DOD Personnel Clearances
Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel Gao ID: GAO-04-632 May 26, 2004As more and more federal jobs are privatized, individuals working for private industry are taking on a greater role in national security work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because many of these jobs require access to classified information, industry personnel must hold a security clearance. As of September 30, 2003, industry workers held more than one-third of all clearances issued by DOD. Long-standing security clearance backlogs and delays in determining clearance eligibility affect industry personnel, military members, and federal employees. As requested, we reviewed the clearance eligibility process for industry personnel and (1) describe the size of the backlog and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) identify reasons for the backlog and delays, and (3) evaluate initiatives that DOD could take to eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays.
As of March 31, 2004, DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases, and the time needed to conduct an investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance during the last 3 fiscal years had increased by 56 days to a total of 375 days. DOD identified three separate backlog estimates; (1) more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances) that were overdue but had not been submitted, (2) over 101,000 new investigations or reinvestigations that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames, and (3) over 25,000 adjudications (a determination of clearance eligibility) that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to conduct an investigation and determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days. Delays in conducting investigations and determining clearance eligibility can increase national security risks, prevent industry personnel from beginning or continuing work on classified programs and activities, hinder industrial contractors from hiring the most experienced and best qualified personnel, increase the time needed to complete national-security-related contracts, and increase costs to the federal government. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlogs and reduce the amount of time needed to conduct an investigation and determine security clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Impediments include a large number of new clearance requests; an increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances, which require more time to process; inaccurate workload projections for both the number and type of clearances needed for industry personnel; and insufficient investigative and adjudicative workforces to handle the large workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that can cause industry delays in filling positions and starting work on government contracts. Also, the effects of past conditions, such as the backlog itself, have been identified as impediments to timely eligibility determinations. Furthermore, DOD does not have an integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing the backlog and delays. DOD is considering several initiatives that might reduce security clearance backlogs and processing times for determining clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Among those initiatives that DOD is exploring are (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation; (2) establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; (3) reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines; and (4) implementing an automated verification process for identifying and validating industrial security clearance requirements. These initiates could, however, face implementation obstacles, such as the need to change governmentwide regulations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-632, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
May 2004:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in
Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel:
GAO-04-632:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-632, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
As more and more federal jobs are privatized, individuals working for
private industry are taking on a greater role in national security work
for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because
many of these jobs require access to classified information, industry
personnel must hold a security clearance. As of September 30, 2003,
industry workers held more than one-third of all clearances issued by
DOD.
Long-standing security clearance backlogs and delays in determining
clearance eligibility affect industry personnel, military members, and
federal employees. As requested, we reviewed the clearance eligibility
process for industry personnel and (1) describe the size of the backlog
and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2)
identify reasons for the backlog and delays, and (3) evaluate
initiatives that DOD could take to eliminate the backlog and decrease
the delays.
What GAO Found:
As of March 31, 2004, DOD‘s security clearance backlog for industry
personnel was roughly 188,000 cases, and the time needed to conduct an
investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance during the last
3 fiscal years had increased by 56 days to a total of 375 days. DOD
identified three separate backlog estimates:
* more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances)
that were overdue but had not been submitted,
* over 101,000 new investigations or reinvestigations that had not been
completed within DOD‘s established time frames, and
* over 25,000 adjudications (a determination of clearance eligibility)
that had not been completed within DOD‘s established time frames.
From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that
it took DOD to conduct an investigation and determine clearance
eligibility for industry personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days.
Delays in conducting investigations and determining clearance
eligibility can increase national security risks, prevent industry
personnel from beginning or continuing work on classified programs and
activities, hinder industrial contractors from hiring the most
experienced and best qualified personnel, increase the time needed to
complete national-security-related contracts, and increase costs to the
federal government.
Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlogs and
reduce the amount of time needed to conduct an investigation and
determine security clearance eligibility for industry personnel.
Impediments include a large number of new clearance requests; an
increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances, which
require more time to process; inaccurate workload projections for both
the number and type of clearances needed for industry personnel; and
insufficient investigative and adjudicative workforces to handle the
large workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full
reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by
another department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that
can cause industry delays in filling positions and starting work on
government contracts. Also, the effects of past conditions, such as the
backlog itself, have been identified as impediments to timely
eligibility determinations. Furthermore, DOD does not have an
integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing the backlog
and delays.
DOD is considering several initiatives that might reduce security
clearance backlogs and processing times for determining clearance
eligibility for industry personnel. Among those initiatives that DOD is
exploring are (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation; (2)
establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; (3)
reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines; and
(4) implementing an automated verification process for identifying and
validating industrial security clearance requirements. These initiates
could, however, face implementation obstacles, such as the need to
change governmentwide regulations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to improve projections of
industry clearances required, eliminate reciprocity limitations,
develop an integrated plan to eliminate the backlog and reduce delays,
and analyze the feasibility of initiatives to reduce the backlog and
delays. DOD fully concurred with three recommendations and partially
concurred with one.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-632.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Backlog for Industry Personnel Was Roughly 188,000 Cases, and the
Time Needed for the Clearance Process Has Increased:
Impediments Hinder Elimination of the Backlog and Reduction of Time
Needed to Conduct an Investigation and Determine Eligibility for a
Clearance:
DOD Is Considering Several Initiatives to Decrease the Backlog and Time
Needed to Obtain a Security Clearance:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Excerpts from the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Information Gathered in Conducting an Investigation to
Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance:
Table 2: Comparison of Backlog Sizes As of September 30, 2003, and
March 31, 2004:
Table 3: Average Number of Days Needed to Conduct an Investigation and
Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance for Industry Personnel,
Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Table 4: Increase in the Average Number of Days Needed to Conduct an
Investigation and Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance for
Industry Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Table 5: Number of Clearance-Eligibility Determinations for Industry
Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Table 6: Increase in the Number of Clearance-Eligibility Determinations
for Industry Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Table 7: Proposed Phase 1 and Phase 2 Sources of Information for a
Phased Reinvestigation:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Process for
Industry Personnel:
Figure 2: Estimated Sizes of Industry Personnel and DOD-wide Backlogs
and Time Frames Used to Determine Backlogs, as of September 30, 2003:
Abbreviations:
ACES: Automated Continuing Evaluation System:
CAF: central adjudication facility:
DD: Department of Defense (form):
DISCO: Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOHA: Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals:
DSS: Defense Security Service:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
JPAS: Joint Personnel Adjudication System:
NACLC: national agency check/local agency check/credit check:
NISP: National Industrial Security Program:
NISPOM: National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual:
NSC: National Security Council:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
OUSD (I): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
PERSEREC: Defense Personnel Security Research Center:
PR: periodic reinvestigation:
PSI: personnel security investigation:
PSWG: Personnel Security Working Group:
SAP: special access program:
SCI: sensitive compartmented information:
SOR: statement of reasons:
SSBI: single-scope background investigation:
SSBI-PRsingle-scope background investigation-periodic reinvestigation:
TS PR: top secret periodic reinvestigation:
TS/SCI: top secret/sensitive compartmented information:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 26, 2004:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman: Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
As a result of an increased awareness of threats to our national
security stemming from the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, and increased efforts over the past decade to
privatize federal jobs, individuals working for private industry are
playing an increasingly larger role in national security work conducted
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Some
industry personnel hold jobs requiring access to classified information
that were formerly held by military members and federal employees.
These jobs allow them to work on classified programs and activities. To
handle classified information, industry personnel must hold a security
clearance. As of September 30, 2003, industry personnel held about
682,000 (or about 34 percent) of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued
security clearances.
To protect national security, the federal government must provide
high-quality and timely security clearances. As part of the process,
DOD determines whether industry personnel are eligible for a security
clearance by conducting a background investigation and adjudication
(determining eligibility for access to classified information).
However, some government and industry officials have expressed concerns
about the security clearance backlog--overdue security clearance
reinvestigations[Footnote 1] that have not been requested and new
investigations and adjudications that have not been completed within
established time frames--and the amount of time it takes DOD to conduct
an investigation and determine eligibility for a security clearance for
industry personnel.
As our previous work has shown, backlogs and delays in obtaining a
security clearance historically have been problems for DOD, and they
affect industry personnel as well as military members and federal
employees.[Footnote 2] In our February 2004 report, for example, we
identified several impediments that hinder DOD's ability to eliminate
its security clearance backlog and made recommendations for decreasing
the backlog and improving timeliness.[Footnote 3] The impediments and
recommendations apply to industry personnel as well as military members
and federal employees. Likewise, the House Committee on Government
Reform recently documented problems with DOD's personnel security
clearance program and recommended changes to, among other things,
reduce the backlog.[Footnote 4]
Recent legislation could affect DOD's security clearance process. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 authorized the
transfer of DOD's personnel security investigative functions and more
than 1,800 investigative employees to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM).[Footnote 5] However, as of May 6, 2004, this transfer
had not taken place. The transfer can occur only after the Secretary of
Defense certifies to Congress that certain conditions can be met and
the Director of OPM concurs with the transfer.
In response to your request, we reviewed the process that DOD uses to
determine security clearance eligibility for industry personnel. As
agreed with your offices, our objectives in this report concerning
industry personnel clearances are to (1) describe the size of the
security clearance backlog and changes during the last 3 fiscal years
in the amount of time it takes to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a clearance, (2) identify reasons for the
backlog and for delays in conducting investigations and determining
eligibility, and (3) evaluate initiatives that DOD could take to
eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays.
In conducting this review, we examined DOD's policy guidance,
regulations, instructions, and statistical evidence on the security
clearance process for industry personnel. In addition, we reviewed
reports by GAO, DOD, congressional staff, and other government
entities. We also interviewed DOD and industry officials; observed the
procedures used to process clearance information; and analyzed data
from the Case Control Management System's database, which manages the
collection and dissemination of personnel security data from receipt of
personnel security history to the monitoring, closing, transmitting,
and maintaining of personnel security records. We assessed the
reliability of the Case Control Management System's data used to
determine the extent of the backlog and the time needed to conduct an
investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance and determined
that the data for fiscal years 2001 and thereafter were sufficiently
reliable for the purpose of this report. In addition, we reviewed the
methodology, sampling, and modeling techniques used in the Defense
Personnel Security Research Center's reports on various DOD initiatives
relating to the clearance process. We conducted our review from July
2003 through May 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Additional information on our scope and methodology
can be found in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
As of March 31, 2004, DOD's security clearance backlog for industry
personnel was roughly 188,000 cases, and the time needed to conduct
an investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance had
increased by 56 days during the last 3 fiscal years. DOD identified
more than 61,000 reinvestigations that were overdue but had not been
submitted, over 101,000 backlogged investigations, and over 25,000
backlogged adjudications. In the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to conduct
an investigation and determine clearance eligibility for industry
personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days. Delays in conducting an
investigation and obtaining eligibility for a clearance can increase
national security risks, prevent industry personnel from beginning or
continuing work on classified programs and activities, hinder
industrial contractors from hiring the most experienced and best
qualified personnel, increase the time needed to complete national-
security-related contracts, and increase costs to the federal
government.
A number of impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog
and decrease the amount of time needed to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry personnel.
Impediments that affect the security clearance program for industry
overlap those that affect the DOD-wide program. As we reported in our
February 2004 report, these impediments include large investigative and
adjudicative workloads that are inaccurately projected.[Footnote 6]
These large workloads stem from the large number of clearance requests
in recent years and an increase in the proportion of requests requiring
top secret clearances, which take longer and are more expensive to
complete than secret clearances. The inaccurate forecasts for both the
number and type of security clearances needed for industry personnel
make it difficult for DOD to plan ahead and to size its investigative
and adjudicative workforce to handle the workload. Industrial
contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity--a policy that requires
acceptance by an agency of an equivalent personnel security clearance
and access granted by another agency--as an impediment that can cause
industry contractors delays in filling positions and starting work on
government contracts. In addition, the effects of past conditions--the
backlogs themselves, problems with DOD's automated system for managing
investigations, and additional national investigative requirements--
are still being felt. Furthermore, DOD does not have a management plan
to address the impediments in a comprehensive and integrated manner.
