Defense Transformation
Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities
Gao ID: GAO-05-70 December 17, 2004
Because future threats the nation may face are uncertain, and with many competing demands on its resources, the Department of Defense (DOD) has begun to transform its military capabilities, which will involve not only the acquisition of new weapon systems but also how the armed forces think, train, and fight. In 2003, DOD estimated $263 billion would be allocated from fiscal year 2004 through 2009 for transformation efforts. In this report GAO (1) describes DOD's strategy to transform joint military capabilities; (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has established clear leadership, accountability, and a mechanism to integrate transformation efforts; and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD's framework incorporates results-oriented management tools to guide transformation efforts.
DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy to transform U.S. military capabilities, but it has not established clear leadership and accountability or fully adopted results-oriented management tools to help guide and successfully implement this approach. The responsibility for transforming military capabilities is currently spread among various DOD organizations, with no one person or entity having the overarching and ongoing leadership responsibilities or the accountability for achieving transformation results. In addition, although DOD established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to discuss transformation issues, this group has no charter, formal responsibilities, or authority to direct changes. GAO has previously reported that key practices for successful transformation include leadership that sets the direction of transformation and assigns accountability for results, and the use of crosscutting implementation teams, which can provide the day-to-day management needed for success. In recent testimony on DOD's business transformation, we underscored the importance of these elements and stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish goals. DOD officials believe that a single organization accountable for transformation results and a formal implementation team are not necessary because existing informal mechanisms involve key organizations that can individually implement needed changes, and an annual assessment of transformation roadmaps is prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who can direct the transformation efforts of each organization. However, in the absence of clear leadership, accountability, and a formal implementation mechanism, DOD may have difficulty resolving differences among competing priorities, directing resources to the highest priorities, and ensuring progress should changes in senior personnel occur. In addition, informal mechanisms are not sufficient to provide transparency to the process or assurance to Congress that DOD is allocating resources to address needed improvements rather than desired improvements. While DOD's strategy to transform military capabilities is a good first step, DOD has not fully developed results-oriented management tools that can help managers effectively implement and manage major efforts, and focus on achieving results. Specifically, DOD has not revised its initial transformation goals, set in 2001, to reflect new joint concepts--thus, DOD lacks a foundation for developing other tools such as performance goals and measures and linking specific resources needed to achieve each goal. DOD faces challenges in developing these tools because the joint concepts are being developed concurrently with its plans to acquire new capabilities. But without these results-oriented tools, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, to measure its overall progress, or to provide transparency for how billions of dollars in planned investments are being applied.
Recommendations
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GAO-05-70, Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2004:
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION:
Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to
Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities:
GAO-05-70:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-70, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Because future threats the nation may face are uncertain, and with many
competing demands on its resources, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
begun to transform its military capabilities, which will involve not
only the acquisition of new weapon systems but also how the armed
forces think, train, and fight. In 2003, DOD estimated $263 billion
would be allocated from fiscal year 2004 through 2009 for
transformation efforts. In this report GAO (1) describes DOD‘s strategy
to transform joint military capabilities; (2) assesses the extent to
which DOD has established clear leadership, accountability, and a
mechanism to integrate transformation efforts; and (3) assesses the
extent to which DOD‘s framework incorporates results-oriented
management tools to guide transformation efforts.
What GAO Found:
DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy
to transform U.S. military capabilities, but it has not established
clear leadership and accountability or fully adopted results-oriented
management tools to help guide and successfully implement this
approach. The responsibility for transforming military capabilities is
currently spread among various DOD organizations, with no one person or
entity having the overarching and ongoing leadership responsibilities
or the accountability for achieving transformation results. In
addition, although DOD established an informal crosscutting group that
meets occasionally to discuss transformation issues, this group has no
charter, formal responsibilities, or authority to direct changes. GAO
has previously reported that key practices for successful
transformation include leadership that sets the direction of
transformation and assigns accountability for results, and the use of
crosscutting implementation teams, which can provide the day-to-day
management needed for success. In recent testimony on DOD‘s business
transformation, we underscored the importance of these elements and
stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for
performance to specific organizations or individuals who have
sufficient authority to accomplish goals. DOD officials believe that a
single organization accountable for transformation results and a formal
implementation team are not necessary because existing informal
mechanisms involve key organizations that can individually implement
needed changes, and an annual assessment of transformation roadmaps is
prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who can direct the
transformation efforts of each organization. However, in the absence of
clear leadership, accountability, and a formal implementation
mechanism, DOD may have difficulty resolving differences among
competing priorities, directing resources to the highest priorities,
and ensuring progress should changes in senior personnel occur. In
addition, informal mechanisms are not sufficient to provide
transparency to the process or assurance to Congress that DOD is
allocating resources to address needed improvements rather than desired
improvements.
While DOD‘s strategy to transform military capabilities is a good first
step, DOD has not fully developed results-oriented management tools
that can help managers effectively implement and manage major efforts,
and focus on achieving results. Specifically, DOD has not revised its
initial transformation goals, set in 2001, to reflect new joint
concepts”thus, DOD lacks a foundation for developing other tools such
as performance goals and measures and linking specific resources needed
to achieve each goal. DOD faces challenges in developing these tools
because the joint concepts are being developed concurrently with its
plans to acquire new capabilities. But without these results-oriented
tools, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which
its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, to measure
its overall progress, or to provide transparency for how billions of
dollars in planned investments are being applied.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes recommendations designed to establish clear leadership,
accountability, and a more results-oriented management framework to
guide DOD‘s transformation of military capabilities. In oral comments,
the Office of Force Transformation disagreed with these recommendations
but did not address the weaknesses described in this report or provide
convincing evidence to show the recommendations are not warranted.
Therefore, GAO continues to believe the recommendations are
appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent, (202)
512-4402.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Evolving and Involves Complex and
Concurrent Components:
Overall Transformation Leadership, Accountability, and Integrating
Mechanism Have Not Been Established:
Approach to Transform Military Capabilities Lacks Important Management
Tools:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices:
Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis:
Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense
Guidance Documents:
Figures:
Figure 1: Components of DOD's Strategy for Transforming Military
Capabilities:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OUSD: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense:
TPG: Transformation Planning Guidance:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 17, 2004:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jim Saxton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Martin T. Meehan:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Because of the uncertainties associated with the future threats the
nation may face, and with many competing demands on its resources, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked on a major effort to transform
its business processes, human capital, and military capabilities. The
transformation of military capabilities, which is the focus of this
report, will involve not only the acquisition of new weapon systems,
but also how the armed forces think, train, and fight. Transformation
is also seen as a process intended to provide continuous improvements
to military capabilities. In the words of the Secretary of Defense
"—DOD is building a culture of continual transformation, so that our
armed forces are always several steps ahead of any potential
adversaries." One of the fundamental objectives of transformation is to
enhance joint operations--the coordinated use of all military forces
that share information across traditional service boundaries and levels
of command.
This transformation effort will require a significant investment of
resources at a time when the nation faces a serious fiscal imbalance
and many competing demands. In 2003, DOD reported that it planned to
spend about $263 billion for transformation from fiscal year 2004
through 2009. Concurrently, DOD must also balance resource demands for
ongoing military operations around the world and maintain existing
weapon systems.
Because of the importance of successfully adapting U.S. military
capabilities to address changing threats and the significant
investments that this will require, we assessed the management
framework DOD has established to guide its transformation efforts.
Specifically, in this report we (1) describe DOD's strategy to
transform joint military capabilities; (2) assess the extent to which
DOD has clearly established leadership, accountability for achieving
transformation results, and a mechanism to integrate transformation
efforts; and (3) assess the extent to which DOD is using results-
oriented management tools to guide implementation of its transformation
strategy. We prepared this report at our own initiative, and are
providing a copy to you because of your oversight of defense issues.
