Tactical Aircraft
Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business Case Gao ID: GAO-04-391 March 15, 2004Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete F/A-22 development, Congress asked GAO to assess the Air Force's F/A-22 development program annually and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. On April 23, 2003, a congressional subcommittee requested that the Department of Defense (DOD) provide more detailed information on the business case that supports the estimated quantities and costs for an affordable F/A-22 program. Specifically, GAO (1) identified changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception, (2) reviewed the status of the development activities, and (3) examined the sufficiency of business case information provided for congressional oversight.
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be less detectable to adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and able to provide a pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding situation through integrated avionics. In addition, the Air Force plans to expand the F/A-22's ability to engage targets on the ground to provide a robust capability not originally planned at the start of the program. The Air Force plans to begin initial operational test and evaluation in March 2004 and to seek full rate production approval in December 2004. The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The Air Force had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can only afford 218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop the expanded air-to-ground attack capability, the Office of Secretary of Defense estimates that the Air Force will need $11.7 billion in modernization funding. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support most planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk. Further, the development test program continues to experience problems and risks further delays. The F/A-22's avionics continue to experience shutdowns and failures. Moreover, the F/A-22 has not met its reliability requirements and has experienced failures in its computerized maintenance support system. This has led to aircraft spending more time on the ground undergoing maintenance. Due to the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did not address why this aircraft is needed given current and projected threats. The business case also did not address how many aircraft the Air Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford considering the full life-cycle costs, whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities are needed, and what are the opportunity costs associated with purchasing any proposed quantities of this aircraft. While the response stated that the Air Force still plans to buy 277 F/A-22 aircraft, the Air Force estimates that only 218 aircraft are affordable within congressionally imposed funding limitations. In addition, significant investment decisions remain and could affect another $40 billion to support this program through full rate production and implementation of the spiraled improvement efforts. In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in today's environment, the large investments that remain, and unknown outcomes of planned operational testing, GAO continues to have concerns regarding the DOD's readiness to make a full rate production decision.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-391, Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business Case
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
March 2004:
Tactical Aircraft:
Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business Case:
GAO-04-391:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-391, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete F/A-22
development, Congress asked GAO to assess the Air Force‘s F/A-22
development program annually and determine whether the Air Force is
meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. On April 23, 2003, a
congressional subcommittee requested that the Department of Defense
(DOD) provide more detailed information on the business case that
supports the estimated quantities and costs for an affordable F/A-22
program. Specifically, GAO (1) identified changes in the F/A-22 program
since its inception, (2) reviewed the status of the development
activities, and (3) examined the sufficiency of business case
information provided for congressional oversight.
What GAO Found:
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be less detectable
to adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and able to
provide a pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding situation
through integrated avionics. In addition, the Air Force plans to expand
the F/A-22‘s ability to engage targets on the ground to provide a
robust capability not originally planned at the start of the program.
The Air Force plans to begin initial operational test and evaluation in
March 2004 and to seek full rate production approval in December 2004.
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it
began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to
purchase the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The
Air Force had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now
estimates it can only afford 218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop
the expanded air-to-ground attack capability, the Office of Secretary
of Defense estimates that the Air Force will need $11.7 billion in
modernization funding. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new
avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support
most planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs
and risk.
Further, the development test program continues to experience problems
and risks further delays. The F/A-22‘s avionics continue to experience
shutdowns and failures. Moreover, the F/A-22 has not met its
reliability requirements and has experienced failures in its
computerized maintenance support system. This has led to aircraft
spending more time on the ground undergoing maintenance.
Due to the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a
congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case
information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did
not address why this aircraft is needed given current and projected
threats. The business case also did not address how many aircraft the
Air Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can
afford considering the full life-cycle costs, whether investments in
new air-to-ground capabilities are needed, and what are the opportunity
costs associated with purchasing any proposed quantities of this
aircraft. While the response stated that the Air Force still plans to
buy 277 F/A-22 aircraft, the Air Force estimates that only 218 aircraft
are affordable within congressionally imposed funding limitations. In
addition, significant investment decisions remain and could affect
another $40 billion to support this program through full rate
production and implementation of the spiraled improvement efforts.
In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in
today‘s environment, the large investments that remain, and unknown
outcomes of planned operational testing, GAO continues to have concerns
regarding the DOD‘s readiness to make a full rate production decision.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD complete a new business case that determines
the continued need for the F/A-22 and the number of aircraft required
for its air-to-air and air-to-ground roles based on capabilities, need,
alternatives, and constraints of future defense spending
departmentwide. GAO also recommends that plans and costs for resolving
problems identified during initial operational testing be provided to
the defense committees prior to the department‘s full rate production
decision. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations. GAO
believes a business case and the plans and costs of corrective action
should be reported to Congress.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-391.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Allen Li at (202)
512-4841 or lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Significant Changes Have Occurred in the F/A-22 Program During Nearly
Two Decades of Development:
Remaining Development and Operational Testing Could Impact F/A-22
Program Outcomes:
DOD Did Not Provide Congress Sufficient Business Case Information to
Justify Current Aircraft Quantities or Modernization Investment Plans:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Changes in F/A-22 Program Estimates Since It Started in 1986:
Table 2: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Status of F/A-22 Avionics Metrics, as of January 2004:
Figure 2: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes:
Abbreviations:
CAIG: Cost Analysis Improvement Group:
CIP: common integrated processors:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MTBAA: Mean Time Between Avionics Anomaly:
MTBIE: Mean Time Between Instability Events:
IOT&E: initial operational test and evaluation:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 15, 2004:
Congressional Committees:
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be an air
superiority and ground attack aircraft with advanced features to make
it less detectable to adversaries, capable of high speeds for long
ranges, and able to provide a pilot with improved awareness of the
surrounding situation. The ability to engage targets on the ground is
being expanded to provide a robust capability not originally planned at
the start of the program.[Footnote 1] The Air Force plans to begin
initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) to demonstrate
the aircraft's operational effectiveness and suitability in March 2004
and to seek full rate production approval in December 2004.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires
us to assess the Air Force's F/A-22 development program annually and
determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule,
and cost goals.[Footnote 2] The Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, asked
us to continue monitoring the F/A-22 development program during a
hearing on April 2, 2003. On April 23, 2003, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, asked the Department of Defense (DOD)
to provide more detailed information on the business case that supports
the estimated quantities and costs for an affordable F/A-22 program. In
response to the concerns and directions of these various committees,
we (1) identified changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception,
(2) reviewed the status of the development activities, and (3) examined
the sufficiency of business case information provided for congressional
oversight.