DOD and industry association officials have suggested a number of
initiatives to reduce the backlog and the amount of time needed to
conduct an investigation and determine eligibility for a security
clearance. Among the steps that DOD is exploring are conducting a
phased periodic reinvestigation, establishing a single adjudicative
facility for industry, reevaluating investigative standards and
adjudicative guidelines, and implementing an automated verification
process for identifying and validating industrial security clearance
requirements. Even if these initiatives prove promising, they face
obstacles that could prevent or limit their implementation. For
example, implementation of the phased periodic reinvestigation would
require using a process that does not comply with existing
governmentwide regulations.
We are making the following four recommendations to improve DOD's
ability to eliminate security clearance backlogs for industry personnel
and reduce the amount of time required to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a clearance: (1) improve the projections of
industrial personnel clearance requirements, (2) work to eliminate
unnecessary reciprocity limitations, (3) develop and implement an
overall management plan, and (4) determine the feasibility of
implementing promising initiatives. In addition, we made
recommendations in our February 2004 report on security clearances DOD-
wide that are important for industry personnel.[Footnote 7] Matching
workforce sizes to workloads and completing the implementation of the
DOD-wide automated system for adjudication management were among
those recommendations.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with
three of our four recommendations and partially concurred with our
recommendation to develop and implement an integrated, comprehensive
management plan to eliminate the backlog and reduce delays. Also, in
commenting on our recommendations, DOD noted that we gave little or no
acknowledgement to the many significant initiatives under way and
policy changes implemented by DOD in past years to expedite the
security clearance process. Our evaluation of DOD's comments documented
that we recognized the positive steps that DOD has taken along with the
failures that contributed to a long-standing problem. DOD's comments
and our evaluation of them are on page 39.
Background:
Within DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (OUSD [I]) is responsible for coordinating and
implementing DOD-wide policies related to access to classified
information.[Footnote 8] Within OUSD (I), the Defense Security Service
(DSS) is responsible for conducting background investigations and
administering the personnel security investigations program for DOD and
22 other federal agencies that allows industry personnel access to
classified information.[Footnote 9] Two offices are responsible for
adjudicating cases involving industry personnel. DSS's Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) adjudicates cases that
contain only favorable information or minor issues regarding security
concerns (e.g., some overseas travel by the individual), and the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) within the Defense Legal
Services Agency adjudicates cases that contain major security issues
(e.g., an individual's unexplained affluence or criminal
history).[Footnote 10]
As with military members and federal workers, industry personnel must
obtain a security clearance to gain access to classified information,
which is categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and
confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of
protection required for information and the amount of damage that
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to
national defense or foreign relations. For top secret information, the
expected damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause is "exceptionally grave damage;" for secret
information, it is "serious damage;" and for confidential information,
it is "damage."[Footnote 11] Individuals who need access to classified
information over a long period are required to periodically renew their
clearance (a reinvestigation). The time frames for reinvestigations are
5 years for top secret clearances, 10 years for secret clearances, and
15 years for confidential clearances.[Footnote 12]
To ensure the trustworthiness, judgment, and reliability of industry
personnel in positions with access to classified information, DOD
relies on a three-stage personnel security clearance process. (See
fig. 1.) This process, which is essentially the same for industry
personnel as it is for military members and federal employees, entails
(1) determining that the position requires a clearance and, if so,
submitting a request for a clearance to DSS; (2) conducting an initial
investigation or a reinvestigation; and (3) using the investigative
report to determine eligibility for access to classified information--
a procedure known as "adjudication.":
Figure 1: DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Process for
Industry Personnel:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Cases involving sensitive compartmented information (see footnote
38) access are sent through the requesting agency's central
adjudication facility for adjudication.
[End of figure]
In the preinvestigation stage, if a position requires a clearance, then
the industrial contractor must request an investigation of the
individual. The request could be the result of needing to fill a new
position for a recent contract, replacing an employee in an existing
position, renewing the clearance of an individual who is due for
reinvestigation, or processing a request for a future employee (up to
180 days) in advance of the hiring date. Once the requirement for a
security clearance is established, the industry employee completes a
personnel security questionnaire, and the industrial contractor submits
it to DSS. All industry requests for a DOD-issued clearance are
submitted to DSS, while requests for military members and federal
employees are submitted to either DSS or OPM.
In the investigation stage, DSS, OPM, or one of their contractors
conducts the actual investigation of the industry employee by using
standards that were established governmentwide in 1997[Footnote 13] and
implemented by DOD in 1998.[Footnote 14] As table 1 shows, the type of
information gathered in an investigation depends on the level of
clearance needed and whether an initial investigation or a
reinvestigation is being conducted. For either an initial investigation
or a reinvestigation for a confidential or secret clearance,
investigators gather much of the information electronically. For a top
secret clearance, investigators gather additional information that
requires much more time-consuming efforts, such as traveling, obtaining
police and court records, and arranging and conducting interviews.
DSS's Personnel Investigations Center forwards the completed
investigative report to DISCO.
Table 1: Information Gathered in Conducting an Investigation to
Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance:
Type of information gathered:
1. Personnel security questionnaire:
The subject's self-reported answers on a paper SF-86 form or an
electronic form;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: Yes;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
2. National agency check:
Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, military records
centers, Department of the Treasury, etc;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: Yes;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
3. Credit check:
Data from credit bureaus where the subject lived/worked/attended school
for at least 6 months;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: Yes;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
4. Local agency checks:
Data from law enforcement agencies where the subject lived/worked/
attended school during past 5 years;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: Yes;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
5. Date and place of birth:
Corroboration of information supplied on the personnel security
questionnaire;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: Yes;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: No.
Type of information gathered:
6. Citizenship:
For individuals born outside of the United States, verification of U.S.
citizenship directly from the appropriate registration authority;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: No.
Type of information gathered:
7. Education:
Corroboration of most recent or significant claimed attendance, degree,
or diploma;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
8. Employment:
Review of employment records and interviews with workplace references,
such as supervisors and coworkers;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
9. References:
Data from interviews with subject-identified and investigator-developed
leads;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
10. National agency check for spouse or cohabitant:
National agency check without fingerprint;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
11. Former spouse:
Data from interview(s) conducted with spouse(s) divorced within the
last 10 years;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
12. Neighborhoods:
Interviews with neighbors and verification of residence through records
check;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
13. Public records:
Verification of issues, such as bankruptcy, divorce, and criminal and
civil court cases;
Type of security clearance: Confidential or secret: No;
Initial investigation or reinvestigation:
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Initial investigation: Yes;
Type of security clearance: Top secret: Reinvestigation: Yes.
Type of information gathered:
14. Subject interview:
To collect relevant data, resolve significant inconsistencies, or both.
Source: DSS.
[End of table]
In the adjudicative stage, DISCO uses the information from the
investigative report to determine whether an individual is eligible for
a security clearance. If the report is determined to be a "clean" case-
-a case that contains no potential security issue or minor issues--then
DISCO adjudicators determine eligibility for a clearance. However, if
the case is determined to be an "issue" case--a case containing
information that might disqualify an individual for a clearance (e.g.,
foreign connections or drug-or alcohol-related problems)--then DISCO
forwards the case to DOHA adjudicators for the clearance-eligibility
decision. Regardless of which office renders the adjudication, DISCO
issues the clearance-eligibility decision and forwards this
determination to the industrial contractor. All adjudications are based
on 13 federal adjudicative guidelines established governmentwide in
1997 and implemented by DOD in 1998 (see app. II).[Footnote 15] DISCO
and DOHA serve as central adjudication facilities for industry
personnel, whereas DOD uses eight other central adjudication facilities
to approve, deny, or revoke eligibility for a security clearance for
military members and federal employees.
DOD's Backlog for Industry Personnel Was Roughly 188,000 Cases, and the
Time Needed for the Clearance Process Has Increased:
DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly
188,000 cases, and the time needed to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a clearance had increased by 56 days during
the last 3 fiscal years. As of March 31, 2004, DSS identified more
than 61,000 overdue but not submitted reinvestigations and about
127,000 investigations or adjudications that had been started but not
completed within set time frames. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal
year 2003, the average time that it took to conduct an investigation
and determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased
from 319 days to 375 days. DOD's delays in conducting an investigation
and determining clearance eligibility can, among other things, increase
national security risks and the costs to the federal government of
contractor performance on defense contracts.
Industry Personnel Backlog Was Roughly 188,000 Cases:
As of March 31, 2004, the industry personnel backlog was roughly
188,000 cases. DOD identified more than 61,000 reinvestigations that
were overdue but had not been submitted, over 101,000 backlogged
investigations, and over 25,000 backlogged adjudications. For the
25,000 completed investigations awaiting adjudication, DSS found that
over 19,000 of the cases were at DISCO and more than 6,300 of the cases
were at DOHA. However, as of March 31, 2004, DOHA independently
reported that it had eliminated its adjudication backlog. A
complicating factor in determining the size of the industrial personnel
backlog is that the backlog may be underestimated, since DSS had opened
relatively few cases between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2004, in
anticipation of the authorized transfer of the investigative function
from DSS to OPM.[Footnote 16] DSS had received, but not opened,
almost 69,200 new industry personnel requests received in the first
half of fiscal year 2004. Cases received in fiscal year 2004, which
have already exceeded the set time frames for completing the
investigation, are included in the 101,000 backlogged investigations
identified above.
To view the industry personnel backlog in its proper context, we
compared this backlog to the DOD-wide clearance backlog as of September
30, 2003, the date of the most recent DOD-wide data. For the
preinvestigation stage, DOD did not know the total number of personnel
DOD-wide with overdue requests for reinvestigation that had not been
submitted--even though their clearances exceeded the governmentwide
time frames for submitting reinvestigations.[Footnote 17] (See fig. 2.)
Any request for a reinvestigation that has not been submitted within a
specified time frame is overdue and considered part of the backlog. As
noted in our February 2004 report, DOD could not estimate the number of
military members and federal employees who had not requested a
reinvestigation.[Footnote 18] Similarly, in a prior report, we
indicated that DOD estimated its backlog of overdue but not submitted
reinvestigations at 300,000 cases in 1986 and 500,000 cases in
2000.[Footnote 19] Because DOD's Case Control Management System has
limited query capability, DOD was unable to identify the number of
overdue but not submitted industrial personnel reinvestigations as of
September 30, 2003. Although this system can identify overdue
reinvestigations for industry personnel when queried at a specific
point in time, it does not allow DOD to identify the number of military
members and federal employees whose reinvestigations are overdue but
not submitted at any time.
Figure 2: Estimated Sizes of Industry Personnel and DOD-wide Backlogs
and Time Frames Used to Determine Backlogs, as of September 30, 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The size of the total DSS-estimated backlog for industry personnel
doubled during the 6-month period ending on March 31, 2004. Table 2
compares the sizes of the investigative and adjudicative backlogs at
the end of fiscal year 2003 with the end of the first-half of fiscal
year 2004. This comparison does not include the backlog of overdue
reinvestigations that have not been submitted, because DSS was not able
to estimate that backlog as of September 30, 2003.
Table 2: Comparison of Backlog Sizes As of September 30, 2003, and
March 31, 2004:
Type of backlog: Investigative backlog;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Sept. 30, 2003: 44,600;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Mar. 31, 2004: 101,000;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 56,400;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 126%.
Type of backlog: Adjudicative backlog at DISCO;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Sept. 30, 2003: 12,800;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Mar. 31, 2004: 19,000;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 6,200;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 48.
Type of backlog: Adjudicative backlog at DOHA;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Sept. 30, 2003: 4,500;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Mar. 31, 2004: 6,300;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 1,800;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 40.
Type of backlog: Total;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Sept. 30, 2003: 61,900;
Estimated number of backlogged cases for industry personnel:
Mar. 31, 2004: 126,300;
Increase in backlog: Number of cases: 64,400;
Increase in backlog: Percentage of increase: 104%.
Sources: DSS and the Case Control Management System (data); GAO
(analysis).
Note: Although DSS provided the backlog estimates in table 2, DOHA
independently reported that, as of March 31, 2004, it had eliminated
its adjudicative backlog.
