Military Prepositioning
Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond
Gao ID: GAO-04-562T March 24, 2004
Since the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its reliance on prepositioned stocks of military equipment and supplies, primarily because it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning allows the military to respond rapidly to conflicts. Ideally, units need only to bring troops and a small amount of materiel to the conflict area. Once there, troops can draw on prepositioned equipment and supplies, and then move quickly into combat. Today's testimony describes (1) the performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); (2) current status of the stocks and plans to reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as it reshapes these programs to support DOD's force transformation efforts.
The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. They both reported that prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided most of the combat equipment used and, for the most part, this equipment was in good condition and maintained high readiness rates. However, the Army's prepositioned equipment included some older models of equipment and shortfalls in support equipment such as trucks, spare parts, and other supplies. Moreover, the warfighter did not always know what prepositioned stocks were available in theater, apparently worsening an already overwhelmed supply-and-distribution system. The units were able to overcome these challenges; fortunately, the long time available to build up forces allowed units to fill many of the shortages and adjust to unfamiliar equipment. Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years--depending on how long Iraqi Freedom operations continue--before these stocks will be available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after they become available, much of the equipment will likely require substantial maintenance, or may be worn out beyond repair. The Army has estimated that it has an unfunded requirement of over $1 billion for reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However, since most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has not been turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution, most of the funding is not required at this time. When the prepositioned equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions will have to be made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units, what equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced with existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF. DOD faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into its future. In the near term, the Army and Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF operations. While waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also has an opportunity to address shortfalls and modernize remaining stocks. For the longer term, DOD may need to (1) determine the role of prepositioning in light of efforts to transform the military; (2) establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint expeditionary forces; and (3) ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its priority and is affordable even as the force is transformed. Congress will play a key role in reviewing DOD's assessment of the cost effectiveness of various options to support its overall mission, including prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly.
GAO-04-562T, Military Prepositioning: Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 24, 2004:
Military Prepositioning:
Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Beyond:
Statement of William M. Solis, Director, Defense Management and
Capabilities:
GAO-04-562T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-562T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its
reliance on prepositioned stocks of military equipment and supplies,
primarily because it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop
presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the
Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning allows
the military to respond rapidly to conflicts. Ideally, units need only
to bring troops and a small amount of materiel to the conflict area.
Once there, troops can draw on prepositioned equipment and supplies,
and then move quickly into combat.
Today‘s testimony describes (1) the performance and availability of
Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); (2) current status of the stocks and
plans to reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as
it reshapes these programs to support DOD's force transformation
efforts.
GAO‘s observations are based on ongoing work as well as previous
reports on equipment accountability, supply distribution, and other
logistics issues during OIF, plus other past work on spare parts
shortages and on the readiness of prepositioning programs.
What GAO Found:
The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated
during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps
relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to
decisively defeat the Iraqi military. They both reported that
prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF.
Prepositioned stocks provided most of the combat equipment used and,
for the most part, this equipment was in good condition and maintained
high readiness rates. However, the Army's prepositioned equipment
included some older models of equipment and shortfalls in support
equipment such as trucks, spare parts, and other supplies. Moreover,
the warfighter did not always know what prepositioned stocks were
available in theater, apparently worsening an already overwhelmed
supply-and-distribution system. The units were able to overcome these
challenges; fortunately, the long time available to build up forces
allowed units to fill many of the shortages and adjust to unfamiliar
equipment.
Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support
continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years”depending on
how long Iraqi Freedom operations continue”before these stocks will be
available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after they
become available, much of the equipment will likely require substantial
maintenance, or may be worn out beyond repair. The Army has estimated
that it has an unfunded requirement of over $1 billion for
reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However, since
most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has not
been turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution, most
of the funding is not required at this time. When the prepositioned
equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions will have to be
made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units, what
equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced with
existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the
prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF.
