Defense Acquisitions
The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, Risks, and Alternatives
Gao ID: GAO-04-635T April 1, 2004
To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS)--which the Army calls the "greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken"--is expected to meet the Army's transformational objectives. Forming FCS' backbone is an information network that links 18 systems. Not only is FCS to play a pivotal role in the Army's military operations, FCS and its future iterations are expected to eventually replace all Army forces. For FCS' first developmental increment, the Army has set aside a 5 1/2-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the initial production decision (November 2008). GAO was asked to testify about FCS' key features, whether the program carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks.
The FCS concept is a new generation of manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions, each of which taps into a secure network of superior combat information. These weapon systems are to be a fraction of the weight of current weapons yet as lethal and survivable. FCS' lightweight and small size are critical to meeting the Army's goals of deploying faster and being more transportable for big or small military operations. Rather than rely on heavy armor to withstand an enemy attack, FCS' systems will depend on superior communications to kill the enemy before being detected. One of FCS' key advantages is that it provides an architecture within which individual systems will be designed--an improvement over designing systems independently and making them interoperable after the fact. Another merit is that FCS is being acquired and developed with the full cooperation of the Army's program managers, contractors, and the warfighter community. FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources. Three-fourths of FCS' needed technologies were still immature when the program started. The first prototypes of FCS will not be delivered until just before the production decision. Full demonstration of FCS' ability to work as an overarching system will not occur until after production has begun. This demonstration assumes complete success-- including delivery and integration of numerous complementary systems that are not inherently a part of FCS but are essential for FCS to work as a whole. When taking into account the lessons learned from commercial best practices and the experiences of past programs, the FCS strategy is likely to result in cost and schedule consequences if problems are discovered late in development. Because it is promising to deliver unprecedented performance capabilities to the warfighter community, the Army has little choice but to meet a very high standard and has limited flexibility in cutting FCS requirements. Because the cost already dominates its investment budget, the Army may find it difficult to find other programs to cut in order to further fund FCS. To avoid unanticipated cost and schedule problems late in development, several alternatives can be considered: (1) add time to FCS' acquisition schedule to reduce concurrent development; (2) take the time to develop and demonstrate the most critical capabilities first, such as the FCS network, then proceed with an acquisition program; and (3) focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle them in demonstrations of capabilities, and ensure that decision makers have attained the knowledge they need at critical junctures before moving forward.
GAO-04-635T, Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, Risks, and Alternatives
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Thursday, April 1, 2004:
Defense Acquisitions:
The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, Risks, and Alternatives:
Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management:
GAO-04-635T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-635T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is
changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and
more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS)”which the Army calls
the ’greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken“”is
expected to meet the Army‘s transformational objectives. Forming FCS‘
backbone is an information network that links 18 systems. Not only is
FCS to play a pivotal role in the Army‘s military operations, FCS and
its future iterations are expected to eventually replace most of the
Army forces. For FCS‘ first developmental increment, the Army has set
aside a 5 ½-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the
initial production decision (November 2008).
GAO was asked to testify about FCS‘ key features, whether the program
carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for
developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks.
What GAO Found:
The FCS concept is a new generation of manned and unmanned ground
vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions, each of which taps into a secure
network of superior combat information. These weapon systems are to be
a fraction of the weight of current weapons yet as lethal and
survivable. FCS‘ lightweight and small size are critical to meeting the
Army‘s goals of deploying faster and being more transportable for big
or small military operations. Rather than rely on heavy armor to
withstand an enemy attack, FCS‘ systems will depend on superior
communications to kill the enemy before being detected. One of FCS‘ key
advantages is that it provides an architecture within which individual
systems will be designed”an improvement over designing systems
independently and making them interoperable after the fact. Another
merit is that FCS is being acquired and developed with the full
cooperation of the Army‘s program managers, contractors, and the
warfighter community.
FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability
within budgeted resources. Three-fourths of FCS‘ needed technologies
were still immature when the program started. The first prototypes of
FCS will not be delivered until just before the production decision.
Full demonstration of FCS‘ ability to work as an overarching system
will not occur until after production has begun. This demonstration
assumes complete success”including delivery and integration of numerous
complementary systems that are not inherently a part of FCS but are
essential for FCS to work as a whole. When taking into account the
lessons learned from commercial best practices and the experiences of
past programs, the FCS strategy is likely to result in cost and
schedule consequences if problems are discovered late in development.
Because it is promising to deliver unprecedented performance
capabilities to the warfighter community, the Army has little choice
but to meet a very high standard and has limited flexibility in cutting
FCS requirements. Because the cost already dominates its investment
budget, the Army may find it difficult to find other programs to cut in
order to further fund FCS. To avoid unanticipated cost and schedule
problems late in development, several alternatives can be considered:
* add time to FCS‘ acquisition schedule to reduce concurrent
development;
* take the time to develop and demonstrate the most critical
capabilities first, such as the FCS network, then proceed with an
acquisition program; and
* focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle
them in demonstrations of capabilities, and ensure that decision makers
have attained the knowledge they need at critical junctures before
moving forward.