[End of table]
As of September 30, 2003, the estimated size of the investigative
backlog for industry personnel amounted to roughly 44,600 cases, or
17 percent of the larger DOD-wide backlog of approximately 270,000
cases, which included military members, federal employees, and industry
personnel. (See fig. 2.) DSS's time frames for completing
investigations range from 75 days to 180 days, depending on the
investigative requirements.[Footnote 20] For instance, an initial
secret investigation is required to be completed within 75 days, while
a secret or top secret reinvestigation has to be completed within
180 days. Some requests for investigations receive priority over other
requests. For example, requests for initial clearances receive priority
over requests for reinvestigations, since individuals awaiting initial
clearances cannot work whereas individuals who already have clearances
that are due for reinvestigation can continue to work.
As of September 30, 2003, the estimated size of the adjudicative
backlog for industry personnel totaled roughly 17,300 cases. This
number represented 19 percent of the roughly 93,000 cases in the DOD-
wide adjudicative backlog on that date. Of the 17,300 industry
personnel cases, some 12,800 were awaiting adjudication at DISCO (most
of which were reinvestigations) and the remaining 4,500 cases were
awaiting adjudication at DOHA. As of March 31, 2004, DOHA independently
reported that it had totally eliminated this backlog of cases that had
been awaiting initial adjudication by its security specialists.
Typically, about 14 to 20 percent of the cases received by DISCO are
eventually sent to DOHA for adjudication. As shown in figure 2, DISCO
and DOHA use different time frames for identifying cases as backlogged.
For example, DISCO uses 3 days for initial clearances and 30 days for
reinvestigations, while DOHA uses different time frames on the basis of
the number of cases on hand for 30 days that exceed a steady workload
of 2,150 cases each month. If DISCO's time frames were applied to
investigations awaiting adjudication at DOHA, then DOHA's backlog would
have been larger than that reported at the end of fiscal year 2003.
Average Time for Clearance Process Increased to More Than 1 Year for
Industry Personnel:
In the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003,
the average time that DOD took to determine clearance eligibility for
industry personnel rose from 319 days to 375 days, an increase of
18 percent. (See tables 3 and 4.) In other words, during fiscal year
2003, industry personnel waited an average of more than 1 year from the
time DSS received a personnel security questionnaire to the time that
DISCO issued an eligibility determination.
Table 3: Average Number of Days Needed to Conduct an Investigation and
Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance for Industry Personnel,
Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: All industry cases: 375;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Clean cases[A]: 332;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Issue cases[B]: 615.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: All industry cases: 343;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Clean cases[A]: 316;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Issue cases[B]: 629.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: All industry cases: 319;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Clean cases[A]: 301;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Issue cases[B]: 516.
Sources: DISCO and the Case Control Management System.
[NOTE:] Although the Case Control Management System can provide the
total elapsed time between opening a case and issuing the final
security clearance eligibility determination, it is not capable of
generating separate time estimates for the intermediate stages of the
clearance process. Nor does it have the capability to identify how much
time DOHA needed to adjudicate issue cases. Therefore, all of the time-
based findings include the time period beginning when personnel
security questionnaires were entered into the Case Control Management
System and ending when DISCO notified the industrial contractor of the
DISCO or DOHA adjudicators' decisions to determine eligibility for a
clearance.
[A] Includes investigative time and DISCO review time.
[B] Includes investigative time, DISCO and DOHA review time, and
additional time when some cases were sent back for additional
investigation or were appealed after a denial or revocation of a
clearance.
[End of table]
In fiscal year 2003, it took DOD an average of 332 days to determine
eligibility for "clean" cases, that is, those that had little or no
potential security issues. (See table 3.) By comparison, it took DOD an
average of 615 days to complete "issue" cases that contained
potentially more serious security matters.[Footnote 21] This time
period included DSS's investigation, DISCO's identification of
potential issues and its forwarding of an issue case to DOHA, DOHA's
need to request additional investigation in some instances, and DOHA's
adjudication of the case. The 615-day average for issue cases is an
overestimate because of problems with DSS's Case Control Management
System. The system is unable to distinguish between the end of the
investigative and adjudicative processes to determine eligibility for a
clearance and the continuing appeals process that may follow the denial
of a clearance request or the revocation of a clearance.
Table 4 shows that from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the
average number of days it took to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry personnel
increased by 56 days, or 18 percent.
Table 4: Increase in the Average Number of Days Needed to Conduct an
Investigation and Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance for
Industry Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Increases from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003:
Number of days;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: All industry cases: 56;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Clean cases[A]: 31;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Issue cases[B]: 99.
Increases from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003:
Percentage of days;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: All industry cases: 18%;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Clean cases[A]: 10%;
Average number of days to conduct an investigation and
determine eligibility for a security clearance for industry
personnel[A]: Issue cases[B]: 19%.
Sources: DISCO and the Case Control Management System.
[A] Includes investigative time and DISCO review time.
[B] Includes investigative time, DISCO and DOHA review time, and
additional time when some cases were sent back for additional
investigation or were appealed after a denial or revocation of a
clearance.
[End of table]
Delays Can Affect National Security and Contract Timeliness, Quality,
and Cost:
Delays in renewing security clearances for industry personnel and
others who are doing classified work caused by the backlog can lead to
a heightened risk of national security breaches. Such breaches involve
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, which can cause
up to "exceptionally grave damage" to national security. In a 1999
report, the Joint Security Commission II pointed out that delays in
initiating reinvestigations create risks to national security because
the longer the individuals hold clearances, the more likely they are to
be working with critical information and systems.[Footnote 22]
In addition, delays in determining security clearance eligibility for
industry personnel can affect the timeliness, quality, and cost of
contractor performance on defense contracts. A 2003 Information
Security Oversight Office[Footnote 23] report identified concerns about
the length of time required to process industrial security
clearances.[Footnote 24] According to the report, industrial contractor
officials who were interviewed said that delays in obtaining clearances
cost industry millions of dollars per year and affect personnel
resources.[Footnote 25] Interviewees reported having difficulty in
filling sensitive positions and retaining qualified personnel. The
report also stated that delays in the clearance process hampered
industrial contractors' ability to perform duties required by their
contracts. According to industry contractors, these delays increased
the amount of time needed to complete national-security-related
contracts. In interviews we conducted during our review, industrial
contractors told us about cases in which their company hired competent
applicants who already had the necessary security clearances, rather
than individuals who were more experienced or qualified but did not
have a clearance. As a result, according to industry association
officials, industrial contractors may not be performing government
contracts with the most experienced and best-qualified personnel, thus
diminishing the quality of the work. Moreover, industry association
representatives told us that defense contractors might offer monetary
incentives to attract new employees with clearances--for example, a
$15,000 to $20,000 signing bonus for individuals with a valid security
clearance, and a $10,000 bonus to current employees who recruit a new
employee with a clearance. In turn, the recruit's former company may
need to backfill the position, as well as settle for a lower level of
contract performance while a new employee is found, obtains a
clearance, and is trained. In addition, defense contractors may hire
new employees and begin paying them, but not be able to assign any work
to them--sometimes for a year or more--until they obtain a clearance.
Contractors may also incur lost-opportunity costs if prospective
employees decide to work elsewhere rather than wait to get a clearance.
We were told that contractors might pass these operating costs on to
the federal government--and the taxpayer--in the form of higher bids
for defense contracts.
Impediments Hinder Elimination of the Backlog and Reduction of Time
Needed to Conduct an Investigation and Determine Eligibility for a
Clearance:
A number of impediments hinder DOD's efforts to eliminate the clearance
backlog for industry personnel and reduce the time needed to conduct an
investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance. Impediments--
similar to those we identified DOD-wide in our February 2004 report--
also affect industry personnel and include large investigative and
adjudicative workloads resulting from a large number of clearance
requests in recent years and an increase in the proportion of requests
requiring top secret clearances, inaccurate workload projections, and
insufficient investigative and adjudicative workforces to handle the
large workloads.[Footnote 26] The underutilization of reciprocity is an
impediment that industrial contractors cited as an obstacle to timely
eligibility determinations. The effects of past conditions, such as the
backlog itself, problems with DSS's Case Control Management System, and
additional national investigative requirements, also have been
identified by DOD officials as impediments to timely eligibility
determinations. Furthermore, DOD does not have a management plan that
could help it address many of these impediments in a comprehensive and
integrative manner.
Clearance Workloads Are Large and Inaccurately Projected DOD-wide:
A major impediment is the large--but inaccurately projected--number of
requests for security clearances for industry personnel, military
members, and federal employees. A growing number of these requests are
for top secret clearances, which require more effort to process. The
large and inaccurately projected investigative and adjudicative
workloads for industry personnel cases must be viewed in the context of
increasing DOD-wide and governmentwide clearance requirements. The
large number of requirements is found in the form of both the number of
requests and a growing portion of the requests requiring top secret
clearances. Also, DOD has been unable to accurately project the number
and type of clearances required for industry personnel. Additional
inaccuracy--a potential surge in clearance requests--could result when
the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) is fully implemented and
DOD is able to identify overdue but not submitted reinvestigations
DOD-wide.[Footnote 27]
Large Number of Clearance Requests DOD-wide Taxes Overburdened Process:
The large number of clearance requests that DOD receives annually taxes
a process that already is experiencing backlogs and delays. These
requests are for industry personnel, as well as for military members
and federal employees. In fiscal year 2003, DOD submitted over
775,000 requests for investigations to DSS and OPM. This figure
included almost 143,000 requests for investigations of industry
personnel. According to OPM officials, OPM has received an
unprecedented number of requests for investigations governmentwide
since September 2001 and has identified this large number as the
primary reason for delays in granting clearances.
Table 5 shows an increase in the number of DOD eligibility
determinations for industry personnel made during each of the last
3 years.[Footnote 28] DOD issued about 63,000 more eligibility
determinations for industry personnel in fiscal year 2003 than it did
2 years earlier, an increase of 174 percent. During the same period,
the average number of days required to issue an eligibility
determination for industry personnel grew by 56 days, or about
18 percent. (See table 4.) In other words, the increase in the average
wait time was small compared to the increase in the number of cases.
Fiscal year 2001 is an important baseline for examining changes in
clearance processing because (1) major problems with DSS's Case Control
Management System had been largely corrected and (2) the end of fiscal
year 2001 occurred shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, which prompted an increase in clearance requests.
Table 5: Number of Clearance-Eligibility Determinations for Industry
Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Fiscal year: 2003;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: All industry cases: 99,652;
Number of clearance- eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Clean cases: 87,172;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Issue cases: 12,480.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: All industry cases: 86,226;
Number of clearance- eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Clean cases: 78,836;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Issue cases: 7,390.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: All industry cases: 36,370;
Number of clearance- eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Clean cases: 33,294;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Issue cases: 3,076.
[End of table]
Sources: DISCO and the Case Control Management System.
Table 6 shows that from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the
number of clearance eligibility determinations for industry personnel
increased by more than 63,000 cases, or 174 percent.
Table 6: Increase in the Number of Clearance-Eligibility Determinations
for Industry Personnel, Fiscal Years 2001-2003:
Increases from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003: Number of
cases;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: All industry cases: 63,282;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Clean cases: 53,878;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Issue cases: 9,404.
Increases from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003: Percentage of
cases;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: All industry cases: 174%;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Clean cases: 162%;
Number of clearance-eligibility determinations for industry
personnel: Issue cases: 306%.
Sources: DISCO and the Case Control Management System.
[End of table]
Proportion of Requests Requiring Top Secret Clearances Has Grown:
Beginning with fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2003, the
proportion of all requests requiring top secret clearances for industry
personnel grew from 17 to 27 percent. As indicated earlier, top secret
clearances require more information than that needed for secret
clearances. According to OUSD (I), top secret clearances take 8 times
more investigative effort to complete and 3 times more adjudicative
effort to review than do secret clearances. In addition, a top secret
clearance must be renewed twice as often--every 5 years instead of
every 10 years for a secret clearance. The full effect of requesting a
top secret, rather than a secret, clearance thus is 16 times the
investigative effort and 6 times the adjudicative effort.
The increased demand for top secret clearances also has budget
implications for DOD. In fiscal year 2003, security investigations
obtained through DSS cost $2,640 for an initial investigation for a top
secret clearance, $1,591 for a reinvestigation of a top secret
clearance, and $328 for an initial investigation for a secret
clearance. Thus, over a 10-year period, DOD would spend $4,231 (in
current-year dollars) to investigate and reinvestigate an industry
employee for a top secret clearance, a cost 13 times higher than the
$328 it would require to investigate an individual for a secret
clearance.