DOD faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and
makes plans for how such stocks fit into its future. In the near term,
the Army and Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF
operations. While waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also
has an opportunity to address shortfalls and modernize remaining
stocks. For the longer term, DOD may need to (1) determine the role of
prepositioning in light of efforts to transform the military; (2)
establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint
expeditionary forces; and (3) ensure that the program is resourced
commensurate with its priority and is affordable even as the force is
transformed. Congress will play a key role in reviewing DOD‘s
assessment of the cost effectiveness of various options to support its
overall mission, including prepositioning and other alternatives for
projecting forces quickly.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-562T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on logistical issues
related to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), focusing on prepositioned
stocks. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD)
has increased its reliance on prepositioned reserves of military
equipment and supplies since it can no longer plan on having a large
forward troop presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on
land in the Persian Gulf and other regions around the world.
Prepositioning can speed response times. Ideally, the military needs
only to bring troops and a small amount of materiel to the area of
conflict. Once there, troops can draw on prepositioned equipment and
supplies, and then move rapidly into combat.
My statement today reflects our preliminary observations drawn from
ongoing work as well as previously published reports. As requested, my
testimony today will focus on the performance, reconstitution, and
future of prepositioning programs. Specifically, it describes (1) the
performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned
equipment and supplies to support OIF; (2) the current status of the
stocks and plans to reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the
military as it reshapes these programs to support the military's force
transformation efforts.
Summary:
The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated
during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps
relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to
decisively defeat the Iraqi military. The following summarizes our
preliminary observations and issues to consider for the future.
* Army and Marine Corps officials reported that prepositioned stocks
were a key factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided
a significant amount of the combat equipment used by the Army and the
Marine Corps. For the most part, the prepositioned combat systems were
in good condition and reportedly maintained high readiness rates
throughout the war. However, the Army's prepositioning program had some
less-than-modern equipment and had shortfalls, such as trucks, spare
parts, and other items. Moreover, the warfighters did not always know
what prepositioned sustainment stocks were available in theater,
apparently worsening an already overwhelmed theater supply-and-
distribution system. While these challenges were not insurmountable to
the units, they did slow them down. Fortunately, the long time
available to build up forces allowed U.S. forces to fill many of the
shortages and adjust to unfamiliar equipment.
* Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support
continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years--depending on
how long Iraqi Freedom operations continue--before these stocks will be
available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after these
stocks become available, much of the equipment will likely require
substantial maintenance, or it may be worn out beyond repair. The Army
has estimated that it has an unfunded requirement of over $1 billion
for reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However,
since most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has
not been turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution,
most of the funding is not required at this time. When the
prepositioned equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions will
have to be made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units,
what equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced
with existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the
prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF. In the interim, both
the Army and Marines have kept some land-or sea-based prepositioned
stocks in the Pacific to cover a possible contingency in that region.
* The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its
prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the
future. In the near term, the Army and the Marine Corps must
necessarily focus on supporting ongoing operations in OIF. And while it
may be several years before most prepositioned assets are available to
fully reconstitute the Army's programs, opportunities exist to address
shortfalls and selectively modernize the remaining stocks. For the
longer term, the department may need to rethink its prepositioning
programs to ensure that they are in sync with overall transformation
goals and the evolving military strategy. Some changes are already
underway. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are pursuing sea-
basing ideas--where prepositioning ships could serve as floating
logistics bases. Importantly, DOD needs to consider affordability. The
drawdown of Army forces made prepositioning a practical alternative in
recent years because the service had ample equipment. However, as the
services' equipment is transformed or recapitalized, it may not be
practical to buy enough equipment for units to have one set at their
home station and another set in prepositioning. Consideration of the
cost of various options will be critical as the department evaluates
alternatives for transforming its force structure to achieve future
mission objectives. Congress will have a key role in reviewing the
department's assessment of the cost-effectiveness of options to support
DOD's overall mission, including mobility and force projection.
