Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts Gao ID: GAO-04-530T March 17, 2004The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to managing the growing number of UAV programs. GAO was asked to summarize (1) the results of its most current report on DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAVs1 and the extent to which the approach provides reasonable assurance that its investment will lead to effective integration of UAVs into the force structure, and (2) the major management issues GAO has identified in prior reports on UAV research and development.
GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some positive steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide reasonable assurance that the significant Congressional investment in UAVs will result in their effective integration into the force structure. In 2001, DOD established the joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability, the task force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap. While the Roadmap provides some strategic guidance for the development of UAV technology, neither the Roadmap nor other documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force has only advisory authority and, as such, cannot compel the services to adopt its suggestions. GAO's prior work supports the need for effective oversight of individual UAV programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered from requirements growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within the services. Some programs have been terminated. Success has been achieved as a result of top-level intervention and innovative acquisition approaches. For example, in 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had to intervene to keep the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program viable. As UAV programs grow in the future, they will face challenges in the form of increased funding competition, greater demand for capabilities, and spectrum and airspace limitations. Moreover, UAVs are no longer an additional "nice-to-have" capability; they are becoming essential to the services' ability to conduct modern warfare. Meeting these challenges will require continued strong leadership, building on the UAV Roadmap and Planning Task Force as GAO has recommended.
GAO-04-530T, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 17, 2004:
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES:
Major Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts:
Statement of Statement of Neal P. Curtin, Director Defense Capabilities
and Management:
and:
Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
GAO-04-530T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-530T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services
Why GAO Did This Study:
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been
under development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and
Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy
forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the
Department of Defense (DOD). Congress has been particularly interested
in DOD‘s approach to managing the growing number of UAV programs.
GAO was asked to summarize (1) the results of its most current report
on DOD‘s approach to developing and fielding UAVs [NOTE 1] and the
extent to which the approach provides reasonable assurance that its
investment will lead to effective integration of UAVs into the force
structure, and (2) the major management issues GAO has identified in
prior reports on UAV research and development.
NOTE 1: 1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved
Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts,
GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).
What GAO Found:
GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some
positive steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide
reasonable assurance that the significant Congressional investment in
UAVs will result in their effective integration into the force
structure. In 2001, DOD established the joint UAV Planning Task Force
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision
for UAV-related efforts and to establish interoperability standards. To
communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability, the task force
issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap. While the Roadmap provides some strategic
guidance for the development of UAV technology, neither the Roadmap nor
other documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that
the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on
systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority
missions needed, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force has
only advisory authority and, as such, cannot compel the services to
adopt its suggestions.
GAO‘s prior work supports the need for effective oversight of
individual UAV programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered
from requirements growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain
funding support within the services. Some programs have been
terminated. Success has been achieved as a result of top-level
intervention and innovative acquisition approaches. For example, in
2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had to intervene to keep
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program viable. As UAV programs grow in
the future, they will face challenges in the form of increased funding
competition, greater demand for capabilities, and spectrum and airspace
limitations. Moreover, UAVs are no longer an additional ’nice-to-have“
capability; they are becoming essential to the services‘ ability to
conduct modern warfare. Meeting these challenges will require continued
strong leadership, building on the UAV Roadmap and Planning Task Force
as GAO has recommended.
What GAO Recommends:
In our most recent report, GAO recommends that DOD (1) establish a
strategic plan to guide UAV development and fielding and (2) designate
the UAV Task Force or other appropriate body to oversee the plan‘s
implementation, ensuring sufficient authority is provided.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-530T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin at (202)
512-4914 or curtinn@gao.gov; or Paul Francis at (202) 512-2811 or
francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
major management issues that we identified in our current and prior
work on the research, development, and fielding of the latest
generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the Department of
Defense (DOD). The current generation of UAVs has been under
development for defense applications since the 1980s, and as DOD
continues to transform the way in which it conducts military
operations, UAVs are becoming a vital part of the force structure.
