Missile Defense
Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed
Gao ID: GAO-04-254 February 26, 2004
In August 2000, the Defense Department's (DOD) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), made 50 recommendations on a test program for a system to defeat long-range ballistic missile threats against the United States. DOD's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to begin fielding the system by September 2004. GAO examined (1) how MDA addressed DOT&E's recommendations and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of the system to be fielded by September 2004. GAO issued a classified report on this subject in June 2003. This unclassified, updated version reflects changes in MDA's test schedule.
MDA is addressing most of DOT&E's recommendations on flight testing but will not complete many actions before September 2004. For example, DOT&E recommended removing flight test range limitations by adding more intercept regions and launch locations to add greater realism to its tests. MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure to add five intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new locations. By September 2004, one of the regions will be tested. MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's proposals on ground testing. For example, although MDA had begun upgrading a ground facility to provide a realistic testing environment for the interceptor, MDA deferred testing at the facility to fund other priorities. Finally, MDA is addressing DOT&E's recommendations on discrimination--the system's ability to find an enemy warhead among decoys--by funding analysis programs. Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be fielded by September: MDA will not demonstrate in flight tests a critical radar called Cobra Dane before that date or conduct a system-level demonstration, and has yet to test its three-stage boosters as part of a planned intercept.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
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GAO-04-254, Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
February 2004:
Missile Defense:
Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated
Assessment Needed:
GAO-04-254:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-254, a report to Congressional Requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In August 2000, the Defense Department …s (DOD) Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), made 50 recommendations on a test program
for a system to defeat long-range ballistic missile threats against the
United States. DOD‘s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to begin
fielding the system by September 2004.
GAO examined (1) how MDA addressed DOT&E‘s recommendations and (2) what
is known about the effectiveness of the system to be fielded by
September 2004. GAO issued a classified report on this subject in June
2003. This unclassified, updated version reflects changes in MDA‘s test
schedule.
What GAO Found:
MDA is addressing most of DOT&E‘s recommendations on flight testing but
will not complete many actions before September 2004. For example,
DOT&E recommended removing flight test range limitations by adding more
intercept regions and launch locations to add greater realism to its
tests. MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure to add five
intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new
locations. By September 2004, one of the regions will be tested.
MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's proposals on ground testing.
For example, although MDA had begun upgrading a ground facility to
provide a realistic testing environment for the interceptor, MDA
deferred testing at the facility to fund other priorities. Finally, MDA
is addressing DOT&E's recommendations on discrimination--the system's
ability to find an enemy warhead among decoys--by funding analysis
programs.
Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic
missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be
fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed
configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be
fielded by September: MDA will not demonstrate in flight tests a
critical radar called Cobra Dane before that date or conduct a system-
level demonstration, and has yet to test its three-stage boosters as
part of a planned intercept.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends DOT&E report on the status of MDA‘s responses to its
recommendations and advise MDA how to modify the test program to
address long-standing concerns. DOD agreed with these recommendations,
while noting there have been many changes in its test program and its
acquisition strategy and structure since DOT&E‘s August 2000 report.
GAO revised the report to reflect the latest, approved test program but
believes most DOT&E recommendations remain relevant given the
significant technical challenges and uncertainties facing MDA.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-254.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Bob Levin at (202)
512-4841 or levinr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address DOT&E
Recommendations:
Characterization of Initial Defensive Capability:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Abbreviations:
BMDO: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
CHOP: Countermeasures Hands-On Program:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT&E: Director, Operational Test and Evaluation:
DRR: Deployment Readiness Review:
EKV: Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle:
FY: fiscal year:
GMD: Ground-based Midcourse Defense:
GPS: Global Positioning System:
HWIL: Hardware in the Loop:
IFICS: In-Flight Interceptor Communications System:
IFT: Integrated Flight Test:
IOC: Initial Operational Capability:
LFT&E: Live Fire Test and Evaluation:
LIDS: Lead System Integrator (LSI) Integrated Distributed Simulation:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
NMD: National Missile Defense:
NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive:
OPINE: Operations in the Nuclear Environment:
ORD: Operational Requirements Document:
UEWR: Upgraded Early Warning Radar:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 26, 2004:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
House of Representatives:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) within the Department of Defense (DOD)
is developing and testing components of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) element, which is intended to defeat long-range ballistic
missile threats in the midcourse phase of flight.[Footnote 1] When
deployed, GMD will include (1) space-and ground-based sensors to
provide early warning and tracking of missile launches; (2) ground-and
sea-based radars to identify and refine the tracks of threatening
missiles (called reentry vehicles) and associated objects; (3) ground-
based interceptors, each consisting of a three-stage booster and kill
vehicle, to destroy enemy missiles through "hit-to-kill" impacts
outside the atmosphere; and (4) fire control nodes for battle
management and execution of the GMD mission.
In August 2000, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),
submitted a report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics for consideration at DOD's deployment
readiness review for the National Missile Defense system.[Footnote 2]
The purpose of the report was to provide an independent assessment of
the system's potential operational effectiveness and suitability. Based
on its assessment of the system at that time and the adequacy of
testing in the context of deployment, it stated that test results
supported a decision to continue development but not deployment. In the
report, DOT&E stated that the current test program required
augmentation and probably significant funding increases to demonstrate
an operationally effective system for deployment. The report included a
list of 50 detailed recommendations regarding the test program. In
September 2000, the President decided to defer the deployment decision
to the next administration, and MDA (then named the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization) continued with development of the system.
In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense refocused the ballistic
missile defense program into a broad-based research and development
effort managed by MDA. The new program follows a "capability-based
approach" and aims at developing layered defenses to intercept missiles
in all phases of flight. According to MDA, such an approach adds
flexibility to the acquisition process by permitting the development
and testing of mature technologies for the quick delivery of some
capability. The new approach also allows DOD to evolve and demonstrate
additional improvements in missile defense systems before committing to
procurement and operations. To this end, MDA is following a "block"
approach, which defines, develops, produces or acquires, and fields
operational capability in incremental blocks. Each block is designed to
build capability into the system by introducing new or improved
technology. The first block--Block 2004--in this approach to offer a
defensive capability builds upon MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS) Test Bed for conducting more realistic testing of ballistic
missile defense elements, of which GMD is the centerpiece.