In responding to your request, we conducted work that included
officials from Headquarters, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C.; Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois;
Combat Equipment Group-Afloat, Goose Creek, South Carolina; and Blount
Island Command, Jacksonville, Florida. At these locations, we
interviewed officials familiar with prepositioning issues during OIF as
well as plans for the future. We reviewed and obtained relevant
documentation and performed analyses of reconstitution and options for
the future. We also reviewed after-action reports on OIF and Operation
Desert Storm. We obtained service estimates for funding prepositioned
stocks requirements, but we did not validate these estimates. In
addition, we drew on the preliminary results of our ongoing reviews of
OIF lessons learned and OIF reconstitution and on our recent reports on
OIF supply and distribution issues, Stryker deployment, and Army spare
parts shortages. We also relied on our 2001 report on Army war reserve
spare parts shortages, 1998 report on prepositioning in the Army and
the Air Force, and early 1990s reports on Operation Desert
Storm.[Footnote 1] We performed our work in March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Background:
The basic purpose of prepositioning is to allow DOD to field combat-
ready forces in days rather than in the weeks it would take if the
forces and all necessary equipment and supplies had to be brought from
the United States. However, the stocks must be (1) available in
sufficient quantities to meet the needs of deploying forces and (2) in
good condition. For prepositioning programs, these factors define
"readiness." If on-hand stocks are not what is needed--or are in poor
condition--the purpose of prepositioning may be defeated because the
unit will lose valuable time obtaining or repairing equipment and
supplies. U.S forces had months to build up for OIF, so speed was not
imperative. Prepositioning sites became reception and staging areas
during the months leading up to the war, and afforded the military the
necessary time and access in Kuwait to build up its forces for the
later offensive operations of OIF.
Prepositioning programs grew in importance to U.S. military strategy
after the end of the Cold War, particularly for the Army. Recognizing
that it would have fewer forward-stationed ground forces--and to
support the two-war strategy of the day--the Army used equipment made
available from its drawdown to field new sets of combat equipment
ashore in the Persian Gulf and in Korea. It also began an afloat
program in the 1990s, using large ships to keep equipment and supplies
available to support operations around the world. The Marine Corps has
had a prepositioned capability since the 1980s. Its three Marine
Expeditionary Forces are each assigned a squadron of ships packed with
equipment and supplies--the Marines view this equipment as their "go-
to-war" gear. Both the services also have retained some stocks in
Europe, although the Army stocks have steadily declined since the end
of the Cold War.[Footnote 2] Today, the Army has sites in the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, while the Marine Corps retains
stocks in Norway. Figure 1 shows the location of Army and Marine Corps
prepositioned equipment prior to OIF.
Figure 1: Location of Army and Marine Prepositioned Equipment Prior to
OIF:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Prepositioning is an important part of DOD's overall strategic mobility
calculus. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three
ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. Each part of this triad has
its own advantages and disadvantages. Airlift is fast, but it is
expensive to use and impractical for moving all of the material needed
for a large-scale deployment. Although ships can carry large loads,
they are relatively slow. Prepositioning lessens the strain on
expensive airlift and reduces the reliance on relatively slow sealift
deliveries. However, prepositioning requires the military to maintain
equipment that essentially duplicates what the unit has at home
station. Moreover, if the prepositioned equipment stocks are
incomplete, the unit may have to bring along so much additional
equipment that using it could still strain lift, especially scarce
airlift in the early days of a conflict.
Prepositioned Equipment Performed Well in OIF, Despite Shortfalls and
Other Logistical Challenges:
The Army and Marine Corps reported that their prepositioned equipment
performed well during OIF but that some problems emerged. We reviewed
lessons-learned reports and talked to Army and Marine Corps officials
who managed or used the equipment. We heard general consensus that
major combat equipment was generally in good condition when drawn and
that it performed well during the conflict. However, Army officials
said that some equipment was out-of-date and some critical items like
trucks were in short supply and parts and other supplies were sometimes
not available. The officials agreed that, overall, OIF demonstrated
that prepositioned stocks could successfully support major combat
operations.
