DOD Personnel Clearances
Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel Gao ID: GAO-04-202T May 6, 2004Because of increased awareness of threats to national security and efforts to privatize federal jobs, the demand for security clearances for government and industry personnel has increased. Industry personnel are taking on a greater role in national security work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because many of these jobs require access to classified information, industry personnel need security clearances. As of September 30, 2003, industry workers held about one-third of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued security clearances. Terrorist attacks have heightened national security concerns and underscored the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that DOD had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to review the clearance eligibility determination process and backlog for industry personnel. This testimony presents our preliminary observations on the security clearance process for industry personnel and describes (1) the size of the backlog and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) the impediments to reducing the backlog and delays, and (3) some of the initiatives that DOD is considering to eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays. Later this month, we plan to issue our final report.
On the basis of our preliminary observations, long-standing backlogs and delays in determining security clearance eligibility for industry personnel continue to exist and can have adverse effects. DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases as of March 31, 2004. The backlog included estimates by the Defense Security Service (DSS)--the agency responsible for administering DOD's personnel security investigations program--that consisted of more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances) that were overdue but had not been submitted to DSS; over 101,000 new DSS investigations or reinvestigations that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames; and over 25,000 cases awaiting adjudication (a determination of clearance eligibility) that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased by 56 days to over 1 year. Delays in completing reinvestigations of industry personnel and others doing classified work can increase national security risks. In addition, delays in determining clearance eligibility can affect the timeliness, quality, and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and decrease the amount of time needed to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Impediments include a large number of new clearance requests; an increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances, which require more time to process; inaccurate workload projections for both the number and type of clearances needed for industry personnel; and the imbalance between workforces and workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that can cause industry delays in filling positions and starting work on government contracts. Furthermore, DOD does not have an integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing the backlog and delays. DOD is considering a number of initiatives to supplement actions that it has implemented in recent years to reduce the backlogs and the time needed to determine eligibility for a security clearance. Additional initiatives include (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation; (2) establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; and (3) reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. GAO's forthcoming report will provide a more complete discussion of these and other initiatives.
GAO-04-202T, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, May 6, 2004:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining
Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel:
Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Acting Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management:
GAO-04-202T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-202T, a testimony before the House Committee on
Government Reform
Why GAO Did This Study:
Because of increased awareness of threats to national security and
efforts to privatize federal jobs, the demand for security clearances
for government and industry personnel has increased. Industry personnel
are taking on a greater role in national security work for the
Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because many of
these jobs require access to classified information, industry personnel
need security clearances. As of September 30, 2003, industry workers
held about one-third of the approximately 2 million DOD issued security
clearances.
Terrorist attacks have heightened national security concerns and
underscored the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security
clearance process. However, GAO‘s past work found that DOD had a
clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to
review the clearance eligibility determination process and backlog for
industry personnel.
This testimony presents our preliminary observations on the security
clearance process for industry personnel and describes (1) the size of
the backlog and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility
determinations, (2) the impediments to reducing the backlog and delays,
and (3) some of the initiatives that DOD is considering to eliminate
the backlog and decrease the delays. Later this month, we plan to issue
our final report.
What GAO Found:
On the basis of our preliminary observations, long-standing backlogs
and delays in determining security clearance eligibility for industry
personnel continue to exist and can have adverse effects. DOD‘s
security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000
cases as of March 31, 2004. The backlog included estimates by the
Defense Security Service (DSS)”the agency responsible for administering
DOD‘s personnel security investigations program”that consisted of
* more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances)
that were overdue but had not been submitted to DSS,
* over 101,000 new DSS investigations or reinvestigations that had not
been completed within DOD‘s established time frames, and
* over 25,000 cases awaiting adjudication (a determination of clearance
eligibility) that had not been completed within DOD‘s established time
frames.
From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that
it took DOD to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel
increased by 56 days to over 1 year. Delays in completing
reinvestigations of industry personnel and others doing classified work
can increase national security risks. In addition, delays in
determining clearance eligibility can affect the timeliness, quality,
and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts.
Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and
decrease the amount of time needed to determine clearance eligibility
for industry personnel. Impediments include a large number of new
clearance requests; an increase in the proportion of requests for top
secret clearances, which require more time to process; inaccurate
workload projections for both the number and type of clearances needed
for industry personnel; and the imbalance between workforces and
workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity
(the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another
department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that can cause
industry delays in filling positions and starting work on government
contracts. Furthermore, DOD does not have an integrated, comprehensive
management plan for addressing the backlog and delays.
DOD is considering a number of initiatives to supplement actions that
it has implemented in recent years to reduce the backlogs and the time
needed to determine eligibility for a security clearance. Additional
initiatives include (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation;
(2) establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; and (3)
reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. GAO‘s
forthcoming report will provide a more complete discussion of these and
other initiatives.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-202T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory Wilshusen at
(202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our preliminary observations
on the process the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to determine
security clearance eligibility for industry personnel.