We performed our work from July 2003 through March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it
began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to
purchase the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The
Air Force had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now
estimates it can only afford 218 aircraft under the congressionally
imposed limit on production funding. Development costs have grown
127 percent, to $28.7 billion, and the program could incur further cost
growth before development and testing is completed. This reduction in
buying power and increased costs are largely a result of the program's
failure to base acquisition decisions on high levels of knowledge at
critical junctures in the development program.[Footnote 3] Second, the
Air Force has decided to add a robust air-to-ground attack capability
not previously envisioned but now considered necessary to increase the
utility of the aircraft. The Office of Secretary of Defense estimated
the Air Force would need as much as $11.7 billion to develop the
expanded capability. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new
avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support
some planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs
and risk.
The development test program continues to experience problems and risks
further delays. The F/A-22's advanced avionics system--which allows a
pilot to have better control of information regarding the surrounding
situation--frequently failed, delaying earlier testing, and must now be
proven stable before IOT&E can start. The F/A-22's avionics system
continues to experience shutdowns and failures. Recently, the Air Force
established a new criterion to measure the stability of the avionics
software and hardware and its readiness to begin IOT&E. The new
criterion is more comprehensive but requires fewer hours of operation
before a failure occurs than the original criterion. To date, the
program has not met the new criterion. In addition, the F/A-22 program
has not met its reliability requirements, resulting in aircraft
spending more time on the ground undergoing maintenance. Further,
the program has experienced failures in its computerized maintenance
support system, which have prevented maintenance crews from correctly
diagnosing and addressing problems on the aircraft. As a result of the
problems with the development test program, the start of IOT&E has been
delayed, and the time to complete it has been compressed by 4 months.
Additional delays in completing IOT&E could jeopardize the full rate
production decision in December 2004.
Due to significant changes to the program and the risks of future cost
increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested
that DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22.[Footnote 4]
However, the information provided by DOD did not address how
many aircraft the Air Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many
the Air Force can afford, and whether investments in new air-to-ground
capabilities are needed. Instead, the information shows that the Air
Force still plans to buy 277 F/A-22 aircraft despite estimates that
state it can only afford 218 aircraft and the potential for further
reduction in buying power from cost increases in the development
program. In the past, reducing the amount of funds available in the
procurement budget has offset development cost growth. This is a part
of DOD's "buy to budget" plan. If the current congressionally imposed
production cap of $36.8 billion is maintained and the Air Force uses
more procurement funds to address higher development costs, the number
of F/A-22 aircraft the Air Force could buy would be reduced.
We are making recommendations that DOD complete a new business case
that justifies the continued need for the F/A-22 and determines the
number of F/A-22 aircraft needed in its air-to-air and air-to-ground
roles based on capabilities, need, alternatives, and constraints of
future defense spending departmentwide. We also recommend that the
results of IOT&E be provided to the defense committees prior to making
the full rate production decision. In written comments on a draft of
this report, DOD stated that it partially concurred with our
recommendations.
Background:
The F/A-22 is planned to be an air superiority and ground
attack aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to
adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for
long ranges.[Footnote 5] It has integrated avionics that greatly
improve pilots' awareness of the situation surrounding them. The
objectives of the F/A-22 development program are to (1) design,
fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F/A-22 development test aircraft, 2
nonflying structural test aircraft, 6 production representative
test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate,
integrate, and test the avionics; and (3) design, develop, and test the
support and training systems. The F/A-22 is being developed under
contracts with Lockheed Martin Corporation, the prime contractor (for
the aircraft),and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine).
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the
development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation
for both the development and the production.[Footnote 6] Subsequently,
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 eliminated the cost
limitation for the development, but it left the cost limit for the
production.[Footnote 7] The production program is now limited to
$36.8 billion.[Footnote 8] The current cost estimate of the development
program is $28.7 billion.
Currently, the F/A-22 program is both in development and production.
Development is in its final stages, and production has been ongoing
since fiscal year 1999.
The aircraft's development problems and schedule delays in completing
flight testing have led to congressional concerns. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 prohibited the obligation of
$136 million in procurement funds until the Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, submitted to the congressional
defense committees, among other things, a certification that the
avionics software installed on test aircraft can operate at least
5 hours on average before certain types of avionics anomalies occur.
The Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
the final authority in making acquisition decisions in DOD, has also
included this criterion as a requirement for the F/A-22 program before
entering IOT&E .
Significant Changes Have Occurred in the F/A-22 Program during Nearly
Two Decades of Development:
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it
began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to
purchase the quantities of aircraft that were originally planned
18 years ago. This reduction in buying power is attributed, in a large
part, to increases in development time and cost due to the program's
failure to employ a knowledge-based acquisition approach to developing
the F/A-22. Second, in September 2002, the Air Force decided to add a
more robust air-to-ground attack capability than previously envisioned
but now deemed needed to increase the utility of the aircraft. This
capability will add significant cost to the program over the next
10 years. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new computer
processors and architecture are needed to support some planned
enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk.