Most of the issues we heard were with the Army's program. Marine Corps
officials reported few shortfalls in their prepositioned stocks or
mismatches with unit equipment. This is likely due to two key
differences between the services. First, the Marines view prepositioned
stocks as their "go-to-war" gear and give the stocks a very high
priority for fill and modernization. Second, the units that will use
the prepositioned stocks are assigned in advance and the Marine Corps
told us that the combat units feel a sense of "ownership" in the
equipment. This manifests itself in important ways. For example, the
Marines have periodic conferences with all involved parties to work out
exactly what their ships will carry and what the units will need to
bring with them to the fight. Such an effort to tailor the
prepositioned equipment increases familiarity, allows for prewar
planning, and thus minimizes surprises or last-minute adjustments. The
Marines also train with their gear periodically. By contrast, the Army
does not designate the sets for any particular unit and provides little
training with the equipment, especially with the afloat stocks.
Prepositioned Combat Equipment Performed Well:
Personnel who used and managed the equipment agreed that the tanks,
infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers were in good condition when
they were drawn from the prepositioned stocks; moreover, the equipment
generally stayed operational throughout the fight. For example, the
Third Infantry Division after-action report said that new systems and
older systems proved to be very valuable and the tanks and Bradleys
were both lethal and survivable. Additionally, according to Army
Materiel Command documents, combat personnel reported that their
equipment, in many cases, worked better than what they had at home
station. Moreover, operational readiness data we reviewed showed that
major combat equipment stayed operational, even in heavy combat across
hundreds of miles. In fact, officials from both services agreed that
OIF validated the prepositioning concept and showed that it can
successfully support major combat operations. Moreover, the U.S.
Central Command, in an internal lessons-learned effort, concluded that
prepositioned stocks "proved their worth and were critical in
successfully executing OIF.":
Some Prepositioned Equipment Was Out-of-Date or Did Not Match Unit
Needs:
Some of the Army's prepositioned equipment was outdated or did not
match what the units were used to at home station. At times, this
required the units to "train down" to older and less-capable equipment
or bring their own equipment from home. Examples include:
* Bradleys--The prepositioned stocks contained some older Bradley
Fighting Vehicles that had not received upgrades installed since
Operation Desert Storm. Such improvements included items like laser
range finders, Global Positioning System navigation, thermal viewers,
battlefield identification systems, and others. In addition, division
personnel brought their own "Linebacker" Bradleys instead of using the
outdated prepositioned stocks that would have required the crew to get
out of the vehicle to fire.
* M113 Personnel Carriers--The prepositioned stocks contained many
older model M113A2 vehicles. This model has difficulty keeping up with
Abrams tanks and requires more repairs than the newer model M113A3,
which the units had at home station.
* Trucks--The prepositioned stocks included 1960s-vintage model trucks
that had manual transmissions and were more difficult to repair. Most
units now use newer models that have automatic transmissions. The
effect of this was that soldiers had to learn to drive stick shifts
when they could have been performing other tasks needed to prepare for
war; in addition, maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with fixing
manual transmissions.
* Tank Recovery Vehicle--The prepositioned stocks contained M-88A1
recovery vehicles. These vehicles have long been known to lack
sufficient power, speed, and reliability. We reported similar issues
after Operation Desert Storm.[Footnote 3] According to data collected
by the Army Materiel Command, these vehicles broke down frequently,
generally could not keep up with the fast-paced operations, and did not
have the needed capabilities even when they were in operation.
None of these problems, however, were insurmountable. The U.S. forces
had months to prepare for OIF, and plenty of time to adjust to the
equipment they had available. Additionally, the U.S. forces faced an
adversary whose military proved much less capable than U.S. forces.
Army Faced Spare Parts Shortfalls and Theater Distribution Issues:
Our preliminary work also identified shortfalls in available spare
parts and major problems with the theater distribution system, which
were influenced by shortages of trucks and material handling equipment.
Prior to OIF, the Army had significant shortages in its prepositioned
stocks, especially in spare parts. This is a long-standing problem. We
reported in 2001 that the status of the Army's prepositioned stocks and
war reserves was of strategic concern because of shortages in spare
parts.[Footnote 4] At that time the Army had on hand about 35 percent
of its stated requirements of prepositioned spare parts and had about a
$1-billion shortfall in required spare parts for war reserves.
