DOD Operational Ranges
More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates and a Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed Gao ID: GAO-04-601 May 28, 2004For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has tested and fired munitions on more than 24 million acres of operational ranges. Munition constituents such as lead, trinitrotoluene (TNT), and perchlorate may cause various health effects, including cancer. Concerned about the potential cost to clean up munitions, Congress required DOD to estimate the cost to clean up its operational ranges. Congress asked GAO to determine (1) how DOD identified the location and last use of operational ranges and the basis for DOD's cost estimates for cleaning up those ranges; and (2) DOD's policy to address contaminants linked to the use of munitions on operational ranges and, where contaminants such as perchlorate have been detected, what corrective actions the military services have taken.
DOD identified the location and status of its operational ranges based on inventory data developed by the individual military services. However, the reliability of DOD's inventory is questionable because the services did not use a common framework to collect and analyze data on the number of existing operational ranges. Because DOD's cost estimates to clean up its operational ranges were based on individual service calculations that combined inventory data with unvalidated DOD cost assumptions, various service assumptions, and computer-generated cost rates, these cost estimates are also questionable. Specifically, GAO found that each service compiled inventory data using various methodologies over different time periods and developed cost estimates using a mix of differing assumptions and estimates, along with actual data. As a result, the services' estimates to clean up an acre of highly contaminated land vary from about $800 for the Air Force to about $7,600 for the Army. DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup on operational ranges for the more than 200 chemicals associated with military munitions. However, when required by the Safe Drinking Water Act or other environmental laws, DOD has sampled and cleaned up munitions and munitions constituents. With regard to perchlorate, DOD has issued sampling policies but cannot assure funding is provided for such sampling. In some cases, DOD has sampled for perchlorate when required under the Safe Drinking Water Act's Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulation and for other contaminants when directed by state environmental agencies. However, DOD generally has not independently taken actions specifically directed at cleaning up munitions contaminants, such as perchlorate, on operational ranges when they have been detected.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-601, DOD Operational Ranges: More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates and a Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
May 2004:
DOD OPERATIONAL RANGES:
More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates and a Proactive Approach to
Identifying Contamination Are Needed:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-601]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-601, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has tested and fired
munitions on more than 24 million acres of operational ranges.
Munition constituents such as lead, trinitrotoluene (TNT), and
perchlorate may cause various health effects, including cancer.
Concerned about the potential cost to clean up munitions, Congress
required DOD to estimate the cost to clean up its operational ranges.
You asked GAO to determine (1) how DOD identified the location and
last use of operational ranges and the basis for DOD‘s cost estimates
for cleaning up those ranges; and (2) DOD‘s policy to address
contaminants linked to the use of munitions on operational ranges and,
where contaminants such as perchlorate have been detected, what
corrective actions the military services have taken.
What GAO Found:
DOD identified the location and status of its operational ranges based
on inventory data developed by the individual military services.
However, the reliability of DOD‘s inventory is questionable because the
services did not use a common framework to collect and analyze data on
the number of existing operational ranges. Because DOD‘s cost estimates
to clean up its operational ranges were based on individual service
calculations that combined inventory data with unvalidated DOD cost
assumptions, various service assumptions, and computer-generated cost
rates, these cost estimates are also questionable. Specifically, GAO
found that each service compiled inventory data using various
methodologies over different time periods and developed cost estimates
using a mix of differing assumptions and estimates, along with actual
data. As a result, the services‘ estimates to clean up an acre of
highly contaminated land vary from about $800 for the Air Force to
about $7,600 for the Army. The figure below shows high and low cost
estimates and range acreage used to estimate costs, by service.
High and Low Cleanup Cost Estimates and Total Range Acreage by Service:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup
on operational ranges for the more than 200 chemicals associated with
military munitions. However, when required by the Safe Drinking Water
Act or other environmental laws, DOD has sampled and cleaned up
munitions and munitions constituents. With regard to perchlorate, DOD
has issued sampling policies but cannot assure funding is provided for
such sampling. In some cases, DOD has sampled for perchlorate when
required under the Safe Drinking Water Act‘s Unregulated Contaminant
Monitoring Regulation and for other contaminants when directed by state
environmental agencies. However, DOD generally has not independently
taken actions specifically directed at cleaning up munitions
contaminants, such as perchlorate, on operational ranges when they have
been detected.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD (1) revise its cost estimates for the cleanup
of operational ranges using its most complete range inventory and a
consistent estimating methodology, and (2) provide specific funding for
sampling at sites where perchlorate contamination is likely, in
accordance with DOD‘s policy requiring sampling.
In commenting on this report, DOD disagreed with GAO‘s findings and
recommendations. GAO believes its findings are sound and its
recommendations are appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-601.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Anu MIttal at (202)
512-3841 or MittalA@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Inventory and Cost Estimates for Operational Range Cleanup May
Not Provide Congress with a Reliable Picture of Potential Liabilities:
DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy on Contaminants Associated
with Military Munitions and Has Not Specifically Cleaned Up Known
Perchlorate Contamination:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Safety, Environmental, and Human Health Risks:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Installations That Were Cleaning Up Perchlorate as a
Result of Demonstration Projects:
Edwards Air Force Base:
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head:
Appendix IV: Installations That Identified Perchlorate as a Result of
Munitions Research, Manufacturing, Testing, and Disposal Activities:
Edwards Air Force Base:
Holloman Air Force Base:
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head:
Redstone Arsenal:
White Sands Missile Range:
Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Dates Service Inventories Were Conducted:
Table 2: Active and Inactive Operational Ranges and Acreage as Reported
by DOD in April 2003:
Table 3: Low and High Cost Estimates to Clean Up Unexploded Ordnance,
Discarded Military Munitions, and Munitions Constituents:
Table 4: High Cost Estimates to Clean Up an Acre with a High Density of
Contamination, by Service:
Table 5: Summary of Perchlorate Sampling Conducted at Installations
Visited by GAO:
Table 6: Potential Effects of the Munitions Constituents Closely
Associated with Military Munitions:
Table 7: Installations Visited during Our Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Discarded Munitions on an Operational Range That Were Later
Uncovered by Erosion:
Figure 2: Discarded Military Munitions Discovered on a Closed Range:
Figure 3: Munitions Debris, Including Ordnance, Collected during Range
Clearance:
Figure 4: High and Low Density Operational Range Acreage Used to
Estimate Cleanup Costs, by Service:
Abbreviations:
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
NPDES: National Pollution Discharge Elimination System:
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act:
TNT: Trinitrotoluene:
Letter May 28, 2004:
The Honorable John D. Dingell:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Hilda L. Solis:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:
For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has tested and fired
munitions on millions of acres of operational ranges. These munitions
contain various constituents such as lead, trinitrotoluene (TNT), and
ammonium perchlorate salt (perchlorate) that are, in some instances,
known or suspected of causing health effects such as damage to the
central and peripheral nervous systems, cancer, and interfering with
thyroid function. Concerns about the potential cost to clean up
munitions prompted Congress to require that DOD develop an estimate for
what it would cost to clean up its operational ranges. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required DOD to provide
(1) a comprehensive assessment of unexploded ordnance, discarded
military munitions, and munitions constituents at current and former
DOD facilities; and (2) an estimate of the aggregate projected cost of
remediation (cleanup) at operational ranges,[Footnote 1] stated as a
range of costs, including a low and high estimate. As of April 2003,
DOD identified 10,444 operational ranges located in the United States
and its territories, with Army operational ranges accounting for 94
percent of the total. DOD estimated it would cost between $16 billion
and $165 billion to clean up unexploded ordnance, discarded military
munitions, and munitions constituents on these operational ranges.
There is a growing concern about the potential health effects
associated with the environmental contamination caused by constituents
used in the munitions and specifically the possible contamination of
drinking water with perchlorate--the primary ingredient of solid rocket
propellant that is also used in varying quantities in many types of
munitions, explosives, and incendiary devices, such as mortars,
grenades, and flares. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates that about 90 percent of the perchlorate manufactured in the
United States is for solid rocket fuel used for military purposes and
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. According to EPA,
studies have shown that perchlorate can interfere with thyroid function
and negatively affect fetal and infant brain development and growth.
Since 1990, the state of California has detected perchlorate in wells
and other drinking water sources near sites that once supported
munitions manufacturing, storage, and testing. EPA reports that
perchlorate has been detected in 34 states and attributes a significant
portion of the contamination to defense manufacturing and test sites.
In monitoring and cleaning up munitions and munitions constituents on
operational ranges, DOD must comply with applicable provisions of
various federal environmental laws, including the Safe Drinking Water
Act, as amended; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as
amended (RCRA); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA). EPA does
not have specific regulatory standards under the Safe Drinking Water
Act for the roughly 200 chemicals associated with military munitions
use,[Footnote 2] but requires sampling for some of these contaminants,
including perchlorate. According to DOD, at least 20 of these
constituents, including perchlorate, are of great concern due to their
widespread use and potential environmental impact. For example, EPA and
some states are considering whether to establish a specific drinking
water standard for perchlorate levels and have, in some cases,
established advisory levels. Appendix I contains a listing of munitions
constituents of greatest concern and their potential health effects.
You asked us to determine (1) how DOD identified the location and last
active use of all operational ranges and the basis for DOD's cost
estimates for cleaning up those ranges; and (2) DOD's policy to address
contaminants linked to the use of munitions on operational ranges and,
where munitions-related contaminants have been detected, what
corrective actions the services have taken. Specifically, you asked us
to focus on DOD's actions with regard to perchlorate.
To determine how DOD identified the location and last active use of all
operational ranges, we reviewed the services' inventory data and
interviewed DOD and service officials to obtain information on how the
inventories were conducted and the reliability of the data collected.
We assessed the reliability of the services' data (1) by reviewing
existing information about the data and processes that produced them
and (2) by interviewing DOD officials knowledgeable about the data. We
determined that data on the number of operational ranges and acreage
were sufficiently reliable to include in our report. Although we found
the reliability of data on operational range characteristics to be
questionable, we present the data in the report for informational
purposes. To determine the basis for DOD's cost estimates for cleaning
up the operational ranges, we reviewed the services' estimated costs,
supporting analyses, and calculations, and interviewed service and DOD
officials on the scope and methodology used to develop cost estimates.