What GAO Recommends:
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-635T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Army's
Future Combat Systems (FCS), a networked suite of weapons and other
systems. FCS is the centerpiece of the Army's plan to transform to a
lighter, more agile, and more capable force. The Army plans to develop
and field FCS in increments, but has only defined the first increment
at this time. Increment 1 of FCS began system development and
demonstration in May 2003. The production decision is currently planned
for November 2008 and initial operational capability is slated for
December 2010. This first increment will equip 15 brigade-sized Units
of Action by 2020--about one third of the active force. Total costs to
develop and produce Increment 1 are estimated at $92 billion, in then
year dollars. The fiscal year 2004 budget provides $1.7 billon in
research and development funds for FCS; the fiscal year 2005 budget
requests a substantial increase to $3.2 billion.
Today I would like to cover (1) the features of the FCS concept, (2)
the prospects for delivering a capable FCS within budgeted cost and
schedule, and (3) whether alternatives to the current FCS strategy are
worth considering.
Summary:
FCS is an information network linking a suite of 18 new manned and
unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions. They
are to be a fraction of the weight of current weapons, yet are to be as
lethal and survivable. Their lightweight and small size are critical to
meeting the other goals of the Army's future force: better
responsiveness and enhanced sustainability. At a fundamental level, the
FCS concept is replacing mass with superior information; that is, to
see and hit the enemy first, rather than to rely on heavy armor to
withstand an attack. The ability to make this leap depends on (1) the
ability of the network to collect, process, and deliver vast amounts of
information such as imagery and communications and (2) the performance
of the individual systems themselves. This concept has a number of
progressive features. It provides an architecture within which
individual systems will be designed--an improvement over designing
systems independently and making them interoperable after the fact. It
includes sustainability as a design characteristic versus an
afterthought. It has galvanized relationships between users and
developers. It also shows a willingness on the part of Army leaders not
to be bound by tradition.
FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability
within budgeted resources. At conflict are the program's unprecedented
technical challenges and time. At a top level, the technical challenges
are: development of a first-of-a-kind network, 18 advanced systems, 53
critical technologies, 157 complementary systems, and 34 million lines
of software code. From a time standpoint, the Army allows only 5 ½
years between program start and the production decision. This is faster
than it has taken to develop a single major system, and FCS has several
systems including the network, an Abrams replacement, a Bradley
replacement, and a Crusader replacement. To meet this timetable, FCS is
proceeding on a highly concurrent strategy that started with over
75 percent of critical technologies immature. Assuming everything goes
as planned, the FCS program will begin production before all of its
systems have been demonstrated. If all FCS elements are not ready at
the production decision, Army plans still call for going forward with
production and fielding. Based on the lessons learned from best
practices and the experiences of past programs, FCS is susceptible to
discovering costly problems in late development and early production,
as the demonstration of multiple technologies, individual systems, the
network, and the system of systems will all culminate.
Alternatives to the current FCS strategy are worth considering in light
of these risks. The tools normally employed to accommodate problems
in weapon systems--relaxing performance requirements and adding funds-
-may not be available to the FCS program. The opportunity for making
performance trade-offs on FCS is limited by the fact that it must be
transportable by the C-130 aircraft yet be as lethal and survivable as
the current force. On the funding side, the $92 billion cost estimate
only allows for 14 of the 18 systems to be acquired, despite being
based on an immature program and assuming full success in development.
A modest delay late in development could cost $5 billion; a similarly
modest 10-percent increase in production cost would amount to
$7 billion. Providing more money on this scale after problems have
occurred may not be feasible given the fiscal pressures the government
in general--and DOD in particular--faces. Several alternatives that
would enable a less concurrent--and more predictable--strategy are
possible, if acted upon early. Alternatives should have several things
in common: building more knowledge before commitments like production
are made; preserving the advantages of the FCS concept, such as
defining an architecture to guide the design of individual systems; and
the ability to spin off mature technologies to existing systems.
Army Transformation and the FCS Program:
The Army plans to develop and acquire FCS in at least two increments
but, according to program officials, only the first one has been
defined at this point. The first increment is an information network
linking a new generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air
vehicles, sensors, and munitions. The manned ground vehicles are to be
a fraction of the weight of current weapons such as the Abrams tank and
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, yet are to be as lethal and survivable. At a
fundamental level, the FCS concept is replacing mass with superior
information; that is, to see and hit the enemy first, rather than to
rely on heavy armor to withstand attack. The ability to make this leap
depends on (1) the ability of the network to collect, process, and
deliver vast amounts of information such as imagery and communications
and (2) the performance of the individual systems themselves. The
concept has a number of progressive features. For example, it provides
an architecture within which individual systems will be designed--an
improvement over designing systems independently and making them
interoperable after the fact.
Army Transformation:
A decade after the cold war ended, the Army recognized that its combat
force was not well suited to perform the operations it faces today and
is likely to face in the future. The Army's heavy forces had the
necessary firepower but required extensive support and too much time to
deploy. Its light forces could deploy rapidly but lacked firepower. To
address this mismatch, the Army decided to radically transform itself
into a new "Future Force."
The Army expects the Future Force to be organized, manned, equipped,
and trained for prompt and sustained land combat, requiring a
responsive, technologically advanced, and versatile force. These
qualities are intended to ensure the Future Force's long-term dominance
over evolving, sophisticated threats. The Future Force will be
offensively oriented and will employ revolutionary operational
concepts, enabled by new technology. This force will fight very
differently than the Army has in the past, using easily transportable
lightweight vehicles, rather than traditional heavily armored
vehicles.[Footnote 1] A key characteristic of this force is agility.