Inaccurate Projections for Clearance Workload Hamper Planning:
DOD's inability to accurately estimate the number and type of clearance
requests that it will have to process for industry personnel during the
next fiscal year is part of a bigger DOD-wide workload-estimation
problem. For fiscal year 2001, DOD estimated that it would receive
about 850,000 requests for clearances DOD-wide; however, the actual
number of submissions was 18 percent lower than estimated. In contrast,
DOD estimated that it would receive about 720,000 and 690,000 new
requests DOD-wide in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively, but the
actual numbers of submissions were 19 and 13 percent higher than
expected.
Although DSS has made efforts to improve its projections of industry
personnel security clearance requirements, problems remain. For
example, inaccurate forecasts for both the number and type of security
clearances needed for industry personnel make it difficult for DOD to
plan ahead and to size its investigative and adjudicative workforce to
handle the workload and fund its security clearance program. For fiscal
year 2003, DSS reported that the actual cost of industry personnel
investigations was almost 25 percent higher than had been projected.
DOD officials believed that these projections were inaccurate primarily
because DSS received a larger proportion of requests for initial top
secret background investigations and top secret reinvestigations, both
of which require considerably more effort to process. Since fiscal year
2001, DSS has conducted an annual survey of security officers at
cleared contractor facilities over which DSS has cognizance to obtain
their best estimates of the number of background investigations they
would require over the next 7 years.[Footnote 29] Using those estimates
and historical data, DSS then prepares its annual security clearance
projections for industry personnel. For fiscal year 2003, DSS asked
each facility for the number and types of clearances that they would
need. DSS said that about 25 percent of the approximately 11,000
cleared contractor facilities voluntarily responded to this request,
but that 80 to 90 percent of the facilities with the largest dollar
contracts responded. DSS officials attributed the inaccurate projection
estimate to the use of some industry employees on more than one
contract and often for different defense agencies; the movement of
employees from one company to another; and unanticipated world events,
such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Currently, DSS does
not receive data from DOD's acquisition community that issues the
contracts--primarily military service and defense agency acquisition
managers--to help DSS more accurately forecast the number and type of
industrial personnel security clearances that would be required to
implement or support their particular acquisition programs and
activities.
DOD is developing a plan to link the number of investigations required
for contract performance to an electronic database with personnel
clearance information, and to require that the contracting officer
authorize the number and type of investigations required. According to
DOD, this will allow DSS to better monitor requirements and tie them to
the budget process. Also, linking the electronic personnel clearance
information database with the contract database maintained by the
acquisition community would tie the security clearance process more
closely to the acquisition process.
Surge in Requests May Occur When JPAS Is Fully Implemented DOD-wide:
DOD may experience a surge in security clearance requests DOD-wide when
JPAS is fully implemented.[Footnote 30] This system will enable DOD to
identify overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted.
However, any surge in the number of unexpected reinvestigations may be
identified too late to have the extra workload planned and budgeted for
the next fiscal year.
DOD's inability to fully anticipate the number of reinvestigations that
will be submitted is the result of continued delays in implementing
JPAS, a system that DOD's Chief Information Officer has identified as a
mission critical system. In response to a recommendation in our August
2000 report,[Footnote 31] DOD said that JPAS would be implemented in
fiscal year 2001 and would provide an automated means of tracking and
counting overdue but not submitted requests for reinvestigations. At
the time of our February 2004 report, which again recommended the
implementation of JPAS, OUSD (I) officials said that they expected to
fully implement JPAS during January 2004.[Footnote 32] Currently,
OUSD (I) officials project that JPAS will be fully implemented sometime
in fiscal year 2004.
Insufficient Investigative and Adjudicative Staff Cannot Handle Large
Workloads:
Insufficient investigative and adjudicative workforces, given the
current and projected workloads, serve as additional barriers to
eliminating the backlog and reducing security clearance processing
times for industry personnel. DOD partially concurred with our February
2004 recommendation to identify and implement steps to match the sizes
of the investigative and adjudicative workforces to the clearance
request workload.[Footnote 33] DOD--like the rest of the federal
government--is competing for a limited number of investigative staff.
In contrast, DOD has more control over its adjudicative capacity and
has taken steps to increase those resources.
Too Few Investigative Staff Are Available to Meet Government and DOD
Needs:
The limited number of investigative staff available to process requests
from DOD and other government agencies hinders DOD's efforts to
eliminate the backlog and issue timely clearances for industry
personnel. According to an OPM official, DOD and OPM together need
roughly 8,000 full-time-equivalent investigative staff to eliminate
the security clearance backlogs and deliver timely investigations to
their customers.[Footnote 34] However, in our February 2004 report, we
estimated that DOD and OPM have around 4,200 full-time-equivalent
investigative staff who are either federal employees or contract
investigators, slightly more than half as many as needed.[Footnote 35]
In addition to having too few investigators, DOD may experience a
short-term decrease in productivity in the near future as DSS
investigative employees are pulled away from their investigations to
receive training on OPM's case management system and investigative
procedures. In December 2003, advisors to the OPM Director expressed
concerns about financial risks associated with the transfer of DSS's
investigative functions and 1,855 investigative staff authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The advisors
therefore recommended that the transfer not occur, at least during
fiscal year 2004. On February 6, 2004, DSS and OPM signed an
interagency agreement that leaves the investigative functions and DSS
personnel in DOD and provides DSS personnel with training on OPM's case
management system and investigative procedures as well as access to
that system. According to our calculations, if all 1,855 DSS
investigative employees complete the 1-week training program as
planned, the loss in productively will be equivalent to 35 person-years
of investigator time. Also, other short-term decreases in productivity
will result while DSS's investigative employees become accustomed to
using OPM's system and procedures.
Too Few Adjudicative Staff Are Available to Meet Industry Needs:
Similarly, an adjudicative backlog of industry personnel cases
developed because DISCO and DOHA did not have an adequate number of
adjudicative personnel on hand. DOD personnel and industry officials
identified several reasons why adjudicator staff have not been able to
process requests within their established time frames. These include an
increase in the number of investigations being sent to DISCO and DOHA
as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the larger
number of completed investigations stemming from DOD's contract with
OPM and private-sector investigation companies. The adjudicative
backlog also resulted from problems in the operations of DSS's Case
Control Management System.
DISCO and DOHA have taken steps to decrease the backlog and delays by
augmenting their adjudicative staff. As of September 30, 2003, DISCO
had 56 nonsupervisory adjudicators on board, and 6 additional
nonsupervisory adjudicator applicants are currently undergoing
investigations for their security clearances. By contrast, only
33 nonsupervisory adjudicators were available in 2001. To achieve part
of this increase in the number of adjudicators, DISCO moved
nonadjudicative customer service employees into adjudicative positions
and filled the vacated positions with contract personnel. In addition,
DISCO authorized overtime for its adjudicative staff. As of September
30, 2003, DOHA had 23 permanent federal adjudicators as well as 46
temporary adjudicators hired specifically to help reduce its
adjudicative backlog. In 2001, after DOHA identified a growing
adjudicative workload of industry personnel cases that exceeded its
capacity, it received authority to hire 46 additional term-appointment
adjudicators. After establishing this plan to eliminate its backlog of
cases awaiting initial adjudication by its security specialists, DOHA
requested authority to hire additional permanent adjudicators to ensure
that a backlog would not recur.
Reciprocity of Access Is Not Fully Utilized:
While the reciprocity of security clearances within DOD has not been a
problem for industry personnel, reciprocity of access to certain types
of information and programs within the federal government has not been
fully utilized, thereby preventing some industry personnel from working
and increasing the workload on already overburdened investigative and
adjudicative staff.[Footnote 36] According to DOD and industry
officials, a 2003 Information Security Oversight Office report on the
National Industrial Security Program,[Footnote 37] and our analysis,
reciprocity of clearances appears to be working throughout most of DOD.
However, the same cannot be said for access to sensitive compartmented
information and special access programs[Footnote 38] within DOD or
transferring clearances and access from DOD to other agencies.
Similarly, a recent report by the Defense Personnel Security Research
Center concluded that aspects of reciprocity for industrial contractors
appear not to work well and that the lack of reciprocity between
special access programs was a particular problem for industry
personnel, who often work for many of these programs
simultaneously.[Footnote 39]
The extent of the problems that are caused by the lack of full
reciprocity is unknown. In 2001, the Defense Personnel Security
Research Center proposed collecting quantitative data on the number and
type of personnel affected by reciprocity. However, the center
determined that the differences in how the various agencies handled
tracking these personnel situations proved so great and the databases
they used so various that center researchers could not overcome these
incompatibilities in the time and with the resources they had for the
study. This situation has occurred despite the establishment in 1997
(and implementation by DOD in 1998) of governmentwide investigative
standards and adjudicative guidelines. In 1999, the interagency Joint
Security Commission II noted, "With these standards and guidelines in
place, there is no longer a legitimate reason to investigate or
readjudicate when a person moves from one agency's security purview to
another."[Footnote 40] More recently, the chair of the federal
interagency Personnel Security Working Group indicated that the lack of
full reciprocity is a major concern governmentwide, not just within
DOD.
Industry association officials told us that reciprocity of access to
certain types of information and programs, especially the lack of full
reciprocity in the intelligence community, is one of the top concerns
of their members. One association provided us with several examples of
access problems that industry personnel with DOD-issued security
clearances face when working with intelligence agencies. For example,
the association cited different processes and standards used by
intelligence agencies, such as guidelines for (1) the type of
investigations and required time frames, (2) type of polygraph tests,
and (3) refusal to accept adjudication decisions made by other
agencies. Industry association officials stated that these access
problems are becoming more common, especially for firms with multiple
contracts with different intelligence agencies.
Industry officials identified reciprocity concerns for the following
situations, among others:
* Sensitive compartmented information and special access programs--The
DOD directive that establishes policy, responsibilities, and procedures
for industry employee clearances explicitly provides that the directive
"[d]oes not apply to cases for access to sensitive compartmented
information or a special access program."[Footnote 41] The procedures
used in determining access to sensitive compartmented information and
special access programs are different from those used in the normal
clearance process. These procedures may involve applying more selective
and stringent investigative and adjudicative criteria. The reciprocity
of sensitive compartmented information eligibility determinations is
left up to each organization or agency that may have additional
investigative requirements that must be met (e.g., a polygraph test)
prior to granting access. While DOD requires that special access
program eligibility determinations for military members and federal
employees be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all DOD
components, this requirement does not apply to industry personnel.
DOD components and some of the agencies serviced by DISCO do not always
accept the interim clearances that DISCO issues to industry employees.
DISCO provides interim clearances when an individual's case does not
identify any potential security issues after a review of initially
gathered information. DISCO reported that it issues interim clearances
to about 95 percent of those industry personnel applying for a secret
clearance within 3 days of receiving the clearance request. However,
according to industrial contractors, their ability to use industry
personnel with interim clearances on some contracts but not on others
limits their staffing options. In addition, DSS and contractor
association officials told us that some personnel with an interim
clearance could not start work because an interim clearance does not
provide access to specific types of national security information, such
as sensitive compartmented information, special access programs, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization data, and restricted data.[Footnote 42]
Industry associations told us that intelligence agencies do not accept
DOD's waivers, even with a letter of consent from the employee's former
company or a verification letter by the agency that requested the
original investigation and granted the employee the clearance. To
eliminate the need to perform another investigation, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense may use a waiver to reinstate or convert a
security clearance under certain circumstances.[Footnote 43] For
example, a security clearance can be converted if an individual leaves
the federal government and subsequently begins to work for an
industrial contractor, provided that (1) no more than 24 months have
elapsed since the date the clearance was terminated, (2) there is no
known adverse information, and (3) the most recent investigation meets
both the scope and completion time frame for the clearance being
reinstated. By using waivers for reinstatements and conversions, DOD
can eliminate the need to perform another investigation.