Delays and Higher Costs Have Reduced DOD's Buying Power:
Since the F/A-22 acquisition program started in 1986, cost and schedule
estimates have grown significantly, thus contributing to a loss in
buying power. Development costs are now estimated at $28.7 billion, a
127 percent increase over the 1986 estimates. Planned development cycle
time has grown from 9 years to 19 years, and the initial operational
capability date has slipped over 9 years, from March 1996 to December
2005. These schedule extensions, delays, and cost increases were major
contributors to changes in the Air Force's initial plan to purchase
750 aircraft. Current Air Force budget estimates include plans to
purchase 277 aircraft. Table 1 shows the changes in the F/A-22 program
since its start in 1986 based on information provided in Selected
Acquisition Reports[Footnote 9] over time.
Table 1: Changes in F/A-22 Program Estimates Since It Started in 1986:
Development cost;
1986--Start of demonstration and validation: $12.6 billion;
1991--Start of engineering and manufacturing development: $19.5 billion;
2002--Current available Selected Acquisition Report information: $28.7
billion.
Development cycle time;
1986--Start of demonstration and validation: 9 years;
1991--Start of engineering and manufacturing development: 16 years;
2002--Current available Selected Acquisition Report information: 19
years.
Development test and evaluation;
1986--Start of demonstration and validation: Not estimated;
1991--Start of engineering and manufacturing development: 51 months;
2002--Current available Selected Acquisition Report information: 99
months.
Initial operational capability;
1986--Start of demonstration and validation: March 1996;
1991--Start of engineering and manufacturing development: Not shown in
report;
2002--Current available Selected Acquisition Report information:
December 2005.
Quantities;
1986--Start of demonstration and validation: 750;
1991-- Start of engineering and manufacturing development: 648;
2002--Current available Selected Acquisition Report information:
276[A].
Sources: Selected Acquisition Reports and Air Force documents.
Note: All references to F/A-22 costs in this report are in then-year
dollars in order to maintain consistent reporting with our prior
reports on the F/A-22 aircraft.
[A] In fiscal year 2003, the Air Force increased the number of F/
A-22 aircraft it planned to buy from 276 to 277.
[End of table]
In our 1988 report, the average unit procurement cost was estimated by
the Air Force to be $69 million.[Footnote 10] Today, after schedule
delays and development problems, the estimated average unit procurement
costs have grown to $153 million--almost a 122 percent increase. The
Air Force does not expect the development program to be completed until
2005 and with IOT&E still to be completed, the possibility of
additional changes and costs is likely.
As we previously reported,[Footnote 11] the acquisition approach of the
F/A-22 program has contributed to cost increases and delays in
schedule. Leading commercial firms that we studied employ an
acquisition approach that evolves a product to its ultimate
capabilities on the basis of mature technologies and available
resources. Further, product enhancements are planned for subsequent
development efforts only when technologies are proven to be mature and
other resources are available. Our work has shown that commercial firms
ensure that high levels of knowledge exist at three critical junctures
in a development program. First, a match must be made between a
customer's needs and the available resources--technology, engineering
knowledge, time, and funding--before a new development program is
launched. Second, a product's design must demonstrate its ability to
meet performance requirements and be stable about midway through
development. Third, the developer must show that the product can be
manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets and is
demonstrated to be reliable before production begins.
In contrast, the F-22 acquisition strategy from the outset was to
achieve full capability in a "big bang" approach instead of evolving
development in manageable increments of new capability. By not using an
evolutionary approach, the Air Force took on significant risk and
onerous technology challenges. The three critical technologies that
were immature at the start of the program included low-observable
materials, propulsion, and integrated avionics. Integrated avionics
has been a source of major schedule delays and cost increases in the F/
A-22 program. Starting the program with these immature technologies
prevented the program from knowing cost, schedule, and performance
ramifications until late in the development program, after significant
investments had already been made. Efforts to mature technology
cascaded into development, delaying attainment of design and production
maturity. The overall result has been significant delays and
substantially higher investments to buy over 60 percent fewer aircraft.
Additional Investments Needed to Expand F/A-22 Capability:
Developing an expanded air-to-ground attack capability for the F/A-22
will be costly and add risk to the program. The Air Force began
development of the F/A-22 as a replacement for the F-15 air superiority
fighter with primary emphasis on the air-to-air role. It was never
intended to have robust air-to-ground capability. Its need was based on
a projection that the Soviet Union would develop and produce large
numbers of advanced fighter aircraft. The F/A-22 was intended to
identify, track, and kill advanced fighters before it was targeted,
giving it the edge and making it a more lethal and survivable aircraft
than an F-15. However, the original Soviet threat never materialized.
To enhance the utility of the F/A-22, the Air Force plans to develop a
robust air-to-ground attack capability to be able to engage a greater
variety of ground targets, such as surface-to-air missile systems, that
have posed a significant threat to U.S. aircraft in recent years.
The Air Force has a modernization program to improve the capabilities
of the F/A-22 focused largely on a new robust air-to-ground capability.
It has five developmental spirals planned over more than a 10-year
period, with the initial spiral started in 2003. Table 2 shows each
spiral as currently planned. In March 2003, the Office of Secretary of
Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the Air
Force would need $11.7 billion for the planned modernization program.
The CAIG estimate included costs for development, production, and the
retrofit of some aircraft. As of March 2003, the Air Force F/A-22
approved program baseline did not include estimated costs for the full
modernization effort. Instead, the Air Force estimate included
$3.5 billion for modernization efforts planned through fiscal year
2009.
Table 2: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program:
Developmental spiral;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2007:
Global Strike Basic;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2011:
Global Strike Enhanced[A];
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2013:
Global Strike Full;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2015:
Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
Examples of enhancements to be added;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2007:
Capability to launch Joint Direct Attack Munition at faster F/A-22 air
speeds and at longer distances and update to air-to-air capabilities;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2011:
Improved radar capabilities to seek and destroy advanced surface-to-air
missile systems and integrate additional air-to-ground weapons;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2013:
Increased capability to suppress or destroy the full range of air
defenses and improve speed and accuracy of targeting;
Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements: 2015:
Capability for full intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
integration for increased target sets and lethality.
Cost Analysis Improvement Group's estimate through fiscal year 2015:
$11.7 billion.
Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense.