Agile forces would possess the ability to seamlessly and quickly
transition among various types of operations from support operations to
warfighting and back again. They would adapt faster than the enemy,
thereby denying it the initiative. In an agile force, commanders of
small units may not have the time to wait on higher command levels;
they must have the authority and high quality information at their
level to act quickly to respond to dynamic situations.
Thus, to be successful, the transformation must include more than new
weapons. The transformation is extensive, encompassing tactics and
doctrine, as well as the very culture and organization of the Army.
Against that backdrop, today, I will focus primarily on the equipment
element of the transformation, represented by FCS.
The FCS Solution:
FCS will provide the majority of weapons and sensor platforms that
comprise the new brigade-like modular units of the Future Force known
as Units of Action. Each unit is to be a rapidly deployable fighting
organization about the size of a current Army brigade but with the
combat power and lethality of a current (larger) division. The Army
also expects FCS-equipped Units of Action to provide significant war-
fighting capabilities to the Joint Force.
The first FCS increment will ultimately be comprised of an information
network and 18 various systems--which can be characterized as manned
ground systems, unmanned ground systems, and unmanned air vehicles.
While some systems will play a larger role in the network than others,
the network will reside in all 18 systems, providing information to
them as well as taking information from them. Figure 1 shows FCS
Increment 1.
Figure 1: Basic Composition of FCS Increment 1:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical are two programs outside of FCS that integrate all the
various systems and soldiers together. As such, their development is
crucial to the FCS network. The communications backbone of the Unit of
Action will be a multi-layered mobile network centered on the Joint
Tactical Radio System. According to program officials, all soldiers and
FCS vehicles, including the unmanned vehicles, will employ these
radios. Beyond being the primary communications component within the
unit, the Joint Tactical Radio System also will assist with
communications beyond the unit, to assets at higher echelons.
Communications with those echelons will be enabled through the
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, which provides the
overarching network background for the FCS network and is expected to
conform to DOD's interoperability and network architecture directives.
Increment 1 began system development and demonstration in May 2003.
Currently, only the network and 14 systems are funded. The remaining
4 systems will be introduced as funding becomes available. Current
estimates are for the acquisition of Increment 1 to cost $92 billion
(then-year dollars) and to achieve an initial operational capability by
the end of 2010. Although the Under Secretary of Defense approved the
Army's request to begin the system development and demonstration
phase, he directed the Army to prepare for a full program review in
November 2004. Increment 1 is expected to replace roughly one-third of
the active force through about 2020, when the first 15 Units of Action
are fielded.
According to program officials, the Army has not yet defined future FCS
increments. However, it is important to note that the Army expects to
eventually replace most of its current forces with the FCS. Much of the
current Army heavy force is expected to remain in the inventory--
needing to be maintained and upgraded--through at least 2020. We
recently reported[Footnote 2] that costs of maintaining legacy systems
would be significant, but funding is likely to be extremely limited,
particularly given competition for funds from transformation efforts.
We concluded that maintaining legacy equipment will likely be a major
challenge, necessitating funding priorities to be more clearly linked
to needed capability and to long-range program strategies.
The Army intends to employ a single Lead Systems Integrator throughout
the completion of Increment 1. The Lead System Integrator will be the
single accountable, responsible contractor to integrate FCS on time and
within budget. It will act on behalf of the Army throughout the life of
the program to optimize the FCS capability, maximize competition,
ensure interoperability, and maintain commonality in order to reduce
life-cycle cost. In order to quickly transition into system development
and demonstration and to manage the multitude of tasks associated with
FCS acquisition, the Army chose the Lead System Integrator approach to
capitalize on industry's flexibility.
The Requirements Challenge:
The Army wants the FCS-equipped Unit of Action to have a number of
features. These can be described in four characteristics: lethality,
survivability, responsiveness, and sustainability. The Unit of Action
is to be as lethal as the current heavy force. It must have the
capability to address the combat situation, set conditions, maneuver to
positions of advantage, and close with and destroy enemy formations at
longer ranges and greater precision than the current force. To provide
this level of lethality and reduce the risk of detection, FCS must
provide high single-shot effectiveness. To be as survivable as the
current heavy force, the Unit of Action is primarily dependent upon the
ability to kill the enemy before being detected. This depends on unit's
ability to see first, understand first, act first, and finish
decisively. The individual FCS systems will also rely on a layered
system of protection involving several technologies that lowers the
chances of a vehicle or other system being seen by the enemy; if seen,
lowers the chances of being acquired; if acquired, lowers the chances
of being hit; if hit, lowers the chances of being penetrated; and
finally, if penetrated, increases the chances of surviving. To be
responsive, Units of Action must be able to rapidly deploy anywhere in
the world, be rapidly transportable via various transport modes, and be
ready to fight upon arrival. To facilitate rapid transportability, FCS
vehicles are being designed to match the weight and size constraints of
the C-130 aircraft. The Unit of Action is to be capable of sustaining
itself for periods of 3 to 7 days depending on the level of conflict.
This sustainability requires subsystems with high reliability and low
maintenance, reduced demand for fuel and water, highly effective
offensive weapons, and a fuel-efficient engine.