Table 1 shows the percentage of authorized parts that were available in
March 2001 in the prepositioned stocks that were later used in OIF.
These stocks represent a 15-day supply of spare and repair parts for
brigade units (Prescribed Load List) and for the forward support
battalion that backs up the brigade unit stocks (Authorized Stockage
List). While the goal for these stocks was to be filled to 100 percent,
according to Army officials the Army has not had sufficient funds to
fill out the stocks. In March 2002, the Army staff directed that
immediate measures be taken to fix the shortages and provided $25
million to support this effort. The requirements for needed spare and
repair parts were to be filled to the extent possible by taking stocks
from the peacetime inventory or, if unavailable there, from new
procurement.
Table 1: Status of Army Unit Spare Parts Available in Afloat and
Selected Land-Based Prepositioned Sets in March 2001[A]:
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Brigade set;
Type of spare parts: Authorized Stockage List;
Percent fill of authorization: 63.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Brigade set;
Type of spare parts: Prescribed Load List;
Percent fill of authorization: 60.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Corps Support;
Type of spare parts: Authorized Stockage List;
Percent fill of authorization: 0.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Corps Support;
Type of spare parts: Prescribed Load List;
Percent fill of authorization: 30.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Theater Support 1;
Type of spare parts: Authorized Stockage List;
Percent fill of authorization: 18.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Theater Support 1;
Type of spare parts: Prescribed Load List;
Percent fill of authorization: 15.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Theater Support 2;
Type of spare parts: Authorized Stockage List;
Percent fill of authorization: 0.
Location: Afloat;
Unit type: Theater Support 2;
Type of spare parts: Prescribed Load List;
Percent fill of authorization: 6.
Location: Qatar;
Unit type: Brigade set;
Type of spare parts: Authorized Stockage List;
Percent fill of authorization: 13.
Location: Qatar;
Unit type: Brigade set;
Type of spare parts: Prescribed Load List;
Percent fill of authorization: 19.
Location: Qatar;
Unit type: Division base;
Type of spare parts: Authorized Stockage List;
Percent fill of authorization: 0.
Location: Qatar;
Unit type: Division base;
Type of spare parts: Prescribed Load List;
Percent fill of authorization: 0.
Source: Army Materiel Command.
[A] Information is provided for prepositioned sets later used in OIF
that were managed by the Army Materiel Command. Army Central Command
managed the Kuwait set.
[End of table]
By the time the war started in March of 2003, the fill rate had been
substantially improved but significant shortages remained. The
warfighter still lacked critical, high-value replacement parts like
engines and transmissions. These items were not available in the supply
system and could not be acquired in time. Shortages in spare and repair
parts have been a systemic problem in the Army over the past few years.
Our recent reports on Army spares discussed this issue[Footnote 5] and,
as previously noted, our 2001 report highlighted problems specifically
with prepositioned spares. According to Army officials, the fill rates
for prepositioned spare parts--especially high-value spares--were
purposely kept down because of systemwide shortfalls. The Army's plan
to mitigate this known risk was to have the units using the
prepositioned sets to bring their own high-value spare parts in
addition to obtaining spare parts from non-deploying units.
Nonetheless, according to the Third Infantry Division OIF after-action
report, spare parts shortages were a problem and there were also other
shortfalls. In fact, basic loads of food and water, fuel, construction
materials, and ammunition were also insufficient to meet the unit
sustainment requirements.