[A] The Global Strike Enhanced includes two developmental spirals to
achieve the planned enhanced capability.
[End of table]
New Computer Architecture and Avionics Processors Needed to Support
Expanded Capability:
To support the F/A-22's expanded capability beyond Global Strike
Enhanced, the Air Force has determined that its baseline computer
architecture and critical avionics processors will need to be replaced.
Current processors are old and obsolete, cannot be supported, and do
not have sufficient capacity to meet the increased processing demands
required for planned new air-to-ground capabilities beyond Global
Strike Enhanced. As a bridge to meet this expanded capability, the Air
Force plans to modify some avionics processors and purchase sufficient
quantities to support production of the first 155 F/A-22 aircraft.
The F/A-22 is dependent on its onboard computers and software to
perform its mission. Unlike other fighter aircraft, it has a highly
advanced, integrated avionics system capable of detecting, identifying,
and engaging the enemy at ranges beyond a pilot's vision. The key to
the F/A-22 avionics lies in its fully integrated core architecture and
its two central, networked computers called common integrated
processors (CIP). CIPs use very high-speed integrated circuits to
collect, process, and integrate data and signals from the aircraft's
sensors. CIP serves as the "brains" for the F/A-22's integrated
avionics system and is unique to this aircraft.
The primary processor in CIP is the Intel i960MX
microprocessor,[Footnote 12] which is used strictly for avionics
processing. This microprocessor is based on 1990's technology and has a
32-bit processor that operates at speeds of 25mhz. By today's
technology standards, the processor is considered obsolete and cannot
support spiral developments beyond the Global Strike Enhanced. In mid-
2003, the manufacturer of the microprocessor informed the Air Force
that it planned to permanently shut down the i960MX production line by
January 2004 because the microprocessor was no longer a viable product
for the company.
As a result, the Air Force decided in November 2003 to replace its
computer architecture and avionics processors to support the F/A-22's
expanded capabilities. In December 2003, the Air Force purchased its
last i960MX microprocessors when it bought 820 of the microprocessors.
According to program officials, this quantity and previously purchased
quantities are sufficient to support production of 155 F/A-22 aircraft.
These officials believe that with some minor upgrades to improve
processing capacity, these processors will be able to support the
baseline aircraft and the developmental spirals--Global Strike Basic
and Global Strike Enhanced. However, the Air Force plans for the
remaining production aircraft to include a new computer architecture
and avionics processor needed to support the final two planned spirals-
-Global Strike Full and Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance.
At the time of our review, the Air Force believed its best long-term
solution to its avionics architecture and computer-processing
shortfalls was a new, modern, open system architecture. Rather than
start a new development program, the program office plans to leverage
two other ongoing Air Force development or modification programs for
this processing capability: the new architecture being developed for
the F-35 and the new commercial off-the-shelf general-purpose
processors designed for newer versions of the F-16. According to F/A-22
program officials, this new architecture will be state-of-the-art and
will have ample processing capacity to accommodate all future air-to-
ground capabilities as currently planned. These officials do not expect
the new architecture to be fully developed and ready for installation
in the F/A-22 for at least 5 to 6 years.
F/A-22 program officials acknowledge that this mass changeover of
the F/A-22 computer architecture and avionics processor will be a
time-consuming and costly effort and will likely create additional
program risks. Air Force cost estimates are not yet available.
Nevertheless, program officials estimate the nonrecurring engineering
costs alone could be at least $300 million. At the time of our review,
the Air Force had not made a decision about retrofitting aircraft
equipped with the i960MX microprocessor. Additional risks are likely
because the new processor and architecture are being developed by other
major aircraft programs and will require extensive integration and
operational testing to ensure that the F/A-22 program does not
encounter similar problems that have delayed integration and testing of
the F/A-22's current avionics suite.
Remaining Development and Operational Testing Could Impact F/A-22
Program Outcomes:
The F/A-22 program did not meet key testing goals established for
fiscal year 2003 and required for the aircraft to begin IOT&E testing.
The Air Force's efforts to stabilize avionics software and improve its
performance have not been sufficiently demonstrated, and entrance
criterion previously set for starting IOT&E testing has been changed.
In addition, the F/A-22 program is not performing as expected in some
other key performance areas, including reliability and maintenance
support. The ongoing problems have led to a revised test schedule,
which has compressed the time to complete initial operational testing
by 4 months, and have increased the potential for cost increases and
delays in the full rate production decision. The program has made
progress in correcting several of the design problems we identified in
our March 2003 report.
Air Force Changed Avionics Performance Criterion to Start Operational
Testing:
The Air Force changed the avionics stability metric planned as a
criterion to enter IOT&E from an average of 20 hours between avionics
software failures to a broader measure of an average of 5 hours between
avionics software or hardware failures. Current testing shows the
program continues to have problems meeting the new and old avionics
stability metrics.
Because the F/A-22 avionics encountered frequent shutdowns over the
last few years, many test flights were delayed. As a result, the Air
Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center wanted assurances that the
avionics would work before it was willing to start the IOT&E program.
It established a requirement for a 20-hour performance metric that was
to be demonstrated before IOT&E would begin. The metric was Mean Time
Between Instability Events (MTBIE)[Footnote 13] and tracked two
distinct types of avionics software failures:
* Hard failures (type 1) that were the most serious resulting in a
complete avionics system shutdown requiring the need to restart the
avionics system.
* Significant failures (type 2) that were less serious failures but
required the pilot to restart an individual subsystem that failed
versus the complete avionics system.
Using personal computers as an analogy, a type 1 failure would be
equivalent to a failure of one's personal computer that requires it to
be shut down and rebooted, except that the time to restart the F/A-22
avionics system could take substantially longer. A type 2 failure would
be equivalent to a failure in a particular application, such as the
word processing program shutting down. Even with such a failure, other
software applications could still be operated while the word processing
software was restarted. Likewise, in the case of the F/A-22, other
applications would still be operable despite the failure of any single
application, such as a shutdown in the communication, navigation, and
identification system.