* Smith Amendment--Many DOD and industry officials view the Smith
Amendment[Footnote 44] as an impediment to reciprocity because people
who once worked for DOD or other agencies may not be eligible to work
for DOD when it is time to renew their clearance because of selected
potential security issues. The Smith Amendment, which applies only to
DOD, specifies that DOD should not grant or renew a clearance for
anyone who (1) has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding
1 year, (2) is an unlawful user of or is addicted to a controlled
substance, (3) is mentally incompetent, or (4) has been discharged or
dismissed from the military under dishonorable conditions. Therefore, a
clearance previously granted by another federal agency or through DOD
would be ineligible for a subsequent DOD clearance if one or more of
the four prohibitions were applicable. However, the Secretary of
Defense or one of the Service secretaries may authorize an exception to
the Smith Amendment prohibitions, but only in cases where the
individual seeking the clearance has been sentenced to imprisonment for
a term exceeding 1 year or has been dishonorably discharged from the
Armed Forces.
Ordinarily, the adjudicators are to consider mitigating factors and
available, reliable information about the person--past and present,
favorable and unfavorable--in reaching an "overall common sense"
clearance-eligibility determination that gives careful consideration
to the 13 adjudicative guidelines. (See app. II.) According to the
guidelines, any doubt about whether a clearance for access to
classified information is consistent with national security is to be
resolved in favor of national security. However, under the Smith
Amendment, such mitigating factors should not be considered when one or
more of the four elements are present in the investigative report on a
person applying for a clearance through DOD--unless the Secretary of
Defense or one of the Service secretaries issues a waiver.
Effects of Past Conditions Still Being Felt:
A number of past conditions also serve as impediments to issuing timely
eligibility determinations for industry personnel. The backlogs
themselves contribute to delays because most new requests for
investigations remain largely dormant until earlier requests are
completed. Backlogged cases might delay the start of an initial secret
clearance, for instance, until 60 days after it is received by DSS. In
such a hypothetical situation, DSS would have only 15 days, rather than
the full 75 days, to complete the investigation before having the case
labeled as "backlog." Similarly, the adjudicative backlog might lead to
a delay in reviewing new investigative reports, thereby increasing the
likelihood that a new adjudication will be categorized as "backlog"
before an eligibility determination is provided.
In addition, problems with DSS's Case Control Management System during
fiscal years 1999 and 2000 affected the processing of security
clearances in subsequent years. These problems included limiting the
dissemination of leads to investigative staff and, thereby, limiting
the flow of completed cases to adjudication facilities, such as DISCO
and DOHA. Although DSS officials indicate that the Case Control
Management System problems have been corrected, the February 2004
interagency agreement between DSS and OPM allows DOD to replace that
system with OPM's case management system. An OUSD (I) official said
that DOD estimates it will save about $100 million over 5 years by
avoiding the need to update and maintain DSS's Case Control Management
System.
According to DSS officials, additional national investigative
requirements, which were implemented by DOD in 1998, have strained
nationwide investigative resources.[Footnote 45] For instance, the
current requirement for a secret clearance calls for investigative
staff to conduct national agency checks, local area checks, and a
credit check. Previously, a secret clearance required only national
agency checks. DOD has had over 5 years to address this issue and
allocate sufficient resources to handle the additional requirements.
Lack of Overall Management Plan Exacerbates Clearance Backlog and
Delays:
Currently, DOD has numerous plans to address pieces of the backlog
problem but does not have an overall management plan to eliminate
permanently the current investigative and adjudicative backlogs, reduce
the delays in determining clearance eligibility for industry personnel,
and overcome the impediments that could allow such problems to recur.
DOD has a plan to engineer a business process for personnel security,
transform DSS as an agency, complete and closeout DSS's old
investigative work, and decommission DSS's Case Control Management
System.[Footnote 46] DOD also has a transition plan to transfer DSS's
investigative function to OPM. The terms and conditions of that
transfer are contained in the Memorandum of Understanding between DOD
and OPM (Jan. 24, 2003). Because the transition has not occurred yet,
DSS signed the Interagency Agreement with OPM (Feb. 6, 2004) that
leaves the investigative functions and DSS personnel in DOD and
provides DSS personnel with training on OPM's case management system
and investigative procedures as well as access to that system. Finally,
DSS has a draft Fiscal Year 2004 Performance Plan (Mar. 25, 2004) that
is intended to serve as an interim plan pending final implementation of
DSS's strategic plan as a transformed agency. Rather than including
specific performance measures seen in previous plans, this plan
provides an accounting of milestones that must be achieved for the
agency's transformation. None of these plans address eliminating
permanently the investigative and adjudicative backlogs, reducing the
delays in conducting investigations and determining eligibility for
clearances, or overcoming the impediments. In addition, none of these
plans address budgets, personnel resources, costs, or potential
obstacles and options for overcoming the obstacles to eliminate the
backlog and reduce the delays.
DOD's numerous plans do not include establishing processwide objectives
and outcome-related goals; setting priorities; identifying resources;
establishing performance measures; and providing milestones for
reducing, and eventually eliminating, the backlog and delays. The
principles of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
provide federal agencies with a basis for such a results-oriented
framework that includes setting goals, measuring performance, and
reporting on the degree to which goals are met.[Footnote 47]
DOD Is Considering Several Initiatives to Decrease the Backlog and Time
Needed to Obtain a Security Clearance:
DOD and industry association officials have suggested a number of
initiatives to reduce the backlog and delays in conducting an
investigation and issuing eligibility for a security clearance. They
indicated that these steps could supplement actions that DOD has
implemented in recent years or has agreed to implement as a result of
our recommendations or those of others. Even if positive effects would
result from these initiatives, other obstacles, such as the need to
change investigative standards, coordinate these policy changes with
other agencies, and ensure reciprocity, could prevent their
implementation or limit their use.
* Phased periodic reinvestigations could make staff available for more
productive uses. A phased approach to periodic reinvestigations
involves conducting a reinvestigation in two phases; a more extensive
reinvestigation would be conducted only if potential security issues
were identified in the initial phase. Table 7 identifies proposed
sources of information for both parts of a phased periodic
reinvestigation. The more productive sources for investigative leads
are shown in phase 1. Investigative staff would gather information from
phase 2 sources only in those cases where potential security issues
were uncovered in phase 1.
Table 7: Proposed Phase 1 and Phase 2 Sources of Information for a
Phased Reinvestigation:
Phase 1 sources:
Credit report;
Polygraph (if used);
National agency check of subject;
Personnel Security Questionnaire;
National agency check of spouse/cohabitant;
Local agency checks;
Financial Center Title 31;
Reports received between reinvestigations;
Subject interview;
Employment interviews;
Ex-spouse interview;
Security records;
Security manager interview;
Medical records;
Medical interview;
Employment records;
Military records;
Public records;
All other sources not in Phase 2;
Phase 2 sources:
Listed reference interviews;
Developed reference interviews;
Residence interviews;
Residence records.
Source: Defense Personnel Security Research Center.
[End of table]
Recent research has shown that periodic reinvestigations for top secret
clearances conducted in two phases can save at least 20 percent of the
normal investigative effort with almost no loss in identifying critical
issues for adjudication.[Footnote 48] This research included phasing
analyses conducted by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center
with 4,721 reinvestigations for top secret clearances, a pilot test
conducted by DSS, independent research at the Central Intelligence
Agency and National Reconnaissance Office, and an evaluation of DSS's
implementation of a phased reinvestigation in fiscal year 2003
conducted by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center. This
research has shown that the most productive sources (phase 1 sources)
can be used to identify investigations in which the least productive
sources (phase 2 sources) are likely to yield issue information.
Analyses showed a phased approach missed very little potential security
issue information and identified all of the cases in which agencies
took some form of action against individuals (e.g., a suspension of
their clearance or warnings, monitoring, or reprimands). According to
DSS, this initiative is designed to use the limited investigative
resources in the most productive manner and reduce clearance-processing
time by eliminating the routine use of low-yield information sources on
many investigations and concentrating information-gathering efforts on
high-yield sources. Research conducted by the Defense Personnel
Security Research Center suggests the phased periodic reinvestigation
represents a way of balancing the risks of a rare missed issue and the
costs associated with a normal reinvestigation. While analyses have not
been conducted to evaluate how the implementation of phasing would
affect the investigative backlog, the implementation of phasing could
be a factor in reducing the backlog by decreasing some of the hours of
fieldwork required in some reinvestigations.
Even if additional testing confirms promising earlier findings that the
procedure very rarely fails to identify critical issues, several
obstacles could prevent the implementation or limit the use of this
initiative. First, the phased reinvestigation does not comply with the
Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to
Classified Information (Standard C).[Footnote 49] Currently, Standard C
mandates the same investigative scope for all reinvestigations for top
secret clearances, whereas the phased approach uses different standards
for clean versus potential issue cases. Second, any change in Standard
C would necessitate a corresponding change in the Code of Federal
Regulations. Third, without modification of Standard C, reciprocity
problems could result if some agencies use the phased reinvestigation
and other agencies refuse to accept eligibility determinations based on
it. DOD is now actively working to change Standard C so that a phased
reinvestigation would be an option under the national standards.
* Single adjudicative facility for industry could reduce adjudicative
time. Under this initiative, DOD would consolidate DOHA's adjudicative
function with that of DISCO to create a single adjudicative facility
for all industrial contractor cases. At the same time, DOHA would
retain its hearings and appeals function. According to OUSD (I)
officials, this consolidation would streamline the adjudicative
process for industry personnel and make it more coherent and uniform. A
single adjudicative facility would serve as the clearinghouse for all
industrial contractor-related issues.
DOD's Senior Executive Council is considering this consolidation as
part of a larger review of DOD's security clearance process. From 1991
through 1998, studies by the Defense Personnel Security Research
Center, Joint Security Commission, and DOD Office of the Inspector
General concluded that the present decentralized structure of DOD's
adjudication facilities had drawbacks. Two of the studies recommended
that DOD consolidate its adjudication facilities (with the exception of
the National Security Agency).
An OUSD (I) official told us that the consolidation would provide
greater flexibility in using adjudicators to meet changes in the
workload and could eliminate some of the time required to transfer
cases from DISCO to DOHA. If the consolidation occurred, DISCO
officials said that their operations would not change much, except for
adding adjudicators. On the other hand, DOHA officials said that the
current division between DISCO and DOHA of adjudicating clean versus
issue cases works very well and that combining the adjudicative
function for industry into one facility could negatively affect DOHA's
ability to prepare denials and revocations of industry personnel
clearances during appeals. They told us that the consolidation would
have very little impact on the timeliness and quality of adjudications.
* Evaluation of the investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines
could reveal efficiencies. This initiative would involve an evaluation
of the investigative standards used by personnel security clearance
investigators to help identify requirements that do not provide
significant information relevant to adjudicative decisions. By
eliminating the need to perform certain tasks associated with these
requirements, investigative resources could be used more efficiently.
For example, DSS officials told us that less than one-half of 1 percent
of the potential security issues identified during an investigation are
derived from neighborhood checks; however, this information source
accounts for about 14 percent of the investigative time.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required the
Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney
General, and Director of OPM to jointly submit to Congress by
February 15, 2004, a report on the utility and effectiveness of the
current security background investigations and security clearance
procedures of the federal government, including a comparison of the
costs and benefits of conducting background investigations for secret
clearances with the costs and benefits of conducting full field
background investigations.[Footnote 50] At the time of our report, the
report mandated in the intelligence act had not been delivered to
Congress.
The modification of existing investigative standards would involve
using risk management principles based on a thorough evaluation of the
potential loss of information. Like a phased periodic reinvestigation,
this initiative would require changes in the Common Investigative
Standards. In addition, the evaluation would need to be coordinated
within DOD, intelligence agencies, and others.
* Requirements-identification improvements could optimize resources
and reduce backlog and delays. This initiative would use an automated
verification process to identify and validate security clearance
requirements for industry personnel. DSS officials stated that a
process to verify requirements could help DSS allocate investigative
and adjudicative resources to projected workloads, thereby reducing the
backlog and delays. DOD is considering implementing this initiative to
help project the number and type of clearances that industry may need
for a specific acquisition program. According to DSS officials, more
stability is needed in workload projections to allow the government and
industrial contractors to size their investigative workforces with the
workload. This projection becomes more critical because the
investigative function is labor-intensive and it can take 1 year to
hire and train investigators before they are able to work
independently. Implementing this initiative might require additional
data gathering and reporting by DOD's acquisition community that issues
contracts--primarily military service and defense agency acquisition
managers, especially when contracts are being awarded. Although
industry currently provides this information voluntarily, the
acquisition community is not required to provide this information.