To describe DOD's strategy to transform military capabilities, we
reviewed the department's Transformation Planning Guidance and plans
for implementing major parts of the strategy. We corroborated and
clarified our understanding of how DOD intends to implement its
strategy with appropriate DOD officials. To assess the extent to which
DOD has clearly established leadership, accountability for achieving
transformation results, and a mechanism to integrate transformation
efforts, we examined DOD instructions governing the roles and
responsibilities of various defense organizations and reviewed relevant
policy guidance and documents. We also identified similar crosscutting
initiatives within DOD and examined how it established the authority
and accountability for those initiatives. We compared this information
to selected key practices consistently found to be at the center of
successful mergers and organizational transformations and discussed the
results with relevant DOD officials. To assess the extent to which DOD
is using results-oriented management tools to guide transformation
efforts, we compared DOD's current management framework with management
principles embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 and discussed our results with appropriate DOD officials. We
assessed the reliability of the cost data we obtained from DOD reports
by corroborating the data with knowledgeable agency officials and
determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. See
appendix I for a more complete description of our scope and
methodology. We conducted our work between May 2003 and October 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy
to transform U.S. military capabilities. The foundation of the strategy
is joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S. military
forces will be integrated to conduct future operations. For example,
DOD is developing a joint concept called force application that will
describe how the Joint Force Commander will integrate and rapidly
maneuver forces across the range of military operations. DOD plans to
develop and refine these concepts through experimentation efforts led
by the Joint Forces Command. These concepts are intended to evolve as
DOD's transformation efforts progress. As DOD defines and develops
these joint concepts, it has also required each military department and
the Joint Forces Command to prepare individual plans (called roadmaps)
to acquire the capabilities to implement these new joint concepts. The
roadmaps are prepared annually and reflect ongoing initiatives, such as
the Army's Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and
technology are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. The
strategy also calls for an annual assessment of the progress made in
implementing transformation of military capabilities, the results of
which are intended to influence future defense guidance and,
ultimately, investment decisions.
Although the Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility for
managing key aspects of transformation, DOD has not established clear
leadership and accountability for achieving transformation results, nor
has it established a formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the
various transformation efforts within the department. As we have
previously reported, key practices for successful transformation
include leadership that sets the direction of transformation, assigns
accountability for results, and is supported by crosscutting
implementation teams, which, in turn, can provide the focused, day-to-
day management needed for success.[Footnote 1] In recent testimony on
DOD's business transformation, we underscored the importance of these
elements and stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability
for performance to specific organizations or individuals who have
sufficient authority to accomplish goals.[Footnote 2] Although the
Secretary of Defense has provided the vision for transformation and set
the tone for accomplishing it, the responsibility for various parts of
the transformation strategy for military capabilities is spread among
several organizations, including the Office of Force Transformation,
the Joint Staff, each of the services, and the Joint Forces Command;
and no single individual or organization has been given the overarching
leadership responsibilities, authority, or the accountability for
achieving transformation results. In addition, although DOD has
established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to
discuss transformation issues, this group has no formal charter, meets
on an irregular basis, and has no directive authority. DOD officials
stated that they believe that the current assignment of
responsibilities among various department organizations is adequate and
that a formal crosscutting group is not needed because existing
informal mechanisms involve key organizations that can implement needed
changes, and the annual assessment of the progress made in
transformation efforts is prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who
can direct the transformation efforts of each military department.
However, in the absence of clear leadership, accountability, and a
formal implementation mechanism, DOD may have difficulty in resolving
differences among competing priorities, directing resources to the
highest priorities, and ensuring progress if changes in senior
personnel occur. In addition, informal mechanisms are not sufficient to
provide transparency to the process or provide Congress with assurance
that DOD is allocating resources to address needed improvements rather
than desired improvements.
While the strategy designed by DOD to transform military capabilities
is a good first step toward establishing a framework to guide and
monitor the results of its transformation efforts, DOD has not fully
developed results-oriented management tools that provide a means to set
clear and specific goals and measure progress in achieving them. For
example, DOD initially established six long-term goals for
transformation in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, and it
subsequently articulated additional transformation goals in other
department documents. DOD has not, however, revised these goals to
reflect the new joint concepts, which, as previously discussed, are now
intended to be the foundation of the transformation strategy. Without
clear and consistent long-term goals grounded in the joint concepts,
DOD lacks a foundation for developing other important tools such as
performance goals and measures, and it is limited in its ability to
link resource needs to specific goals. DOD faces challenges in
developing these management tools because of the inherently concurrent
nature of the transformation process--the joint concepts are being
defined and developed at the same time the services and the Joint
Forces Command are developing their plans to acquire new capabilities.
But without tools such as clear long-term goals, performance goals and
measures, and specific resource requirements that are linked to these
goals, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which
its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, measure its
overall progress, or provide transparency for how billions of dollars
in planned investments are being applied.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense establish clear
leadership and accountability for achieving the transformation of
military capabilities, establish a formal group to integrate
departmentwide efforts, and direct this group and the Joint Forces
Command to more fully incorporate results-oriented management tools to
help DOD guide the transformation efforts and report on results
achieved. In official oral comments on a draft of this report provided
by the Office of Force Transformation, DOD officials generally
disagreed with our recommendations. In general, their comments
indicated that they believe the current transformation leadership,
organizational structures, strategy, and oversight mechanisms are
adequate and appropriate; therefore the recommendations we make in this
report are unwarranted. DOD's comments did not, however, address the
weaknesses we describe in the report, and the additional points they
raised did not provide convincing evidence that our recommendations
were unnecessary. Accordingly, we continue to believe our
recommendations, if implemented, could enhance the department's efforts
to transform military capabilities and provide Congress with greater
visibility over how billions of dollars are being applied to achieve
this goal. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in detail at
the end of this report.
Background:
DOD defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing
nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations
of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our
nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric
vulnerabilities."[Footnote 3] It describes the outcome of
transformation as "fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed
forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across
the battlespace"--that is, transformation should result in maximum
collaboration among the services and between levels of command, all of
them having access to the same, integrated computer network,
geographically dispersed but effectively interconnected, to enable
quick, real-time decision making and achieve widespread effects. DOD's
transformation efforts are not limited to military capabilities; DOD is
also undertaking efforts to transform its business practices, human
capital,[Footnote 4] and its relationships with interagency and
multinational partners. The focus of this report is on DOD's efforts to
transform military capabilities to meet the changing and uncertain
nature of future threats.
The transformation of joint military capabilities began with DOD's 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated but DOD-led
study, which concluded that transformation of U.S. forces is needed to
extend America's military advantages into the future. DOD published its
strategy for transforming military capabilities in the April 2003
Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG). The TPG stated that new joint
concepts are needed to describe how U.S. forces will conduct operations
in the next 15 to 20 years and that changes in new weapons systems,
organizations, doctrine, training, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities will be needed to provide these capabilities.
According to a recent DOD report,[Footnote 5] the performance of U.S.
forces in the successful conduct of Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom has provided a glimpse of the future potential of
emerging concepts, such as sharing information among dispersed forces
and using existing weapon systems in new ways. In fact, the Deputy
Commander, Joint Forces Command, testified in February 2004 that these
operations sharpened DOD's transformation focus by showing the
effectiveness of integrating forces, such as merging special operations
and conventional forces.
Implementations of large-scale changes, such as transformations, are
not simple endeavors and require concentrated efforts to accomplish
goals. Experience shows that successful changes can take years to
accomplish and, in the federal government, can be difficult to sustain
given frequent turnover in leadership. We have reported that DOD's
force transformation will also require cultural changes and business
process reengineering that will take years to accomplish.[Footnote 6]
In our past work, we have reported on the advantages of using results-
oriented management tools to help organizations successfully manage
major efforts such as transformation. Our work on transforming
organizations highlighted the need for leadership to drive the
transformation with integrated strategic goals, dedicating a
crosscutting team to implement the strategy, and the use of performance
management principles to assign responsibility and ensure
accountability for the change.[Footnote 7] Similarly, we have reported
that management principles (or tools) embodied by the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 provide agencies with a framework
to effectively implement and manage programs and shift the management
focus from measuring the program activities and processes to measuring
outcomes.[Footnote 8] Such a shift in focus is especially important for
efforts such as the transformation of military capabilities, which will
involve billions of dollars in spending.
DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Evolving and Involves Complex and
Concurrent Components:
DOD has designed a complex strategy focused on developing and fielding
improved joint military capabilities and, in fiscal year 2003, it began
to implement this strategy for the first time. The foundation of DOD's
strategy is the joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S.
military forces will be integrated to conduct future operations. The
strategy also requires the Joint Forces Command and each military
department to prepare roadmaps--that is, implementation plans--for
developing and acquiring the capabilities needed to implement the joint
concepts. The roadmaps reflect some programs that are ongoing, such as
the Army's Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and
technology are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. DOD
also performs an annual assessment of the roadmaps, the results of
which are intended to influence future defense guidance and,
ultimately, investment decisions.