In July 2003, the Air Force decided to switch to a different metric--
Mean Time Between Avionics Anomaly (MTBAA)--to measure the performance
of the avionics software for the start of IOT&E. Two main differences
between the new metric and its predecessor are the new metric
(1) includes hardware and some subsystem software failures not
previously counted and (2) requires a failure rate based on an average
of 5 hours without experiencing avionics anomalies, instead of
20 hours. According to Air Force operational test officials, they
adopted this new metric because they believe it is a better measure of
the avionics operational performance needed to start IOT&E, whereas the
previous metric was more technically focused on software performance,
excluding hardware failures. They also said the 5-hour criterion would
provide a minimum amount of effective operational test time to
efficiently conduct IOT&E. In turn, Congress included the new metric in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.[Footnote
14] Testing as of January 2004 showed the program had achieved
2.7 hours--54 percent of the requirement. Once this criterion is
achieved, the avionics must still undergo rigorous operational testing
to demonstrate its effectiveness and suitability in a realistic
environment. Figure 1 shows the status of the MTBIE and MTBAA metrics.
Figure 1: Status of F/A-22 Avionics Metrics, as of January 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: MTBIE is no longer tracked by the Air Force.
[End of figure]
The figure shows that MTBIE, the previous criterion, was demonstrated
at about 67 percent of the requirement. In addition, the type 1
failures, causing a complete shutdown of the avionics system, have
significantly diminished. They are occurring only about once every
25 hours on average. This is the result of a substantial effort on the
part of the Air Force and the contractor to identify and fix problems
that led to the instability in the F/A-22 avionics software. Type 2
failures are still occurring frequently. While less serious when
compared to the entire avionics suite shutting down, type 2 failures
become serious if critical subsystem software shuts down when its
function is needed for the success of the mission or survivability of
the aircraft.
In September 2003, the F/A-22 contractor reported a high number of
outstanding avionics Common Problem Reports.[Footnote 15] Of the 231
reports of problems not resolved, about 25 (or 11 percent) were
identified as stability-related problems. The remaining 206 reports
(89 percent) were the result of avionics performance or functional
problems. For example, the communication, navigation, and
identification subsystem accounted for nearly 36 percent of the total
reports. Because the avionics system is essential to the success of the
F/A-22, the integrated avionics still needs to be demonstrated to meet
design specifications and operational requirements. Reductions in
avionics performance could affect the ability of the F/A-22 to
effectively carry out its expected missions.
Reliability Requirements Not Being Met:
The F/A-22 program is not meeting its requirements for a reliable
aircraft and it is not using a best practice approach. The Air Force
established reliability requirements to be achieved at the completion
of development and at system maturity.[Footnote 16] As a measure of the
system's overall reliability, the Air Force established a requirement
for 1.95-hours mean time between maintenance by the completion of
development, and 3-hours mean time between maintenance at system
maturity. This measure of reliability represents the average flight
time between maintenance actions. As of October 2003, the Air Force had
only been able to demonstrate a reliability of about 0.5 flying hours
between maintenance actions or about 26 percent of the development
requirement and 17 percent of system maturity requirement. This has led
to the development test aircraft spending more time than planned on the
ground undergoing maintenance.
During 2003, the Air Force identified 68 parts that had a high rate of
failure causing them to be removed or replaced, affecting the F/A-22
system reliability. The contractor has initiated programs to eliminate
the high failure rates experienced by these parts. The canopy has also
been experiencing failures during testing, allowing it to achieve only
about 15 percent of its expected 1,600-hour life. A second manufacturer
for canopies is being developed, but until it has passed qualification
testing, it cannot be used as an alternative source for the high
failing canopies.
Best commercial practices for new product development require
reliability to be demonstrated by the start of production. Our work has
shown that product development engineers from leading commercial firms
expect to achieve reliability requirements before entering production.
They told us reliability is attained through an iterative process of
design, test, analyze, and redesign.[Footnote 17] Commercial firms
understand that once a system enters production, the costs to achieve
reliability through this iterative design change process become
significantly more expensive. The F/A-22 aircraft has been in
production since fiscal year 1999, and the Air Force has on contract 52
production aircraft, and an additional 22 aircraft on long lead
contracts representing 27 percent of the planned buy quantity. With
83 percent of the reliability requirement yet to be achieved through
this iterative design change process, the Air Force can expect to incur
additional development and design change costs. If the Air Force fails
to improve the F/A-22's reliability before fielding the aircraft, the
high failure rates will result in higher operational and support costs
to keep the aircraft available for training or combat use.
Immaturity of Maintenance Support Systems:
The F/A-22 is designed to have a computerized and paperless maintenance
system that monitors, diagnoses, identifies, and reports failures to
maintenance crews and that is intended to allow a faster maintenance
turnaround to flight status. The onboard Diagnostics Health and
Management system constantly monitors the aircraft's systems and the
performance of both hardware and software. It collects, analyzes,
stores, and reports failures. Critical failures are reported to the
pilot, and all failures are stored in a portable database for later use
by ground maintenance crews. At the completion of a flight, the
database is removed from the aircraft and is downloaded into a system
on the ground, the Integrated Management Information System, which is a
network of computers the maintainers use to process the maintenance and
support information. This system further analyzes the downloaded
information to determine the problems and match failures with the
appropriate digitized technical order data needed to make the repairs.
This information is then loaded into handheld portable computers that
the technicians use to repair the aircraft.
According to DOD and Air Force test officials, these systems have been
generating false reports of failures, which have caused maintenance
staff to spend more hours than planned replacing items unnecessarily
and trying to identify the actual problems. In addition, the
maintenance systems are not providing all the technical data needed to
repair the aircraft, thus making it more difficult to make repairs.
According to the test officials, they do not have precise data to
quantify the extent of the problems, and they said it has disrupted
maintenance activities. A key indication has been the inability to
fly aircraft as planned. We found that between October 2003 and January
2004 the test force could only fly about 53 percent of the planned test
flights and that the maintenance problems were a key contributor to
this poor flying performance.
