Force Structure
Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts Gao ID: GAO-04-342 March 17, 2004The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services. GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure.
During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29 Predators. DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV program's management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development, neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction. Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational concepts without considering those of other services. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future interoperability problems.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-342, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
March 2004:
Force Structure:
Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Efforts:
GAO-04-342:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-342, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services
Why GAO Did This Study:
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been
under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were
used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track,
target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened
interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
services.
GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was
appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts
during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DOD‘s approach to
planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in
UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure.
What GAO Found:
During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV
development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the
services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid
employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV
development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by
DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the
services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned.
For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million
to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million”enough
to buy 29 Predators.
DOD‘s approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not
provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will
facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently,
although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV program‘s
management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and
promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published
the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential
missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the
Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development,
neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic
plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that
complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid
duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction.
Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning
documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational
concepts without considering those of other services. Without a
strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to
enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV
force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future
interoperability problems.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD (1) establish a strategic plan to guide UAV
development and fielding and (2) designate the UAV Task Force or other
appropriate body to oversee the plan‘s implementation, ensuring that
sufficient authority is provided. DOD partially concurred with one
recommendation and disagreed with the other, saying it did not need to
provide more authority for an organization within the department. GAO
continues to support both recommendations because of growth in the
number and cost of UAV programs and their importance to military
capabilities.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-342.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal P. Curtin (202)
512-4914 or curtinn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD's Requests:
DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs
into the Force Structure:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: UAV Funding Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal
Years 1999-2003:
Table 2: UAV Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding
Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003:
Table 3: UAV Procurement Funding Requests, Appropriations, and
Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003:
Table 4: Framework for Strategic Planning:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
UAV; unmanned aerial vehicle:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 17, 2004:
The Honorable Curt Weldon:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been
under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs won
considerable acceptance during military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq in 2002 and 2003. They were used in these operations to observe,
track, target, and in some cases strike enemy forces. These and similar
successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the services. In fact, by 2010, DOD plans to have at
least 14 different UAVs in the force structure to perform a variety of
missions.
Given the evolution of UAVs to an operational status, you asked us to
review DOD's overall planning effort to establish, maintain, and
operate UAVs. As agreed with your office, we (1) analyzed the extent to
which DOD requested, was appropriated and was obligated funds for major
UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assessed
whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable
assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration
into the force structure.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed DOD documentation
from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2003 for UAV-related procurement
and research, development, test, and evaluation funding. We obtained
and examined key departmentwide strategic documents--including the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2002 UAV Roadmap[Footnote 1]--to
identify the level of DOD's strategic planning for UAVs across the
department. Additionally, we met with key Office of the Secretary of
Defense activities and the Joint Staff, as well as key service
organizations involved in developing UAV force structure planning
documents. Further information on our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I.
We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided funding for UAV
development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD,
and to date the services have obligated about 99 percent of these
funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress appropriated
nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs from fiscal year 1999
through fiscal year 2003 compared with the $2.3 billion requested by
DOD. The majority of the funds--$1.8 billion (67 percent)--have been
for UAV research, development, test and evaluation. Only three systems
over these 5 years--the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk, and the
Army's Shadow--have matured to the point that they required procurement
funding, amounting to about $880 million by fiscal year 2003 and
another estimated $938 million needed by fiscal year 2005. Because
Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are
able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in
fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator
UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29
Predators. The Air Force has obligated 71 percent of the Predator's
fiscal year 2003 funding during its first program year.
DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not
provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will
facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently,
although DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the UAV
program's management. To help manage UAV development, in 2001 DOD
established the joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts
and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision
and promote UAV interoperability, the Task Force issued the 2002 UAV
Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential
missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on developing emerging
technologies. While DOD's Roadmap provides strategic guidance for the
development of UAV technology and suggests priority goals for
developing the technology, neither the Roadmap nor other defense
planning documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure
that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on
systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority
missions needed, and avoid duplication. Consequently, officials from
each of the services indicated that service-specific UAV roadmaps that
were recently developed primarily address the services' requirements
and operational concepts without the benefit of a departmentwide UAV
strategic plan. Moreover, the Task Force does not have program
directive authority and serves only in an advisory capacity to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics.
As such, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its
suggestions. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with
sufficient authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance
that its investment in UAVs will be effectively integrated into the
force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into
the force structure, which could increase development, procurement, and
logistics costs, and increase the risk of future interoperability
problems.
