Military Operations
Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain Gao ID: GAO-04-547 June 28, 2004Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and technologies, such as improvements in force networks and increased use of precision weapons, designed to address changes in the security environment resulting from the continuing terrorist threat and the advent of the information age. Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress.
Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked operations, such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and more integrated command and control centers, have improved DOD's ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force--reducing the time required for analysis and decision making in combat operations. However, recognizing that the full impact of these changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a series of case studies to better understand the effects of networked operations. Improvements in force networks have also been enhanced by the use of precision-guided weapons and associated technologies. These improvements not only provide commanders with greatly increased flexibility, such as the ability to conduct bombing operations in poor weather and from higher and safer altitudes, but also increase the accuracy of bombing operations. GAO's analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and those in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas stand out as key: (1) a lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to needed capabilities among military services; (2) continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses of bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other improvements in the speed of operations; (3) the absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness, which creates confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies, about assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs, and about procurement decisions; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information, more centralized management, and other changes in the operating environment brought about by the strategic changes.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-547, Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2004:
Military Operations:
Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology,
but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain:
GAO-04-547:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-547, a report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services; Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq
benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and
technologies, such as improvements in force networks and increased use
of precision weapons, designed to address changes in the security
environment resulting from the continuing terrorist threat and the
advent of the information age.
Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these
conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into
the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1)
assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in
force networks and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying
key barriers to continued progress.
What GAO Found:
Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are
clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated
in recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations
have been speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does
not have detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked
operations, such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and
more integrated command and control centers, have improved DOD‘s
ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate
quickly with all elements of the force”reducing the time required for
analysis and decision making in combat operations. However, recognizing
that the full impact of these changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a
series of case studies to better understand the effects of networked
operations. Improvements in force networks have also been enhanced by
the use of precision-guided weapons and associated technologies. These
improvements not only provide commanders with greatly increased
flexibility, such as the ability to conduct bombing operations in poor
weather and from higher and safer altitudes, but also increase the
accuracy of bombing operations. GAO‘s analysis found that the
percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to targets
increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and those in
Afghanistan.
Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued
progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas
stand out as key:
* A lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which
reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually
reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to
needed capabilities among military services.
* Continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses
of bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other
improvements in the speed of operations.
* The absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide
standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness,
which creates confusion about the success of new tactics and
technologies, about assumptions used in battlefield simulation
programs, and about procurement decisions.
* The lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at
all levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information,
more centralized management, and other changes in the operating
environment brought about by the strategic changes.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD take steps to improve standardization of
information used in bombing operations, address continuing problems
with battle damage assessments, develop a unified battlefield
information system to improve analyses of combat effectiveness, and
develop realistic joint training to help personnel adapt to emerging
changes to the operating environment. DOD generally agreed with the
recommendations and stated that it is addressing the issues GAO raised
in a variety of ongoing efforts.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-547.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin, (757)
552-8100, CurtinN@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons
Central to Increased Combat Power:
Key Barriers Inhibit Continued Progress in Implementing the New
Strategy:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
Technologies Used in Recent Operations:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Bibliography:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: The Joint Targeting Cycle:
Figure 2: Percentage of Guided and Unguided Munitions Used in Recent
Combat Operations:
Figure 3: Notional Networked Operations:
Figure 4: U.S. Central Command Battle Damage Assessment Manning Levels
for Recent Operations:
Abbreviation:
DOD: Department of Defense:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 28, 2004:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have
been widely regarded as an unprecedented demonstration of combat power.
Relying predominately on air power, Operation Allied Force drove the
forces of Slobodan Milosovic out of Kosovo in 78 days during the spring
of 1999. Operation Enduring Freedom, using a combination of air power
and special operations forces, drove the Taliban from power in
Afghanistan in 175 days between October 2001 and March 2002. And, most
recently, the combination of air power and ground maneuver elements
used in Operation Iraqi Freedom drove Sadam Hussein from power in only
43 days between March and May 2003. These operations have benefited
from the fielding of new strategies and technologies developed to deal
with the new security environment--now characterized by surprise and
uncertainty as a result of the evolving terrorist threat, and by the
need to transition from the industrial age into the information age.
The Department of Defense's (DOD) new capabilities-based strategy seeks
to contend with uncertainty by improving DOD's ability to act quickly
and decisively across a wide range of combat conditions. This strategy
is being enabled by moves toward more highly integrated force networks
that combine information superiority and advances in technologies for
surveillance, communications, precision weapons, and other areas to
gain the advantage and rapidly defeat the enemy.
On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we reviewed
the operational results of recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the
strategic and technological changes being implemented by DOD. This
report focuses on (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness
of improvements in force networking and in the use of precision weapons
and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress. We are
addressing this report to you because we believe it will be of interest
to your committees as you address DOD's programs and funding. In
performing our work, we reviewed DOD policies, procedures, and reports
related to implementation of the new capabilities-based strategy; met
with officials from throughout the department; conducted a detailed
analysis and reliability assessment of bombing data; and discussed the
results of our analysis with cognizant officials. A more thorough
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I. We
performed our work from April 2003 through March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Improvements in force networking and in the use of precision weapons
are clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power
demonstrated in recent operations. However, the full extent to which
operations have been speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear
because DOD does not have detailed measures of these effects. The
emerging concept of networked operations, referred to by DOD as
network-centric operations, involves developing communications and
other linkages among all elements of the force to create a shared
awareness of operations. Technological enhancements to these network-
centric systems include improved sensors and other intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms for observing targets on
the battlefield; more integrated command and control centers for
analyzing targeting data and approving attacks; and improvements in
precision weapons. The improved ability to share a broad view of the
battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has
compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in
bombing operations, thus increasing lethality. However, DOD recognizes
that the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or
otherwise affected is unclear because of the absence of detailed
measures of these effects. As a result, DOD's Office of Force
Transformation is conducting a series of case studies of training
exercises and combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to better
understand the effects of networked operations. Advances in force
networking have been enhanced by improvements in the use of precision-
guided weapons and associated technologies, providing military
commanders with greatly increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing
operations. For example, the introduction of laser-guided and Global
Positioning System-guided bombs has reduced limitations on operations
created by poor weather and visibility and allowed bombing operations
to be conducted from higher and safer altitudes. Further, increases in
the number of aircraft capable of delivering such weapons allow DOD to
use old aircraft in new ways, further improving flexibility. These
improvements are also increasing the accuracy of bombing operations.
Our analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage
or destruction to fixed and mobile targets increased markedly between
operations in Kosovo and those in Afghanistan.
Despite such improvements, DOD officials and reports identified a
variety of barriers inhibiting continued progress in implementing the
new strategy. Four interrelated areas stood out as key to continued
progress.
* Lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment. This is a
long-standing problem in DOD that reduces effectiveness by requiring
operations to be slowed as time must be taken to manually reconcile
information from one operating system into forms usable by other
systems, or by limiting access to communications or other needed
capabilities because equipment from one service cannot interact with
equipment used by another for the same purpose. For example, DOD has
not standardized procedures used in basic operations, such as reporting
on the results of bombing missions. As a result, each service and
unified command must develop its own procedures, with no system to
ensure standardization. During operations in Afghanistan, the Central
Command received mission reports using at least 23 different formats--
requiring time-consuming manual deconfliction. The Joint Forces Command
also reported that operations in Iraq were beset by a lack of commonly
understood operational-level standards for evaluating the effect of
attacks. The integration of information was undermined by groups
adopting their own standards and formats, resulting in difficulties in
translating information and coming to a mutual understanding. We have
also reported[Footnote 1] on problems with standardization and
interoperability. DOD understands that the lack of standardization
fundamentally hampers attempts to improve networking and joint
operations, and it has been trying to address various aspects of the
problem. However, previous reforms have been undermined by parochial
allegiances to the services and other problems that continue to exist.
* Difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the
effects of bombing operations. Battle damage assessments are an
increasingly critical component of combat operations. Slow or
inaccurate assessments can negate improvements in the speed of
operations, create uncertainty about the battlefield situation and slow
ground advances, and ultimately increase the risk of death or injury to
ground troops. However, lessons learned reports on operations in Iraq-
-similar to earlier operations--found that battle damage assessments
could not keep up with the pace of operations and failed to provide the
information needed for operational decisions. These problems are due to
several factors. First, advances in network-centric operations and
precision weapons have increased the speed at which targets are
generated and attacked. At the same time, the lack of an occupational
specialty for damage assessments and other problems result in shortages
of trained analysts when resources need to be surged during combat
operations, resulting in the need to rely upon on-the-job training of
personnel from other areas. Moreover, according to officials, DOD does
not have a comprehensive system to track personnel who have received
training, further exacerbating the problem. The Joint Forces Command
has called for recognition of this problem as a major obstacle to
operations requiring a variety of changes to resolve.