Air Force officials do not expect the maintenance systems to be fully
matured until December 2005. Consequently, the program office has had
to provide additional funding to the contractor to purchase special
test equipment that will be used to support maintenance requirements
during operational testing. Moreover, because these systems will not be
fully available during the operational testing, it may be difficult to
assess the systems' real performance.
Problems in the Development Program Have Led to Further Delays and
Changes in Operational Testing:
Progress in F/A-22 flight testing was slower than expected in 2003, and
start of IOT&E was delayed an additional 7 months due to avionics and
other problems. Realizing the Air Force would not be ready to enter
initial operational testing as previously planned, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense requested the F/A-22 program to establish a new
operational test plan that included measures to ensure the aircraft and
its avionics are ready before entering operational testing. In
response, the Air Force put in place a two-phase operational test
program.
* Phase 1, also called an operational assessment, is not the official
start of operational testing. It is intended to assess the F/A-22's
readiness for IOT&E. Started in October 2003, it calls for testing two
F/A-22 aircraft to conduct live air-to-air missile shots, fly one-ship
and two-ship formation operational sorties, and assess the computerized
maintenance system's maturity. It will include some flight tests that
are planned to be repeated in IOT&E if the aircraft configuration
changes.
* Phase 2 testing is considered the actual start of IOT&E. To begin
this phase, the Air Force must meet a number of criteria. Perhaps most
importantly, it must demonstrate that the F/A-22 integrated avionics
will be able to operate for sufficient lengths of time, without
shutting down. Other criteria that must be met prior to IOT&E include
the availability of four fully configured F/A-22 test aircraft and one
spare aircraft, the completion of live missile shots, the completion of
key aircraft flight envelope testing (planned speed, altitude, and
maneuver boundaries of the F/A-22), the completion of operational pilot
and maintenance training, a useable system with technical data to fix
problems, and the software upgrades to the maintenance system.
Figure 2 compares the changes in the planned test program since our
last report.
Figure 2: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to Air Force test officials, results of some phase 1 tests
could be used to satisfy IOT&E requirements if the aircraft and
software configurations do not change for IOT&E testing. This could
reduce the scope of the test effort planned during IOT&E. The Defense
Acquisition Board[Footnote 18] is scheduled to review the F/A-22's
readiness for IOT&E in March 2004.
At the present time, the Air Force expects to complete IOT&E in
October 2004, before the full rate production decision, now expected in
December 2004. The time allotted to complete IOT&E under the new test
plan, however, has been compressed by 4 months, assuming phase 1
testing results are not permitted to be used for IOT&E. This means the
Air Force would have less time than previously planned to complete the
same amount of testing. If the Air Force continues to experience delays
in testing prior to IOT&E, then the full rate production decision would
also have to be delayed until IOT&E is complete and the Beyond Low Rate
Initial Production Report is delivered to Congress[Footnote 19]. There
is no consensus within DOD on the Air Force's ability to meet this
October 2004 milestone. The Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense, believes the start of
testing will slip, although the Air Force maintains it will meet its
schedule.
Past Design Problems Corrected:
The Air Force has corrected design problems discussed in our March 2003
report. To correct the movement or buffeting of the vertical fins in
the tail section of the aircraft, the Air Force designed and
implemented modifications, which strengthen the fin and hinge
assemblies. Because of this problem, the Air Force placed restrictions
on flights below 10,000 feet. Testing was done above and below
10,000 feet, and the flight restrictions were removed. Likewise, the
Air Force modified the aircraft to prevent overheating concerns in the
rear portion of the aircraft by adding thermal protection and
strengthened strategic areas in the aft tail sections. The Air Force
also plans to modify later production aircraft using a new venting
approach to resolve the heat problems. We reported that the Air Force
had also experienced separations in the horizontal tail materials.
After additional testing, the Air Force deemed that the original tails
met requirements established for the life of the airframe. However, the
Air Force redesigned the tail to reduce producibility costs. Tests will
be performed on the redesigned tail in late 2004.
DOD Did Not Provide Congress Sufficient Business Case Information to
Justify Current Aircraft Quantities or Modernization Investment Plans:
DOD has not provided Congress with sufficient information to support
the business case for buying and modernizing the F/A-22 program. In our
testimony of April 11, 2003, before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, we stressed that the issue was not
whether the F/A-22 should be produced, but rather in what quantities it
is needed--as justified by a business case. We discussed the current
and future environments in which the F/A-22 investment decision would
have to be made, including the need to consider opportunity costs
inside and outside DOD. DOD has planned investments over the next
several years, on average $150 billion a year, to keep legacy systems
working while at the same time modernizing and transforming U.S.
national defense capabilities for the future. The F/A-22 program
represents a sizable investment and must compete with other demands
within the defense budget. This competition requires a knowledge-based
approach to justify acquisition investment decisions and an efficient
acquisition process to ensure programs are implemented within
expectations set in associated business cases.
Since the start of the F/A-22 program, acquisition costs have
increased, the aircraft's mission and key capabilities have expanded,
fewer quantities are affordable, and delivery to the user has been
delayed. The Air Force currently estimates the total F/A-22 acquisition
program will cost about $72 billion, excluding all costs estimated to
complete the spiral improvement effort. Including these costs brings
the estimated total investment for the F/A-22 program to about
$80 billion. Through fiscal year 2004, about one-half this investment
has been funded.
In light of the changes in the program and investments that remain, the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, asked DOD to provide a
business case justifying the Air Force's planned number of F/A-22s (276
at that time) as well as how many F/A-22s are affordable. In its
response, DOD did not sufficiently address key business case questions
such as how many F/A-22s are needed, how many are affordable, and if
alternatives to planned investments increasing the F/A-22 air-to-ground
capabilities exist.