The combatant commander had built up the OIF force over a period of
months, departing from doctrinal plans to have receiving units in
theater to receive the stocks. When it came time to bring in the backup
supplies, over 3,000 containers were download from the sustainment
ships, which contained the required classes of supply--food, fuel, and
spare parts, among others. The theater supply-and-distribution system
became overwhelmed. The situation was worsened by the inability to
track assets available in theater, which meant that the warfighter did
not know what was available. The Third Infantry Division OIF after-
action report noted that some items were flown in from Europe or Fort
Stewart because they were not available on the local market. Taken
together, all these factors contributed to a situation that one Army
after-action report bluntly described as "chaos.":
Our recent report on logistics activities in OIF described a theater
distribution capability that was insufficient and ineffective in
managing and transporting the large amount of supplies and equipment
during OIF.[Footnote 6] For example, the distribution of supplies to
forward units was delayed because adequate transportation assets, such
as cargo trucks and materiel handling equipment, were not available
within the theater of operations. The distribution of supplies was also
delayed because cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets had
to be separated and repackaged several times for delivery to multiple
units in different locations. In addition, DOD's lack of an effective
process for prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use
of scarce theater transportation assets. Finally, one of the major
causes of distribution problems during OIF was that most Army and
Marine Corps logistics personnel and equipment did not deploy to the
theater until after combat troops arrived, and in fact, most Army
personnel did not arrive until after major combat operations were
underway.
Continuing Support of Operations Will Likely Delay Reconstitution:
Forces are being rotated to relieve personnel in theater. Instead of
bringing their own equipment, these troops are continuing to use
prepositioned stocks. Thus, it may be several years--depending on how
long the Iraqi operations continue--before these stocks can be
reconstituted.
The Marine Corps used two of its three prepositioned squadrons (11 of
16 ships) to support OIF. As the Marines withdrew, they repaired some
equipment in theater but sent much of it back to their maintenance
facility in Blount Island, Florida. By late 2003, the Marine Corps had
one of the two squadrons reconstituted through an abbreviated
maintenance cycle, and sent back to sea.[Footnote 7] However, to
support ongoing operations in Iraq, the Marine Corps sent equipment for
one squadron back to Iraq, where it is expected to remain for all or
most of 2004. The Marine Corps is currently performing maintenance on
the second squadron of equipment that was used during OIF, and this
work is scheduled to be completed in 2005.
Most of the equipment that the Army used for OIF is still in use or is
being held in theater in the event it may be needed in the future. The
Army used nearly all of its prepositioned ship stocks and its ashore
stocks in Kuwait and Qatar, as well as drawing some stocks from Europe.
In total, this included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock,
670,000 repair parts, 3,000 containers, and thousands of additional
pieces of other equipment. According to Army officials, the Army is
repairing this equipment in theater and reissuing it piece-by-piece to
support ongoing operations. Thus far, the Army has reissued more than
11,000 pieces of equipment, and it envisions that it will have to issue
more of its remaining equipment to support future operations. Thus, it
may be 2006 or later before this equipment becomes available to be
reconstituted to refill the prepositioned stocks. Officials also told
us that, after having been in use for years in harsh desert conditions,
much of the equipment would likely require substantial maintenance and
some will be worn out beyond repair. Figure 2 shows OIF trucks needing
repair.
Figure 2: Some Trucks Used in OIF that Need Repair:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Both the Army and the Marine Corps have retained prepositioned stocks
in the Pacific to cover a possible contingency in that region. While
the Marine Corps used two of its three squadrons in OIF, it left the
other squadron afloat near Guam. The Army used most of its ship stocks
for OIF, but it still has a brigade set available in Korea and one
combat ship is on station to support a potential conflict in Korea,
although it is only partially filled. Both the Army and the Marine
Corps used stocks from Europe to support OIF. The current status of the
services' prepositioned sets is discussed in table 2.
Table 2: Current Status of Selected Prepositioning Programs (as of
March 2004):
Army;
Location: Kuwait and Qatar;
Status: The equipment and supplies from these locations are still in
use to support continuing operations in Iraq.
Army;
Location: Korea;
Status: This brigade set of equipment is currently filled to
approximately 90 percent.
Army;
Location: Afloat;
Status: Equipment and supplies from 10 of 11 ships were downloaded to
support OIF and most of this equipment remains in Iraq or Kuwait. One
combat ship has been partially filled to support two Army battalions.