To enhance management control over the UAV program, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense establish a strategic plan by modifying
the Roadmap or developing another document to guide UAV development and
fielding, and designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate
organization to oversee the strategic plan's implementation, providing
it with sufficient authority to effectively enforce the plan's
direction, and promote joint operations and efficient expenditure of
funds. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation and
disagreed with the second, saying it did not need to provide more
authority to an organization within the department. We continue to
support both recommendations, however, because we believe the growth in
number and cost of UAV programs, and their importance to military
capabilities, will need more centralized oversight by DOD.
Background:
DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a
human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic
forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be
expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.
Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle, a flight control
station, information and retrieval or processing stations, and
sometimes wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery
platforms.
Evolution of UAV Development and Use:
UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions
for many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in
1960, certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear
testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to
destroy the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United
States has used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle
carrying suspected terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is
also considering using UAVs to assist with border security for homeland
security or homeland defense.
Battlefield commanders' need for real time intelligence has been a key
reason for the renewed interest in UAVs. According to the Congressional
Research Service, UAVs are relatively lightweight and often difficult
to detect. Additional advantages include longer operational presence,
greater operations and/or procurement cost-effectiveness, and no risk
of loss of life of U.S. service members.[Footnote 2]
DOD operates three UAV types--small, tactical, and medium altitude
endurance--in its force structure. The Air Force has operated the MQ-1
Predator since 1996 in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions, using a variety of sensors and satellite data links to relay
information, and in an offensive combat role using Hellfire missiles.
The Air Force also operates a small UAV called Desert Hawk, a 5-pound
aerial surveillance system used by security personnel to improve
situational awareness for force protection. The Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps have at various times operated the RQ-2 Pioneer since 1986. Only
operated by the Marine Corps today, the Pioneer provides targeting,
intelligence, and surveillance. The Marine Corps also operates a small
UAV called Dragon Eye for over-the-hill reconnaissance. This small,
4.5-pound UAV is currently in full-rate production. Originally
envisioned to be a joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps program, the RQ-5
Hunter was cancelled in 1996 after low-rate initial production. The
Army currently operates the residual Hunters for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Army also has selected the RQ-7
Shadow to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance at the
brigade level, and full-rate production was approved in 2002. Another
system, the Raven, a small, 4-pound UAV is being purchased commercially
off the shelf by both the Army for regular unit support and the Air
Force for special operations. Numerous other UAVs of various sizes
remain in development. These include the RQ-4 Global Hawk, a nearly
27,000-pound, jet-powered UAV with a wing span of over 116 feet used
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over an area of up
to 40,000 square nautical miles per day; the RQ-8 Fire Scout, a
vertical takeoff and landing UAV weighing nearly 2,700 pounds; and the
Neptune, weighing under 100 pounds with a wingspan of 7 feet and
optimized for sea-based operations.
In addition, congressional action in recent years has been directed
toward promoting an increase in the number and type of missions on
which UAVs can be used. For example, section 220 of the Department of
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 specifies that it shall
be a goal of the armed forces that one-third of the aircraft in the
operational deep strike aircraft fleet be unmanned by 2010. Moreover,
in section 1034 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2004, Congress mandated a DOD report of the potential for UAVs to
be used for a variety of homeland security and counter drug
missions.[Footnote 3] Finally, the fiscal year 2004 Defense
Appropriations Conference Report[Footnote 4] directs that DOD prepare a
second report by April 2004 detailing UAV requirements that are common
to each of the uniformed services.
Prior GAO Review of UAV Development:
Most of our prior work has focused on the development, testing, and
evaluation of unmanned aerial vehicles. As recently as September 2000,
we reported that DOD was deciding to procure certain UAV systems before
adequate testing had been completed.[Footnote 5] We found that buying
systems before successfully completing their testing had led repeatedly
to defective systems that were later terminated or required costly
retrofits or redesigns to achieve satisfactory performance. Conversely,
when DOD focused UAV acquisition on mature technologies that proved the
military utility of a given vehicle, the department had an informed
knowledge base upon which to base a decision. For example, even though
the Predator UAV was based on the existing Gnat 750 UAV, the department
required Predator's performance to be validated.[Footnote 6] As a
result, Predator moved quickly to full-rate production and, at the time
of our current review, had performed a variety of operational missions
successfully.