For our statement today, you asked us to discuss the results of our
most recent report to the subcommittee, which is being released
today.[Footnote 1] In this report, we summarized recent UAV costs and
funding, and analyzed DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAVs to
see to what extent the approach provides reasonable assurance that UAV
programs will be efficiently integrated into the force structure. You
also asked that we summarize the major management issues we have
identified in prior reports on UAV programs, including our 2003 report
on the unmanned combat aerial vehicle.[Footnote 2]
Summary:
In our report being released today, we point out that funding for UAV
research and development and procurement has been increasing in recent
years, and Congress has actually provided more funds for UAV
acquisition than DOD requested. During the past 5 fiscal years,
Congress provided about $2.7 billion in funding for UAV development and
procurement as compared with about $2.3 billion requested by DOD.
Additionally, spending on operations and maintenance for UAVs has been
increasing as DOD has begun using UAV systems in recent military
operations. This growing spending reflects the importance that Congress
has placed on UAVs as they have demonstrated success in recent
operations. We also report that DOD's approach to planning for UAVs
does not provide reasonable assurance that the investment will result
in the effective integration of UAV programs into the force structure.
We recognize that DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the
UAV program's management. For example, to help manage UAV development,
in 2001 DOD established a joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related
efforts and to establish interoperability standards. Also, to
communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability, the Task Force
issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs,
identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on
developing emerging technologies. Our concern, however, is that neither
the Roadmap nor other defense planning documents represent a
comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD
agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each
other, will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid
duplication. Moreover, the joint UAV Planning Task Force does not have
program directive authority and serves only in an advisory capacity to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and
Logistics. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with
sufficient authority to implement the plan, DOD risks poorly
integrating UAVs into the force structure, which could increase
development, procurement, and logistics costs, and increase the risk of
future interoperability problems. Consequently, in our most recent
report we recommended that DOD (1) establish a strategic plan to guide
UAV development and fielding and (2) designate the joint UAV Planning
Task Force or other appropriate body to oversee the plan's
implementation, ensuring sufficient authority is provided.
Our prior work on UAV systems identifies the growing importance of UAVs
to effective military operations and the need for the effective
oversight of service programs at the departmental level. Over the
years, UAV acquisition programs have suffered from requirements growth,
risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within
individual services. Some of these programs have been terminated.
Program success has been achieved as a result of leadership
intervention and the use of innovative approaches like the Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration.[Footnote 3] DOD's experience with the
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program is a case in point; intervention by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense was necessary to keep the
program viable. Over the years, we have reported that DOD has faced
some expensive lessons in managing its UAV program. As UAVs become more
and more integral to the way the U.S. military carries out operations,
it will become even more important that the department manages its
program effectively. UAVs are no longer an additional "nice-to-have"
capability; they are becoming essential to the services' ability to
conduct modern warfare. The acquisition environment for new UAVs will
be characterized by increased funding competition, greater demand for
UAV capabilities, and electromagnetic frequency spectrum and airspace
limitations. This will require strong leadership at the departmental
level, building on the UAV Roadmap and efforts of the joint UAV
Planning Task Force, to ensure that the most cost-effective solutions
are adopted as we have recommended in our previous work.
Background:
DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a
human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic
forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be
expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.
Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control
station; information and retrieval or processing stations; and,
sometimes, wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery
platforms.
UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions
for many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in
1960, certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear
testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to
destroy the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United
States has used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle
carrying suspected terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is
also considering using UAVs to assist with border security for homeland
security or homeland defense.
The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense
applications since the 1980s. UAVs won considerable acceptance during
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003,
respectively. They were used in these operations to observe, track,
target, and in some cases strike enemy forces. These and similar
successes have heightened interest in UAVs within DOD and the services.
