Weapons Of Mass Destruction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be Improved Gao ID: GAO-04-330 February 13, 2004The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the visibility of DTRA's role has increased as federal agencies and military commanders have looked to the agency for additional support and advice. GAO was asked to report on DTRA's (1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other government entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational goals.
Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting inspections of U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by eliminating and securing weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, supports military commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD, and develops technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various ways to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources and assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA's planning process identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess progress. DTRA's planning process is influenced by funding, most of which is appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that the performance report resulting from its internal review summarized DTRA's accomplishments and activities but did not compare them with established goals and objectives nor explain the actions needed to achieve or modify these unmet goals as called for under GPRA.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-330, Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be Improved
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-330
entitled 'Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be
Improved' which was released on February 13, 2004.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
February 2004:
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but
Performance Reporting Can Be Improved:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-330]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-330, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of
Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001,
attacks, the visibility of DTRA‘s role has increased as federal
agencies and military commanders have looked to the agency for
additional support and advice.
GAO was asked to report on DTRA‘s (1) mission and the efforts it
undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other
government entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to
prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational goals.
What GAO Found:
Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat
of WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat
control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development.
The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by
conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting
inspections of U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by
eliminating and securing weapons and materials in the former Soviet
Union, supports military commanders by providing technical and
analytical support regarding WMD, and develops technologies that
support efforts to address the WMD threat.
DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various
ways to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA
has a formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile. DTRA‘s relationship with DHS is subject to the
broader DOD-DHS relationship and may change as the relationship
between DOD and DHS evolves.
The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources
and assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA‘s planning
process identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives
by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to
assess progress. DTRA‘s planning process is influenced by funding,
most of which is appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that
the performance report resulting from its internal review summarized
DTRA‘s accomplishments and activities but did not compare them with
established goals and objectives nor explain the actions needed to
achieve or modify these unmet goals as called for under GPRA.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Director of DTRA improve the agency‘s annual
performance report by comparing the agency‘s actual performance
against planned goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were
not met and the agency‘s plan to address these unmet goals in the
future.
DTRA agreed with the GAO recommendation that it improve its annual
performance report. DTRA stated that it is refining its performance
report methodology to better address the linkage of reported
performance to planned goals and future efforts.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-330.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff
at (202) 512-8979.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DTRA's Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat:
DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies:
DTRA's Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress,
but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix:
Appendix I: Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency:
Related GAO Products:
GAO Products Covering the CTR Program:
Tables:
Table 1: DTRA's Budget and Personnel:
Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements:
Figures Figures:
Figure 1: DTRA Locations:
Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes:
Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD:
Figure 4: DTRA's Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004:
Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared with DTRA's
2002 Performance Report:
Abbreviations:
ASCO: Advanced Systems Concepts Office:
CBDP: Chemical and Biological Defense Program:
CMAT: Consequence Management Advisory Team:
CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:
NWC: Nuclear Weapons Council:
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Letter
February 13, 2004:
The Honorable Pat Roberts:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of
Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With a fiscal year 2004 budget
request of more than $2.3 billion, the agency has a broad range of
responsibilities, including the support of combat commanders in
defending against nuclear, chemical, and biological threats on the
battlefield and monitoring international arms control treaties. Since
the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the anthrax attack in
Washington, D.C., federal agencies and military commanders have
increasingly looked to DTRA for support and advice.
Because of the increased visibility of this agency's role within DOD
and in relation to other federal agencies, particularly the Departments
of Energy and Homeland Security (DHS), you asked us to report on DTRA's
(1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2)
relationship with other government entities, specifically Energy and
DHS; and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess
progress toward organizational goals.
To meet these objectives, we reviewed DTRA's 2000, 2001, and 2003
strategic plans and interviewed its Director. We reviewed supporting
documentation, including budget documents, historical records, program
and project plans, and assessments. We also interviewed senior
officials from each of DTRA's core functions and other DTRA officials
and contractors associated with specific programs. We met with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their
assessments of DTRA and the agency's relationships with other
government entities. In addition, we interviewed officials from Energy
to discuss its interaction with DTRA, including the management of the
nuclear weapons stockpile.
Results in Brief:
Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat
of WMD. DTRA program documents show that its mission is carried out
through four core functions--(1) threat control, (2) threat reduction,
(3) combat support, and (4) technology development. First, the agency
works to control the threat of WMD by verifying other countries'
compliance with arms control treaties and by meeting U.S. obligations
to support inspections of U.S. facilities. For example, DTRA personnel
inspect Russian facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting
WMD delivery systems and provide support for Russian inspections of
similar U.S. facilities. Second, DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD
by eliminating and securing weapons and materials through the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program in the former Soviet Union. Third,
DTRA works to support military commanders by providing technical and
analytical support regarding WMD. For example, DTRA provides commanders
with information on the vulnerabilities of their forces and
installations to a WMD attack. Finally, the agency develops
technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. For
example, the agency develops computer programs that model the effects
of WMD releases, specialized weapons for use against WMD targets, and
sensors to detect the presence of WMD materials.