Meeting all these requirements will be a difficult challenge because
the solution to meet one requirement may work against another
requirement. For example, the FCS vehicles' small size and lighter
weight are factors that improve agility, responsiveness, and
deployability. However, their lighter weight precludes the use of the
traditional means to achieve survivability--heavy armor. Instead, the
FCS program must use cutting-edge technology to develop systems, such
as an active protection system, to achieve survivability. Yet such
technology cannot be adopted if it impairs the new systems' reliability
and maintainability. Weight, survivability, and reliability will have
to be kept in balance.
Merits of the Concept:
The essence of the FCS concept itself--to provide the lethality and
survivability of the current heavy force with the sustainability and
deployability of a force that weighs a fraction as much--has the
intrinsic attraction of doing more with less. The concept has a number
of merits, which demonstrate the Army's desire to be proactive in its
approach to preparing for potential future conflicts and its
willingness to break with tradition in developing an appropriate
response to the changing scope of modern warfare.
* If successful, the architecture the program is developing will
leverage individual capabilities of weapons and platforms and will
facilitate interoperability and open systems. This architecture is a
significant improvement over the traditional approach of building
superior individual weapons that must be netted together after the
fact. Also, the system of systems network and weapons could give
acquisition managers the flexibility to make best value trade-offs
across traditional program lines.
* This transformation of the Army, both in terms of operations and in
equipment, is underway with the full cooperation of the Army warfighter
community. In fact, the development and acquisition of FCS are being
done using a collaborative relationship between the developer (program
manager), the contractor, and the warfighter community. For example,
the developer and the warfighter are using a disciplined approach to
decompose the Unit of Action Organizational and Operational Plan and
the FCS Operational Requirements Document into detailed specifications.
This work is defining in detail the requirements for a Unit of Action
to operate in a network-centric environment. This approach is in line
with best practices to ensure that specific technical issues are
understood before significant design work is done.[Footnote 3]
* The Army has established sustainability as a design characteristic
equal to lethality and survivability. This is an improvement over past
programs, such as the Apache helicopter and the Abrams tank. These
programs did not emphasize sustainability, to less than desirable
results, including costly maintenance problems and low readiness rates,
which persisted even after the systems were fielded. FCS' approach of
emphasizing sustainability from the outset should allow operating and
support costs and readiness to be evaluated early in development, when
there is a greater chance to affect those costs positively. This
approach is also in line with best practices.[Footnote 4]
FCS at Significant Risk of Not Delivering Required Capability Within
Estimated Resources:
The FCS program has yet to--and will not--demonstrate high levels of
knowledge at key decision points. It thus carries significant risks for
execution. At conflict are the program's technical challenges and
limited time frame. The Army began system development and demonstration
in May 2003 and plans to make its initial FCS production decision in
November 2008--a schedule of about 5 ½ years. Seventy-five percent of
the technologies were immature at the start of system development and
demonstration and some will not be proven mature until after the
scheduled initial production decision. First prototypes for all 14
funded systems and the network will not be demonstrated together until
after the production decision and will serve both as technology
demonstrators and system prototypes. They will represent the highest
level of FCS demonstration before production units are delivered, as no
production-representative prototypes are planned. Even this level of
demonstration assumes complete success in maturing the technologies,
developing the software, and integrating the systems--as well as the
delivery and integration of the complementary systems outside of FCS.
While the Army is embarking on an impressive array of modeling,
simulation, emulation, and other demonstration techniques, actual
demonstration of end items is the real proof, particularly for a
revolutionary advance, such as FCS.
If the lessons learned from best practices and the experiences of past
programs have any bearing, the FCS strategy is susceptible to "late
cycle churn," a phrase used by private industry to describe the
discovery of significant problems late in development and the attendant
search for fixes when costs are high and time is short. FCS is
susceptible to this kind of experience as the demonstration of multiple
technologies, individual systems, the network, and the system of
systems will all culminate late in development and early production.
FCS Is an Unprecedented Technical Challenge:
In the Army's own words, FCS is "the greatest technology and
integration challenge the Army has ever undertaken." It intends to
develop a complex, family of systems-an extensive information network
and 14 major weapon systems--in less time than is typically taken to
develop, demonstrate, and field a single system. The FCS Acquisition
Strategy Report describes this scenario as a "dramatically reduced
program schedule (which) introduces an unprecedented level of
concurrency." Underscoring that assessment is the sheer scope of the
technological leap required for the FCS. For example:
* A first-of-a-kind network will have to be developed.
* The 14 major weapon systems or platforms have to be designed and
integrated simultaneously and within strict size and weight
limitations.
* At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving
critical performance capabilities will need to be matured and
integrated into the system of systems.
* The development, demonstration, and production of as many as
157 complementary systems will need to be synchronized with FCS content
and schedule. This will also involve developing about 100 network
interfaces so the FCS can be interoperable with other Army and joint
forces.
* An estimated 34 million lines of software code will need to be
generated (5 times that of the Joint Strike Fighter, which had been the
largest defense undertaking in terms of software to be developed).
Some of these technical challenges are discussed below.