In fact, by 2010, DOD plans to have at least 14 different UAVs in the
force structure to perform a variety of missions. Moreover, in the
fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
established the goal that one-third of the Air Force's deep-strike
capability be provided by UAVs by 2010.[Footnote 4]
The overall management of UAV programs has gone full circle. In 1989
the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering set up the UAV
Joint Project Office as a single DOD organization with management
responsibility for UAV programs. With the Navy as the Executive Agency,
within 4 years the Joint Project Office came under criticism for a lack
of progress. Replacing the office in 1993, DOD created the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Office as the primary management oversight and
coordination office for all departmentwide manned and unmanned
reconnaissance. In 1998, however, this office also came under criticism
for its management approach and slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that
same year, this office was dissolved and UAV program development and
acquisition management was given to the services, while the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence was assigned to provide oversight for the Secretary of
Defense.
GAO's New Report Calls for Improved Strategic Planning:
Our report being issued today (Force Structure: Improved Strategic
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-
342, Mar. 17, 2004) analyzes recent funding trends for UAVs and makes
recommendations to strengthen DOD's strategic planning and management
approach for UAVs.
UAV Funding Has Increased:
During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided funding for UAV
development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD,
and to date the services have obligated about 99 percent of these
funds. To promote the rapid employment of UAVs, Congress appropriated
nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs from fiscal year 1999
through fiscal year 2003, compared with the $2.3 billion requested by
DOD. The majority of the funds--$1.8 billion (67 percent)--have been
for UAV research, development, test, and evaluation. Figure 1 displays
the trends in research, development, test, and evaluation and
procurement funding from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003.
Figure 1: UAV Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and
Procurement Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Over these 5 years, only three systems--the Air Force's Predator and
Global Hawk, and the Army's Shadow--have matured to the point that they
required procurement funding, amounting to about $880 million by fiscal
year 2003 and another estimated $938 million needed by fiscal year
2005.
Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the
services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned.
For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million
to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million, enough
to buy 29 Predators. The Air Force had obligated 71 percent of the
Predator's fiscal year 2003 funding during its first program year.
The Hunter, Predator, Pioneer, and Shadow are among the UAV systems
currently being used, and therefore we determined the level of DOD's
operations and maintenance spending from fiscal year 1999 through
fiscal year 2003 for these systems. Operations and maintenance funding
has steadily increased over that period from about $56.6 million for
three of the systems to $155.2 million in 2003 for all four. These
increases are the result of a larger inventory of existing systems and
the introduction of new systems. Figure 2 displays the operations and
maintenance spending for these UAV systems for fiscal years 1999 to
2003.
Figure 2: Operations and Maintenance Funding for UAVs, for Fiscal Years
1999 to 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Progress Made, but Challenges Remain in UAV Planning:
DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the management of the
UAV program by establishing a program focal point in the joint UAV
Planning Task Force and trying to communicate a common vision for UAV
development, the UAV Roadmap. While the creation of the Task Force and
the UAV Roadmap are important steps to improve the management of the
program, they are not enough to reasonably assure that DOD is
developing and fielding UAVs efficiently. The Task Force's authority is
generally limited to program review and advice, but is insufficient to
enforce program direction. Moreover, the UAV Roadmap does not
constitute a comprehensive strategic plan for developing and
integrating UAVs into force structure.
Some Positive Steps Have Been Taken to Improve Program Management:
Since 2000, DOD has taken several positive steps to improve the
management of the UAV program. In October 2001, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint
UAV Planning Task Force as the joint advocate for developing and
fielding UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV
efforts throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future
UAV-related activities and to establish interoperability standards. For
example, the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating
detailed UAV development plans, recommending priorities for development
and procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense
agencies with implementing guidance for common UAV programs.
The development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force's primary
product to communicate its vision and promote interoperability. The
Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAV development
through 2027, and describes current programs, identifies potential
missions, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies.
The Roadmap is also intended to assist DOD decision makers to build a
long-range strategy for UAV development and acquisition in such future
planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review or other planning
efforts.