* Absence of unified data to measure combat effectiveness and plan for
the future. Advances in the accuracy of bombing operations have raised
expectations for more efficiency and effectiveness in combat
operations. Instead of traditional operations where multiple sorties
and multiple bombs were required to destroy one target objective, some
DOD officials now believe one bomb per target and multiple targets on
one sortie should be the norm. However, confirmation of such
expectations is difficult because DOD does not have a unified
battlefield information system to provide standardized, baseline data
on the effectiveness of bombing operations. Currently, the services and
the unified commands maintain their own databases. As a result, the
services create databases to measure different aspects of operations,
and measures of key operational data elements--such as attacks needed
to destroy a target, effects of operations, and basic targeting
characteristics--are defined differently. The absence of a baseline
system to bridge these differences and provide information about actual
bombing operations effectiveness creates confusion about the success of
new tactics and technologies and about the assumptions used in
battlefield simulation programs. The lack of such a unifying system
also makes it difficult to make procurement decisions for weapons
required for operations and calculate DOD's return on investment from
the new technologies.
* Lack of realistic training to help understand and adapt to changing
command and control environment. DOD officials also cited the need for
high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels
understand and adapt to changes in the operating environment brought
about by the move to a networked force using advanced technologies. For
example, officials noted that large increases in the pace of operations
and the volume of information associated with more integrated force
networks have overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at times.
Further, increased networking and other changes have fostered a more
centralized style of management, with senior leaders increasingly
involved in operations. At the same time, network-centric operating
concepts are distributing information to lower and lower organizational
levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units
and individual soldiers. However, training has not kept pace with these
changes. For example, the Joint Forces Command reported that the lack
of realistic training undermined intelligence and surveillance
management and other operational-level capabilities during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Consistent with DOD's basic tenet that a force must
train as it will fight, DOD officials called for improved training to
match the scale and tempo of actual operations. Similarly, the Defense
Science Board reported that the changing operating environment will
have unintended consequences that will require personnel to adapt to
increasing cognitive demands at even the most junior levels. However,
according to the Board, current training is not adequate to prepare DOD
personnel to cope with these demands.
To ensure that these problems do not continue to inhibit realization of
the full promise of DOD's strategy, we are recommending that DOD take
steps to provide more standardized operating information for use during
joint combat operations, formulate a plan to address problems with
battlefield damage assessments, develop a unified battlefield
information system to improve assessments of combat effectiveness, and
develop realistic joint training to help commanders and personnel adapt
to the changing operating environment. In comments on a draft of this
report, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that
it is addressing the issues we raised in a variety of ongoing efforts.
Background:
The close integration and coordination of ground combat forces and
bombing operations is essential to the exercise of lethal combat power
on the modern battlefield. As depicted in figure 1, military
doctrine[Footnote 2] describes targeting in terms of a cyclical process
composed of six basic phases. During this process, the joint force
commander identifies the objectives for military operations in support
of the national objectives for the conflict and any key limitations on
operations--such as procedures for limiting civilian collateral damage.
The commander's guidance then drives the subsequent phases of the
targeting cycle to include identifying and analyzing potential targets
and resources available to attack them, obtaining formal permission for
the strike, executing the strike, and then assessing strike
effectiveness and any need to reattack.
Figure 1: The Joint Targeting Cycle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The success of this process is highly dependent on the speed and
quality of interaction among the people and systems conducting the
various activities at each phase. Trained ground control personnel must
interact quickly and covertly with manned and unmanned aircraft,
electronic sensors and space-based satellite imagery systems, or other
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mechanisms to spot the
target and accurately mark its location. Accuracy depends upon the
ability of the ground personnel to locate themselves, the target, and
any friendly forces nearby and accurately judge the distance between
each. These elements must be able to communicate the targeting
information to command and control centers that coordinate the actions
of a variety of analysts and others who assess the situation, plan the
strike, communicate the information back to the ground personnel, and
analyze the effectiveness of the attack.
DOD is working to improve the interaction of these elements by using
network-centric operating concepts. The term "network-centric" is used
to describe a broad class of approaches to military operations that are
enabled by networking the force. DOD's approach involves developing the
sensors and other technologies to provide pervasive oversight of the
battlefield, and then linking them to all elements of the war-fighting
force through communications and other technologies. This allows the
various elements of the force to develop a shared situation awareness,
a shared knowledge and understanding of commanders' intent, and the
ability to rapidly process and analyze information. The belief is that
these capabilities will increase combat power by better synchronization
of weapons effects in the battle space and greater speed in command
decision making. This strategic change is being accompanied by an array
of changes to doctrine, tactics, organization, and training to
integrate the network-centric concept into DOD's culture.
Advances in networking the force are being complemented by advances in
precision weapons.[Footnote 3] Precision-guided weapons provide
precise control of bombs through the use of electrical equipment that
help guide the weapon in flight. These capabilities provide an
advantage in accuracy over conventional weapons that do not have the
ability to adjust their trajectory while in flight. The transition from
unguided to guided weapons has accelerated rapidly since Operation
Desert Storm in 1991 where unguided weapons were the norm. For example,
as shown in figure 2, only about 8 percent of the weapons used during
Operation Desert Storm were guided, while this number increased to
about 68 percent in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq provided a variety of
conditions for the development of these network-centric approaches. For
example, operations in Kosovo were conducted primarily by air over
rugged and undeveloped mountainous terrain. There were no direct
attacks by large massed ground forces, and the cover of forests and
villages allowed enemy forces to easily conceal their location.
Similarly, Afghanistan's rugged and mountainous terrain and large
number of caves and bunkers also provided numerous opportunities to
conceal Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Light infantry and special
operations forces were the primary U.S. forces on the ground, with
aircraft as their sole means of fire support. In contrast, the terrain
in Iraq is characterized by mostly broad plains with mountainous
regions along the borders and a largely desert climate posing threats
from dust and sand storms. Initial operations pitted large massed
forces against one another in more traditional ways of fighting.
However, the conduct of U.S. operations also relied heavily on small,
dispersed groups of special operations forces operating on battlefields
with no clear front and rear lines, as enemy forces blended in and out
of urban populations.
Figure 2: Percentage of Guided and Unguided Munitions Used in Recent
Combat Operations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
With the exception of Kosovo, these conflicts were also characterized
largely by pronounced U.S. air superiority, with little threat from
enemy air defenses. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
enemy air defenses were so limited that U.S. forces were able to win
near total air supremacy early in the war. Similarly, air superiority
was not a concern during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to the
conflict, military forces had been working to set the conditions for
air dominance through more than 3 years of bombing. During Operation
Allied Force in Kosovo, however, there were significant concerns about
enemy air defense systems, causing bombing operations to be carried out
at high altitudes to avoid the threat. Moreover, access to overseas
bases was problematic in all three of these operations, straining
logistical support systems and complicating military operations. For
example, this lack of forward air basing infrastructure within
effective fighter range of land-locked Afghanistan required U.S. forces
to rely primarily on carrier-based aircraft to provide strike power
during the operations. These operations were also conducted in an
environment of pronounced concerns about limiting collateral damage to
civilian populations and infrastructure. Adversaries attempted to
exploit collateral damage in an effort to gain public sympathy for
their cause and cast a negative light on U.S. operations. U.S. forces
adjusted the target selection and approval process to minimize
collateral damages, calling on senior leaders to approve target
selection in some cases. However, attempts to minimize collateral
damages can also create tension with military objectives and complicate
bombing operations.
Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons
Central to Increased Combat Power:
DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use
of precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat
power demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating
concepts, particularly in surveillance and command and control systems,
have created unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for
commanders and their forces, yet the full extent to which operations
have been affected is unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of
precision-guided weapons have also provided military commanders with
increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations.
Networked Surveillance and Command and Control Systems Create Improved
Situation Awareness:
Network-centric operating concepts have improved battlefield situation
awareness for commanders and their forces. DOD has indicated that
technological improvements in information-gathering systems allow
commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Such improvements
provide for greater shared situation awareness, which, in turn, speeds
command and control. However, while it appears that enhanced networking
has speeded operations, the full impact on operations is unclear
because of the absence of detailed measures of their effects.
Improvements to Information-Gathering Systems Allow for Unprecedented
Ability to Monitor Battlefield:
DOD officials and reports cite a variety of technological and other
improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
mechanisms as basic to the unprecedented ability of commanders and
forces to observe and monitor the battlefield. For example,
surveillance aircraft orbiting the battlefield--such as the E-3 Sentry
airborne warning and control system (for detecting enemy air and naval
activities and directing friendly fighters), the RC-135 and EP-3
aircraft (for locating enemy radar and other electronic emissions), the
E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (for detecting enemy
ground activity), and the U-2 (for high altitude, wide-area
surveillance)--have been outfitted with smaller, lower cost, and higher
quality sensors and radars, improving their ability to detect the enemy
and provide high resolution imagery of the battlefield. Another key is
the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Predator and
the Global Hawk used extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. These
aircraft carry cameras, sensors, or even weapons and are used to
constantly circle over the battlefield and provide continuous live
surveillance of the enemy without risk to human pilots. The Predator is
remotely piloted by operators on the ground, while the Global Hawk is
self-piloted, controlled by a preprogrammed onboard computer that
controls the aircraft from takeoff to landing.