Network Development Challenges:
The overall FCS capabilities are heavily dependent on a high quality of
service--good information, delivered fast and reliable--from the
network. However, the Army is proceeding with development of the entire
FCS system of systems before demonstrating that the network
will deliver as expected. Many developmental efforts will need to be
successful for the network to perform as expected. For each effort, a
product--whether software or hardware--must first be delivered and then
demonstrated individually and collectively. The success of these
efforts is essential to the high quality of service the network must
provide to each Unit of Action. In some cases, an individual technology
may be a linchpin--that is, if it does not work, the network's
performance may be unacceptable. In other cases, lower than expected
performance across a number of individual technologies could
collectively degrade network performance below acceptable levels. Some
key challenges are highlighted below:
* System of Systems Common Operating Environment is a software layer
that enables interoperability with external systems and manages the
distribution of information and software applications across the
distributed network of FCS systems. According to program officials, the
System of Systems Common Operating Environment is on the critical path
for most FCS software development efforts.
* The Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical, and several new wideband waveforms--all in
development--are essential to the operation of the FCS network. It is
vital that these complementary developments be available in a timely
manner for the currently planned demonstrations of the network.
* The information-centric nature of FCS operations will require a great
deal of bandwidth to allow large amounts of information to be
transmitted across the wireless network. However, the radio frequency
spectrum is a finite resource, and there is a great deal of competition
and demand for it. An internal study revealed that FCS bandwidth demand
was 10 times greater than what was actually available. As a result, the
program initiated a series of trade studies to examine and reassess
bandwidth requirements of various FCS assets. The results of these
studies may have a dramatic effect on the FCS network. The Army has
already made a number of changes to the network design to use available
bandwidth more efficiently and to reduce bandwidth demand.
* After determining that Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor missions
would constitute the largest consumption of network bandwidth, the Army
started a new wideband waveform development effort, using the higher
frequency bands. This effort will also require new updated Joint
Tactical Radio System hardware and new antennas in addition to a new
waveform.
* Sophisticated attackers could compromise the security of the FCS
network, which is critical to the success of the system of systems
concept. Such an attack could degrade the systems' war-fighting ability
and jeopardize the security of Army soldiers. The Army is developing
specialized protection techniques as there is only limited commercial
or government software currently available that will adequately protect
a mobile network like the one proposed for FCS.
UAV Development Challenges:
FCS Increment 1 includes four classes of UAVs that cover increasing
areas of responsibility. According to program officials, two of the UAV
classes are currently unfunded and are currently not being developed.
The Army plans to develop, produce and field them if funding becomes
available. Within the FCS concept, UAV roles include reconnaissance,
target acquisition and designation, mine detection, and wide-band
communications relay. The required UAVs will need to be designed,
developed, and demonstrated within the 5½-year period prior to the
initial FCS production decision. As we recently testified,[Footnote 5]
DOD's experiences show that it is very difficult to field UAVs. Over
the last 5 years, only three systems have matured to the point that
they were able to use procurement funding.
Manned Ground Vehicle Development Challenges:
FCS Increment 1 includes eight manned ground systems, however, one--the
maintenance and recovery vehicle--is unfunded. The Army plans to use
the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck-Wrecker in its place in the
Unit of Action. The remaining seven manned ground systems require
critical individual and common technologies to meet required
capabilities. For example, the Mounted Combat System will require,
among other new technologies, a newly developed lightweight weapon for
lethality; a hybrid electric drive system and a high-density engine for
mobility; advanced armors, an active protection system, and advanced
signature management systems for survivability; a Joint Tactical Radio
System with the wideband waveform for communications and network
connection; a computer-generated force system for training; and a water
generation system for sustainability.
Under other circumstances, each of the seven manned ground systems
would be a major acquisition program on par with the Army's past major
ground systems such as the Abrams tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle,
and the Crusader Artillery System. As such, each requires a major
effort to develop, design, and demonstrate the individual vehicles.
Recognizing that a number of subsystems will be common among the
vehicles, meeting the Army's schedule will be a challenge as this
effort must take place within the 5½-year period prior to the initial
FCS production decision.
High Levels of Demonstrated Knowledge Are Key to Getting Desired
Outcomes:
We have found for a program to deliver a successful product within
identified resources, managers should build high levels of demonstrated
knowledge before significant commitments are made.[Footnote 6] Figure 2
depicts the key elements for building knowledge.
Figure 2: Best Practices Model Focuses on Three Critical Knowledge
Points:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
This knowledge build, which takes place over the course of a program,
can be broken down into three knowledge points to be attained at key
junctures in the program:
* At knowledge point 1, the customer's needs should match the
developer's available resources--mature technologies, time, and
funding. This is indicated by the demonstrated maturity of the
technologies needed to meet customer needs.[Footnote 7]
* At knowledge point 2, the product's design is stable and has
demonstrated that it is capable of meeting performance requirements.
This is indicated by the number of engineering drawings that are
releasable to manufacturing.
* At knowledge point 3, the product must be producible within cost,
schedule, and quality targets and have demonstrated its reliability. It
is also the point at which the design must demonstrate that it performs
as needed. Indicators include the number of production processes in
statistical control.