For a variety of reasons, including an increased awareness of threats
to our national security resulting from the terrorist attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001, and efforts over the past decade
to privatize federal jobs, the demand for security clearances for both
government employees and industry personnel has increased over the last
few years. Individuals working for industry are playing an increasingly
larger role in national security work conducted by DOD and other
federal agencies. Many industry personnel hold jobs that allow them to
work on classified programs and activities and that require access to
classified information. To handle classified information, industry
personnel must hold a security clearance. As of September 30, 2003,
industry personnel held about 682,000 (or about 34 percent) of the
approximately 2 million DOD-issued security clearances.
Terrorist attacks have heightened national security concerns and have
highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security
clearance process. As part of a three-stage process, DOD determines
whether industry personnel are eligible for a security clearance by
conducting a background investigation and adjudication (determining
eligibility for access to classified information). However, some
government and industry officials have recently expressed concern about
the security clearance backlog--overdue security clearance
reinvestigations[Footnote 1] that have not been requested and new
investigations and adjudications that have not been completed within
established time frames--and the amount of time it takes to determine
eligibility for a security clearance for industry personnel.
Since at least the late 1990s, the timeliness of DOD's personnel
security clearance process has been at issue. As our previous work has
shown, backlogs and delays in personnel security investigations and
adjudications historically have been problems for DOD, and they affect
industry personnel as well as service members and civilian
employees.[Footnote 2] In February and September 2000 testimonies
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform,[Footnote 3] we noted our concerns about the amount of time
needed to obtain clearances and that DOD had historically reported a
large backlog of overdue but not submitted reinvestigations for
security clearances. In our February 2004 report, for example, we
identified several impediments that hinder DOD's ability to eliminate
its security clearance backlog and made recommendations for decreasing
the backlog and improving timeliness.[Footnote 4] Likewise, this
committee reported that DOD's personnel security investigations backlog
poses a threat to national security and recommended actions to address
the backlog.[Footnote 5]
Mr. Chairman, in June 2003, you and the Vice Chairman of this committee
asked us to review the process DOD uses to determine security clearance
eligibility for industry personnel. Later this month, we plan to
provide you with a report containing the final results and our
recommendations.
Today, I will present our preliminary observations on DOD's security
clearance process for industry personnel. Specifically, I will discuss
(1) the size of the backlog and changes during the last 3 fiscal years
in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) the
impediments to reducing the backlog and delays, and (3) some of the
initiatives that DOD is considering to eliminate the backlog and
decrease the delays.
In conducting this review, we examined DOD policy guidance,
regulations, instructions, and statistical evidence on the security
clearance process for industry personnel. In addition, we reviewed
reports by GAO, DOD, congressional staff, and other government
entities. We also interviewed DOD and industry officials, observed the
procedures used to process clearance information, and assessed the
reliability of databases. We determined that the data for fiscal years
2001 and thereafter were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our
work. At the end of my statement is a list of related GAO products. We
conducted our review from July 2003 through April 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Long-standing backlogs and delays in determining security clearance
eligibility for industry personnel continue to exist and can have
adverse effects. As of March 31, 2004, DOD estimated that its security
clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases. DOD
identified more than 61,000 reinvestigations that were overdue but had
not been submitted, over 101,000 backlogged investigations, and over
25,000 backlogged adjudications. In the 3-year period from fiscal year
2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to
determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased by
56 days to over 1 year. Delays in initiating reinvestigations for
individuals working on classified programs and activities can increase
national security risks while delays in determining eligibility for
clearances for industry personnel can affect the timeliness, quality,
and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts. Such delays
prevent industry personnel from beginning or continuing work on
classified programs and activities, hinder industrial contractors from
hiring the most experienced and best qualified personnel, increase the
time needed to complete national-security-related contracts, and
increase costs to the federal government.
A number of impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog
and decrease the amount of time needed to determine eligibility for
security clearances for industry personnel. Impediments include large
investigative and adjudicative workloads resulting from a large number
of clearance requests in recent years; an increase in the proportion of
requests requiring top secret clearances, which take longer and are
more expensive to complete than secret clearances; inaccurate workload
projections; and the imbalance between workforces and workloads.
Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity--a policy
that requires acceptance by an agency of an equivalent personnel
security clearance and access granted by another agency--as an
impediment that can cause industry contractors delays in filling
positions and starting work on government contracts. Furthermore, DOD
does not have a management plan to address the impediments in a
comprehensive and integrated manner.
DOD is considering a number of initiatives to reduce the backlog and
the amount of time needed to determine eligibility for a security
clearance. Among those steps that DOD is exploring are conducting a
phased periodic reinvestigation; establishing a single adjudicative
facility for industry; and reevaluating investigative standards and
adjudicative guidelines. Even if these initiatives prove promising,
they face obstacles--such as the need to change investigative
standards, coordinate these policy changes with other agencies, and
ensure reciprocity--that could prevent their implementation or limit
their use. Our May 2004 evaluative report will provide a more complete
discussion of these and other initiatives.