To identify DOD's policy on sampling for constituents linked to the use
of munitions on operational ranges, we reviewed DOD's and the services'
policies related to sampling and cleanup of potential contaminants and
specifically their policies on perchlorate. Finally, to report on what
corrective actions the services have taken with regard to munitions
constituents, particularly perchlorate, we visited seven DOD
installations where perchlorate had been detected and discussed what
efforts have taken place or were planned to respond generally to
munitions-related contaminants and specifically to
perchlorate.[Footnote 3] Our observations about these installations are
not generalizable to all military installations. We conducted our work
between June 2003 and March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. More detail on the scope and methodology
of our review is presented in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
DOD identified the location and status of its operational ranges based
on inventory data developed by the individual services. However,
inconsistencies in how DOD collected and analyzed data on operational
ranges raise questions about the reliability of DOD's inventory. For
example, the services used different methods to gather data, conducted
inventories at different periods of time and for different reasons, and
did not always validate their results. DOD's cost estimates to clean up
operational ranges also are questionable because the estimates were
based on this inventory data, as well as on a mix of cost assumptions
that were not validated--where DOD did not establish a reasonable and
defensible basis for the assumptions used--and computer-generated cost
rates that varied across the services. For example, we found that in
addition to DOD-provided assumptions, the services were allowed to use
their own assumptions to estimate cleanup costs. Their differing
approaches to estimating the percentage of acreage likely to be
contaminated produced varying, and likely questionable, estimates of
the costs to clean up operational ranges. In 2004, DOD completed
another inventory of its operational ranges that was based on a more
consistent data collection framework. However, because the 2004
inventory was conducted for a different purpose and scope, the 2003 and
2004 inventories are not comparable and there are differences between
them. The differences between the two inventories make it difficult to
determine if the range data used to estimate the cost of cleaning up
operational ranges were accurate.
DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup
of the more than 200 chemical contaminants associated with military
munitions on operational ranges. None of these munitions constituents
are currently regulated with a drinking water standard under the Safe
Drinking Water Act, although some of them, including perchlorate, are
covered under the act's Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring
Regulation.[Footnote 4] Certain chemicals associated with military
munitions may, however, be subject to other environmental laws,
including RCRA and CERCLA. With a few exceptions, EPA generally has not
used its authority under these laws to require DOD to conduct a cleanup
of its operational ranges, although some states have required
installations to monitor and sample for contaminants, including
perchlorate. For example, EPA and several states have asked DOD to test
for perchlorate in areas such as old dump sites because of concern
about potential contamination of groundwater. In this context, DOD
issued a policy in November 2002 allowing the services to test for
perchlorate if there was a reasonable basis to suspect both the
presence of perchlorate and the possibility for human exposure. In
September 2003, DOD revised its policy to direct sampling for
perchlorate contamination at previously unexamined sites, including
operational ranges, where a perchlorate release is suspected and a
pathway to human exposure is likely, but the policy did not identify
specific funding for this sampling. None of the seven installations
with reported perchlorate contamination that we visited were currently
sampling operational ranges for perchlorate under DOD's guidance,
although they had conducted some sampling when required by states.
While six of the installations we visited had reported high levels of
perchlorate, none of these were cleaning up perchlorate contamination
because, installation officials said, DOD policy did not require that
they do so. Further, at six of the locations we visited, we determined
that research, manufacturing, testing, and disposal of perchlorate were
the primary activities that had caused contamination, and not the use
of ordnance during training exercises.
In order to assist Congress, EPA, and state regulators in assessing and
planning for the cleanup of contamination from the use of munitions at
operational ranges, we are recommending that DOD (1) use its most
complete operational range inventory to revise its cost estimates for
the cleanup of operational ranges and use a more consistent methodology
for estimating costs, and (2) provide specific funding for sampling at
sites where perchlorate contamination is likely, in accordance with
DOD's policy requiring sampling.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our
findings and recommendations. DOD disagreed with our conclusion that it
did not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup of
munitions constituents on operational ranges and cited specific
policies requiring the services to respond to the release of munitions
constituents. However, the policies cited by DOD pertain only to the
migration of munitions constituents off-range, and environmental
reporting, and do not address the sampling or cleanup of munitions
constituents found on operational ranges that are the subject of this
report. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that it needed to develop
new cost estimates for cleaning up operational ranges, stating that it
is developing a system for providing data and assessing its ranges for
potential munitions constituent migration to off-range areas. However,
the requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2002 was to report estimated costs to clean up operational ranges,
not the costs to respond to or clean up constituent migration off-
range. DOD also questioned whether decision makers would find useful an
estimated cost to clean up operational ranges. We disagree with DOD's
view of the usefulness of the information to Congress, because on two
occasions, including in DOD's authorization act, Congress has directed
DOD to provide such information. DOD also disagreed with our
recommendation to provide specific funding for perchlorate sampling.
According to DOD, its current policy designates funding for perchlorate
sampling as a high priority environmental project. However, we believe
that due to limited funds and because perchlorate sampling must compete
with other high priority environmental priorities, it may not be
funded. Consequently, while DOD policy designates a funding mechanism
for perchlorate, it cannot assure that perchlorate sampling will be
funded. DOD also provided technical comments and clarifications that we
incorporated into the report, as appropriate. DOD's comments appear in
appendix V.
Background:
DOD policy defined an operational range as an area used to conduct
research, develop and test military munitions, or train military
personnel. Operational ranges were considered active when regularly
used for range activities, and inactive when not currently used but
still under military control and available for use as a range.[Footnote
5] Once a range is closed, DOD is required to identify, assess, and
clean up or take other appropriate action in response to contamination
by military munitions.[Footnote 6] As such, DOD's current inventory of
operational ranges represents a potential liability for future cleanup.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show examples of the types of ordnance and
explosives that can be found on operational ranges.
Figure 1: Discarded Munitions on an Operational Range That Were Later
Uncovered by Erosion:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Discarded Military Munitions Discovered on a Closed Range:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Munitions Debris, Including Ordnance, Collected during Range
Clearance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Section 313(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002[Footnote 7] required DOD to provide Congress with a
comprehensive assessment of unexploded ordnance, discarded military
munitions, and munitions constituents at current and former DOD
facilities.[Footnote 8] The law required the assessment to include an
estimate of the aggregate projected cost of remediation (or cleanup) at
operational ranges, to be presented as a range of costs including a low
and high estimate, and delivered to Congress in 2003 in DOD's report on
the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. In April 2003, DOD
reported its estimate for the total cost to address the potential
liability associated with unexploded ordnance, discarded military
munitions, and munitions constituents at operational ranges to be
between $16 billion and $165 billion.
Collecting Inventory Data and Estimating Cleanup Costs:
To provide Congress with estimated costs to clean up operational
ranges, DOD used inventory data available at the time of its April 2003
report, which counted 10,444 operational ranges located in the United
States and its territories. At the direction of Congress, only
operational ranges in the United States and its territories were to be
considered for the purpose of estimating cleanup costs. According to
DOD, these cost estimates were supported by individual service
estimates, which in turn were supported by summary information on the
number of operational ranges and acreage assumed to contain a high
density of unexploded ordnance and munitions constituents--such as
target areas, detonation sites, and demolition areas--and the
percentage of acreage assumed to contain a low density of contamination
from unexploded ordnance and munitions constituents, such as buffers,
training areas, and maneuver areas.
The services continued to inventory operational ranges under section
366 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003,[Footnote 9] which required DOD to inventory operational ranges to
address training range sustainment and encroachment concerns and submit
the inventory to Congress as part of the President's fiscal year 2005
budget request early in calendar year 2004. The scope of this inventory
effort addressed operational range training and testing capacities and
capabilities, and specific constraints on the use of operational
ranges, but did not specifically include data on the cleanup of
unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, or munitions
constituents.
We previously reported that the two key data needed to develop
operational range cleanup costs were (1) an accurate and complete
operational range inventory and (2) a consistent methodology for
estimating costs.[Footnote 10] Reliable cost estimates can be critical
information for DOD and Congress when considering the potential
benefits of closing operational ranges or entire installations versus
the potentially very high cost of cleaning up such sites. However, such
estimates must be based on accurate data that, in the case of
operational ranges, begins with a complete and accurate operational
range inventory. The costs for cleaning up ranges can be extensive. For
example, DOD estimates it will cost $22.6 million to clean up Fort
McClellan in Alabama, recommended for closure under DOD's base
realignment and closure program in 1995, and $247 million to clean up
Fort Ord in California, closed in 1994. DOD officials explained that
wide variations in cost can be attributed to a number of factors, such
as future land use, technical complexities, and the high level of
difficulty to locate, recover, and destroy ordnance located beneath the
ground surface.
Environmental Laws and Regulations Affecting DOD Installations and
Operational Ranges:
DOD's operations at military installations and operational ranges in
the United States are subject to laws and regulations governing a
variety of environmental concerns, from water quality to the treatment
and disposal of hazardous wastes. These laws include the Safe Drinking
Water Act, the Clean Water Act, RCRA, the Federal Facility Compliance
Act, and CERCLA. DOD is also generally required to comply with state
and local environmental statutory and regulatory requirements on its
installations and operational ranges. DOD has proposed that Congress
specifically exempt it from requirements to clean up unexploded
ordnance, munitions, and munitions constituents on operational ranges
under RCRA and CERCLA.
The Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes EPA to issue national primary
drinking water regulations setting maximum contaminant level standards
for drinking water that must be met by public water systems.[Footnote
11] EPA may authorize states to carry out primary enforcement authority
for implementing the Safe Drinking Water Act if, among other things,
the state adopts drinking water regulations that are no less stringent
than the national primary drinking water regulations. EPA has set
standards for approximately 90 contaminants in drinking water,
including microorganisms, organic chemicals, inorganic chemicals,
disinfectants, disinfection byproducts, and radioactive
substances.[Footnote 12] None of the more than 200 chemical
contaminants associated with munitions use are currently regulated
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
The 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act required EPA to
establish criteria for a monitoring program for unregulated
contaminants (where a maximum contamination level has not been
established) and to publish a list of contaminants--chosen from those
not currently monitored by public water systems--to be monitored.
EPA's regulation, referred to as the Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring
Regulation, was issued in 1999 and supplemented in 2000 and
2001.[Footnote 13] The purposes of the regulation are to determine
whether a contaminant occurs at a frequency and in concentrations that
warrant further analysis and research on its potential effects and to
possibly establish future drinking water regulations. The first step in
the current program required public water systems serving more than
10,000 customers (and a sample of 800 small public water systems
serving fewer than 10,000) to monitor drinking water for perchlorate
and 11 other unregulated contaminants over a consecutive 12-month
period at any point between 2001 and 2003, and report the results to
the EPA. Under this regulation, some DOD installations were required to
monitor drinking water for perchlorate and other munitions-related
contaminants and to report the results.
The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to regulate the discharge of
pollutants into waters in the United States. EPA may authorize states
to carry out a state program in lieu of the federal program if the
state program is at least equivalent to the federal program and
provides for adequate enforcement. Under the Clean Water Act's National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program, facilities
discharging pollutants into waters of the United States are required to
obtain an NPDES permit from EPA or authorized states. NPDES permits
include specific limits on the quantity of pollutants that may be
discharged and require monitoring of those discharges to ensure
compliance. EPA's list of the toxic pollutants subject to regulation
under the Clean Water Act includes nitrobenzene, a chemical that is on
DOD's list of 20 constituents of greatest concern.[Footnote 14]
RCRA requires owners and operators of facilities that treat, store, and
dispose of hazardous waste, including federal agencies, to obtain a
permit specifying how their facilities will safely manage the waste.