In December 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding
components of the ballistic missile defense system for operational use
by 2004. That is, in addition to focusing resources on the development
of the BMDS Test Bed for developmental testing of missile defense
elements, he instructed MDA to build in an initial defensive capability
that would protect the United States against long-range missile
attacks. The Secretary of Defense stated that "—it would be a very
preliminary, modest capability." DOD decided to begin fielding an
initial capability by September 2004.
Because of the significance of recommendations made by DOT&E during
DOD's deployment readiness review and the decision by the President to
deploy an initial defensive capability, you asked us to examine (1) the
actions taken or planned by MDA that address the recommendations made
by DOT&E, and (2) what is known about the effectiveness and limitations
of the initial defensive capability to defeat long-range ballistic
missiles in the September 2004 time frame. The scope and methodology
for our review is included in appendix I.
We provided you with a classified report on this subject in June 2003.
This is an unclassified version of that report, which has also been
updated as of December 2003 to reflect changes in the GMD test program.
In preparing this unclassified version, we removed details on some of
our findings after an extensive declassification process. These details
can be found in the classified version of the report. The current
version has been reviewed by the DOD and approved for public release.
Results in Brief:
Of the recommendations listed in the August 2000 DOT&E report--which we
grouped under flight testing, ground testing, target discrimination,
and programmatics categories--MDA is taking actions that, over time,
address most of the flight testing recommendations but, by contrast,
substantially fewer of the remaining recommendations. Specifically,
* MDA is addressing most of the DOT&E's recommendations on flight
testing but will not complete many actions before September 2004. For
example, DOT&E recommended the removal of flight test range limitations
by adding more intercept regions and launch locations to achieve new
intercept geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer ranges
flown by the interceptor. MDA is expanding the test range
infrastructure through the development of the Test Bed to add five
intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new
locations. By September 2004, MDA will have tested in one of the five
new intercept regions. Other DOT&E recommendations on enhanced realism
and the elimination of artificialities in flight tests are being acted
upon by MDA, but full realization will take time to complete.
* MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's recommendations on ground
testing. For example, although MDA had taken steps to proceed with the
design and construction of a hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the
Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tennessee, comprehensive
testing of the kill vehicle in this facility has been deferred beyond
Block 2004 because of funding constraints. However, lethality testing
for GMD engagements on the ground has been enhanced with investments in
the Hypersonic Upgrade Program facility at Holloman Air Force Base.
* MDA is generally addressing DOT&E's recommendations on
discrimination--the system's ability to identify the true reentry
vehicle from among decoys and associated objects. MDA has substantially
increased the scope of work being done in discrimination, but MDA's
flight tests planned through September 2007 are not designed to address
the challenge posed by the certain countermeasures that DOT&E
identified as simple for an enemy to implement. MDA maintains that the
complexity and challenge of target suites used in integrated flight
tests will increase as the discrimination capability is incrementally
proven.
The predicted effectiveness of the initial defensive capability to
defeat long-range ballistic missiles is currently based on a limited
set of flight-test data. For example, none of the components of the
initial defensive capability to be fielded in September 2004--
interceptors, fire control nodes for battle management and execution,
upgraded radars, and forward-deployed Aegis radars on Navy cruisers and
destroyers--has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. As
such, current predictions of effectiveness are based on analysis and
simulations of expected performance of constituent components. The most
significant uncertainties surrounding the capability to be fielded in
September 2004 are (1) MDA does not plan to demonstrate capabilities of
a critical radar for use with the GMD element, called Cobra Dane, in
flight tests before that date; (2) MDA has yet to test both three-stage
boosters as part of an attempted intercept; and (3) MDA does not plan
to conduct a system-level demonstration of the initial defensive
capability in flight testing before September 2004. Furthermore, a
notable limitation of system effectiveness is the inability of system
radars to perform rigorous target discrimination. The Cobra Dane radar
and the upgraded early warning radar in California can perform
rudimentary target discrimination, but the kill vehicle itself must
perform final target selection during the endgame.
The recommendations in this report also appeared in our classified
June 2003 report. We have made these recommendations to provide
decision makers DOT&E's assessment of MDA's actions related to concerns
raised by DOT&E's August 2000 report. In commenting on a draft of our
June 2003 report, DOD agreed with our recommendations. The department
raised concerns, however, that the GMD test program as described in
this report is no longer current and the program strategy and structure
have changed since DOT&E submitted its report. While the GMD test
program has, indeed, been in a constant state of flux, thus
complicating our analysis, our report presents the latest, approved
test program information provided to us by MDA. Also, despite
alterations to the acquisition strategy and structure of the ballistic
missile defense system, we believe most of the DOT&E recommendations
are still relevant because the technical challenges and uncertainty
with developing, testing, and fielding effective defensive
capabilities, as identified in the August 2000 DOT&E report, remain
significant.
Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address DOT&E
Recommendations:
The August 2000 DOT&E report summarized the progress, up to that date,
of the National Missile Defense program and the adequacy of testing in
the context of a deployment decision.[Footnote 3] At the time, the
development program revolved around a series of ground and flight tests
and was to have culminated in an initial operational capability by the
end of fiscal year 2005. Formal test documentation called for a total
of 16 integrated flight tests (system-level intercept attempts) through
2004 with three additional flight tests during Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation during the 2005 fiscal year. DOT&E's principal finding
was that ground and flight tests completed up to that time did not
provide results of sufficient fidelity to support a deployment
decision. Indeed, when the deployment readiness review was held, there
had been two failed intercepts out of three attempts. Furthermore, as
stated in the DOT&E report, ground testing was not adequate to yield
credible estimates of GMD system performance. DOT&E indicated that the
current test program required augmentation and probably significant
funding increases to demonstrate an operationally effective system for
deployment. Accordingly, the report included a list of detailed
recommendations for enhancing the test program.