Joint Transformation Strategy Includes Several Complex Components:
DOD has developed a complex strategy to transform joint military
capabilities that involves several complex components. Figure 1
provides a general portrayal of the relationship between these
components. Fiscal year 2003 was the first year that DOD implemented
this overall strategy.
Figure 1: Components of DOD's Strategy for Transforming Military
Capabilities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As illustrated in figure 1, the strategy is based on general defense
guidance reflected in documents such as the National Military Strategy
and the Quadrennial Defense Review. From this general guidance, DOD is
developing a "family" of joint operating, functional, and integrating
concepts, which collectively depict how transformed forces will operate
in the future. DOD intends to continually develop and evolve each of
these joint concepts over the next several years through
experimentation conducted by each service and the Joint Forces Command.
Each military department and the Joint Forces Command also prepare
annual roadmaps, which are intended to provide more specific
information on plans to acquire the capabilities to achieve the joint
concepts. The strategy also calls for the Director, Office of Force
Transformation,[Footnote 9] to conduct an annual evaluation of the
progress made in achieving transformation goals (called a strategic
assessment) by reviewing the annual roadmaps. DOD officials stated that
the results of the strategic assessment are incorporated into defense
guidance that provides direction for budget development. We discuss
each of these components in more detail below.
Joint Concepts Are Intended to Provide a Foundation for Transformation:
DOD has reported that the key to its transformation strategy is a
family of joint concepts, which includes an overarching vision
(articulated in the Joint Operations Concepts) and interrelated
operating, functional, and integrating concepts. DOD created the Joint
Operations Concepts to articulate the overarching description of how
the military will conduct all types of joint operations in the next 15
to 20 years. It focuses more on how the United States can defeat a
broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than
who the adversaries are and where they may engage U.S. forces or
interests. The Secretary of Defense signed the Joint Operations
Concepts in November 2003.
The Joint Operations Concepts calls for the creation of subordinate
Joint Operating Concepts (hereinafter called operating concepts) that
collectively describe how the military will operate across the range of
military operations. According to a Joint Staff official, although DOD
has drafted the four operating concepts, as of October 2004, the
Secretary of Defense had not approved them. These four Joint Operating
Concepts and a general description of each are as follows:
* Major Combat Operations - conduct large-scale military actions.
* Stability Operations - conducted before, during, and after major
combat operations to provide security, initial humanitarian assistance,
limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other
reconstruction assistance.
* Strategic Deterrence - discourage aggression or any form of coercion
against the United States or its interests and alter a nation's or
group's will and ability to attack the homeland, U.S. allies, or
development of democracies throughout the world.
* Homeland Security - detect, deter, prevent, and defeat attacks
against the homeland to provide military forces in support of civilian
authority, and plan for emergencies.
Complementing the four operating concepts are eight functional
concepts. These functional concepts as described in DOD documents are:
* Command and Control - describes how joint forces will collaborate,
communicate, and implement commanders' decisions while conducting
operations as described in the operating concepts.
* Force Application - describes how the Joint Force Commander will
integrate and rapidly maneuver forces to engage adversaries and defeat
them across the range of military operations outlined collectively in
the operating concepts.
* Battlespace Awareness - describes the information about an
operational environment--including status of friendly, adversary, and
nonaligned forces and the impacts of physical, cultural, social,
political, and economic factors on military operations--and how the
Joint Force Commander can use this information to plan operations.
* Force Protection - describes how the joint force will use active and
passive capabilities to protect personnel, physical assets, and
information to prevent adversaries from restricting or preventing U.S.
forces from conducting operations as described in the operating
concepts.
* Focused Logistics - describes how DOD will provide the Joint Force
Commander with equipment and other support on time for simultaneous
operations conducted over geographically dispersed areas.
* Network-Centric Warfare - currently in development.
* Force Management - currently in development.
* Joint Training - currently in development.
Functional concepts are intended, collectively, to describe the
capabilities and attributes that will be needed to implement the
operating concepts. As forces shift from one type of operation to
another, such as from stability operations to major combat operations,
the functional capabilities they need may change as well. For example,
a stability operation may require nonlethal force application
capabilities, but if the operation shifts to major combat, then lethal
capabilities may be emphasized. DOD approved the battlespace awareness,
joint command and control, force application, force protection, and
focused logistics concepts in February 2004. According to a Joint Staff
official, as of October 2004, the other three were in development.
The integrating concepts, which crosscut through the operating and
functional concepts, have the narrowest focus of all the concepts. As
of October 2004, DOD had begun drafting seven integrating concepts,
although none were completed and more may be added. The seven concepts
being drafted are:
* Joint Command and Control,
* Joint Logistics,
* Joint Forcible Entry Operations,
* Integrating Air and Missile Defense,
* Global Strike,
* Seabasing, and:
* Undersea Superiority.
The integrating concepts describe how the capabilities derived from the
joint and functional concepts are meant to work together. For example,
according to Office of Force Transformation and Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereafter referred to as OUSD Policy)
officials, the seabasing concept may describe how the capabilities
derived from the focused logistics functional concept would be applied
in a major combat operation. The March 2004 defense guidance directed
that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive,
prioritized list of integrating concepts required to support the
operating concepts before fiscal year 2005 and assign them to specific
DOD components for development. This guidance also directs that
undersea superiority operations, seabasing operations, and global
strike operations be developed prior to the next Quadrennial Defense
Review. We did not evaluate the status of these concepts during our
review.
DOD plans to use experimentation[Footnote 10] to help define and
develop each concept and identify the specific capabilities needed to
implement them. The Joint Forces Command is responsible for joint
experimentation on the concepts and integrating results from other
combatant commanders' experiments. Based on the results, the Joint
Forces Command will recommend modifications to existing joint concepts
as well as recommend changes needed in doctrine, organizations,
training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities to achieve
the capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts. According to
the Joint Forces Command's experimentation plan, these recommendations
should help DOD senior leadership make informed decisions about future
investments. Experimentation is ongoing--the Joint Forces Command's
experimentation plan outlines the Command's approach from fiscal year
2004 through 2011, and it presents in detail events scheduled
throughout fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
Roadmaps Are Implementation Plans to Develop and Acquire Capabilities
for Joint Concepts:
The Office of Force Transformation is responsible for managing the
roadmap process. The 2003 transformation roadmaps were the first ones
to be prepared under DOD's transformation strategy, and they were
submitted in November 2003 to the Office of Force Transformation for
review. They are intended to be implementation plans outlining the
concrete steps DOD must take to develop and acquire the capabilities
necessary for implementing the joint concepts. Specifically, the
Transformation Planning Guidance requires the roadmaps to include
information such as:
* when and how desired capabilities will be fielded;
* which critical capabilities from other services and agencies are
required for success;
* changes to the organizational structure, operating concepts,
doctrine, and skill sets of personnel;
* initiatives intended to improve interoperability;
* measures intended to assess DOD's six transformational goals
identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and joint operating
concepts; and:
* funding information that includes appropriation breakouts through the
Future Years Defense Program[Footnote 11] for the desired capabilities.
The military department roadmaps (Army, Naval,[Footnote 12] and Air
Force) are developed by the services. They provide a broad overview of
the service capabilities under development to support the joint
concepts. As the concepts develop over time and specify more precisely
what capabilities are required, the roadmaps can, in turn, specify more
precisely how those capabilities will be acquired. The roadmaps also
reflect some ongoing programs, such as the Army's Future Combat System
and the Air Force's Space-Based Radar, and recognize that science and
technology investments are expected to yield new capabilities. The
Joint Forces Command is responsible for developing the joint roadmap
using input from the combat support defense agencies.[Footnote 13] The
purpose of the joint roadmap is to document planned activities to
achieve transformational improvements in joint capabilities, such as
joint command and control and joint intelligence, and to facilitate the
coordination of transformational activities across DOD.
Strategic Appraisal Designed to Assess Transformation Progress:
The TPG requires the Office of Force Transformation to conduct an
annual strategic appraisal to assist the Secretary of Defense in
evaluating progress in implementing transformation. The TPG requires
that the strategic appraisal process include an evaluation of
transformation progress using specific measures; that barriers to
transformation be identified; and that recommendations are developed to
improve transformation for the next TPG or other defense guidance. That
guidance, in turn, is intended to provide the services with
instructions for budget development.