* Automated Continuing Evaluation System may result in additional
workloads. The last initiative involves testing and eventually
implementing the Automated Continuing Evaluation System, which is being
developed by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center. This
automated assessment tool is designed to provide automated database
checks and identify issues of security concern on cleared individuals
between the specified periodic reinvestigations. The system does not
require an individual to complete any additional paperwork before a
query is undertaken. In addition, the system automatically notifies
adjudication facilities when an individual with a security clearance
engages in an act of security concern. This notification occurs sooner
than is currently possible. The system underwent a large-scale pilot
program in 2002 and was subsequently modified. Operational field
testing began in April 2004.
DOD officials acknowledge that the Automated Continuing Evaluation
System alone would not help to eliminate the backlog and, in fact, may
initially result in larger investigative and adjudicative workloads.
However, they maintain that, when combined with the phased periodic
reinvestigation, the system could help reduce workloads and the
backlog, and ultimately improve personnel security.
This initiative would face some of the same obstacles as those raised
for a phased periodic reinvestigation--the need to change
governmentwide investigative standards and concerns about reciprocity.
Conclusions:
The backlog of clearances for industry personnel and delays in
conducting investigations and determining eligibility for a clearance
must be considered in the larger context of DOD-wide backlogs and
delays. Many of the impediments and initiatives identified in this
report apply to both industry-specific and DOD-wide situations. Taken
together, these impediments hamper DOD's ability to eliminate the
security clearance backlog and reduce the amount of time it takes to
determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel.
DSS is unable to accurately project the number and type of security
clearances needed for industry personnel as well as military members
and civilian employees. This makes it difficult to determine budgets
and staffing for investigative and adjudicative workforces. Without
close coordination and cooperation among all interested parties--OUSD
(I), DOD components issuing the contracts, industrial contractors, and
the acquisition community--inaccurate projections of the number and
type of clearance requirements for industrial personnel could continue.
The reciprocity of security clearances within DOD has not been a
problem for industry personnel; however, reciprocity for access to
certain types of information and programs within the federal government
has not been fully utilized. As a result, some who already have
clearances issued by one agency face delays in starting to work on
contracts for other agencies. In addition, the failure to utilize
reciprocity unnecessarily increases the investigative and adjudicative
workloads on the already overburdened investigative and adjudicative
staff.
In recent years, DOD has reacted to the impediments in a piecemeal
fashion rather than by establishing an integrated approach that
incorporates objectives and outcome-related goals, sets priorities,
identifies resources, establishes performance measures, and provides
milestones for permanently eliminating the backlog and reducing delays.
Without such an integrated, comprehensive plan, DOD's efforts to
improve its process for conducting security clearance background
investigations and adjudications for industry personnel will likely
continue to proceed in a piecemeal fashion.
DOD and industry officials have suggested a number of initiatives that
could help eliminate the backlog and reduce clearance delays. However,
it remains unclear whether any single initiative--or combination of
initiatives--can have a direct and immediate impact on the backlog or
delays. Even if positive effects would result from these initiatives,
other obstacles, such as the need to change investigative standards,
coordinate these policy changes with other agencies, and ensure
reciprocity, could prevent or limit the implementation of the
initiatives.
We made recommendations in our February 2004 report on security
clearances for DOD personnel that also apply to industry
personnel.[Footnote 51] Among other things, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence to (1) identify and implement steps to match the sizes of
the investigative and adjudicative workforces to the clearance request
workload and (2) complete the implementation of the Joint Personnel
Adjudication System. In its written response on a draft of that report,
DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation and concurred
with the second recommendation. Since we have already recommended these
actions in the larger context of DOD personnel, we are not repeating
them in this report for industry personnel.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the security clearance process for industry personnel as
well as for military members and federal employees, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence to take the following four actions:
* improve the projections of clearance requirements for industrial
personnel--both the number and type of clearances--by working with DOD
components, industrial contractors, and the acquisition community to
identify obstacles and implement steps to overcome them;
* work with DOD components and other agencies to eliminate unnecessary
reciprocity limitations for industry personnel whose eligibility for a
clearance is granted by DOD;
* develop and implement an integrated, comprehensive management plan to
eliminate the backlog, reduce the delays in conducting investigations
and determining eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the
impediments that could allow such problems to recur; and:
* analyze the feasibility of implementing initiatives designed to
reduce the backlog and delays, prioritize the initiatives, and make
resources available for testing and implementing the initiatives, which
could include, but are not limited to, those evaluated in this report.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with
three of our four recommendations: improve projections of clearance
requirements for industrial personnel, eliminate unnecessary
reciprocity limitations, and analyze the feasibility of initiatives to
reduce the backlog and delays. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendation to develop and implement an integrated, comprehensive
management plan.
In its partial concurrence, DOD noted that it had numerous plans to
improve its process and said we did not identify why a single,
comprehensive plan would improve its ability to achieve success. As our
report points out, there are several reasons for the recommendation.
Specifically, the plans that DOD provided to us often were missing
details on budgets, personnel resources, costs, milestones with
specific dates for accomplishment, identification of potential
obstacles, and options for overcoming the obstacles if they should
occur. Also, the use of multiple smaller plans does not provide DOD
with a bigger picture of how it should strategically plan and
prioritize its personnel and budget resources and actions required
simultaneously in two or more plans. Continued use of piecemeal
planning could result in a failure to recognize problems not yet
addressed or planned actions that conflict with those being
implemented--or planned as part of another effort. Moreover, DOD cited
its plan to transfer DSS's investigative functions and personnel to
OPM. While the plan would result in DOD eliminating its responsibility
for conducting the investigations, no new investigative personnel would
result, if or when the transfer occurs. Therefore, it is not apparent
how the transfer will help DOD eliminate its backlog and reduce
clearance delays. DOD's failure to identify contingency actions if the
transfer did not occur according to its plans already has delayed the
start of nearly 70,000 investigations for industry personnel in fiscal
year 2004. We continue to believe our recommendation has merit and
should be implemented.
Also, in commenting on our recommendations, DOD made several points
that need to be addressed. DOD noted that we gave little
acknowledgement to the many significant initiatives under way and no
acknowledgement to policy changes implemented by DOD in past years to
expedite the process. Our report highlights several steps DOD has
taken. First, we acknowledged actions that DOD has taken in recent
years to address the backlog--and handle the 174 percent increase from
fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003 in the number of clearance
eligibility determinations for industry personnel, such as contracting
for additional investigative services, hiring more adjudicators, and
authorizing overtime for adjudicative staff. Second, we discuss in some
detail five significant initiatives that DOD is considering to reduce
the backlog and delays. DOD noted that its initiatives "are gradually
improving the process." This DOD statement supports our conclusion that
it remains unclear whether any of the initiatives--individually or
collectively--can have a direct and immediate impact on the backlog or
delays. Third, we acknowledged policy changes, but many of the changes
were implemented from 4 to 18 years earlier--using waivers for
clearance reinstatements and conversions to eliminate the need to
perform another investigation (2000), implementing national
investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines (1999), utilizing
full reciprocity (1997), and granting of interim clearances to put
industry personnel to work (1986). These positive steps must, however,
be considered in the context of major concerns that remain. These
concerns include the sizeable and long-standing backlog; the length of
time needed to conduct an investigation and determine eligibility for a
clearance, which now takes, on average, over 1 year to complete; the
failure to implement JPAS throughout DOD with all of its intended
design features, even though DOD said it would be implemented in fiscal
year 2001; and DOD's declaration that its personnel security
investigations program has been a systemic weakness since fiscal year
2000. We believe that our report presents a balanced representation of
the improvements and the failures that contributed to a long-standing
problem that can increase national security risks; affect the
timeliness, quality, and costs of contractor performance on national-
security-related contracts; and ultimately increase costs to the
federal government.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided
technical comments that we incorporated in the final report as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees. We also are sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the
Director, Office of Personnel Management; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will make copies available to other
interested parties upon request. This report also will be available at
no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao/gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5559 or by e-mail at stewartd@gao.gov or
contact Jack E. Edwards at (202) 512-8246 or by e-mail at
edwardsj@gao.gov.
Mark A. Pross, James F. Reid, William J. Rigazio, and Nancy L. Benco
made key contributions to this report.
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart, Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our review of the security clearance process for industry
personnel, we visited key offices within the Department of Defense
(DOD) that have responsibility for oversight and program management and
implementation. We also met with selected industrial contractors and
industry associations whose employees and members are affected by the
DOD backlog and delays in conducting investigations and determining
eligibility for security clearances. We conducted our work in
Washington, D.C., at DOD, including the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD [I]); Defense Security Service (DSS);
and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA); at the Office of
Personnel Management; the Information Security Oversight Office at the
National Archives and Records Administration; and at the Personnel
Security Working Group of the National Security Council's Policy
Coordinating Committee on Records Access and Information Security. We
also conducted review work in Columbus, Ohio, at the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office (DISCO) and DOHA; at Fort Meade, Maryland, at
DSS's Personnel Investigations Center; and in Monterey, California, at
the Defense Personnel Security Research Center.
We met with representatives of several industrial contractors,
including Northrop-Grumman Corporation, Linthicum, Maryland, and Data
Systems Analysts, Inc., and General Dynamics Advanced Information
Systems in Arlington, Virginia. In addition, we held discussions with
officials representing industry associations, including the Northern
Virginia Technology Council and the National Classification Management
Society in Washington, D.C; via telephone with the Shipbuilders
Council of America; with officials from the Information Technology
Association of America, Arlington, Virginia; and with representatives
from the Aerospace Industries Association and National Defense
Industrial Association, Linthicum, Maryland.
To determine the size of the security clearance backlog and changes
during the last 3 fiscal years in the amount of time it takes to
conduct an investigation and issue a clearance eligibility
determination, we met with DSS and DOHA officials to obtain the
relevant data from the Case Control Management System and discussed
their methods for determining what constitutes a backlog. As part of
the process for estimating the backlog, we observed the steps used to
process investigative and adjudicative information during our visits to
the DSS Personnel Investigations Center, DISCO, and DOHA. During these
site visits, we obtained information on the number of days required to
complete an investigation or adjudication, the time frames for
designating what constitutes an investigative or adjudicative backlog,
and data reliability through questionnaires and interviews. Our Applied
Research and Methods team assisted us in reviewing the reliability of
the databases used to determine the backlog. We also examined data for
fiscal years 2001 to 2003 to track changes in how long it took industry
personnel to obtain a clearance during those years. We discuss
developments during the first half of fiscal year 2004, where
appropriate, so that information is current as of March 31, 2004.
To identify the reasons or impediments for the backlog and delays in
conducting investigations and issuing eligibility determinations, we
reviewed reports by GAO, DOD Office of the Inspector General, House
Committee on Government Reform, Defense Personnel Security Research
Center, Information Security Oversight Office, and the Joint Security
Commission II. We interviewed officials from DSS, DISCO, and DOHA and
observed and reviewed their procedures. We also discussed impediments
with officials of OUSD (I), the Defense Personnel Security Research
Center, the Information Security Oversight Office, and the Chair of the
Personnel Security Working Group of the National Security Council, as
well as industry representatives. In addition, we reviewed these
agencies' prior reports. Our Office of the General Counsel reviewed
various public laws; executive orders; federal regulations; and DOD
policy memorandums, directives, regulations, and manuals.
To identify additional steps that DOD could take to reduce the time
needed to conduct investigations and issue eligibility determinations,
we reviewed prior reports to identify previously suggested initiatives.
We supplemented this information with discussions on the status of
those previously identified steps, as well as ongoing initiatives, with
both industry representatives and government officials. Where
appropriate, our Applied Research and Methods team reviewed Defense
Personnel Security Research Center reports to help ensure that the
center's (1) approaches were methodogically sound, (2) sampling and
statistical modeling techniques were sufficient, and (3) proposed
empirically based procedural changes to DOD's security clearance
process also were methodologically sound. The team also reviewed
industry association survey results and evaluated the validity and
reliability of the survey methodology and results.