The three knowledge points are related, in that a delay in attaining
one delays those that follow. Thus, if the technologies needed to meet
requirements are not mature, design and production maturity will be
delayed. For this reason, the first knowledge point is the most
important. DOD's acquisition policy has adopted the knowledge-based
approach to acquisitions. Translating this approach to DOD's
acquisition policy, a weapon system following best practices would
achieve knowledge point 1 by the start of system development and
demonstration, knowledge point 2 at critical design review (about
halfway through development), and knowledge point 3 by the start of
production.
For the most part, all three knowledge points are eventually attained
on a completed product. The difference between highly successful
product developments--those that deliver superior products within cost
and schedule projections--and problematic product developments is how
this knowledge is built and how early in the development cycle each
knowledge point is attained. If a program is attaining the desired
levels of knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero risk--of future
problems. Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated
knowledge and best practices, it indicates an increased risk--not a
guarantee--of future problems. Typically, these problems cost more
money than has been identified and take more time than has been
planned.
DOD programs that have not attained these levels of knowledge have
experienced cost increases and schedule delays. We have recently
reported on such experiences with the F/A-22, the Advanced SEAL
Delivery System, the Airborne Laser, and the Space Based Infrared
System High. For example, the technology and design matured late in the
F/A-22 program and have contributed to numerous problems. Avionics have
experienced major development problems and have driven large cost
increases and caused testing delays.
Even Assuming Success, FCS Strategy Will Not Demonstrate High Levels of
Knowledge:
The FCS program started system development and demonstration with
significantly less knowledge than called for by best practices. This
knowledge deficit is likely to delay the demonstration of subsequent
design and production knowledge at later junctures and puts the program
at risk of cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls.
Two factors contributed to not having a match between resources and
requirements at the start of system development and demonstration:
75 percent of critical technologies were not mature and requirements
were not well defined. Later in the program, when the initial
production decision is made, a knowledge gap will still exist even if
the program proceeds on schedule. For example, prototypes of all 14
funded systems, the network, and the software version needed for
initial operational capability will not be brought together and tested
for the first time until after the production decision. Further, as
production-representative prototypes will not be built, it does not
appear that much demonstration of production process maturity can occur
before the production decision.
Knowledge Gap at Start of System Development and Demonstration:
Using best practices, at the start of system development and
demonstration, a program's critical technologies should be demonstrated
to a technology readiness level of 7. This means the technology should
be in the form, fit, and function needed for the intended product and
should be demonstrated in a realistic environment, such as on a
surrogate platform. While DOD's policy states a preference for a
technology readiness level of 7, it accepts a minimum of a level 6.
According to program officials, technologies were accepted for FCS if
they were at level 6 or if the Army determined that the technologies
would reach a readiness level of 6 before the July 2006 critical design
review. To put this discussion of technology maturity in perspective,
the difficulties the F/A-22 fighter are currently experiencing with its
avionics system are, in essence, the consequence of not demonstrating a
technology readiness level of 7 until late in the program.
Consequently, the Army started FCS system development and demonstration
phase with about 75 percent of its critical technologies below level 7,
with many at level 5 and several at levels 3 and 4. Since then,
progress has been made, but the Army expects that, by the full program
review in November 2004, only 58 percent of the program's critical
technologies would be matured to a technology readiness level of 6 or
higher. The Army estimates that 95 percent of the technologies will
reach level 6 by the critical design review. The program does not
expect all FCS critical technologies to be demonstrated to level 7
until mid-2009, after the initial production decision and about 6 years
after the start of system development and demonstration.
The second factor keeping the Army from matching resources with
customer's needs before starting the system development and
demonstration phase was that it did not have an adequate definition of
the FCS requirements. The program continues to work on defining the
requirements for the FCS system of systems and the individual systems.
System requirements may not be completely defined until at least the
preliminary design review in April 2005 and, perhaps, as late as the
critical design review in July 2006. The program still has a number of
key design decisions to be made that will have major impacts on the FCS
requirements and the conceptual design of FCS Increment 1. Currently,
the program has 129 trade studies underway including 5 studies that are
critical and due to be completed soon. For example, a critical study
with great potential impact is determining the upper weight limit of
the individual FCS manned platforms. This determination could affect
the FCS transportability, lethality, survivability, sustainability,
and responsiveness capabilities. These and other open questions on the
FCS requirements will need to be answered in order for the detailed
design work to proceed and ultimately to be stabilized at the critical
design review.
Demonstrated Knowledge Will Be Low at Production Decision:
To go from system development and demonstration to production in
5 ½ years, the FCS program depends on a highly concurrent approach to
developing technology, as well as to designing, building, testing, and
producing systems. This level of concurrency resulted from the Army's
establishment of 2010 as its target for initial operating capability
for the first FCS Unit of Action. Army officials acknowledge that this
is an ambitious date and that the program was not really ready for
system development and demonstration when it was approved. However, the
officials believe it was necessary to create "irreversible momentum"
for the program. Army leaders viewed such momentum as necessary to
change Army culture. The result is an accelerated schedule-driven
program, as depicted in figure 3, rather than an event-driven program.
Figure 3: The FCS Acquisition Schedule Includes Periods of Concurrent
Development:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Even if the program successfully completes this schedule, it will yield
lower levels of demonstrated knowledge than suggested by best practices
and DOD's acquisition policy. Significant commitments will thus be made
to FCS production before requisite knowledge is available. For example:
* Technology development is expected to continue through the production
decision.