DOT&E made 50 specific, interrelated recommendations, which we
organized into the following four overarching categories: Flight
Testing, Ground Testing, Target Discrimination,[Footnote 4] and
Programmatics. Although DOT&E categorized discrimination-related
recommendations under the flight-testing and ground-testing
categories, we created a separate category because discrimination was
of principal concern to DOT&E at the time. DOD classified the full text
of the recommendations. A detailed assessment indicating whether
actions have been initiated by MDA and what their timing is relative to
the September 2004 initial defensive capability date can be found in
our June 2003 classified report on this subject. A summary of MDA
actions to address the DOT&E recommendations is provided below.
DOT&E Recommendations on Flight Testing:
Integrated flight tests of the GMD element are demonstrations of system
performance during which an interceptor is launched to engage and
intercept a target reentry vehicle (mock warhead) above the atmosphere.
Many recommendations (20 of 50) in the DOT&E report pertain to aspects
of integrated flight testing, such as deficiencies in flight-test
complexity, operational realism, and artificialities. DOT&E's concerns
with the composition of target suites in flight tests for testing
discrimination are discussed separately in the discrimination section
of this report. DOT&E reported that increasing the scope of flight
testing was essential to stress the limits of system design and to keep
pace with system development.
MDA is taking actions that address many of the shortcomings in flight
testing DOT&E identified in its August 2000 report. Indeed, the
development of the BMDS Test Bed--the agency's key instrument for
enhancing the existing test infrastructure to provide more realistic
testing--should go far in addressing these DOT&E recommendations over
the long term. Currently, flight tests are limited to target launches
out of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and interceptor launches
out of Kwajalein Missile Range in the western Pacific.[Footnote 5] For
enhancing the capabilities of integrated flight testing, the test bed
adds an interceptor launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base; target
launch facilities at Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska; a GMD fire control
node at Fort Greely, Alaska; an upgraded early warning radar at Beale
Air Force Base, California; upgraded communication links among test bed
components; and test infrastructure to support five additional
intercept regions. The ship-based Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar is also
available as a forward-deployed asset for early target tracking. In
addition, the design and construction of a sea-based X-band radar,
which would be positioned on a mobile platform in the Pacific, has been
funded by MDA and is scheduled to be available for test bed utilization
in late 2005. Other components of the BMDS Test Bed such as the Cobra
Dane radar in Shemya, Alaska, and interceptors at Fort Greely will not
actively participate in integrated flight tests at least through
September 2007.
Flight Test Complexity:
Several August 2000 DOT&E recommendations call for integrated flight
testing with Category B engagements[Footnote 6] and scenarios with
multiple threatening reentry vehicles, both of which are expected to be
common during operational missions. In addition, the recommendations
call for integrated flight testing to be performed under increasingly
difficult conditions and to be made more challenging through, for
example, testing under various solar and weather conditions. Our
analysis of the GMD test program as it pertains to flight test
complexity, based on the March 2003 Developmental Master Test Plan for
the GMD element and related program documentation, is summarized below.
* Flight Test Complexity--Actions Taken or Planned. The GMD test plan
calls for Category B engagements beginning with Integrated Flight Test
15 (IFT-15), scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.
Furthermore, it indicates that Category B engagements would be a common
occurrence of flight testing, because the weapon task plan[Footnote 7]
would be generated from Beale or Aegis radar data. According to MDA
officials, however, the decision to conduct future flight tests under
Category B engagements is currently under review; the resolution will
depend on the individual flight test scenario and the maturity of
battle management assets. The GMD Developmental Master Test Plan also
shows that an integrated flight test (designated IFT-22/23) in which
two interceptors are launched against two attacking reentry vehicles
(multiple simultaneous engagements) will be carried out in fiscal year
2007.
* Flight Test Complexity--Actions Not Taken or Planned. Although
previous flight tests have been conducted under limited adverse
conditions (light rain), flight tests to assess the actual effects of
severe weather on system performance are not currently planned.
According to the program office, the verification of system performance
in adverse weather will be achieved through modeling and simulation
grounded in technical measurements and flight test data. Furthermore, a
nighttime engagement was attempted during IFT-10 (December 2002), but
the failure of the kill vehicle to separate from the surrogate booster
precluded collection of any applicable data.
Operational Realism:
The recommendations on operational realism reflect limitations of the
current test range. Currently, intercept tests are constrained to a
single corridor and intercept region--target launches out of Vandenberg
Air Force Base and interceptor launches out of the Reagan Test Site. As
a result, flight-test engagement conditions are limited to those with
low closing velocities and short interceptor fly-out ranges. DOT&E
called for an expansion of engagement conditions and suggested adding
more intercept regions and launch locations to achieve new intercept
geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer ranges flown by the
interceptor during flight testing.
* Operational Realism--Actions Taken or Planned. The expansion of the
test range in the Pacific with the development of the BMDS Test Bed
will have a significant impact on achieving operational realism in
integrated flight tests. The Block 2004 Test Bed adds five intercept
regions, target launches out of Kodiak Launch Complex, and interceptor
launches out of Vandenberg Air Force Base. The combination allows for
flight tests with new intercept geometries, additional crossing angles,
higher closing velocities, and longer ranges flown by the interceptor.
For example, IFT-15 (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004) will be
conducted with a target launch out of Kodiak, and IFT-17 (fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2005) will be the first test with an interceptor
launched from Vandenberg.
* Operational Realism--Caveats. The principal caveat to the associated
MDA actions addressing operational realism is timing. By September
2004, one of the five new intercept regions, north of Reagan Test Site,
will have been exercised. The remaining new intercept regions will not
be exercised until after September 2004. For example, the two intercept
regions off the west coast of the United States will be used in IFT-17
(fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005) and IFT-18 (fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2005), respectively. A fourth intercept point will be
exercised in IFT-21 (third quarter of fiscal year 2006). Finally, the
fifth intercept point will be exercised as part of the multiple
simultaneous engagement to be conducted in fiscal year 2007.
Artificialities:
The DOT&E recommendations on flight test artificialities--such as the
removal of surrogates (test range assets emulating operational assets)-
-also reflect limitations of the current test range. The most
artificial surrogate noted in the August 2000 DOT&E Report was the
placement of a C-band transponder[Footnote 8] on the target reentry
vehicle. The transponder was essential for the execution of flight
tests, because in conjunction with the test range radar (designated
FPQ-14[Footnote 9]), there were no other non-artificial options
available to track the reentry vehicle with sufficient accuracy for
executing the mission. DOT&E argued that this artificiality be phased
out and, in general, recommended the system utilized in integrated
flight tests be as functional and representative as possible.
