilities. The United States could
lose its leadership role in strategic unmanned aerial vehicles as
multiple interested foreign partners would likely look to themselves,
or elsewhere, for a more reliable source. Finally, delaying or stopping
production of the RQ-4B creates a gap for the warfighter by delaying
the fielding of critical IMINT and SIGINT capability to the warfighter.
The negative impact of this capability loss is also not addressed in
the report.
Finally, the report's sequential, knowledge-based approach does not
consider real world, external environmental inputs such as 9/11, North
Korea, and Iraq. The Department selected the Global Hawk program as a
transformational weapon system based on a determination that real world
events required a rapid and significant increase in ISR capability.
Subsequent military actions validated our forward-thinking decision and
the need to rapidly field ISR capability.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Knowledge Gaps at Critical Knowledge Points:
Technology Maturity Gap--Knowledge Point 1:
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development is a particularly important best practice. This means that
the critical technologies needed to meet essential product requirements
are in the form, fit, and function needed for the intended product and
have been demonstrated to work in their intended environment. The RQ-4B
development program is struggling to meet these criteria for several of
its most critical technologies. More than 2 years after development
began, the technologies required for the RQ-4B to perform its
operational mission including enhanced imaging sensors, signals
intelligence, multiplatform radar, and open system architecture are
immature, basically at a functional rather than form or fit
configuration. Nevertheless, the Air Force continues to build the RQ-4B
platform, lacking solid assurance that these critical subsystems will
work as planned.
In particular, the airborne signals intelligence payload and
multiplatform radar technology insertion program are still in
development under separate Air Force programs and will be purchased by
the Global Hawk program as government furnished equipment. These
subsystems are key to providing the advanced intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for which the RQ-4B is
being developed. At the time of our review, neither of these
technologies had been demonstrated in an operational environment using
a system prototype. Air Force officials characterized their current
stages of development as laboratory settings demonstrating basic
performance, technical feasibility, and functionality but not form or
fit (size, weight, materials, etc.). Technology maturity of the sensors
is critical because the basic design of the RQ-4B has been completed
and allocates limited space, weight, and power for the new capability.
If the new sensors cannot be developed within these constraints, some
performance trade-offs--such as reduced frequency coverage--are
likely. The airborne signals intelligence payload currently exceeds the
weight allocated for its integration into the RQ-4B, while the
multiplatform radar uses most of the vehicle's available power-
generation capability.
Officials expect them to be mature by the time they begin buying
sensors to incorporate them into the Global Hawk production line in
fiscal years 2008 and 2009. However, by this time most of the air
vehicles will have already been bought; additional time and money might
be needed to fix or retrofit any remaining differences. Also,
operational testing to evaluate performance in a realistic operating
environment is not scheduled until late fiscal year 2008 for the
signals intelligence sensor and late 2010 for the radar. Any changes or
delays in these programs would likely impact Global Hawk cost,
schedule, and/or performance.
Design Maturity Gap--Knowledge Point 2:
Seventy-five percent of engineering drawings were released at the
Global Hawk design readiness review that triggered the start of RQ-4B
manufacturing and assembly. This figure is 15 percent less than the
best practices' standard of 90 percent. The Air Force and contractor
had anticipated being able to use much of the design work and
production experience on the RQ-4A to prove the design and decrease the
time and extent of engineering work on the RQ-4B. However, officials
found out that the two models had much less in common than anticipated.
About 90 percent of the airframe had to be redesigned--only 10 percent
was common to both models. Therefore, relying on the experience of the
RQ-4A increased the risk of poor program outcomes because the RQ-4B is
substantially heavier; incorporates a new wing, fuselage, and vertical
tail; has a 50 percent greater payload capacity to carry advanced
sensors still in development; and requires new production tooling, new
materials, and changed manufacturing processes.
The Air Force also did not build an RQ-4B prototype--a best practice to
demonstrate design stability--before awarding a contract to start
production. An analysis of the development contract performance, as of
May 2004, shows that development and integration efforts needed to
finalize the design and prepare the RQ-4B for production is behind
schedule and over cost. The planned work efforts were just over one-
half completed, but two-thirds of the budget allocated for these
efforts was expended. Defense Contract Management Agency analysts cited
cost growth in labor and materials and problems in finalizing and
releasing design drawings as causes for the problems.
Neither the original nor the current plan established comprehensive
reliability targets and growth curves. Reliability growth is the result
of an iterative design, build, test, analyze, and fix process.
Improvements in reliability of a product's design can be measured by
tracking reliability metrics and comparing the product's actual
reliability with the growth plan and, ultimately, to the overall goal.
Although both models are in production, the Air Force did not establish
reliability growth programs to measure how reliability is improving and
to uncover design problems so fixes could be incorporated before the
design was frozen and before committing to production.
Production Maturity Gap--Knowledge Point 3:
Officials have started to identify the critical manufacturing processes
for the RQ-4B but do not intend to collect and use statistical process
control data to ensure that the manufacturing could deliver quality
products within best practices quality standards and that the end
product meets the design and specifications. The officials' assessments
of the program continue to identify significant concerns about the
quality, performance, and timeliness of the work of several
subcontractors. For example, the subcontractor building the vertical
tail and main parts of the fuselage is new to large-scale manufacture
using advanced composite materials. The firm experienced significant
start-up problems and the prime contractor and DOD sent special teams
of advisors to help develop the firm's manufacturing processes and to
train employees. The subcontractor's critical processes must be
demonstrated to ensure good quality and limit rework. Officials have
identified similar concerns with the subcontractors building the wing
and imaging sensor.