DTRA's specialized capabilities and services are also used to support
civilian agencies' efforts to address WMD threats, particularly the
efforts of Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration, resulting from legislation
requiring DOD and Energy to share responsibility for maintaining the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons Council, to which
DTRA provides staffing and expertise, manages this responsibility,
which includes the production, inventorying, and dismantlement of all
nuclear weapons. DTRA works with Energy on several other programs,
including securing nuclear materials in Russia. However, as we reported
in March 2003, these efforts face several coordination issues.[Footnote
1] DTRA also works with DHS on a variety of programs, such as the
International Counterproliferation Program. DTRA's relationship with
DHS may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. DTRA
also works with and supports other federal entities, state and local
governments, and governments with which the United States has bilateral
agreements. For example, DTRA provides training for emergency personnel
responding to WMD incidents and assesses the vulnerability of personnel
and facilities to WMD threats.
DTRA uses a strategic planning process to prioritize resources and
assess progress toward its organizational goals; however, its
performance report does not document the extent to which the agency's
accomplishments and activities may or may not have met these goals.
DTRA's strategic planning process incorporates elements of the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; the agency's process
identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which
to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess
progress. The resources prioritized through this process consist of
personnel and funds for the agency's use, funds for the congressionally
directed Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program administered by DTRA. Both the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess DTRA's
performance biennially, and their most recent reviews concluded that,
in general, DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military
forces by providing useful products and services. For example, the 2001
assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff commended DTRA's focus on
supporting military commanders. In 2002, DTRA completed an internal
self-assessment that resulted in the 2002 performance report. While
DTRA management quarterly tracks the agency's progress against its
goals, the 2002 performance report summarizes the agency's
accomplishments and activities but does not compare these
accomplishments and activities with the established goals and
objectives, nor does it explain why performance goals may not have been
met. For example, it discusses the number and types of vulnerability
assessments conducted in 2002 without discussing how many were planned.
We are recommending that DTRA improve its annual performance report by
comparing its actual performance against planned goals and, where
appropriate, explain why goals were not met and how these unmet goals
will be addressed in the future.
Background:
In the early 1990s, DOD officials recognized that the proliferation of
chemical, biological, and nuclear materials that could be used to
develop WMD was a growing threat. A series of terrorist attacks
highlighted by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo's
subway system heightened concerns about U.S. vulnerability to a
terrorist attack involving WMD. Senior DOD leaders, supported by a
Defense Science Board study, concluded that DOD was not properly
organized to focus on nonproliferation and counterproliferation.
On October 1, 1998, DTRA was established, with a budget of
approximately $1.7 billion and almost 2,000 military and civilian
personnel, to address all aspects of the WMD threat. The agency reports
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy providing
input into several of DTRA's programs. Additionally, DTRA responds to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to the agency's
support of military commanders. Table 1 provides data on DTRA's budget
and personnel since the agency's inception. DTRA's budget has increased
by over $650 million (about 40 percent) since its establishment, of
which over $450 million was due to increases in the funding of the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). Total personnel at DTRA
also have increased.
Table 1: DTRA's Budget and Personnel:
Dollars in millions:
DTRA;
Fiscal Year: 1999: $1,044.7;
Fiscal Year: 2000: $1,122.5;
Fiscal Year: 2001: $1,175.4;
Fiscal Year: 2002: $1,291.2;
Fiscal Year: 2003: $1,359.2;
Fiscal Year: 2004: $1,253.9.
CBDP;
Fiscal Year: 1999: 642.0;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 762.5;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 874.6;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 1,118.2;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 1,070.7;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 1,104.7.
Total budget;
Fiscal Year: 1999: $1,686.7;
Fiscal Year: 2000: $1,885.0;
Fiscal Year: 2001: $2,050.0;
Fiscal Year: 2002: $2,409.4;
Fiscal Year: 2003: $2,429.9;
Fiscal Year: 2004: $2,358.6.
Civilian personnel;
Fiscal Year: 1999: 881;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 917;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 957;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 972;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 875;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 1,022.
Military personnel;
Fiscal Year: 1999: 941;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 970;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 872;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 866;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 771;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 888.
Total personnel;
Fiscal Year: 1999: 1,822;
Fiscal Year: 2000: 1,887;
Fiscal Year: 2001: 1,829;
Fiscal Year: 2002: 1,838;
Fiscal Year: 2003: 1,646;
Fiscal Year: 2004: 1,910.
Source: DTRA.
Note: Fiscal years 1999 to 2003 data are actual figures, and fiscal
year 2004 data are based on personnel authorizations and program budget
decisions.
[End of table]
DTRA is currently headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; maintains
test facilities in the United States; maintains a Defense Nuclear
Weapons School in New Mexico; and maintains permanent staff at other
locations, including Germany, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as
seen in figure 1. DTRA also maintains liaison officers at several
locations, including the combatant commanders' headquarters, the
National Guard Bureau, and the Pentagon.
Figure 1: DTRA Locations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DTRA was established in 1998 through the consolidation of three
agencies and two programs, as shown in figure 2. The Defense Special
Weapons Agency tested, analyzed, and provided assistance in developing
new technologies for maintaining and modernizing the nation's nuclear
weapons. The agency also worked to counter the effects of the use of
chemical and biological weapons against U.S. military bases and forces.
The Defense Technology Security Administration managed the DOD license
review process for the export of munitions and critical technologies
that have both civilian and military applications. As part of this
effort, the Defense Technology Security Administration oversaw U.S.
satellites launched abroad. The On-Site Inspection Agency, established
as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, carried
out on-site inspections to verify that treaty implementation was done
in accordance with all treaty requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the
agency's responsibilities were expanded as new treaties were ratified,
and, in 2000, the agency was asked to support the United Nation's
mission to monitor and eliminate WMD in Iraq.[Footnote 2]
Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The two additional programs included in DTRA's formation dealt
extensively with the threats posed by WMD and related materials. The
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program implemented a
congressionally mandated program to assist the nations of the former
Soviet Union in securing and eliminating their WMD stockpiles. We have
undertaken several reviews of the DTRA-managed CTR program. A list of
our reports concerning the CTR program appears at the end of this
report. In addition, CBDP was established in 1994 to consolidate,
coordinate, and integrate the chemical and biological defense
requirements of all the services into a single DOD program. DTRA was
given the responsibility to administer the distribution of program
funds, but the agency did not directly manage the program.