These systems interact with ground personnel, such as special
operations forces or specially trained combat controllers, to locate
and precisely mark targets and assess bombing results. Technological
advances now enable these controllers to identify a target and
determine its precise location by using laser designators, which may be
connected to a hand-held Global Positioning System receiver. Reports
have cited the use of these technologies interacting with aircraft
flying at high altitudes to avoid enemy air defenses, combined with new
tactics for integrating special operations forces with conventional
units, as a breakthrough capability. During Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan, special forces teams used these technologies linked to
piloted aircraft or unmanned Predator drones--providing live
battlefield video directly to nearby AC-130 gun ships--to attack small
groups of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and other fleeting targets. The
Joint Forces Command report[Footnote 4] on missions conducted during
Operation Iraqi Freedom also cited the capabilities provided by these
advances.
Shared Situation Awareness Speeds Command and Control:
DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view
of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the
force has compressed the time required for analysis and decision making
in bombing operations, increasing lethality significantly. Before an
actual strike may begin, information on potential targets generally
must be routed through command and control centers where the target
information is analyzed; information is exchanged between a myriad of
commanders, analysts, and other elements of the force; and final
approval for the strike is granted. The ability to network these
elements and rapidly exchange information during this process--central
to combat effectiveness---is enabled by improvements in computing
power, digital communications, and satellite data links in recent
years. For example, increases in computing power have enabled the
networking of computers from a multitude of personnel and locations,
with near instantaneous exchange of information through techniques such
as file sharing, video conferencing, and e-mailing. These capabilities
are enhanced by digital communications, which can be faster and more
accurate than voice communication. For example, digital systems allow a
ground controller to input the coordinates and other information needed
for an attack into a computer and transmit this information instantly
to computers on board an aircraft or at command and control centers.
The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks
has some limitations. For example, the Defense Science Board recently
reported[Footnote 5] that despite the successes in Afghanistan, there
were difficulties in passing coordinates from ground personnel to
aircraft overhead due to the unreliability and limited range of secure
communications and the absence of digital communications systems. As a
result, instead of instantaneously transmitting targeting information
across digital systems, ground controllers were required to pass Global
Positioning System coordinates by voice radio to aircrews. Aircrews
then had to write the coordinates on boards held on their knees, and
then read them back for confirmation. Once confirmed, aircrews needed
to load the coordinates by hand into the weapons, a process requiring
as many as 51 computer keystrokes and subject to error.
The ability to rapidly exchange information generated by these networks
is also dependent upon satellite data links and availability of
bandwidth. Bandwidth is a term used to describe the rate at which
information moves from one electronic device to another--usually
expressed in terms of bits per second---over phone lines, fiber optic
cable, or wireless telecommunications systems. Increases in this
capacity have enabled the rapid exchange of large visual and data
files, giving commanders increasing access to more real-time
surveillance, intelligence, and targeting information than in previous
conflicts. For example, according to the Joint Forces Command, U.S.
forces in Iraq had access to 42 times the bandwidth available in Desert
Storm. However, despite this improvement the Army and others have
experienced continuing shortages in the availability of
bandwidth.[Footnote 6]
Despite some limitations, technological advances have also made it
possible to manage conflicts from command centers located far away from
the battlefield, using so-called reach back techniques, where some
commanders, analysts, and other support personnel remain at home
stations and communicate with commanders at the battlefield using the
networks described above. For example, during Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo the center used to direct air operations was located in Vicenza,
Italy. Images from Predator aircraft located over the battlefield in
Kosovo were transmitted by satellite communications to a ground station
in England, then by fiber optic cable to a facility in the United
States for analysis. The information was then transmitted to the
District of Colombia area, where it was up-linked to a satellite and
transmitted back to controllers aboard an airborne command and control
aircraft in Kosovo. The information was then provided to controllers,
who provided the information to aircraft poised to strike the targets
(see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Notional Networked Operations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The reach back technique not only provides for more centralized control
of operations but also provides the opportunity for savings in
logistical support requirements. For example, in previous conflicts,
command centers--comprised of perhaps 1,500-2,000 commanders,
analysts, and others, and the equipment needed to do their jobs--had to
be transported into the war zone. This requirement created major
demands on transportation and other support elements during the early
phases of an operation and reduced the air and sealift available to
move soldiers and supplies. Now, networking permits commanders at the
battlefield to reach back to analysts and other staff located thousands
of miles away for guidance and support. During operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the joint forces commander remained at U.S.
Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while air operations
were directed from centers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Electronic map
displays at these locations provided near continuous tracking of
ground, air, and naval units, with Predator drones and other aircraft
feeding live video imagery from the battlefield.
Full Impact of Networking Is Unclear:
While it seems clear that networking has speeded operations, the full
impact on operations is unclear because of the absence of detailed
measures of their effects. For example, U.S. Central Command officials
told us that while the targeting process was slowed by requirements for
additional command approvals for some targets, they believed that
overall, the targeting process was more efficient during Operation
Iraqi Freedom than previous conflicts. However, statistics were not
maintained by the Central Command to measure this improvement.
Several experiments and exercises provide some information on this
issue. For example, according to a recent DOD report[Footnote 7] to
Congress, an Army exercise in 1997 using computer simulation to
determine the war-fighting effectiveness of a digitized division-sized
force found that the time required to process calls for fire was
reduced from 3 minutes to 30 seconds and that the planning time for
attacks at the company level was cut from 40 to 20 minutes. Similarly,
a 1998 experiment involving networked Army helicopter units and a range
of Navy and Marine units to counter a simulated attack by North Korean
special operations boats found that the average decision time was
reduced from 43 to 23 minutes and that shooter effectiveness measured
in kills per shot was increased by 50 percent. DOD also reported that a
special Air Force project in the mid-1990s found that F15-C fighter
aircraft networked with digital communication packages increased their
success rate in air-to-air combat exercises by more than 150 percent
over aircraft equipped with voice only communications. The increase was
attributed to the benefits of shared situation awareness provided by
the digital networks. According to DOD's report, pilots with voice only
communications can only see enemy aircraft in the radar zone directly
in front of their aircraft, and they cannot see supporting friendly
aircraft to their rear. To attack enemy aircraft, the voice only
aircraft must hold verbal conversations with supporting aircraft to
understand the entire combat picture and develop a coordinated attack
plan. However, fighter aircraft networked with digital communications
are able to see the entire picture of enemy and friendly support
aircraft locations on their screens without the need for time-consuming
conversations. According to the report, this shared mental picture of
the battlefield reduces the cognitive load on the pilots, enabling them
to concentrate more on the battle, react quicker, and make
synchronized, mutually reinforcing decisions with their supporting
aircraft.
These examples provide illustrations of the potential effects of
network-centric operations. However, DOD's report acknowledges that
evidence of its full impact is limited and often scattered, rather than
focused and systematic. Having a fuller, more precise understanding of
the effects of network-centric operations is important because of its
potential impact on issues such as the ability to model the speed of
combat operations and the resources needed to support them. An official
from DOD's Office of Force Transformation told us that the office is
conducting a series of case studies of operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq and exercises at the National Training Center and elsewhere to
better understand these effects.
Precision Weapons Increase Flexibility and Accuracy:
The development of technologies such as laser-guided and Global
Positioning System-guided precision weapons has provided military
commanders with increased flexibility and accuracy in bombing
operations, making them increasingly lethal.
Precision Weapons Provide Increased Flexibility:
Precision weapons reduce limitations created by poor weather and
visibility, enable bombing operations from higher and safer altitudes,
and allow aircraft to be used in new ways. For example, bombing
operations have always faced limitations due to targets being obscured
by bad weather or other limitations on visibility. Traditionally, the
process of locating and marking a target was dependent on the
controllers' ability to see the target, judge distances, and accurately
find coordinates using paper maps. Targeting objectives were marked
using smoke grenades, flares, or other such techniques. However, Global
Positioning System-guided bombs help reduce these limitations by
providing an all-weather delivery capability enabled by satellite-aided
navigation. The system is a constellation of 24 orbiting satellites
emitting continuous navigation signals that handheld receivers on the
ground can translate into time, location, and velocity of targets. Time
can be calculated to within a fraction of a second, location to within
100 feet, and velocity within less than a mile per hour. According to
DOD officials, laser-guided bombs--which follow a narrow beam of pulsed
energy trained on a target by aircraft or operators on the ground--are
more precise than Global Positioning System-guided bombs, and have a
capability for attacks on moving targets that Global Positioning
System-guided bombs do not. However, laser-guided bombs are subject to
limitations presented by rain, clouds, or other visibility conditions
since there must be a clear line of sight between the laser designator
and the target.
From Operation Allied Force to Operation Enduring Freedom, DOD
increased the use of Global Positioning System-guided bombs by about 45
percent and decreased the use of laser-guided bombs by about 32
percent. Conversely, between Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom, DOD decreased the use of Global Positioning System-guided
bombs by about 13 percent and increased the use of laser-guided bombs
by about 10 percent. DOD officials stated that there is a need for both
laser-guided and Global Positioning System-guided bombs in today's
environment and that the use depends on such factors as nature of the
target being struck, theater of operations, weather conditions,
availability, and cost. Frequently used guided munitions such as the
Global Positioning System Guided Bomb Unit 31 have a unit cost of about
$21,100 to $28,400, depending on the version used, while laser-guided
bombs such as the Guided Bomb Units 10/12/16 have unit costs ranging
from $14,600 to $23,000. Unguided bombs such as the 500-pound MK-82 and
1,000-pound MK-83 have unit costs ranging from about $2,000 to $8,700.
