Defense Acquisitions
Space-Based Radar Effort Needs Additional Knowledge before Starting Development Gao ID: GAO-04-759 July 19, 2004Missing among the Department of Defense's (DOD) portfolio of systems is a capability to track stationary and moving enemy vehicles on land or at sea in any type of weather, day or night, from space. To meet this need, DOD and the intelligence community are collaborating on the ambitious Space-Based Radar (SBR) program. By leveraging the newest generation of radar technologies, the SBR concept promises to deliver high-quality data to a wide array of users. DOD intends to start product development in 2006 and to field SBR satellites as quickly as possible so that warfighters, the intelligence community, and national decision makers can gain a better understanding of what adversaries are doing in specific locations around the world. GAO reviewed the SBR program to assess DOD's progress in attaining the knowledge it needs by 2006 in terms of customer needs (or requirements) and resources.
Although SBR is 2 years away from product development, the program already faces major challenges. DOD officials say SBR will likely be the most expensive and technically challenging space system ever built by DOD. The acquisition time frame is much shorter than what has been achieved in the past for other complex satellite systems. Finally, DOD is setting precedence by taking the lead on developing SBR with the intelligence community as a partner. Most DOD space programs that GAO has reviewed in the past several decades were hampered by schedule and cost growth and performance shortfalls. Problems were largely rooted in a failure to match requirements with resources when starting product development. Commitments were made without knowing whether technologies being pursued would work as intended. To avoid these problems, leading commercial firms have adopted a knowledge-based model that enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at critical junctures and helps them make informed investment decisions. Although DOD has taken positive steps to strengthen the involvement of senior leaders within DOD and the intelligence community in setting requirements, SBR's concept of operations has not been approved and signed by requirements boards for either of the two partners. Without documentation and formal approval, it is unclear who will be held accountable for setting requirements or how disagreements among SBR's partners will be resolved when DOD moves SBR into ensuing phases of acquisition. DOD has adopted noteworthy practices to gain knowledge about SBR's resources. These include maximizing the use of systems engineering to close gaps between requirements and resources; estimating all of SBR's costs; exploring alternatives for SBR if the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA)--the communications infrastructure that is expected to relay SBR data across a network of users--incurs schedule and performance shortfalls; and asking contractors to propose multiple operations concepts for SBR with or without TCA. Despite these accomplishments, DOD is at risk of knowledge gaps. SBR's critical technologies will not be mature when product development starts, as called for by best practices. One of TCA's primary components may not be ready in time to support SBR data. These knowledge gaps make it harder for DOD to reliably estimate how much time and money are needed to complete SBR's development. If TCA is delayed, DOD's alternatives may involve reducing SBR's capabilities or significantly increasing program cost. Without sufficient knowledge, DOD may not be able to determine by the time SBR's product development starts in 2006 whether space-based radar is best suited to tracking moving targets on land or at sea or whether air-based radar would provide enough capabilities at far less cost. More specific analyses would help DOD weigh the merits of various alternatives and assess how much to invest in the SBR acquisition program versus air platforms with similar capabilities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-759, Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar Effort Needs Additional Knowledge before Starting Development
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2004:
Defense Acquisitions:
Space-Based Radar Effort Needs Additional Knowledge before Starting
Development:
GAO-04-759:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-759, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Missing among the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) portfolio of systems is
a capability to track stationary and moving enemy vehicles on land or
at sea in any type of weather, day or night, from space. To meet this
need, DOD and the intelligence community are collaborating on the
ambitious Space-Based Radar (SBR) program. By leveraging the newest
generation of radar technologies, the SBR concept promises to deliver
high-quality data to a wide array of users. DOD intends to start
product development in 2006 and to field SBR satellites as quickly as
possible so that warfighters, the intelligence community, and national
decision makers can gain a better understanding of what adversaries are
doing in specific locations around the world. GAO reviewed the SBR
program to assess DOD‘s progress in attaining the knowledge it needs by
2006 in terms of customer needs (or requirements) and resources.
What GAO Found:
Although SBR is 2 years away from product development, the program
already faces major challenges. DOD officials say SBR will likely be
the most expensive and technically challenging space system ever built
by DOD. The acquisition time frame is much shorter than what has been
achieved in the past for other complex satellite systems. Finally, DOD
is setting precedence by taking the lead on developing SBR with the
intelligence community as a partner. Most DOD space programs that GAO
has reviewed in the past several decades were hampered by schedule and
cost growth and performance shortfalls. Problems were largely rooted in
a failure to match requirements with resources when starting product
development. Commitments were made without knowing whether technologies
being pursued would work as intended. To avoid these problems, leading
commercial firms have adopted a knowledge-based model that enables
decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at
critical junctures and helps them make informed investment decisions.