* Artificialities--Actions Taken or Planned. Use of the transponder/
FPQ-14 radar combination as a surrogate radar for midcourse tracking is
planned to be phased out. Indeed, IFT-15 (fourth quarter of fiscal year
2004) would be the first test that does not use this surrogate for
mission execution. Rather, in integrated flight tests IFT-15 and
beyond, midcourse tracking of the target suite would be achieved
through the use of the Beale upgraded early warning radar or, pending
ongoing analysis by GMD, the Aegis SPY-1 radar. The eventual use of the
sea-based X-band radar beginning in late 2005 can also be used for
midcourse tracking. The removal of other surrogates is under way. For
example, the short-range surrogate interceptor booster, which has been
used in all flight tests to date, is scheduled to be replaced with two
more operationally representative boosters beginning with IFT-14 (third
quarter of fiscal year 2004).
* Artificialities--Actions Not Taken or Planned. The MDA is not
currently considering conducting flight tests under unrehearsed and
unscripted conditions.
Elimination of Flight Tests:
Overall, the current DOT&E has looked favorably on MDA's actions that
address its recommendations, because the GMD test infrastructure is
being significantly enhanced to allow for more flight test complexity,
operational realism, and artificialities. We noted, however, that since
DOT&E's August 2000 assessment, MDA has reduced the extent of the
flight test program, as follows:
* Integrated Flight Tests--Number of Cancellations. During the initial
planning phases of the revised test program, MDA considered conducting
four intercept attempts per year. But after considerable planning and
contract evaluations, MDA limited the flight test program to no more
than three intercept attempts per year because of overlapping test
objectives and funding constraints. Significantly, the previous GMD
test program at the time of the deployment readiness review called for
a total of 19 integrated flight tests to be carried out through fiscal
year 2005. The current test program, however, now has a total of 12
integrated flight tests through fiscal year 2005--because of the
cancellation of IFT-11, 12, and 16, and the conversion of IFT-13 to
booster tests (IFT-13A and 13B). To date, 8 of the 12 have been
completed under largely the same test conditions that were critically
assessed by DOT&E. In short, only two flight tests under improved test
conditions with more representative hardware are planned to be
conducted before September 2004, the time at which the initial
defensive capability is scheduled to become available.
* Operational Testing--No Longer Required. The previous GMD test
program also called for operational testing--Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation--by the military services. Operational testing is a
statutory requirement for DOT&E to independently determine operational
effectiveness and suitability of a deployed system for use by the
warfighter. MDA does not plan to operationally test the Block 2004 GMD
element before it is available for initial defensive operations. The
September 2004 fielding is not connected with a full-rate production
decision that would clearly trigger statutory operational testing
requirements. Nonetheless, the Combined Test Force, a group of users
and developers, plans tests to incorporate both developmental and
operational test requirements in the test program.
DOT&E'S Recommendations on Ground Testing:
The 13 ground testing recommendations formulated by DOT&E in its August
2000 report are focused concerns encompassing four areas: (1) realistic
testing of kill vehicle functions in a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWIL)
facility,[Footnote 10] (2) ground-based lethality testing, (3)
development of the system-level simulation known as the Lead System
Integrator Integration Distributed Simulation (LIDS), and (4)
Operations in a Nuclear Environment (OPINE) testing of kill vehicle
components. In general, DOT&E's recommendations on ground testing are
not being addressed.
Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing:
A number of the August 2000 DOT&E ground testing recommendations
pertain to the hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle built
by Raytheon. For example, a test article is placed in an evacuated
chamber to simulate an exoatmospheric environment, and infrared
radiation of a simulated target scene is projected onto the kill
vehicle's sensors. DOT&E recommended "that an innovative new approach
needs to be taken towards hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill
vehicle, so that potential design problems or discrimination challenges
can be wrung out on the ground in lieu of expensive flight tests."
DOT&E stated that, in order to verify kill vehicle performance, kill
vehicle testing should be executed using actual unit hardware in a
hardware-in-the-loop facility capable of providing a realistic space
environment and threat scene. MDA had taken steps to proceed with the
design and construction of a hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the
Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee. Although
an initial test capability had been planned for the 2004 time frame,
testing at the Arnold Engineering facility has been deferred beyond
Block 2004 based on Test Bed funding constraints. In response to a
draft of this report, MDA stated that future investments and test
events at this facility are subject to MDA internal management trade-
offs among the numerous priorities associated with the whole missile
defense program portfolio.
Lethality Testing:
DOT&E made recommendations in its August 2000 report for improving GMD
lethality testing--testing aimed at assessing a kill vehicle's
effectiveness in destroying a reentry vehicle. Current test plans call
for an approach whereby ground-based experiments are conducted to
collect data to anchor simulations, which in turn are used to assess
lethality performance. Indeed, GMD expects to anchor such simulations
from data derived from improved "sled testing," which uses full-scale
targets in the newly developed Holloman Air Force Base Hypersonic
Upgrade Program facility. However, there are no plans to conduct
intercept flight tests of the interceptor's ability to destroy threat
representative targets that fulfill the Live Fire Test and Evaluation
requirements. Rather, hit point information is collected from actual
intercept tests, which, in turn, is used as input to simulations to
determine whether the impact was lethal.
LIDS:
Another area of ground testing recommendations identified in the August
2000 DOT&E report concerned the development and use of system-level
digital simulations. During the time of the deployment readiness
review, the prime contractor's principal tool for assessing system
performance over a broad range of scenarios was the end-to-end digital
simulation known as LIDS. Because the development of the simulation was
behind schedule and unavailable to support analyses of overall system
performance, DOT&E reported that results obtained from it should not be
used in making a deployment decision. DOT&E recommended that LIDS
capability be "evolved to a fully validated, high-fidelity simulation."
In addition, DOT&E recommended that LIDS be made flexible enough to
permit independent use by test agencies. MDA disagrees with the
recommendations pertaining to LIDS. MDA views LIDS as one of many tools
to analyze performance aspects of the GMD element and does not believe
that LIDS needs to be developed to the level expected by DOT&E.