We assessed the reliability of the data that were provided by DSS's
Case Control Management System and used to determine the investigative
and adjudicative backlog and the time needed to conduct an
investigation and determine eligibility for a security clearance by
(1) reviewing existing information about the data and system that
produced them, (2) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about
the data, and (3) reviewing DISCO's and DOHA's responses to a detailed
questionnaire about their information technology data reliability. We
determined that the data for fiscal years 2001 and thereafter were
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report.
The Case Control Management System also faced certain limitations,
which had an impact on our findings. Although the Case Control
Management System, which is used to obtain the backlog estimates, can
provide the total elapsed time between opening a case and issuing the
final security clearance eligibility determination, it is not capable
of generating separate time estimates for the intermediate stages of
the clearance process. Nor does it have the capability to identify how
much time DOHA needed to adjudicate issue cases. Therefore, all of the
time-based findings include the time period beginning when personnel
security questionnaires were entered into the Case Control Management
System and ending when DISCO notified the industrial contractor of the
DISCO or DOHA adjudicators' decisions to determine eligibility for a
clearance. Thus, the total number of days to determine eligibility for
a clearance includes investigative time; DISCO and possibly DOHA review
time; additional DISCO investigative time, if required; and DOHA's
appeals process that may follow the denial of a clearance request or
the revocation of a clearance. Finally, the Case Control Management
System has the capability to monitor overdue reinvestigations and
generate accurate estimates for that portion of the backlog for
industry personnel; however, it does not have this capability for
military members and federal employees.
We conducted our review from July 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We include a
comprehensive list of related GAO products at the end of this report.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Excerpts from the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information:
The Federal Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for
Access to Classified Information were approved by the President on
March 24, 1997,[Footnote 52] and implemented by the Department of
Defense in 1998. They include the following 13 guidelines and the
reasons for concern.
1. Allegiance to the United States: The willingness of an individual to
safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to
suspect the individual's allegiance to the United States.
2. Foreign influence: A security risk may exist when an individual is
bound by affection, influence, or obligation to persons, such as family
members, who are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to
duress.
3. Foreign preference: When an individual acts in such a way as to
indicate preference for a foreign country, such as possession and/or
use of a foreign passport, then he or she may be prone to make
decisions harmful to the interests of the United States.
4. Sexual behavior: Sexual behavior is a security concern if it
involves a criminal offense; indicates a personality or emotional
disorder; may subject the individual to undue influence of coercion,
exploitation, or duress; or reflects lack of judgment or discretion.
5. Personal conduct: Conduct involving questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, or unwillingness to
comply with rules and regulations could indicate that an individual may
not properly safeguard classified information.
6. Financial considerations: An individual who is financially
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate
funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from
financially profitable criminal acts.
7. Alcohol consumption: Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to
the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, and failure to
control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of
classified information due to carelessness.
8. Drug involvement: Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises
questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect
classified information.
9. Emotional, mental, or personality disorders: Emotional, mental, or
personality disorders are a security concern because they may indicate
a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability.
10. Criminal conduct: A history or pattern of criminal activity creates
doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.
11. Security violations: Noncompliance with security regulations raises
doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability
to safeguard classified information.
12. Outside activities: Involvement in certain types of outside
employment or activities is a security concern if it poses a conflict
with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an
increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
13. Misuse of information technology systems: Noncompliance with rules,
procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information
technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's
trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect
classified systems, networks, and information.
The guidelines state that each case is to be judged on its own merits
and that a final determination to grant, deny, or revoke access to
classified information is the responsibility of the specific department
or agency. The adjudicators are to consider available, reliable
information about the person--past and present, favorable and
unfavorable--in reaching an "overall common sense" clearance-
eligibility determination that gives careful consideration to the 13
adjudicative guidelines. According to the guidelines, any doubt about
whether a clearance for access to classified information is consistent
with national security is to be resolved in favor of national security.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000:
INTELLIGENCE:
May 10, 2004:
Mr. Derek B. Stewart, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stewart:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-04-632, "DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES: Additional Steps Can Be
Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Granting Security Clearances to
Industry Personnel," dated April 19, 2004 (GAO Code 350522).
As industrial personnel are part of the same clearance process that has
resulted in significant delays for government and military personnel
the statistics noted in your report are not surprising. What I find of
note is that that the number of eligibility determinations for Industry
increased by 176% since FY 2001.
There are many significant initiatives underway that are gradually
improving the process and there is little acknowledgment of those
initiatives in this report. Nor is there any acknowledgement of the
policy changes that have been implemented by DoD over the past years to
expedite industry's access to classified information.
Since 1986, contractor employees who are found eligible have been
automatically issued Interim SECRET clearances within 3 days of their
paperwork being received. These employees can then be put to work on
classified programs requiring access to SECRET classified information.
As acknowledged in the GAO report, reciprocity of security clearances
within DoD has not been a problem for DoD personnel and Industry has
even been authorized to grant access to employees based on confirmation
of a clearance from another contractor or government source.
Industry is now authorized access to the Joint Personnel Adjudication
System (JPAS) and will be responsible for maintaining the access
records for their own employees. They will also be able to determine
the eligibility status of other government, military and contractor
personnel to readily facilitate the transfer of the clearances of these
personnel.
We have significantly increased the number of adjudicative personnel
and instituted process reforms that will expedite the adjudication of
contractor investigations. DoD is conducting the research and
developing the new automated systems that could soon revolutionize how
investigations are conducted and is working through the interagency
process to obtain approval of new investigative standards to leverage
the new technologies.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the report, but note that
this is yet another GAO Report that highlights the bad news while
giving passing if any notice to the significant improvements being
made. Comments on the specific recommendations are enclosed. Technical
comments on the report have been provided under separate cover to the
GAO team leader.
Sincerely:
Signed for:
Carol A. Haave:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Counterintelligence and Security:
Enclosure As stated:
GAO-04-632/GAO CODE 350522:
"DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES: ADDITIONAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO REDUCE
BACKLOGS AND DELAYS IN GRANTING SECURITY CLEARANCES TO INDUSTRY
PERSONNEL":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to improve
projections of industrial personnel clearance requirements-both
numbers and types of clearances-by working with DoD components,
industrial contractors, and the acquisition community to identify
obstacles and implement steps to overcome the obstacles. (Page 28/Draft
Report):
DoD Response: Concur: While we concur that the process for projecting
industrial personnel clearance requirements can be improved, we believe
that the current system of surveying cleared contractors annually to
obtain best estimates of the number of background investigations
required for contract performance has yielded fairly accurate results.
Actual submissions in FY01 were 92% of the projection for that year;
actual submissions in FY02 were 103% of the projection; and actual
submitted in FY03 was 114% of the projection. While the total number of
cases being submitted is close to the projection, we are starting to
see a change in the mix of cases. During FY03, there was a significant
increase in the number of requests for SSBIs for initial Top Secret
clearances.
Projected:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
A plan is being developed to link the number of investigations required
for contract performance to the Contract Security Classification
Specification (DD 254), and to require that the number be authorized by
the contracting officer. This will allow DSS to better monitor
requirements and tie them to the budget process. An electronic DD 254
database with personnel clearance information can be linked to the
contract database maintained by the acquisition community, thus tying
the clearance process more closely to the acquisition process.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to work with DoD
components and other agencies to eliminate unnecessary reciprocity
limitations for industry personnel, whose eligibility for a clearance
is granted by DoD. (Page 28/Draft Report):
DoD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense assures reciprocity of
security clearances through the transfer, reinstatement and conversion
policies currently in place and by accepting background investigations
and security clearance determinations from all other federal
departments for access to equivalent levels and below. Contractors
under the NISP already have the authority to transfer clearance
eligibility from one company to another and from a government entity to
a contractor facility without any action being required by the
Department through use of a waiver to the National Industrial Security
Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). Industry has been given access to
JPAS, which will be the system of record for eligibility and access
information for the Department of Defense. As of April 24, 2004 there
were 4,377 industry users of JPAS. These users are validating the data
contained in the system in preparation for JPAS becoming the system of
record for industry as of September 2004. Companies can view a person's
eligibility for access, immediately grant collateral access, and are
responsible for recording the access into the system. When accesses are
terminated, the company is responsible for recording that action, as
well.
Based on our experience, the majority of industry reciprocity issues
brought to our attention have involved access to special access
programs (SAP), Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), or the
practice on the part of other Federal agencies to review other
government investigations and adjudications before granting access.
SAP
and SCI are programs requiring additional risk determinations prior to
approving access and these access determinations are made by the
services and intelligence agencies for military, civilian and industry
cases.
The Department is participating in several inter-agency reciprocity
working groups to identify both the impediments and corrective action
to the reciprocity issues between Federal agencies. This office is also
working with the SAP community to clearly identify the additional risk
determinations required prior to granting access to a specific program
and to ensure full reciprocity between programs of "like" risk. Similar
processes are underway with the Intelligence Community for the granting
of access to SCI.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to develop and
implement an integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the
backlog, reduce delays in determining eligibility for security
clearances, and overcome the impediments that could allow such problems
to recur. (Page 28/Draft Report):
DoD Response: Partially Concur. The Department has numerous plans
underway to improve the PSI process from "end-to-end." These plans
align changes with functional responsibilities. GAO does not identify
why a single, comprehensive, management plan would improve our ability
to achieve success.
In November 2002, the Department of Defense made the decision to divest
the PSI function and procure these services from OPM. This decision
came from the Secretary's Business Improvement Council under the Senior
Executive Council, and is reflected in the President's Budget for FY
2004. The transfer of PSIs to OPM and the corresponding transformation
of DSS is intended to result in the permanent elimination of the
investigative and adjudicative backlogs, and reduce delays in
determining eligibility for clearances.
The implementation of this effort is quite extensive, and significantly
impacts both DSS and OPM. The briefing package "Reengineering Personnel
Security" provided to the GAO team represents the high-level plan for
the transfer of PSIs to OPM and the corresponding transformation of
DSS. A high-level implementation plan is contained in the FY 2004 DSS
Performance Plan, which was originally drafted as the implementation
plan. A transition team has been in operation since November 2002
administering the details of the implementation. The team has addressed
the budget, personnel resources, and costs associated with the transfer
and transformation efforts.
The transfer of the DSS investigative workforce will give OPM a federal
investigative strength to accomplish the most critical and sensitive
investigations. At the same time, OPM will be increasing its contractor
base of investigators to ensure sufficient investigative resources for
the federal investigative workload. Investigations are a core
competency of OPM, so by moving all DoD investigations to OPM and
centralizing the contracting function for investigations, capacity will
be leveraged, resulting in decreasing investigative timelines.
The collaborative adjudicative support element being established at DoD
will provide oversight for DoD investigations and adjudications. This
includes oversight of the efforts that are underway to leverage
technology to accomplish low risk investigations through data mining
and other automated mechanisms. This is intended to decrease the
traditional investigative workload, facilitate increased investigative
capacity, and result in faster case completion times for the most
critical investigations.
The DSS collaborative adjudication support will provide common services
for all of the DoD CAFs. Such services will include acquisition and
contracting oversight. This DSS organization will also leverage DSS'
relationship with industry as the single Industry CAF for all industry
clearances, including interim, suitability and trustworthiness
determinations. The adjudicative process will cover SCI accesses. These
efforts are intended to streamline the DoD adjudicative process,
facilitating faster adjudicative timelines.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary for Intelligence to analyze the feasibility
of implementing initiatives designed to reduce the backlog and delays,
prioritize the initiatives, and make resources available for testing
and implementing the initiatives, which could include, but are not
limited to, those evaluated in this report. (Page 28/Draft Report):
DoD Response: Concur. Ongoing actions specific to each of the GAO
evaluated initiatives are identified below:
* Phased Periodic Reinvestigation (PR):
In 2001, DoD began working on improvements to the single scope
background investigation -periodic reinvestigation (SSBI-PR). As
background, the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC)
conducted initial research on the productivity of certain specified
investigative sources in the SSBI-PR. Their research suggested the two-
phased approach to the SSBI-PR, similar to medical screening where
findings of initial tests determine if follow-up tests are required,
was a valid alternative. During FY03 DoD conducted a pilot test of this
phased approach. The results reflected that the phased SSBI-PR saves
substantial resources with minimal loss of derogatory information.