One ammunition ship remains on station and another is in its
maintenance cycle. The Army is also working to reconstitute equipment
for a support ship and another combat ship, but it is unclear how much
equipment will be available to source these requirements.
Army;
Location: Europe;
Status: Stocks in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy have been
depleted to support ongoing operations.
Marines;
Location: Afloat (Guam);
Status: This 6-ship squadron was not used in OIF and has almost its
full complement of stocks.
Marines;
Location: Afloat (Mediterranean);
Status: One ship has been downloaded in support of OIF and another has
been partially downloaded. This squadron's equipment is currently
filled to about half of its requirement and will complete its normal
maintenance cycle in 2005.
Marines;
Location: Afloat (Diego Garcia);
Status: This squadron's equipment was used during the first phase of
OIF, was repaired to combat condition but not to normal standards, and
has been downloaded for reuse in Iraq.
Marines;
Location: Norway;
Status: Stocks in Norway were used to support OIF. Currently, the
stocks have approximately two-thirds of the authorized equipment.
Source: U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps data.
[End of table]
Army and Marine Corps maintenance officials told us that it is
difficult to reliably estimate the costs of reconstituting the
equipment because so much of it is still in use. As a result, the
reconstitution timeline is unclear. Based on past experience, it is
reasonable to expect that the harsh desert environment in the Persian
Gulf region will exact a heavy toll on the equipment. For example, we
reported in 1993 that equipment returned from Operation Desert Storm
was in much worse shape than expected because of exposure for lengthy
periods to harsh desert conditions. The Army has estimated that the
cost for reconstituting its prepositioned equipment assets is about
$1.7 billion for depot maintenance, unit level maintenance, and
procurement of required parts and supplies. A request for about $700
million was included in the fiscal year 2004 Global War on Terrorism
supplemental budget, leaving a projected shortfall of about $1 billion.
Army Materiel Command officials said they have thus far received only a
small part of the amount funded in the 2004 supplemental for
reconstitution of the prepositioned equipment, but they noted that not
much equipment has been available. Additionally, continuing operations
in Iraq have been consuming much of the Army's supplemental funding
intended for reconstitution. Since much of the equipment is still in
Southwest Asia, it is unclear how much reconstitution funding for its
prepositioned equipment the Army can use in fiscal year 2005. But it is
clear that there is a significant bill that will have to be paid for
reconstitution of Army prepositioned stocks at some point in the
future, if the Army intends to reconfigure the afloat and land-based
prepositioned sets that have been used in OIF.
Issues Facing the Prepositioning Program:
The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its
prepositioning program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the
transformed military. In the near term, the Army and the Marine Corps
must focus on supporting current operations and reconstituting their
prepositioning sets. Moreover, we believe that the Army may be able to
take some actions to address the shortfalls and other problems it
experienced during OIF. In the long term, however, DOD faces
fundamental issues as it plans the future of its prepositioning
programs.
Near-Term Issues:
As it reconstitutes its program, the Army would likely benefit from
addressing the issues brought to light during OIF, giving priority to
actions that would address long-standing problems, mitigate near-term
risk, and shore up readiness in key parts of its prepositioning
program. These include:
* ensuring that it has adequate equipment and spare parts and
sustainment supplies in its prepositioning programs, giving priority to
afloat and Korea stocks;
* selectively modernizing equipment so that it will match unit
equipment and better meet operational needs; and:
* planning and conducting training to practice drawing and using
prepositioned stocks, especially afloat stocks.
Based on some contrasts in the experiences between the Army and the
Marine Corps with their prepositioned equipment and supplies in OIF,
some officials we spoke to agree that establishing a closer
relationship between operational units and the prepositioned stocks
they would be expected to use in a contingency is critical to wartime
success. The Marines practice with their stocks and the Army could
benefit from training on how to unload, prepare, and support
prepositioned stocks, particularly afloat stocks. While the Army has
had some exercises using its land-based equipment in Kuwait and Korea,
it has not recently conducted a training exercise to practice unloading
its afloat assets. According to Army officials, such exercises have
been scheduled over the past few years, but were cancelled due to lack
of funding.