The Air Force started producing the A and B models without first
demonstrating that the systems would meet reliability goals.
Reliability is a function of the specific elements of a product's
design and making changes after production begins is costly and
inefficient. Best practices for system development require reliability
to be demonstrated by the start of production. The RQ-4A is a
production version of the demonstrators with few changes. Testing of
the demonstrators identified a need to evaluate reliability under a
stressful operating tempo. Air Force officials told us that reliability
improvements on the RQ-4A were constrained, as were demonstrations of
reliability. The RQ-4B design has incorporated improvements in such
areas as flight control actuators, mission computers, avionics, and
structures that officials expect will fix some of the identified
problems and improve reliability, but these have not been demonstrated.
Finally, the Air Force did not acquire and test a fully integrated
system representative prototype before committing to production. The
contract for the first three units was awarded and work began in late
fiscal year 2004. Budget plans call for procuring 13 RQ-4Bs in low-rate
production through the fiscal year 2006. The Air Force has also
programmed advance procurement funds in fiscal year 2006 for 7 more,
meaning that the government will have made investments in 20 RQ-4Bs--45
percent of the entire RQ-4B fleet--before the basic air vehicle is
flight tested and before evaluations are made leading to the full-rate
production decision, scheduled in fiscal year 2007. The Air Force also
plans to enter full-rate production without complete testing to
demonstrate that a fully integrated system--with advanced sensors and
data links--will work as intended, is reliable, and can be produced
within cost, schedule, and quality targets. Initial operational test
and evaluation will only test the RQ-4B air vehicle with its basic
imagery intelligence payloads. Complete operational testing and
incorporation of the advanced signals intelligence payload and the
multiplatform radar capabilities--the reasons for acquiring the larger
model in the first place--will not occur until later in the program,
after the full-rate decision is made.
In the absence of specific product knowledge required by best practices
and DOD acquisition guidance, the Air Force and its contractor are
depending on the operational experience of the demonstrators, lab
modeling and simulation efforts, and production of the RQ-4A to help
"close the gaps" and provide some assurance on the RQ-4B design
maturity, its reliability, and its producibility within cost, schedule,
and quality targets. Although the demonstrator program had notable
successes, testing identified significant improvements were needed
before producing operationally effective and suitable air vehicles.
Areas needing improvement included reliability under a stressful
operating tempo, performance of sensors, mission planning, and
communications bandwidth burden. We also note that the RQ-4A is a
production version of the demonstrators with few changes and that
government acceptance of the second production RQ-4A was delayed due to
deficiencies, including flight problems. Moreover, as previously
discussed, the RQ-4B is significantly different than the RQ-4A and
requires investing in new tooling and changed manufacturing processes.
These factors contribute to increased risks of poor cost, schedule, and
performance outcomes due to incomplete product knowledge.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-248]
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO-04-342]
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,
but More Controls Are Needed.
[Hyperlink, http:// www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-53]
Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-598]
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-57]
Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-701]
Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best
Practices.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-469T]
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapons System Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi- bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288]
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001:
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-199]
Washington D.C.: July 31, 2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T- NSIAD-00-137]
Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-78]
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/ NSIAD-99-33]
Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Program
Implement Best Practices.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-206]
Washington, D.C.: August 16,1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-162]
Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD- 99-116]
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123]
Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.
Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon System
Programs.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98- 87]
Washington, D.C. March 17, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-56]
Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1998.
Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD's Earned Value
Management Process.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/ NSIAD-97-108]
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1997.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-162]
Washington, D.C.: August 26,1996.
(120296):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Intelligence is defined by DOD as the product resulting from the
collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and
interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or
areas. DOD also defines the term as information and knowledge about an
adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or
understanding. Surveillance is defined by DOD as the systematic
observation of places, persons, or things through visual and other
means. DOD defines reconnaissance as a mission undertaken to obtain, by
visual observation or other detection methods, information about
activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to secure
data characteristics of a particular area.
[2] Imagery intelligence is defined by DOD as being derived from the
exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors,
lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors (such as synthetic aperture
radar sensors) wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or
electronically on film, electronic, display devices, or other media.
DOD defines signals intelligence as involving intelligence derived from
communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.
[3] DOD Directive 5000.1 "The Defense Acquisition System" and DOD
Instruction 5000.2 "The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,"
both dated May 12, 2003.
[4] In addition to enhancements to existing imagery sensors, the RQ-4B
will eventually incorporate the Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload
and the MultiPlatform Radar Technology Insertion Program.
[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs,
GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004). This report includes an
assessment of the Global Hawk program against the knowledge-based
approach. Other recent reports discussing best practices include GAO,
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002) and Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing
Best Practices, GAO-02-469T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2002).
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best
Practices, but More Controls Are Needed, GAO-04-53 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 10, 2003).
[7] For example, the policy states that unless some other factor is
overriding in its impact, the maturity of the technology shall
determine the path to be followed by the program in entering the system
development phase of the acquisition cycle.
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