Through our prior work, we have also periodically raised the question
of the potential for duplication of efforts among the services and the
effectiveness of overarching strategy documents and management
approaches to avoid duplication and other problems. For example, in
June 2003 we reported that the Air Force and Navy, which previously
were independently developing unmanned combat aerial vehicles, had
agreed to jointly develop a new system for offensive combat missions
that met both of their needs.[Footnote 7] However, we also pointed out
that while one program is more efficient than two, the participation of
two services would increase the challenges of sustaining funding and
managing requirements. Similarly, as early as 1988, we raised concerns
about a variety of management challenges related to UAV
development.[Footnote 8] At that time, various congressional committees
had expressed concern about duplication in the services' UAV programs
and stressed the need to acquire UAVs that could meet the requirements
of more than one service, as the Air Force and Navy have recently
agreed to try. In response to congressional direction, DOD developed a
UAV master plan, which we reviewed at that time. We identified a number
of weaknesses in the 1988 master plan, including that it (1) did not
eliminate duplication, (2) continued to permit the proliferation of
single-service programs, (3) did not adequately consider cost savings
potential from manned and unmanned aircraft trade-offs, and (4) did not
adequately emphasize the importance of common payloads among different
UAV platforms. DOD generally concurred with that report and noted that
it would take until 1990 to reconcile service requirements for
acquiring a common family of UAVs.
Since our 1988 report, the overall management of defense UAV programs
has gone full circle. In 1989 the DOD Director of Defense Research and
Engineering set up the UAV Joint Project Office as a single DOD
organization with management responsibility for UAV programs. With the
Navy as the Executive Agency, within 4 years the Joint Project Office
came under criticism for a lack of progress. Replacing the office in
1993, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was created as the
primary management oversight and coordination office for all
departmentwide manned and unmanned reconnaissance. In 1998, however,
this office also came under criticism for its management approach and
slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that same year, this office was
dissolved and UAV program development and acquisition management were
given to the services, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence was assigned to
provide oversight for the Secretary of Defense.
Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD's Requests:
Overall, Congress has provided funding for UAV development and
procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD during the past 5
fiscal years, and the services to date have obligated about 99 percent
of these funds. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, DOD
requested approximately $2.3 billion, and Congress, in its efforts to
encourage rapid employment of UAVs by the military services, has
appropriated nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs. In total,
the services have obligated $2.6 billion of the appropriated funds.
(See table 1.):
Table 1: UAV Funding Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal
Years 1999-2003:
Dollars in millions.
1999;
Presidential budget: $413.2;
Appropriated: $429.4;
Obligated: $397.1.
2000;
Presidential budget: $228.3;
Appropriated: $257.4;
Obligated: $256.5.
2001;
Presidential budget: $333.9;
Appropriated: $377.0;
Obligated: $396.1.
2002;
Presidential budget: $506.3;
Appropriated: $510.8;
Obligated: $613.4.
2003;
Presidential budget: $778.7;
Appropriated: $1,079.0;
Obligated: $956.2.
Total;
Presidential budget: $2,260.5;
Appropriated: $2,653.6;
Obligated: $2,619.2.
Source: DOD.
Notes: The Presidential budget column represents funds requested by
DOD. The Appropriated column includes only these funds appropriated in
that fiscal year resulting from the budget request; it does not include
reprogramming, rescissions, and transfers to total obligation
authority. The Obligated column includes all funds the services and DOD
have reported as obligated against total obligation authority. We did
not attempt to reconcile the difference between appropriated and total
obligation authority.
Columns may not total because of rounding.
[End of table]
Generally, the additional funding provided by Congress was targeted for
specific programs and purposes, enabling the services to acquire
systems at a greater rate than originally planned. For example, in
fiscal year 2003 the Air Force requested $23 million to acquire 7
Predators, but Congress provided over $131 million--an increase of
approximately 470 percent--enough to acquire 29 Predators to meet
operational demands in the war against terrorism. The Air Force has
obligated 71 percent of the Predator 2003 funding during its first
program year.
About $1.8 billion (67 percent) of the money appropriated during the
fiscal year 1999-2003 period went for research, development, test and
evaluation of the various models, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: UAV Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding
Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003:
Dollars in millions.
1999;
Presidential budget: $298.7;
Appropriated: $299.7;
Obligated: $$285.4.
2000;
Presidential budget: $144.4;
Appropriated: $199.4;
Obligated: $198.6.
2001;
Presidential budget: $251.7;
Appropriated: $284.7;
Obligated: $297.9.
2002;
Presidential budget: $294.8;
Appropriated: $309.3;
Obligated: $315.5.
2003;
Presidential budget: $574.0;
Appropriated: $683.8;
Obligated: $614.1.
Total;
Presidential budget: $1,563.6;
Appropriated: $1,776.8;
Obligated: $1,711.5.
Source: DOD.
Notes: The Presidential budget column represents funds requested by
DOD. The Appropriated column includes only those funds appropriated in
that fiscal year resulting from the budget request; it does not include
reprogramming, rescissions, and transfers to total obligation
authority. The Obligated column includes all funds the services and DOD
have reported as obligated against total obligation authority. We did
not attempt to reconcile the difference between appropriated and total
obligation authority.
Columns may not total because of rounding.