According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials,
the Office of Force Transformation conducted its first strategic
appraisal of the roadmaps between December 2003 and February 2004, the
results of which were briefed to the Secretary of Defense in April
2004. According to Office of Force Transformation officials,
information provided from the strategic appraisal was incorporated into
2004 defense guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. For example,
the 2004 defense guidance required the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, to prepare a roadmap for the development of directed-
energy capabilities through 2020. Other results, according to Office of
Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, were incorporated into
informal guidance that the Office of Force Transformation provided to
the services and the Joint Forces Command for updating the roadmaps
that were due to be submitted in July 2004. Neither the strategic
appraisal's results nor the defense guidance is published outside DOD.
According to these officials, the 2004 roadmaps were submitted for
review in July 2004, and the second strategic appraisal process is now
under way.
According to the TPG, the strategic appraisal process should include
input from the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, which
evaluates the transformational value of the service budget requests in
light of the services' roadmaps. Although this evaluation was not
completed in the first strategic appraisal, officials from this office
said that they intend to require the services to show how their
proposed budgets support their roadmaps, and the services' input will
become the basis for the evaluation. Furthermore, officials said that
in cases where the services' budget requests deviate from resource
requirements articulated in each roadmap, the services are required to
show how any increases in funding for one program will be offset by
decreases in other areas.
DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Intended to Link to the Acquisition
Process:
The transformation strategy is designed to link with the acquisition
process through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System. This system is DOD's capabilities-based process intended to
identify, evaluate, and prioritize capabilities needed to implement the
joint concepts. According to a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction,[Footnote 14] this process is complex but includes the
following basic steps. In the first step, a variety of defense
organizations, including the military services and the combatant
commands, identifies, analyzes, and prioritizes the gaps between
current capabilities and those needed to implement the joint concepts.
Second, these same organizations develop solutions to address these
gaps through a combination of materiel changes (that is, developing and
buying new weapon systems) and nonmateriel changes (that is, changes in
doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel, and
facilities). Finally, several review boards within the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council[Footnote 15] review the recommended
solutions. Approved solutions are then funded as part of DOD's budget
process. For example, the approved solution to providing capability X
for implementing the force application functional concept may be to
develop and buy a new weapon system. This new weapon system then
becomes an acquisition requirement that is funded as part of DOD's
budget process.
Overall Transformation Leadership, Accountability, and Integrating
Mechanism Have Not Been Established:
Although the Secretary of Defense has taken some positive steps to
begin the transformation of military capabilities and assigned
responsibility for various components of this effort, DOD has not
established clear leadership and accountability for achieving
transformation results, nor has it established a formal mechanism to
coordinate and integrate the various transformation efforts within the
department. As we have reported, key practices and implementation steps
for a successful transformation include leadership that sets the
direction of transformation, assigns accountability for results, and is
supported by crosscutting implementation teams, which, in turn, can
provide the focused, day-to-day management needed for success.[Footnote
16] According to OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation
officials, an informal group consisting of representatives from key
organizations meets periodically to discuss transformation issues. But
this group has no official charter designating specific
responsibilities; it prepares no minutes of its proceedings, and it has
no directive authority to implement the decisions it makes. Without
formally designating responsibility and accountability for results,
sustaining transformation over the long term, choosing among competing
demands for scarce resources, and resolving differences in priorities
between various DOD organizations may be difficult and could impede
DOD's ability to transform in an efficient and timely manner.
Key Practices for Successful Transformation Include Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Crosscutting Implementation Team:
We reported in 2003 that key practices and implementation steps for
successful transformations include clear leadership and
accountability, and that a dedicated implementation team should be
responsible for the transformation's day-to-day management, which is
important to ensuring that various initiatives are integrated.[Footnote
17] Such an implementation team, vested with the necessary authority,
would ensure that transformation receives the focused, full-time
attention necessary to be sustained and effective by establishing
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, helping to reach agreement
on work priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated. We recently
emphasized the importance of these elements in our March 2004 testimony
on DOD's business transformation efforts before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services.[Footnote 18] In that testimony, the Comptroller General
stated that, given the importance of DOD's business transformation
effort, it is imperative that it receives the sustained leadership
needed to improve DOD's business operations over a number of years and
various administrations. Our testimony highlighted that DOD has not
routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific
organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to
accomplish goals. While DOD's leadership has demonstrated the
commitment to reforming the department, the day-to-day demands placed
on the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and others make it difficult
for these leaders to maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed
to resolve the weaknesses in DOD's business operations. The lack of
adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all of
DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars in annual
wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint. As a
result, DOD does not have timely, reliable information for management
to use in making informed decisions. The Comptroller General also
stated that one way to ensure sustained leadership over DOD's business
transformation efforts would be to create a position for a chief
operating officer or chief management official who would serve as the
Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management.
In some cases, DOD has taken steps to establish clear accountability
and authority for other significant transformation efforts. For
example, DOD has designated the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness with overall responsibility for training transformation
and named the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness as
Executive Agent.[Footnote 19] Supporting the Executive Agent are
oversight and implementation groups whose members crosscut DOD, that
is, the Joint Staff, the military services, and representatives from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense that include Program Analysis
and Evaluation; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Comptroller;
and Policy. The implementation group is responsible for providing
overall daily management, while the oversight groups are to resolve
issues, manage funding, and ensure collaboration across DOD.
For efforts related to the transformation of military capabilities, the
Joint Forces Command has recognized the importance of using
crosscutting groups and assigning overall responsibility and
accountability for results. First, the Command developed an Integrated
Interoperability Plan that recommends a crosscutting governance group
be established to implement and monitor the achievement of
interoperability objectives, which are key to transformation. According
to the plan, the purpose of the crosscutting group would be to provide
oversight and coordination of capability development, synchronizing all
key DOD processes, and ensuring "holistic" implementation of the
requirements/acquisition process, from conception to fielding. The plan
recommended that this group be led by a senior DOD official and include
participation from the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, Special
Operations Command, Strategic Command, services, and defense agencies
to serve as the senior resolution body for capability and
interoperability issues cutting across DOD components, and to approve
joint capability and interoperability measures. According to OUSD
Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, however, this
group has not been established because it was believed to be a layer of
bureaucracy that was not needed. Second, the Joint Roadmap[Footnote 20]
prepared by the Joint Forces Command concluded that "[f]ailure to
successfully integrate the emerging — systems will imperil the
transformation of DOD military capabilities." The roadmap recommended
that a coordination group be established to help identify synergies
between activities and to direct limited resources where they would be
the most beneficial. The roadmap also recommended that four DOD
organizations work together to ensure that science and technology
efforts will be linked to developing the new joint concepts. The Joint
Forces Command official we spoke with indicated that they were unaware
of any actions taken to respond to these recommendations.
Clear Leadership and Accountability for Transformation of Military
Capabilities Have Not Been Established:
As table 1 shows, there are many DOD organizations tasked with specific
responsibilities for implementing parts of the transformation strategy,
but none of these organizations have been given the leadership
responsibilities or the overarching authority and accountability for
achieving transformation results. According to Office of Force
Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, the Secretary of Defense is
ultimately responsible and accountable for all DOD activities, and
therefore is inherently responsible and accountable for the successful
transformation of military capabilities. We believe that while DOD
leadership has demonstrated the commitment to transforming military
capabilities, as previously stated, the day-to-day demands placed on
the Secretary make it difficult for him to personally maintain the
oversight, focus, and momentum needed to sustain transformation
efforts.
Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices:
Organization: Secretary of Defense;
Responsibilities: Sets transformation policies and objectives.
Organization: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs;
Responsibilities: Oversees joint concept development and validates
joint requirements.
Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy;
Responsibilities: Prepares Transformation Planning Guidance and other
defense guidance.
Organization: Office of Force Transformation;
Responsibilities: Monitors and evaluates implementation of the
transformation strategy; advises the Secretary of Defense; assesses the
roadmaps during the strategic appraisal process.
Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis
and Evaluation;
Responsibilities: Analyzes service budgets to see that initiatives in
transformation roadmaps are funded in budget requests.