According to the agency, a baseline of models and simulations are
available that are intended to collectively support the entire range of
analysis required to verify the capabilities of the GMD elements.
Furthermore, MDA asserts the evolution of LIDS from Software Build 4 to
its current Software Build 6.1.0 has improved the flexibility of the
system to allow for sensitivity analyses by government users. According
to MDA, extensive analysis using LIDS has been conducted at the Joint
National Integration Center at Shriever Air Force Base, Colorado.
OPINE Testing:
Finally, the remaining ground testing recommendations identified in the
August 2000 DOT&E report focus on OPINE testing, which refers to the
operation of individual GMD components in environments induced by
nuclear explosions. Details can be found in the classified version of
this report.
DOT&E Recommendations on Target Discrimination:
Target discrimination is a critical function of a missile defense
engagement that requires the successful execution of a sequence of
functions, including target detection, target tracking, estimations of
physical characteristics of tracked objects, and data fusion. DOT&E had
two overarching concerns with the operational testing of the
discrimination function:
* Capability against diverse threats. Fundamentally, successful target
discrimination requires that the defense be able to anticipate many
characteristics of the threat. DOT&E, therefore, was concerned that
discrimination algorithms may not be sufficiently robust to handle
unanticipated threat scenes.
* The quality and quantity of information known prior to testing. DOT&E
was concerned that every physical property of target objects is known
with unrealistic accuracy in advance of flight tests.
Twelve of 50 recommendations in the August 2000 DOT&E report pertain to
the testing of the discrimination function. Specifically, DOT&E
recommended adding challenging yet unsophisticated countermeasures to
the target suites of integrated flight tests. DOT&E also recommended
integrating countermeasures developed by the Countermeasures Hands-On
Program[Footnote 11] (CHOP) into target suites of integrated flight
tests. Finally, DOT&E recommended executing flight test events--either
intercept attempts or risk reduction flights--that have a "pop quiz"
component with respect to radar discrimination. Operationally, this
type of flight test is more representative of a true tactical
engagement, because the exact composition and type of countermeasures
flown in an actual engagement are generally unknown. Details can be
found in the classified version of this report.
Relative to the previous test program, MDA has substantially increased
the scope of work being done in discrimination. MDA is pursuing a block
approach that incrementally builds to a system-level discrimination
architecture that incorporates a network of sensors. The idea is to
observe the target suite throughout its trajectory using an array of
ground-and space-based sensors and to combine individual observations
to formulate a "discrimination solution." MDA is also investing
resources to study the discrimination problem and, for example, is
moving forward with flight test events focused on radar discrimination
and large analysis programs.
MDA has plans to conduct four Radar Certification Flights through
fiscal year 2006. These are non-intercept flight tests for
comprehensively characterizing the discrimination capability of the X-
band radar and to support the development of upgraded early warning
radars. Furthermore, these tests are expected to have a "pop quiz"
component to examine radar discrimination. MDA has not yet scheduled
"pop quiz" testing in relation to kill vehicle's capability to perform
target discrimination.
MDA initiated and continues to fund analysis programs for investigating
promising technical concepts to improve its capabilities against enemy
countermeasures. For example, one such program, Project Hercules, is
focused on the development and testing of discrimination algorithms and
draws on academic, government, and industry expertise. Details can be
found in the classified version of this report.
Despite MDA's increased scope of work in the discrimination area,
as described above, the agency's specific actions pertaining to
integrated flight testing only partially address the August 2000 DOT&E
recommendations. No intercept flight tests of the current test plan,
which goes through IFT-26 (fiscal year 2007), are planned to address
the challenge posed by an enemy's use of unsophisticated but more
challenging countermeasures. Rather, agency officials told us that the
technical challenges posed by such countermeasures are being analyzed
and may be inserted into the flight test program at a later time.
DOT&E Recommendations on Programmatics:
The remaining five recommendations from the August 2000 DOT&E report
pertain to concerns on programmatic issues, namely, adequacy of spares
in flight testing, and performance requirements. MDA has not provided
for adequate target or interceptor backups (hot spares) during flight
tests. MDA officials stated that additional target and interceptor
spares can be costly, but they are considering the issue. Even if
implemented, MDA's actions that address the recommendations on spares
would not have a significant impact on the actual conduct of flight
tests but would reduce schedule risk.
When DOT&E made its recommendations in August 2000, the GMD element was
being developed according to operational requirements. However, MDA is
now following a fundamentally new acquisition strategy--one that is
capability-based with no formal operational requirements developed by
the services. Hence, MDA has no plans to reexamine the reliability
requirements. Nonetheless, the current test program is addressing
certain performance issues raised by DOT&E. For example, the GMD
program office is tracking the prime contractor's progress in meeting
target discrimination goals.
Characterization of Initial Defensive Capability:
Under the new acquisition strategy outlined by the Secretary of Defense
in his January 2002 memorandum, the ballistic missile defense program
has been refocused into a broad-based research and development effort
managed by MDA. The new program aims at developing layered defenses to
intercept missiles in all phases of flight and, if directed, to use
developmental prototypes and test assets to provide an early
operational capability. And, as stated above, system development is not
subject to the formal operational requirements developed by the
Services.
On December 16, 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding the
first increment of the multi-element ballistic missile defense system
in 2004. The Secretary of Defense stated the next day that "—it would
be a very preliminary, modest capability." The initial defensive
capability for defending the United States against long-range missiles
would be based on the GMD element of the Test Bed and augmented with
more interceptors and external sensors, as follows:
* GMD Element as part of the BMDS. The principal components of the GMD
element for defensive operations include a total of up to
10 interceptors sited at Fort Greely (6) and Vandenberg Air Force Base
(4); GMD fire control nodes at Fort Greely and Schriever Air Force Base
for battle management and execution; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at
Eareckson Air Station; and an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air
Force Base.
* External Sensors. Existing sensors external to the GMD element would
also be available for defensive operations, including Defense Support
Program satellites for early warning of missile launches, and three
forward-deployed Aegis AN/SPY-1 radars on existing Navy destroyers for
early midcourse tracking.