[End of table]
The programs were generally divided into efforts to develop tactical
UAVs and medium-to-high-altitude endurance UAVs and, until 2002 when
the Predator was armed, were focused on meeting surveillance and
reconnaissance needs. Only three systems--the Army's Shadow and the Air
Force's Predator and Global Hawk--have matured to the point where they
required procurement funding during fiscal years 1999 through 2003. By
fiscal year 2003, appropriations totaled nearly $880 million, as shown
in table 3.
Table 3: UAV Procurement Funding Requests, Appropriations, and
Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003:
Dollars in millions.
1999;
Presidential budget: $114.5;
Appropriated: $129.8;
Obligated: $111.7.
2000;
Presidential budget: $83.9;
Appropriated: $58.0;
Obligated: $57.9.
2001;
Presidential budget: $82.3;
Appropriated: $92.3;
Obligated: $98.2.
2002;
Presidential budget: $211.5;
Appropriated: $201.5;
Obligated: $297.9.
2003;
Presidential budget: $204.7;
Appropriated: $395.2;
Obligated: $342.1.
Total;
Presidential budget: $696.9;
Appropriated: $876.8;
Obligated: $907.8.
Source: DOD.
Notes: The Presidential budget column represents funds requested by
DOD. The Appropriated column includes only those funds appropriated in
that fiscal year resulting from the budget request; it does not include
reprogramming, rescissions, and transfers to total obligation
authority. The Obligated column includes all funds the services and DOD
have reported as obligated against total obligation authority. We did
not attempt to reconcile the difference between appropriated and total
obligation authority.
Funding obligations exceed appropriations as a result of reprogramming
and other financial actions during the 3 years allowed for the use of
procurement money.
Columns may not total because of rounding.
[End of table]
DOD estimates that an additional $938 million in procurement funding
will be needed through fiscal year 2005.
DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs
into the Force Structure:
DOD's planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide
reasonable assurance that UAVs will be integrated into the force
structure efficiently, although the department has taken certain
positive steps to improve its management of the UAV program.
Specifically, DOD created a joint UAV Planning Task Force and developed
a key planning document, the UAV Roadmap 2002-2027. However, neither
the Joint Task Force nor the Roadmap is sufficient to provide DOD with
reasonable assurance that it is efficiently integrating UAVs into the
force structure. Consequently, the individual services are developing
their own UAVs without departmentwide guidance, thus increasing the
risk of unnecessarily duplicating capabilities and leading to
potentially higher costs and greater interoperability challenges.
DOD Has Taken Positive Steps to Improve Program Management:
Since 2000 DOD has taken positive steps to improve the management of
the UAV program. In October 2001 the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV Planning
Task Force to function as the joint advocate for developing and
fielding UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV
efforts throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future
UAV-related activities and to establish interoperability standards. For
example, the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating
detailed UAV development plans, recommending priorities for development
and procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense
agencies with implementing guidance for common UAV programs.
Moreover, the development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force's
primary product to communicate its vision and promote UAV
interoperability. The Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military
planning for UAV development from 2002 to 2027 and describes current
programs, identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance
on developing emerging technologies. The Roadmap is also intended to
assist DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV
development and acquisition to support defense plans contained in such
future planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Current Efforts Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance for Efficiently
Integrating UAVs into the Force Structure:
While the creation of the joint Task Force and the UAV Roadmap are
important steps to improve management of the UAV program, they are not
enough to provide reasonable assurance that DOD is developing and
fielding UAVs efficiently. The UAV Roadmap does not constitute a
comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into
force structure. Moreover, the Joint Task Force's authority is
generally limited to program review and advice but is insufficient to
enforce program direction.
DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Developing and Fielding
UAVs:
While DOD has some elements of a UAV strategic-planning approach in
place, it has not established a comprehensive strategic plan or set of
plans for developing and fielding UAVs across DOD. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides a framework for
establishing strategic-planning and performance measurement in the
federal government, and for ensuring that federal programs with the
same or similar goals are closely coordinated and mutually reinforcing.
The strategic planning requirement of this framework consists of six
key components, described in table 4.
Table 4: Framework for Strategic Planning:
Key components: Mission statement--explains why the program exists and
what it does. Reflects statutory basis, if applicable.
Key components: Long-term goals and objectives--typically general in
nature and lays out what the agency wants to accomplish in the next 5
years. Should be expressed in a manner that allows for future
assessment of whether they are being achieved.
Key components: Approaches (strategies)--general methods the agency
plans to use to accomplish long-term goals.
Key components: Relationship between long-term goals and objectives and
annual performance goals--explains how annual goals will be used to
measure progress toward achieving the long-term goals.
Key components: External factors--factors external to the agency or
program and beyond its control that may significantly affect the
agency's ability to accomplish goals.
Key components: Program evaluations--a description of how program
evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals.