Under RCRA's corrective action provisions, facilities seeking or
holding RCRA permits can be required to clean up their hazardous waste
contamination. The corrective actions can be specified in the
facility's operating permit, in a separate corrective action permit, or
through an enforcement order. EPA also has authority under RCRA to
order a cleanup of hazardous waste when there is an imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health or the environment. EPA may
authorize states to administer their own programs in lieu of the
federal program, as long as these programs are equivalent to and
consistent with the federal program and provide for adequate
enforcement. EPA's regulations define hazardous wastes to include those
that are specifically listed in the regulations as well as those that
are "characteristic wastes." Characteristic hazardous wastes are
defined as wastes that are ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic. A
federal district court in California recently ruled, in part, that
perchlorate is a hazardous waste under RCRA because it is
ignitable.[Footnote 15]
Under section 107 of the Federal Facility Compliance Act of
1992,[Footnote 16] EPA was required, in consultation with DOD and the
states, to issue a rule identifying when military munitions become
hazardous waste under RCRA, and to provide for protective storage and
transportation of that waste. Under the rule issued by EPA, military
munitions are subject to RCRA when, among other things, (1) unexploded
munitions or their constituents are buried or otherwise disposed of, or
(2) when used or fired munitions are taken off-range.[Footnote 17]
CERCLA governs the cleanup of releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants. CERCLA's definition
of a hazardous substance includes substances regulated under various
other environmental laws, including RCRA, the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act. Under section 120 of
CERCLA, the federal government is subject to and must comply with
CERCLA's requirements to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
DOD's cleanup under CERCLA section 120 is interrelated with its
environmental restoration program under section 211 of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.[Footnote 18]
Contaminants Associated with Military Munitions:
According to DOD, there are more than 200 chemicals associated with
military munitions, and of these, 20 are of great concern due to their
widespread use and potential environmental impact. TNT, Propanetriol
trinitrate (nitroglycerin), Royal Demolition Explosive, and
perchlorate are among the 20. Perchlorate is the primary oxidizer in
propellants, present in varying amounts in explosives, and is highly
soluble. According to EPA, an estimated 90 percent of the perchlorate
produced in the United States is manufactured for use by the military
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Typical
production quantities average several million pounds per year.
Nonmilitary uses for perchlorate include fireworks, flares, fertilizer,
and automobile airbags. As of 2004, EPA reported that 34 states
confirmed perchlorate contamination in ground and surface water, and in
states where EPA determined the source of the contamination, it
attributed a significant portion to defense manufacturing and test
sites.
EPA has not established a federal drinking water standard for
perchlorate. However, in 1999, EPA established a provisional reference
dose for perchlorate in drinking water of between 4 and 18 parts per
billion. A reference dose is an estimate of the daily exposure to a
human that would not pose a significant risk of harmful effects. In
October 2003, the National Academy of Sciences (Academy) began a study
of the best scientific model to use for determining a drinking water
standard or reference dose for perchlorate, if any. According to EPA,
the Academy's study will take about one year to complete. Based on
recommendations from the Academy, EPA will decide whether to regulate
the contaminant and will have up to 2 years after making an affirmative
determination to propose a national primary drinking water regulation
for perchlorate.[Footnote 19] An EPA official told us that updating
drinking water standards can take 2 to 3 years and predicted that a
perchlorate standard will likely not be available until 2006 or 2008.
In the meantime, some states that detected perchlorate in various
media, such as groundwater, have established state guidance or advisory
levels for the contaminant. As of February 2004, seven states have
established interim perchlorate advisory levels. Of those states,
Maryland and Massachusetts have the lowest perchlorate advisory level
of 1 part per billion. On March 12, 2004, California revised its
advisory action level for perchlorate from 4 parts per billion to 6
parts per billion.
DOD's Inventory and Cost Estimates for Operational Range Cleanup May
Not Provide Congress with a Reliable Picture of Potential Liabilities:
DOD's estimate that it would cost between $16 billion and $165 billion
to clean up unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, and
munitions constituents on operational ranges is questionable. To
determine the costs of operational range clean up, DOD had to first
inventory its operational ranges and obtain data such as the type of
range and munitions used. However, the military services used inventory
data that were collected for different purposes over different periods
of time and verified with varying degrees of analytical rigor. Next,
the costs of operational range cleanup were calculated using a mix of
unvalidated assumptions provided by DOD and assumptions provided by the
individual services, as well as actual service data, where available.
Consequently, DOD's overall cost estimates were based on assumptions,
estimates, and actual data that differed across the services and that
raise questions about the reliability of DOD's estimated costs to clean
up operational ranges.
Operational Range Inventory Process Lacked a Common Framework and
Analytical Rigor:
Each service inventoried its operational ranges and collected data on
range acreage and munitions used, using various methodologies over
different periods of time. (See table 1 for the starting and ending
dates of the service's inventories.) Services also conducted
inventories for different reasons, such as to respond to pending
legislation on ranges, public concern about military use of ranges, or
simply to gather data to calculate cleanup cost estimates. The rigor of
the analysis and the degree of the validity of the inventory results
varied by service. The inconsistencies in how DOD collected and
analyzed data on operational ranges raise questions about the
reliability of DOD's inventory.
Table 1: Dates Service Inventories Were Conducted:
Military Service: Air Force;
Inventory started: August 2001;
Inventory ended: December 2002.
Military Service: Army;
Inventory started: July 2000;
Inventory ended: December 2002.
Military Service: Marine Corps;
Inventory started: October 2001;
Inventory ended: November 2002.
Military Service: Navy;
Inventory started: December 1999;
Inventory ended: January 2000.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[End of table]
The Air Force inventory of operational ranges in the United States and
its territories was based on a survey sent to field command levels to
estimate costs to clean up operational ranges. Service officials said
survey data was validated during on-site field inspections or, in some
cases, brief desk reviews to assure surveys were complete and free of
obvious errors. As of December 2002, the Air Force counted 222 active
ranges, 23 inactive ranges, and 23 ranges that were not categorized as
either active or inactive. Together, Air Force operational ranges
covered 6,423,161 acres.
The Army's inventory of operational ranges was conducted concurrently
with an inventory of nonoperational ranges and was based on field
surveys. According to Army officials, the Army initiated an inventory
of its ranges primarily in response to anticipated legislation on the
use of ranges,[Footnote 20] which required a comprehensive inventory of
DOD ranges as well as a collection of descriptive data about each
range, such as the acreage and types of munitions used on the range.
The Army's inventory was also conducted in response to DOD directives
issued in August 1999 that required the services to establish and
maintain an inventory of operational ranges and data on munitions and
ordnance.[Footnote 21] To inventory ranges, the Army used contract
support staff who requested data from field commands and installations,
and then sought to validate the data through on-site visits. Army
officials said the Army's inventory of operational ranges was completed
in December 2002, and encompassed 9,427 active ranges, 377 inactive
ranges, and 4 ranges not designated active or inactive. In total, Army
operational ranges covered 14,991,072 acres in the United States and
its territories.
Similar to the Army, the Marine Corps conducted an inventory of its
operational ranges primarily in response to anticipated legislation on
the use of ranges and DOD directives that required the services to
establish and maintain an inventory of operational ranges and data on
munitions and ordnance. The Marine Corps developed its inventory from
an archive data search and surveys sent to installations. Headquarters'
officials reviewed the surveys to assure that submitted data agreed
with data in the archive search. As of December 2002, the Marine Corps
counted 216 operational ranges totaling 1,980,119 acres in the United
States and its territories. According to headquarters' officials, the
Marine Corps did not distinguish between active and inactive ranges but
designated all ranges as operational.
The Navy's inventory of operational ranges in the United States and its
territories was conducted at the request of the Navy's Environmental
Readiness Division. The Navy's inventory was prepared in response to
the anticipated inventory requirements of DOD's proposed range rule and
because of increased public and regulatory scrutiny of military ranges,
Navy officials said. The inventory was conducted through surveys sent
to the installations. As of December 2002, Navy operational ranges
totaled 121 active ranges and 31 inactive ranges on 1,284,374 acres.
As of April 2003, when DOD reported its estimated cost to clean up
operational ranges, DOD's inventory included 10,444 operational ranges
totaling 24.6 million acres in the United States and its territories.
(See table 2 for a breakout of operational ranges by service and status
and total acres.)
Table 2: Active and Inactive Operational Ranges and Acreage as Reported
by DOD in April 2003:
Air Force;
Operational Ranges: Active: 222;
Operational Ranges: Inactive: 23;
Operational Ranges: Not categorized: 23;
Operational Ranges: Total: 268;
Total acreage (in millions): 6.4.
Army[A];
Operational Ranges: Active: 9,427;
Operational Ranges: Inactive: 377;
Operational Ranges: Not categorized: 4;
Operational Ranges: Total: 9,808;
Total acreage (in millions): 15.0.
Marine Corps;
Operational Ranges: Active: 0;
Operational Ranges: Inactive: 0;
Operational Ranges: Not categorized: 216;
Operational Ranges: Total: 216;
Total acreage (in millions): 1.9.
Navy;
Operational Ranges: Active: 121;
Operational Ranges: Inactive: 31;
Operational Ranges: Not categorized: 0;
Operational Ranges: Total: 152;
Total acreage (in millions): 1.3.
DOD total;
Operational Ranges: Active: 9,770;
Operational Ranges: Inactive: 431;
Operational Ranges: Not categorized: 243;
Operational Ranges: Total: 10,444;
Total acreage (in millions): 24.6.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[A] According to Army officials, the Army's inventory of operational
ranges was finalized in the summer of 2003 and revised to 9,427 active
and 377 inactive ranges totaling about 15 million acres in the United
States and its territories.
[End of table]
DOD continued to inventory its operational ranges. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD to develop a plan
to address training range issues, such as range sustainment and
encroachment and, as part of this plan, to develop a range inventory
system that included all available operational training ranges. In
January 2003, DOD provided the services with an inventory framework and
data definitions to ensure reporting consistency and required the
services to complete detailed inventories of all of their operational
ranges. DOD revised its existing inventory of operational ranges to
meet this new requirement. Because the revised inventory was conducted
for different purposes, using a scope and set of assumptions that were
different from the inventory data used to estimate cleanup costs, it
identified a different number of operational ranges. For example, the
inventory for developing the cost estimates used actual operational
range acreage, whereas the revised inventory used actual and potential
operational range acreage. Further, the revised inventory is divided
into range complexes and individual ranges, and includes operational
ranges outside the United States and its territories not included in
the inventory DOD used to estimate cleanup costs.