The above assets comprise the initial configuration, which is scheduled
for fielding by the end of September 2004. The agency's near-term
intention is to grow this capability by adding 10 interceptors at Fort
Greely, a sea-based X-band radar, and an upgraded early warning radar
at Fylingdales, England,[Footnote 12] by the end of 2005.
Uncertainties of the Initial Defensive Capability:
MDA is moving forward, as directed by the President, with the fielding
of an initial defensive capability by the end of the 2004 fiscal year
to protect the United States from long-range missiles. MDA cannot at
this time formulate a credible assessment of system-level
effectiveness, because critical components like the Cobra Dane radar
and interceptor boosters have yet to be developed and tested in a
flight test environment, and no initial defensive capability is
available for a system-level demonstration and evaluation.
* Cobra Dane Radar. The capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar will not
be demonstrated in flight testing before September 2004. It is an L-
band phased array radar located at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya,
Alaska, at the western end of the Aleutian chain. Its close proximity
to Russia allows it to perform its primary mission of collecting data
on intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic
missile test launches to the Kamchatka impact area. Since the Cobra
Dane radar is currently being used in a surveillance mode, it does not
require real time communications and data processing capabilities.
After planned software and hardware upgrades to be completed in fiscal
year 2004, it will have the additional mission to perform real-time
acquisition and tracking, functions critical for ballistic missile
defense.
* Interceptor Boosters. In July 1998, the GMD prime contractor (Boeing)
began developing a new three-stage booster for its ground-based
interceptor from commercial off-the-shelf components. The contractor
encountered difficulty, and by the time the booster was flight tested
in August 2001, it was already about 18 months behind schedule.
Subsequently, to reduce risk, MDA altered its strategy for acquiring a
new booster for the GMD interceptor. Development of the original
booster was transferred to Lockheed Martin, and MDA authorized the GMD
prime contractor to develop a second source for the booster by awarding
a subcontract to Orbital Sciences Corporation. Both contractors are
developing boosters for use in the September 2004 initial defensive
capability. The first demonstration of an operational booster in an
attempted intercept is scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year
2004.
* System-Level Testing. A system-level demonstration of the initial
defensive capability will not be conducted prior to September 2004. To
date, integrated flight tests have demonstrated basic functionality of
a representative ballistic missile defense system using surrogate and
prototype components, and have shown success in intercepting a mock
reentry vehicle in a developmental test environment. The first flight
test consisting of components closest to the configuration of the
September 2004 initial defensive capability is IFT-14, which is
currently scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. The test
will incorporate Block 2004 prototypes of the interceptor booster and
kill vehicle of the configuration intended for operational use
beginning in September 2004. In addition, the first tactical build of
the battle management software will be utilized in IFT-14. However,
interceptors will not be launched out of Fort Greeley in IFT-14 and
IFT-15 (the remaining integrated flight tests to be conducted before
September 2004).
In commenting on a draft of this report, MDA stated that while it
cannot address all technical concerns for the initial fielding, it has
added the following activities:
* Enhanced producibility, quality, and reliability efforts.
* Increased operational focus in the developmental program, e.g.,
military utility and effectiveness assessments.
* Expanded command and control, battle management, and operator
integration in BMDS testing to support fielding of initial defensive
capabilities in 2004.
MDA also stated that the results of these program decisions are
intended to provide a comprehensive program that demonstrates
operational effectiveness and military utility against credible threats
in an operational environment.
Effectiveness of September 2004 and December 2005 Initial Defensive
Capability:
System effectiveness is characterized in terms of the following four
performance metrics: (1) defended area, (2) launch area denied,
(3) probability of engagement success, and (4) raid size breakpoint.
Defended area is the portion of the United States protected against
long-range missile attacks and, as a metric, is usually reported
relative to a single threat country or region; launch area denied
simply refers to the collection of threat countries from which the
United States is protected. The probability of engagement success is
the probability that all attacking warheads are destroyed, derived from
the probabilities associated with missile defense functions like
detection, discrimination, and hit-to-kill. Finally, raid size
breakpoint is the maximum number of warheads the system can
realistically defeat in a single engagement. This metric is highly
dependent on interceptor inventory.
A detailed discussion of GMD's expected effectiveness is presented in
the classified June 2003 version of this report.
Other Factors Affecting System Performance:
A notable limitation of the effectiveness of the September 2004 initial
defensive capability--and possibly the December 2005 capability--
pertains to the inability of system radars to perform target
discrimination. Neither the Cobra Dane radar nor the upgraded early
warning radar at Beale is capable of performing rigorous
discrimination, a function achievable only by the X-band radar. Rather,
both radars will utilize common "target classification" software that
enables them to classify objects as threatening or non-threatening. For
example, debris would be classified as non-threatening, but objects
like deployment buses and decoy replicas would be classified as
threatening. Accordingly, the system would have to rely solely on the
kill vehicle for a final target selection.
The assessment of kill vehicle discrimination is, therefore, critical
for understanding the capability of the deployed system, a point made
in the DOT&E report. Appropriately, the GMD prime contractor tracks the
discrimination capability of the kill vehicle as a technical
performance measure. The prime contractor's December 2002 assessment
rated the kill vehicle discrimination performance as meeting
expectations based on analysis and simulation.
Lastly, measures of system suitability like availability and
vulnerability--which complement system effectiveness--are important
for characterizing the initial defensive capability as a whole. MDA is
aiming for full-time operations but faces risks in achieving this goal.
Details on system availability and vulnerability are provided in our
June 2003 classified report.
Conclusions:
Since DOT&E issued its August 2000 report, DOD has altered its approach
to the acquisition of missile defense systems to one that follows a
"capability-based" strategy. The new approach allows MDA to evolve and
demonstrate additional improvements in missile defense systems before
committing to procurement and operations. MDA's test program for all
missile defense elements, such as GMD, was also reoriented to focus on
the development and use of the BMDS Test Bed. Over time, the Test Bed
should facilitate testing that address many of DOT&E's recommendations,
especially those pertaining to flight test realism, complexity, and
artificialities. However, most of the agency's actions with respect to
DOT&E's ground testing recommendations, namely, those pertaining to
comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle have
been deferred. In addition, MDA is proceeding slowly with the flight
testing against certain countermeasures, which DOT&E noted are simple
for an enemy to implement. These unresolved concerns in the test
program warrant attention by DOT&E and the test community in general.