Although DOD has taken positive steps to strengthen the involvement of
senior leaders within DOD and the intelligence community in setting
requirements, SBR‘s concept of operations has not been approved and
signed by requirements boards for either of the two partners. Without
documentation and formal approval, it is unclear who will be held
accountable for setting requirements or how disagreements among SBR‘s
partners will be resolved when DOD moves SBR into ensuing phases of
acquisition.
DOD has adopted noteworthy practices to gain knowledge about SBR‘s
resources. These include maximizing the use of systems engineering to
close gaps between requirements and resources; estimating all of SBR‘s
costs; exploring alternatives for SBR if the Transformational
Communications Architecture (TCA)”the communications infrastructure
that is expected to relay SBR data across a network of users”incurs
schedule and performance shortfalls; and asking contractors to propose
multiple operations concepts for SBR with or without TCA. Despite these
accomplishments, DOD is at risk of knowledge gaps. SBR‘s critical
technologies will not be mature when product development starts, as
called for by best practices. One of TCA‘s primary components may not
be ready in time to support SBR data. These knowledge gaps make it
harder for DOD to reliably estimate how much time and money are needed
to complete SBR‘s development. If TCA is delayed, DOD‘s alternatives
may involve reducing SBR‘s capabilities or significantly increasing
program cost. Without sufficient knowledge, DOD may not be able to
determine by the time SBR‘s product development starts in 2006 whether
space-based radar is best suited to tracking moving targets on land or
at sea or whether air-based radar would provide enough capabilities at
far less cost. More specific analyses would help DOD weigh the merits
of various alternatives and assess how much to invest in the SBR
acquisition program versus air platforms with similar capabilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that, before committing to SBR‘s acquisition program in
2006, DOD and its intelligence partners close gaps in the requirements
approval process in terms of documenting decisions and be prepared to
add time and money or make trade-offs with other DOD space programs to
address SBR‘s requirements and resources. DOD generally agreed with our
findings and partially agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-759
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine V. Schinasi at
(202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Gaining Knowledge about Requirements and Resources before Product
Development Is Important for Space Acquisition Success:
DOD Moving Forward on Acquiring Critical Knowledge but Gaps Remain in
Approval for SBR Requirements:
DOD Taking Proactive Steps to Gain Knowledge about Resources, but
Critical Gaps May Remain at Product Development:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: TRL Scale for Assessing Critical Technologies:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Knowledge Provided by SBR's Initial Capabilities Document and
Concept of Operations:
Table 2: Technology Readiness Levels of SBR Critical Technologies:
Figures:
Figure 1: SBR's Acquisition Schedule (in fiscal years):
Figure 2: SBR's Oversight Structure:
Figure 3: Requirements-Setting Can Impact Acquisition Process:
Abbreviations:
AOA: analysis of alternatives:
DOD: Department of Defense:
R&D: research and development:
SBR: Space-Based Radar:
TCA: Transformational Communications Architecture:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 23, 2004:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) currently has ground-based and
air-based radars but no capability to track moving targets from space.
To meet a need for persistent global observation, DOD and the
intelligence community are working together to develop the Space-Based
Radar (SBR) system to find, identify, track, and monitor ground and sea
targets--mobile or immobile--under all-weather conditions and on a
near-continual basis across large swaths of the earth's surface. SBR is
to enhance information gathering by providing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance data in a meaningful and timely
manner.
This is an ambitious program for DOD. DOD's initial total cost estimate
for SBR is about $28.6 billion from fiscal year 2003 to 2024. And
although the technologies for tracking moving targets from space are
still in development, DOD is scheduling almost 7 years between the
start of product development and launch of the first SBR satellite--a
time frame that is considerably shorter than what has been achieved in
the past for other complex satellite systems. DOD would like to field
SBR satellites as quickly as possible because it believes that SBR
represents a major leap forward in providing the warfighters,
intelligence community, and national decision makers with significant
tactical, operational, and strategic advantages over potential
adversaries. For example, DOD envisions that SBR will be able to see
deep inside enemy territory without risk to personnel or resources and
that it will operate over areas where conventional airborne
surveillance systems are at risk from the enemy's surface-to-air
missiles, which can travel increasingly longer ranges. DOD also
envisions that SBR will generate high-quality radar imagery of targets
and terrain and interface with ground, air, and other space systems so
that users can gain a better understanding of what is occurring in
specific locations.
DOD is in the early exploratory phase of the SBR program--a period when
it gathers knowledge about its needs, or requirements, and explores the
feasibility of meeting those requirements. DOD expects to begin product
development in fiscal year 2006; at which point it will make a
commitment to invest in a formal acquisition program for SBR. Our past
work has shown that successful weapon system programs are able to match
their needs to their resources--that is, money, technology, and time--
before product development. With achievable requirements and commitment
of sufficient investment to complete development, programs are better
able to deliver products at cost and on schedule. Most space programs
over the past several decades have not been able to achieve a match
between needs and resources before product development and have
incurred significant cost and schedule increases due in part to the
need to rework technologies in the later stages of their acquisition.