To integrate these components, DTRA began a strategic planning process
in January 1999 and published its first strategic plan in March 2000.
DTRA used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act
of 1993 (GPRA) to guide its planning process. The act calls for
agencies to develop long-term strategic plans, annual performance
plans, and annual assessment reports. Also in 2000, DTRA realigned
itself around four core functions (1) threat control, (2) threat
reduction, (3) combat support (support to military forces), and (4)
technology development. Among these core functions, DTRA officials have
stressed combat support as its first priority.
Three major changes have occurred in the agency's responsibilities, as
illustrated in figure 2. First, in August 2001, responsibility for the
export license review process shifted from DTRA to the reestablished
Defense Technology Security Administration. According to senior
officials, the export license review process did not integrate well
with other DTRA functions and was more appropriately placed under the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Second, in March 2003, DTRA was
assigned the mission to support the elimination of WMD materials found
in Iraq. Third, in April 2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for
managing the CBDP's science and technology program rather than just
overseeing the funds disbursement.
DTRA's Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat:
DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through
four core functions: (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3)
combat support, and (4) technology development.[Footnote 3] First, the
agency controls the threat of WMD through inspections of Russian
facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting WMD, as well as
supporting inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors.
Second, DTRA works to reduce the WMD threat by securing and eliminating
WMD materials, such as destroying aircraft and missiles, through the
CTR program in the former Soviet Union. Third, DTRA supports military
commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD
threats on the battlefield and U.S. installations. Finally, DTRA
develops technologies to assist in its threat control and reduction
efforts and in the support of military operations, such as developing
weapons and sensor technologies to destroy or detect WMD and related
materials. Figure 3 provides examples of DTRA activities in each of
these areas.
Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Threat Control Focuses on Inspection and Treaty Activities:
DTRA implements U.S. responsibilities established under four arms
control treaties dealing with WMD and other treaties and agreements.
DTRA conducts on-site inspections at other nations' WMD facilities and
supports on-site inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors.
These inspections are carried out in accordance with agreements between
the U.S. and other governments. The agency provides inspectors,
transportation, and linguists in support of inspection efforts, and
also provides visa and passport support for visiting inspection teams.
Table 2 shows nine treaties and agreements and DTRA's role in each.
Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements:
Treaty/Agreement: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty;
Objective of treaty/ agreement: Mandates substantial reductions in the
number of U.S. and former Soviet Union strategic ballistic missiles,
heavy bombers, submarines, and the nuclear warheads attributed to
those delivery systems;
DTRA role: Conducts U.S. inspections of signatory facilities to ensure
compliance; monitors missile production facility operations in Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and provides escorts to teams
inspecting U.S. facilities.
Treaty/Agreement: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty;
Objective of treaty/agreement: Requires the U.S. and former Soviet
Union to eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their support structure,
and equipment;
DTRA role: Provides inspectors to observe and measure all vehicles
exiting the Votkinsk missile manufacturing plant and supports Russian
inspections of U.S. facilities.
Treaty/Agreement: Chemical Weapons Convention;
Objective of treaty/ agreement: Prohibits the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons;
obligates parties to destroy their chemical weapons and production
facilities;
DTRA role: Provides escorts for international teams inspecting U.S.
facilities, including DOD and commercial industry sites.
Treaty/Agreement: Threshold Test Ban Treaty;
Objective of treaty/ agreement: Prohibits nuclear tests having a yield
exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT);
DTRA role: Provides monitors for Russian tests and escorts for Russian
teams monitoring U.S. tests.
Treaty/Agreement: Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement;
Objective of treaty/agreement: Mandates the monitoring of the shutdown
of U.S. and Russian production reactors and Russia's reprocessed
plutonium oxide;
DTRA role: Conducts on-site monitoring of Russian shutdown reactors in
Seversk, Ozersk, and Zheleznogorsk and plutonium oxide facilities at
Seversk and Zheleznogorsk and provides escorts to Russian teams
monitoring shutdown of U.S. reactors.
Treaty/Agreement: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty;
Objective of treaty/agreement: Limits five types of conventional
weapons: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack
helicopters, and combat aircraft;
DTRA role: Conducts on-site inspections and provides escorts for
inspections of U.S. facilities.
Treaty/Agreement: Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on
Confidence and Security Building Measures;
Objective of treaty/ agreement: Limits the number of military
exercises permitted by signatories and requires signatories to give
prior notice of large- scale military activities;
DTRA role: Provides personnel for inspections and evaluations of other
signatories and provides escorts and liaison officers for inspections
and evaluations of U.S. facilities.
Treaty/Agreement: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Dayton Accords);
Objective of treaty/agreement: Outlines peace agreement that
implements a series of verification measures similar to those under
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna
Documents and imposes limits on various types of offensive arms;
DTRA role: Represents the United States on international inspection
teams that inspect facilities of the signatories.