Background:
In March 1997, a White House memorandum implemented adjudicative
guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and investigative
standards governmentwide.[Footnote 6] The National Security Council is
responsible for overseeing these guidelines and standards. Within DOD,
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD
[I]) is responsible for coordinating and implementing DOD-wide policies
related to access to classified information.[Footnote 7] Within
OUSD (I), the Defense Security Service (DSS) is responsible for
conducting background investigations and administering the personnel
security investigations program for DOD and 24 other federal agencies
that allow industry personnel access to classified
information.[Footnote 8] DSS's Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office (DISCO) adjudicates cases that contain only favorable
information or minor security issues. The Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals (DOHA) within DOD's Office of General Counsel
adjudicates cases that contain more serious security issues.
As with military members and federal workers, industry personnel must
obtain a security clearance to gain access to classified information,
which is categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and
confidential. Individuals who need access to classified information
over a long period are required to periodically renew their clearance
(a reinvestigation). The time frames for reinvestigations are 5 years
for top secret clearances, 10 years for secret clearances, and 15 years
for confidential clearances.[Footnote 9]
To ensure the trustworthiness, judgment, and reliability of contractor
personnel in positions requiring access to classified information, DOD
relies on a three-stage personnel security clearance process that
includes (1) determining that the position requires a clearance and, if
so, submitting a request for a clearance to DSS, (2) conducting an
initial investigation or reinvestigation, and (3) using the
investigative report to determine eligibility for access to classified
information--a procedure known as "adjudication." Figure 1 depicts this
three-stage process and the federal government offices that have the
lead responsibility for each stage.
Figure 1: DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Process for Industry
Personnel:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Cases involving access to sensitive compartmented information
(see footnote 21) are sent through the requesting agency's central
adjudication facility for adjudication.
[End of figure]
In the preinvestigation stage, the industrial contractor must determine
that a position requires the employee to have access to classified
information. If a clearance is needed, the industry employee completes
a personnel security questionnaire, and the industrial contractor
submits it to DSS. All industry requests for a DOD-issued clearance are
submitted to DSS while requests for military members and federal
employees are submitted to either DSS or the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM).
In the investigation stage, DSS, OPM, or one of their contractors
conducts the actual investigation of the industry employee by using
standards established governmentwide in 1997 and implemented by DOD in
1998.[Footnote 10] As table 1 shows, the type of information gathered
in an investigation depends on the level of clearance needed and
whether an initial investigation or a reinvestigation is required. DSS
forwards the completed investigative report to DISCO.
Table 1: Information Gathered to Determine Eligibility for a Security
Clearance:
Type of information gathered: 1. Personnel security questionnaire: The
subject's self-reported answers on a paper SF-86 form or an electronic
form.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 2. National agency check: Data from
Federal Bureau of Investigation, military records centers, Treasury,
etc.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 3. Credit check: Data from credit bureaus
where the subject lived/worked/attended school for at least 6 months.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 4. Local agency checks: Data from law
enforcement agencies where the subject lived/worked/attended school
during past 5 years.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 5. Date and place of birth: Corroboration
of information supplied on the personnel security questionnaire.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: No.
Type of information gathered: 6. Citizenship: For individuals born
outside of the United States, verification of U.S. citizenship directly
from the appropriate registration authority.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: No.
Type of information gathered: 7. Education: Corroboration of most
recent or significant claimed attendance, degree, or diploma.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 8. Employment: Review of employment
records and interviews with workplace references, such as supervisors
and coworkers.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 9. References: Data from interviews with
subject-identified and investigator-developed leads.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 10. National agency check for spouse or
cohabitant: National agency check without fingerprint.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 11. Former spouse: Data from interview(s)
conducted with spouse(s) divorced within the last 10 years.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 12. Neighborhoods: Interviews with
neighbors and verification of residence through records check.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 13. Public records: Verification of
issues, such as bankruptcy, divorce, and criminal and civil court
cases.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered: 14. Subject interview: To collect
relevant data, resolve significant inconsistencies, or both.
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation: No;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret; Reinvestigation: Yes.
Source: DSS.
[End of table]
In the adjudicative stage, DISCO uses the information from the
investigative report to determine whether an individual is eligible for
a security clearance. If the report is determined to be a "clean" case-
-a case that contains no potential security issue or minor issues--then
DISCO adjudicators determine eligibility for a clearance. However, if
the case is an "issue" case--a case containing issues that might
disqualify an individual for a clearance (e.g., foreign connections or
drug-or alcohol-related problems)--then the case is forwarded to DOHA
adjudicators for the clearance-eligibility decision. Regardless of
which office determines eligibility, DISCO issues the clearance-
eligibility decision and forwards this determination to the industrial
contractor. All adjudications are based on 13 federal adjudicative
guidelines established governmentwide in 1997 and implemented by DOD in
1998.