We conducted our review of the SBR program on the initiative of the
Comptroller General. Given SBR's overall importance to DOD and the
intelligence community, we reviewed the SBR program to assess DOD's
progress in attaining the knowledge it needs by 2006 in terms of
(1) requirements and (2) resources--technology, communications
infrastructure, and funding.
We are addressing this report to you because of your jurisdiction over
weapon systems acquisition.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess DOD's progress in attaining the knowledge it needs before the
start of product development, we examined the resources (technology,
communications infrastructure, and funding) committed and planned for
the program as well as the users' needs for an SBR system. We
considered DOD's plans for maturing the critical technologies when we
obtained technology-readiness information for each critical technology
(as well as its mature backup technology) against best practice
standards to determine if they will be sufficiently mature when DOD
plans to start product development. We also reviewed the SBR risk
management plans and concept development contract information. We
discussed these documents and issues with representatives from Air
Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; and the SBR
Joint Program Office, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air
Force Base, California.
To determine SBR's role in a larger DOD architecture, we met with
officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C; and the Air
Force Directorate of Space Acquisitions, Arlington, Virginia. We also
consulted past GAO reports to determine the relationship between SBR
and the Transformational Communications Architecture.
To determine the scope and completeness of the analysis of alternatives
and its follow-on study to identify the optimal ways to gather
information on ground moving targets from radars based in space versus
air, we met with officials from Air Force Space Command; DOD Office of
the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C; Air
Force Directorate of Requirements for Space, Crystal City, Virginia;
and the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, Arlington, Virginia. We
also talked with an official from the Air Force Office of Aerospace
Studies, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.
We discussed overarching programmatic issues--including the level of
coordination between DOD and the intelligence community--with
representatives from the Air Force Directorate of Space Acquisitions.
We were not able to obtain meetings with members of the Mission
Requirements Board (a board within the intelligence community
responsible for approving program requirements) or the intelligence
agencies to discuss their stake in the SBR program.
We performed our work from November 2003 through June 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DOD has inserted a great deal of management and stakeholder involvement
into developing SBR so that it can gain greater knowledge about
requirements before product development than it has in past programs.
Senior-level officials from DOD, the military services, and the
intelligence community are heading up three new SBR oversight groups to
discuss what can and cannot be accomplished in terms of the desired
time frame, available funding, and achievable technologies. The groups
have so far attained informal agreement on requirements. However, this
commitment has not been formalized, and it is unclear as to whether or
how it will be formalized. Moreover, it is also unclear how
disagreements that may occur later on among SBR's partners will be
resolved. Given the varied interests of SBR's partners and past
problems with securing agreement on requirements for space
programs,[Footnote 1] it is important that DOD build on the positive
steps it has already taken and find ways to formalize commitment to
requirements as well as SBR's concept of operations.
DOD is also taking positive steps in its effort to gain knowledge about
SBR's resources. These steps include strengthening systems engineering
applications; estimating not just direct costs but all of SBR's life-
cycle costs; exploring alternatives for SBR if the new Transformational
Communications Architecture (TCA), the infrastructure that is to help
relay SBR data, falls short of its schedule and performance goals; and
asking concept development contractors to propose multiple design
concepts for SBR with or without TCA. Despite these accomplishments,
however, decision makers will have significant knowledge gaps about
SBR's resources if SBR's product development phase starts when
currently planned. This is because DOD intends to start product
development in fiscal year 2006 even though the two critical
technologies that would enable the tracking of surface-moving targets
and the timely delivery of imagery data will not have been tested in
space or even in a relevant environment. Without the knowledge derived
from such tests, DOD cannot adequately assess whether the technologies
will work as intended, making it harder to reliably estimate how much
time and money is needed to complete development. Adding to SBR's
overall risk are uncertainties as to whether TCA will be available to
transmit SBR's vast volumes of radar data and imagery. Although DOD has
plans underway to develop alternatives for SBR if TCA is delayed, the
primary alternatives would involve either reducing SBR's capabilities
or significantly increasing program cost. Lastly, DOD and the Air Force
may not have sufficient knowledge to make a corporate decision as to
how much it should invest in space-based radar capabilities versus
air-based capabilities at the time it makes a commitment to the formal
SBR acquisition in 2006. While the Air Force has undertaken two
analyses of the SBR investment, neither presents a comprehensive
assessment as to whether space-or air-based radar platforms (or a
combination of both) are better suited for tracking moving targets on
land or at sea, nor does either analysis weigh the capabilities and
costs of each suitable radar option in space and in the air.