Treaty/Agreement: Open Skies Treaty;
Objective of treaty/agreement: Promotes openness and transparency in
military activities through reciprocal, unarmed observation flights;
DTRA role: Provides inspectors and flight monitors during mission and
training activities, conducts preflight inspections of U.S. and
foreign observation aircraft sensor equipment, and operates imaging
sensors during U.S. observation flights.
Sources: GAO and DTRA.
[End of table]
Threat Reduction Has Focused on the WMD Threat in the Former Soviet
Union:
DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities
with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet
Union to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store
and transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3)
reduce the risk of the WMD proliferation. Our previous reviews of the
CTR program have found that it has faced two critical challenges: the
Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program
costs, and Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access
to key nuclear and biological sites (see the list of prior GAO reports
at the end of this report). In addition to the CTR program, DTRA was
recently tasked to secure and destroy any WMD or related materials that
might be found in Iraq.
The CTR program has removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
and Belarus inherited from the former Soviet Union, and the United
States continues to work with Russia and other former Soviet states in
WMD elimination programs. According to agency documents, the CTR
program had, as of October 31, 2003, overseen the destruction of 520 of
1,473 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 451 of 831 missile silos,
122 of 205 strategic bombers, and 27 of 48 strategic missile submarines
that the United States and former Soviet Union agreed to destroy. WMD
destruction programs continue with CTR overseeing projects to eliminate
missile fuel and launcher equipment. DTRA personnel have also
supervised the securing of chemical weapons and are overseeing the
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye,
Russia.
DTRA also assists with the storing and transporting of WMD materials as
part of the CTR program. For example, DTRA is overseeing the
construction of a facility that will be used to securely store nuclear
materials from weapons at Mayak, Russia. This project, however, has
suffered from both a lack of committed Russian funding and access to
the site. As a result, the project, once scheduled to begin accepting
nuclear materials for storage in 1998, will not begin to do so until
2004. Additionally, DTRA works through the CTR program to enhance the
security and safety of biological pathogens located at research centers
in the former Soviet Union, such as at Novosibirsk and Obolensk.
However, lack of Russian cooperation has affected DTRA's ability to
access other suspected biological facilities, and, after 4 years of
effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at
the 49 biological sites where Russia and the United States have
collaborative programs.
DTRA works to prevent the spread of WMD through continuing contacts
with former Soviet Union military personnel and providing expertise and
equipment to the countries of the former Soviet Union to enhance border
security. According to agency documents, in fiscal year 2002, the CTR
program sponsored 423 contacts with former Soviet Union military
personnel in support of various efforts to halt the spread of WMD.
In March 2003, DTRA was also assigned the responsibility of destroying
any WMD materials found in Iraq. Agency personnel accompanied combat
forces into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, DTRA
teams were involved in searching the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center
to recover, inventory, and safeguard several tons of non-weapons-grade
uranium and other radiological materials. DTRA personnel remain in Iraq
and continue to support efforts to search for WMD and WMD-related
materials. If WMD are found, DTRA personnel would have the
responsibility for securing and eliminating them.
DTRA Supports U.S. Military Forces in Addressing WMD Threats:
DTRA provides a wide variety of support to military commanders in their
efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA provides liaison officers to
assist military commanders in their planning and conduct of military
operations. For example, DTRA personnel assisted military commanders
during the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing
information on the appropriate weapons to use on suspected WMD storage
sites, how to counter the effects of WMD that might be used on
coalition forces, and how to secure and dispose of any WMD or WMD-
related materials that might be found. DTRA also developed a handbook
used by troops in Iraq for how to recognize and handle WMD and WMD-
related materials. In addition, these efforts are supported by DTRA's
operations center, which responds to WMD-related requests for
expertise, computer modeling of potential events, and support for
training exercises.
DTRA teams evaluate the security of personnel and facilities worldwide
and assess the survivability of specific infrastructure crucial to
maintaining command and control of U.S. forces. According to agency
documents, DTRA evaluates 80 to 100 DOD installations per year through
Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which are broad in
scope and focus on the overall safety and security of personnel. For
example, agency teams assess physical security plans, review
architectural and structural drawings, and perform analyses of
potential blast effects to recommend procedural, structural, or other
enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities. These assessments were
instituted in the aftermath of (1) the Khobar Towers bombing in
1996[Footnote 4] and (2) the publication of a subsequent DOD report in
1997 that determined there were no published standards for securing
personnel and facilities. In addition, DTRA conducts Balanced
Survivability Assessments to evaluate specific U.S. and allied
infrastructure crucial in maintaining command and control of all U.S.
forces. These assessments evaluate the ability of power, heating,
computer, and communications systems to continue functioning in the
event of a WMD attack, accident or natural disaster, technological
failure, or sabotage. According to agency officials, DTRA teams conduct
an average of 8 Balanced Survivability Assessments per year, but that
number rose temporarily to 30 to meet additional requirements.
DTRA provides additional support to military commanders through the
Defense Nuclear Weapons School and Consequence Management Advisory
Teams (CMAT). DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, to train military and civilian personnel in
various aspects of WMD. The school originally focused on training
military personnel in the aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons and their
effects. The school now includes other areas of the WMD threat, such as
addressing the civil and military responses to radiological, chemical,
and biological attacks or accidents and preventing the spread of WMD.
Additionally, DTRA maintains and deploys teams to deal with the effects
of WMD use. The agency has CMATs whose purpose is to mitigate the
effects of WMD use or accidents. CMATs also work with military and
civilian authorities by conducting training exercises that simulate the
effects of WMD use or accidents in the United States and overseas.