Long-term Issues:
The long-term issues transcend the Army and Marines, and demand a
coordinated effort by the department. In our view, three main areas
should guide the effort.
* Determine the role of prepositioning in light of the efforts to
transform the military. Perhaps it is time for DOD to go back to the
drawing board and ask: what is the military trying to achieve with
these stocks and how do they fit into future operational plans? If, as
indicated in Desert Storm and OIF, prepositioning is to continue to
play an important part in meeting future military commitments, priority
is needed for prepositioning as a part of transformation planning in
the future.
* Establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint
expeditionary forces. If DOD decides that prepositioning is to continue
to play an important role in supporting future combat operations,
establishing sound requirements that are fully integrated is critical.
The department is beginning to rethink what capabilities could be
needed. For example, the Army and Marines are pursuing sea-basing
ideas--where prepositioning ships could serve as offshore logistics
bases. Such ideas seem to have merit, but are still in the conceptual
phases, and it is not clear to what extent the concepts are being
approached to maximize potential for joint operations. In our view,
options will be needed to find ways to cost-effectively integrate
prepositioning requirements into the transforming DOD force structure
requirements. For example, Rand recently published a report suggesting
that the military consider prepositioning support equipment to help the
Stryker brigade meet deployment timelines.[Footnote 8] Such support
equipment constitutes much of the weight and volume of the brigade, but
a relatively small part of the costs compared to the combat systems.
Such an option may be needed, since our recent report revealed that the
Army would likely be unable to meet its deployment timelines for the
Stryker brigade.[Footnote 9]
* Ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its priority,
and is affordable even as the force is transformed. In our view, DOD
must consider affordability. In the past, the drawdown of Army forces
made prepositioning a practical alternative because it made extra
equipment available. However, as the services' equipment is transformed
and recapitalized, it may not be practical to buy enough equipment for
units at home station and for prepositioning. Prepositioned stocks are
intended to reduce response times and enable forces to meet the demands
of the full spectrum of military operations. Once the future role of
prepositioning is determined, and program requirements are set, it will
be important to give the program proper funding priority. Congress will
have a key role in reviewing the department's assessment of the cost
effectiveness of options to support DOD's overall mission, including
prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly to
the far reaches of the globe.
Mr. Chairman, I hope this information is useful to Congress as it
considers DOD's plans and funding requests for reconstituting its
prepositioned stocks as well as integrating prepositioning into the
department's transformation of its military forces.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact William M. Solis at
(202) 512-8365 (e-mail address: Solisw@gao.gov), Julia Denman at (202)
512-4290 (e-mail address: denmanj@gao.gov), or John Pendleton at (404)
679-1816 (e-mail address: pendletonj@gao.gov). Additional individuals
making key contributions included Nancy Benco, Robert Malpass, Tinh
Nguyen, and Tanisha Stewart.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Preliminary
Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003);
Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army
Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003);
Defense Inventory: The Army Needs a Plan to Overcome Critical Spare
Parts Shortages, GAO-03-705 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003); Defense
Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are Uncertain,
GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001); Military Prepositioning:
Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be Reassessed, GAO/NSIAD-99-6
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998); Operation Desert Shield/Storm:
Impact of Defense Cooperation Account Funding on Future Maintenance
Budgets, GAO/NSIAD-93-179 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1993); and
Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment of Bradley and
Abrams, GAO/NSIAD-92-94 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 1992).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save
Millions by Aligning Resources with the Reduced European Mission, GAO/
NSIAD-97-158 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 11, 1997).
[3] GAO/NSIAD-92-94.
[4] GAO-01-425.
[5] GAO-03-705.
[6] GAO-04-305R.
[7] Marine Corps officials told us that they focused on getting
equipment repaired to a mission-capable status, but did not return the
equipment to the high standard to which it is normally maintained.
[8] Eric Pelty, John M. Halliday, and Aimee Bower, Speed and Power:
Toward an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Arroyo Center,
2003).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment
of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the
Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation
Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).