The use of such precision-guided weapons has also made it possible for
bombing operations to be conducted from higher altitudes. This tactic
helps limit the threat to pilots and aircraft from air defense systems
and ground fire, and provides Global Positioning System-guided bombs
with more time to acquire and guide on the satellite signals. In
Kosovo, where air defense systems posed a significant threat to U.S.
forces, pilots conducted bombing missions at an altitude that was
beyond the effective reach of the Serbian enemy air defense systems.
According to DOD officials, they have continued to use this tactic in
Afghanistan and Iraq because of its effectiveness. In addition to high
altitude operations, Global Positioning System-guided weapons, such as
the joint direct attack munition used extensively in Iraq, can also be
launched miles away from a target. The operator can essentially launch
the weapon and proceed on to the next target, relying on the navigation
system to guide the weapon to impact. While conducting bombing
operations from high altitudes is much safer for pilots and aircraft,
it also becomes more difficult to properly identify and distinguish
certain targets, particularly when the enemy employs denial and
deception tactics. For example, during Operation Allied Force, Serbian
forces made tank decoys out of milk cartons and artillery pieces out of
stovepipes.
DOD has also increased the numbers of aircraft capable of delivering
precision-guided munitions, allowing military planners to use aircraft
in new and different ways. According to a recent report, only about 20
percent of U.S. aircraft were equipped with the ability to put a laser-
guided bomb on the target during the first Gulf War. However, nearly
every combat aircraft was capable of employing precision-guided
munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 8] Bombers such as
B-2s are now capable of delivering large payloads of weapons in a
single strike, providing more flexibility in weapons availability.
These capabilities increase the ability to deliver more precision-
guided weapons during each flight. Moreover, they also increase
operational effectiveness by allowing the military to reduce flights by
planning to strike multiple targets during each flight, as opposed to
the traditional approach of carrying out multiple flights to attack one
target.
Precision Weapons Improve Accuracy:
Our analysis found that advances in precision weapons have improved the
accuracy of bombing operations. For example, we compared data on
bombing operations in Afghanistan maintained by the U.S. Central
Command with data on operations in Kosovo from our classified report on
Operation Allied Force. This analysis found that the percentage of
attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed targets increased
by 12 percentage points from Kosovo to Afghanistan. Further, the
percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to mobile
targets increased by 21 percentage points. DOD officials agreed that
bombing accuracy improved, and classified analyses conducted by both
the Air Force and the Navy support that conclusion. According to DOD
officials, there is no similar analysis of the accuracy of bombing
operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
While DOD officials agreed that precision-guided weapons have increased
the accuracy of bombing operations, they stated that it is important to
note that such improvements may also be influenced by other factors.
For example, differences in terrain, the relative numbers of fixed
versus mobile targets (which are harder to hit), and commanders'
guidance on collateral damage can all influence the accuracy of bombing
operations. In addition, the experience and the training that military
forces gained by near continuous combat operations since the beginning
of Operation Allied Force in 1999 may also influence bombing accuracy.
Such factors must be considered when interpreting bombing statistics.
Key Barriers Inhibit Continued Progress in Implementing the New
Strategy:
Despite the improvements brought about by advances in networking and
precision weapons, DOD has identified a variety of barriers undermining
continued progress in implementing the new capabilities-based strategy.
For example, concerns were raised about shortages of digital
communications, commercial satellite capacity and bandwidth, and other
equipment. However, four interrelated areas stood out as key barriers
to continued progress: (1) the lack of standardized, interoperable
systems and equipment; (2) DOD's continuing difficulty in obtaining
timely, high quality assessments of the effects of bombing operations;
(3) the absence of a unified battlefield data collection system to
provide standardized measures and baseline data on the efficiency and
effectiveness of bombing operations; and (4) the lack of high quality,
realistic training to help personnel at all levels understand and adapt
to changes in the operating environment brought about by the move to a
highly networked force using advanced technologies.
Problems in Standardization and Interoperability Slow Operations and
Reduce Effectiveness:
The lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment during
joint operations was one of the most frequently reported problems we
found during our review. According to DOD officials and reports, this
long-standing problem undermines many operating systems at DOD,
including systems used to provide shared situation awareness of the
battlefield, battle management command and control, and damage
assessments of the effects of bombing operations. For example,
officials from the Joint Forces and Special Operations Commands told us
that during Operation Iraqi Freedom, ground forces arrived in theater
with several different, non-interoperable Blue Force Tracking systems.
Blue Force Tracking systems are devices carried by friendly ground
units and vehicles that continuously or periodically transmit their
locations to a central database, allowing their locations to be
displayed on computer screens. Since there is no joint standard for
such tracking systems, the joint force commander is responsible for
resolving the interoperability problems created by the use of disparate
systems. To provide a common picture of the location of ground forces
using these systems, commanders had to develop a number of creative
solutions to bridge the differences between them and integrate them
into a coherent system--requiring considerable time and effort.
DOD officials also told us that the use of differing formats for
processing information creates similar problems. For example, each
service and unified command have their own instructions for performing
operations such as reporting on the results of bombing missions. A
recent DOD report found that during joint operations in Afghanistan,
the Central Command received mission reports using at least 23
different formats.[Footnote 9] This created difficulty in receiving
messages and required time-consuming manual data manipulation and
entry. Operations in Iraq also faced similar problems. According to the
Joint Forces Command report on Iraqi Freedom, the process of evaluating
the effects of attacks in Iraq was beset by a lack of commonly
understood operational level standards. Integration of information was
undermined by groups adopting their own standards and reporting
formats, resulting in difficulties in translating information and
coming to a mutual understanding because they were not able to make
specific comparisons between formats or to a common format. DOD has
published a number of joint publications to help standardize operations
in the joint environment. These publications provide general terms of
reference and descriptions of processes, such as the targeting process,
for use by personnel from the various services while operating in the
joint environment. However, according to DOD officials, these
publications do not provide enough detailed guidance, such as
standardized formats for reporting mission results, for the actual
conduct of operations. As a result, each unified command must develop
its own implementing procedures, with no system to ensure
standardization among the commands. Further, according to DOD
officials, when the pace of operations increases to high levels, there
is a tendency for personnel to revert to using their own familiar
service procedures.
We have also reported that a variety of equipment--such as
reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, ground-based stations processing
intelligence data, ground targeting equipment, and digital transmission
systems used to transmit information between airborne and ground
personnel--is not interoperable across the services. Similar to the
examples cited above, the inability of these systems to operate
effectively together can limit access to communications and other
needed capabilities and confuse and slow targeting activities as less
efficient alternatives must be used to achieve the mission.
DOD recognizes that improved interoperability and standardization are
central to the transformation of its forces, and is attempting to
address the problem. However, the problem is complex and difficult to
resolve because military operations and acquisition systems have
traditionally focused on the services and the specific weapons
platforms needed for their specific missions--not on joint operations
with interoperable systems and equipment. DOD's budget is organized by
service and defense agencies, as we and the Defense Science Board
recently reported in separate publications.[Footnote 10] Therefore, the
process of defining and acquiring the right capabilities is dominated
by the services and defense agencies. Joint force commanders' views are
considered in this process, but they have a difficult time competing
with individual service interests that control the process. As a
result, the acquisition of systems and equipment often fails to
consider joint mission requirements and solutions, and there is no
guarantee that fielded systems will operate effectively together.
DOD is addressing the need for more interoperability and
standardization in several ways. For example, DOD's April 2003
Transformation Planning Guidance requires the commander of the Joint
Forces Command to develop a plan to address DOD's interoperability
priorities. These priorities include such efforts as development of a
common operational picture for joint forces; improved intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; improvements to
selected targeting linkages; and improved reach back capabilities. The
planning guidance also requires the services and the Joint Forces
Command to develop plans for achieving the desired transformational
capabilities, including an identification of the initiatives taken to
improve interoperability. DOD is also attempting to reform the
acquisition process to align it with a new capabilities-based resource
allocation process built around joint operating concepts. Instead of
building plans, operations, and doctrine around individual service
systems, DOD is attempting to explicitly link acquisition strategy to
joint concepts to provide integrated, interoperable joint war-fighting
capabilities. For example, in June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff issued Instruction 3170.01 that established the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. This system provides
new guidelines and procedures for joint staff to review proposed
acquisitions for their contribution to joint war-fighting needs.
DOD is also developing the Global Information Grid to act as the
organizing framework for network-centric operations and help ensure
interoperability in information operations throughout DOD. Begun in the
late 1990s, this effort seeks to integrate the information processing,
storing, disseminating, and managing capabilities--as well as the
associated personnel and processes--throughout DOD into an integrated
network. DOD's Chief Information Officer has described this network as
a private military version of the World Wide Web. The effort includes
programs to develop the policies and guidance needed to implement
network-centric concepts across DOD, as well as programs to provide the
technological improvements needed for the success of network-centric
operations. Parts of this effort, such as policy and procedural
guidance, bandwidth expansion, and improvements to reach back
capabilities, have begun or are in place. For example, definitions of
requirements for interoperable information technology that are used in
developing the Global Information Grid are cited as the authoritative
guidance in the requirements determination and acquisition areas--
including the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
discussed previously. However, according to officials involved in the
effort, development of the grid is still in its early stages and is
planned to continue to the year 2010 and beyond.
While DOD appears committed to improving interoperability, DOD
officials state that such reforms require difficult cultural changes to
fully succeed. However, we previously reported that various problems
have undermined past reforms, including cultural resistance to change,
stove-piped operations, difficulties in sustaining top management
commitment (the average tenure of top political appointees is only 1.7
years), and other problems that continue to exist today.[Footnote 11]
For example, in November 1997, DOD announced the establishment of the
Defense Reform Initiative, which was a major effort to modernize DOD's
business processes and ignite a "revolution" in business affairs at
DOD. The initiative was overseen by the Defense Management Council
composed of senior defense leaders reporting to the Secretary of
Defense. However, by July 2000, we reported[Footnote 12] that the
initiative was not meeting its time frames and goals in a number of
areas. We concluded that the most notable barrier was the difficulty in
overcoming institutional resistance to change in an organization as
large and complex as DOD. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Defense
Management Council was impaired because members were not able to put
aside their particular services' or agencies' interests to focus on
departmentwide approaches.
Similarly, cultural impediments to change were also illustrated in our
March 2003 report on ground-based systems for processing intelligence
data.[Footnote 13] In that report, we stated that DOD's system for
certifying their interoperability was not working effectively. In 1998,
DOD began a program to reduce the number of ground-based systems that
process intelligence data from various sensors and ensure that the
remaining sensors are interoperable with other DOD systems. DOD
requires that such information systems be certified, and to help
enforce the certification process, the department set up a review panel
to periodically review such systems and place those with
interoperability problems on a "watch list." However, 5 years after the
program was started, we reported that only 2 of 26 systems in the
program had been certified and, despite this problem, the systems had
not been placed on the watch list. DOD officials cited a number of
reasons for the noncompliance, including that military services
sometimes allow service-unique requirements to take precedence over
joint interoperability requirements. DOD strongly agreed with our
recommendations to take several steps necessary to enforce its
certification process.
Timely Understanding of Battle Damages Remains a Difficult Problem:
DOD's difficulty in obtaining timely, high quality assessments of the
effects of bombing operations continues to be a difficult problem to
overcome. Problems with battle damage assessments have been repeatedly
identified since at least Operation Desert Storm in 1991. DOD has taken
some steps to address these problems, but they continue to reoccur. As
a result, some DOD officials have called for approaching battle damage
assessments in different ways.
Battle Damage Assessments Cannot Match Pace of Operations:
Reports from DOD and others have identified repeated difficulties in
conducting battle damage assessments in operations in Iraq, as well as
other operations dating back at least to Operation Desert Storm in
1991. Battle damage assessments are a critical component of combat
operations. Slow or inaccurate assessments can result in inefficient
use of forces and weapons, as targets must be struck repeatedly---but
sometimes unnecessarily--to ensure their elimination as a threat.
Inadequate damage assessments also slow ground advances, as units and
individuals face uncertainty about enemy capabilities, which can
ultimately increase their risk of death or injury since they may have
to close with the enemy to understand the conditions ahead of them.
However, DOD reported that battle damage assessments during operations
in Iraq could not keep up with the pace of operations and failed to
provide the information needed for operational decisions. Reports on
operations in Afghanistan also identified similar problems during
Operation Enduring Freedom. Our report on Operation Desert
Storm[Footnote 14] found that battle damage assessments during that
conflict were neither as timely nor as complete as planners had assumed
they would be. Battle damage assessments were performed on only 41
percent of the strategic targets in our analysis, resulting in
potentially unnecessary additional strikes to increase the probability
that target objectives would be met.
The inability of damage assessment resources to keep up with the pace
of modern battlefield operations is due to several factors. According
to DOD officials, advances in network-centric operations and precision
weapons have increased the speed at which targets are generated and
attacked. At the same time, however, DOD does not have an occupational
specialty for battle damage analysts. This results in shortages of
trained analysts when resources are surged during operations, leaving
unified commands to rely on untrained and inexperienced personnel
brought in from other areas and trained on the job. For example, during
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Central Command experienced
requirements for large manning increases in its battle damage
assessment capability. While the command was ultimately able to
increase its staff of analysts to about 60 (see fig. 4), this was only
a fraction of the estimated requirement. Typically, the Central Command
has about three to five full-time personnel assigned to its battle
damage assessment group.
Figure 4: U.S. Central Command Battle Damage Assessment Manning Levels
for Recent Operations:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The time frames indicated as Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom designate periods of major combat operations.
[End of figure]
Moreover, according to Central Command officials, even when they
obtained personnel they were often untrained. Operations were further
slowed, as these personnel were required to receive on-the-job
training. Battle damage assessment training is available at both the
service and joint levels. However, according to DOD officials, the
absence of a formal occupational specialty for battle damage assessment
means there is little incentive for personnel to seek the training.
Further, even if trained, analysts are required to use the instructions
of the unified command in charge of operations during actual conflicts.
DOD officials told us that there is no requirement for these
instructions to be standardized, making it more difficult for personnel
from the services to quickly adapt to operations. Finally, according to
officials, DOD does not have a comprehensive system to track personnel
who have received battle damage assessment training, further
exacerbating problems in quickly locating trained analysts during surge
situations.
Attempts to Address the Battle Damage Assessment Problem Have Been
Limited:
In recognition of the continuing problems associated with battle damage
assessments, DOD has taken some steps to address these problems.
However, these attempts have been somewhat limited. For example, DOD
established the Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint Test and
Evaluation program in August 2000 to investigate solutions to battle
damage assessment process problems. The program was focused on
assessment processes used by U.S. forces in Korea, but it also analyzed
processes used in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
Program officials developed a variety of enhancements that could
improve the battle damage assessment process. For example, program
officials developed improvements to the processes used in Korea to
standardize disparate systems and speed the flow of information between
analysis and command centers. To help address analyst training
problems, they developed a compact disc-based course to provide quick
training for untrained personnel assigned to fill shortages of analysts
during conflicts. Further, they also developed an agreement with a
reserve organization to develop a core of trained battle damage
assessment analysts and to have those personnel available to meet surge
requirements for the Korean command.
However, according to program officials, acceptance of such approaches
is voluntary within DOD, and many have not been implemented outside
Korea. They are trying to gain additional support for adoption of their
enhancements. Program operations will be discontinued and a final
report issued by December 2004. In addition to this program, DOD
officials told us that a Combat Assessment Working Group was recently
established at the Joint Staff to discuss ways to address problems with
the battle damage assessment process. However, the group had not
developed formal recommendations at the completion of our audit work in
March 2004.
Officials Call for Different Approaches to Assessing Battle Damage:
Some DOD officials have called for more effort to be focused on
assessing battle damages from an "effects-based" framework. The
effects-based operational concept calls for an increased emphasis on
conducting military operations and assessing their effects, in terms of
the military and nonmilitary effects sought--rather than in terms of
simply the destruction of a given target or an adversary. According to
a recent Defense Science Board report,[Footnote 15] the emergence of
this concept has been influenced by the opportunity provided by
precision weapons, shared situation awareness, and other advances
enabling the precise use of force, as well as the needs presented by
the nature of current military campaigns. Operations from Kosovo to
Iraq have been characterized by tension among multiple strategic and
operational objectives: destroy enemy infantry and air defenses and
drive the current regime from power, but do not injure civilians or
damage necessary infrastructure.
The use of an effects-based battle damage assessment approach would
mean that instead of the traditional focus only on damage or
destruction of a target, battle damage assessments should also attempt
to determine whether command objectives are being met by other
influences in the battlefield. For example, initial bombing attacks on
nearby targets may persuade enemy troops to abandon a target facility,
eliminating the need to bomb the target facility at all. According to
the Joint Forces Command's report on Iraqi Freedom, commanders in Iraq
attempted to use an effects-based approach to analyze military
operations. However, when the speed of operations exceeded their
capability to analyze and assess how actions were changing the Iraqi
system, they reverted to the traditional focus on simple attrition
measures. Coalition forces reverted to counting specific numbers of
targets destroyed to determine combat progress, rather than evaluating
the broader effect created on the enemy. The command has called for
recognition of problems with battle damage assessments as a major
obstacle to effects-based operations, requiring a variety of changes to
resolve.
DOD officials also told us that the traditional focus on damage and
destruction results in leaders relying too much on visual imagery to
assess battle damages. This problem can cause leaders to delay
battlefield progress until full visual confirmation of the desired
affect is confirmed. According to these officials, given the
increasingly reliable nature of precision weapons, it may be possible
in some cases to rely on predicted or probabilistic effects, rather
than full visual confirmation.
Absence of a Unified Battlefield Information System Confuses Measures
of Effectiveness:
DOD does not have a unified battlefield data collection system to
provide standardized measures and baseline data on the efficiency and
effectiveness of bombing operations. According to DOD officials, the
current system for collecting operational data is for the services and
the unified commands to maintain their own databases, which are often
quite extensive. Precisely how data is defined, gathered, and analyzed
is at the discretion of each individual component and addresses
specific needs. These unique requirements lead to different purposes
for conducting analyses, different data collection approaches, and
different definitions of key data elements.
For example, to better understand the impact of the tactical and
technological changes on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing
operations, we analyzed the number of attacks and bombs required to
damage or destroy a given target for operations in Kosovo and
Afghanistan. A number of DOD officials told us that advances in the
accuracy of bombing operations have raised the expectation that fewer
attacks and bombs are now required to damage or destroy targets.
Instead of traditional operations--where multiple sorties and multiple
bombs were required to destroy one target--some officials now believe
one bomb per target and multiple targets on one sortie should be the
norm. The results of our analyses tended to support the idea that it
took fewer attacks to damage or destroy targets in Afghanistan than in
Kosovo. However, we could not gain agreement from the services on the
results of these analyses because each had its own system for measuring
operations, and the measures also differed from the ones used in our
analysis.
Different Approaches Used to Measure the Number of Attacks Needed to
Destroy Targets:
The question of how many attacks are required to damage or destroy a
target is basic to understanding battlefield effectiveness; however, we
found no consistency among the services and the unified commands as to
which of several basic measures should be used. Some group information
about attacks based on "sorties"--defined as the takeoff and landing of
one aircraft, during which one or more aim points[Footnote 16] may be
attacked. Others do not attempt to group information based on sorties,
making comparisons of information between databases difficult and
confusing. For example, because the Central Command was in charge of
operations in Afghanistan, we used its database to analyze bombing
operations during Operation Enduring Freedom and compare those with the
results of our classified review of Kosovo bombing operations. The
Central Command's database provides information about aircraft attacks
and damages to aim points, since it is focused primarily on assessing
battle damages. However, it does not provide the information needed to
analyze by sortie, since it does not identify activities that took
place between a given takeoff and landing. To compare the Central
Command's data with our data on Kosovo, we grouped the information on
the basis of attacks. An attack was defined as each time that a single
aircraft dropped one or more weapons on any single aim point. Based on
this definition, our analysis found that it took fewer attacks to
damage or destroy both fixed and mobile targets during operations in
Afghanistan than during operations in Kosovo.
Similar comparisons could not be made with the Air Force's and Navy's
databases on Operation Enduring Freedom because their data are not
maintained based on this definition of an attack. Both services list
data by aircraft sortie. More specifically, each record in the Air
Force's database corresponds to one delivery of a specific weapon type
against an aim point, with each weapon delivery linked to a particular
sortie and mission in the air tasking order. For the Navy's analysis,
which describes the percentage of sorties that dropped weapons, each
sortie can have one or multiple attacks, defined as one run at a given
target. Because both the Air Force's and the Navy's analyses are
primarily assessments of weapons and not intended to measure battle
damage information, the main focus is assessing data for and based on
specific weapon drops. As a result, they contain no analysis that links
the relationship between the number of sorties flown and the
corresponding damage.
Effects Also Measured Differently:
A second basic element of effectiveness is whether or not bombing
actions resulted in the desired effects. The services and the Central
Command also differed in their approaches to measuring this element,
further complicating analysis. The Central Command's database provides
information on effects based on battle damage assessments, since
measuring battle damage is the primary responsibility of the unified
commands. However, the service databases are geared toward measuring
the performance of specific systems.
The Air Force, for example, primarily focused its analysis of
operations in Afghanistan on a munitions effectiveness assessment. This
analysis measures the actual success of individual weapons against
predicted results and does not address battle damage assessments. The
analysis measures whether the bomb landed outside an area around the
target within which the bomb was predicted to hit, known as the
circular error probable. Air Force officials stated that it is possible
for a weapon to be scored a miss for Air Force munitions effectiveness
assessment purposes, but still cause significant damage to a target.
According to the Air Force's analysis, the vast majority of munitions
employed in Operation Enduring Freedom performed significantly better
than expected. This could mean that the Air Force can adjust its
planning and modeling assumptions to lower the number of sorties
expected to be required to destroy a target.
Similar to the Air Force's analysis, the Navy measured effects based on
weapon hit rates. However, the Navy's analysis assessed what fraction
of Navy bombs that were dropped impacted the intended target and had a
high order detonation, determined primarily by reviewing weapons system
videos. According to officials, if a weapon hit the target and had a
high order detonation, it was counted as a successful hit for analysis
purposes. The Navy's analysis did not measure whether a weapon fell
within the planned circular error probable, nor did it measure battle
damages.
Basic Target Characteristics Defined Differently:
The services and the U.S. Central Command also differ in their
treatment of the basic question of how to define a target as fixed or
mobile. This distinction is important to considerations of
effectiveness because it is much harder to hit mobile than fixed
targets. Moreover, mobile targets may be becoming more numerous as
adversaries attempt to use mobility to avoid the effectiveness of
precision weapons. Inconsistent definitions of fixed and mobile targets
result in different classifications of like targets and disagreement
among officials when attempting to measure the relative effectiveness
of bombing attacks against mobile and fixed targets.
The Navy's analysis, for example, classifies mobile targets as "mobile"
and "moving." According to the analysis, mobile targets are those that
can move between the time of launch and the time of impact, such as
vehicles and aircraft. Moving targets are those that are actually
moving when they are hit. Classification results are determined by a
direct review of weapon system video or documentation in mission
reports. Unlike the analysis, the Central Command's database classifies
all targets capable of moving as mobile whether they are moving at the
time of attack or not. The classification of moving is not used because
such information is more detailed than is needed for battle damage
assessment purposes.
In contrast, the Air Force's database does not classify targets as
fixed or mobile. The database provides a description of the desired aim
point, such as the center of a runway or troops, but leaves it up to
the user to define which are mobile and which are fixed. There is a
field for moving targets in the database, but according to Air Force
officials, very few records have an entry in this field. Targets are
only classified as moving when there is available weapon system video
to confirm that the target was moving at the time the weapon was
dropped. As a result of these differences, an attack on a truck that is
moving at the time of an attack would be classified as mobile by the
Central Command, as moving by Navy officials, and as either mobile or
moving to Air Force officials, depending on the availability of weapon
system video.
Fixed targets are also classified differently in some cases. For
example, according to Navy officials, there are several types of fixed
targets. Troops are classified as a fixed, area target because
individual troops are not targeted with aircraft but rather as an area
occupied by troops. However, buildings are classified as fixed, point
targets where there is a specific place to hit. In contrast, the
Central Command classifies fixed targets only as those that are not
able to move, such as buildings.
Differences Can Cause Confusion in Operational Assessments and
Financial Decisions:
The absence of a baseline system to bridge definitional and other
differences and provide clear, consistent information about actual
bombing effectiveness creates confusion in several areas. For example,
this confusion was graphically illustrated when we provided the results
of our analyses to the services. The results tended to support the idea
that it took fewer attacks to damage or destroy targets in Afghanistan
than in Kosovo. However, we could not gain agreement from the services
on the results because our analyses were based on Central Command data
that differed from that in their own systems, as previously discussed.
Similar confusion occurred over the results of our March 2002
classified analysis of bombing operations in Kosovo. DOD did not concur
with our use of the Air Force's Mission Analysis Tracking and
Tabulation System database to analyze bombing operations, stating that
no single database is completely accurate and contains all information
needed for the analysis. However, that database was the most
comprehensive available, developed specifically as a primary database
for tracking airframe and weapon effectiveness during Operation Allied
Force, and was used by DOD as the basis for its January 2000 report to
Congress on operations in Kosovo. DOD cannot clearly resolve such
confusion until baseline definitions of effectiveness measures are
reconciled and a unified database developed.
Further, reliable, consistent data on such issues is needed to make
procurement decisions on the number of bombs and other resources DOD
will need to procure for future conflicts. In this regard, we recently
reported[Footnote 17] that differences in battle simulation models and
scenarios used by the services and the unified commands were resulting
in different estimates of munitions needed for operations, and,
ultimately, in reports of munitions shortages. Clear, consistent, and
up-to-date measures of the effectiveness of precision weapons--such as
the actual number of aircraft and bombs required to achieve targeting
objectives--could help resolve such differences and improve procurement
and other planning decisions. In addition, as discussed earlier,
precision weapons can be considerably more expensive than traditional
munitions. Without clear data on bombing effectiveness, DOD cannot
analyze the return on investment from the trade-off of fewer, but more
expensive, precision weapons versus the use of more, but less
expensive, traditional munitions.
Current Training Does Not Provide Realistic Preparation to Cope with
Changing Operating Environment:
Both the Joint Forces Command and the Defense Science Board found that
current training does not provide the realistic preparation needed to
cope with the emerging operating environment. DOD officials raised
concerns that the changing strategy and technological improvements have
created large increases in the pace of operations and volume of
information that have overwhelmed commanders and other personnel at
times. Further, advances in networking the force and other changes have
fostered a more centralized style of management, with senior leaders
increasingly involved in operations. At the same time, however,
network-centric operating concepts are distributing information to
lower and lower organizational levels, raising the potential for
increased autonomy for small units and individual soldiers. According
to DOD officials, personnel at all levels, but particularly commanders,
need realistic training to understand this new environment and adapt to
it to ensure that the new capabilities are used to their fullest
advantage.
Operations Characterized by Increasingly High Volume and Centralized
Command and Control, but More Autonomy at Lower Levels:
DOD officials told us that network-centric operations have advanced to
the point that the heavy flow of information and rapid pace of
operations may at times overload systems and personnel. This problem
can create confusion and inefficiency as systems for conducting battle
damage assessments or other operations become slow and clogged while
sorting and integrating large amounts of information, and officials are
distracted by having to devote precious time to sorting through
hundreds of e-mail messages or by attending increasingly frequent
videoconferences. Moreover, officials also believe that this problem
may get worse as commanders increasingly recognize the advantages of
networked systems, creating a need for even more information.
The officials also stated that increased networking is fostering a more
centralized style of command and control, which can create tension
between command staffs and operators in the field. For example,
according to officials, lawyers and senior civilian and military
leaders at headquarters locations remote from the execution of
operations are becoming increasingly involved in target selection and
other operational areas. Historically, one of the principal tenets of
U.S. command and control has been centralized direction, but
decentralized execution of operations to give subordinates on the scene
sufficient freedom of action to accomplish their missions. Increased
centralization in the execution of operations can result in senior
commanders being bogged down in operational details and subordinates on
the scene losing initiative. This development has been linked to the
advances in technologies that provide the opportunity for detailed
views of the battlefield and frequent videoconferences and other
communications to be shared among a wide array of officials that may be
located thousands of miles away. This trend is also influenced by
increased concerns over sensitive issues such as the avoidance of
intrusions into the airspace of neighboring countries and collateral
damage to civilian structures. Such issues act as an incentive for
senior leaders to increase their involvement in lower and lower levels
of planning and operations.
While senior leaders are becoming increasingly involved in operations,
information is also being distributed to lower and lower organizational
levels, raising the potential for increased autonomy for small units
and individual soldiers. For example, one of the principal organizing
and operating tenets of network-centric operations is the concept
called power to the edge. This concept involves empowering individuals
at the "edge" of an organization--where it interacts with its operating
environment--by expanding access to information and eliminating
unnecessary constraints on action. According to department officials,
adopting this concept requires DOD to change the way it handles
intelligence and other information. For example, DOD's current
information systems are based on data requirements that are focused on
the needs of the organizations supplying the data, with dissemination
of the data based on a sequential process with information pushed out
to customers at the end. But DOD is now moving to systems where broad
arrays of information are placed on networks before any unnecessary
processing at the point of collection, with total access for customers
who can pull out the information that each needs simultaneously. This
provides more information to lower organizational levels, enabling them
to operate more autonomously with less direct control by commanders.
According to officials at the Joint Forces Command, this concept helped
DOD use smaller formations of personnel with flexible command and
control relationships to great advantage during operations in Iraq.
Changing Operating Environment Requires Better, More Realistic
Training:
Consistent with DOD's basic tenet that the force must train as it will
fight, DOD officials have called for improved, more realistic training
to match the scale and tempo of actual operations. For example, the
Joint Forces Command reported that the lack of realistic training
undermined theater-level intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance management and other operational level capabilities
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly, the Defense Science Board
reported[Footnote 18] that the changing operating environment will have
unintended human consequences that will require personnel to adapt to
increasing cognitive demands at even the most junior levels, and to
think and act more quickly. According to the Board, current training
will not adequately prepare DOD personnel to cope with the increasing
and constantly changing cognitive requirements.
DOD officials also cautioned that the joint operational effectiveness
experienced in Operation Iraqi Freedom was often the result of
procedures developed during 18 months of practice begun during
operations in Afghanistan and that such improvements are often
fleeting--needing to be reinvented in the next contingency. The Joint
Forces Command called for development of an improved joint training
capability to institutionalize the operating procedures developed in
Iraq and allow commanders and staffs to experiment with and practice
operational-level processes. Moreover, service and DOD officials also
noted that expectations for the future need to be tempered with the
understanding that operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were
conducted with other advantages--such as largely complete air
superiority--that may not be available in future conflicts.
Conclusions:
The development of networked surveillance and command and control
systems, precision weapons, and other advances has combined to have a
synergetic effect on U.S. military power--providing increased
capabilities for dealing effectively with enemies operating out of
nontraditional battlefields, as well as more traditional approaches to
warfare. Notwithstanding these advances, the full impact of these
changes is still emerging and is not fully understood. Moreover, the
enemy is likely to continue to evolve and adapt its approaches in
response to the continued evolution of U.S. tactics and capabilities.
As a result, it is important to continue developing and refining these
capabilities. However, the legacy of DOD's traditional focus on
service-specific operations is inhibiting the continued evolution of
the new capabilities. The lack of standardized, interoperable systems
and equipment interferes with the development of force networks,
slowing operations and reducing effectiveness. Difficulties in quickly
obtaining sufficient numbers of trained battle damage analysts result
in slowed assessments unable to keep up with the increased pace of
operations, inhibiting battleground progress and the utility of
improvements in other areas. Similarly, the absence of a unified
battlefield information system also confuses the clear understanding of
improvements to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations as a
result of changing capabilities, slowing the rate of adaptation to
changing battlefield conditions. Finally, the lack of realistic
training limits the ability of leaders to understand and systems to
sense changes in the operating environment--such as the increased pace
of operations and flow of information, the increased centralization of
command, and the increased potential for operational autonomy and self-
direction of small units and individual soldiers, as well as emerging
concepts such as effects-based operations--further inhibiting the
ability to adapt.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure continuing evolution of the capabilities demonstrated in
recent conflicts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified commands, and
the military departments to take the following four actions:
* identify the primary information required for bombing operations,
such as targeting and battle damage assessments, ensure that planned
interoperability enhancements provide the standardized definitions,
mission reporting formats, and other necessary instructions for this
information to be used by all unified commands during joint combat
operations, and determine whether this standardized information can
replace that used by the individual services;
* formulate a plan to provide sufficient numbers of personnel trained
in battle damage assessment procedures when they are needed for combat
operations and include in the plan the following: incentives for
personnel to take the existing joint training on damage assessment,
development of a system to be used by the Joint Forces Command to track
and mobilize personnel who have received damage assessment training for
use during surge situations, and development of guidance on the
appropriate use of effects-based, probabilistic, and other
nontraditional concepts in assessing battle damages;
* develop a unified battlefield information system that provides for
the identification and collection of data on key, standardized measures
of bombing operations needed to assess the basic efficiency and
effectiveness of such operations, for use by all unified commands; and:
* develop a joint operations training capability that provides
commanders and staffs with a realistic simulation of the increased pace
of operations and other emerging changes to the combat operating
environment.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with all our recommendations. DOD stated that the
Joint Staff, in coordination with the Joint Forces Command, is
addressing our recommendations for actions to improve standardization
of information used in bombing operations, develop a unified
battlefield information system, and develop realistic joint training to
help personnel adapt to changes in the operating environment in various
ongoing initiatives.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to improve the battle
damage assessment process and stated that it is addressing the issues
we raised in the Joint Network Fires Capability Roadmap, the Joint
Close Air Support action plan, and other efforts. However, DOD believed
that the section of the report titled "Timely Understanding of Battle
Damages Remains a Difficult Problem" discusses battle damage
assessments as if that function was detached from the broader targeting
process. That was not our intent. As indicated on page 6 of the report,
we agree that battle damage assessments are an integral part of the
broader targeting process. The use of a separate section of the report
to deal with that aspect of targeting was meant only to highlight the
long-standing problems with battle damage assessments and the need to
focus DOD's attention on corrective action. Officials from the U.S.
Central Command, which was in charge of operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and the Joint Forces Command report on lessons learned in Iraq
both pointed to the need to elevate recognition of problems in the
battle damage assessment process and address them. Continued
improvement in the speed at which targets are generated and attacked
will only further increase the need for damage assessments to keep pace
with operations in the future.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the
Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The
report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (757) 552-8100. The major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in
networking the force and the use of precision weapons and identify the
key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy, we
followed a three-phased approach.
To identify Department of Defense (DOD), military service, and unified
command policies and approaches to implementing the new strategy, we
obtained briefings, reviewed DOD and unified command directives and
regulations, the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan, lessons
learned reports, and prior reports by us and others. A bibliography of
key reports on issues related to our review is included. We also
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S.
Joint Forces Command; the U.S. Special Operations Command; headquarters
offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and other offices as
appropriate.
We accompanied this work with a detailed analysis of bombing data
developed for our March 2002 classified report on air operations in
Kosovo and bombing data on operations in Afghanistan provided by the
U.S. Central Command. Prior to conducting these analyses, we discussed
the appropriate databases to use, the time frames to measure, and other
such methodological issues with officials from the Central Command. We
used Central Command data because its commander was in charge of joint
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. To determine whether bombing
accuracy and effectiveness had improved, we compared changes in the
percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to fixed and
mobile targets, the number of attacks and the number of bombs during a
given attack that were required to damage or destroy a given target,
and other such measures of operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. We
then provided the results of these analyses to officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Joint Forces Command; the
U.S. Special Operations Command; and the Army, Navy, and Air Force for
their review and comment. We also obtained analyses of Operation
Enduring Freedom from the Navy and the Air Force for comparison
purposes. We requested data from the Army, but officials were unable to
provide such data. We also requested copies of any similar analyses of
operations in Iraq, but officials were unable to locate any such
analyses. We did not conduct our own detailed analysis of operations in
Iraq because of the extremely resource intensive and time-consuming
nature of these analyses.
To assess the reliability of the Central Command's database for
Operation Enduring Freedom, we (1) performed electronic testing for
obvious errors in accuracy and completeness; (2) reviewed related
documentation, including tracking target files to specific data
entries, and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data;
and (3) worked closely with agency officials to identify any data
problems. When we found discrepancies such as missing or incorrect
data, we brought them to the command's attention and worked with it to
correct the discrepancies before conducting our analysis. We determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes.
Following this analysis, we conducted a series of roundtable
discussions with officials from the offices of the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commands, and the services
contacted previously. We conducted these discussions to gain a detailed
understanding of the results of our analyses and officials'
perspectives on the impact of the changing strategy on operations in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the key barriers to continued
progress in implementing the new strategy. We focused our analysis on
combat bombing operations. We did not attempt to analyze whether larger
operational and strategic objectives were achieved.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD Reconnaissance Aircraft, Precision Weapons, and Other
Technologies Used in Recent Operations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
MAY 26 2004:
Mr. Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Curtin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-04-547, "MILITARY OPERATIONS: Recent Campaigns Benefited
from Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued
Progress Remain" dated April 5, 2004 (GAO Code 350358).
The DoD concurs with the comment on the draft report's first
recommendation, partially concurs with the second recommendation, and
concurs with the third and fourth recommendations. The rationale for
the DoD's position is provided at enclosure l. Enclosure 2 provides
additional comments and suggested changes to the report.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosures: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED APRIL 5, 2004 GAO CODE 350358/GAO-04-547:
"MILITARY OPERATIONS: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress
Remain"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified
commands, and the Military Departments to identify the primary
information required for bombing operations, such as targeting and
battle damage assessments, and ensure that planned interoperability
enhancements provide the standardized definitions, mission reporting
formats, and other necessary instructions for this information to be
used by all unified commands during joint combat operations, and
determine whether this standardized information can replace that used
by the individual services. (Page 29/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: The DoD concurs, but recommends adding "and other fires
and effects" to the phrase "bombing operations." The Joint Staff, in
coordination with Joint Forces Command, is addressing these issues in
the Joint Network Fires Capability roadmap, Joint Fires Initiative
(JFI), Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) action plan, Joint Targeting
School (JTS), and various other actions. In addition, DoD is changing
its approach to resolving the Joint interoperability issue by focusing
at the data level. On May 9, 2003, the ASD (NII) issued the DoD Net-
Centric Data Strategy, outlining a new approach that manages data
within Communities Of Interest (COIs) which are defined as "...
collaborative groups of users who must exchange information in pursuit
of their shared goals, interests, missions, or business processes ...".
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified
commands, and the Military Departments to formulate a plan to provide
sufficient numbers of personnel trained in battle damage assessment
procedures when they are needed for combat operations and include in
the plan the following: incentives for personnel to take the existing
joint training on damage assessment, development of a system to be used
by the Joint Forces Command to track and mobilize personnel who have
received damage assessment training for use during surge situations,
and development of guidance on the appropriate use of effects-based,
probabilistic, and other non-traditional concepts in assessing battle
damages. (Page 30/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: The DoD partially concurs. The Joint Staff, in
coordination with Joint Forces Command, is addressing these issues in
the Joint Network Fires Capability roadmap, JFI, JCAS action plan, JTS
and various other actions. The Department does not make a distinction
of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) separate from the targeting process,
as does the GAO. The section of the report titled "Timely Understanding
of Battle Damages Remains a Difficult Problem," deals with BDA from a
perspective outside of the joint targeting process. The report
discusses the BDA function as if it were detached from the broader
targeting process; when in actuality, BDA can only be executed properly
if it is undertaken as a fully integrated (i.e., kinetic and non-
kinetic) activity within the targeting process. The products of the
first three phases of the targeting cycle, depicted in Figure 1, page
6, define the basis for assessments performed in BDA.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified
commands, and the Military Departments to develop a unified battlefield
information system that provides for the identification and collection
of data on key, standardized measures of bombing operations needed to
assess the basic efficiency and effectiveness of such operations, for
use by all unified commands. (Page 30/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: The DoD concurs, but recommends adding "and other fires
and effects" to the phrase "bombing operations." The Joint Staff, in
coordination with Joint Forces Command, DOT&E, and the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO
is addressing these issues in the Joint Network Fires Capability
Roadmap, JFI, JCAS action plan, JTS and various other actions.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified
commands, and the Military Departments to develop a joint operations
training capability that provides commanders and staffs with a
realistic simulation of the increased pace of operations and other
emerging changes to the combat operating environment. (Page 30/GAO
Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: The DoD concurs. The Joint Staff, in coordination with
Joint Forces Command, is addressing these issues in the Joint Network
Fires Capability roadmap, JFI, JCAS action plan, JTS and various other
actions.
GAO Draft Report - Dated April 8, 2004 GAO CODE 350358/GAO-04-547:
"MILITARY OPERATIONS: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress
Remain"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT:
ERROR OF FACT: Under Background, on page 5, the draft report describes
"The Joint Targeting Cycle," Figure 1, as the "sensor-to-shooter loop."
That characterization is not accurate. The "unofficial" process,
frequently expressed as the sensor-to-shooter loop, is only a portion
of the broader targeting process.
DoD RECOMMENDATION: The draft report should make the distinction that a
sensor-to-shooter process exists within the context of a larger
targeting process.
ERROR OF FACT: Pgs. 22 and 23 of the draft report, starting with the
words "Effects-based operations is an emerging .....", contains the
misconception that effects-based operations is an emerging topic. The
targeting process, depicted in Figure 1, is inherently effects-based
because it is initiated and driven by the Commander's Objectives,
Guidance, and Intent. Furthermore, it is fully discussed in JP 3-60,
Joint Doctrine for Targeting, beginning in Chapter I, page I-1,
paragraph 2.a.: "The purpose of the joint targeting process is to
provide the commander with a methodology linking objectives with
effects throughout the battlespace." The concept of effects-based
targeting has been the bedrock of the formal targeting education
curriculum for more than thirty years.
DoD RECOMMENDATION: Delete references to the emergence of this concept,
and replace with "re-emphasize the importance."
ERROR OF FACT: Pg 14, paragraph I of the draft report on line 14
starting with "Some DOD officials....". In fact, Laser Guided Bombs
(LGBs) are precise, whereas Global Positioning System (GPS) aided bombs
are merely accurate.
DoD RECOMMENDATION: Replace with... "Despite the advantages of GPS
weapons, laser guided weapons - which follow a beam of pulsed energy
trained on a target - are more precise, and offer a capability against
moving targets that GPS-guided weapons do not."
enclosure (2):
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
John Pendleton (404) 679-1816 John W. Nelson (404) 679-1949:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Katherine Chenault, Steve Pruitt,
R.K. Wild, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
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U.S. Department of Defense. Report on Network Centric Warfare: Sense of
the Report. Washington, D.C.: 2001.
U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications
for Army and Defense Policy. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 2002.
U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College. Iraq and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army
and Defense Policy. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 2003.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air
Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of
Systems That Process Intelligence Data. GAO-03-329. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks--Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Defense Management: Munitions Requirements and Combatant Commanders'
Needs Require Linkage. GAO-03-17. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2002.
DOD Financial Management: Integrated Approach, Accountability,
Transparency, and Incentives Are Keys to Effective Reform. GAO-02-497T.
Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002.
Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in
Doctrinal Departures. GAO-01-784. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001.
Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the
Munitions Requirements Determination Process. GAO-01-18. Washington,
D.C.: April 5, 2001.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Sustain Reform Initiatives and
Achieve Greater Results. GAO/NSIAD-00-72. Washington, D.C.: July 25,
2000.
Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign. GAO/NSIAD-97-
134. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed
to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data,
GAO-03-329 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003) and Military Readiness:
Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
Forces, GAO-03-505 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003).
[2] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-60: Joint Doctrine
for Targeting (Washington, D.C., Jan. 17, 2002).
[3] In this report, the terms weapons, bombs, and munitions are used
interchangeably.
[4] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, Joint Lessons
Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations (Norfolk,
Virginia: Mar. 1, 2004).
[5] U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on
Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned, Precision Targeting and
Joint Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2003).
[6] Congressional Budget Office, The Army's Bandwidth Bottleneck
(Washington, D.C.: August 2003).
[7] U.S. Department of Defense, Network Centric Warfare, Department of
Defense Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2001).
[8] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Operation Iraqi
Freedom: A First Blush Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 2003).
[9] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Battle Damage Assessment Joint
Test and Evaluation, Operation Enduring Freedom Test Report
(Washington, D.C.: December 2002).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks-Department of Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003) and U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board,
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Enabling Joint Force
Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2003).
[11] See GAO-03-98.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Actions Needed
to Sustain Reform Initiatives and Achieve Greater Results, GAO/
NSIAD-00-72 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2000).
[13] See GAO-03-329.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation
of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
1997).
[15] U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force
(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2003).
[16] A precise point on a target that is assigned for weapon impact.
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Munitions
Requirements and Combatant Commanders' Needs Require Linkage, GAO-03-17
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002).
[18] U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Defense Science
Board Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts--Final Report
(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003).
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