DTRA Works to Develop Technologies to Address the WMD Threat:
To assist in WMD threat control activities, DTRA has developed
technologies that detect WMD. For example, the agency has been
developing sensors to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent
smuggling of WMD or WMD-related materials across borders. DTRA has also
developed computer-tracking systems to help member countries comply
with the reporting obligations stated in treaties and other agreements.
The agency also works to develop ways to protect military equipment and
personnel from WMD effects and manages and operates various technology
testing facilities, such as facilities that simulate the effects of
electromagnetic energy or radiation on military equipment in the event
a nuclear weapon is detonated. Additionally, DTRA has also developed
software to model nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks or
accidents.
DTRA does not have its own laboratories. Rather, the agency uses
existing institutions, such as the service laboratories (Departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force), and national laboratories as well as
academic institutions. For example, in response to the military
requirement for a specialized weapon to bomb caves and tunnels in
Afghanistan, DTRA organized a team that employed products and expertise
from the Navy, Air Force, Energy, and industry, which allowed DTRA to
develop, test, and deploy a weapon that could be used to attack cave
and tunnel targets. DTRA has also worked to develop specialized
incendiary devices that would destroy WMD material held in a storage
facility.
To support DTRA's efforts to address the WMD threat, the agency's
Advanced Systems Concepts Office (ASCO) works to address ways to
identify, anticipate, and address technology gaps to improve agency
capabilities. For example, ASCO personnel with scientific expertise
work to analyze the potential threat to military forces of pathogens
such as bubonic plague, E. coli, and Ebola. DTRA also has overseen a
project to test the ability of military facilities to protect against
and recover from the consequences of chemical and biological attacks.
From 2001 to 2003, DTRA and other military personnel undertook a series
of exercises, technology demonstrations, and assessments at the U.S.
Air Force base at Osan, Korea, to determine different ways to defend
military forces and facilities against chemical and biological attacks.
DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies:
As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD
threats, DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can
assist civilian entities, including Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal
relationship with Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DOD-
Energy responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA
also works with NNSA to secure nuclear materials in Russia. DTRA works
with DHS offices on programs related to WMD issues, such as the
International Counterproliferation Program and crisis response
exercises. DTRA's interface with DHS is through DOD's newly established
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
DTRA's relationship with DHS may be subject to change as the broader
DOD-DHS relationship evolves. In addition to its relations with NNSA
and DHS, DTRA also works with and supports other federal agencies,
state and local governments, and governments with which the United
States has bilateral agreements.
DTRA Works on Many Programs with the Department of Energy:
DTRA works closely with Energy's NNSA[Footnote 5] in matters pertaining
to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This relationship has its roots
in the 1946 Atomic Energy Act,[Footnote 6] which establishes joint DOD
and NNSA responsibility for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including
ensuring the safety, security, and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. These activities are conducted through the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC), the senior-level body dedicated to these activities.
DTRA plays an active role in all activities of the NWC, from
participating as an observer on the NWC to membership on its
subordinate bodies. In addition, both DTRA and NNSA are responsible for
providing the working staff for the NWC. DTRA also works with NNSA on
various nuclear weapons issues associated with the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile stewardship program, such as nuclear surviviability, nuclear
surety,[Footnote 7] and nuclear weapons effects. According to both DTRA
and NNSA officials, coordination between DTRA and NNSA on activities
related to these issues takes place at various levels, such as serving
on committees and working groups, cooperating on research, and
participating on various ad hoc working groups. For example, DTRA and
NNSA are currently engaged in a joint study to understand nuclear
weapons effects and develop simulation techniques to address
survivability of U.S. weapons systems in nuclear environments.
DTRA also works with Energy to implement various agreements, research
projects, and training and exercises. According to DOD documents, DTRA
works with Energy on a variety of agreements related to nuclear
weapons, including the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, the
Plutonium Disposition Agreement, and the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty.[Footnote 8] In addition, DTRA works with Energy laboratories on
joint research projects, working groups, and field tests. For example,
DTRA is currently working with the laboratories on the development of
DOD's unconventional nuclear warfare defense program, which is
developing tools for detecting an unconventionally delivered nuclear or
radiological weapon. DTRA and Energy work on programs to secure nuclear
warheads in Russia, but, as we reported in March 2003, these efforts
face several coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will
secure sites identified in both of their plans and coordinating the
type of equipment used and guard force training.[Footnote 9]
DTRA's Relationship with DHS Is Dependent on the Broader DOD-DHS
Relationship:
DTRA worked and continues to work with several government entities that
are now part of DHS. For example, DTRA works with the U.S. Customs
Service on the congressionally mandated International
Counterproliferation Program, which is designed to prevent the illicit
movement of WMD material, technology, and expertise. As the executive
agent, DTRA implements this program in cooperation with the U.S.
Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DTRA works
with these two agencies to develop courses and training exercises that
provide training and equipment to customs, border guards, and law
enforcement personnel in 25 countries of the former Soviet Union, the
Baltic region, and Eastern Europe.
DTRA also works with DHS on joint exercises and interagency working
groups. For example, DTRA, DHS, and Energy recently sponsored and
participated in a joint atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City.
According to documentation, the study conducted a series of experiments
to evaluate current outdoor atmospheric dispersion models and to
advance the knowledge of the dispersion of contaminants in urban
environments and building interiors. In addition, DTRA participates
with DHS entities in interagency working groups that address issues of
homeland security and preparedness.