In February 2004, DOD released the results of its training range plan
and revised inventory. The revised inventory listed 353 range complexes
and 172 individual ranges on 26 million acres worldwide. These numbers
differ from the inventory data DOD used to estimate cleanup costs,
which counted 10,444 operational ranges on 24.6 million acres in the
United States and its territories primarily because of the aggregation
of individual ranges into complexes and the inclusion of ranges outside
the United States and its territories. For example, under the prior
inventory, Fallon Naval Air Station, in Nevada, reported it had 150,365
acres of rangeland, but under the new inventory, Fallon reported it had
just 103,300 acres of actual and potential rangeland. Also under the
prior inventory, the Marine Corps reported that Camp Lejeune, in North
Carolina, had 95,872 acres of rangeland, while under the new inventory,
Camp Lejeune reported it had 152,000 acres of actual and potential
rangeland (even though the entire installation encompasses just 153,000
acres). The Marine Corps also reported that Camp Pendleton, in
California, had 39,084 acres of rangeland under the old inventory, but
under the new inventory, Camp Pendleton reported it had 114,000 acres
of actual and potential rangeland, almost a threefold increase.
While the 2003 and 2004 inventories are not readily comparable because
of the varying scope and definitions used to develop the revised
inventory, the difference between the two highlights the difficulty in
understanding the basis for, and the results of, DOD's cost estimates.
Finally, we believe the differences in the two inventories may further
complicate efforts of Congress to identify the potential liabilities
that may exist if operational ranges or installations are closed and
require cleanup.
Cost Estimates Were Calculated Using a Mix of Differing Assumptions,
Estimates, and Actual Data:
In 2002, DOD provided guidance to the services on how to estimate costs
for cleaning up operational ranges. This guidance specified the scope
for estimating costs but allowed for variation across the services.
According to DOD officials, because the requirement to estimate cleanup
costs was a one-time congressional requirement, DOD directed the
services to limit their data gathering efforts by using certain costing
assumptions and a computer-costing model in combination with already
existing data. Examples of the scope and some of the assumptions DOD
used to estimate costs include the following:
* The scope of the inventory was limited to operational ranges within
the United States and its territories because DOD believed that was
what Congress intended.
* The scope excluded certain operational ranges, such as water ranges,
because DOD did not have a model for estimating costs associated with
such ranges and did not have any significant historical experience on
which to base an estimate. DOD also did not develop cost estimates for
several types of airspace, such as warning areas and restricted areas.
* DOD directed the services to use both a computer-costing model that
automatically assigned certain values for the cleanup costs of
unexploded ordnance and discarded military munitions and an electronic
worksheet to estimate costs to clean up munitions constituents.
* DOD provided cost assumptions to the services based on operational
range acreage and other variables. For example, the services were
directed to divide range acreage into areas assumed to have a high
density of contamination and a low density of contamination and, on
that basis, calculate individual cleanup costs.
* DOD also provided specific assumptions to calculate costs for various
cleanup activities. For example, to estimate the cost to remove
unexploded ordnance from a highly contaminated range area, the services
were told to assume they would need to remove ordnance from 50 percent
of that area to calculate the high cost estimate and 5 percent of that
area to calculate the low cost estimate.
DOD said its assumptions were based on discussions with the services
and developed through consensus. DOD could not provide any
documentation that the assumptions they asked the services to use were
validated--a confirmation of the reasonableness and justification for
assumptions used--and a senior DOD official told us that, in fact, the
assumptions were not validated.
Furthermore, DOD instructions to the services allowed them to use
additional assumptions or site-specific data so that cost estimates
were calculated based on a mix of actual data and assumptions. Based on
our review of DOD's 2003 report to Congress, and discussions with
service officials on their methodologies to estimate costs, we found
DOD did not fully explain the mix of assumptions and data used and how
this mix affected the cost estimates, so that the usefulness of DOD's
overall cleanup cost estimates to Congress is questionable.
The inconsistencies in how the services developed their cost estimates
are evident in areas such as how the services calculated high-density
acreage (that is, the area of a range containing a high density of
ordnance) and the costs for cleaning up these acres. For example,
although DOD guidance directed the services to estimate what proportion
or percentage of operational range acreage contained a high density of
unexploded ordnance and munitions constituents, and specified how
various types of ranges were to be treated for cost estimating
purposes, each service performed this calculation differently. If site-
specific data was unavailable, the Marine Corps used varying
percentages based on the characteristics of similar ranges to determine
those that were highly contaminated. Our analysis showed that for about
two-thirds of its operational ranges, the Marine Corps assumed 10
percent of its nonsmall arms or multipurpose range acreage was highly
contaminated. However, based on a review of the Marine Corps' total
cleanup cost estimates for operational ranges, GAO determined that the
Marine Corps calculated its costs assuming that an average 53 percent
of range acreage has highly contaminated. In contrast, the Air Force
and the Army used estimated data to determine that 44 percent and 60
percent of their acreage was highly contaminated,
respectively.[Footnote 22] Further, the Air Force did not designate a
percentage of each operational range with a high density of
contamination and a low density of contamination, but rather defined
each operational range as either 100 percent high density or 100
percent low density. The Navy used actual data to determine that 11
percent of its operational range acreage was highly contaminated.
(Figure 4 shows the high and low density acreage by service used to
estimate cleanup costs.)
Figure 4: High and Low Density Operational Range Acreage Used to
Estimate Cleanup Costs, by Service:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Based on the data provided by the services, the model calculated four
totals for each operational range: a low and high estimated cost to
clean up the portion of the range assumed to have a low level of
contamination, and a low and high estimated cost to clean up the
portion of the range assumed to be highly contaminated. Low estimates
for low and high contamination areas were combined to calculate a total
low estimate, and high estimates for low and high contamination areas
were combined to calculate a total high estimate. (See table 3 for low
and high estimates by service.)
Table 3: Low and High Cost Estimates to Clean Up Unexploded Ordnance,
Discarded Military Munitions, and Munitions Constituents:
Billions of dollars;
Air Force;
Low estimate: $1.2;
High estimate: $14.0.
Army;
Low estimate: $14.5;
High estimate: $141.5.
Navy;
Low estimate: $0.2;
High estimate: $2.5.
Marine Corps;
Low estimate: $0.5;
High estimate: $6.7.
DOD[A];
Low estimate: $16.0;
High estimate: $165.0.
Sources: The Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Environmental Restoration
Program report and military service data.
[A] Estimates do not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
In general, using the model and standardized assumptions should have
produced estimates with some variation across the services because of
differing missions, operational practices, and types of munitions used.
However, as reflected in table 4, a tenfold difference in the average
cost to clean up an acre of highly contaminated rangeland calls into
question the mix of different assumptions and data used by the services
to estimate costs. For example, the Air Force's average cost to clean
up an acre with a high density of contamination was $755, whereas the
Army's estimate was $7,577. As a result, the services cost estimates
are not comparable. (Table 4 shows the total and average cost per acre
estimates by service.)
Table 4: High Cost Estimates to Clean Up an Acre with a High Density of
Contamination, by Service:
Service: Air Force;
Acreage: 2,835,579;
High cost estimate (dollars): $$2,140,072,819;
Average high cost per acre (dollars): $755.
Service: Army;
Acreage: 8,691,311;
High cost estimate (dollars): $65,855,410,348;
Average high cost per acre (dollars): $7,577.
Service: Marine Corps;
Acreage: 1,023,623;
High cost estimate (dollars): $3,719,488,388;
Average high cost per acre (dollars): $3,634.
Service: Navy;
Acreage: 134,459;
High cost estimate (dollars): $920,669,000;
Average high cost per acre (dollars): $6,847.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[End of table]
DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy on Contaminants Associated
with Military Munitions and Has Not Specifically Cleaned Up Known
Perchlorate Contamination:
DOD does not have a comprehensive policy requiring sampling or cleanup
of the more than 200 chemical contaminants associated with military
munitions on operational ranges. However, DOD installations have
sampled for and cleaned up munitions-based constituents when directed
by state regulatory authorities. With regard to perchlorate, DOD has
issued sampling policies but does not provide specific funding for such
sampling. Nevertheless, we found some installations have sampled and
monitored for perchlorate to meet the requirements of environmental
laws and regulations, such as RCRA and the Unregulated Contaminant
Monitoring Regulation. During visits to six installations that reported
high levels of perchlorate, we found that none were cleaning up
perchlorate contamination. At six of the seven installations we
visited, perchlorate contamination was largely the result of
researching, manufacturing, testing, and disposing of munitions, and
not the use of munitions during training.
Previous DOD Policy Did Not Require Cleanup or Sampling for
Contaminants Associated with Military Munitions:
According to EPA, of the more than 200 chemicals associated with
military munitions, which include 20 that DOD considers to be of
greatest concern due to their widespread use and potential
environmental impact, none are specifically regulated under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. Further, except in some specific instances, EPA
does not generally use its authority under other environmental laws,
such as RCRA and CERCLA, to require DOD to conduct cleanups on
operational ranges.[Footnote 23] An EPA official told us that although
EPA is concerned with constituents associated with military munitions
such as perchlorate and Royal Demolition Explosive, and the migration
of plumes (pollutants that drain or flow through soil and water) from
military ranges to groundwater, the agency generally does not interfere
with DOD's operation of its operational ranges. Recently, DOD proposed
that Congress specifically exempt it from requirements to clean up
unexploded ordnance, munitions, and munitions constituents that remain
on operational ranges under RCRA and CERCLA.
DOD policy does not generally require the services to clean up or
sample for munitions contaminants because, according to DOD officials,
these contaminants are deposited on operational ranges in the course of
the normal and intended use of these munitions. Yet, DOD may be
required by EPA or states to sample and clean up its munitions
contaminants under various environmental laws and regulations on
operational ranges. For example, under the Clean Water Act, facilities
that discharge pollutants into surface water are required to obtain a
NPDES permit from EPA or an authorized state agency. Several states
have required some DOD installations to monitor for various
contaminants associated with military munitions as part of the NPDES
permit process. For example, the Regional Water Quality Control Board
in San Diego and the Hampton Roads Sanitation District in Hampton
Roads, Virginia, required Navy facilities to monitor their water
discharges for various constituents that are on EPA's list of toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act.[Footnote 24] Under the
Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulation, EPA required some
installations to sample for and report on 12 unregulated contaminants
in drinking water during any 12-month period between 2001 and 2003. The
list of contaminants included four munitions-related contaminants--
perchlorate, 2,4 and 2,6 dinitrotoluene, and nitrobenzene. In April
2004, DOD reported that 36 installations had sampled for the presence
of unregulated contaminants in drinking water, including perchlorate,
under this regulation. Of these, 33 installations reported no
perchlorate was detected or detection results were below the reporting
limit of 4 parts per billion. Only three Air Force installations
detected perchlorate above the reporting limit, ranging from just over
4 parts per billion to 46 parts per billion.