* At the design readiness review (critical design review) in July 2006,
technology development will still be ongoing, putting at risk the
stability of ongoing system integration work.
* In December 2007, while technology development and system integration
are continuing and first prototypes are being delivered, the Army plans
to begin long lead item procurement[Footnote 8] and to begin funding
for the production facilities.
* In November 2008, the initial production decision is expected to be
made. However, program officials said that some technologies will not
have reached level 7 by that time, and the system of systems
demonstration will remain to be done.
* In early 2010, as production deliveries have started, the Army plans
to finish Integrated System Development and Demonstration Test Phase
5.1, the first full demonstration of all FCS components as an
integrated system. Testing and demonstration will continue until the
full rate production decision in mid-2013.
* The initial operational capability is planned for December 2010.
With the FCS concurrent strategy, much demonstration of knowledge will
occur late in development and early in production, as technologies
mature, prototypes are delivered, and the network and systems are
brought together as a system of systems. This makes the program
susceptible to "late cycle churn," a condition that we
reported[Footnote 9] on in 2000. Late cycle churn is a phrase private
industry has used to describe the efforts to fix a significant problem
that is discovered late in a product's development. Often, it is a test
that reveals the problem. The churn refers to the additional--and
unanticipated--time, money, and effort that must be invested to
overcome the problem. Problems are most devastating when they delay
product delivery, increase product cost, or "escape" to the customer.
The discovery of problems in testing conducted late in development is a
fairly common occurrence on DOD programs, as is the attendant late
cycle churn. Often, tests of a full system, such as launching a missile
or flying an aircraft, become the vehicles for discovering problems
that could have been found earlier and corrected less expensively. When
significant problems are revealed late in a weapon system's
development, the reaction--or churn--can take several forms: extending
schedules to increase the investment in more prototypes and testing,
terminating the program, or redesigning and modifying weapons that have
already made it to the field. Over the years, we have reported numerous
instances in which weapon system problems were discovered late in the
development cycle.
The Army has embarked on an impressive plan to mitigate risk using
modeling, simulation, emulation, hardware in the loop, and system
integration laboratories throughout FCS development. This is a laudable
approach designed to reduce the dependence on late testing to gain
valuable information about design progress. However, on a first-of-a-
kind system like FCS that represents a radical departure from current
systems, actual testing of all the components integrated together is
the final proof that the system works both as predicted and as needed.
If the FCS strategy does not deliver the system of systems as planned,
the Army is still prepared to go forward with production and fielding.
The Army's Acquisition Strategy Report states that at the Initial
Production Decision, all elements of the FCS may not be ready for
initial production and will require a continuation of system
development and demonstration efforts to complete integration and
testing in accordance with the program-tailoring plan. For those that
need more time, FCS program manager will present to the Milestone
Decision Authority a path forward, with supporting analysis. In
addition, the Army will accept existing systems in lieu of actual FCS
systems to reach initial operational capability.
Alternatives to FCS Strategy Merit Consideration:
We have reported on options that warrant consideration as alternatives
for developing FCS capabilities with less risk.[Footnote 10]
Alternatives are still viable and worth considering, particularly
before major funding and programmatic commitments are made. If the FCS
program proceeds as planned and does experience problems later in
development, it may pose a real dilemma for decision makers. Typically,
performance, schedule, and cost problems on weapon system programs are
accommodated by lowering requirements and increasing funding. If the
FCS program proceeds on its current path until problems occur in
demonstration, traditional solutions may not be available because of
the significant role it must fulfill and its financial magnitude.
Alternatives Featuring Lowering FCS Performance or Increasing Funds May
Be Difficult:
While there is a significant amount of potential flexibility among the
various FCS systems and technologies, collectively the system of
systems has to meet a very high standard. It has to be as lethal and
survivable as the current force and its combat vehicles have to be a
fraction of the weight of current vehicles to be air transportable on
the C-130 aircraft. These "must haves" constrain the flexibility in
relaxing requirements for the FCS system of systems.
The opportunity for increasing funds to cover cost increases poses a
challenge because FCS already dominates the Army's investment budget.
It might be difficult to find enough other programs to cut or defer to
offset FCS increases. Assuming the Army's acquisition cost estimates
are accurate and the program will succeed according to plan, the FCS
investment for even the first increment is huge--$92 billion (in then-
year dollars). These assumptions are optimistic as risks make problems
likely, the cost estimate was based on an immature program, and budget
forecasts have already forced deferral of four FCS systems. As
estimated, FCS will command a significant share of the Army's
acquisition budget, particularly that of ground combat vehicles, for
the foreseeable future. In fiscal year 2005, the FCS budget request of
$3.2 billion accounts for 52 percent of the Army's proposed research,
development, test and evaluation spending on programs in system
development and demonstration and 31 percent of that expected for all
Army research, development, test, and evaluation activities. See figure
4 for FCS costs through 2016.
Figure 4: FCS Funding Climbs, Then Levels Off at Nearly $9 Billion
Annually:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The ramp up in FCS research and development funding is very steep,
going from $157 million in fiscal 2003 to $1.7 billion in fiscal 2004
to a projected $3.2 billion in fiscal years 2005 and topping out at
about $4.3 billion in fiscal 2006. FCS procurement funding is projected
to start in fiscal 2007 at $750 million and ramp up to an average of
about $3.2 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. In late development
(2008-2009) the total FCS costs will run about $5 billion per year.