According to DTRA officials, the agency is working to share information
and experiences with DHS for homeland security applications. For
example, DTRA has shared with DHS information regarding its experience
on demonstrations conducted as part of the unconventional nuclear
warfare defense program. In addition, DTRA has also shared with DHS the
WMD crisis decision guides that it developed for DOD. These guides
provide response plans for various WMD scenarios. According to DTRA
officials, DHS used the response plans for WMD scenarios that are
outlined in these crisis decision guides to develop its own WMD
response plans.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was recently established
as the focal point for DOD's interaction with DHS and the interagency
community for homeland security issues. This newly established office
is responsible for ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy
direction and for coordinating activities with DHS. Therefore, the
coordination of all new activities, programs, and assistance related to
the threat of WMD that involve DTRA and DHS is the responsibility of
this office. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader
DOD-DHS relationship and therefore may change. The new relationship
between DOD and DHS itself is still evolving because the roles and
responsibilities of the two departments are still under development.
DTRA's Expertise Is Shared with Civilian Entities:
DTRA has provided various capabilities and services, such as
vulnerability assessments and first-responder training programs to
civilian government entities. DTRA's capabilities for conducting
vulnerability assessments are used to perform vulnerability assessments
of civilian facilities and personnel. After the events of September 11,
2001, DTRA was called upon to complete vulnerability assessments of
several federal buildings, such as the U.S. Capitol Building and U.S.
Supreme Court, as well as vulnerability assessments of commercial U.S.
ports. DTRA shares its capabilities and expertise by providing training
programs to civilian entities. For example, the agency provides
training to the National Guard for performing vulnerability assessment
of infrastructure. DTRA also provides WMD and first-responder awareness
training to state and local government entities.
In addition, DTRA provides informational support--ranging from modeling
to subject matter expertise--to civilian government entities and
bilateral partners through the services of its operations center. For
example, the operations center modeled the potential spread of
contamination resulting from a chemical spill of a derailed train by
using the agency's software for chemical weapon attack models. Finally,
DTRA's expertise is also shared with governments with which the United
States has bilateral agreements. For example, according to senior DTRA
officials, the WMD handbooks developed by DTRA were provided to allied
forces supporting U.S. efforts in Iraq, and DTRA has conducted
vulnerability assessments for allies. Finally, DTRA is also involved in
interagency programs that address issues related to WMD threats. For
example, DTRA supports the integration of the DOD Technical Support
Working Group that conducts a national interagency response and
development program for combating terrorism. Participants in this
program include DOD, Energy, State, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration.
DTRA's Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress,
but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals:
DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of
GPRA, to prioritize its resources and assess its progress. It has
developed strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term
objectives by which it measures progress in meeting its goals. These
objectives are affected by funding that comes from several
appropriations, some of which must be spent on specific activities,
such as the funding for the CTR program. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess DTRA every 2 years.
In 2002, DTRA completed its first internal self-assessment, which it
intends to do annually. We found that the performance report resulting
from the self-assessment summarized the agency's accomplishments and
activities but did not assess its progress against established annual
performance goals.
Strategic Planning Process Establishes Agency's Priorities:
DTRA has incorporated GPRA principles in its planning process. Under
GPRA, agencies should prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the
general direction for their efforts. These plans should include
comprehensive mission statements, general and outcome-related goals,
descriptions of how those goals will be achieved, identification of
external factors that could affect progress, and a description of how
performance will be evaluated. Agencies should then prepare annual
performance plans that establish connections between the long-term
goals in the strategic plans with the day-to-day activities of program
managers and staff. These plans should include measurable goals and
objectives to be achieved by a program activity, descriptions of the
resources needed to meet these goals, and a description of the methods
used to verify and validate measured values. Finally, GPRA requires
that the agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting
its goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that
were not met.
DTRA's current strategic plan, issued in 2003, contains most of the
elements in a strategic plan developed using GPRA standards. This plan
lays out the agency's five goals, which serve as the basis of its
individual units' annual performance plans: (1) deter the use and
reduce the impact of WMD, (2) reduce the present threat, (3) prepare
for future threats, (4) conduct the right programs in the best manner,
and (5) develop people and enable them to succeed. These long-term
goals are further broken down into four or five objectives, each with 6
to 17 measurable tasks under each objective. These tasks have projected
completion dates and identify the DTRA unit responsible for the
specific task. For example, under the goal "deter the use and reduce
the impact of WMD" is the objective "support the nuclear force." A
measurable task under this objective is to work with Energy to develop
support plans for potential resumption of underground nuclear weapons
effects testing. The technology development unit in DTRA is expected to
complete this task by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2004. The
strategic plan does not discuss external factors that could affect goal
achievement, but it does have a discussion of how performance will be
measured externally, by other DOD components, and internally through an
annual performance report.
Each unit within DTRA develops its own annual performance plan that
identifies the activities to be completed each year with available
funding. These plans do not use the same format, but they all include
goals, performance measures by which to measure achievement of those
goals, and a link to the strategic plan to show how they support the
long-term goals of the agency. DTRA's leadership discusses each unit's
plan to validate the prioritization of resources and establish the
unit's priorities. DTRA's annual performance plan consists of these
units' plans and detailed budget annexes. DOD guidance now requires
DTRA to submit a consolidated annual performance plan to the DOD
comptroller to facilitate DOD's GPRA reporting. DTRA is in the process
of making the unit plans more consistent for fiscal year 2004.