Revised DOD Policy Directs Sampling for Perchlorate under Certain
Conditions but Little Sampling Has Been Done:
In November 2002, DOD issued its first policy on perchlorate assessment
that stated the services may sample and assess for perchlorate if there
was a reasonable basis to suspect both a potential presence of
perchlorate and a likely pathway that could lead to human exposure. The
policy stated that the services could fund assessments using the
operations and maintenance environmental compliance account, but
specified that sampling should be considered a lower priority (Class
II) environmental project and, as we:
found in a prior effort, was unlikely to be funded.[Footnote 25]
Finally, the policy directed those installations that sampled for and
found perchlorate to report to DOD on the location and amount of
perchlorate found. On September 29, 2003, DOD issued a revised policy
on perchlorate sampling that directed the services to (1) consolidate
data on perchlorate detections, including data developed in response to
environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water
Act, and (2) sample any previously unexamined sites, including ranges,
where a perchlorate release is suspected because of prior DOD
activities and where human exposure is likely. The policy stated that
the services should fund sampling using the same environmental
compliance account specified in the previous policy, but elevated
sampling to a higher (Class I) funding priority and thus made it more
likely to be funded. However, when DOD issued its policy, funding had
already been allocated to Class I requirements for fiscal year 2004. In
future years, unless specific or additional funding is added,
perchlorate sampling will have to compete with other high priority
environmental requirements and may not be funded.
In implementing the revised policy, the services added a third
criterion requiring that installations coordinate with, or obtain
written approval from, headquarters and the chain of command before
sampling for perchlorate. However, if sampling is specifically required
by an environmental law or state agency, the service policies do not
require installations to request approval or notify headquarters before
sampling. During visits we made to selected installations with reported
perchlorate contamination between October 2003 and January 2004, we
found installations were not sampling under the revised policy to
determine the presence of perchlorate on operational ranges. More
broadly, as of February 2004, Marine Corps and Navy officials said that
no installations had requested permission to sample under this policy.
According to the Air Force, three installations asked for permission to
sample for perchlorate because EPA had asked that they sample. Air
Force headquarters approved two of the requests but denied the third
because, according to Air Force headquarters, there was not a reason to
suspect the presence of perchlorate. Four Army installations have asked
for approval to sample for perchlorate, and Army headquarters approved
all four as of March 2004, an Army headquarters official said. Overall,
this suggests that little sampling is being done under DOD's revised
perchlorate policy.
Although none of the installations had begun sampling under DOD's
revised policy, during our visits we found a few installations had
sampled and monitored for perchlorate to meet the requirements of
certain environmental laws and regulations. Table 5 summarizes the
perchlorate sampling that has been conducted at installations we
visited as reported by DOD as of April 2004.
Table 5: Summary of Perchlorate Sampling Conducted at Installations
Visited by GAO:
Installation: Edwards Air Force Base;
Number of samples collected: 413;
Number of positive detections: 309;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): Up to
2,100,000 in soil and up to 30,700 in groundwater;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Propulsion research and rocket
test stand; maintenance; landfill.
Installation: Holloman Air Force Base;
Number of samples collected: 2;
Number of positive detections: 1;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): 7,600;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Research, development, testing
and evaluation.
Installation: Aberdeen Proving Ground;
Number of samples collected: 1,193;
Number of positive detections: 540;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): Less than 1
and up to 12,000;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Training with pyrotechnics and
smoke; use of propellants, ordnance, smoke and chemical agents.
Installation: Redstone Arsenal;
Number of samples collected: Not reported;
Number of positive detections: Not reported;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): Up to 37,000;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Rocket testing.
Installation: White Sands Missile Range[A];
Number of samples collected: Not reported;
Number of positive detections: Not reported;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): Not reported;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Not reported.
Installation: Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake;
Number of samples collected: 12;
Number of positive detections: 12;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): Up to 720;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Research, development and testing; disposal; possible natural occurrence.
Installation: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head;
Number of samples collected: 708;
Number of positive detections: 278;
Range of concentrations detected (in parts per billion): Up to 480,000;
Source of perchlorate contamination: Disposal, open burning, unknown
source.
Source: DOD perchlorate sampling data as of April 2004.
[A] Although it was not reported by DOD as of April 2004, we found
during our visit to White Sands Missile Range that officials sampled
for perchlorate as part of an RCRA application.
[End of table]
During our visits, we found the following installations had sampled for
and monitored perchlorate to meet the requirements of RCRA or the Safe
Drinking Water Act:
* In 1999, as part of an application under RCRA to close an open
burning and detonation facility used to destroy excess and obsolete
ammunition, the state of New Mexico required White Sands Missile Range,
in New Mexico, to sample for contaminants, including perchlorate. The
former open burning and detonation facility is located on an
operational range. Groundwater sampling detected high levels of
perchlorate--up to 25,000 parts per billion.[Footnote 26] The Army
installed 56 monitoring wells on the range to map the plume. Each well
is sampled quarterly. After four years of quarterly sampling and
monitoring, Army officials said the plume is stable and contained,
which means it is isolated underground and not expected to move.
Further, officials said there is no indication that perchlorate has
migrated outside the identified plume. Under its RCRA closure permit
with the state of New Mexico, the Army must continue monitoring the
groundwater for up to 20 years.
* Three of the seven installations we visited tested for perchlorate
under the Safe Drinking Water Act's Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring
Regulation program. Edwards Air Force Base, in California, sampled
twice in 2002 and reported that none of the 12 chemicals listed on the
EPA list of unregulated contaminants, including perchlorate, were
detected in any of the groundwater samples collected from drinking
water wells. (Under the regulation, EPA required surface water systems
to be sampled quarterly and groundwater systems to be sampled
semiannually for one consecutive 12-month period.) Redstone Arsenal, in
Alabama, sampled quarterly for a 12-month period beginning June 2001.
Two water intake sites were sampled (a drinking water source and a
drinking water and industrial water source), both along the Tennessee
River. Redstone Arsenal reported that perchlorate was not detected
above the EPA sampling level of 4 parts per billion. Nearby Huntsville,
Alabama, also sampled for perchlorate and detected no contamination, a
Redstone Arsenal official said. Finally, although the requirements of
the Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulation did not apply to the
Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, in California, because its water
supply system was too small, installation officials volunteered to
sample for perchlorate and other unregulated contaminants. Accordingly,
in October 2003, officials at China Lake sampled 10 drinking water
wells for perchlorate and other contaminants, but perchlorate was not
detected.
DOD Has Not Directed the Services to Clean Up Known Perchlorate
Contamination:
According to information provided by DOD and officials at the
installations we visited, the services were generally not cleaning up
known perchlorate contamination. DOD officials explained that
perchlorate is not a regulated contaminant and, therefore, there is no
requirement to clean up perchlorate contamination.[Footnote 27]
(Current DOD policy is that DOD will clean up perchlorate if there is
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public.) The exceptions we
found were two installations that had cleaned up perchlorate under
demonstration projects designed to demonstrate perchlorate cleanup
technologies. At the installations we visited, perchlorate
contamination was generally the result of research, manufacturing,
testing, and disposal of munitions (such as rocket motors) that
contained high levels of perchlorate. In one case, the perchlorate
resulted from training with smoke munitions containing perchlorate.
Although six of the seven sites we visited reported high levels of
perchlorate contamination, none of these installations were conducting
cleanup actions specifically directed at perchlorate. However, at two
installations we visited--Edwards Air Force Base and the Naval Surface
Warfare Center, Indian Head--officials said they conducted
demonstration projects to develop perchlorate treatment and cleanup
technologies in anticipation of future cleanup requirements. (See app.
III for details on these demonstration projects.)
At six of the seven installations we visited that had operational
ranges and detectable levels of perchlorate, we found the perchlorate
contamination was generally not due to training on operational ranges.
Rather, we found that prior and ongoing research, manufacturing,
testing, and disposal of rocket motors were primarily responsible for
perchlorate contamination. (See app. IV for details of perchlorate
contamination caused by such factors.) Only Aberdeen Proving Ground, in
Maryland, reported that some perchlorate contamination was due to the
use of perchlorate during training exercises on operational ranges.
Further, Aberdeen was the only installation we visited where
perchlorate had contaminated a neighboring municipal water supply. At
Aberdeen, perchlorate concentrations of up to 5 parts per billion have
been detected in drinking water supply wells and 24 parts per billion
have been detected in groundwater.
Between June and August 2002, Aberdeen Proving Ground sampled drinking
water wells owned by the city of Aberdeen located in and along the
northern border between the city and the installation, and detected
perchlorate contamination in four wells ranging from 1.2 to 5 parts per
billion. According to Aberdeen officials, the installation sampled for
perchlorate because it was required to do so by the state of Maryland.
Groundwater samples taken near the well field showed a large
perchlorate plume with contamination levels up to 24 parts per billion.
Aberdeen Proving Ground officials attributed the perchlorate
contamination to intensive testing and training with smoke grenades and
other obscurants. Until about mid-2002, during training exercises in
the vicinity of the city of Aberdeen drinking water wells, Aberdeen
Proving Ground trained troops using smoke grenades that contained
perchlorate. After perchlorate was found in city drinking water,
Aberdeen Proving Ground stopped all training with smoke grenades
containing perchlorate. However, officials at Aberdeen Proving Ground
are not cleaning up the perchlorate detected in city wells. Instead,
both the city of Aberdeen and the installation sample finished water
and production wells on an alternating monthly schedule: Finished water
is sampled weekly, four production wells are sampled twice a month, and
the remaining eight production wells are sampled monthly. Recent
sampling has detected contamination below the EPA interim assessment
guidance of 4 parts per billion, but in some cases, well samples have
been above the Maryland Department of the Environment public health
advisory for perchlorate, which is 1 part per billion for drinking
water. In the event a sample is found to be above the Maryland state
advisory limit, the city of Aberdeen blends well water without
perchlorate with well water containing perchlorate to lower the
concentration level to below 1 part per billion. The Army stated that
it would not clean up the perchlorate contamination at Aberdeen until
an EPA maximum contaminant level for perchlorate in drinking water is
established.
Conclusions:
Because of DOD's approach to how it inventoried its operational ranges
for munitions and how it estimated the costs to clean up those ranges,
both the inventory and the cost estimates are questionable. Further,
DOD did not fully disclose to Congress the basis and limitations of its
estimates, including identifying estimates based on direct observations
and those based on assumptions, and the affect of assumptions on DOD's
cost estimates. Instead, DOD provided only general information to
Congress on the assumptions and cost model used without specific
details on how costs were developed or the effect of assumptions used
on the resulting cost estimates. Consequently, we believe it is
difficult for Congress to evaluate the cost estimates DOD provided and
that it may be unwise to rely on them for assessing the potential
liability associated with contamination on operational ranges. Reliable
cost estimates can be a critical piece of information for DOD and
Congress when considering the potential costs versus benefits of
closing operational ranges or entire installations. However, such
estimates must be based on accurate data that, in terms of ranges,
begins with a complete and accurate operational range inventory.
