Defense Logistics
GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan Gao ID: GAO-04-724R June 18, 2004The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have prompted major changes in the employment of naval forces around the globe. These two events resulted in an ultimate surging to deploy seven carrier strike groups and the largest amphibious task force assembled in decades. According to the Navy, at the time of the September 11 attacks and in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, only a small number of ships at peak readiness were forward deployed. However, most of the Navy's ships were not available for use because they were in early stages of their training cycles. This prompted the Navy, in March 2003, to develop a concept to enhance its deployment readiness strategy. The Navy's Fleet Response Plan, implemented in May 2003, evolved from a concept to institutionalize an enhanced surge capability. Because of potential budget implications, Congress asked us to review the assumption that the Navy's implementation of its Fleet Response Plan would reduce the duration of aircraft carrier depot maintenance intervals between deployment periods from approximately 18 months to 9 months. Specifically, our objectives were to identify the likely impacts and risks for the Navy's logistics requirements that could result from shortened maintenance cycles between deployments; the Navy's plan for fulfilling major repair and maintenance requirements; upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering systems; and performing nuclear refueling in the shortened maintenance cycle; and how the Navy's budget supports its plan to shorten maintenance cycles.
The Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not shorten preexisting time frames for performing aircraft carrier maintenance. Furthermore, it does not alter existing major repair and maintenance requirements; methods of upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering systems; or methods of performing nuclear refueling. At this time, the potential impact of the plan on the Navy's budget is uncertain. The implementation of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not alter existing repair and maintenance requirements; methods for upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering systems; or methods for performing nuclear refueling. These aspects of Navy ship maintenance requirements will continue to be conducted in accordance with Chief of Naval Operations guidance for naval ships. However, Chief of Naval Operations and Naval Sea Systems Command officials informed us that under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy intends to provide needed depot maintenance--called continuous maintenance--more frequently during scheduled, shorter-duration pier dockings, instead of deferring this maintenance until the normal 6-month maintenance period arrives. Intensification of the preexisting continuous maintenance process constitutes the essential core of the Fleet Response Plan's maintenance component. Navy officials stated that additional carrier operational availability is being achieved through intensified continuous depot-level maintenance. There are no present indications that the implementation of the plan will affect the Navy's budget. Navy and Office of the Secretary Defense budget officials stated that the plan was relatively new and they were unaware of any specific budgetary implications at this time.
GAO-04-724R, Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan
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entitled 'Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects
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June 18, 2004:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects
of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom have prompted major changes in the employment of naval forces
around the globe. These two events resulted in an ultimate surging to
deploy seven carrier strike groups and the largest amphibious task
force assembled in decades. According to the Navy, at the time of the
September 11 attacks and in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom,
only a small number of ships at peak readiness were forward deployed.
However, most of the Navy's ships were not available for use because
they were in early stages of their training cycles. This prompted the
Navy, in March 2003, to develop a concept to enhance its deployment
readiness strategy. The Navy's Fleet Response Plan, implemented in May
2003, evolved from a concept to institutionalize an enhanced surge
capability.
The Fleet Response Plan modifies the Navy's pre-2001 rotational
deployment policy, replacing 6-month routine deployments with more
flexible deployment options that provide the capability to deploy as
many as eight carrier strike groups when and where needed. Although we
focused our review of the maintenance impacts of the Fleet Response
Plan on aircraft carriers, the plan applies to all ship classes except
submarines.[Footnote 1] The plan changes the manner in which the Navy
maintains, trains, staffs, and deploys its ships to allow a greater
availability of the fleet to meet Homeland Defense and Defense Guidance
requirements. As it relates to maintenance, the plan relies on
increased continuous maintenance during pier dockings. Primarily, the
plan alters the Navy's prior 6-month rotational deployment and presence
policy to the current policy of being forward deployed and capable of
surging substantial forces--a "6 plus 2" carrier strike force versus a
"3 to 4" carrier strike force--when and where they are needed. The 6
plus 2 force concept signifies that six carrier strike groups are
available to deploy within 30 days of notification, and two additional
groups are available within 90 days of notification. The 3 to 4 force
that preceded the Fleet Response Plan generally had only three or four
carrier strike groups available for deployment when needed.
The emphasis of the Fleet Response Plan is on readiness and speed of
response. It assumes a deployment mind-set of quickly--within 3 to 4
months after completing its maintenance--making a carrier available to
surge, if necessary. This mind-set differs from that of the traditional
rotational deployment process where, in the case of a carrier, the ship
would undergo maintenance, training, and staffing preparations to be
ready for the next scheduled deployment in about 1 year after
completing its maintenance period. The Navy attained the 6 plus 2
carrier strike force capability in November 2003.