DTRA's Planning Is Influenced by Its Funding:
Most of DTRA's funding is appropriated only for specific programs over
which it has various levels of control. First, it administers the
funding for CBDP. Second, it receives money that Congress provides
solely for the CTR program that DTRA is in charge of managing with
congressional direction. Third, it receives funding that it can spend
according to its own priorities, while meeting certain mission
requirements, such as treaty implementation work. Fourth, it receives
reimbursements from other federal entities for some activities, such as
vulnerability assessments conducted for non-DOD agencies.[Footnote 10]
Figure 4 shows the funding profile for DTRA in fiscal year 2004.
Figure 4: DTRA's Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 4, DTRA's administration of CBDP includes funds that
it uses, distributes, and manages. DTRA uses a portion of the CBDP
funds for large-scale technology demonstration projects, such as a
project that focused on restoring operations at bases attacked by
chemical or biological agents. The agency distributes a large portion
of the CBDP funds to others for various purposes, such as procuring
chemical suits for the military forces. Recently, in April 2003, DTRA
was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP's Science and
Technology projects, which are conducted by various laboratories and
research institutes throughout the country.
DTRA Undergoes External and Internal Reviews, but Reporting on Internal
Review Could Be Improved:
DTRA undergoes two DOD reviews--the Biennial Defense Review
commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combat
Support Agency Review conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. These reviews focus on how well DTRA meets its customers'
requirements as a combat support agency. Overall, these two reviews
have concluded that DTRA supports the requirements of the operating
military forces and provides useful products and services.
The most recent biennial review was issued December 2002. DTRA was
assessed on its combat support, technology development, and threat
reduction and control efforts. DTRA's efforts at threat reduction and
control received high satisfaction ratings from the customers surveyed.
The agency received acceptable satisfaction ratings in combat support
but had below average ratings in the area of technology development.
In 2001, the Combat Support Agency Review Team conducted an assessment
of DTRA's responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in
the event of war or threat to national security. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to conduct assessments of all
combat support agencies every 2 years. The review team went to the
commands supported by DTRA and conducted extensive interviewing and
fieldwork regarding the support provided by DTRA. In the 2001
assessment, DTRA was commended for significant improvements in customer
orientation and combat support focus. DTRA was found to be ready to
support the requirements of the operating forces. A major finding in
the assessment concerned DTRA's ongoing work on decontamination
standards for airbases and strategic air and sealift assets. The study
acknowledged that DTRA was supporting the development of these
standards, but, as DOD's center of WMD expertise, it needs to provide
commanders with the best possible information currently available,
rather than wait until all studies have been completed. A Combat
Support Agency Review Team official stated that DTRA has addressed the
findings of the 2001 assessment, and that the 2003 assessment was
delayed by operations in Iraq but should be released in early 2004.
As part of the GPRA process, DTRA produced its first annual performance
assessment in 2002. GPRA requires that agencies report on the extent to
which they are meeting their annual performance goals and the actions
needed to achieve or modify the goals that have not been met. DTRA's
performance report did not compare the agency's achievements to its
goals, discuss the areas where DTRA fell short of its goals, or discuss
DTRA's plans to address goals that it did not achieve. For example, in
the threat control area, the agency discussed the number of missions
conducted and the equipment provided under the International
Counterproliferation Program without stating the program's goals. In
the threat reduction area, the report discussed the number of weapons
systems eliminated in the former Soviet Union and other achievements,
such as implementing security measures over chemical stockpiles at two
sites, again, without discussing the goals of the program. In the area
of combat support, the report discussed the number of vulnerability and
survivability assessments, training exercises of all types, and number
of training courses provided, but does not discuss how many of each
were planned. Finally, in the technology development area, the report
discussed several technologies developed or under development but does
not discuss the agency's plans for the year. See figure 5 for a
comparison of what is expected in an annual performance report and what
DTRA's report contained.
Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared with DTRA's
2002 Performance Report:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although this information is not in DTRA's performance report, we found
that DTRA leadership meets quarterly to assess progress in meeting each
unit's goals and discuss activities that are not on track. Further,
DTRA leadership discusses what needs to be done to get on track and
whether goals are unrealistic or not within its control. For example,
according to agency officials, they have in the past transferred
funding from CTR programs that were having problems into successful CTR
programs to prevent those funds from being lost because congressionally
provided funds must be spent within a certain time frame.
Conclusions:
When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic planning
process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress toward its
organizational goals. Although DTRA officials do measure progress
against these goals in quarterly reviews, the agency's performance
report does not capture the findings from these reviews. The
performance report does not compare accomplishments and activities with
established goals and objectives, nor does it explain what actions are
needed to achieve or modify goals that are not met. Providing this
information would allow decision makers outside of DTRA to have better
information regarding DTRA's performance.
Recommendations:
We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the agency's annual
performance report by comparing the agency's actual performance against
planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why the goals were not
met and the agency's plan for addressing these unmet goals in the
future.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DTRA provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reproduced in appendix I. In these comments, DTRA concurred with our
recommendation to improve DTRA's annual performance report by including
a comparison of the agency's actual performance against planned goals
and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met, and the
agency's plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future. DTRA
stated that it is refining its performance report methodology to better
address the linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future
efforts. DTRA also separately provided technical comments that we
discussed with relevant officials and included in the text of the
report where appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To report on DTRA's mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill
that mission, we reviewed agency documentation. Specifically, we
reviewed historical documents, including documentation of interviews of
the DOD senior officials responsible for the creation of DTRA, and
other agency mission documentation. We relied on our prior work that
reviewed specific DTRA projects. In addition, we interviewed DTRA
officials, including the agency's Director, senior leadership from each
of DTRA's units responsible for the agency's mission, other DTRA staff,
and DTRA contractor personnel. Finally, we attended a 3-day DTRA
liaison officer training class to learn how DTRA trains its liaison
officers about the variety of capabilities and services it can offer to
military forces in the field. We did not assess the effectiveness of
DTRA's programs.