Instead, DOD stated it planned to buy 277 F/A-22s based on a "buy to
budget" concept that determines quantities on the availability and
efficient use of funds by the F/A-22 program office. Furthermore,
justification for expanding the capability, for an estimated $8 billion
to $12 billion investment, was not addressed in DOD's response. While
ground targets such as surface-to-air missile systems are acknowledged
to be a significant threat today, the business case did not establish a
justification for this investment or state what alternatives were
considered. For example, the F-35 aircraft is also expected to have an
air-to-ground role as are planned future unmanned combat air vehicles.
These could be viable alternatives to this additional investment in F/
A-22 capability.
While the business case information submitted to Congress called for
277 aircraft, DOD stated it could only afford to acquire between 216
and 218 aircraft within the congressionally imposed cap on production
costs--currently at $36.8 billion. DOD expects improvements in
manufacturing efficiencies and other areas will provide it with
sufficient funds to buy additional F/A-22 aircraft. However, this seems
to be an unlikely scenario given the program's history. Under the "buy
to budget" approach, the previous $876 million increase in development
costs was funded by taking funds mostly from production, thus
reducing aircraft quantities by 49. With testing still incomplete and
many important performance areas not yet demonstrated, the possibility
for additional increases in development costs is likely.
Conclusions:
While DOD and the Air Force are focused on completing IOT&E and making
a decision to go into full rate production, a more basic issue needs to
be addressed. The conditions driving the business case that spurred the
major investment decision to initially develop and buy 750
F-22 aircraft have changed. A revised and comprehensive business case
assessment has not been completed and shared with congressional defense
oversight committees. At the present time, it is uncertain how many F/
A-22s are needed. The program has been in development for about
18 years, and DOD has invested over $40 billion. This investment
represents about one-half the estimated costs projected for the entire
F/A-22 program. Therefore, DOD must still make investment decisions
affecting another $40 billion to support this program through full rate
production and implementation of the spiraled modernization effort.
Based on current design problems and the development efforts that
remain, the F/A-22 program's affordability is uncertain. Current
conditions suggest the Air Force cannot afford to buy much more than
218 aircraft within the cost limitation imposed by Congress.
In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in
today's environment, the large investments that remain, and the unknown
outcomes of planned initial operational testing, we continue to be
concerned with DOD's readiness to address a December 2004 decision to
enter full rate production. Furthermore, IOT&E, intended to demonstrate
the F/A-22 effectiveness and suitability, has not started and may not
be completed as planned, which may delay the full rate production
decision. With this testing outstanding, the risk is high that
additional development funding will be needed to resolve problems that
could result.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Given the sizable investment that remains in the F/A-22 program, the
uncertainties, and the ever changing financial demands of DOD, Congress
and the Secretary of Defense would benefit from a comprehensive
assessment of the number of F/A-22 aircraft needed as well as assurance
that problems identified in initial operational testing will be
identified and resolved. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense take the following two actions:
* Complete a new business case analysis that determines the continued
need for the F/A-22 and that specifically (a) addresses the need for an
expanded air-to-ground capability and an assessment of alternatives, to
include the feasibility of using other assets like the F-35 and
unmanned aerial vehicles planned for the future; (b) justifies the
quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements for air-to-
air and air-to-ground missions; and (c) provides evidence that the
planned quantity is affordable within current budgets and the
congressional funding limitation. The Secretary should provide the
results of the business case analysis to the defense committees before
the decision to start full rate production.
* Before the full rate production decision is made and in conjunction
with the Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production Report, provide the defense
committees a plan that shows how the Air Force will correct and fund
any major problems identified and still open after IOT&E is completed.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it
partially concurred with our two recommendations. Regarding our first
recommendation on completing a new business case for the F/A-22, DOD
stated that it evaluates the F/A-22 business case elements as part of
the annual budget process. Additionally, DOD's response acknowledged
that this year the department is undertaking a broader set of reviews
under the Joint Capabilities Review process; the F/A-22 will be a part
of this review. The President's budget submission to Congress will
reflect the results of these review efforts of the F/A-22 business
case.
We believe that the various reviews and assessments in the budget
process along with the Joint Capabilities Review process present
excellent opportunities for DOD to conduct a business case analysis.
Other opportunities for completing the business case analysis include
the independent and in-depth study requested by the Office of
Management and Budget for the Comanche and F/A-22 programs. It is
important, however, that the analysis sufficiently address the specific
business case elements included in our recommendation--analysis of
continued need, need for expanded air-to-ground capability, assessment
of alternatives, justification of needed quantities, and evidence that
planned quantities are affordable. In addition, it is important that
the outcomes of the business case analysis are provided to the Congress
prior to the full rate production decision.
Regarding our second recommendation on providing Congress the plans
to resolve outstanding problems after the completion of IOT&E, DOD
stated that the law already requires the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, to submit to Congress a Beyond Low Rate Initial Production
Report that includes the results of operational testing. Since this
report is an independent assessment of test results, the department did
not believe it appropriate to include in it Air Force plans and costs
for corrective actions stemming from operational testing. However, DOD
will present these actions and costs to the Defense Acquisition Board
for decisions on the F/A-22 program that will be included in the
President's budget submission to Congress.
We understand the legal requirements for submitting the Beyond Low Rate
Initial Production Report. We also recognize that this is an
independent report submitted by the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation. The intent of our recommendation is not to modify the
report itself, but to ensure corrective actions and resultant costs are
identified and reported in a timely fashion and before the full rate
production decision is made. Because plans and costs could span over
several years, such information may or may not be captured in annual
budget submissions. We have modified our recommendation to clarify our
intent.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception, we
analyzed cost information from Selected Acquisition Reports and
obtained information from the Air Force on its plans to modernize the
F/A-22 to include enhanced air-to-ground capabilities. We compared
prior cost information with the Air Force's current estimates to
complete development and production of the F/A-22.
To determine the impact of development and testing on program outcomes,
we examined the extent to which the development program is meeting
planned flight test goals for 2003 and the Air Force's planned entry
criterion for starting initial operational testing.