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Agency Strategic Plans under
GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16
(Washington, D.C.: May 1997).
[End of table]
When applied collectively and combined with effective leadership, the
components can provide a management framework to guide major programs,
efforts, and activities, including the development and integration of
UAVs into the force structure.
However, neither the UAV Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents
represent a comprehensive strategy to guide the development and
fielding of UAVs that complement each other, perform the range of
priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. DOD officials
acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not issued
any guidance that establishes an overall strategy for UAVs in DOD.
While high-level DOD strategic-planning documents provide some general
encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, including the
development of UAVs, these documents do not provide any specific
guidance on developing and integrating UAVs into the force structure.
Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a start on a strategic plan because
it incorporates some of the key components of strategic planning
provided by the Results Act framework as shown by the following:
* Long Term Goals--The Roadmap states its overall purpose and what it
hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap refers to the
Defense Planning Guidance's intent for UAVs as a capability and
indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid advancement of this
capability. At the same time, it does not clearly state DOD's overall
or long-term goals for its UAV efforts. Similarly, while it states that
it wants to define clear direction to the services, it does not clearly
identify DOD's vision for its UAV force structure from 2002 through
2027.
* Approaches to Obtain Long-Term Goals--The Roadmap's Approach section
provides a strategy for developing the Roadmap and meeting its goal.
This approach primarily deals with identifying requirements and linking
them to needed UAV payload capabilities, such as sensors and associated
communication links. The approach then ties these requirements to
forecasted trends in developing technologies as a means to try to
develop a realistic assessment of the state of the technology in the
future and the extent to which this technology will be sufficient to
meet identified requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap
does not provide a clear description of a strategy for defining how to
develop and integrate UAVs into the future force structure. For
example, the Roadmap does not attempt to establish UAV development or
fielding priorities nor does it identify the most urgent mission-
capability requirements. Moreover, without the sufficient
identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link these priorities
to current or developing UAV programs and technology.
Beyond strategic planning, the Results Act calls for agencies to
establish results-oriented performance measures and to collect
performance data to monitor progress. The Roadmap addresses, in part,
key elements of performance measurement, as shown in the following:
* Performance Goals--The Roadmap established 49 specific performance
goals to accomplish a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are aimed
at fielding transformational capabilities without specifying what
missions will be supported by the new capabilities. Others are to
establish joint standards and control costs. Nonetheless, of the 49
goals, only 1 deals directly with developing and fielding a specific
category of UAV platform to meet a priority mission-capability
requirement--suppression of enemy air defenses or strike electronic
attack. The remaining goals, such as developing heavy fuel aviation
engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly associated with developing
UAV or related technologies, and UAV-related standards and policies to
promote more efficient and effective joint UAV operations. Thus, the
Roadmap does not establish overall UAV program goals.
* Performance Indicators--Some of the 49 performance goals have
performance indicators that could be used to evaluate progress, such as
the reliability goal for decreasing the annual mishap rate for large
UAVs. However, many other goals have no established indicators, such as
developing standards to maximize UAV interoperability. Furthermore, the
Roadmap does not establish indicators that readily assess how well the
program will meet the priority mission capabilities needed by the
services and theater commanders.
While the Roadmap has incorporated some key strategic-planning
components, it only minimally addresses the other key components.
According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching architecture for
UAVs departmentwide. It does, however, provide some significant
guidance for developing UAV and related technologies. In addition to
the 49 separate goals, the Roadmap also provides a condensed
description of DOD's current UAVs, categorizing them as operational,
developmental, and other (residual and conceptual) UAV systems. The
Roadmap further sought to identify current and emerging requirements
for military capabilities that UAVs could address.
In addition to the Roadmap, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council[Footnote 9] has reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for
some systems, such as the Army's Shadow and the Air Force's Predator.
According to Joint Staff officials, however, neither the Joint Staff
nor the council has issued any guidance that would establish a
strategic plan or overarching architecture for DOD's current and future
UAVs. In addition, in June 2003 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff created the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
to provide a top-down capability-based process. Under the system, five
Functional Capabilities Boards have been chartered, each representing a
major warfighting capability area as follows: (1) command and control,
(2) force application, (3) battle space awareness, (4) force
protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has representatives
from the services, the Combatant Commanders, and certain major
functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is tasked with
developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint operations in
its respective functional area. Transformation of these capabilities is
expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific capabilities
that can be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint Staff
officials, these initiatives will also not result in an overarching
architecture for UAVs. However, the identification of capabilities that
can be met by UAVs is expected to help enhance the understanding of
DOD's overall requirement for UAV capabilities.