Recent legislation could affect DOD's security clearance process. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 authorized the
transfer of DOD's personnel security investigative functions and more
than 1,800 investigative employees to OPM.[Footnote 11] However, as of
March 31, 2004, this transfer had not taken place. The transfer can
occur only after the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that
certain conditions can be met and the Director of OPM concurs with the
transfer.
Long-standing Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance
Eligibility for Industry Personnel Continue to Exist and Can Have
Adverse Effects:
DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel is sizeable,
and the average time needed to determine eligibility for a clearance
increased during the last 3 fiscal years to over 1 year. DSS has
established case-completion time frames for both its investigations and
adjudications. For investigations, the time frames range from 75 to
180 days, depending on the investigative requirements.[Footnote 12] For
DISCO adjudications, the time frames are 3 days for initial clearances
and 30 days for periodic reinvestigations. DOHA's time frame is to
maintain a steady workload of adjudicating 2,150 cases per month within
30 days of receipt. Cases exceeding these time frames are considered
backlogged.
* Sizeable backlog continues to exist--As of March 31, 2004, the
security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly
188,000 cases. This estimate is the sum of four separate DSS-supplied
estimates: over 61,000 reinvestigations that were overdue but had not
been submitted, over 101,000 ongoing DSS investigations, over
19,000 cases awaiting adjudication at DISCO, and more than 6,300 cases
awaiting adjudication at DOHA that had exceeded the case-completion
time frames established for conducting them. However, as of March 31,
2004, DOHA independently reported that it had eliminated its
adjudicative backlog.
Moreover, the size of the total DSS-estimated backlog for industry
personnel doubled during the 6-month period ending on March 31, 2004,
as the comparison in table 2 shows. This comparison does not include
the backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted
because DSS was not able to estimate that backlog as of September 30,
2003.
Table 2: Comparison of Backlog Sizes As of September 30, 2003, and
March 31, 2004:
Type of backlog: Investigative backlog;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Sept. 30, 2003: 44,600;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Mar. 31, 2004: 101,000;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 56,400;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 126.
Type of backlog: Adjudicative backlog at DISCO;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Sept. 30, 2003: 12,800;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Mar. 31, 2004: 19,000;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 6,200;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 48.
Type of backlog: Adjudicative backlog at DOHA;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Sept. 30, 2003: 4,500;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Mar. 31, 2004: 6,300;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 1,800;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 40.
Type of backlog: Total;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Sept. 30, 2003: 61,900;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry
personnel: Mar. 31, 2004: 126,300;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 64,400;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 104.
Sources: DSS and the Case Control Management System (data); GAO
(analysis).
Note: Although DSS provided the backlog estimates in table 2, DOHA
independently reported that, as of March 31, 2004, it had eliminated
its adjudicative backlog.
[End of table]
The industry backlogs for investigations and adjudications represent
about one-fifth of the DOD-wide backlog for investigations and
adjudications as of September 30, 2003 (the date of the most recent
DOD-wide data). On that date, the estimated size of the investigative
backlog for industry personnel amounted to roughly 44,600 cases, or
17 percent of the larger DOD-wide backlog of approximately
270,000 cases, which included military members, federal employees, and
industry personnel. Similarly, the estimated size of the adjudicative
backlog for industry personnel totaled roughly 17,300 cases, or
19 percent of the approximately 93,000 cases in the DOD-wide
adjudicative backlog on that date.
Furthermore, the size of the industrial personnel backlog may be
underestimated. In anticipation of the authorized transfer of the
investigative function from DSS to OPM, DSS had opened relatively
few cases between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2004. More
specifically, DSS had not opened almost 69,200 new industry personnel
requests received in the first half of fiscal year 2004. Because these
requests have not been opened and investigations begun, they are not
part of the 188,000 case backlog identified above. An unknown number of
these cases might have already exceeded the set time frames for
completing the investigation.
* Average time to determine clearance eligibility has increased--In the
3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the
average time that DOD took to determine clearance eligibility for
industry personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days, an increase of
18 percent. (See table 3.) During fiscal year 2003, DOD took an average
of more than 1 year from the time DSS received a personnel security
questionnaire to the time it issued an eligibility determination. From
fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the number of days to
determine clearance eligibility for clean cases increased from 301 days
to 332 days, whereas the time increased for issue cases from 516 days
to 615 days.
Table 3: Average Number of Days Needed to Determine Eligibility for a
Security Clearance for Industry Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-3:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: All industry cases: 375;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: Clean cases[A]: 332;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: Issue cases[B]: 615.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: All industry cases: 343;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: Clean cases[A]: 316;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: Issue cases[B]: 629.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: All industry cases: 319;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: Clean cases[A]: 301;
Average number of days to determine eligibility for a security
clearance for industry personnel: Issue cases[B]: 516.
Sources: DISCO and the Case Control Management System.