To discuss DTRA's relationship with other government entities, we
reviewed the agency's documentation of programs and activities that it
undertakes with other government entities. We reviewed documents
provided by DTRA and NNSA staff regarding NWC responsibilities. In
addition, we interviewed DTRA, DOD, Energy, and NNSA officials about
DTRA's coordination with Energy and NNSA. We relied on documentation
and discussions with DOD officials regarding the nature of DTRA's
relationship with DHS. We also relied upon our previous audits
reviewing DHS and DOD to ascertain the nature of the relationship.
To determine how DTRA prioritizes its resources to meet its mission
objectives, we reviewed DTRA's 2000, 2001, and 2003 strategic plans. We
reviewed supporting documentation, including budget documents, program
and project plans, and internal and external assessments of DTRA.
Specifically, we compared DTRA's strategic plan, each unit's annual
performance plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and documentation on
the units' ongoing assessments of their activities with what we have
reported should be found in GPRA-based documents. We met with DTRA
officials to discuss the agency's planning and review process and with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their
assessments of DTRA.
We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review
from April 2003 to December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on
the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Key contributors to this report were F.
James Shafer, Hynek Kalkus, Monica Brym, Tim Wilson, Etana Finkler,
Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, and Ernie Jackson.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency:
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J. Kingman Road MSC 6201
Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-6201:
JAN 23 2004:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO Draft Report, GAO-04-
330, "WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be
Improved," dated January 9, 2004 (GAO Code 320182). This constitutes
the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft Report.
The DoD concurs with the finding of the report. Specific comments on
the finding are enclosed.
Technical comments for accuracy and clarification of this report have
been provided separately. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on
the Draft Report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Stephen M. Younger:
Director:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED JANUARY 9, 2004 GAO-04-330 (GAO CODE 320182):
"WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Defense Threat Reduction Agency Addresses
Broad Range of Threats, but Performance Reporting Can Be Improved":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION: The GAO recommended that the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) improve the Agency's annual performance
report by comparing the Agency's actual performance against planned
goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met and the
Agency's plan for addressing these in the future. (p. 27/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The DoD concurs with the findings of the report. The 2002
Performance Report referenced in the GAO report provided a summary of
DTRA's performance achievements once it adopted a balanced scorecard
approach for assessing performance. DTRA is not required to develop a
formal performance report, but has done so of its own accord. As part
of maturing and improving the Agency assessment process, DTRA is
refining its performance report methodology to better address the
linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts.
This revised methodology will be used in developing future performance
reports.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
[End of section]
GAO Products Covering the CTR Program:
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1008R].
Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-627R].
Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-482].
Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and
Nonproliferation Programs in Russia.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-526T].
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2003.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-341R].
Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-426].
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of
Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-694].
Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2001.
Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers
Benefits, Poses New Risks.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-138].
Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian
Scientists Taxed by Russia.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-154R].
Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for
Assistance Were Late and Incomplete.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-40].
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from
the Former Soviet Union.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119]. AO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119.
Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May
Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi- bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-76].
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1999.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on
Assistance Provided.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-218].
Washington, D.C.: September 5, 1997.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in
the Former Soviet Union.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-101].
Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1997.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat
Assistance Has Improved.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-84].
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 1997.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96- 222].
Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent
States Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls.
[Hyperlink, http:// www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118].
Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1996.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Material Controls in Newly Independent States.
[Hyperlink, http:// www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89].
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat
Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-191].
Washington, D.C.: September 29, 1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former
Soviet Union-An Update.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/ NSIAD-95-165].
Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former
Soviet Union.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-7].
Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics
Secure and Destroy Weapons.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5].
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 1993.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S.
Dismantlement Assistance.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-93-154].
Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1993.
Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear
Threat Reduction Act of 1991.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/ getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47].
Washington, D.C.: July 27, 1992.
(320182):
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to
Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
24, 2003).
[2] In the early 1990s, the On-Site Inspection Agency was asked to
support the earlier United Nation's efforts in Iraq.
[3] WMD, once defined by DOD as nuclear, biological and chemical, now
includes radiological and high explosives as well.
[4] In June 1996, 19 U.S. Air Force personnel were killed when
terrorists detonated a truck bomb near a fence in the American military
section of Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia, damaging the Khobar Towers
housing facilities.
[5] In 2001, NNSA was established as a semiautonomous agency within
Energy that is responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and
associated nonproliferation activities. NNSA includes all atomic energy
defense activities, specifically those parts of Energy formerly known
as Defense Programs, Nonproliferation and National Security, Fissile
Materials Disposition, and Naval Reactors, as well as the national
weapons laboratories and other plants and facilities that constitute
the nuclear weapons complex.
[6] Responsibility for the management of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile was originally established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
[7] DOD defines "surety" as material, personnel, and procedures that
contribute to the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons.
[8] The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement and the Plutonium
Disposition Agreement are agreements between the United States and
Russia that are designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive
stocks of plutonium by both eliminating the reactors that produce
plutonium and reducing existing stocks of plutonium.
[9] GAO-03-482.
[10] The specific reimbursement arrangements vary by activity and
agency.
GAO's Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW,
Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.
20548:
