Military Aircraft
DOD Needs to Determine Its Aerial Refueling Aircraft Requirements Gao ID: GAO-04-349 June 4, 2004With the heavy pace of operations in support of the war on terrorism, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force have become increasingly concerned about their aging aerial refueling aircraft. We last reviewed the aerial refueling fleet in 1996 and found that KC-135 aircraft were aging and becoming increasingly costly to maintain and operate. In December 2001, we began new work on the Air Force's requirements for refueling aircraft. However, we suspended our work several times to provide testimony and other products on the condition of the current fleet and Air Force plans to accelerate replacement. We were asked to review (1) the extent to which the current fleet has met aerial refueling needs, and the cost and effort to operate and sustain the fleet, (2) DOD's current refueling requirements, and (3) options to meet future aerial refueling needs.
The current refueling force has successfully supported the needs of U.S. combat and mobility air forces during peacetime and wartime operations but future support costs will continue to rise as the fleet continues to age, according to the Air Force. Congress authorized the Air Force to acquire 100 KC-767A aerial refueling aircraft in November 2003 as the first step in replacing the 538-plane KC-135 fleet but it could take up to 30 years to replace the rest based on the estimated production rate for the first 100 aircraft. Thus, the Air Force will need to continue maintaining and modernizing some of the remaining aircraft for up to 3 decades. Some of those aircraft could be 70 to 80 years old when they are eventually replaced. DOD does not know how many or what type of aircraft are needed to meet future refueling needs because its requirements study is out of date. The most recent study, Tanker Requirements Study-05, was done in 2001 and identified the number of aircraft needed to carry out a two-major-theaterwar strategy. However, that strategy has been superceded by a new capabilities-based approach contained in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. In addition, significant changes taking place in operational concepts and force structure could substantially affect future refueling requirements. As a result, the Air Force does not have a clear picture of future needs that could guide its replacement and investment decisions. GAO outlines three broad options to meet the Air Force's long-term aerial refueling requirements. DOD could adopt one or a combination of these approaches. GAO is not taking a position on which option(s) would be most suitable. The Air Force was recently directed by DOD to conduct and complete by August 2005 an analysis of alternatives for replacing the current capability. However, at the time of our audit work, the Air Force did not plan to study the option of using contractor-provided aerial refueling services as part of its analysis of alternatives.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-349, Military Aircraft: DOD Needs to Determine Its Aerial Refueling Aircraft Requirements
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2004:
Military Aircraft:
DOD Needs to Determine Its Aerial Refueling Aircraft Requirements:
GAO-04-349:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-349, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
With the heavy pace of operations in support of the war on terrorism,
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force have become
increasingly concerned about their aging aerial refueling aircraft. We
last reviewed the aerial refueling fleet in 1996 and found that KC-135
aircraft were aging and becoming increasingly costly to maintain and
operate. In December 2001, we began new work on the Air Force‘s
requirements for refueling aircraft. However, we suspended our work
several times to provide testimony and other products on the condition
of the current fleet and Air Force plans to accelerate replacement. We
were asked to review (1) the extent to which the current fleet has met
aerial refueling needs, and the cost and effort to operate and sustain
the fleet, (2) DOD's current refueling requirements, and (3) options to
meet future aerial refueling needs.
What GAO Found:
The current refueling force has successfully supported the needs of
U.S. combat and mobility air forces during peacetime and wartime
operations but future support costs will continue to rise as the fleet
continues to age, according to the Air Force. Congress authorized the
Air Force to acquire 100 KC-767A aerial refueling aircraft in November
2003 as the first step in replacing the 538-plane KC-135 fleet but it
could take up to 30 years to replace the rest based on the estimated
production rate for the first 100 aircraft. Thus, the Air Force will
need to continue maintaining and modernizing some of the remaining
aircraft for up to 3 decades. Some of those aircraft could be 70 to 80
years old when they are eventually replaced.
DOD does not know how many or what type of aircraft are needed to meet
future refueling needs because its requirements study is out of date.
The most recent study, Tanker Requirements Study-05, was done in 2001
and identified the number of aircraft needed to carry out a two-major-
theater-war strategy. However, that strategy has been superceded by a
new capabilities-based approach contained in the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review. In addition, significant changes taking place in
operational concepts and force structure could substantially affect
future refueling requirements. As a result, the Air Force does not have
a clear picture of future needs that could guide its replacement and
investment decisions.
GAO outlines three broad options (see table below) to meet the Air
Force‘s long-term aerial refueling requirements. DOD could adopt one or
a combination of these approaches. GAO is not taking a position on
which option(s) would be most suitable. The Air Force was recently
directed by DOD to conduct and complete by August 2005 an analysis of
alternatives for replacing the current capability. However, at the time
of our audit work, the Air Force did not plan to study the option of
using contractor-provided aerial refueling services as part of its
analysis of alternatives.
Options for Meeting Aerial Refueling Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) conduct a study to
determine the current and projected aerial refueling requirements, and
(2) direct that the planned analysis of alternatives be a comprehensive
study of all reasonably available options or options currently being
tested, including using contractor-provided aerial refueling services.
DOD concurred with each recommendation and had begun the studies at the
time of this report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-349.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin at (757)
552-8100 or curtinn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Current Force Has Met Refueling Needs but at Increasing Cost and
Effort:
Air Force's Aerial Refueling Requirements Are Outdated:
Three Options Exist to Meeting the Air Force's Future Aerial Refueling
Requirements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Air Force Aerial Refueling Statistics for Major Conflicts
Since 1991:
Table 2: Distribution of Flying Hours for the KC-135 Fleet
(Fiscal Years 1996-2002):
Table 3: KC-135 Operating and Support Costs (Fiscal Years 1996-2002):
Table 4: Number of Air Force Aerial Refueling Aircraft in the Fleet
Expressed as KC-135R Aircraft Equivalents:
Table 5: Changes to National Strategies and Operational Concepts That
Could Lead to Changed Aerial Refueling Requirements:
Figures:
Figure 1: KC-10 Aerial Refueling Aircraft Preparing to Refuel an F-16
Fighter:
Figure 2: KC-135 Aerial Refueling Aircraft:
Figure 3: Removal and Replacement of KC-135 Fuselage Skin:
Figure 4: Example of a Cracked Frame Component That Was Replaced During
Programmed Depot Maintenance:
Figure 5: Trend in the Number of Depot Flow Days for Programmed Depot
Maintenance Per KC-135 Aircraft (Fiscal Years 1991-2000):
Abbreviation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 4, 2004:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Joel Hefley:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Aerial refueling is critical to U.S. national security strategy,
allowing bomber, fighter, and transport aircraft to rapidly deploy and
operate globally, stay airborne longer, and carry more weapons,
equipment, and supplies. The Air Force has most of the Department of
Defense's (DOD) refueling capability in 59 large KC-10 and 538 KC-135
aerial refueling aircraft. The KC-135 aircraft averages about 43 years
of age--the oldest aircraft in the military inventory. Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the start of the global
war on terrorism, DOD and the Air Force have become increasingly
concerned about possible age-related problems that could ground the
refueling fleet. The Air Force believes the national security strategy
cannot be executed without aerial refueling.
We last reviewed the aerial refueling fleet in 1996[Footnote 1] and
concluded that the KC-135 aircraft were aging and becoming increasingly
costly to maintain and operate. We also pointed out that DOD had a need
for more mobility aircraft to transport troops and equipment to
theaters of operations. Consequently, we recommended that when DOD
considers a replacement for the KC-135 aircraft, it develop a multi-
role aircraft that could do aerial refueling or airlift operations. DOD
responded that it could operate the KC-135 aircraft for another 35
years, to approximately 2030, when they would be 70 to 80 years old.
However, since 2001, DOD and the Air Force have accelerated plans to
begin replacing the KC-135 aircraft. They will be expensive to replace
and will likely require many years of effort given the number of
aircraft to be replaced and the high cost of military aircraft. In
December 2001, we were requested to review the Air Force's requirements
for aerial refueling aircraft and options to meet those requirements.
We received the request and began the work before the Air Force
announced that it planned to lease Boeing 767 aircraft modified for
aerial refueling. We suspended this work several times to provide
testimony and other products related to the condition of the current
refueling fleet and the specific terms of the proposed lease in 2002
and 2003 (see p. 35 of this report for a list of GAO aerial refueling
aircraft-related products, including our testimony statements). We have
now completed our work on the original request and this report is the
result. As requested, we examined, (1) the extent to which DOD's
current aerial refueling force has met refueling needs, and the cost
and effort associated with operating and sustaining the current fleet;
(2) the most recent aerial refueling requirements; and (3) options to
enable DOD to meet future aerial refueling requirements. Subsequent to
this request, in 2002, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Air
Force to initiate a multi-year pilot program to lease up to 100 Boeing
767 aircraft for use as aerial refueling aircraft. Subsequent to the
hearings, Congress amended the authorization to permit the Air Force to
lease 20 and purchase 80 aerial refueling aircraft.
To examine the extent to which DOD's current aerial refueling force has
met mission requirements, the cost of maintenance, and efforts to
sustain the fleet, we interviewed DOD and Air Force officials and
reviewed key documents, comparing mission requirements and aerial
refueling aircraft availability rates; and obtained a variety of data
documenting maintenance costs. We did not independently verify the
reliability of the cost and maintenance data, but we discussed cost
estimates with certain internal and external organizations
knowledgeable about aircraft operating and maintenance costs to
determine the reasonableness of the data, and we determined that the
estimates were reasonable. To examine current aerial refueling aircraft
requirements, we interviewed key DOD and Air Force officials and
reviewed key requirements documents, including a joint instruction
calling for a requirements determination study and recommending an
analysis of alternatives to meeting the requirements, a briefing on
Tanker Requirements Study-05, and the complete Mobility Requirements
Study-05. To identify options to enable DOD to meet the requirements,
we interviewed officials and obtained documents outlining three
different approaches to meeting refueling requirements that are
generally considered to be reasonably available in the near term. We
describe our scope and methodology in appendix I. We conducted this
work from December 2001 to April 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The current refueling force has met the needs of U.S. forces in
peacetime and wartime; however, future costs and efforts needed to
operate and support the existing refueling fleet, especially the
KC-135s, will likely continue to rise as these aircraft age. Although
Congress has authorized the Air Force to lease 20 and purchase 80
KC-767A aerial refueling aircraft to start replacing the 538-plane
KC-135 fleet, the Air Force will likely need another 20 to 30 years to
replace the rest based on the planned production rate of the first 100
aircraft and the likely cost of the planes. Consequently, the Air Force
will need to maintain and possibly modernize at least some of the
remaining aircraft for up to 3 decades. Some of those aircraft could be
between 70 to 80 years old when replaced. Operations and support costs
for the KC-135 fleet are estimated to grow from about $2.2 billion in
fiscal year 2003 to $5.1 billion (fiscal year 2003 dollars) in fiscal
year 2017, an increase of $2.9 billion, or over 130 percent, which
represents an annual growth rate of about 6.2 percent.
Currently, the Air Force does not know how many aircraft or the type of
aircraft needed for the future refueling mission because no up-to-date
studies exist to validate the number or type needed. Tanker
Requirements Study-05 is the most recent study, but it specifies the
number of refueling aircraft needed to support operations contemplated
in the outdated two-major-theater-war strategy. The current strategy is
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review approach to (1) defend the
homeland, (2) deter aggression by maintaining regionally tailored
forces, (3) swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping major
conflicts, and (4) decisively defeat the adversary in one of two major
conflicts. The current strategy, combined with the global war on
terrorism, and DOD reassessments of operational concepts and the force
structure may lead to still more changes in planned operations and by
extension, in refueling support that will be required, although no
requirements study was planned to replace Tanker Requirements Study-05
at the time of our audit work. DOD guidance also specifies that an
analysis of alternatives is required to identify options for meeting
requirements.[Footnote 2] The Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense
Authorization Act required an analysis of alternatives to identify
options best suited to meeting current and projected refueling needs by
no later than March 1, 2004. To comply with the mandated requirement,
DOD has completed an interim report memorandum dated February 24, 2004,
outlining the framework and parameters it proposes for the Air Force to
use in an overview study of various options for replacing its aging
fleet of KC-135 aircraft. However, DOD and the Air Force recognize that
the February 2004 guidance letter is not an analysis of alternatives.
DOD plans to issue a separate analysis and report studying the material
condition of its fleet of KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft by September
2004, followed by the analysis of alternatives study to be issued in
August 2005.
At least three options exist to meet future refueling needs. The Air
Force could (1) directly acquire new aircraft to replace the KC-135
fleet, (2) obtain excess commercial aircraft configured for refueling,
or (3) augment its fleet with contractor-provided refueling. Except for
the option to directly acquire new aircraft, these options or some
combination could enable DOD to meet refueling needs without incurring
the full cost to acquire, operate, and support a new refueling fleet
and develop required associated infrastructure. DOD's planned analysis
of alternatives will review options related to buying new or
commercially similar aircraft as well as acquiring and modifying used
aircraft but was not planned to evaluate the potential for contractor-
provided refueling, according to the memorandum from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to the Air Force directing that an analysis of
alternatives be done. We are not taking a position on which option(s)
would be more suitable.
To provide a current, comprehensive roadmap to guide long-term
replacement of the current tanker fleet, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense (1) conduct a new, validated requirements study to
determine current and projected aerial refueling requirements and (2)
expand the planned analysis of alternatives to include all viable
options for providing aerial refueling including the potential for the
use of contractors. DOD concurred with each recommendation and had
begun the studies at the time of this report.
Background:
Aerial refueling is critical to carrying out U.S. national security
strategy because it allows other aircraft to fly further, stay airborne
longer, and carry more weapons, equipment, and supplies. The Air Force
has stated that without aerial refueling, U.S. national security
strategy could not be executed. While numerous military aircraft are
used for refueling, most of the U.S. refueling capability is in the Air
Force's 59 KC-10 and 538 KC-135 aircraft. These large, long-range
aircraft are based on commercial aircraft modified for aerial
refueling. The KC-10 aircraft is based on the DC-10 commercial
aircraft, was built in the 1980s and averages about 20 years in age.
Figure 1 displays a KC-10 aircraft refueling an F-16 fighter aircraft.
Figure 1: KC-10 Aerial Refueling Aircraft Preparing to Refuel an F-16
Fighter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to its refueling capability, the KC-10 is a multi-role
aircraft and can be used to transport air cargo, known as airlift.
The KC-135 aircraft, similar to the Boeing 707 commercial airliner, was
built in the 1950s and 1960s, and aircraft still in the fleet average
about 43 years in age. Figure 2 displays a KC-135 refueling aircraft.
Figure 2: KC-135 Aerial Refueling Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In terms of refueling capacity, the KC-135 aircraft comprise about
90 percent of the refueling fleet and consequently are the mainstay of
the U.S. aerial refueling capability.[Footnote 3] However, their
ability to meet current and future refueling mission requirements will
depend on continued maintenance, support, and operations for years to
come.
Prior to 2001 neither DOD nor the Air Force Expressed an Urgent Need
for a New Refueling Aircraft:
Between 1996 and November 2001, DOD and the Air Force expressed little
urgency to replace KC-135 aircraft even though the aircraft were
experiencing age-related problems. For example, the Air Force was
addressing corrosion, increased operating and support costs, and
reduced aircraft availability in the mid-1990s, when we last reviewed
aerial refueling issues.[Footnote 4] In our 1996 report, we stated that
(1) the KC-135 aircraft was becoming increasingly costly to maintain
and operate, (2) procurement of a commercial-derivative aircraft could
take 4 to 6 years and development of a new aircraft could take up to 12
years, and (3) the Air Force would need to quickly initiate studies to
develop a replacement strategy for mobility aircraft used in aerial
refueling and airlift. DOD responded that "while the KC-135 is an
average of 35 years old, its airframe hours and cycles are relatively
low. With proper maintenance and upgrades, we believe the aircraft may
be sustainable for another 35 years." Thus, DOD planned to continue
operating the aircraft until about 2030, when they would be about 70 to
80 years old.
At that same time, the Air Mobility Command deferred the start of
KC-135 replacement from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2013. Moreover,
in November 2001, the commander of the Air Mobility Command stated that
the "Air Mobility Command's priority is to continue with C-17
acquisition and C-5 modernization in the near term. As the airlift
priority is met, AMC will begin to shift resources to address the next
air refueling platform in the mid-to-long-term. Air Mobility Strategic
Plan 2000 envisions KC-135 aircraft retirement beginning in 2013 with
the concurrent fielding of a replacement air refueling platform.":
In January 2002,[Footnote 5] Congress authorized a pilot program to
lease 100 Boeing 767 aircraft modified for aerial refueling,
subsequently designated the KC-767A aircraft. At about the time that
Congress authorized the proposed lease, the Air Force position on when
it wanted to begin retiring KC-135s and introducing replacement
aircraft shifted from around 2013 to 2006. The Air Force stated that
the urgency was due to growing operating and support costs, declining
aircraft availability, and an increasing possibility that a fleetwide
grounding event would prevent continued operation of the KC-135
aircraft and thus cripple refueling support to U.S. combat air forces.
In mid-2003, the Air Force introduced a plan to retire 61 KC-135Es, to
reduce the support costs while increasing the number of crews, flying
hours, and utilization rates for the remaining aircraft.[Footnote 6]
The fiscal year 2004 defense authorization act limited the number of
KC-135Es to be retired in that fiscal year to 12 aircraft.
Despite the recently stated urgency of replacing the KC-135 aircraft,
the Air Force has not requested funds in the fiscal year 2005 budget to
buy or lease new refueling aircraft. In a traditional procurement, the
Air Force would need to have programmed any funding to buy the new
aircraft. On the other hand, a key claimed advantage of the proposed
lease was that the Air Force could immediately order the KC-767A
aircraft for delivery beginning in 2006 but would only have to make
annual payments to the aircraft owner rather than paying the full
purchase price. Conversely, if the Air Force replaced the refueling
aircraft through a purchase, it would have had to program sufficient
funds to pay the full purchase price by 2006 for delivery beginning in
2009. However, neither DOD nor the Air Force wanted to reprogram funds
from other acquisition programs to accelerate refueling aircraft
procurement because such action was thought to have the potential to
disrupt other programs and affect military capability.
Status of KC-767A Aircraft Acquisition:
In 2003, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees held hearings
on the condition of the KC-135 fleet and proposed leasing of 100
KC-767A aircraft. Subsequent to the hearings and in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress amended the
original lease provision and authorized the Air Force to lease 20 new
KC-767A aircraft and purchase 80. A key advantage of this plan is that
it offered savings of about $5 billion in current dollars over the plan
to lease all 100 aircraft but also requires the Air Force to pay for
the 80 aircraft sooner than if they were leased. However, at the time
of this report, the combined lease and purchase had not yet been
initiated. DOD has placed the final contract signing for the combined
lease and purchase on hold until the DOD Inspector General completes a
review of the actions of Air Force and Boeing officials during
negotiations, and until the Defense Science Board completes a review of
the condition of the KC-135 fleet, expected in September 2004.
Current Force Has Met Refueling Needs but at Increasing Cost and
Effort:
DOD's aerial refueling force has met the needs of U.S. combat and
mobility air forces since 1991.[Footnote 7] However, as the fleet ages,
the costs and the efforts to keep it operating safely are likely to
grow. Although the Air Force has begun the process to replace all 121
KC-135E aircraft with 100 KC-767A aircraft pending final approval, the
effort is planned for completion in 2011 or later. Moreover, this plan
does not lead to replacement of any of the 417 KC-135R aircraft, a
process that could last another 20 to 30 years. As a result, U.S.
combat and mobility air forces are likely to continue to rely on some
KC-135R aircraft for aerial refueling through at least the 2020 to 2030
time frame.
DOD's Aerial Refueling Force Has Met Refueling Fleet Needs in Combat
and Peacetime Operations:
Since 1991, U.S. airpower has been used in combat in the Middle East,
the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the United States on homeland defense
missions. Aerial refueling has played a vital supporting role in these
operations due to the long distances between bases in the United States
and elsewhere and the combat theaters, the distances within the
theaters between bases and operating areas; the need to keep combat
aircraft aloft for extended periods of time or maintain operations
around the clock; and the relatively short operating ranges of many
combat and support aircraft. Nearly every mission flown by combat and
support aircraft during these conflicts required at least one, and
often multiple refuelings from U.S. refueling aircraft. Table 1 depicts
aerial refueling activity in the last four major conflicts.
Table 1: Air Force Aerial Refueling Statistics for Major Conflicts
Since 1991:
Number of refueling aircraft;
Iraq (1991): 306;
Kosovo (1999): 175;
Afghanistan 2001-02: 80;
Iraq 2003: 185.
Sorties;
Iraq (1991): 16,865;
Kosovo (1999): 5,215;
Afghanistan 2001- 02: 15,468;
Iraq 2003: 6,193.
Flight hours;
Iraq (1991): 66,238;
Kosovo (1999): 52,390;
Afghanistan 2001-02: 115,417;
Iraq 2003: Not available.
Average sortie length (hrs);
Iraq (1991): 3.9;
Kosovo (1999): 10.0;
Afghanistan 2001-02: 7.5;
Iraq 2003: Not available.
Receiver aircraft;
Iraq (1991): 51,696;
Kosovo (1999): 23,095;
Afghanistan 2001-02: 50,585;
Iraq 2003: 28,899.
Fuel off-loaded (lbs);
Iraq (1991): 800.7M;
Kosovo (1999): 253.8M;
Afghanistan 2001-02: 1,166M;
Iraq 2003: 376.4M.
Avg. fuel per sortie (lbs);
Iraq (1991): 47.5K;
Kosovo (1999): 48.7K;
Afghanistan 2001-02: 75.4K;
Iraq 2003: 60.8K.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
[End of table]
According to the Air Force, since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the refueling fleet has been increasingly stressed due to
operational requirements. Table 2 depicts the percentages of the KC-135
fleet that flew within various ranges of flight hours each year from
fiscal years 1996 through 2002.
Table 2: Distribution of Flying Hours for the KC-135 Fleet (Fiscal
Years 1996-2002):
Hours per aircraft: 0;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 3.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 4.2%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 4.2%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 5.8%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 8.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 7.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 4.2%.
Hours per aircraft: 1-99;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 3.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 5.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 5.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 9.8%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 11.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 11.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 7.3%.
Hours per aircraft: 100-199;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 11.9%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 8.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 8.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 9.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 11.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 9.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 9.1%.
Hours per aircraft: 200-299;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 16.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 13.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 16.7%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 18.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 20.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 18.7%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 12.4%.
Hours per aircraft: 300-399;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 28.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 34.2%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 28.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 21.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 22.0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 22.0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 15.8%.
Hours per aircraft: 400-499;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 23.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 20.5%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 21.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 12.9%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 13.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 18.5%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 19.5%.
Hours per aircraft: 500-599;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 7.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 9.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 10.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 7.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 7.8%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 8.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 15.5%.
Hours per aircraft: 600-699;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 4.9%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 4.2%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 4.2%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 6.0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 3.6%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 3.5%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 8.7%.
Hours per aircraft: 700-799;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 1.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 0.5%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 0.9%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 4.7%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 0.9%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 0.5%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 3.5%.
Hours per aircraft: 800-899;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 2.0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 0.7%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 0.4%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 1.5%.
Hours per aircraft: 900-999;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 0.2%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 1.1%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 1.5%.
Hours per aircraft: >1000;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1996: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1997: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1998: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 1999: 1.3%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2000: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2001: 0%;
Percentage of KC-135 fleet: 2002: 1.3.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The cumulative lifetime fleetwide average was about 16,000 hours per
KC-135 aircraft at the time of our review, less than half of the
projected limit of 36,000-39,000 hours per aircraft, according to Air
Force data. In 2001, the Air Force projected that the fatigue life for
nearly all of the KC-135 aircraft should permit their usage until 2040.
However, since 2001, the Air Force has become concerned that unknown
future problems could arise and lead to the grounding of the KC-135
fleet, thereby undermining refueling capability.
KC-135 Aircraft Has Undergone Significant Improvements to Remain Combat
Ready:
While the KC-135 fleet was delivered between 1957 and 1965, significant
portions of the aircraft have been upgraded or modified since. Thus,
while the aircraft are considered old, significant improvements have
been incorporated into the aircraft since, including capability-
enhancing modifications and replacement of major structural components.
For example, between 1975 and 1988, the Air Force replaced about
1,500 square feet of the aluminum skin on the underside of the wings of
most KC-135 aircraft with an improved aluminum alloy that was less
susceptible to fatigue. Engine strut fittings were also replaced.
In addition to such specific large-scale, fleetwide upgrade programs,
most aircraft have had some other major structural components replaced
as necessary, and some major components have been replaced on all
aircraft. Examples of some of these major structural repairs include
replacement of segments of fuselage skins, floor beams, fuselage
bulkheads, and upper wing skins. Figure 3 shows replacement of fuselage
skin underway on a KC-135 aircraft.
Figure 3: Removal and Replacement of KC-135 Fuselage Skin:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As components such as these are replaced, the use of new and improved
materials, fabrication, and corrosion prevention techniques are being
used to prevent corrosion and allow for increased service life of the
parts.
KC-135 Operating and Support Costs Have Increased Significantly:
KC-135 operations and support costs have risen significantly since
1996. As shown in table 3, the actual average cost per flying hour,
adjusted to constant 2002 dollars, increased from $8,476 per hour in
1996 to $10,955 per hour in 2002, an increase of 29 percent.
Table 3: KC-135 Operating and Support Costs (Fiscal Years 1996-2002):
Constant fiscal year 2002 dollars in millions.
Cost category: Mission personnel;
1996: $693.6;
1997: $671.3;
1998: $641.1;
1999: $792.9;
2000: $780.2;
2001: $793.0;
2002: $778.2.
Cost category: Unit level consumption;
1996: $475.4;
1997: $473.9;
1998: $514.8;
1999: $525.7;
2000: $388.1;
2001: $485.0;
2002: $633.8.
Cost category: Depot maintenance total;
1996: $292.0;
1997: $306.5;
1998: $417.8;
1999: $460.8;
2000: $390.2;
2001: $423.9;
2002: $647.3.
Cost category: Contractor support total;
1996: $6.0;
1997: $4.6;
1998: $8.3;
1999: $10.8;
2000: $5.8;
2001: $13.3;
2002: $4.2.
Cost category: Sustaining support total;
1996: $30.1;
1997: $18.8;
1998: $23.1;
1999: $22.9;
2000: $24.5;
2001: $24.5;
2002: $38.4.
Cost category: Indirect support total;
1996: $111.6;
1997: $134.7;
1998: $130.9;
1999: $220.2;
2000: $211.9;
2001: $211.6;
2002: $298.7.
Total;
1996: $1,608.7;
1997: $1,609.8;
1998: $1,736.0;
1999: $2,033.3;
2000: $1,800.7;
2001: $1,951.3;
2002: $2,400.6.
Annual flying hours[A];
1996: $189,827;
1997: $188,579;
1998: $189,236;
1999: $195,851;
2000: $157,786;
2001: $165,574;
2002: $219,136.
Cost per flying hour;
1996: $8,476;
1997: $8,536;
1998: $9,173;
1999: $10,382;
2000: $11,412;
2001: $11,785;
2002: $10,955.
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
[A] Excludes hours for four KC-135D aircraft that are scheduled for
retirement in fiscal year 2005.
[End of table]
The Air Force's 15-year cost estimates project further significant
growth through fiscal year 2017. For example, operations and support
costs for the KC-135 fleet are estimated to grow from about $2.2
billion in fiscal year 2003 to $5.1 billion (2003 dollars) in fiscal
year 2017, an increase of $2.9 billion, or over 130 percent, which
represents an annual growth rate of about 6.2 percent.
KC-135 Depot Maintenance Trends Change:
To maintain serviceability, each KC-135 aircraft periodically undergoes
programmed depot maintenance. During this maintenance, crews inspect
the aircraft, repair or replace structural components and systems, make
modifications, and strip and reapply paint. Figure 4 shows the location
and damage to a component of a refueling aircraft's frame that was
discovered during program depot maintenance. The part was replaced.
Figure 4: Example of a Cracked Frame Component That Was Replaced During
Programmed Depot Maintenance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Most KC-135 aircraft are scheduled for depot maintenance every 5 years,
although aircraft based in locations subject to humid air and/or a salt
air environment are generally scheduled every 4 years.[Footnote 8]
Between mid-1994 and mid-1998, an average of about 100 KC-135 aircraft
were at a depot at any given time. However, by mid-2000, that number
had risen to 166 aircraft, about 30 percent of the fleet, due in part
to modernization programs and the need for more extensive maintenance
attributed to the aircraft aging. As shown in figure 5, the average
number of days that each KC-135 spent in depot maintenance, known as
"depot flow days," rose sharply during the 1990s but declined
significantly in fiscal year 2000, due to a variety of short-term
initiatives.
Figure 5: Trend in the Number of Depot Flow Days for Programmed Depot
Maintenance Per KC-135 Aircraft (Fiscal Years 1991-2000):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Between 1991 and 2000, the Air Force doubled the basic depot
maintenance package, accounting for a significant portion of the
increased depot flow days. The change increased maintenance time from
16,000 hours to 32,000 hours[Footnote 9] on average per aircraft.
Moreover, other factors also increased maintenance time including:
* the removal and replacement of major portions of wiring systems
(5,200 hours per plane);
* one-time structural changes to prevent corrosion (2,100 hours per
plane); and:
* unplanned major structural repairs, including replacement of floor
beams, fuselage bulkheads, and fuselage skins (increased by 6,000 hours
per plane).
Depot flow days began to decline in fiscal year 1999 but recognizing
the need to try to further reduce depot flow days and despite the
doubling of the maintenance package, in 2001, the Air Force made
improvements to depot operations. These changes included:
* deferring maintenance if warranted based on an inspection of the
aircraft;
* increasing the number of maintenance personnel;
* moving engineers to production to shorten decision-making time on
whether to remove, repair, or replace a damaged or worn aircraft
component;
* and increasing second shift operations.
As a result, the number of aircraft in the depot decreased from 176 to
89 between September 2000 and September 2002 with no known degradation
in aircraft safety and readiness. The Air Force expects the number of
KC-135s in depot maintenance to continue to decline to 73 aircraft in
fiscal year 2005, followed by a gradual increase to 89 aircraft in
fiscal year 2020.
Air Force's Aerial Refueling Requirements Are Outdated:
The Air Force plans to embark on a program to replace the KC-135 fleet
without a current study to identify the number or type of aircraft
needed for the future refueling mission. The most recent study is
Tanker Requirements Study-05. However, it specifies the number of
refueling aircraft needed for the outdated two-major-theater-war
strategy, which was replaced by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Moreover, refueling requirements could change still more due to force
transformation initiatives, projected changes in operational concepts,
the advent of new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and
force structure changes. Finally, the Air Force also has not conducted
a recommended analysis of alternatives to identify the approach best
suited to meeting refueling mission requirements prior to committing to
a specific approach. Consequently, the Air Force may embark on an
expensive program to invest in new aircraft without knowing how many it
needs and may miss an opportunity to meet its needs using the most
cost-effective approach.
Current Refueling Force Is a Cold War Legacy:
The KC-135 aircraft design and fleet size has evolved from
post-World War II requirements to that needed to carry out the
U.S. strategy of containment of the former Soviet Union. The Air Force
acquired more than 700 KC-135 aircraft between 1957 and 1965,
principally to refuel bombers that would have carried out the strategic
nuclear war plan. Thus, the KC-135 aircraft was equipped with a boom to
provide high refueling rates that strategic bombers needed. In that
role, the refueling aircraft spent 30 percent of their time on nuclear
alert ready for takeoff but were not actually flown much. In the post-
Cold War era, the aerial refueling aircraft mission has changed to the
support of global operations of all strike and cargo aircraft, but the
KC-135 fleet was reduced to 538 aircraft from over 700.
Most Recent Study Reflects Now Outdated Two-Major-Theater-War Strategy:
The most recent study effort addressing Air Force aerial refueling
requirements is Tanker Requirements Study-05, which was issued in
February 2001. According to Air Force officials, the purpose of the
study was to determine the number of tanker aircraft and aircrews
needed to support the National Military Strategy of conducting two
nearly simultaneous major theater wars in Korea and in Southwest Asia.
The study also included the refueling requirements to support the
strategic nuclear plan, certain special operations, and smaller-scale
contingencies. The study identified shortages of both aircrews and
aircraft in certain scenarios.
Tanker Requirements Study-05 concluded that up to 1,033 aircrews were
needed, depending on the scenario. When we applied the KC-10 and KC-135
crew ratios to the number of aircraft in the inventory, we derived a
total of over 840 aircrews, a shortage of about 190 crews. The KC-10
crew ratio is 2.0 crews per active duty aircraft and 1.5 crews per
reserve component aircraft while the KC-135 crew ratio is 1.36 crews
per active duty aircraft and 1.27 crews per reserve component aircraft.
However, even this level was insufficient in Operation Desert Storm
when the Air Force needed 1.5 crews per KC-135 aircraft, and in
Operation Allied Force when it needed 1.8 crews per KC-135 aircraft. To
meet the immediate mission requirements of these operations, the Air
Force deployed more crews from their home bases without their aircraft.
While this permitted the Air Force to meet the immediate needs of the
specific operation, it also significantly undermined the refueling
capability that would normally be available for other concurrent
contingencies.
Tanker Requirements Study-05[Footnote 10] also concluded that,
depending on the scenario, the Air Force needed up to 607 KC-135R-
equivalent[Footnote 11] aircraft to meet aerial refueling requirements
in 2005 and uses such equivalencies to evaluate its refueling capacity.
When we applied the equivalencies to the fleet in March 2004,
acknowledging that some aircraft will not be available due to aircraft
needed for training (24) and aircraft in depot maintenance (98), the
Air Force had the equivalent of 507 KC-135R available aircraft, as
shown in table 4.
Table 4: Number of Air Force Aerial Refueling Aircraft in the Fleet
Expressed as KC-135R Aircraft Equivalents:
Aircraft: KC-135E;
Number in the fleet in March 2004: 121;
Used in training[A]: [Empty];
In depot maintenance[A]: 20;
Number in the fleet available: 101;
Equivalency factor: 0.84;
Number in fleet in 2004 as an equivalency of the KC-135R: 85.
Aircraft: KC-135R;
Number in the fleet in March 2004: 417;
Used in training[A]: 24;
In depot maintenance[A]: 70;
Number in the fleet available: 323;
Equivalency factor: 1.00;
Number in fleet in 2004 as an equivalency of the KC-135R: 323.
Aircraft: KC-10;
Number in the fleet in March 2004: 59;
Used in training[A]: [Empty];
In depot maintenance[A]: 8;
Number in the fleet available: 51;
Equivalency factor: 1.95;
Number in fleet in 2004 as an equivalency of the KC-135R: 99.
Aircraft: Total;
Number in the fleet in March 2004: 597;
Used in training[A]: 24;
In depot maintenance[A]: 98;
Number in the fleet available: 475;
Equivalency factor: N/A;
Number in fleet in 2004 as an equivalency of the KC-135R: 507.
Source: Air Force.
[A] Estimated number of aircraft expected to be unavailable for
operations in 2004. As we pointed out previously in this report, the
Air Force expects the number of KC-135 aircraft in depot to decrease to
73 by fiscal year 2005 and gradually increase to 89 in fiscal year
2020. Thus between 335 and 351 KC-135 aircraft could be available for
operations between 2005 and 2020.
[End of table]
New Strategies and Changing Operational Concepts Could Affect Aerial
Refueling Requirements:
Major changes in U.S. national security strategy and changes in
operational concepts could have a significant effect on the type and
number of aerial refueling aircraft needed.
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Promulgated New Defense Strategy:
Prior to 2001, U.S. national security strategy was based on the long-
standing two major theater war threat-based model, which focused on
specific adversaries and geographic locations. Tanker Requirements
Study-05 is based on this approach. In 2001, the Quadrennial Defense
Review shifted defense planning to a "capabilities-based" construct
based on the assumption that the United States cannot know which
specific nation or group may pose a future threat, although defense
planners can anticipate the range of capabilities an adversary might
employ.
Under the strategy articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S.
forces must:
* defend the U.S. domestic population, territory, and critical defense-
related infrastructure against attacks from outside U.S. borders;
* deter aggression and coercion by maintaining regionally tailored
forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the
East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia;
* swiftly defeat aggression against U.S. allies and friends in two
overlapping major conflicts; and:
* decisively defeat the adversary in one of two major conflicts by
imposing U.S. will and removing any future threat from that adversary.
The revised strategy significantly broadens the scope of potential
theaters of operations. Moreover, Air Force officials believe that the
Quadrennial Defense Review approach represents a significant increase
in potential mission requirements and carries with it a concomitant
increase in refueling requirements. At the same time, increasing
domestic operations in defense of the U.S. homeland may also impose
substantial aerial refueling requirements not previously contemplated.
As shown in table 5, in addition to changes in U.S. national security
strategy, changes in (1) overseas basing rights, (2) operational
concepts, (3) the extent of use of precision-guided munitions, (4)
joint operations, and (5) technology could also change refueling
requirements.
Table 5: Changes to National Strategies and Operational Concepts That
Could Lead to Changed Aerial Refueling Requirements:
Change: Changes in strategy; Discussion: If changes to U.S. national
security strategies occur, including the 2005 Quadrennial Defense
Review, refueling requirements could also change. For example, "anti-
access environments" may exist whereby both the tanker and receiver
aircraft would be required to fly longer distances, causing the tanker
to have less fuel to offload and the receiver aircraft to require more
fuel.
Change: Overseas basing; Discussion: The potential loss of overseas
basing rights without a concomitant increase in basing rights elsewhere
or contemplated overseas force realignments could force U.S. combat and
support aircraft to operate from bases at greater distances from
theaters of operations and consequently require additional aerial
refueling to meet combat and support mission requirements.
Change: Operational concepts; Discussion: Refueling requirements could
change if individual aircraft in the new refueling fleet can remain
longer at aerial refueling rendezvous points and themselves be aerially
refueled.
Change: Precision-guided munitions; Discussion: Increased reliance on
precision-guided munitions could change refueling requirements if
standoff distances increase for combat aircraft, thereby decreasing
distances from the operational base to the munitions' launch location,
and if precision munitions' success rate increases sufficiently to
reduce the number of sorties needed to bring the same effects on
target.
Change: Mixed receivers on joint operations; Discussion: The Air Force
uses one type of refueling system known as a "boom and receptacle,"
while Navy, Marine Corps, and many allied aircraft use another system,
known as "hose and drogue." Consequently, increasing reliance on joint
operations leads to increased requirements for both boom and
receptacle, and hose and drogue off load capabilities. If the refueling
fleet can operate either type of offload mechanism on a single mission,
refueling requirements could be still different.
Change: Emerging technologies; Discussion: Some emerging technologies
such as unmanned aerial vehicles have much longer ranges than manned
systems and may lead to changed refueling requirements.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Other Factors Could Impact Requirements:
Other aircraft acquisition and modification programs may also affect
future aerial refueling requirements. For example, Air Force officials
believe that newer aircraft will be increasingly fuel efficient,
possibly increasing their ranges and potentially reducing the number of
refueling aircraft needed. In its 2003 report on re-engining the B-52
bomber fleet, the Defense Science Board examined the effect of more
fuel-efficient engines on missions flown from Diego Garcia during
Operation Enduring Freedom. Assuming that more efficient engines would
increase the B-52s range by at least 25 percent, the Board found that
the Air Force could reduce the size of the refueling fleet on Diego
Garcia by one-third.[Footnote 12]
In addition, the Air Force may be expected to refuel fewer aircraft in
the future potentially leading to a reduction in refueling aircraft
requirements. For example, in its fiscal year 2004 budget submission,
the Navy proposed a new Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration plan
that is to more fully integrate the Navy and Marine Corps strike
fighter forces between fiscal years 2003 and 2012. If implemented, Navy
and Marine Corps strike fighter forces would be reduced from 872 to 562
aircraft, significantly reducing the number of aircraft needing aerial
refueling.
Greater Efficiencies of a Modern Refueling Aircraft Could Lead to
Reduced Requirements:
Initially, the Air Force plans to begin replacing its KC-135E aircraft,
about 130 planes, with 100 new KC-767A aircraft. The KC-767A, like most
modern aircraft, will have advantages and capabilities not found on the
KC-135s. In theory, these capabilities permit recapitalization of the
refueling fleet with fewer but more efficient aircraft without
degrading refueling capability. These capabilities could be added to
new aircraft during construction or during refurbishment and conversion
of used aircraft.
* New aircraft can be equipped with engines that are considerably more
powerful, yet more fuel efficient, maintainable, and less costly than
those powering the KC-135Es. This enables larger aircraft to operate
from shorter runways and to carry a greater payload (fuel, cargo, and/
or passengers) longer distances than the KC-135R aircraft. This would
allow new aircraft with characteristics similar to the KC-767A, to
operate from four times as many runways and offload up to 20 percent
more fuel than the KC-135E aircraft.
* Refueling aircraft that are equipped to refuel both hose and drogue
and boom and receptacle-type receiver aircraft on the same flight would
enhance joint operations because a single refueling aircraft could
refuel both Air Force and Navy aircraft without first landing and
changing equipment or requiring two differently equipped aircraft to
operate simultaneously. All of the KC-10 and 20 of the KC-135 refueling
aircraft currently have this capability.
* Refueling aircraft that can be aerially refueled themselves serve as
force multipliers in the sense that they can remain airborne for much
longer missions than the KC-135s and potentially support many more
receiver aircraft.
* Refueling aircraft that are equipped with wing-mounted refueling pods
could refuel two Navy-allied receiver aircraft simultaneously.
* Refueling aircraft derived from commercial aircraft designs can be
maintained according to commercial maintenance practices, which
generally results in the aircraft spending less time in maintenance at
any given time and consequently, being available for missions more
often than the KC-135 aircraft.
Updated requirements study and analysis of alternatives were not
planned at the time of our work:
The national security strategy and defense planning guidance have
changed considerably since Tanker Requirements Study 05 was completed.
In addition, DOD Instruction 5000.2,[Footnote 13] which governs defense
acquisition programs, identifies the basic process acquisition programs
should follow, beginning with and based upon the overarching national
security strategy, any existing national military strategies, and joint
concepts of operations. Generally, a series of analyses should be
conducted to identify: what is needed to achieve military objectives;
current capabilities; gaps or shortcomings; and potential solutions.
However, at the time of our work, DOD did not plan to conduct a new
requirements study or replace Tanker Requirements Study 05. The
guidance also recommends that DOD conduct an analysis of alternatives
to evaluate the operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and
estimated costs of alternative approaches to meet a mission capability.
The analysis assesses the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives
being considered to satisfy capabilities, including the sensitivity of
each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions or variables.
The Air Force did not comprehensively reassess aerial refueling
requirements following the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, nor
did it conduct a comprehensive analysis of alternatives before it
proposed to lease 100 KC-767A aerial refueling aircraft in 2003.
Consequently, as a result of congressional concerns about this matter,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required
that DOD complete an analysis of alternatives by March 2004. DOD issued
a memorandum dated February 24, 2004, containing a preliminary report
and outlining the framework and parameters for the Air Force overview
study of various options for replacing its aging fleet of KC-135
refueling aircraft. In addition, DOD has contracted for a study of the
material condition of its fleet of KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft
with a report due by September 2004. Finally, to fully comply with the
congressional reporting requirement and the DOD February 2004
memorandum, the Air Force plans to issue an analysis of alternatives in
August 2005.
Three Options Exist to Meeting the Air Force's Future Aerial Refueling
Requirements:
Replacing over 500 KC-135s will likely cost tens of billions of
dollars, and the time period over which this will be done could last
several decades, a period in which aircraft technology and aerial
refueling needs, as well as U.S. national security and military
strategies and operational concepts could change significantly. Just as
conditions in the first decade of the 21st century are dramatically
different than they were in the mid-1950s when the KC-135s were
introduced, so too will conditions be far different 30 to 40 years from
now. As the Air Force begins to modernize its aerial refueling fleet,
it has three alternatives available that have either been used
previously or were being tested at the time of our report. The most
obvious alternative is to acquire one or more variants of new
commercial aircraft and convert them to refueling aircraft. A second
option is to acquire used commercial aircraft and convert them into
refueling aircraft. Thirdly, the Air Force could contract for a portion
of its aerial refueling needs as a service. The most cost-effective
solution may be a combination of these or other options that would be
closely examined in a comprehensive analysis of alternatives, although
the Air Force's analysis of alternatives was not planned to review the
option of contractor-provided aerial refueling.
Acquiring New Aircraft:
The Air Force could acquire one or more variants of new production
aircraft and convert them to refueling aircraft either through
purchase, lease, or a combination of the two.[Footnote 14] These new
aircraft could consist of a mixed force comprised of small, medium, and
large aircraft suitable for supporting a wide range of refueling
operations. For example, in some instances, U.S. airpower may be needed
in parts of the world where there are few suitable overseas airfields
from which to operate large refueling aircraft. In such cases, smaller
tactical refueling aircraft capable of operating from short, unimproved
airfields close to the battlefield may be desirable. In other
instances, U.S. aircraft may be denied access to airfields close to the
battlefield, requiring combat aircraft to fly extremely long distances
with multiple aerial refuelings and large amounts of fuel. In these
instances, large strategic refueling aircraft capable of offloading
large amounts of fuel may be desirable. Regardless of the ultimate
aircraft mix, the overall cost to procure these planes could be
extremely expensive. If the Air Force could buy new refueling aircraft
at the $131 million price negotiated with the Boeing Company in 2003,
it would spend about $71 billion (in 2003 dollars), excluding support
and other costs, to replace all of the KC-135 fleet on a one-for-one
aircraft basis. On the other hand, if the Air Force leased some of
these aircraft over a long period of time--10 years for example--its
cost per aircraft could be about $80 million to $125 million.[Footnote
15] While purchasing costs less than leasing if the aircraft is
retained for its full service life of 20 to 30 years, leasing could
have merit in some instances--for example to temporarily fill a known
capability gap before a significantly improved technologically-
advanced new aircraft can be produced.
Currently, the aircraft most discussed as the initial replacement for
some of the KC-135 fleet is the Boeing KC-767A. Section 8159 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002[Footnote
16] authorized the Air Force to lease up to 100 aerial refueling
aircraft, which the Air Force tried to do in 2003 when it sought
congressional approval of its leasing plan. Subsequent to the hearings
and in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,
Congress amended the original lease provision and authorized the Air
Force to lease 20 new KC-767A aircraft and purchase 80.[Footnote 17]
The KC-767A has about the same fuel capacity as the KC-135R and is
larger and heavier, but more fuel-efficient. Another current aerial
refueling aircraft candidate is the Airbus A330 aircraft. The A330 is
considerably larger than the KC-767A and has about 20 percent greater
fuel capacity. It was being considered as the replacement refueling
aircraft in the United Kingdom at the time of this report. Another
Airbus model, the A310 is being operated with five international air
forces, with the first aerial refueling version expected to be
operational with the German Air Force in the first half of this year.
In addition, two other aircraft are being developed that could
potentially serve as future refuelers. Airbus is developing the A380,
which is somewhat larger than the Boeing 747 and is expected to enter
passenger service in 2006. Airbus claims the A380 will burn 13 percent
less fuel but carry about 35 percent more passengers. Boeing has begun
developing the 7E7, which will be closer in size to the A330. Boeing
claims the 7E7 will be 20 percent more efficient than current aircraft.
Also, future unmanned aerial refueling vehicles may be another
acquisition option to be considered by the Air Force and is denoted as
a possible option to study in DOD's February 2004 guidance to the Air
Force. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap released by DOD in March
2003 suggests the possibility of such unmanned aerial refueling
vehicles being in the Air Force's inventory in the 2015-2020 time
period.[Footnote 18] The development and deployment of such vehicles
would permit their remaining at an aerial refueling rendezvous point
for long durations without entering a combat zone. In addition, such a
collection of unmanned aerial refueling vehicles may be smaller in size
than the aerial refueling aircraft now being considered and may better
meet the needs of the Air Force in certain unique operations.
Acquire Used Aircraft:
The Air Force could augment its refueling fleet by acquiring some used
aircraft from among the over 1,500 commercial airliners in storage at
the time of our report.[Footnote 19] Under this approach, the Air Force
would convert them to aerial refueling aircraft. Some of these aircraft
are relatively new or have not been used extensively, while others are
older and have been used extensively. However, with extensive
refurbishment and conversion into a refueling and cargo-capable
aircraft, these aircraft could be suitable, given the relatively few
hours refueling aircraft fly each year when compared to commercial
aircraft. Possible limitations are that it is not known whether the
owners would sell the aircraft, the cost to convert them could be high,
and introduction of differing aircraft types into the fleet could
complicate maintenance and logistics because different spare parts
would need to be stockpiled and maintenance crews would need different
types of training.
Obtain Refueling Services from a Contractor:
Under this concept the Air Force would maintain a core aerial refueling
capability and augment it with contractor-provided refueling services
that could be activated on short notice--an aerial refueling Civil
Reserve Air Fleet--to meet additional anticipated aerial refueling
demands that may exceed its own capacity. We envision that this
approach could be similar to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program in
which commercial airlines agree in advance to make some of their
aircraft and crews available to DOD when needed to transport troops to
a theater of operations in wartime. In addition, contractor refuelers
could be used to meet some of the non-combat aerial refueling demands
such as proficiency training for receiver aircraft aircrews, supporting
the deployment of aircraft during periodic Air Force Air Expeditionary
Force rotations, and other planned aircraft movements. Currently, these
types of support missions can add a considerable amount of additional
time that active duty and reserve component refueling aircrews must
spend away from their home bases.
Before joining the program's pool of eligible aircraft, the aircraft
would be structurally modified, and basic aerial refueling equipment
including additional fuel tanks, lines, and pumps, would be installed,
most likely at government expense. Some of this equipment, such as
external refueling booms and pods, and militarily-unique avionics could
be designed so that it can be quickly added or removed depending on
whether the aircraft is to be operated in a military or civilian
capacity. The aircraft owners would most likely operate these aircraft
for commercial airfreight business when not needed for aerial
refueling.
Contractor-owned aircraft would not necessarily have to be used in the
combat theater, but could nevertheless provide significant refueling
support, and free up military refueling aircraft to be used in combat
areas. For example, these aircraft could be used to provide the "air
bridge" refueling to support the movement of fighters, bombers, and
transport aircraft from home bases in the United States or elsewhere to
the combat theater of operations but never enter the theater.[Footnote
20] DOD and the Air Force did not plan to include the option of
contractor-provided aerial refueling in its analysis of alternatives,
at the time of our review.
The Navy is conducting a pilot program to examine the feasibility of
using contractor-provided aerial refueling services to meet some of its
aerial refueling needs. The Navy refueling aircraft is a Boeing 707,
the same aircraft on which the Air Force's current workhorse KC-135 is
based. At times, Air Force refueling aircraft have not been available
to support Navy training due to the lower priority placed on Navy
training by the Air Force, and sometimes training plans changed on
relatively short-notice; hence, the Navy sought alternatives and
developed the pilot program. According to a Center for Naval Analyses
study, the Navy's contractor has enhanced aircraft carrier training.
The study reported that having an aerial refueling aircraft controlled
by and dedicated to the Navy provided flexibility during periods of
high-operational tempo, and saved time and fuel as Navy aircraft flew
coast to coast to conduct training. Moreover, Navy officials have
stated that at least in the early stages of its pilot program, mission
availability rates have been excellent for operations performed in the
continental United States and in supporting training exercises in
Puerto Rico. The presence of a large dedicated refueling aircraft
during training has also enabled Navy aircraft to rely less on their
own refueling-capability, currently S-3B and F/A-18F fighter aircraft
that can refuel other fighters, and allow those aircraft, especially
the F/A-18D/Es to focus on their primary combat missions. While Navy
officials expressed positive views about their experience to date with
contractor-provided aerial refueling, they also said that landing
privileges at military bases, peacetime and wartime communication
requirements, reliability, and other issues would need to be worked out
if this approach were used on a large scale.
Conclusions:
The Air Force is embarking on a program that could cost billions of
dollars to replace the existing KC-135 fleet without knowing how many
or what types of replacement aircraft it needs, because it does not
have a current requirements study. Consequently, the Air Force could
miss opportunities to meet its refueling needs in the most cost-
effective manner; it does not have a roadmap to guide it as it makes
investment decisions about tanker replacement. The Air Force could
begin its tanker replacement program along the lines of the lease-buy
program approved by Congress last year without such a roadmap, but we
believe that long-term replacement decisions for the remainder of the
tanker fleet should be based on a sound, comprehensive requirements
study reflecting the most up-to-date analysis possible of the future
environment.
Also, at least three options exist for meeting DOD's aerial refueling
needs, but without a comprehensive analysis of alternatives, the Air
Force would not know what option or combination of options are best
suited to meeting the requirements. As a result, the Air Force would
not have a sufficient basis on which to make its investment decision.
Thus, we agree with the February 2004 DOD initiative for the Air Force
to conduct an analysis of alternatives study for meeting the aerial
refueling requirements. We believe, however, that the planned analysis
of alternatives would be more effective and useful if it included all
potential options, especially the possibility of meeting at least a
portion of tanker needs through the use of contractor-provided
refueling.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide a current, comprehensive roadmap to guide long-term
replacement of the current tanker fleet, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense conduct a new, validated requirements study to
determine the current and projected aerial refueling requirements.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the Air
Force's planned analysis of alternatives be a comprehensive study of
all reasonable options, including using contractor-provided aerial
refueling services to meet some portion of its aerial refueling needs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Director of Defense Systems in the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In its comments,
DOD concurred with each of our recommendations. First, DOD indicated
that a Mobility Capabilities Study was underway at the time of our
report to determine aerial refueling requirements. Second, DOD
indicated that the analysis of alternatives would include consideration
of contractor-provided aerial refueling as a potential alternative.
DOD's comments are printed in their entirety in appendix II.
In addition, DOD provided technical comments which we incorporated in
our report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force,
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and it will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-4914. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III.
Signed by:
Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which DOD's current
aerial refueling force has met aerial refueling needs, and the cost and
effort associated with operating and sustaining the current aircraft
fleet; (2) the most recent aerial refueling requirements; and (3)
options to enable DOD to meet future aerial refueling requirements.
To examine the extent to which DOD's current aerial refueling force has
met refueling needs, we conducted interviews with DOD and Air Force
officials and obtained documents showing the services' refueling needs
in recent operations and the mission capable rates achieved of the
current refueling fleet. In addition, to examine the cost and effort to
operate and maintain the existing aerial refueling fleet, we
interviewed officials and obtained documents from the Office of the
Chief of Air Force Acquisition, Global Reach Program. We also visited
the Air Force's Air Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois,
and the Air Force's Oklahoma Air Logistics Center at Tinker Air Force
Base and interviewed key aerial refueling aircraft operations,
maintenance, and program analysis officials. At both locations, we
reviewed cost and maintenance documents. We did not independently
verify the reliability of the cost and maintenance data provided to us
however, we discussed cost estimates with certain external
organizations, including the Institute of Defense Analyses, the
American Transport Association, and other organizations and determined
the data that we had obtained was reasonable. We also reviewed
testimony by DOD, Air Force, and other officials before a variety of
congressional committees considering the proposed lease of 100 KC-767A
aerial refueling aircraft.
To examine the most recent aerial refueling requirements, we met with
officials from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and
U.S. Transportation Command officials responsible for determining
refueling requirements and operating costs and obtained key
requirements documents including DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of
the Defense Acquisition System," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3170.01C, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System," June 24, 2003, and other documents showing the
characteristics, missions, requirements, employment concepts, and
costs of operation of the refueling aircraft. We also reviewed a
briefing on Tanker Requirements Study-05 and the complete Mobility
Requirements Study-05, and other Air Force briefings, and related
documents. To gain a better perspective of air refueling operations and
requirements, we discussed with appropriate Air Force and DOD officials
the services' policies, priorities, and procedures for using,
modernizing, and maintaining their refueling aircraft inventory.
Moreover, we obtained information documenting required KC-135
maintenance and planned modifications to the aircraft. We also reviewed
several studies and reports addressing various aerial refueling fleet
topics, including those developed in recent major combat operations. We
also reviewed a report from the Congressional Budget Office that
estimates refueling aircraft maintenance and replacement costs. In
addition, we discussed aerial refueling issues with representatives of
several research organizations including the Institute of Defense
Analyses and The Rand Corporation, and major military aircraft
manufacturers including The Boeing Company and Lockheed-Martin. When
analyzing the problems of maintaining aging aircraft, we concentrated
on the Air Force's KC-135 aircraft because it makes up the bulk of the
DOD's aerial refueling inventory.
Finally, to examine options to enable DOD to meet its aerial refueling
requirements, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller); Office of Air Force Acquisition, Global Reach
Programs; the Air Force's Air Logistics Center at Tinker Air Force
Base; a contractor who was providing refueling services to the Navy at
the time of our review; the Office of Management and Budget; the Air
Transport Association; several major U.S. commercial airlines; and the
United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense, which was preparing to lease
aerial refueling aircraft at the time of our review. We used our 1996
report on aging refueling aircraft and related accelerating operation
and maintenance cost problems to suggest ways for DOD to consider
recapitalizing its aerial refueling fleet. Moreover, we reviewed
documents and briefings from many of these same organizations to
identify options available to the Air Force and DOD to meet current and
projected aerial refueling requirements.
We performed our work from December 2001 through April 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
MAY 21 2004:
Mr. Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Curtin:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-04-349, (GAO Code) - "MILITARY AIRCRAFT: DOD Needs to
Determine Its Aerial Refueling Aircraft Requirements," dated May 2004
(GAO Code 350229).
The DOD concurs with both of the draft report's recommendations. The
rationale for the DOD's position is provided in enclosure 1. Enclosure
2 provides additional comments and suggested changes to the report.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director, Defense Systems:
Enclosures:
1. DOD Comments to the GAO Recommendations 2. DOD Technical Comments to
the Draft Report:
GAO CODE 350229/GAO-04-349:
"MILITARY AIRCRAFT: DOD NEEDS TO DETERMINE ITS AERIAL REFUELING
AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
conduct a new, validated requirements study to determine the current
and projected aerial refueling requirements. (Page 29/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Two efforts are underway to determine tanker
requirements and recapitalization needs: the Mobility Capabilities
Study, directed by the Strategic Planning Guidance; and the KC-135
Tanker Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), directed by the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct that the Air Force's planned analysis of alternatives be a
comprehensive study of all reasonable options, including using
contractor-provided aerial refueling services to meet some portion of
its aerial refueling needs. (Page 29/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The AoA guidance outlines a comprehensive study.
We agree with the recommendation regarding consideration of contractor-
provided aerial refueling, and we will work through the AoA Senior
Steering Group to incorporate this option into the AoA Study Plan.
enclosure (1):
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contact:
Brian J. Lepore (202) 512-4523:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, William C. Meredith; Kenneth W.
Newell; Joseph J. Faley; Tim F. Stone; Fred S. Harrison; Norman L.
Jessup, Jr; James K. Mahaffey; Ann M. Dubois; Charles Perdue; and
Kenneth E. Patton also made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Aircraft: Observations on DOD's Aerial Refueling Aircraft
Acquisition Options. GAO-04-169R. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2003.
Military Aircraft: Institute for Defense Analysis Purchase Price
Estimate for the Air Force's Aerial Refueling Aircraft Leasing
Proposal. GAO-04-164R. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2003.
Military Aircraft: Observations on the Proposed Lease of Aerial
Refueling Aircraft by the Air Force. GAO-03-923T. Washington, D.C.:
September 4, 2003.
Military Aircraft: Observations on the Air Force Plan to Lease Aerial
Refueling Aircraft. GAO-03-1143T. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003.
Military Aircraft: Considerations in Reviewing the Air Force Proposal
to Lease Aerial Refueling Aircraft. GAO-03-1048T. Washington, D.C.:
July 23, 2003.
Military Aircraft: Information on Air Force Aerial Refueling Tankers.
GAO-03-938T. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003.
Air Force Aircraft: Preliminary Information on Air Force Tanker
Leasing. GAO-02-724R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2002.
U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to Maintain
and Operate. GAO/NSIAD-96-160. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 1996.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging
Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to Maintain and Operate, GAO/NSIAD-96-160
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 1996).
[2] An analysis of alternatives evaluates the operational
effectiveness, suitability, and estimated costs of alternative systems
to meet a mission capability. It assesses the advantages and
disadvantages of the alternatives being considered, including the
sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions.
[3] There are two basic versions of the KC-135 aircraft today--the
KC-135R and the KC-135E--both of which were derived from the original
KC-135As produced in the 1950s and 1960s. The Air Force undertook a
two-pronged engine replacement program in the mid-1980s to improve the
performance of its then 20-to 30-year-old KC-135A refueling fleet.
First, over 155 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tankers were
modified with used commercial airline engines, which improved their
fuel offload capability by 20 percent, and their fuel efficiency by
14 percent. These aircraft were redesignated as KC-135Es. During this
same period, active duty aircraft received new, more powerful,
efficient CFM-56 commercial engines plus about 25 other improvements
(such as reinforced floors and wing structures and strengthened landing
gear), which enabled the modified aircraft--redesignated as KC-135Rs--
to offload 50 percent more fuel, reduce fuel consumption by 25 percent,
and operate 96 percent quieter than the KC-135As. Subsequently, some of
the KC-135Es were also modified to KC-135Rs, so that as of March 1,
2004, there were 417 KC-135Rs and 121 KC-135Es. All active duty Air
Force units only operate the KC-135Rs, as do some Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve units, while all of the KC-135Es are assigned to
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. Over half of the total
538-plane KC-135 fleet is assigned to Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve units.
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging
Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to Maintain and Operate, GAO/NSIAD-96-160
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 1996).
[5] Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States
Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8159, 115 Stat. 2230, 2284-85 (2002).
[6] Seven additional KC-135E aircraft will be moved to back-up aircraft
inventory, which allows the Air Force to conduct scheduled and non-
scheduled maintenance, modifications, inspections, and repair on these
aircraft without a corresponding reduction of aircraft available for
operational missions.
[7] We did not review aerial refueling mission accomplishment for
missions prior to 1991; however, we are not aware of any shortcomings
prior to that date.
[8] KC-135 depot maintenance is performed at the Oklahoma City Air
Logistics Center at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; the Boeing
Aircraft Support Center in San Antonio, Texas; and at PEMCO Inc. in
Birmingham, Alabama.
[9] These hours are calculated by tallying the total number of hours
that each maintainer worked on an aircraft.
[10] We did not evaluate the validity of the study's analysis.
[11] "Tanker equivalents" reduces the differing capabilities of various
refueling aircraft to a common standard. Tanker Requirements Study-05
established the range and offload capability of the KC-135R as the
standard, thus its equivalency is one. A KC-135E can offload less fuel
than can a KC-135R because the E model carries less fuel and its
engines are not as fuel-efficient. Therefore, its equivalency to a
KC-135R is 0.84 to 1.00. The KC-10, on the other hand, has a greater
fuel capacity than the KC-135R. Thus, its equivalency is 1.95 to 1.00.
[12] Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Defense Science Board Task
Force on B-52H Re-Engining (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2002).
[13] DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System," May 12, 2003, implements DOD Directive 5000.1, "The Defense
Acquisition System," dated May 12, 2003. One of the stated purposes of
5000.2 is to "establish a simplified and flexible management framework
for translating—approved mission needs and requirements, into stable,
affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs that include weapon
systems."
[14] In 1996, we recommended that the Air Force consider a multi-role
aircraft that could conduct either aerial refueling or airlift
operations as a replacement for the KC-135. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to
Maintain and Operate, GAO/NSIAD-96-160 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8,
1996).
[15] Based on a lease rate for wide-body aircraft of one-half to eight-
tenths of 1 percent per month of the estimated purchase price,
multiplied by duration of the lease. This formula was presented by an
expert in commercial leasing at a July 23, 2003, hearing held by the
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
[16] Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8159, 115 Stat. 2230, 2284-85
(2002).
[17] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub.L.
No. 108-136, § 135, 117 Stat. 1392, 1413-14 (2003).
[18] U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap,
2002-2027 (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).
[19] Speednews.com, a commercial aviation Web site, reported that there
were 475 wide-body jets in storage in December 2003 and 1,147 narrow-
body jets. Of the wide-body aircraft, there were 119 B-747s, 71 B-767s,
81 DC-10s, and 26 MD-11s.
[20] The Air Force used 100 refueling aircraft during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm to support the Atlantic and Pacific "air
bridges."
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