Note: Although DSS's case management system can provide the total
elapsed time between opening a case and issuing the final security
clearance eligibility determination, it is not capable of generating
separate time estimates for the intermediate stages of the clearance
process. Nor does it have the capability to identify how much time DOHA
needed to adjudicate issue cases. Therefore, all of the time-based
findings include the time period beginning when personnel security
questionnaires were entered into the case management system and ending
when DISCO notified the industrial contractor of the DISCO or DOHA
adjudicators' decisions to grant a clearance.
[A] Includes investigative time and DISCO review time.
[B] Includes investigative time, DISCO and DOHA review time, and
additional time when some cases were sent back for additional
investigation or were appealed after a denial or revocation of
a clearance.
[End of table]
* Backlogs and delays can have adverse effects--Delays in renewing
security clearances for industry personnel and others who are doing
classified work can lead to a heightened risk of national security
breaches. In a 1999 report, the Joint Security Commission II pointed
out that delays in initiating reinvestigations create risks to national
security because the longer the individuals hold clearances, the more
likely they are to be working with critical information and
systems.[Footnote 13] In addition, delays in determining security
clearance eligibility for industry personnel can affect the timeliness,
quality, and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts.
According to a 2003 Information Security Oversight Office[Footnote 14]
report, industrial contractor officials who were interviewed said that
delays in obtaining clearances cost industry millions of dollars per
year and affect personnel resources.[Footnote 15] The report also
stated that delays in the clearance process hampered industrial
contractors' ability to perform duties required by their contracts and
increased the amount of time needed to complete national-security-
related contracts. Industrial contractors told us about cases in which
their company hired competent applicants who already had the necessary
security clearances, rather than individuals who were more experienced
or qualified but did not have a clearance. Industry association
representatives told us that defense contractors might offer monetary
incentives to attract new employees with clearances--for example, a
$15,000 to $20,000 signing bonus for individuals with a valid security
clearance, and a $10,000 bonus to current employees who recruit a new
employee with a clearance. In addition, defense contractors may hire
new employees and begin paying them, but not be able to assign any work
to them--sometimes for a year or more--until they obtain a clearance.
Contractors may also incur lost-opportunity costs if prospective
employees decide to work elsewhere rather than wait to get a clearance.
Impediments Hinder Elimination of the Backlog and Reduction of Time
Needed to Determine Eligibility for a Clearance:
A number of impediments hinder DOD's efforts to eliminate the clearance
backlog for industry personnel and reduce the time needed to determine
eligibility for a clearance. Impediments include large investigative
and adjudicative workloads resulting from a large number of clearance
requests in recent years and an increase in the proportion of requests
requiring top secret clearances, inaccurate workload projections, and
the imbalance between workforces and workloads. The underutilization of
reciprocity is an impediment that industrial contractors cited as an
obstacle to timely eligibility determinations. Furthermore, DOD does
not have a management plan that could help it address many of these
impediments in a comprehensive and integrative manner.
* Large number of clearance requests--The large number of clearance
requests that DOD receives annually for industry personnel, military
members, and federal employees taxes a process that already is
experiencing backlogs and delays. In fiscal year 2003, DOD submitted
over 775,000 requests for investigations to DSS and OPM, about one-
fifth of which (almost 143,000 requests) were for industry personnel.
Table 4 shows an increase in the number of DOD eligibility
determinations for industry personnel made during each of the last
3 years.[Footnote 16] DOD issued about 63,000 more eligibility
determinations for industry personnel in fiscal year 2003 than it did
2 years earlier, an increase of 174 percent. During the same period,
the average number of days required to issue an eligibility
determination for industry personnel grew by 56 days, or about
18 percent. In other words, the increase in the average wait time was
small compared to the increase in the number of cases.
Table 4: Number of Clearance-Eligibility Determinations for Industry
Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-3:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
All industry cases: 99,652;
Number of clearance- eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
Clean cases: 87,172;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
Issue cases: 12,480.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
All industry cases: 86,226;
Number of clearance- eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
Clean cases: 78,836;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
Issue cases: 7,390.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
All industry cases: 36,370;
Number of clearance- eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
Clean cases: 33,294;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry personnel:
Issue cases: 3,076.
Source: DISCO and the Case Control Management System.
[End of table]
* Increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances--
From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2003, the proportion of all
requests requiring top secret clearances for industry personnel grew
from 17 to 27 percent. According to OUSD (I), top secret clearances
take eight times more investigative effort to complete and three times
more adjudicative effort to review than do secret clearances. The
increased demand for top secret clearances also has budget implications
for DOD. In fiscal year 2003, security investigations obtained through
DSS cost $2,640 for an initial investigation for a top secret
clearance, $1,591 for a reinvestigation of a top secret clearance, and
$328 for an initial investigation for a secret clearance. Thus, over a
10-year period, DOD would spend $4,231 (in current-year dollars) to
investigate and reinvestigate an industry employee for a top secret
clearance, a cost 13 times higher than the $328 it would require to
investigate an individual for a secret clearance.