DOD installations have conducted little or no sampling for perchlorate
under DOD's perchlorate policy, and DOD has not provided specific
funding to the services to conduct the sampling that is required by its
policy. Available information indicates that testing for perchlorate on
installations has been limited and is specifically needed at facilities
that are or were involved in research, manufacturing, testing, and
disposal of munitions. DOD's decision not to provide specific funding
to the services for sampling hampers the ability of DOD, as well as EPA
and the states, to collect better data on the extent and nature of
possible perchlorate contamination on military installations. Such
information could be important to regulators when determining if there
is a potential public health risk from perchlorate and deciding what,
if any, actions might be warranted. Further, the lack of such
information impedes DOD and congressional efforts for planning and
budgeting future cleanup that may be required if federal or state
standards regulating perchlorate are adopted.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to the assist Congress, EPA, and state regulators in assessing
and planning for the cleanup of contamination associated with military
munitions at operational ranges, we are making the following two
recommendations:
* To improve congressional oversight of DOD and its operational ranges,
including providing Congress with more realistic estimates of the
potential liability associated with cleaning up contamination related
to the use of military munitions, we recommend that DOD, using a more
consistent estimating methodology, use its most complete operational
range inventory to revise its cost estimates for the cleanup of
operational ranges. The revised estimates should include an explanation
of the basis and scope on which the inventory was conducted, and how
the cost estimates were calculated. The estimates should be accompanied
by a detailed description of how costs were developed, such as where
estimates and assumptions were used, the basis of and rationale for any
assumptions used, and an explanation as to how such assumptions
affected cost figures.
* To develop information needed by Congress, EPA, and the states, such
as the location and amount of perchlorate contamination, when deciding
what, if any, actions are warranted to address such contamination, we
recommend that DOD, acting under its revised perchlorate sampling
policy, provide specific funding for comprehensive sampling at sites
where no prior sampling has been conducted, yet perchlorate
contamination is likely and human exposure is possible based on the
sites' prior or current use. To help identify possible sites of
perchlorate contamination, we recommend DOD consolidate and review
sampling data previously collected by installations under environmental
laws governing the release or disposal of various hazardous substances.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its May 6, 2004, letter, DOD disagreed with our findings and
recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments and
clarifications that we incorporated in the report, as appropriate.
DOD disagreed with our conclusion that it did not have a comprehensive
policy requiring sampling or cleanup of munitions constituents on
operational ranges, and that it generally has not taken actions to
clean up contaminants. In its letter, DOD cited specific policies in
place requiring the services to address the release of munitions
constituents. However, the guidance DOD cited pertains only to the
migration of munitions constituents off-range and the reporting of
environmental liabilities, but does not address the sampling or cleanup
of munitions constituents found on operational ranges that are the
subject of this report. Further, DOD's letter states that it is
responding to munitions constituents at 23 installations and ranges. We
acknowledge that DOD is sampling for, and in some cases, cleaning up
munitions constituents when directed to do so by EPA or a state
environmental agency under various environmental laws. In reviewing the
data provided by DOD, however, we found that only 2 of the
installations they cited had operational ranges and both of those were
being cleaned up because of EPA direction or a court order. At the 12
other installations with active ranges, half of them had sampled or
were sampling for munitions constituents as a result of EPA or state
environmental agency requests, RCRA requirements, or cleanup associated
with Superfund hazardous waste sites. None of these installations,
however, were cleaning up the munitions constituents found as a result
of sampling.
DOD disagreed with our assessment that its inventory data and cost
estimates were questionable and said it was not necessary to revise its
cost estimates because inventory data used to develop the estimates
were "accurate within reason." In its comments, DOD stated that it was
not required to use validated costing assumptions, or a consistent
estimating methodology, because the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act provided that the standard for the report of
liabilities did not apply to DOD's cost estimates. Although the act
allowed DOD to develop cost estimates that did not meet the same
standards as required for the report of liabilities in DOD's annual
financial statement, we believe that DOD had a responsibility to
provide Congress with useful information by making a reasonable attempt
to prepare accurate and complete estimates, including assuring that its
assumptions were valid. However, as our report sets out, the
inconsistencies in how DOD collected and analyzed data on operational
ranges raise questions about the reliability of DOD's inventory.
Specifically, DOD did not provide Congress with a detailed description
of how the costs were prepared and an explanation of where site-
specific data were used in place of assumptions, why specific and
different assumptions were used by the services, and how assumptions
affected the overall cost estimates. Without DOD's supporting data and
analysis, it is difficult for Congress to evaluate the accuracy or
validity of the cost estimates DOD provided and it may be unwise to
rely on them for assessing the potential liability associated with
contamination on operational ranges.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that it needed to develop new
cost estimates for cleaning up operational ranges, stating that it is
developing a system for providing auditable data that meets the
standards for the report of liabilities and is actively assessing its
ranges for potential munitions constituent migration to off-range
areas. However, the requirement in the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2002 was to report estimated costs to clean up
operational ranges, not the costs to respond to or clean up constituent
migration off-range. In its letter to GAO, DOD also questioned whether
decision makers would find useful an estimated cost to clean up
operational ranges and asserted that it is not required to develop
cleanup estimates for operational ranges until such costs become
probable and estimable by accounting standards. We disagree with DOD's
view of the information and its usefulness to Congress. Congress on two
occasions asked DOD to provide just such information. Specifically, the
2002 Defense Authorization Act required that DOD report this
information. In addition, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in
its report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2000 (S. Rep. No. 106-50), directed DOD to provide to the
congressional defense committees a report with a complete estimate of
current and projected costs to clean up munitions constituents. In our
opinion, the authorization act's requirement and the committee's
direction provide ample evidence that congressional decision makers
would find such information useful.
DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that DOD provide specific
funding for sampling for perchlorate. As our report points out, DOD's
current policy on perchlorate sampling designates funding for sampling
as a Class I high priority environmental project. This means that
perchlorate sampling is a priority for funding, along with all other
high priority environmental projects. As a result, perchlorate sampling
must compete with other high priority environmental priorities for
funding and, due to limited funds, may not be funded. The result is
that while DOD policy has designated a funding mechanism for
perchlorate, DOD's policy cannot assure that perchlorate sampling will
be funded. Simply stated, if DOD wants to assure that installations
conduct perchlorate sampling where appropriate, then it will need to
provide specific funding for this sampling.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense,
and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-
3841, or Edward Zadjura at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Anu K. Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Safety, Environmental, and Human Health Risks:
Military munitions can pose risks to public safety, human health, and
the environment. Unexploded ordnance poses a risk of physical injury to
those who encounter it. Military munitions may also pose a health and
environmental risk especially on ranges located in ecologically
sensitive wetlands and floodplains because their use and disposal may
release constituents that may contaminate soil, groundwater, and
surface water. More than 200 chemical munitions constituents are
associated with ordnance and its use. When exposed to some of these
constituents, humans potentially face long-term health problems, such
as cancer and damage to the heart, liver, and kidneys.
Munitions Constituents of Greatest Concern:
Of the more than 200 chemical munitions constituents associated with
ordnance and its use, DOD considers 20 to be of greatest concern
because of their widespread use and potential environmental impact. The
20 munitions constituents, taken from DOD's Fiscal Year 2002 Defense
Environmental Restoration Program Annual Report to Congress, are:
* Trinitrotoluene (TNT),
* 1,3-Dintrobenzene,
* Nitrobenzene,
* 2,4-Dinitrotoluene,
* 2-Amino-4,6-Dinitrotoluene,
* 2-Nitrotoluene,
* 2,6-Dinitrotoluene,
* 4-Amino-2,6-Dinitrotoluene,
* 3-Nitrotoluene,
* Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine (HMX),
* 2,4-Diamino-6-nitrotoluene,
* 4-Nitrotoluene,
* Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX),
* 2,6-Diamino-4-nitrotoluene,
* Methylnitrite,
* Perchlorate,
* 1,2,3-Propanetriol trinitrate (Nitroglycerine),
* Pentaerythritoltetranitrate (PETN),
* 1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene, and:
* N,2,4,6-Tetranitro-N-methylaniline (Tetryl) (White Phosphorus).
While many of these compounds have been an environmental concern to DOD
for more than 20 years, the current understanding of the causes,
distribution, and potential effect of constituent releases into the
environment remains limited. The nature of the potential effect, and
whether it poses an unacceptable risk to human health and the
environment, depends upon the dose, duration, and pathway of exposure,
as well as the sensitivity of the exposed populations. The link between
constituents and their potential health effects is not always clear and
continues to be studied. Table 6 describes some of the potential health
effects of five of the munitions constituents of greatest concern.
Table 6: Potential Effects of the Munitions Constituents Closely
Associated with Military Munitions:
Contaminant: Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
Potential toxicity/effects: Possible human carcinogen. Targets liver,
skin, irritations, cataracts.
Contaminant: Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX);
Potential toxicity/ effects: Possible human carcinogen, prostate
problems, nervous system problems, nausea, and vomiting. Laboratory
exposure to animals indicates potential organ damage.
Contaminant: High Melting Explosive (HMX);
Potential toxicity/effects: Animal studies suggest potential liver and
central nervous system damage.
Contaminant: Perchlorate;
Potential toxicity/effects: Exposure causes itching, tearing, and pain;
ingestion may cause gastroenteritis with abdominal pain, nausea,
vomiting, and diarrhea;
systemic effects may follow and may include ringing of ears,
dizziness, elevated blood pressure, blurred vision, and tremors.
Chronic effects may include metabolic disorders of the thyroid.
Contaminant: White Phosphorus;
Potential toxicity/effects: Reproductive effects. Skin burns,
irritation of throat and lungs, vomiting, stomach cramps, drowsiness.
Liver, heart, or kidney damage. Death.
Source: Environmental Protection Agency.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
You asked us to determine (1) how DOD identified the location and last
active use of all operational ranges and the basis for DOD's cost
estimates for cleaning up those ranges; and (2) DOD's policy on
sampling for contaminants linked to the use of ordnance on operational
ranges and, where munitions-related contaminants have been detected,
what corrective actions the services have taken. Specifically, you
asked us to focus on DOD's actions with regard to perchlorate.
To determine how DOD identified the location and last active use of all
operational ranges, we reviewed the services' inventory data and
interviewed service headquarters officials to determine how the
inventories were conducted and the reliability of the data collected.
We assessed the reliability of the services' data (1) by reviewing
existing information about the data and the processes that produced
them and (2) by interviewing DOD officials knowledgeable about the
data. We determined that data on the number of operational ranges and
acreage were sufficiently reliable to include in our report; however,
we determined that data on range characteristics were unreliable.
Although we found the data on range characteristics to be unreliable,
we present the data for informational purposes. To determine the basis
for DOD's cost estimates for cleaning up operational ranges, we
reviewed the services' estimated costs, supporting analyses, and
calculations, and interviewed service and DOD officials on the scope
and methodology used to develop cost estimates.