The Joint UAV Planning Task Force Has Limited Authority:
The joint UAV Planning Task Force's authority is generally limited to
program review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce program
direction. The Task Force Director testified before the House Armed
Services Committee in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have
program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and
recommended actions.[Footnote 5] Without such authority, according to
the Director, the Task Force seeks to influence services' programs by
making recommendations to them or proposing recommended program changes
for consideration by the Under Secretary. According to defense
officials, the Task Force has attempted to influence the joint
direction of service UAV efforts in a variety of ways, such as
reviewing services' budget proposals, conducting periodic program
reviews, and participating in various UAV-related task teams and has
had some successes, as shown below:
* The Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider an
existing UAV (Global Hawk) rather than develop a unique UAV for its
Broad Area Marine Surveillance mission.
* The Task Force has worked with the Army's tactical UAV program to
encourage it to consider using the Navy's Fire Scout as an initial
platform for the Future Combat System class IV UAV.
* The Task Force convinced the Air Force to continue with the Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air Force wanted to
terminate it, and the Task Force ultimately helped the then-separate
Air Force and Navy programs merge into a joint program.
* The Task Force convinced the Navy not to terminate the Fire Scout
rotary wing UAV program as planned.
However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its
suggestions and consequently has not always succeeding in influencing
service actions. For example, according to DOD officials, no
significant progress has been made in achieving better interoperability
among the services in UAV platform and sensor coordination, although
efforts are continuing in this vein.
DOD Has No Comprehensive Strategic Plan:
Neither the Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a
comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs
that complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and
avoid duplication. DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has not issued any guidance that establishes an
overall strategy for UAVs in DOD. While high-level DOD strategic-
planning documents--such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint
Vision 2020, and the Defense Planning Guidance--provide some general
encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, including the
development of UAVs, these documents do not provide any specific
guidance on developing and integrating UAVs into the force structure.
At the same time, while the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council[Footnote 6] has reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for
some systems, neither the Joint Staff nor the council has issued any
guidance that would establish a strategic plan or overarching
architecture for DOD's current and future UAVs. In June 2003, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System to provide a top-down capability-
based process. Under the system, five boards have been chartered, each
representing a major warfighting capability area as follows: (1)
command and control, (2) force application, (3) battle space awareness,
(4) force protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has
representatives from the services, the combatant commanders, and
certain major functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board
is tasked with developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct
joint operations in its respective functional areas. The transformation
of these capabilities is expected, and the boards are likely to
identify specific capabilities that can be met by UAVs. Nonetheless,
according to Joint Staff officials, these initiatives will not result
in an overarching architecture for UAVs. However, the identification of
capabilities that can be met by UAVs is expected to help enhance the
understanding of DOD's overall requirement for UAV capabilities.
Moreover, according to officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching
architecture for UAVs. The Roadmap does state that it is intended to
assist DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV
development and acquisition in such future planning efforts as the
Quadrennial Defense Review. Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a start
on a strategic plan because it incorporates some of the key components
of strategic planning, as shown below:
Long-term goals--The Roadmap states its overall purpose and what it
hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap refers to the
Defense Planning Guidance's intent for UAVs as a capability and
indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid advancement of this
capability. At the same time, it does not clearly state DOD's overall
or long-term goals for its UAV efforts. Similarly, while it states that
it wants to provide the services with clear direction, it does not
clearly identify DOD's vision for its UAV force structure through 2027.
Approaches to obtain long-term goals--The Roadmap's "Approach" section
provides a strategy for developing the Roadmap and meeting its goal.
This approach primarily deals with identifying requirements and linking
them to needed UAV payload capabilities, such as sensors and associated
communication links. The approach then ties these requirements to
forecasted trends in developing technologies as a means to try to
develop a realistic assessment of the state of the technology in the
future and the extent to which this technology will be sufficient to
meet identified requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap
does not provide a clear description of a strategy for defining how to
develop and integrate UAVs into the future force structure. For
example, the Roadmap does not attempt to establish UAV development or
fielding priorities, nor does it identify the most urgent mission-
capability requirements. Moreover, without the sufficient
identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link these priorities
to current or developing UAV programs and technology.
Performance goals--The Roadmap established 49 specific performance
goals for a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are aimed at fielding
transformational capabilities without specifying the missions to be
supported. Others are to establish joint standards and control costs.