Recently, DoD presented the results of this pilot test to the Personnel
Security Working Group (PSWG) under the Policy Coordinating Committee
on Records Access and Information Security of the National Security
Council (NSC) on:
May 3, 2004. We are confident that the results will speak for
themselves and that PSWG, representing the entire security community,
and the National Security Council (NSC), will approve the Phased PR as
part of the national investigative standards.
Industry Central Adjudication Facility (CAF):
One of the key ongoing initiatives to improve PSI processing for
industry is to expand the DISCO adjudicative role to serve as the
nucleus for a single central adjudication facility
(CAF) that will handle all adjudications for Industry, to include
trustworthiness and SCI determinations. This plan, including the
proposed structure, authorities, training and resource details, should
be finalized this calendar year. DISCO has instituted a process to
adjudicate Industry cases up to the statement of reasons (SOR). Should
DISCO believe an SOR is required, the case is referred to DOHA for
further evaluation and issuance of the SOR if DOHA determines it to be
appropriate.
Evaluation of investigative and adjudicative standards:
The Department is currently participating with other Federal agencies
in an evaluation of the utility and effectiveness of the current
security background investigations and security clearance procedures of
the federal government. When that evaluation is completed, a copy will
be provided to the GAO.
Requirements-identification improvements:
As part of the automation of the Contract Security Classification
Specification (DD 254), the contracting officer and the contractor will
determine the number of investigations required for contract
performance. When a contractor investigative request is received in PAS
it will be validated against this contract database to verify the need
for the investigation. This will allow DSS to better monitor
investigative requirements and tie the requirements to the budget
process. The requirements definition phase is currently underway for
this initiative.
Automated Continuing Evaluation System (ACES):
ACES, an automated assessment tool, is designed to identify issues of
security concern on cleared personnel between the specified periodic
reinvestigations (5 years for Top Secret access, 10 years for Secret,
and 15 years for Confidential). Through ACES, specified databases are
searched to identify information that assists in the evaluation of
cleared individuals in order to determine their suitability for
continued access to classified information. ACES automatically
identifies and schedules cleared personnel for a series of database
checks that include: credit reports, FBI criminal history, Treasury
large currency transaction filings, Customs foreign travel, and real
estate ownership records. The report produced by the database will be
electronically forwarded to each CAF for review and adjudication, as
necessary. As additional appropriate data sources are identified or
become available, DoD will conduct the necessary research, testing, and
programming to include them as part of ACES.
Initially, ACES checks will be conducted on personnel holding TS/SCI
clearances at the mid-point between their reinvestigation cycles of
five (5) years. However, within the next few years, DoD will conduct an
annual ACES check on individuals holding all levels of clearance.
Eventually, it is hoped that ACES will provide a means to eliminate the
periodicity of reinvestigations and transform the personnel security
process into a proactive, risk-managed process.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments
to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344.
Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2004.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility
for Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.:
April 18, 2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.:
August 24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.:
February 16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.:
October 27, 1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to
and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the
Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.:
October 19, 1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March
24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R.
Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative
Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.:
May 10, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.:
May 6, 1992.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided
When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.:
April 23, 1990.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Reinvestigations are conducted after a period of years to determine
whether an individual's security clearance should be renewed.
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel Clearances:
Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining
Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-202T
(Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004); DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed
in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret Clearances, GAO-01-465
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001); DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed
to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations, GAO/NSIAD-
00-215 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 24, 2000); and DOD Personnel: Inadequate
Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks, GAO/
NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999).
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD
Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining
Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[4] See Committee on Government Reform, Defense Security Service: The
Personnel Security Investigations [PSI] Backlog Poses a Threat to
National Security, H.R. 107-767 (Oct. 24, 2002).
[5] Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 906, (Nov. 24, 2003).
[6] See GAO-04-344.
[7] See GAO-04-344.
[8] Previously, this responsibility resided within the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence. OUSD (I) was created in 2002 by the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-314, § 901, (Dec. 2, 2002).
[9] Executive Order No. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
Within Industry, Feb. 20, 1960, which was amended by Executive Order
No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program, Jan. 6, 1993,
authorizes DOD to reach agreement with other federal departments and
agencies to extend its regulations concerning authorizations for access
to classified information by industry. The agencies that have entered
into agreements with DOD for security services under the National
Industrial Security Program are the (1) National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, (2) Department of Commerce, (3) General Services
Administration, (4) Department of State, (5) Small Business
Administration, (6) National Science Foundation, (7) Department of the
Treasury, (8) Department of Transportation, (9) Department of the
Interior, (10) Department of Agriculture, (11) Department of Labor,
(12) Environmental Protection Agency, (13) Department of Justice, (14)
Federal Reserve System, (15) U.S. General Accounting Office, (16) U.S.
Trade Representative, (17) U.S. International Trade Commission, (18)
U.S. Agency for International Development, (19) Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, (20) Department of Health and Human Services,
(21) Department of Homeland Security, and (22) Department of Education.
The Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency are
signatories of the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual and thus have reciprocity with DOD under provisions of the
manual. Three federal agencies (the Department of Energy, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission) also may grant
security clearances to industry personnel who work on national-
security-related programs.
[10] See Ralph M. Carney et al., Quality Assurance in Defense
Adjudication: An Adjudicator Workshop for Defining and Assessing
Quality (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security Research Center,
March 2003).
[11] Classification of National Security Information, 5 C.F.R. §1312.4
(2003).
[12] Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information, 32 C.F.R. Part 147, Subpart B, Attach. A and
Attach. C (2003).
[13] The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum includes
the Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to
Classified Information and Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information. It approves the
adjudicative guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order No. 12968, Access
to Classified Information, Aug. 4, 1995.
[14] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, "Personnel Security Investigations
and Adjudications," Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 1998). In
implementing the federal adjudicative guidelines, DOD Directive 5200.2,
DOD Personnel Security Program (Apr. 9, 1999), sets forth the policies
and procedures for granting DOD military, civilian, and industry
personnel access to classified information. The policies and procedures
for granting industrial personnel security clearances and adjudicative
procedural guidance for appealing cases if an unfavorable clearance
decision is reached also are contained in DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program, Apr. 20, 1999.
[15] The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum approves
the adjudicative guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order No. 12968, Access
to Classified Information, Aug. 2, 1995.
[16] DSS investigators began training on OPM's case management system
and investigative procedures and working on fiscal year 2004 requests
in February 2004 (the fifth month of fiscal year 2004).
[17] See GAO-04-344.
[18] See GAO-04-344.
[19] See GAO/NSIAD-00-215.
[20] DSS's performance goal is to complete at least 75 percent of each
type of investigation within the specified time limits. However,
monitoring of the backlog requires a determination of whether each
investigation was completed within the time frame--not whether an
aggregate performance goal was met for a particular type of
investigation.
[21] According to DOHA officials, the 615-day figure is misleadingly
high, since it includes time spent awaiting further processing, cases
sent back for further investigation, cases requiring more information
from the individual, or the few cases requiring an appeal after denial
or revocation of a clearance.
[22] See Joint Security Commission II, Report by the Joint Security
Commission II (Aug. 24, 1999), pp. 5-6. In 1999, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence reconvened the
Joint Security Commission to assess progress towards the goals
recommended in the original February 1994 Joint Security Commission
report and examine emerging security issues.
[23] Executive Order No. 12829, National Industrial Security Program,
Jan. 6, 1993, requires the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office to implement and monitor the National Industrial
Security Program and oversee agency, contractor, licensee, and grantee
actions; review all agency implementing regulations, internal rules, or
guidelines; and gives the Director the authority to conduct periodic
on-site reviews of the implementation of the program by each program
member that has access to classified information or stores it. This
office is part of the National Archives and Records Administration.
[24] See Information Security Oversight Office, The National Industrial
Security Program, Industry's Perspective: Making Progress, but Falling
Short of Potential (2003).
[25] The Information Security Oversight Office evaluated the
effectiveness of the National Industrial Security Program by conducting
a survey of 4,709 industrial contractors, of which 393 responded. To
follow up on the findings, the office supplemented the survey with on-
site interviews of industry facility security officers and other
corporate security representatives at 52 industry facilities across the
country to discuss their views and experiences. Because only 8 percent
of the industrial contractors responded to the survey, we did not use
the survey data. However, we did use information gathered during the
on-site interviews as examples of some of the timeliness, quality, and
cost issues facing industrial contractors, recognizing that the
comments cannot be generalized to the experiences of all industrial
contractors.
[26] See GAO-04-344.
[27] JPAS is DOD's automated system to maintain all security clearance
(eligibility and access) and adjudication information for DOD
contractor and government personnel.
[28] The outcomes of the clearance requests are eligibility
determinations, but the determinations may be made in the year
subsequent to the year when the request was submitted.
[29] Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000). This legislation amends 10
U.S.C. §1564 by directing DOD to quantify their requirements for
background investigations necessary for granting security clearances
for DOD personnel and industry personnel engaged in sensitive duties
that are critical to the national security.
[30] DOD officials suggested that the number of overdue but not
submitted reinvestigations could decrease for industry personnel, since
JPAS would identify some personnel in the system more than once or
others who no longer needed a security clearance. We continue to be
concerned about a possible surge in requests because sufficient data
are not available to determine accurately the number of unsubmitted
requests for industry personnel as well as military members and federal
employees.
[31] See GAO/NSIAD-00-215.
[32] See GAO-04-344.
[33] See GAO-04-344.
[34] OPM has estimated that DOD and OPM account for 80 percent of the
investigations conducted for the federal government.
[35] See GAO-04-344.
[36] Reciprocity, which is required by Executive Order No. 12968, is a
policy that requires background investigations and eligibility
determinations conducted under the order be mutually and reciprocally
accepted by all agencies, except when an agency has substantial
information indicating that an employee may not satisfy the standards
under this order. Reciprocity also involves the ability to transfer
(1) an individual's existing, valid security clearance and (2) access
from one department, agency, or military service to another or from the
federal government to the private sector (and vice versa) when the
individual changes jobs without having to grant another clearance or
access.
[37] See Information Security Oversight Office, The National Industrial
Security Program, Industry's Perspective: Making Progress, but Falling
Short of Potential (2003).
[38] Sensitive compartmented information is classified intelligence
information derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical
processes, which is handled by systems established by the Director of
Central Intelligence. A special access program is a sensitive program
that imposes need-to-know and access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to confidential, secret, or top secret information.
[39] See Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Reciprocity: A
Progress Report, PERSEREC Technical Report 04-2 (Monterey, Calif.: Apr.
1, 2004).
[40] See Joint Security Commission II, Report by the Joint Security
Commission II (Aug. 24, 1999), p. 2.
[41] DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Review
Program, § 2.6 (Apr. 20, 1999).
[42] Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended), the term
"restricted data" means all data (information) concerning the
(1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the
production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special
nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include
data declassified or removed from the restricted data category pursuant
to § 142 of the Act. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 11 (Aug. 30, 1954), codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2014.
[43] DOD Manual 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual (May 1, 2000), p. 2-2-4.
[44] Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1071 (Oct. 30, 2000) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 986).
[45] See The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997).
[46] See OUSD (I), Reengineering Personnel Security (July 2003).
[47] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (Aug. 3, 1993).
[48] See Defense Personnel Security Research Center, A New Approach to
the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation, PERSEREC Technical
Report 01-6 (Monterey, Calif.: Oct. 29, 2001) and Implementation of the
Phased SSBI-PR at DSS: An Evaluation with Recommendations, PERSEREC
Technical Report 04-X (Monterey, Calif.: in press).
[49] Approved by the National Security Council in 1997 as part of the
Common Investigative Standards, the Investigative Standards for
Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information
(Standard C) establish when a reinvestigation must be conducted,
specific investigative requirements, and when a reinvestigation may be
expanded.
[50] Pub. L. No. 108-177, § 352 (Dec. 13, 2003).
[51] See GAO-04-344.
[52] The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum approves
the adjudicative guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order No. 12968, Access
to Classified Information, Aug. 2, 1995.
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