Given the importance of ground testing and discrimination testing for
understanding system effectiveness, decision makers in the Congress and
Office of the Secretary of Defense would benefit from having
information on the agency's progress in these matters as they consider
investments in developing the ballistic missile defense system. As an
independent office that reviews DOD's weapon system testing and the
office that made the recommendations discussed in this report, DOT&E
would be in a good position to provide such information to decision
makers.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
As a means of providing decision makers with critical information when
investments in missile defense are considered, we recommend that DOT&E
report periodically, as it deems appropriate, on the status of MDA's
actions taken or planned in response to the August 2000
recommendations. In its review, DOT&E should include information and
recommendations, as warranted, on MDA's progress and planning (1) to
improve hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, (2) to test
kill vehicle components in nuclear environments, and (3) to test the
GMD element's capability to defeat likely and simple near-term
countermeasures during integrated flight tests. In the report, DOT&E
can advise the Director, MDA, on how the test program could be modified
to accommodate DOT&E's long-standing concerns.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a classified draft version of this report, DOD agreed
with our recommendations. (See app. II for a reprinted version of DOD's
comments.) However, DOD conveyed the following concerns:
* The GMD test program as described in this report is no longer
current.
* It is difficult to reconcile the dated terms of reference of the
original DOT&E recommendations with the current program strategy and
structure.
* The inherent robustness of the envisioned layered BMD System relative
to midcourse countermeasures is overlooked.
While the GMD test program has, indeed, been in a constant state of
flux, thus complicating our analysis, our report presents the latest,
approved test program information provided to us by MDA.
Despite alterations to the acquisition strategy and structure of the
ballistic missile defense system and its constituent elements, like
GMD, we believe most of the DOT&E recommendations are still relevant
because the technical challenges and uncertainty with developing,
testing, and fielding effective defensive capabilities, as identified
in the August 2000 DOT&E report, remain significant. For example, the
DOT&E report issued in February 2003, FY02 Assessment of the Missile
Defense Agency Ballistic Missile Defense System, continued to highlight
the need for a comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop capability to test
the kill vehicle under the stress of real physical phenomena and to
test the kill vehicle's discrimination capability. We do recognize that
a number of recommendations for which no actions are currently planned,
such as those recommendations dealing with flight testing during
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, are a direct result of MDA's
new acquisition approach.
The department is correct in stating that we did not address the
capability of the envisioned ballistic missile defense system as a
whole in defeating midcourse countermeasures. However, we do note that
a system-level discrimination architecture would use a network of
ground-and space-based sensors to formulate a "discrimination
solution." Also, given the early stages of development of the
envisioned layered system, including boost-phase intercept, the value
of this strategy has not been demonstrated.
Although the department agreed that DOT&E should report periodically on
the status of MDA's actions to address the August 2000 DOT&E
recommendations, it did not believe additional reporting is required to
track their resolution. The department pointed out that our
recommendation grants DOT&E discretionary reporting authority
where mandatory reporting already exists. We believe, however, the
recommendation is worded appropriately. Existing statutory reporting
requirements for DOT&E on the adequacy and sufficiency of the missile
defense test program do not require that the August 2000 DOT&E
recommendations be specifically addressed. We worded the recommendation
to highlight the areas we believe DOT&E should address--hardware-in-
the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, testing of kill vehicle
components in nuclear environments, and testing the GMD element's
capability to defeat likely and simple near-term countermeasures--and
to give DOT&E the discretion to address our recommendation in the
manner it deems appropriate. To present its assessment, DOT&E could use
existing or new reporting vehicles.
Finally, department comments pertaining to MDA actions on ground
testing are addressed in the body of this report.
As arranged with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date. At that time, we plan to provide copies of this
report to interested congressional committees; the Secretary of
Defense; and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report
were Randy Zounes, Stan Lipscomb, Tana Davis, and Bill Graveline.
Signed by:
R. E. Levin:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In examining the actions taken or planned by the MDA in response to the
DOT&E recommendations, we analyzed pertinent test documents, studies,
and reports. These include the (1) GMD Element Developmental Master
Test Plan (March 2003); (2) GMD System Element Reviews; (3) MDA
"immersion day" briefing; (4) MDA written responses to our questions
about MDA actions in response to the DOT&E recommendations; (5)
Secretary of Defense January 2002 Memorandum on Missile Defense Program
Direction; and (6) Independent Review Team (Welch panel) Reports. In
addition, MDA officials briefed us on GMD's program status and efforts
to defeat enemy countermeasures. We also reviewed available
documentation on the schedule and purpose of the Test Bed. These
documents included studies on the enhanced test program restructure,
fiscal year 2003 budget justifications, and the request for the
contract proposal for the Block 2004 Test Bed.
To assess the effectiveness and limitations of the initial defensive
capability, we relied on the following MDA documentation: (1) GMD
System Element Review (January 2003); (2) BMDS Block 2004 Statement of
Goals; and (3) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-23),
the President's directive to begin fielding an initial capability. We
also identified uncertainties--based on the level of testing achieved
to date--of the potential capabilities of individual elements of the
initial defensive capability, such as the radars and interceptor
boosters, as well as radar capabilities to perform the discrimination
function.
We conducted our work primarily at the MDA, located in Arlington,
Virginia, and the GMD Joint Program Office, located in Arlington,
Virginia, and Huntsville, Alabama.
We conducted our audit work for the June 2003 classified report, upon
which this unclassified version is based, from October 2001 to March
2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. However, reported dates of GMD flight test events given in
this unclassified version have been updated with the latest (December
2003) GMD test schedules.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100:
JUN 5 2003
Mr. R. E. Levin:
Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Levin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "MISSILE DEFENSE: Actions Being
Taken to Address Testing Recommendations But Updated Assessment Is
Needed;' dated May 1, 2003 (GAO code 120098/GAO-03-279).
The Department partially concurs with the report but remains concerned
that most of the test schedule and data are no longer current.