Nonetheless, of the 49 goals, only 1 deals directly with developing and
fielding a specific category of UAV platform to meet a priority
mission-capability requirement--the suppression of enemy air defenses
or strike electronic attack. The remaining goals, such as developing
heavy-fuel aviation engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly
associated with developing UAV or related technologies as well as UAV-
related standards and policies to promote more efficient and effective
joint UAV operations. However, the Roadmap does not establish overall
UAV program goals.
Performance indicators--Some of the 49 goals have performance
indicators that could be used to evaluate progress, while others do
not. Furthermore, the Roadmap does not establish indicators that
readily assess how well the program will meet the priority mission
capabilities.
As the services and defense agencies pursue separate UAV programs, they
risk developing systems with duplicate capabilities, potentially higher
operating costs, and increased interoperability challenges. The House
Appropriations Committee was concerned that without comprehensive
planning and review, there is no clear path toward developing a UAV
force structure.[Footnote 7] Thus, the committee directed that each
service update or create a UAV roadmap. These roadmaps were to address
the services' plans for the development of future UAVs and how current
UAVs are being employed. Officials from each of the services indicated
that their UAV roadmap was developed to primarily address their
individual service's requirements and operational concepts. However, in
their views, such guidance as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military
Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance did not constitute strategic
plans for UAVs to guide the development of their individual service's
UAV roadmap. These officials further stated that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's 2002 UAV Roadmap provided some useful guidance,
but was not used to guide the development of the service's UAV
roadmaps. Moreover, they did not view the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Roadmap as either a DOD-wide strategic plan or an overarching
architecture for integrating UAVs into the force structure. According
to service officials developing the service-level UAV roadmaps, there
was little collaboration with other services' UAV efforts.
As we have described for you today, DOD has an opportunity to enhance
its strategic planning to improve the management of UAV development and
fielding. In the report released to you today, we make two
recommendations to assist DOD to enhance its management control over
the UAV program. We recommend that DOD establish a strategic plan or
set of plans based on mission requirements to guide UAV development and
fielding. We also recommend that DOD designate the joint UAV Planning
Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the
implementation of a UAV strategic plan. In responding to our report,
DOD stated that it partially concurred with the first recommendation
but preferred to address UAV planning through the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System process. DOD disagreed with the
second recommendation saying that it did not need to provide an
organization within the department with more authority because it
believes that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology already has sufficient authority to achieve DOD's UAV
goals. Our report states clearly that we continue to support both
recommendations. We believe that the growth in the number and cost of
UAV programs, and their importance to military capabilities, will need
more formalized oversight by DOD.
Oversight Challenge Is Framed by Experiences of the Past and Demands of
the Future:
Our reviews of system development efforts over the last several decades
show that the road to fielding operational UAVs has not been easy.
Success has been achieved as a result of intervention by leadership and
the use of innovative processes. Even when put on a sound footing,
these programs have continued to face new challenges. In the future,
UAVs will be growing in number, sophistication, and significance, but
will also have to compete for increasingly scarce funds,
electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and airspace.
Lessons From Past Experience:
Since the mid 1970s, we have reviewed many individual DOD UAV
development efforts.[Footnote 8] A list of our reports is attached in
the section entitled "Related GAO Products." Our previous work has
highlighted problems that addressed congressional efforts to bring the
development process under control and subsequently led to the
termination or redesign and retrofit of a number of these development
efforts.
In 1988 we reported on a variety of management challenges related to
UAV development.[Footnote 9] At that time, congressional committees had
expressed concern about duplication in the services' UAV programs,
which ran counter to the committees' wishes that DOD acquire UAVs to
meet common service needs. In 1988, we noted that DOD was to provide,
at minimum, a UAV master plan that (1) harmonized service requirements,
(2) utilized commonality to the maximum extent possible, and (3) made
trade-offs between manned and unmanned vehicles in order to provide
future cost savings. After budget deliberations for fiscal year 1988,
Congress eliminated separate service accounts for individual UAV
programs and consolidated that funding into a single Defense Agencies
account. This in turn led to the formation of DOD's UAV Joint Projects
Office, which promoted joint UAV efforts that would prevent unnecessary
duplication. This effort was led by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance
Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has since
been disbanded.