Planning Task Force Has Limited Authority:
As a joint advocate for UAV efforts, the joint UAV Planning Task
Force's authority is limited to program review and advice. The Task
Force Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not
have program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and
recommended actions. [Footnote 10] Without such authority, according to
the Director, the Task Force seeks to influence services' programs by
making recommendations to them or proposing recommended program changes
for consideration by the Under Secretary. Nonetheless, according to DOD
officials, the Task Force has attempted to influence the joint
direction of service UAV efforts in a variety of ways, such as
reviewing services' budget proposals, conducting periodic program
reviews, and participating in various UAV-related task teams. For
example, the Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider
an existing UAV rather than develop a unique UAV for its Broad Area
Marine Surveillance mission. The Task Force has also worked with the
Army's tactical UAV program, encouraging it to consider using the
Navy's Fire Scout as an initial platform for the Future Combat Systems
class IV UAV. The Task Force also regularly reviews services' UAV
program budgets and, when deemed necessary, makes budget change
proposals. For example, the Task Force, in conjunction with other
Secretary of Defense offices, was successful in maintaining the Air
Force's Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air
Force attempted to terminate it. The Task Force was also successful in
overturning an attempt by the Navy to terminate the Fire Scout rotary
wing UAV program. However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to
adopt any of its suggestions. For example, according to the Director,
no significant progress has been made in achieving better
interoperability among the Services in UAV platform and sensor
coordination, but work continues with the services, intelligence
agencies, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Joint Forces
Command to this end.
Developing Service-Specific UAV Force Structures without Clear
Departmentwide Strategic Guidance Increases Risk:
As they pursue separate UAV programs, the services and DOD agencies
risk developing UAVs with duplicate capabilities, potentially leading
to greater costs and increased interoperability challenges. The House
Appropriation Committee, in a 2003 report, expressed concern that
without comprehensive planning and review, there is no clear path
toward developing a UAV force structure.[Footnote 11] Thus, the
committee directed that each service provide an updated UAV roadmap.
These reports were to address the services' plans for the development
of UAVs and how current UAVs are being employed. Officials from each of
the services indicated that their UAV roadmap was developed to
primarily address their individual service's requirements and
operational concepts. However, in their views, high-level DOD guidance-
-such as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military Strategy, and Defense
Planning Guidance--did not constitute strategic plans for UAVs that
would guide the development of their individual service's UAV roadmap.
These officials further stated that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's 2002 UAV Roadmap provided some useful guidance, especially in
regard to UAV technology, but was not used to guide their UAV roadmap's
development. Moreover, they did not view the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Roadmap as a departmentwide strategic plan nor an overarching
architecture for integrating UAVs into the force structure. Moreover,
according to the service officials developing the service-level UAV
roadmaps, there was little collaboration with other services' UAV
efforts.
Thus, DOD has little assurance that the current approach to developing
and fielding UAVs in the services will result in closely coordinated or
mutually reinforcing program efforts, as recommended by the Results
Act. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have tried to coordinate these efforts through the Joint UAV
Planning Task Force, the absence of a guiding strategy and sufficient
authority has made it difficult to have reasonable assurance that
development and fielding are being done efficiently. If not managed
effectively, this process can potentially lead to the development and
fielding of UAVs across DOD and the services, which may unnecessarily
duplicate each other. For example, the Army, Marine Corps, and Air
Force are individually developing small, backpackable, lightweight UAVs
for over-the-horizon and force protection reconnaissance missions.
Likewise, both the Marine Corps and Army are individually pursuing
various medium-sized tactical UAVs with both fixed and rotary wings to
accomplish a variety of missions, including tactical reconnaissance,
targeting, communications relay, and force protection.
Conclusions:
Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient program
directive authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance
that its investment will result in UAV programs being effectively
integrated into the force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly
integrating UAVs into the force structure, which could increase
development, procurement, and logistics costs; increase the risk of
future interoperability problems; and unnecessarily duplicate efforts
from one service to the next.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance management control over the UAV program, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
* establish a strategic plan or set of plans that are based on mission
requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying the
Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a minimum,
ensure that the plan links operational requirements with development
plans to ensure that the services develop systems that complement each
other, will perform the range of missions needed, and avoid duplication
and:
* designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate organization to
oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan; provide this
organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan's direction,
and promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of funds.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our first recommendation and disagreed with the second. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense establish a strategic plan or set of plans to guide the
development and fielding of UAVs by modifying the Roadmap or developing
another appropriate document. DOD stated that its preferred way to
address UAV planning was through the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, which is a capability-based planning process at the
Joint Staff level that will identify UAV capabilities as needed across
the five major joint warfighting areas through the use of the
Functional Capabilities Boards.
We continue to believe that DOD needs a departmentwide strategic plan
establishing the mission capabilities required of UAVs and the detailed
strategy for effectively developing and acquiring these capabilities.