Recommendations for factual corrections are provided in separate
enclosure and are based on best information available to date. The
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) continually reassesses its Ballistic
Missile Defense System development and test program content and
schedules, which impacts the Ground-Based Midcourse element. The three
recommendations cited in the subject GAO report (Results in Brief) are
prudent steps MDA is addressing as part of our evolutionary program
planning. The Department agrees with the recommendation that "DOT&E
should report periodically, as it seems appropriate, on the status of
Missile Defense Agency's actions". However, this recommendation grants
DOT&E discretionary reporting authority where mandatory reporting
already exists. Additional reporting in order to track the resolution
of DRR recommendations is not required.
The other difficulty with the report is reconciling the dated terms of
reference of the original Dr. Coyle recommendations with the current
BMD System program strategy and structure. For example, one recurring
theme in missile defense program discussions is the recognized
technical challenges and uncertainty with developing, testing, and
fielding effective defensive capabilities. There is more than one path
to retire the uncertainty characterized by the August 2000 DOT&E
report. One option, as Dr. Coyle advocates, is to defer fielding any
capability until much more progress is made to retire the majority of
uncertainty, thereby delaying missile defense fielding several years,
albeit with more confidence in the initial fielding. Or, as the
evolutionary MDA approach emphasizes, we field many years sooner an
initial capability of what is achievable while fully understanding and
characterizing the known limitations (e.g., only modest ability to
discriminate relatively simple decoys). Concurrently, we aggressively
continue to develop and field additional improvements and, over time,
achieve a robust defensive
system pacing the threat, responding to stakeholder needs, and
capitalizing on program progress and successes. The Missile Defense
Agency is implementing an innovative acquisition approach to manage
more effectively this uncertainty (program risk), as acknowledged by
the GAO report.
Another key point overlooked in the August 2000 DOT&E report, and now
the subject GAO report, is the inherent robustness of the envisioned
layered BMD System relative to midcourse countermeasures. The GAO
report correctly identifies the challenges any of our midcourse
defensive weapons and sensor systems would face in the presence of
various decoys and countermeasures. But, the BMD program will evolve to
include employment of layered sensors and Boost-phase intercept
capabilities as an effective means to defeat midcourse countermeasures,
sophisticated or otherwise, by destroying the adversaries' ballistic
missile prior to the deployment of the enemy warhead and accompanying
countermeasures. The value in this strategy must be factored in when
making investment decisions for all available counter-countermeasure
programs.
MDA's FY2004 President's Budget, describes program investments for
improved hardware-in-the-loop facilities at the Arnold Engineering
Development Center, Tennessee, to support sophisticated ground testing
of major system components, to include ground-based kill vehicles,
complete with synthetic scene generation capabilities. Similarly, we
are planning to characterize the performance envelope of all of our
system components relative to dealing with decoys and countermeasures,
as well as a nuclear upset space environment. The timing and funding of
these program test events, however, is subject to internal management
trade-offs among the numerous priorities and fact-of-life pressures
associated with the whole missile defense program portfolio. While we
cannot address all technical concerns for the initial fielding, we have
added:
* Enhanced producibility, quality, and reliability work in our R&D
program efforts, backed by revised contractor incentive clauses;
* Increased operational focus in our developmental program including
military utility and effectiveness assessments, live-fire lethality
assessments, and linked measures of effectiveness for the BMD System
and individual weapon and sensor components; and,
Expanded command and control, battle management, and operator
integration in the BMD System testing to support fielding of initial
defensive capabilities in 2004.
The result of these program decisions provides a comprehensive program
that demonstrates operational effectiveness and military utility
against credible threats in an operational environment, and
systematically retires both operational and technical risks
prior to initial operations. As we learn more about our capabilities
and limitations in our development and testing, our program management
processes are structured to incorporate practicable adjustments.
My point of contact for this report is Mr. Luis A. Villalobos, (703)
697-7465, luis.villalobos@ mda.osd.mil.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
ROBERT SNYDER:
Executive Director:
Enclosures: As stated:
FOOTNOTES
[1] The midcourse phase of flight refers to that portion of a ballistic
missile's trajectory between the boost phase and reentry phase when the
warheads and decoys travel on ballistic trajectories above the
atmosphere.
[2] DOT&E is responsible for providing independent oversight of testing
of major DOD acquisition programs to ensure that operational test and
evaluation of major defense programs is adequate for verifying
operational effectiveness and suitability for combat use. The Director
is the principal operational test and evaluation official within DOD
and advises the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on operational test and
evaluation. The Director also provides advice to responsible officials
on developmental testing.
[3] The National Missile Defense program is now referred to as the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, terminology we use from
this point on.
[4] Target discrimination is the identification of the true reentry
vehicle from among decoys and associated objects.
[5] Kwajalein Missile Range is now referred to as Reagan Test Site,
terminology we use from this point on.
[6] The GMD system is designed to launch interceptors under one of
three "categories" of operation: (A) when a threat reentry vehicle has
been tracked and discriminated by ground-based radars; (B) when ground-
based radars have a track of the threat complex but discrimination is
either incomplete or unavailable; or (C) when space-based sensors
provide an early track of the boosting missile.
[7] A weapon task plan consists of pre-launch instructions for
generating an interceptor flyout solution that places it on an
intercept path with the target. Such a plan is required before an
interceptor is launched.
[8] MDA defines a transponder as a "receiver-transmitter that will
generate a reply signal under proper interrogation." The missile
defense community also refers to the transponder as the "C-band
beacon."
[9] FPQ-14 is a C-band test-range radar located in Oahu, Hawaii.
[10] Hardware-in-the-loop testing is the high fidelity ground testing
of a test article in a realistic yet simulated environment.
[11] The CHOP program, based at the U.S. Air Force Phillips Laboratory
at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, is an MDA-funded program
chartered to develop, build, and test countermeasures using only
technology available to emerging missile states. The program involves
young scientists, engineers, and military officers who are not
specifically trained in missile defense or countermeasures and are
given access only to the open literature and commercial off-the-shelf
technology.
[12] The upgrading of the Thule early warning radar located in
Greenland will not be part of the Block 2004 Test Bed; it has been
deferred to Block 2006.
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