Our analysis of DOD's 1988 UAV master plan identified a number of
weaknesses: (1) it did not eliminate duplication, (2) it continued to
permit the proliferation of single-service programs, (3) it did not
adequately consider cost savings potential from manned and unmanned
aircraft trade-offs, and (4) it did not adequately emphasize the
importance of common payloads among different UAV platforms.
In testimony presented in April 1997, we recognized the strong support
that Congress had provided for DOD's UAV acquisition efforts and how it
had encouraged the department to spur related cooperation between the
services.[Footnote 10] We noted that problems with UAV development
continued and were leading to cost, schedule, and performance
deficiencies; continued duplication of UAV capabilities; and even
program cancellations in many instances. In 1997, only one UAV--the
Pioneer--had been fielded.
Factors That Limit UAV Development:
Since 1997, we have continued to evaluate the department's UAV
development efforts, including plans to develop a lethal variant of
UAVs called unmanned combat air vehicles. Our reviews over the last 27
years have revealed several reasons why UAV efforts have not been
successful, including requirements that outstrip technology, overly
ambitious schedules, and difficulties integrating UAV components and
UAV testing. We have also found that UAV system acquisitions processes
were not protected from what is known as "requirements creep." These
requirements changes increase development and procurement costs
significantly. For example:
* The Aquila was started in 1979 with a straightforward mission to
provide small, propeller-driven UAVs to give group commanders real-time
battlefield information about enemy forces beyond ground observers'
line of sight.[Footnote 11] Requirements creep increased complexity and
development and anticipated procurement costs significantly. For
example, in 1982 a requirement for night vision capability was added
which increased development costs due to the additional payloads and
air vehicles needed to meet the new requirement. During operational
tests, the Aquila successfully fulfilled all requirements in only 7 of
105 flights.
* When the Air Force's Global Hawk reconnaissance UAV was started in
1994, it was expected to have an average unit flyaway price of $10
million. Changes in the aircraft's range and endurance objectives
required the contractor to modify the wings and other structural parts,
and by 1999 its cost had increased by almost 50 percent. In our April
2000 report, we concluded that the cost of air vehicles to be produced
could increase still further, because the Air Force had not finalized
its design requirements.[Footnote 12] In 2002, the Global Hawk program
adopted a higher-risk strategy that calls for both a larger, more
advanced aircraft and an accelerated delivery schedule.
* In June 2003 we reported that the original requirements for the Air
Force's unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) program posed significant,
but manageable challenges to build an air vehicle that is affordable
throughout its life cycle, highly survivable, and lethal.[Footnote 13]
Subsequently, however, the Air Force added requirements--adding a
mission and increasing flying range. This action widened the gap
between requirements and resources and increased the challenge for the
development program.
Aside from the air vehicle, other ground and airborne systems are also
needed for the UAV to be complete. DOD's practice of buying systems
before successful completion of testing has repeatedly led to defective
systems that were terminated, redesigned, or retrofitted to achieve
satisfactory performance. Our reviews have shown that, before
production begins, DOD needs to test to ensure that all key parts of
the UAV system can work successfully together, and that it can be
operated and maintained affordably throughout its lifecycle.
* In March 1999, we examined the Medium Range UAV, which began in 1989
as a joint effort of the Navy and Air Force.[Footnote 14] The Air Force
was to design and build the sensor payload, including cameras, a
videotape recorder, and a communications data link that would send back
the imagery from the UAV. The Navy was to design and build the air
vehicle. Splitting and then integrating these development efforts
became problematic. The Air Force ran into major payload development
difficulties, which impacted payload development costs. As a result of
the difficulties, the payload program fell behind schedule,
developmental tests on a surrogate manned aircraft[Footnote 15] were
unsuccessful, and the payload was too big to fit in the space the Navy
had allotted inside the aircraft. In 1993, the program was terminated.