Because of potential budget implications, you asked us to review the
assumption that the Navy's implementation of its Fleet Response Plan
would reduce the duration of aircraft carrier depot maintenance
intervals between deployment periods from approximately 18 months to 9
months. Specifically, our objectives were to identify
* the likely impacts and risks for the Navy's logistics requirements
that could result from shortened maintenance cycles between
deployments;
* the Navy's plan for fulfilling major repair and maintenance
requirements; upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and
engineering systems; and performing nuclear refueling in the shortened
maintenance cycle; and:
* how the Navy's budget supports its plan to shorten maintenance
cycles.
On April 6, 2004, we provided your office with a briefing on our
observations regarding the maintenance impacts associated with the
plan. This report summarizes and updates the information we provided
you in that briefing. A copy of the briefing is included in enclosure I
to this report.
To address our objectives, we held discussions with officials from key
Department of Defense and Navy organizations responsible for
conceptualizing and implementing the Navy's plan. While the scope of
our work did not include an assessment of the impact of staff
assignments or the training aspects of the Fleet Response Plan, we plan
to initiate a separate review to assess the plan's effect on staffing,
training, and meeting the theater commanders' needs. In addition, we
did not independently assess the reliability of the workload data that
we obtained for the Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards. For
purposes of this assignment, we considered the data sufficiently
reliable to determine the extent to which workloads changed.
We performed our work from November 2003 through April 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The Navy's Fleet Response Plan Does Not Shorten Maintenance Intervals:
The Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not shorten preexisting time frames
for performing aircraft carrier maintenance. Furthermore, it does not
alter existing major repair and maintenance requirements; methods of
upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering
systems; or methods of performing nuclear refueling. At this time, the
potential impact of the plan on the Navy's budget is uncertain.
Maintenance Intervals Remain the Same:
The Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not reduce depot maintenance
intervals between deployment cycles as was initially assumed. Navy
officials informed us that the concept of reducing maintenance
intervals in order to deploy ships more quickly if needed was
considered during early discussions of what was to become the plan, but
it was quickly dismissed as an unviable option. The Navy recognized
that shortened maintenance cycles might adversely affect fleet
readiness and would not meet the intent of the plan.
Overall, the Navy's Fleet Response Plan alters how the Navy assigns
personnel, accomplishes training, and manages maintenance to provide a
more ready force. With respect to maintenance intervals, we obtained
data regarding changes that had occurred after the implementation of
the plan. Prior to the plan, the Navy had a notional 24-month Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle for its nuclear carriers--the majority of its
carrier fleet. This cycle normally included a 6-month maintenance
period and an 18-month operational cycle, which incorporated training
and a 6-month deployment. However, the Navy was actually performing a
27-month cycle instead of the notional 24-month cycle. Under the Fleet
Response Plan, in essence, the Navy formalized the 27-month cycle that
it was already performing--revising its name to "Inter-Deployment
Readiness Cycle." This change formally extended the operational
interval for a nuclear carrier by about 3 months.[Footnote 2] However,
it did not alter the 6-month depot-level maintenance period that
existed prior to the implementation of the plan.
Major Repair, Upgrading Systems, and Nuclear Refueling Process Remain
Unchanged under Fleet Response Plan:
The implementation of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan does not alter
existing repair and maintenance requirements; methods for upgrading and
modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering systems; or
methods for performing nuclear refueling. These aspects of Navy ship
maintenance requirements will continue to be conducted in accordance
with Chief of Naval Operations guidance for naval ships.[Footnote 3]
However, Chief of Naval Operations and Naval Sea Systems Command
officials informed us that under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy
intends to provide needed depot maintenance--called continuous
maintenance--more frequently during scheduled, shorter-duration pier
dockings, instead of deferring this maintenance until the normal 6-
month maintenance period arrives. Intensification of the preexisting
continuous maintenance process constitutes the essential core of the
Fleet Response Plan's maintenance component. Navy officials stated that
additional carrier operational availability is being achieved through
intensified continuous depot-level maintenance.
As an additional measure to obtain an indication of the Fleet Response
Plan's impact on depot-level maintenance, we conducted a limited review
of total workload data at the Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards
before and after the implementation of the plan for the period of
fiscal years 2003 projected through 2009. The "snapshot" data we
obtained indicated that although the scheduled maintenance workloads
varied somewhat on an annual basis, the total and average maintenance
workload, in terms of staff-days, increased only by about 1 percent and
remained relatively constant over this period. Naval Sea Systems
Command officials stated that workload adjustments are a routine
business function among shipyards that occurred before the plan was
implemented and will continue to occur.
Impact of Fleet Response Plan on Navy's Budget Is Unknown:
There are no present indications that the implementation of the plan
will affect the Navy's budget. Navy and Office of the Secretary Defense
(OSD) budget officials stated that the plan was relatively new and they
were unaware of any specific budgetary implications at this time.