After 2008, FCS will command nearly 100 percent of the funding for
procurement of Army ground combat vehicles. After 2011, FCS costs will
run nearly $9 billion annually to procure enough FCS equipment for two
Units of Action per year. According to Army officials, it is not yet
clear that the Army can afford this level of annual procurement funding
for FCS. The consequences of even modest cost increases and schedule
delays for FCS would be dramatic. For example, we believe that a 1-year
delay late in FCS development, not an uncommon occurrence for other DOD
programs, could cost $4 billion to $5 billion. A modest 10 percent
increase in production cost would amount to over $7 billion.
In a broader context, any discussion of DOD's sizeable investment that
remains in the FCS program must also be viewed within the context of
the fiscal imbalance facing the nation within the next 10 years. There
are important competing priorities, both within and external to DOD's
budget, that require a sound and sustainable business case for DOD's
acquisition programs based on clear priorities, comprehensive needs
assessments, and a thorough analysis of available resources. Funding
specific program or activities will undoubtedly create shortfalls in
others.
Alternatives for Proceeding:
Alternatives to developing FCS capabilities that do not follow a
concurrent strategy are feasible, if acted upon early enough.
Alternatives should have the common elements of building more knowledge
before making program commitments; preserving the advantages of the FCS
concept, such as defining an architecture before individual systems are
developed; and spinning off mature technologies to systems already
fielded. Alternatives that would allow for building such knowledge
include:
* Adding more time to the FCS program with its scope intact to reduce
concurrency would lower risk. However, until technologies are mature
and more is known about whether the FCS concept will work, there still
would not be a sound basis for estimating how much time will be needed
to build the knowledge needed to complete system development and
demonstration.
* Focus on the development and demonstration of its most critical
capabilities first, such as the network. This could be done by
conducting one or more advanced technology demonstrations[Footnote 11]
to reduce technical and integration risks in critical areas, then
proceed with an acquisition program. This would take more time than if
the current FCS schedule were successfully carried out.
* Focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle
them in demonstrations of capabilities, such as Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations,[Footnote 12] then proceed with an
acquisition program that would attain sufficient knowledge at the right
acquisition junctures. This would also take more time than if the
current FCS schedule were successfully carried out.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that
strategy, we contacted, interviewed, and obtained documents from
officials of the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense Cost
Analysis Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Program Executive Officer
for Ground Combat Systems; the Program Manager for Future Combat
Systems; and the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator. We
reviewed, among other documents, the Objective Force Operational and
Organizational Plan for Maneuver Unit of Action and the Future Combat
Systems' Operational Requirements Document; the Acquisition Strategy
Report, the Baseline Cost Report, the Critical Technology Assessment
and Technology Risk Mitigation Plans, and the Integrated Master
Schedule. We attended the FCS Business Management Quarterly Meetings,
Management Quarterly Review Meetings, and Directors Quarterly Review
Meetings.
In our assessment of the FCS, we used the knowledge-based acquisition
practices drawn from our large body of past work, as well as DOD's
acquisition policy and the experiences of other programs. We discussed
the issues presented in this statement with officials from the Army and
the Secretary of Defense, and made several changes as a result. We
performed our review from July 2003 to March 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For future questions about this statement, please contact me at
(202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to this statement
include Lily J. Chin, Marcus C. Ferguson, Lawrence Gaston, Jr., William
R. Graveline, W. Stan Lipscomb, John P. Swain, and Carrie R. Wilson.
FOOTNOTES
[1] As an interim step toward transformation, the Army is organizing
medium weight, rapidly deployable brigades around 19-ton Stryker
armored vehicles.
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: DOD Needs
to Reassess Program Strategy, Funding Priorities, and Risks for
Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003).
[3] Over the past 8 years, we have completed a number of reviews of
best practices for managing new product developments. For a broader
discussion on best practices in relation to user or warfighter
involvement, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better
Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System
Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).
[4] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting
Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems' Total Ownership
Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2003).
[5] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major
Management Issues Facing DOD's Development and Fielding Efforts, GAO-
04-530T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).
[6] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Capturing
Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002); Best Practices: Better
Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcome,
GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); and Best Practices:
Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD's
Environment, GAO/NSIAD-98-56 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 1998).
[7] Technology readiness levels are a way to measure the maturity of
technology. Technology is considered sufficiently mature to start a
program when it reaches a readiness level of 7. This involves a system
prototype demonstration in an operational environment. The prototype is
near or at the planned operational system.
[8] Long lead items are those components or a system or piece of
equipment for which the times to design and fabricate are the longest,
and therefore, to which an early commitment of funds may be desirable
in order to meet the earliest possible date of system completion.
[9] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: A More
Constructive Approach is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/
NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000).
[10] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues Facing the Army's
Future Combat Systems Program, GAO-03-1010R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13,
2003).
[11] Advanced technology demonstrations are used to demonstrate the
maturity and potential of advanced technologies for enhanced military
operational capability or cost-effectiveness and reduce technical risks
and uncertainties at the relatively low costs of informal processes.
[12] An Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration is a demonstration of
the military utility of a significant new capability and an assessment
to clearly establish operational utility and system integrity.