* Inaccurate workload projections--Although DSS has made efforts to
improve its projections of industry personnel security clearance
requirements, problems remain. For example, inaccurate forecasts for
both the number and type of security clearances needed for industry
personnel make it difficult for DOD to plan ahead to size its
investigative and adjudicative workforce to handle the workload and
fund its security clearance program. For fiscal year 2003, DSS reported
that the actual cost of industry personnel investigations was almost
25 percent higher than had been projected. DOD officials believed that
these projections were inaccurate primarily because DSS received a
larger proportion of requests for initial top secret investigations and
reinvestigations. Further inaccuracies in projections may result when
DOD fully implements a new automated adjudication tracking system,
which will identify overdue reinvestigations that have not been
submitted DOD-wide.
* Imbalance between workforces and workloads--Insufficient
investigative and adjudicative workforces, given the current and
projected workloads, are additional barriers to eliminating the backlog
and reducing security clearance processing times for industry
personnel. DOD partially concurred with our February 2004
recommendation to identify and implement steps to match the sizes of
the investigative and adjudicative workforces to the clearance request
workload. According to an OPM official, DOD and OPM together need
roughly 8,000 full-time-equivalent investigative staff to eliminate the
security clearance backlogs and deliver timely investigations to their
customers.[Footnote 17] In our February 2004 report, we estimated that
DOD and OPM have around 4,200 full-time-equivalent investigative staff
who are either federal employees or contract investigators.[Footnote
18]
In December 2003, advisors to the OPM Director expressed concerns about
financial risks associated with the transfer of DSS's investigative
functions and 1,855 investigative staff authorized in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The advisors therefore
recommended that the transfer not occur, at least during fiscal year
2004. On February 6, 2004, DSS and OPM signed an interagency agreement
that leaves the investigative functions and DSS personnel in DOD and
provides DSS personnel with training on OPM's case management system
and investigative procedures as well as access to that system.
According to our calculations, if all 1,855 DSS investigative employees
complete the 1-week training program as planned, the loss in
productively will be equivalent to 35 person-years of investigator
time. Also, other short-term decreases in productivity will result
while DSS's investigative employees become accustomed to using OPM's
system and procedures.
Likewise, an adjudicative backlog of industry personnel cases
developed because DISCO and DOHA did not have an adequate number
of adjudicative personnel on hand. DISCO and DOHA have, however, taken
steps to augment their adjudicative staff. DISCO was recently given the
authority to hire 30 adjudicators to supplement its staff of
62 nonsupervisory adjudicators. Similarly, DOHA has supplemented its
23 permanent adjudicators with 46 temporary adjudicators and, more
recently, has requested that it be able to hire an appropriate number
of additional permanent adjudicators.
* Reciprocity of access underutilized--While the reciprocity of
security clearances within DOD has not been a problem for industry
personnel, reciprocity of access to certain types of information and
programs within the federal government has not been fully utilized,
thereby preventing some industry personnel from working and increasing
the workload on already overburdened investigative and adjudicative
staff.[Footnote 19] According to DOD and industry officials, a 2003
Information Security Oversight Office report on the National Industrial
Security Program,[Footnote 20] and our analysis, reciprocity of
clearances appears to be working throughout most of DOD. However, the
same cannot be said for access to sensitive compartmented information
and special access programs[Footnote 21] within DOD or transferring
clearances and access from DOD to some other agencies. Similarly, a
recent report by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center
concluded that aspects of reciprocity for industrial contractors appear
not to work well and that the lack of reciprocity between special
access programs was a particular problem for industry personnel, who
often work on many of these programs simultaneously.[Footnote 22]
Industry association officials told us that reciprocity of access to
certain types of information and programs, especially the lack of full
reciprocity in the intelligence community, is becoming more common and
one of the top concerns of their members. One association provided us
with several examples of access problems that industry personnel with
DOD-issued security clearances face when working with intelligence
agencies. For example, the association cited different processes and
standards used by intelligence agencies, such as guidelines for (1) the
type of investigations and required time frames, (2) the type of
polygraph tests, and (3) not accepting adjudication decisions made by
other agencies.
In addition to the reciprocity concerns relating to access to sensitive
compartmented information and special access programs, industry
officials identified additional reciprocity concerns. First, DSS and
contractor association officials told us that some personnel with an
interim clearance could not start work because an interim clearance
does not provide access to specific types of national security
information, such as sensitive compartmented information, special
access programs, North Atlantic Treaty Organization data, and
restricted data. [Footnote 23] Second, intelligence agencies do not
always accept clearance reinstatements and conversions (e.g., a
security clearance may be reactivated depending on the recency of the
investigation and the length of time since the clearance was
terminated). Third, the Smith Amendment--with exceptions--prohibits an
individual with a clearance from being eligible for a subsequent DOD
clearance if certain prohibitions (e.g., unlawful user of a controlled
substance) are applicable.[Footnote 24]
* Lack of overall management plan--Finally, DOD has numerous plans to
address pieces of the backlog problem but does not have an overall
management plan to eliminate permanently the current investigative and
adjudicative backlogs, reduce the delays in determining clearance
eligibility for industry personnel, and overcome the impediments that
could allow such problems to recur. These plans do not address process
wide objectives and outcome-related goals with performance measures,
milestones, priorities, budgets, personnel resources, costs, and
potential obstacles and options for overcoming the obstacles.