To identify DOD's policy on sampling for constituents linked to the use
of ordnance on operational ranges, we reviewed DOD's and the service's
policies related to the sampling and cleanup of potential contaminants
and specifically their policies on perchlorate. We also interviewed
officials at both headquarters and several installations on the
implementation of DOD and service policies. To report on what actions
the services have taken with regard to munitions constituents and
perchlorate, we visited seven DOD installations where perchlorate had
been detected and discussed what efforts have taken place, or were
planned, to respond generally to munitions-related contaminants and
specifically for perchlorate. We selected installations based on
available data but were unable to determine the total number of
installations reporting perchlorate contamination. We selected
installations where generally high levels of perchlorate had been
detected or, in one case, where perchlorate had contaminated a local
municipal water supply. We also based our selection on the desire to
include at least two installations from each military department and
installations from different states or geographic locations in order to
provide a mix of services and state agencies. (See table 7 for a
listing of the installations we visited.)
During our visits, where possible, we observed the areas of
contamination as well as any cleanup demonstration projects under way.
To identify what levels of contamination had been detected at DOD
installations, we first obtained various summary schedules and lists of
active and closed DOD and non-DOD sites with suspected or detected
perchlorate contamination from both EPA and DOD. Because DOD has only
recently begun to collect data on perchlorate, none of the listings we
obtained included all installations. Further, most lists did not
generally contain current data and were incomplete. Additionally, much
of the data was redundant, with the same installations appearing on
more than one list. Prior to selecting an installation to visit,
therefore, we contacted service officials to verify that perchlorate
contamination had, in fact, been detected. Our observations about
perchlorate contamination and response actions at these installations
are not generalizable to all military installations.
Table 7: Installations Visited during Our Review:
Installation: Edwards Air Force Base;
Military department: Air Force;
State: California;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: Up to
160,000 parts per billion in groundwater (detected in 1997).
Installation: Holloman Air Force Base;
Military department: Air Force;
State: New Mexico;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: About
16,000 parts per billion in surface water (detected in 1999).
Installation: Aberdeen Proving Ground;
Military department: Army;
State: Maryland;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: 5
parts per billion in drinking water and 24 parts per billion in
groundwater (reported in 1998).
Installation: Redstone Arsenal;
Military department: Army;
State: Alabama;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: About
19,000 parts per billion in groundwater (as of 2000).
Installation: White Sands Missile Range;
Military department: Army;
State: New Mexico;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: 21,000
parts per billion in groundwater (reported in 1998).
Installation: Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake;
Military department: Navy;
State: California;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: 560
parts per billion in groundwater (detected in 2001).
Installation: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head;
Military department: Navy;
State: Maryland;
Perchlorate contamination levels initially detected or reported: More
than 1,000 parts per billion in surface water (reported in 1998).
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Installations That Were Cleaning Up Perchlorate as a
Result of Demonstration Projects:
Although we found no installations were cleaning up perchlorate, two
installations we visited were conducting or had conducted demonstration
projects of new technologies to clean up perchlorate, in anticipation
of future cleanup requirements.
Edwards Air Force Base:
In May 2003, Edwards Air Force Base, in California, began a
demonstration project to remove perchlorate from groundwater. Edwards
officials said the installation funded the project because the Air
Force is DOD's lead agency for perchlorate-related efforts and expected
to help develop perchlorate treatment technologies. Edwards first
detected perchlorate on the installation in 1997, while testing for
other contaminants, and has detected perchlorate at 10 sites on the
installation. Perchlorate contamination of 160,000 parts per billion
was detected at one site where the source of the contamination is
attributed to the use of perchlorate by various research facilities
beginning about 1945. On this site the Air Force constructed a well
field and project treatment facility. The demonstration project uses
resin beads, which act like a magnet to pull perchlorate out of the
water. Four wells extract groundwater that is discharged into a storage
tank and then pumped through treatment equipment containing the resin.
Treated groundwater is returned to the aquifer through five injection
wells. Plans are to operate the project through July 2005. Currently,
Edwards officials report that perchlorate continues to be removed to
nondetectable levels, or less than 1 part per billion.
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head:
In 2002, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, in Maryland,
funded a field demonstration project using naturally occurring
microorganisms, or bacteria, that break down or consume perchlorate.
Navy officials first became concerned about perchlorate in 1998 when
they learned of widespread perchlorate contamination at DOD sites in
California. At that time, the installation regularly drained
perchlorate-contaminated water into ditches and two bordering rivers.
In 2001, Navy officials sampled and detected a shallow and well-defined
plume of perchlorate contamination located in an area where the Navy
once cleaned small rocket motors using a high-pressure wash.
Perchlorate levels detected in the area ranged from 8,000 to 430,000
parts per billion. On this site in early 2002, the Navy installed two
extraction wells, two injection wells, and nine groundwater monitoring
wells. Groundwater was removed from the site, mixed with a lactate and
a carbonate/bicarbonate liquid mixture, and then reinjected into the
aquifer. After 20 weeks, perchlorate levels were reduced by more than
95 percent in eight of the nine monitoring wells. According to Navy
officials, the mixture acted as an oxidizer to stimulate microorganisms
that consumed the perchlorate. Officials said they plan to reuse the
equipment to field test the technology at another site in an attempt to
clean soil contaminated with perchlorate.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Installations That Identified Perchlorate as a Result of
Munitions Research, Manufacturing, Testing, and Disposal Activities:
We visited installations that had operational ranges and detectable
levels of perchlorate but found the perchlorate contamination was
generally not due to training, but rather due to prior and ongoing
research, testing, manufacturing, and disposal of rocket motors and
propellant waste on operational ranges and other parts of the
installations.
Edwards Air Force Base:
Perchlorate contamination was detected at 10 sites on Edwards Air Force
Base beginning in 1997. Officials attributed all detected perchlorate
contamination to rocket propellant manufacturing, research,
development, and testing, and not to the use of munitions during
training. The maximum perchlorate contamination level detected was
160,000 parts per billion in groundwater at one site. Officials said no
live bombs had been exploded on Edwards Air Force Base ranges since
1952, and some ranges where bombs were exploded have been closed.
Perchlorate is not used as part of current range activities, and
Edwards Air Force Base does not test for contaminants on operational
ranges, installation officials said.
Holloman Air Force Base:
In March 1999, after a rainstorm, the U.S. Geological Survey sampled
for perchlorate in a normally dry riverbed at Holloman Air Force Base,
in New Mexico, and detected contamination of 16,000 parts per billion.
During periods of rain, the river flows from the installation to the
neighboring White Sands National Monument. The contamination was found
on the installation near a former munitions operations site and rocket
sled. Air Force officials said it was unlikely that the contamination
was due to training. They attributed the perchlorate contamination to
munitions research and testing in the 1960s and 1970s. Officials at
White Sands National Monument attributed the perchlorate contamination
to spent rocket motors stacked near the river and a high-speed rocket
sled used to test the effects of acceleration. DOD and New Mexico's
state environmental agency sampled the riverbed and surrounding area
again in 1999 and 2000 but did not find the high concentration of
perchlorate previously detected. Air Force officials said they believed
the 16,000 parts per billion detected in 1999 was an anomaly.
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head:
At the time of our visit, officials at the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Indian Head, in Maryland, reported they detected perchlorate
contamination at five sites on the installation, of which three were
landfills, one was a metal parts disposal site, and one was a metal
parts degreasing tank site. Indian Head detected maximum perchlorate
concentrations between 88 and 450,000 parts per billion in the soil at
two of the three landfills. At the third landfill, a perchlorate
concentration of 2,000 parts per billion was detected in the
groundwater. However, none of the contamination detected was attributed
to the use of perchlorate during training exercises on operational
ranges.
Redstone Arsenal:
As of March 2004, Redstone Arsenal, in Alabama, detected perchlorate
contamination in the groundwater at 2 sites and in surface water and
soil at 11 other sites. Redstone Arsenal officials attributed
contamination to various past production, maintenance, and disposal
activities at a number of sites, including at open burning areas used
to incinerate waste rocket motor propellant, burning trenches used to
incinerate solid material contaminated with rocket propellant, a rocket
engine plant, motor degreasing and trimming areas, and a propellant
waste storage area. Perchlorate contamination of about 20 parts per
billion was also detected in ground and surface water outside the
installation. The highest concentration levels detected in groundwater
on Redstone installations have ranged from 106,000 to 160,000 parts per
billion and the highest concentration levels detected in surface water
have ranged from 377 to 1,700 parts per billion. Although Redstone
Arsenal has conducted training on the installation, none of the
contamination detected has been attributed to the use of perchlorate
during training exercises.
White Sands Missile Range:
White Sands Missile Range, in New Mexico, detected perchlorate
contamination at two sites beginning in 1999. At one site, sampling
detected perchlorate concentrations up to 25,000 parts per billion.
Officials said they were unsure of the precise cause of the
contamination but said they initially believed it was due to an open
burning and detonation facility used in the 1950s to incinerate rocket
motors. However, officials also said that the contamination plume was
uphill from where the open burning and detonation site is believed to
have been, so that the contamination may be generally due to previous
testing of hazardous materials in the area. Perchlorate was also found
at the former site of a high-energy laser system test facility.
Perchlorate contamination detected has been as high as 118 and 295
parts per billion in some wells. Officials said the contamination might
be due to open ground burning of expended test items, or residue from
actual tests, conducted prior to 1995. Officials said they planned to
conduct more sampling to precisely identify the source of the
perchlorate but did not attribute any of the perchlorate detected to
training exercises on operational ranges.
Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake:
At the time of our visit in October 2003, the Naval Air Weapons
Station, China Lake, in California, had detected perchlorate at five
sites on the installation. Perchlorate contamination was predominantly
found in drainage and waste disposal areas, most likely the result of
research on propellants and explosives, and residue from the
manufacture of propellants. Installation officials said that since the
1960s, thousands of pounds of perchlorate-based propellant have been
stored and tested on China Lake. In July 2003, installation officials
sampled and detected perchlorate concentrations of 778 and 921 parts
per billion at two wells and at a drainage site. However, none of the
contamination detected is attributed to the use of munitions during
training exercises on operational ranges.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
MAY - 6 2004:
Ms. Anu Mittal:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Mittal:
This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO
report, "DOD OPERATIONAL RANGES: More Reliable Cost Estimates and a
Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed," May 2004
(GAO-04-601).
The Department nonconcurs with GAO recommendations that the Department
(1) revise its cost estimates for the cleanup of operational ranges and
(2) provide specific funding for sampling at sites where perchlorate
contamination is likely. Enclosed are specific comments on each of
these recommendations.
The Department also nonconcurs with the GAO findings that (1) the
reliability of DoD's inventory is questionable, (2) DoD's cost
estimates are questionable, (3) DoD does not have a comprehensive
policy requiring sampling, (4) neither DoD nor the Services provide
specific funding to installations to sample for or cleanup contaminants
linked to munitions use, and (5) no corrective actions have been taken
by DoD specifically directed at cleaning up contaminants, such as
perchlorate. Enclosed are specific comments on each of these findings.