DOD acknowledged that its UAV Roadmap is not a broad strategic plan.
Moreover, as we pointed out in our report, DOD recognized in its UAV
Roadmap the need for a focused strategic plan for UAV capabilities,
stating that the Roadmap was "to assist Department of Defense decision
makers in developing a long-range strategy for UAV development and
acquisition in future Quadrennial Defense Reviews and other planning
efforts"--a strategy that has yet to be created. Such a strategic plan
would provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint UAV
Planning Task Force, or other appropriate authorities with the
additional leverage and guidance to ensure effective oversight of the
services' development and integration of UAV capabilities into the
joint warfighting force structure. The Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System process, which DOD referred to, may be a useful
tool for DOD to implement its capabilities-based planning approach.
However, we continue to believe that a strategic plan for UAVs would be
an important element in assuring UAV decisions and development reflect
decisions made within the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System process and are consistent with the strategic plan's
intent.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to designate the UAV
Planning Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the
implementation of a UAV strategic plan and provide this organization
with sufficient authority to enforce the plan's direction. In its
response, DOD indicated that the Secretary of Defense already has the
authority needed to accomplish the intent of our recommendation. To
buttress its point, DOD identified four actions taken to influence
service development, evaluation, acquisition, and fielding of certain
UAVs.
We acknowledge in our report that the formation of the Task Force
represents a step in the right direction for DOD and that the Task
Force has achieved some successes in coordinating some UAV programs. In
our recent report on the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, in fact, we
gave the Task Force credit for bringing the Air Force and Navy programs
together into a joint program. However, the Task Force has not always
been successful. For example, no significant progress has been made in
achieving better interoperability among Service UAVs and sensors. Our
concern is that with UAVs assuming ever-greater importance as key
enabling technologies, and with increasing sums of money being
allocated for a growing number of UAV programs, DOD needs more than a
coordination mechanism. It needs an organization with authority to
achieve the most cost-effective development of UAVs. Consequently, we
continue to believe that the recommendation is sound, and that to
effectively implement a strategic plan for UAVs, the Secretary needs to
designate an appropriate office with the authority to oversee and
implement the strategy.
DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. DOD
provided technical comments, which we included in our report as
appropriate.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 14 days from its issue date. At that
time,we will send copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget, and it will be available at no charge
on GAO's Web site at http: //www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4914. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)
requested, received, and used funds for major unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003, we reviewed
department and service documentation for major operational UAV
programs, programs that are in procurement, and programs that are under
development and to be procured by 2010. Funding data were obtained from
various sources. We obtained the funding levels that DOD requested for
UAV programs from the justification books used to support DOD's budget
requests and the DOD Comptroller's Congressional Funding tracking
database. We also obtained the funding levels appropriated to service
UAV programs by analyzing the services' Appropriation Status by Fiscal
Year Program and Subaccounts reports.[Footnote 12] Additionally, we
analyzed these reports to determine the extent to which these
appropriated funds were obligated within their allowed program years.
We did not conduct a comprehensive audit to reconcile the differences
in appropriated and obligated funds.
To assess whether DOD's approach to developing and employing UAVs
ensures that UAVs will be efficiently integrated into the force
structure, we reviewed key departmentwide strategic documents, such as
the Defense Planning Guidance, to identify the level of DOD's strategic
planning for UAVs and its impact on service planning. We discussed the
level of strategic planning for UAVs with key DOD and service officials
from organizations with key roles in DOD's g development, such as the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Joint UAV Planning Task Force; the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence; the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council; and U.S. Joint Forces Command. We reviewed each service's
current UAV roadmap and held discussions with officials from service
activities involved in planning and developing their UAV force
structure roadmaps. We also reviewed in detail the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, and
assessed the extent to which it establishes an overall DOD management
framework for developing and employing UAVs departmentwide. We used the
principles embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 as criteria for assessing the UAV Roadmap.
We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
5 MAR 2004:
Mr. Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Curtin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-04-342, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Improved Strategic Planning Can
Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts," dated February 6, 2004
(GAO Code 350212).
The DoD partially concurs with the draft report's first recommendation,
and does not concur with the second recommendation. The rationale for
the DOD's position is provided at enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 provides
additional comments and suggested changes to the report.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact
Dyke Weatherington, UAV Planning Task Force, 703-695-6188.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director: Defense Systems:
Enclosures:
1. DOD Comments to the GAO Recommendations 2. DOD Comments on the Draft
Report:
GAO Draft Report - Dated February 6, 2004 GAO CODE 350212/GAO-04-342:
"FORCE STRUCTURE: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DoD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: Establish a strategic plan or set of plans based on
mission requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying
the Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a
minimum, ensure that the plan links operational requirements with
development plans to ensure that the Services develop systems that
complement each other, will perform the range of missions needed, and
avoid duplication. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD UAV Roadmap addresses a wide
variety of UAV systems, however it is not a broad UAV strategic plan
based on mission areas or requirements. UAVs contribute in several
functional capability areas as described in the new Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, including Battle
Space Awareness (BA) and Force Application (FA). The JCIDS process
establishes Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB) that are responsible
for all aspects, materiel and nonmateriel, of their assigned functional
area(s). Each FCB works to coordinate, integrate and deconflict the
efforts of all DoD Components within its assigned functional area(s).