* In 1999, the Army began low-rate initial production of four Shadow
systems at the same time that it began the engineering and
manufacturing development phase. In February 2001, the Army sought to
revise its acquisition strategy to procure four additional Shadow
systems before conducting operational tests. We recommended in a 2000
report that the Army not buy these four additional systems until after
operational testing is completed.[Footnote 16] In our opinion, only
operational testing of the system in a realistic environment can show
whether the overall system would meet the Army's operational needs.
Subsequently, we reported that problems encountered during early tests
forced the program to delay completion of operational testing by one
year. The results of operational tests revealed that the Shadow was not
operationally suitable, survivable, and may not be affordable.
Factors That Lead to UAV Success:
Our body of UAV work also made several observations about factors that
contribute to success, including the use of innovative approaches and
high-level interventions by individuals and organizations. In August
1999, we concluded that DOD's use of Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration projects improved UAV acquisitions because it focused on
maturing technology and proving military utility before committing to a
UAV.[Footnote 17] We found that DOD's Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration approach was consistent with the practices that we
typically characterize as leading commercial development efforts.
Predator UAV used a 30-month Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
approach and prototypes were deployed in Bosnia in 1995 and 1996 as
part of the demonstration. Performance data gathered there convinced
military users that Predator was worth acquiring.
High-level individuals intervened to set resource constraints and
encouraged evolutionary acquisition strategies on the Air Force's
Global Hawk, the Army's Shadow UAV, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Air
System programs.
* In the initial Shadow program, the Army's top military acquisition
executive reached an agreement with his counterpart in the requirements
community that limited the program to "must have" capabilities and
restrained resources such as cost. This resulted in the need to make
trade-offs--so the Army lowered the performance requirement for the
imagery sensor so that existing technology could be used.[Footnote 18]
* In the Global Hawk program, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) became personally involved and
insisted that the program take an evolutionary approach, developing and
fielding different versions of increasingly capable UAVs. He also
placed cost constraints on the initial version, which enabled more
advanced imagery sensor capabilities to be deferred for later versions
of the UAV.
* In our report on the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program, we reported
on Air Force plans to have initial deliveries of a lethal-strike-
capable aircraft by 2011.[Footnote 19] The Air Force had abandoned the
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle initial low-risk approach to development,
and increased requirements and accelerated its program schedule shortly
before it was to shift to the product development stage. As previously
reported, it took intervention by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to resolve requirements and funding challenges and maintain
strong oversight over the program. The Task Force also was instrumental
in getting the funding restored to the program, creating a joint effort
between the Air Force and Navy, and accelerating the Navy's version.
Their strong oversight and intervention might have saved the program,
which is now known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System program.
Future Challenges in Oversight of UAVs:
Over the next decade, DOD plans show that UAV investments will
increase, greater numbers will be fielded, and these systems will play
more significant roles than in the past. In addition to overcoming the
problems and pressures that have impaired past programs, managers of
future UAV programs will face increasing competition for money,
electromagnetic frequency spectrum bandwidth, and airspace.
By 2010, DOD plans to invest $11 billion in UAV acquisitions,
quadrupling the number of systems in its inventory today. As UAV
programs vie for increased funding, they will have to compete against
very large programs, such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter.
If the costs of acquisition programs continue to exceed what has been
set aside in the budget, competition will intensify and funding could
be jeopardized.
Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented
capabilities the warfighter already had. They were, in a sense,
"another pair of eyes." We are already seeing the evolution of UAVs
into more significant roles, for which they provide primary capability.
For example, the Global Hawk is being seen as replacing the U-2
reconnaissance aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle may
eventually perform electronic warfare missions that the EA-6 Prowler
aircraft performs today. UAVs are figuring prominently in plans to
transform the military into a more strategically responsive force. UAVs
are expected to be an integral part of this information-based force.
For example, UAVs may serve as relay nodes in the Future Combat
System's command and control network. As UAVs perform increasingly
significant roles, their payloads and designs will likely become more
sophisticated.