Organization: Joint Forces Command (and other combatant commands);
Responsibilities: Conduct joint concept development and
experimentation.
Organization: Military services;
Responsibilities: Build plans (called roadmaps) and budgets to achieve
transformational capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD guidance.
[End of table]
Two organizations (Office of Force Transformation and the Joint Forces
Command) have central roles in the transformation strategy but no
overarching authority or accountability for achieving transformation
results. First, the Director, Office of Force Transformation, is to
advise the Secretary of Defense, monitor and evaluate the
transformation strategy, and assess the roadmaps during the strategic
appraisal process. The Director does not have the overall authority,
responsibility, and accountability for implementing DOD's
transformation strategy. In fact, the Director testified before
Congress that he "is a catalyst for" and "encourages" but does not
"direct" transformation.[Footnote 21] Although the Office of Force
Transformation was created in November 2001, its charter, as of
September 2004, had not been approved. Second, as previously discussed,
the Joint Forces Command is responsible for annually preparing the
joint roadmap. However, Joint Forces Command officials told us the
Command does not have the overall authority and responsibility to
implement the roadmap because the Command does not have the authority
to direct the services' and defense agencies' programs described in the
roadmap.
Formal Implementation Team Has Not Been Established to Integrate
Transformation Efforts:
According to OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials,
DOD established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally
to discuss transformation issues. But, according to these officials, it
has no charter designating specific responsibilities for achieving
transformation goals, assessing transformation performance measures,
or linking resources to goals. In addition, the group has no specified
authority to direct changes across various DOD offices, and no minutes
are kept of its meetings. Therefore, we were unable to determine what
specific topics were discussed by the group, or the frequency, nature,
or results of its efforts. Participants in this group are invited as
needed, but the group generally includes representatives from the
Office of Force Transformation and others from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Policy; Program Analysis and Evaluation;
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and Office of Net Assessment),
the Joint Staff (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate), and the Joint Forces Command.
Lack of Coordinating Authority Can Hinder Development of Joint
Capabilities:
Concerns have been raised in several forums about the lack of adequate
authority to coordinate transformation efforts. For example, the House
Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 stated that while the services
have embraced transformation as an objective, the committee remained
concerned that each military service has embarked on its own
transformational campaign without an enforceable, integrated joint
roadmap to ensure that service plans are mutually supportive and
overlap where necessary.[Footnote 22] For example, in discussing a
proposed joint program office to improve interoperability among
systems, the report notes that the services and the defense agencies
acquire systems to meet their own requirements, not necessarily joint
concepts.[Footnote 23]
In addition, a June 2004 DOD Inspector General report[Footnote 24]
recommended that DOD formalize roles, responsibilities, and processes
for the overall development, coordination, and oversight of DOD
network-centric warfare efforts.[Footnote 25] The report found that the
lack of formalized roles and responsibilities resulted in confusion on
who had decision-making authority. Further, the report states that the
absence of formalized roles and processes for the overall development,
coordination, and oversight of network-centric warfare efforts does not
ensure that ongoing or planned initiatives are properly focused and
complement each other. According to the report, DOD management agreed
with the need for leadership improvements.
Likewise, we have issued several reports dealing with the challenges
DOD faces in fielding joint capabilities:
* We reported in July 2004 that no single office is in charge of the
Global Information Grid (a key transformation initiative intended to be
the foundation for implementing all joint concepts), making it more
difficult to make and enforce trade-off decisions.[Footnote 26]
Previous DOD efforts to foster interoperability have had limited
success because management tools and leadership attention were not
strong enough to provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance
by the military services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of
requirements that would benefit DOD.
* We reported in June 2004 that one of the key factors undermining
DOD's progress in implementing its capabilities-based strategy is the
lack of standardized, interoperable equipment and systems in joint
operations.[Footnote 27] The report noted that although DOD recognizes
improved interoperability is central to transformation, resolving this
problem is difficult because military acquisition has traditionally
focused on service-specific platforms, not joint operations with
interoperable equipment.
* In a March 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish an
appropriate organization to implement a strategic plan for unmanned
aerial vehicles, ensuring that sufficient authority is provided to
enforce the plan's direction, promote joint operations, and expend
funds efficiently.[Footnote 28]
* We reported in December 2002 that the military services and the
defense agencies have been reluctant to fund acquisition of advanced
concept technology-proven technologies, especially those focusing on
joint requirements, because of their competing priorities.[Footnote 29]
Likewise, a Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004 study
stated that DOD continues to struggle with insufficient
jointness.[Footnote 30] Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom underscore interoperability shortcomings in equipment fielded
by the services. Managing resources along service lines has not
achieved real interoperability in joint command and control. The study
team believes that true interoperability in joint command and control
will not be achieved until it is bought jointly.
A 2003 study chartered by the Secretary of Defense stated that current
processes do not optimize investment in joint capabilities to meet
current and future security challenges because the services and the
defense agencies define their needs at the component level and joint
needs are forced into the process after each service has developed its
program.[Footnote 31] The report further states that improving
interoperability is key, which requires greater coordination at the
department level.
DOD officials stated that they believe that the Director, Office of
Force Transformation, has the authority he needs to be effective. The
Director can persuade others to take action and influence defense
guidance using results of the strategic appraisal. These officials
stated that the only benefit to having directive authority is some
things may happen faster than they would without this authority. DOD
officials also stated that DOD has not formally established a
crosscutting group responsible for implementing the transformation
strategy because, in their opinion, setting up a bureaucratic layer to
administer DOD's transformation strategy is not needed.
This reasoning, however, is contradictory to the advice and experiences
of other organizations involved in major transformation efforts that
considered clearly defined accountability and crosscutting
implementation teams essential for successful transformations. It is
also inconsistent with the approach taken by DOD in other cases.
Without formally designating responsibility and accountability for
results, choosing among competing demands for scarce resources and
resolving differences in priorities between various DOD organizations
may be difficult and could impede DOD's ability to transform in an
efficient manner. In addition, it may be particularly difficult for DOD
to sustain transformation progress when key personnel changes occur. As
we discussed these points and the results of our analysis with DOD
officials, they recognized that leadership and accountability for
transformation results may not be clearly identified and DOD is
considering what, if any, actions need to be taken to address this
issue.
Approach to Transform Military Capabilities Lacks Important Management
Tools:
DOD has not fully developed critical components of a management
framework to guide and monitor the results of its transformation
efforts. DOD has made progress in adopting some tools--specifically,
establishing a transformation strategy based on joint concepts, using
mechanisms to identify and mitigate external factors, and initiating a
process for reviewing roadmaps. However, it has not (1) revised its
2001 transformation goals to reflect the new joint concepts,
(2) established performance goals and performance measures, (3) fully
identified resources needed to achieve its goals, and (4) established a
process to assess progress in achieving long-term and performance
goals. Without fully utilizing these tools, it is difficult for DOD to
determine the extent to which its transformation efforts are achieving
the desired results, measure its overall progress, or provide
transparency for how billions of dollars programmed for transformation
are being applied.
Studies by several organizations, including us, have shown that
successful organizations in both the public and private sectors use
results-oriented management tools to help achieve desired program
outcomes. These tools, or principles, embodied by the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, provide agencies with a management
framework for effectively implementing and managing programs and shift
program management focus from measuring program activities and
processes to measuring program outcomes. The framework can include
various management tools, such as long-term goals, performance goals,
and performance measures, which can assist agencies in measuring
performance and reporting results. Table 2 lists the results-oriented
management framework tools we used in our analysis.
Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis:
Long-term goals: Strategies to be used;
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to
expect such results: General methods the agency plans to use to
accomplish long-term goals.
Long-term goals: External factors;
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to
expect such results: Factors beyond the agency's control that could
affect the agency's ability to achieve desired results.
Long-term goals: Performance goals;
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to
expect such results: Derived from long-term goals, should establish
intended performance and focus on results required.
Long-term goals: Performance measures;
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to
expect such results: Specific means of gauging performance.
Long-term goals: Resources;
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to
expect such results: Identification of the resources needed to achieve
each goal.
Long-term goals: Evaluation plan;
Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes and when to
expect such results: An objective and formal assessment of results.
Source: GAO guidelines.