Each FCB ensures that new capabilities are conceived and developed in
an integrated joint warfighting context. UAV systems are one of many
possible materiel solutions available to each FCB for given mission
capabilities, and should not be the exclusive focus of a separate plan
as recommended by the GAO. The focus of capability based planning
within the Department should be (and is, with JCIDS) on the needed
mission capability and all possible solutions, materiel and
nonmateriel, including UAVs. We will continue to work with the Joint
Staff to develop detailed mission capability plans.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Designate the UAV task force or another appropriate
organization to oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan,
providing this organization sufficient authority to enforce the plan's
direction, and promote joint operations and efficient expenditure of
funds. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) established the UAV
Planning Task Force (PTF) in 2001 to provide oversight and
recommendations consistent with the responsibilities vested within
AT&L; to include promoting payload commonality,
developing and enforcing interface standards, ensuring multi-Service
cooperation, promoting joint experimentation for integrating UAVs into
combat operations, assisting the transition of promising UAV-related
technologies, and resolving overarching export policy and airspace
issues. The Department believes that the USD (AT&L) has sufficient
oversight and influence to effectively integrate UAV capability into
the Combatant Commanders' operational forces. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) retains the ability to impact programs and
modify program direction and resources when appropriate. The Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process affords OSD the
opportunity to adequately review and enforce program activities,
including UAV activities, across Services. Additionally, JCIDS, a
capabilities-based process, focuses on developing integrated joint
warfighting capability, providing analysis of requirements and
solutions across Services. Together, these existing processes are in
place to promote the sharing of information, identify areas of
cooperation, and recommend program adjustments to correct capability
gaps and redundancies.
The UAV PTF, in combination with other Department and Service
organizations, has been very successful in influencing the development,
evaluation, acquisition and fielding of UAV capability. A few examples
of recent UAV efforts include:
1. The creation of a Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program,
combining capabilities needed by the Air Force and Navy into a Joint
program that will demonstrate critical capabilities and enhance
jointness and competition, beginning with an Operational Assessment in
2007.
2. The Navy and Army are coordinating their program offices' efforts to
develop their respective vertical takeoff UAV (VTUAV) capabilities by
developing a common base aircraft to be used in Littoral Combat Ship
and Future Combat Systems projects.
3. The Joint Small UAV Project Manager (PM) Working Group --initiated
on the UAV PTF's recommendation and chaired by the Army PM for UAVs --
promotes the sharing of information, data, techniques, and technologies
related to small UAVs. Recent successes include an Army, United States
Marine Corps (USMC), and SOCOM combined buy of a Small UAV infrared
camera, saving 50 percent in unit costs; sharing training curriculum
and training manuals between the USMC and the Army; providing a SOCOM
training team to support Army efforts; and putting in place a
frequency-compliant communications system development that supports
all Small UAVs.
4. The UAV PTF and the Services have applied DoD experience and assets
to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct UAV
demonstrations. The demonstrations have helped evaluate and
characterize the potential to rapidly transition DoD UAV capability for
DHS use.
enclosure (1):
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Fred Harrison, Lawrence E.
Dixon, James Mahaffey, James Driggins, R.K. Wild, and Kenneth Patton
also made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise
Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology
Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175.
Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598.
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow
200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.:
September 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude
Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.:
December 15, 1998.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to
Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD--97-
138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy
Fleet Use. N GAO/SIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in
Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4,
1992.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
1990.
Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 2002-
2027 (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).
[2] Congressional Research Service, Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), 96-75F (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 1998).
[3] The act also mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct a study
of future naval platform architecture, including the potential for
unmanned ships in the future.
[4] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-283 at 291 (2003).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200 Acquisition Strategy,
GAO/NSIAD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2000).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's
Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-33
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 1999).
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching
Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
Program's Success, GAO-03-598 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 1988).
[9] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization
made up of senior representatives from each of the services to review
joint experimentation and make appropriate recommendations to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3180.1, (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 31, 2002).
[10] Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force before
the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services
Committee, Mar. 26, 2003.
[11] Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 2003 Report, H.R. Rep.
No. 107-532 at 207.
[12] These reports are commonly referred to as Accounting Report (M)
1002.
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