DOD Is Considering Several Initiatives to Decrease the Backlog and Time
Period Needed to Obtain Eligibility for a Clearance:
DOD and industry association officials have suggested several
initiatives to reduce the backlog and delays in issuing eligibility for
a security clearance. They indicated that these steps could supplement
actions that DOD has implemented in recent years or has agreed to
implement as a result of our recommendations or those of others. Even
if positive effects would result from these initiatives, other
obstacles, such as the need to change investigative standards,
coordinate these policy changes with other agencies, and ensure
reciprocity, could prevent their implementation or limit their use.
Today, I will discuss three of the suggested initiatives. Our final
report to you will provide a more complete evaluation of these and
other initiatives.
* Conducting a phased periodic reinvestigation--A phased approach to
periodic reinvestigations for top secret clearances involves conducting
a reinvestigation in two phases; the second phase would be conducted
only if potential security issues were identified in the initial phase.
Phase 1 information is obtained through a review of the personnel
security questionnaire, subject and former spouse interviews, credit
checks, a national agency check on the subject and former spouse or
current cohabitant, local agency checks, records checks, and interviews
with workplace personnel. If one or more issues are found in phase 1,
then phase 2 would include all of the other types of information
gathered in the current periodic reinvestigation for a top secret
investigation. Recent research has shown that periodic reinvestigations
for top secret clearances conducted in two phases can save at least
20 percent of the normal effort with almost no loss in identifying
critical issues for adjudication.[Footnote 25] According to DSS, this
initiative is designed to use the limited investigative resources in
the most productive manner and reduce clearance-processing time by
eliminating the routine use of low-yield information sources on many
investigations and concentrating information-gathering efforts on
high-yield sources. While analyses have not been conducted to evaluate
how the implementation of phasing would affect the investigative
backlog, the implementation of phasing could be a factor in reducing
the backlog by decreasing some of the hours of fieldwork required in
some reinvestigations. Even if additional testing confirms promising
earlier findings that the procedure very rarely fails to identify
critical issues, several obstacles, such as noncompliance with existing
governmentwide investigative standards and reciprocity problems, could
prevent the implementation or limit the use of this initiative.
* Establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry--Under this
initiative, DOD would consolidate DOHA's adjudicative function with
that of DISCO's to create a single adjudicative facility for all
industry personnel cases. At the same time, DOHA would retain its
hearings and appeals function. According to OUSD (I) officials, this
consolidation would streamline the adjudicative process for industry
personnel and make it more coherent and uniform. A single adjudicative
facility would serve as the clearinghouse for all industrial
contractor-related issues. As part of a larger review of DOD's security
clearance processes, DOD's Senior Executive Council is considering this
consolidation. An OUSD (I) official told us that the consolidation
would provide greater flexibility in using adjudicators to meet changes
in the workload and could eliminate some of the time required to
transfer cases from DISCO and to DOHA. If the consolidation occurred,
DISCO officials said that their operations would not change much,
except for adding adjudicators. On the other hand, DOHA officials said
that the current division between DISCO and DOHA of adjudicating clean
versus issue cases works very well and that combining the adjudicative
function for industry into one facility could negatively affect DOHA's
ability to prepare denials and revocations of industry personnel
clearances during appeals. They told us that the consolidation would
have very little impact on the timeliness and quality of adjudications.
* Evaluation of the investigative standards and adjudicative
guidelines--This initiative would involve an evaluation of the
investigative standards used by personnel security clearance
investigators to help identify requirements that do not provide
significant information relevant for adjudicative decisions. By
eliminating the need to perform certain tasks associated with these
requirements, investigative resources could be used more efficiently.
For example, DSS officials told us that less than one-half of
one percent of the potential security issues identified during an
investigation are derived from neighborhood checks; however, this
information source accounts for about 14 percent of the investigative
time. The modification of existing investigative standards would
involve using risk management principles based on a thorough evaluation
of the potential loss of information. Like a phased periodic
reinvestigation, this initiative would require changes in the
governmentwide investigative standards. In addition, the evaluation and
any suggested changes would need to be coordinated within DOD,
intelligence agencies, and others.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the committee may have
at this time.
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Gregory C. Wilshusen, (202) 512-6244 Jack E. Edwards, (202) 512-8246:
Acknowledgments:
Individuals making key contributions to this statement include
Mark A. Pross, James F. Reid, William J. Rigazio, and Nancy L. Benco.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments
to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344.
Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2004.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility
for Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.:
April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August
24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.:
February 16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.:
October 27, 1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access
to and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the
Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.:
October 19, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March
24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R.
Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate
Duplicative Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23.
Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided
When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.:
May 6, 1992.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23,
1990.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Reinvestigations are conducted periodically to determine whether an
individual's security clearance should be renewed.
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: More Consistency
Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret Clearances, GAO-01-465
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001); U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD
Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance
Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-00-215 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000);
and U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel
Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: Inadequate
Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/T-
NSIAD-00-65 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2000) and U.S. General
Accounting Office, DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue
Security Clearance Reinvestigations Is Needed, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2000).
[4] See U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD
Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining
Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[5] See Committee on Government Reform, Defense Security Service: The
Personnel Security Investigations [PSI] Backlog Poses a Threat to
National Security, H.R. 107-767 (Oct. 24, 2002).
[6] See The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum includes
the Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to
Classified Information and Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information. It approves the
adjudicative guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order No. 12968, Access
to Classified Information (Aug. 4, 1995).
[7] Previously, this responsibility resided within the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence. OUSD (I) was created in 2002 by the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-314 § 901 (Dec. 2, 2002).
[8] Executive Order No. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), which was amended by Executive Order
No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program (Jan. 6, 1993),
authorizes DOD to reach agreement with other federal departments and
agencies to extend its regulations concerning authorizations for access
to classified information by industry. Three federal agencies (the
Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission) also may grant security clearances to industry
personnel who work on national-security-related programs.
[9] See Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access
to Classified Information, 32 C.F.R. Part 147, Subpart B, Attach. A and
Attach. C (2003).
[10] See Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, "Personnel Security Investigations
and Adjudications," Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 1998). In
implementing the federal adjudicative guidelines, DOD Directive 5200.2,
DOD Personnel Security Program (Apr. 9, 1999), sets forth the policies
and procedures for granting DOD military, civilian, and industry
personnel access to classified information. The policies and procedures
for granting industrial personnel security clearances and adjudicative
procedural guidance for appealing cases if an unfavorable clearance
decision is reached also are contained in DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Apr. 20, 1999).
[11] See Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 906 (Nov. 24, 2003).
[12] DSS's performance goal is to complete at least 75 percent of each
type of investigation within the specified time limits. However,
monitoring of the backlog requires a determination of whether each
investigation was completed within the time frame--not whether an
aggregate performance goal was met for a particular type of
investigation.
[13] See Joint Security Commission II, Report by the Joint Security
Commission II (Aug. 24, 1999), pp. 5-6.
[14] Executive Order No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program,
Jan. 6, 1993, requires the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office to implement and monitor the National Industrial
Security Program and oversee agency, contractor, licensee, and grantee
actions; review all agency implementing regulations, internal rules or
guidelines; and gives the Director the authority to conduct periodic
on-site reviews of the implementation of the program by each program
member that has access to classified information or stores it. This
office is part of the National Archives and Records Administration.
[15] See Information Security Oversight Office, The National Industrial
Security Program, Industry's Perspective: Making Progress, but Falling
Short of Potential (2003).
[16] The outcomes of the clearance requests are eligibility
determinations, but the determinations may be made in the year
subsequent to the year when the request was submitted.
[17] OPM has estimated that DOD and OPM account for 80 percent of the
investigations conducted for the federal government.
[18] See GAO-04-344.
[19] Reciprocity, which is required by Executive Order No. 12968, is a
policy that requires background investigations and eligibility
determinations conducted under the order be mutually and reciprocally
accepted by all agencies, except when an agency has substantial
information indicating that an employee may not satisfy the standards
under this order. Reciprocity also involves the ability to transfer
(1) an individual's existing, valid security clearance and (2) access
from one department, agency, or military service to another or from the
federal government to the private sector (and vice versa) when the
individual changes jobs without having to grant another clearance or
access.
[20] See Information Security Oversight Office, The National Industrial
Security Program, Industry's Perspective: Making Progress, but Falling
Short of Potential (2003).
[21] Sensitive compartmented information is classified intelligence
information derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical
processes, which is handled by systems established by the Director of
Central Intelligence. A special access program is a sensitive program
that imposes need-to-know and access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to confidential, secret, or top secret information.
[22] See Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Reciprocity: A
Progress Report, PERSEREC Technical Report 04-2 (Monterey, Calif.: Apr.
1, 2004).
[23] Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended), the term
"restricted data" means all data (information) concerning the
(1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, (2) the
production of special nuclear material, or (3) the use of special
nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include
data declassified or removed from the restricted data category pursuant
to § 142 of the Act. Pub. L. No. 83-703 § 11 (Aug. 30, 1954), codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2014.
[24] See Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1071 (Oct. 30, 2000) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 986).
[25] See Defense Personnel Security Research Center, A New Approach to
the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation, PERSEREC Technical
Report 01-6 (Monterey, Calif.: Oct. 29, 2001) and Implementation of the
Phased SSBI-PR at DSS: An Evaluation with Recommendations, PERSEREC
Technical Report 04-X (Monterey, Calif.: in press).