In examining sufficiency of the business case DOD provided to a
congressional oversight committee, we obtained a copy of the business
plan and analyzed the various DOD assumptions and approaches used to
make the assessment conclusions.
In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we
required access to current information about test results, performance
estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, costs being
incurred, aircraft modifications, and the program's plans for continued
development and initial production. The Air Force and the contractors
gave us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on
the matters covered in this report.
In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C;
the F/A-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio; Lockheed-Martin, Marietta, Georgia; the Defense Contract
Management Agency, Marietta, Georgia; the Air Force Operational Test
and Evaluation Center, Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico; and the
Combined Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Michael J. Hazard at (937) 258-
7917 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report.
Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Allen Li Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking:
Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
4 MAR 2004:
Mr. Allen Li:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Li:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Changing
Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business Case," dated March, 2004
(GAO Code 120239/GAO-04-391).
The DoD partially concurs with the draft report's first recommendation,
and partially concurs with the second recommendation. The rationale for
the DoD's position is provided at enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 provides
additional comments and suggested changes to the report.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, my point of
contact for this report is Mr. David Hersh, (703) 697-3619,
david.hersh@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin,
Director
Defense Systems:
Enclosures:
1. DoD comments to The GAO Recommendations
2. DoD comments on the Draft Report:
GAO Draft Report Dated January 28, 2004 GAO-04-391 (GAO Code 120239):
"TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: CHANGING CONDITIONS DRIVE NEED FOR NEW F/A-22
BUSINESS CASE":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
complete a new business case analysis that determines the continued
need for the F/A-22, and that the Department provide the results of
this analysis to the Defense Committees before the Full Rate Production
Decision. (Pg. 24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. The
Department evaluates the F/A-22 business case, program progress, need
for the aircraft, and quantities required, as a part of our routine
acquisition and budget processes. These processes include regularly
scheduled reviews by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The DAB makes
necessary program adjustments that support development of the
President's budget. This year, the Department will also be undertaking
a broader set of reviews of selected capability areas under the
framework of the Joint Capabilities Review process, introduced last
year by Secretary Rumsfeld. DoD will be studying major aviation program
plans, including F/A-22, as a part of this review. The President's
budget submission to Congress will reflect the results of the
Department's reviews of the F/A-22 business case.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that before the Full Rate
Production decision, the Secretary of Defense provide the results of
the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation testing to the defense
committees, along with a plan that shows how the Air Force will correct
and fund any major problems identified and still open after this
operational testing is completed. (Pg. 24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The DoD partially concurs with this recommendation. In
accordance with Section 2399 of title 10, United States Code, the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) will submit a Beyond
Low Rate Initial Production (BLRIP) report to the congressional defense
committees following Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. The BLRIP
report will provide DOT&E's evaluation of the operational testing
results, and it may recommend further testing and evaluation. Since the
BLRIP report is an independent assessment, it will not include an Air
Force plan for corrective action. However, before granting approval of
Full Rate Production of the F/A-22, the Defense Acquisition Executive
will review the Air Force's plans to correct any deficiencies
identified in IOT&E. The President's budget submission to the Congress
will reflect these plans.
enclosure (1):
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments:
Acknowledgments:
Marvin E. Bonner, Edward Browning, Roger Corrado, Steve Hunter, Gary
Middleton, and Robert Ackley made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can
Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-645T. Washington, D.C.: April
11, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-603T.
Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22
Production Rates While Development Risks Continue. GAO-03-431.
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs to Better Inform Congress about
Implications of Continuing Cost Growth. GAO-03-280. Washington, D.C.:
February 28, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should
Be Lower to Reduce Risks. GAO-02-298. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2002.
Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs
Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.:
July 16, 2001.
Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need
for Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2001.
Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.:
August 15, 2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating
F-22 Total Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.:
June 15, 2000.
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for
Fiscal Year 2001. GAO/OCG-00-8. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2000.
F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals.
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999.
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Production and RDT&E Programs. GAO/
NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999.
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal
Year 2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
FOOTNOTES
[1] As a result, in September 2002 the Air Force changed the aircraft's
designation from F-22 to F/A-22, which includes increased emphasis on
acquiring an improved air-to-ground capability.
[2] Pub.L.105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Acquisition
Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program,
GAO-03-645T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2003). We testified on the
failure to use these best practice acquisition concepts in the F/A-22
program and used the F/A-22 program as a case study to show lessons to
be learned had the F/A-22 applied this best practice approach in its
development and procurement activities.
[4] The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform,
requested the F/A-22 business case information as a result of the April
11, 2003, hearings.
[5] Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the
conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive
interference by the enemy.
[6] Pub. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217.
[7] Pub. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001), section 213.
[8] The cost limitation, before adjustment under the act's provisions,
was $43.4 billon.
[9] Selected Acquisition Reports are standard, comprehensive, summary
status reports of major defense acquisition programs (acquisition
category 1) required for periodic submission to Congress. They include
key cost, schedule, and technical information.
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aircraft Development: The Advanced
Tactical Fighter's Costs, Schedule, and Performance Goals, GAO/NSIAD-
88-76 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 1988).
[11] GAO-03-645T.
[12] The i960MX microprocessor is a registered trademark of the Intel
Corporation.
[13] MTBIE is the ratio of the total hours the avionics are turned on
divided by the number of countable instability events averaged over
multiple flights. It was derived by conducting dedicated stability
flights, nominally six flights of 2.5 hours duration each.
[14] Pub. L. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003), section 133.
[15] Common Problem Reports are used to identify problems within
the aircraft avionics.
[16] System maturity is defined by the Air Force as a point when the F/
A-22s have accumulated 100,000 flying hours, expected to occur in 2008
after most F/A-22s are to be procured.
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Capturing Design
and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-
02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
[18] The Defense Acquisition Board is DOD's senior-level forum for
advising the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics on critical decisions concerning major defense acquisition
programs.
[19] 10 U.S.C. 2399 provides that a major defense acquisition program
may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until initial
operational test and evaluation is completed and the defense committees
have received the report of testing results from the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation.
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