UAVs depend on the available space in the electromagnetic frequency
spectrum to send and receive signals. Such signals are essential to UAV
control, communications, and imagery. As the number of UAVs grows, the
systems will have to compete for more room on the spectrum. Spectrum
resources are scarce and facing increased demands from sources other
than UAVs. Because of the changing nature of warfighting, more and more
military systems are coming to depend on the spectrum to guide
precision weapons and obtain information superiority. Recently, because
of advances in commercial technology, a competition for scarce
frequency spectrum has developed between government and nongovernment
users.
Moreover, as the growing number of UAV systems become available for
military units and civilian agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security, their operation will also need to be integrated into
the national airspace system. Currently, the Federal Aviation
Administration requires detailed coordination and approval of UAV
flights in the national airspace system. The Federal Aviation
Administration and DOD are working on how to better integrate military
UAVs within the national air space system. In the future, UAVs are
going to be used for homeland security, and their acceptance into civil
airspace may be difficult to accomplish until significant work is
accomplished in the areas of reliability, regulation, communications,
and collision avoidance.
Concluding Remarks:
Recent operations are convincing military commanders that UAVs are of
real value to the warfighter. That success on the battlefield is
leading to more and more demand for UAVs and innovative ways of using
them, creating pressures such as a greater need for interoperability of
systems and competition for limited resources like money,
electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are
successful today survived an environment characterized by a number of
canceled programs, risky strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and
uncertain funding. It took additional measures for them to succeed, not
the least of which was strong management intervention. In recent years,
DOD has taken positive steps to better manage the development of UAVs
by creating the joint UAV Planning Task Force and the UAV Roadmap. The
question is whether these steps will be sufficient to make the most out
of current and future investments in UAVs. We believe that DOD should
build on these good steps so that it will be in a better position to
provide stewardship over these investments. Taking these steps will
give Congress confidence that its investments' in the technology will
produce optimum capabilities desired of UAVs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy
to answer any questions that you or Members of the subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
For future questions about this statement, please contact Mr. Curtin at
(202) 512-4914, Mr. Francis at (202) 512-2811, or Brian J. Lepore at
(202) 512-4523. Individuals making key contributions to this statement
include Fred S. Harrison, Lawrence E. Dixon, James K. Mahaffey, James
A. Driggins, Jerry W. Clark, Jose Ramos, Jr., R.K. Wild, Bob Swierczek,
and Kenneth E. Patton.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise
Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology
Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175.
Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598.
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow
200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.:
September 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude
Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.:
December 15, 1998.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to
Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.:
September 23, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/ T-NSIAD-97-
138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy
Fleet Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in
Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4,
1992.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28,
1990.
Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching
Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
Program's Success, GAO-03-598 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).
[3] The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program was initiated
by DOD in 1994 as a way to get new technologies that meet critical
military needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than the
traditional acquisition process.
[4] P.L. 106-398, Section 220.
[5] Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force before the
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services
Committee, March 26, 2003.
[6] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization
made up of senior representatives from each of the services to review
joint experimentation and make appropriate recommendations to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3180.1 (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 31, 2002).
[7] Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 2003 Report, H.R. Rep.
No. 107-532 at 207.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Status of the Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Programs. GAO/PSAD-77-30 (Washington, D.C.: February 18,
1977).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 1988).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's
Acquisition Efforts, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138 (Washington, D.C.: April 9,
1997).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle:
Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, GAO/NSIAD-88-19
(Washington, D.C.: October 26, 1987).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress
of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, GAO/
NSIAD-00-78 (Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2000).
[13] GAO-03-598.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium
Range System Components Do Not Fit, GAO/NSIAD-91-2 (Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 1991).
[15] A surrogate manned aircraft is a conventional aircraft with
unmanned controls that is being operated as a UAV with a pilot on board
to override controls in the event of an emergency.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200 Acquisition Strategy,
GAO/NSIAD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2000).
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's
Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-33
(Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999).
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of
Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes,
GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001).
[19] GAO-03-598.