[End of table]
These management tools can provide DOD and Congress ways to measure
progress and determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired
results. The following is our assessment of the extent to which DOD is
using these tools in implementing its strategy for transforming
military capabilities:
* Long-term goals: Long-term goals should identify expected results,
should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that
allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. DOD initially
established six long-term goals for transformation in the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, and it subsequently articulated
transformation goals in other department documents (see table 3).
According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials,
the differences in these goals reflect evolution in DOD's vision for
transformation outcomes. For example, some goals expressed in the 2004
National Military Strategy are not reflected in the 2003 Transformation
Planning Guidance. Further, these goals have not been updated to
reflect the joint concepts emerging from current transformation
efforts. An Office of Force Transformation official said that DOD's
initial goals were a good start, but they do not cover the full range
of military operations that the joint concepts will cover. Although the
official agreed that these goals would and should change, DOD has not
begun a process to revise them.
Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense
Guidance Documents:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
* Strategy: A strategy should describe the general methods an agency
plans to use to accomplish long-term goals. As we described in the
previous section of this report, DOD has made significant progress in
developing its strategy to transform military capabilities. The
strategy is linked to the overall defense guidance and is based on
joint concepts, and many of the strategy's components have been
initiated. The strategy is also flexible and adaptable to new concepts
as they are developed through experimentation.
* External factors: Agencies should identify factors beyond their
control that could affect their ability to achieve desired results and
develop mitigation plans to address these factors. According to OUSD
Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, DOD does have
mechanisms for examining and mitigating factors beyond its control that
could affect the achievement of desired results. One of these
mechanisms is the strategic appraisal process discussed earlier in this
report. Another is DOD's Risk Management Framework, developed to ensure
that current defense needs are balanced against future requirements and
consider trade-offs among four risk areas--force management,
operational, institutional, and future challenges (that is,
transformation). According to Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, if resource needs in one
risk area increase, then resources available for other areas may
decrease. For example, if demands for current operations increase, then
fewer resources may be available for transformation.
* Performance goals: Performance goals should establish intended
performance, should be results-oriented, and should be linked to long-
term goals. Since the joint roadmap is DOD's implementation plan for
joint military capabilities, we looked for performance goals in the
2003 joint roadmap. In some parts of the roadmap, goals are not
included at all; in others, goals are unclear, and references are made
to goals presented in other documents. For example, the roadmap
includes several sets of goals for joint intelligence and refers to
other goals in DOD's Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Capstone Strategic Plan. As a result, it is not clear whether or how
these goals support each other, how they relate to the joint concepts,
or how the various programs described in this section of the roadmap
will support achievement of these goals. Clearly articulated, results-
oriented performance goals would help DOD explain how the myriad of
programs described in the roadmap will result in the improved joint
capabilities necessary to implement each joint concept.
* Performance measures: Performance measures are the specific means of
gauging performance and should include a baseline and target; should be
objective, measurable, and quantifiable, and should include a time
frame. DOD has not developed performance measures to assess progress in
the following three areas: implementation of the transformation
strategy across DOD; achievement of joint capabilities through the
programs described in the joint roadmap; and assessment of the
contribution of experimentation to transformation.
First, DOD has not developed measures to assess transformation progress
across DOD. DOD reports departmentwide performance measures in its
Annual Defense Report, and defense guidance states that DOD must
develop performance measures based on joint capabilities. The Program
Analysis and Evaluation Office has begun developing performance
measures for DOD's balanced scorecard, which will be included in future
Annual Defense Reports. DOD officials stated that, as part of this
effort, they plan to develop measures to assess the progress of
transformation DOD-wide. But to date, no such measures have been
developed. Further, the few transformation measures included in the
2003 Annual Defense Report are process rather than results-oriented.
For example, the measures for "experiment[ing] with new warfare
concepts" are process-oriented, such as providing a briefing and
drafting an experimentation plan.
Second, DOD has not developed measures to assess the achievement of
joint capabilities through the programs described in the 2003 joint
roadmap. The TPG requires the roadmaps to include performance measures
to address the joint concepts, but the joint roadmap does not include
performance measures and does not describe any ongoing efforts to
develop them. Joint Forces Command officials stated that performance
measures were not developed because the joint concepts were not drafted
at the time the roadmap was prepared and that they do not expect to
include performance measures until the July 2005 joint roadmap, at the
earliest.
Third, DOD has not developed measures to assess the contribution of
experimentation to transformation. In 2002, we recommended that the
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, develop strategic planning tools
to use in managing and periodically assessing the progress of joint
experimentation.[Footnote 32] At that time, a Joint Forces Command
official stated that the Command was developing such measures. DOD
agreed with this recommendation and stated that subsequent guidance
would address this issue. Although the Joint Forces Command has drafted
measures to assess the contribution of experimentation to
transformation, as of September 2004 it had not approved or implemented
these measures.
* Resources: Agencies should identify the resources needed to achieve
each goal and should provide a rationale for how these resources will
contribute to achieving the expected level of performance. The TPG also
requires the roadmaps to include the funding necessary to develop the
desired capabilities. However, we found that DOD has not clearly linked
resources--either throughout the department or in the joint roadmap--
with the development of capabilities needed to implement the joint
concepts.
For example, the 2003 Annual Defense Report stated that DOD is
committed to making budget documents more transparent by clearly
aligning dollars to specific programs so that senior-level decision
makers can see directly how they support the defense strategy. This
report showed $263 billion (for fiscal years 2004-2009) for
transformation; however, it is difficult to independently verify how
much DOD plans to spend on transformation--we reported in May 2004 that
DOD's Future Years Defense Program does not clearly identify those
programs DOD considers transformational. Further, the Annual Defense
Report did not fully reflect all the programs planned to develop the
capabilities needed for each joint concept. Likewise, the joint roadmap
did not provide a complete description of the programs and resources
needed to develop the desired capabilities. For example, the roadmap
states that the Global Information Grid will require changes in
doctrine, organizational processes, cultures, and behaviors, but it
does not explain what changes are needed or the funding required for
these changes.
* Evaluation and corrective action plan: An evaluation plan is an
objective and formal assessment of the results of a major effort; a
corrective action plan should describe how evaluation findings will be
used to improve performance or revise unmet goals. As previously
discussed, the strategic appraisal process is designed to provide DOD
with a mechanism for evaluating its transformation efforts and
identifying corrective actions. It calls for the use of evaluation
findings to improve performance and identify or implement needed
actions. According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy
officials, any shortfalls identified during the appraisal are corrected
in one of two ways--either by incorporating required actions into
directive defense guidance issued by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense or by providing informal guidance to the Joint Forces Command
and the services regarding issues to be addressed in the next roadmap
iterations. In fiscal year 2004, the first year a strategic appraisal
was conducted, DOD reviewed each roadmap prepared by the military
departments and the Joint Forces Command to determine if any
significant gaps existed in the capabilities being acquired. The
assessment did not evaluate the progress achieved in acquiring the
capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts because the
concepts were still undefined and under development. In lieu of the
joint concepts, the first strategic appraisal used lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Secretary of Defense's Top Ten
priorities as criteria to identify these capability gaps. In reviewing
information on the strategic appraisal's results, it was not clear what
measures were used in evaluating how well the roadmaps were addressing
these gaps. The strategic appraisal could attain more definitive
results and more clearly identify actions that need to be taken if
future assessments are based on clearly articulated goals and measures
founded on the joint concepts.
When we discussed the weaknesses in the current framework guiding the
transformation effort, DOD officials explained that DOD's
transformation strategy is new and that many parts are being developed
simultaneously and continuously evolving. For example, the
transformation strategy calls for the joint roadmap to be based on the
joint concepts, but both are being developed at the same time. As the
concepts mature, DOD officials expect future versions of the roadmaps
will explain in more detail how capabilities will be developed to
implement the concepts. DOD officials also stated that the annual
strategic appraisal is designed to identify capability gaps that future
roadmaps or defense guidance will address. In their view, this process
is equivalent to setting goals and measures. Regarding directly linking
resource requirements to long-term and performance goals, the officials
stated that the department allocates resources in its budget process
and did not address how these resources link to long-term or
performance goals.