However, Program Budget Decision 709R, dated December 22, 2003, asserts
that the plan might generate a "bow-wave" of maintenance requirements
in future years. This assertion stems from an assumption that the
longer the time between maintenance periods, the more repair work may
be required. Discussion with an OSD budget official revealed that the
assertion was not supported by analysis, but rather was based on the
official's prior experience with the development of new Navy programs,
and on the official's understanding that the Fleet Response Plan
focused on streamlining ship maintenance and extending operational
cycles. The official raised the bow-wave issue in Program Budget
Decision 709R to provide impetus for improving the plan implementation.
However, based on the Navy's intensification of its continuous
maintenance process, the OSD budget official in retrospect agreed that
the Fleet Response Plan probably would not generate a bow-wave of
maintenance requirements. Program Budget Decision 709R states that,
prior to the Fiscal Year 2006 Program Review, the Navy should evaluate
the impact of the plan on (1) sea-shore rotations and manning; (2)
intermediate, organizational, and depot maintenance; and (3) readiness.
OSD and Navy officials stated that such assessments would not require
formal studies but would occur during the normal budget review process.
The officials from the various organizations we visited stated that it
might take several years of experience to assess the effects that
result from implementing the plan.
Scope and Methodology:
To address the assumption that the duration of aircraft carrier depot
maintenance cycles between deployments would be reduced from
approximately 18 months to 9 months and the effects that such a
reduction would have on the Navy's maintenance operations and budget,
we relied on data gathered through our visits and interviews with key
personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations; Office of the Navy Comptroller; Naval Sea
Systems Command; and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. We reviewed
the Navy's Fleet Response Plan, policies, procedures, and pertinent
articles and obtained briefings to understand ship maintenance
practices and intervals before and after the implementation of the
plan. Also, because shipyards perform the bulk of depot-level
maintenance, we completed a limited analysis of workload data for two
public shipyards--Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards--to
determine potential workload impacts associated with the implementation
of the Fleet Response Plan. The workload data developed by the Naval
Sea Systems Command are used to make adjustments in workload among the
shipyards. We used the data to determine if significant changes
occurred in shipyard workloads as a result of the Navy's implementation
of its Fleet Response Plan. For purposes of this assignment, we
considered the data sufficiently reliable to determine the extent to
which workloads changed.
To address the effects of shortened maintenance cycles on the Navy's
major repair and maintenance requirements; upgrading and modernizing
weapons, communications, and engineering systems; and performing
nuclear refueling, we relied on data gathered through our visits and
interviews with key Navy personnel within the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations; Naval Sea Systems Command; and Commander, U.S. Fleet
Forces Command. We reviewed the Navy's Fleet Response Plan, policies,
procedures, and pertinent articles and briefings. Because the Fleet
Response Plan does not shorten ship maintenance cycles, we did not
perform any additional work regarding this objective. These types of
maintenance activities continue to be performed in the normal scheduled
maintenance intervals.
To determine budget implications associated with the Fleet Response
Plan, we interviewed Under Secretary of Defense and Navy Comptroller
officials and reviewed and discussed Program Budget Decisions that
approved the Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan.
We performed our work from November 2003 through April 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on this report, the Department of Defense concurred
with the draft report. The department provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate. The Deputy Under Secretary's
comments are included in enclosure II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for the
Department of Defense. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies
will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any question about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or e-mail me at solisw@gao.gov. Key
contributors to this report were David Schmitt, Dudley Roache, Patricia
Albritton, Cheryl Weissman, and Julio Luna.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures - 2:
Briefing Slides:
[See PDF for image]
[End of slide presentation]
Comments from the Department of Defense:
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS:
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
JUN 4 2004:
Mr. William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "DEFENSE LOGISTICS: GAO's
Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan,"
(GAO Code 350466/GAO 04-724R).
The Department concurs with the report subject to the technical
correction described in the attachment. The Department appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradley Berkson:
Acting:
Attachment: As stated:
Technical corrections for GAO audit GAO Draft Report, GAO-04-724R
"DEFENSE LOGISTICS: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the
Navy's Fleet Response Plan" (GAO Code 350466):
Page two, second paragraph, second and third sentences should read:
"It assumes a deployment mind-set of quickly-within three to four
months after completing its maintenance-making a carrier available to
surge, if necessary.
This mind-set differs from that of the traditional rotational
deployment process where, in the case of a carrier, the ship would
undergo maintenance, training, and staffing preparations to be ready
for the next scheduled deployment in about one year after completing
its maintenance period."
[End of section]
(350466):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Navy officials informed us that maintenance processes do not change
under the Fleet Response Plan for the submarine force because of the
nature and criticality of submarine systems.
[2] The Navy is assessing its capability to achieve a 32-month Inter-
Deployment Readiness Cycle. This would extend carrier operational
availability by an additional 5 months.
[3] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) NOTICE 4700,
Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair
Man-Days for Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships,
June 16, 2003.