Although some of GAO's points merit discussion, the Report presents an
invalid characterization of the Department's environmental efforts at
operational ranges. The Department believes that government decision
makers deserve a more accurate and objective analysis of the
Department's Sustainable Range policies and actions.
The Report incorrectly asserts that DoD does not have a comprehensive
policy requiring sampling or cleanup of munitions constituents. A
careful examination of the Department's policies and actions
demonstrate that it has comprehensive policies in place to address
munitions constituents associated with operational ranges. The Report
mentions none of the key policies. For example:
* Since 1999, DoDI 4715.11 has required the Services to conduct an
appropriate response using existing statutory authorities (e.g., DERP,
CERCLA) to any release of munitions constituents that are migrating
from an operational range to off-range
areas. An update to be published soon will further require assessments
of the hydrology and hydrogeology of operational ranges and how the
ranges are being or have been used.
* The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years 2004-2009
established a requirement for the Services to "... assess potential
hazards from off-range migration of munitions constituents and begin
remediation by FY2008." The Services have begun implementing programs
to conduct operational range assessments, and are expecting to begin
any necessary responses by the FY08 date.
DoD Directive 3200.15 "Sustainment of Ranges and Operating Areas
(OPAREAs)" requires reporting of environmental liabilities for
operational ranges where the Department of Defense is obligated to
conduct environmental remediation, in accordance with DoD 7000.14-R
(the DoD Financial Management Regulations).
The Report states that, "DoD policy does not require the Services to
clean up or sample for munitions contaminants." In fact, the Department
has had policy in place on response actions for some time. In addition
to the failure to discuss current policies, GAO does not address new
or expanding policies that the Department presently has under
development.
The Report also asserts that, "To date, no corrective actions have been
taken specifically directed at cleaning up contaminants when they have
been detected." Again, this observation is not factual. DoD is
responding to munitions constituents at twenty-three installations and
ranges, as is illustrated in the enclosures. The Report fails to
recognize DoD's efforts at these sites.
Finally, the Report asserts that DoD's operational range inventory and
its estimates of cleanup costs are "questionable." However, the Report
provides no supporting analysis for this conclusion and is misleading
in that it does not factually address:
* The adequacy of inventory data to support cost estimating.
* The specific Congressional direction to DoD about development of the
aggregate high-low cost estimates.
* The reasonableness of the assumptions in the detailed estimating
guidance the Department developed.
* Differences in the way the Services use and manage operational ranges
and the impact of these differences in cost estimates among the
Services.
In addition, the Report incorrectly assumes that decision makers would
find a cost to clean up an operational range useful. The decision to
close an operational range will not be determined by cleanup cost. It
will be determined by whether the range is needed for operational
requirements. An estimate of the cost to clean up a range will be
developed after the range is no longer operational. There is no
requirement for DoD to produce cleanup estimates for operational
ranges.
The report also misrepresents the current state of affairs because it
fails to report the facts surrounding EPA's treatment of perchlorate
regulation. The report insinuates that DoD has some affirmative
responsibility to sample for perchlorate under the Safe Drinking Water
Act beyond Unregulated Contaminate Monitoring Rule requirements, which
is not the case.
This response and the enclosed materials are provided to help GAO
better understand and recognize DoD's policies and actions. Enclosure 1
provides the Department's specific responses to GAO's Report Findings
and Recommendations. Enclosure 2 offers the Department's detailed,
line-by-line analysis of the elements of GAO's report. Enclosures 3 and
4 provide examples of
the Services' operational range assessment programs that assess
potential hazards from off-range migration of munitions constituents.
Enclosures 5, 6, and 7, which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
provided to Congressman Dingell in response to an inquiry, provide some
details on munitions constituents. Specifically:
* Enclosure 5 provides information on DoD installations where sampling
for perchlorate and other munitions constituents is ongoing:
* Enclosure 6 provides information on occurrences of perchlorate or
other constituents of military munitions in public or private drinking
water wells where a DoD facility is a possible or likely source of the
occurrence.
* Enclosure 7 provides information on DoD installations where EPA has
reason to believe that a constituent of military munitions, including
perchlorate, TNT, RDX, HMX, or White Phosphorus has been detected or
discovered, and the status of the response action.
Taken together, the analytical and logical deficiencies in this Report
render the findings and recommendations invalid. The Department
recommends that the Report be withdrawn and a new analysis be
undertaken.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Alex A. Beehler:
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health):
Enclosures: As stated.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841 Edward Zadjura, (202) 512-9914:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Christine Frye, Roderick Moore, David
Noguera, and Doreen Feldman made key contributions to this report. John
Delicath and Amy Webbink also contributed to this report.
(360349):
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD was also required to provide a separate estimate for all other
defense sites.
[2] DOD's Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Environmental Restoration Program
Annual Report to Congress.
[3] The installations we visited were Holloman Air Force Base, in New
Mexico; Edwards Air Force Base, in California; Army Redstone Arsenal,
in Alabama; Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, in Maryland; Army White Sands
Missile Range, in New Mexico; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian
Head, in Maryland; and Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, in
California. We selected installations based on available data, but were
unable to determine the total number of installations reporting
perchlorate contamination. DOD and EPA had only recently begun to
collect data on perchlorate and data lists were not always current or
complete, and were often redundant in that the same installations
appeared on more than one list of installations reporting
contamination.
[4] DOD has other policies requiring the services to assess potential
hazards from munitions constituents migrating from operational ranges
to off-range areas.
[5] DOD no longer distinguishes between active and inactive ranges. The
current statutory definition of an operational range is "a range that
is under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the Secretary of
Defense and (A) that is used for range activities, or (B) although not
currently being used for range activities, that is still considered by
the Secretary to be a range and has not been put to a new use that is
incompatible with range activities." Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1042(e)(3)
(Nov. 24, 2003).
[6] DOD distinguishes range cleanup from range clearance. Range
clearance is routine, conducted for the continued use of active ranges,
and performed primarily for safety reasons, whereas range cleanup
involves interim removal, remedial activities, and a final remedy, but
only for closed ranges.
[7] Pub. L. No. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).
[8] This report deals with operational ranges on active installations.
In December 2003, we issued a report on closed installations or those
in the process of closing. As of September 2002, DOD had closed 542
ranges on open installations and 74 ranges on installations closed
under the Base Realignment and Closure process, and is required to
clean up munitions contamination on these ranges, if present. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, Military Munitions: DOD Needs to Develop a
Comprehensive Approach for Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites, GAO-04-147
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003).
[9] Pub. L. No. 107-314 (Dec. 2, 2002).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Liabilities: DOD
Training Range Cleanup Cost Estimates Are Likely Understated, GAO-01-
479 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2001).
[11] A public water system is subject to the Safe Drinking Water Act if
the system has at least 15 service connections or regularly serves at
least 25 individuals.
[12] None of the approximately 90 contaminants regulated by EPA under
the Safe Drinking Water Act are associated with the use of military
munitions. Some regulated contaminants, such as arsenic, may result
from the use of military munitions, but EPA does not regulate arsenic
resulting from such use. It does, however, regulate arsenic found in
drinking water resulting from the erosion of natural deposits, runoff
from agriculture sites, and certain production wastes.
[13] 40 C.F.R. § 141.40.
[14] 40 C.F.R. § 401.15.
[15] Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1053
(C.D. Cal. 2003). The conclusion that perchlorate is a hazardous waste
was the first step in the court's analysis of whether perchlorate is a
hazardous substance under CERCLA. (The definition of hazardous
substances under CERCLA includes hazardous waste under RCRA.)
[16] Section 107 of the Federal Facility Compliance Act amended RCRA by
adding a new section 3004(y), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6924(y).
[17] 40 C.F.R § 266.202.
[18] Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program established
under section 211, DOD is required to identify, investigate, and clean
up environmental contamination and other hazards at active and closing
installations, as well as at formerly used defense sites.
[19] 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(E).
[20] On September 26, 1997, DOD published a proposed range rule on
closed, transferred, and transferring ranges containing military
munitions. The proposed rule identified a process for evaluating
response action on closed, transferred, and transferring ranges and
required a comprehensive inventory of DOD ranges, including a
collection of descriptive data for each range. However, the proposed
rule applied to nonoperational ranges only. On November 13, 2000, DOD
withdrew the proposed range rule from the rule-making process because
DOD, EPA, and federal land managers could not reach consensus on
several key issues, including how explosive safety would be handled
under the rule, concurrence on remedial actions, and who would decide
the remedy.
[21] DOD Directives 4715.11 and 4715.12.
[22] Army officials told us the Army assumed 60 percent of operational
range acreage was highly contaminated, but our analysis of Army data
(see table 4) shows the Army actually assumed that 58 percent of
acreage was highly contaminated.
[23] In some instances, EPA has used its authority under these acts to
require cleanup of munitions constituents on operational ranges. For
example, at Fort Richardson, Alaska, EPA required the Army to clean up
contamination caused by munitions containing white phosphorus.
[24] See 40 C.F.R. § 401.15. The three constituents--2,4 and 2,6
dinitrotoluene (used to produce explosives and ammunition and known to
cause cancer) and nitrobenzene (may be used in defense manufacturing
and linked to blood disorders)--are on DOD's list of munitions
constituents of greatest concern.
[25] To assure compliance with the requirements of environmental laws,
DOD has an environmental quality program that is largely funded by
DOD's appropriation for operation and maintenance activities. This
account also funds a wide range of installation activities such as
military training, base operations, and property management. As such,
DOD's environmental quality program must compete with these other
activities for funding. As GAO reported in June 2003, DOD's
environmental quality program has a ranking system for funding
environmental activities where activities ranked Class 0 or I must be
funded in the current program year because of a law or regulation,
whereas funding for activities ranked Class II or III may be deferred
because there is no legislative requirement in the current budget year.
We found DOD did not always have sufficient funds to pay for
environmental priorities and sometimes did not follow the program's
ranking system and instead funded lower priority activities while not
funding some higher priorities. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Environmental Compliance: Better DOD Guidance Needed to Ensure That the
Most Important Activities Are Funded, GAO-03-639 (Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2003).
[26] Initially, Army officials said they believed the perchlorate
contamination resulted from the burning of rocket motors in pits at the
open burning and detonation facility. More recently, however, Army
officials speculated that the plume in the hazardous test area is from
another unknown source because it is uphill from the open burning and
detonation facility.
[27] Although there is not a standard for perchlorate under the Safe
Drinking Water Act, in at least one instance EPA required the Army to
clean up munitions constituents in groundwater, such as perchlorate.
EPA required the Massachusetts Military Reservation to clean up
munitions constituents under its Safe Drinking Water Act authority,
which allows it to take action when there is an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons. 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a).
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