Although we agree that the concurrent nature of the transformation
strategy has required many components to be developed simultaneously,
we do not believe that this precludes the development of results-
oriented management tools that can help the department manage this
effort and achieve the desired results. For example, DOD has made
progress in developing the joint concepts, and although they all are
not fully developed, they can still provide a basis for establishing
long-term goals, performance goals, and performance measures. As the
concepts mature through experimentation, DOD can periodically revise
the management tools to reflect these changes, possibly as part of the
annual strategic appraisal process. Without taking the steps to
establish clear and consistent long-term goals that are grounded in the
joint concepts, the department's transformation efforts may not fully
support the desired outcomes. Likewise, the absence of performance
goals and performance measures limits the department's ability to
measure progress toward achieving its goals. Finally, without a clear
link between resource requirements and transformation goals, it is
unclear what resources will be required to achieve transformation, when
the funds will be required, or how billions of dollars programmed for
transformation are being applied.
Conclusions:
The complexity, magnitude, and importance of transforming military
capabilities demand that an effective, results-oriented management
framework be established to guide DOD-wide transformation efforts and
monitor the billions of dollars that will be invested to achieve
transformation goals. This framework should include clear leadership
and accountability for achieving results, as well as management tools
to guide activities and measure outcomes. As discussed in this report,
DOD has taken significant, positive steps toward establishing this
framework. The Secretary of Defense has provided a transformation
vision and instituted some important elements of a results-oriented
management framework. For example, the overall strategy provides
flexibility to adapt to new joint operating concepts. Also, planned
annual updates to each service's roadmap are intended to detail how new
capabilities may be acquired, and the annual strategic appraisal is a
mechanism to primarily assess the transformation plans in the roadmaps.
These positive steps were taken in a relatively short period of time
and they reflect the dedication of department personnel to transform
military capabilities and achieve the vision set by the Secretary of
Defense.
These steps also establish a foundation for DOD to take additional
actions that can enhance its transformation strategy and develop a more
comprehensive, results-oriented framework to guide its efforts and
achieve intended results. Specifically, the overall accountability and
authority for achieving transformation goals are unclear, and the
existing working group created to help integrate the multitude of
transformation efforts underway is informal, having no official charter
and no directive authority, and meets on an irregular basis. These
weaknesses can limit DOD's ability to promote an integrated approach to
transformation, choose between competing priorities, and
institutionalize a transformation process that will endure over time.
In addition, the lack of a comprehensive set of results-oriented
management tools that reflect the joint concepts under development
limits DOD's ability to manage this complex process with a focus on
results and clouds the visibility over the significant resources that
have been expended and will be required to transform military
capabilities. These factors may ultimately impede progress toward
achieving the overarching transformation goal--maintaining the
preeminence of U.S. military capabilities and the ability of U.S.
forces to defeat all future threats--and the department may have
difficulty in garnering congressional support for transformation
efforts unless it adopts a stronger and more result-oriented management
approach.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To clarify the accountability for achieving the transformation of
military capabilities and to establish a mechanism to integrate the
transformation efforts using results-oriented management tools, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
* Assign clear leadership and accountability for achieving the
transformation of military capabilities.
* Establish a formal crosscutting transformation group, assign it with
the responsibility for overseeing and integrating DOD's strategy,
provide it with the necessary authority to perform their
responsibilities effectively, and hold it accountable for results. The
group should:
* Include representatives from the key offices deemed necessary for
successful implementation.
* Have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
* Articulate and periodically revise long-term goals for the
transformation of military capabilities that reflect the joint
concepts. These long-term goals should identify what transformation
results are to be expected and when to expect these results.
* Clearly identify the resources that DOD estimates it will need to
achieve each long-term goal.
* Use the goals and measures as a foundation for the annual assessment
of transformation progress.
* Prepare an annual report to Congress on the progress in achieving
transformation goals, including actions taken and outcomes achieved,
resources expended and programmed, measures used to assess progress
achieved, and actions planned to meet or revise unmet goals.
To further develop results-oriented management tools that can guide
DOD's transformation of joint military capabilities, measure progress,
and determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired results,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following action:
* direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to direct the Commander,
Joint Forces Command, to include in future updates to the Joint
Transformation Roadmap:
* a discussion of how the capabilities being developed will link with
and support accomplishment of the long-term goals;
* results-oriented performance goals linked to long-term goals, which
also reflect the joint concepts and gaps in current capabilities, that
establish intended performance, focus on outcomes or results expected
or required, and establish target dates for the achievement of these
results;
* performance measures based on the performance goals to assess
progress; and:
* resources required (for nonmateriel as well as materiel efforts) to
obtain capabilities for each joint concept and linkage of resources
with each performance goal.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested DOD to provide written comments on a draft of this report.
However, DOD's Office of Force Transformation provided oral comments.
In official oral comments, DOD officials generally disagreed with our
recommendations. First, pertaining to our recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense assign clear leadership and accountability for
achieving the transformation of military capabilities, DOD stated that
the Secretary of Defense already provides clear leadership for
transformation within DOD, the services play a key role in implementing
the Secretary's priorities, and their roles and responsibilities are
clearly delineated in the Transformation Planning Guidance. DOD also
stated that the transformation roadmaps and the strategic appraisal
process are used to assess transformation progress and inform the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system.
We agree that the Secretary of Defense has provided overall leadership
and a vision for the transformation of military capabilities, and have
highlighted this in our report, but as we also point out, the day-to-
day demands placed on the Secretary make it difficult for him to
personally maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed to
sustain transformation efforts. In addition, currently individual has
clear accountability, such as the Deputy Secretary or another senior
official, to achieve transformation results, and the strategic
appraisal process has not provided an overall evaluation of the
progress achieved in acquiring transformational capabilities. Rather,
the appraisal process has primarily focused on identifying potential
gaps in the capabilities being acquired by each service. Accordingly,
we still believe the recommendation to assign clear leadership and
accountability for transformation results is a critical step needed to
achieve the transformation of military capabilities.
Second, in commenting on our recommendation to establish a formal
crosscutting transformation group, assign it the responsibility for
overseeing and integrating DOD's strategy, and hold it accountable for
results, DOD stated that this recommendation would result in a parallel
and overlapping structure that would compete with the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system. DOD also stated that our
recommended crosscutting group would represent another bureaucratic
layer and lines of authority would not become clearer, but would rather
compete for preeminence within DOD. In regard to our recommendation
that this group also prepare an annual report to Congress on the
progress made in achieving transformation goals, DOD pointed out that
DOD's Annual Defense Report includes the current progress of
transformation.
We disagree that the establishment of a formal crosscutting group would
compete with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
system, or that it would confuse the lines of authority. Therefore, we
believe our recommendation is still warranted. As highlighted in this
report, DOD has chosen to appoint crosscutting implementation teams for
other transformation efforts, the Joint Forces Command has recognized
the need to better coordinate and integrate transformation efforts, and
the advice and experience of other organizations in other government
agencies and in the private sector argue that crosscutting integration
teams are essential for successful transformation efforts. Moreover, in
the absence of such a group, DOD has no routine vehicle for maintaining
a continued focus on transformation goals set by the Secretary, nor a
mechanism for resolving implementation issues that may arise. With
regard to the Annual Defense Report serving as a vehicle to report on
the results of transformation efforts, while we recognize that DOD has
begun to develop transformation performance measures that are intended
to be included in future Annual Defense Reports, to date, these
measures have not been fully developed, and the few measures included
in the 2003 Annual Defense Report are process, rather than results-
oriented. Therefore, we continue to believe that an additional
reporting mechanism that describes the resources devoted to
transformation efforts and outcomes achieved is needed. Such a
reporting mechanism could help Congress determine whether the billions
of dollars being applied to transform military capabilities are
providing an adequate return on investment in light of the significant
long-term affordability challenges that DOD faces.
Third, in commenting on our recommendation that future updates to the
Joint Transformation Roadmap include specific results-oriented tools,
DOD stated that a combination of the existing strategic appraisal
process, joint concepts, service transformation roadmaps, Joint
Transformation Roadmap, and service, combatant command, Joint Staff,
and Office of the Secretary of Defense inputs to the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system provide the results-
oriented management tools we recommended. We disagree with DOD's
comments on this point, because, as we discuss in this report, even
when viewed collectively, these separate elements still lack clearly
defined goals linked to the joint concepts, specific resource
requirements to meet the goals, and performance measures to evaluate
the outcomes of the initiatives. Moreover, DOD's comments did not
specifically address the need for improvements to the Joint
Transformation Roadmap. We continue to believe our recommendation is
needed because of the deficiencies in the joint roadmap we discuss in
this report, which were also recognized by DOD officials as we
conducted our review.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Policy), and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or my Assistant Director, Robert L.
Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are listed
in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy to transform
joint military capabilities, we reviewed the April 2003 Transformation
Planning Guidance and discussed the tasks and time frames it
established with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (OUSD Policy), the Office of Force Transformation,
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Command. To describe the concept
development process, we reviewed the July 2004 Joint Concept
Development and Revision Plan and discussed the process with Joint
Staff and Joint Forces Command officials with responsibilities in that
process. To determine how the joint experimentation process fits into
the strategy, we reviewed the January 2004 Joint Concept Development
and Experimentation Campaign Plan and discussed its relationship to
transformation with officials from the Office of Force Transformation,
OUSD Policy, the Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Staff. We
discussed the role of the joint and service transformation roadmaps in
the transformation strategy with officials from the Joint Staff, the
Joint Forces Command, and the Office of Force Transformation. We
documented the strategic appraisal process and discussed it with
officials from OUSD Policy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Office of Force
Transformation. To determine how the transformation strategy links to
the acquisition process, we reviewed relevant DOD instructions
governing these processes and discussed them with officials from the
Office of Force Transformation, OUSD Policy, the Joint Staff, and the
Joint Forces Command.
To assess the extent to which DOD has clearly established leadership,
accountability for achieving transformation results, and a mechanism to
integrate transformation efforts, we examined DOD instructions
governing the roles and responsibilities of the various defense
organizations outlined in the April 2003 Transformation Planning
Guidance (TPG) and assessed whether the TPG clearly designated
responsibility for implementing the transformation strategy or merely
parts of the strategy. We also gathered and reviewed relevant policy
guidance, instructions, and documents related to the transformation
strategy, including the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap issued in
January 2004, the July 2004 Joint Concept Development Revision Plan,
the draft directive for the Director of Force Transformation, and the
January 2004 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign
Plan. We identified how DOD has implemented similar large, crosscutting
efforts such as training transformation and studied DOD reports that
recognized the importance of clearly designating an entity responsible
and accountable for transformation efforts and that recommended that
crosscutting groups be established to successfully implement these
efforts. We also reviewed various reports that raised concerns about
the lack of adequate authority to coordinate programs DOD-wide issued
by the House Committee on Armed Services, us, DOD, and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Next, we compared this information
to selected key practices consistently found to be at the center of
successful mergers and organizational transformations. These selected
key practices were ensuring that top leadership drives the
transformation and dedicating an implementation team to manage the
transformation process. We discussed the results, with officials from
OUSD Policy, the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Staff, and
the Joint Forces Command responsible for implementing parts of the
strategy.
To assess the extent to which DOD is using results-oriented management
tools in implementing its transformation strategy, we compared these
tools with the management principles embodied in the Government Results
and Performance Act of 1993 and further refined in the act's user
guides and our prior reports. After assessing the management tools and
reviewing our related guidelines, we discussed with DOD officials the
management tools that were relevant to the transformation strategy. To
assess whether DOD was using each management tool, we used relevant
questions derived from our guidelines in analyzing pertinent documents
such as the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2003 Joint
Transformation Roadmap issued in January 2004, and the January 2004
Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan. We did not
assess the extent to which each service's roadmap incorporated these
management tools. We also discussed our results with appropriate DOD
officials including the Office of Force Transformation, Joint Forces
Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director for Program,
Analysis and Evaluation, and OUSD Policy. Finally, to identify DOD
estimates for transformation costs DOD-wide and costs for the joint
capabilities described in the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap, we
obtained cost estimates from official DOD reports. We assessed the
reliability of the data by corroborating the data with knowledgeable
agency officials and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for
our purposes.
Organizations Visited for this Assignment:
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of Force Transformation:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics:
* Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation:
Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* Joint Transformation Division, Operational Plans and Joint Force
Development, J-7:
* Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8:
Joint Forces Command:
* Joint Experimentation Directorate, J-9:
* Joint Requirements and Integration and Division, J-8:
* Office of Prototype Oversight, Joint Training Directorate and Joint
Warfighting Center, J-7:
* Strategy and Analysis Directorate, J-5:
We conducted our review from May 2003 through October 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Brenda Waterfield, John Beauchamp,
Dawn Godfrey, Mary Jo LaCasse, Sarah E. Veale, Elizabeth H. Curda,
Cheryl A. Weissman, and David A. Mayfield made key contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation
for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: March 10,
2004.
Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well
Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130
Aircraft Need to Be Clarified. GAO-04-925. Washington, D.C.: August 12,
2004.
Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing
Its Implementation. GAO-04-858. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2004.
Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress
Remain. GAO-04-547. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of
DOD's Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. Washington, D.C.: May 7,
2004.
Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and
Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management
Transformation. GAO-04-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2004.
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements
for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for
Future Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003.
Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-03-95. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum
of DOD's Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO-03-237. Washington,
D.C.: December 5, 2002.
Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations. GAO-03-52. Washington, D.C.: December 2,
2002.
Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better
Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope. GAO-03-13. Washington, D.C.:
November 4, 2002.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint
Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.:
November 16, 2001.
Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and
Focused. GAO-01-853. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems
Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.
The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency Annual
Performance Plans. GAO/GGD-10.1.20. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1998.
Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate
Congressional Review (Version 1). GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, D.C.:
May 1, 1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003).
[2] GAO, Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and
Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management
Transformation, GAO-04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004).
[3] Transformation Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C.: April 2003.
[4] GAO, Human Capital: Building on DOD's Reform Effort to Foster
Governmentwide Improvements, GAO-03-851T (Washington, D.C.: June 4,
2003).
[5] Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Office of Force
Transformation, (Washington, D.C.: 2003).
[6] GAO-03-669.
[7] GAO-03-669.
[8] Congress enacted this legislation to provide for, among other
things, the establishment of strategic planning and performance
measurement in the federal government. See Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[9] The Director, Office of Force Transformation, advises the Secretary
of Defense on transformation issues.
[10] Experimentation uses various types of assessments to develop,
refine, and validate joint concepts and their associated capabilities.
These activities vary in scale but are designed to identify areas to
explore (that is, develop hypotheses) and then use simulated or live
experiments to confirm, refute, or modify the ideas.
[11] The Future Years Defense Program is a DOD centralized report that
provides information on DOD's current and planned outyear budget
requests.
[12] The Naval Transformation Roadmap represents the Navy and Marine
Corps plan.
[13] Defense Agencies that are assigned wartime support missions are
designated as Combat Support Agencies and include agencies such as the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency,
the Defense Logistics Agency, and the National Security Agency.
[14] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01D: Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. March 12, 2004.
[15] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council to
assist the Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and
assessing the priority of joint military capabilities to meet the
national military and defense strategies. Chariman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Instruction 5123.01B: Charter of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council. April 15, 2004.
[16] GAO-03-669.
[17] GAO-03-669.
[18] GAO-04-551T.
[19] DOD defines "Executive Agent" as the Head of a DOD Component to
whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
assigned specific responsibilities, functions and authorities to
provide support..for designated activities that involve two or more
DOD Components. DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, Sec. 3.1,
September 3, 2002.
[20] U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation Roadmap
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21, 2004).
[21] Hearings on Defense Transformation Before the House Committee on
Armed Services: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, 108th Cong. 5,33 (2004) (statement of Arthur Cebrowski,
Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense).
[22] H.R. Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.355 (2004).
[23] H.R. Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.302 (2004).
[24] Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Joint
Warfighting and Readiness: Management of Network Centric Warfare Within
the Department of Defense, D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22,
2004).
[25] Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing
linking sensors, decision makers, and shooters, which is intended to
result in increased mission effectiveness.
[26] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and
Challenges Facing Its Implementation, GAO-04-858 (Washington, D.C.:
July 28, 2004).
[27] GAO, Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress
Remain, GAO-04-547 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
[28] GAO, Force Structure: Enhanced Strategic Planning Can Enhance
DOD's UAV Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).
[29] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations, GAO-03-52 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2,
2002).
[30] C.A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a
New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Mar. 2004).
[31] Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense Capabilities
Study: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: December, 2003).
[32] GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage
DOD's Joint Experimentation Program, GAO-02-856 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
29, 2002).
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