Before committing to SBR's acquisition program in 2006, we recommend
that senior-level officials in DOD and the intelligence community close
gaps in the requirements-setting process in terms of documenting
decisions and establishing a formal mechanism for addressing unresolved
issues or how changes to approved requirements will be assessed. We
recommend that DOD's space acquisition policy be modified to identify
the requirements-setting process when DOD partners with the
intelligence community on space programs. We recommend that DOD delay
approval to commit funding to product development for SBR until
technologies are matured to higher levels, but if DOD determines that
the SBR program should proceed to product development with less than
mature technologies, we recommend that DOD be prepared to add time and
money or make trade-offs with other DOD space programs to address SBR's
requirements and resources. DOD generally agreed with our findings and
our recommendation to strengthen its study of SBR alternatives. DOD
partially agreed with our recommendations to strengthen its requirement
setting process for SBR and to demonstrate SBR technologies in a
relevant or operational environment before committing to product
development. DOD did not agree with our recommendation to modify its
acquisition policy to strengthen requirements setting. In commenting on
our recommendations, DOD cited concerns about supplanting current
requirements setting processes. Our recommendation does not advocate
replacing this process, but rather strengthening it to provide more
transparency, discipline, and accountability.
Background:
SBR represents the first time that DOD has taken the lead on developing
a major national security space capability with the intelligence
community as a partner. Because of this partnership, SBR's acquisition
process is more complex than that used for typical DOD programs. While
DOD and the intelligence community will likely use all the data that
SBR produces, their priorities differ. DOD's warfighting community is
particularly interested in tracking targets moving over land or sea as
well as other objects of interest. The intelligence community is more
focused on obtaining detailed global imagery and combining it with
other data for advanced processing. SBR is expected to meet both needs
and be fully integrated with other space and non-space systems,
including TCA, which is to transmit SBR's data to receivers in the air,
at sea, or on the ground.
A key advantage of radar in space is having the ability to "see"
through clouds and sand storms and any type of weather, day or night.
Radar-equipped aircrafts, on the other hand, require U.S. air dominance
to collect radar information and must steer clear of hostile areas--the
result being limited radar coverage. The SBR concept offers other added
features, including electronic steering of the radar signal toward a
particular area and capturing high volumes of very fine resolution
radar images of targets and terrain. With the ability to perform these
functions almost simultaneously, SBR is expected to help analysts gain
a better understanding of what is occurring in specific locations.
To help meet some of its goals, DOD plans to leverage key technologies
that were developed in the late 1990s to demonstrate a space-based
radar capability. According to DOD officials, contractors developed
some satellite hardware and prototype components under the
Discoverer II program, which began in 1998 and was to identify and
validate by 2008 the capability of tracking mobile ground targets from
space. Discoverer II, comprising two radar demonstration satellites,
was a joint initiative by the Air Force, DOD's Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, and the intelligence community's National
Reconnaissance Office. DOD officials told us that the Discoverer II
program had reached the preliminary design review phase when it was
cancelled in 2000 because of cost and schedule uncertainties, poorly
explained requirements, and the lack of a coherent vision to transition
the system to operational use.
The Secretary of Defense concluded that space-based radar could provide
a military advantage and in 2001 approved SBR as a new major defense
acquisition program, delegating it to the Air Force. In July 2003, an
independent cost assessment team consisting of representatives from DOD
and the intelligence community estimated that $28.6 billion would be
needed to pay for SBR's life-cycle costs--development, production,
launch, and operation. The program entered the study phase in August
2003. The Air Force has requested $328 million for SBR in fiscal year
2005 and has programmed about $4 billion for the program from
fiscal years 2005 to 2009. Given concerns about affordability and
readiness, the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Appropriations Conference
Report reduced funding for SBR to $75 million, with the direction to
return this effort back to the technology development phase. In 2003,
Congress reduced the Air Force's $274 million budget request for SBR by
$100 million due to concerns about technology maturity and schedule.
DOD has scheduled the start of product development for mid-fiscal year
2006, with production starting at the end of fiscal year 2008 and the
first satellite to be launched at the end of fiscal year 2012. Figure 1
shows SBR's acquisition schedule in fiscal years.
Figure 1: SBR's Acquisition Schedule (in fiscal years):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Gaining Knowledge about Requirements and Resources before Product
Development Is Important for Space Acquisition Success:
In the past several decades, DOD's space acquisitions have experienced
problems that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions,
even billions, of dollars; have stretched schedules by years; and have
increased performance risks. In some cases, capabilities have not been
delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. Our reports
have shown that these problems, common among many weapon acquisitions,
are largely rooted in a failure to match the customer's requirements
(desired capabilities) with the developer's resources (technical
knowledge, timing, and funding) when starting an acquisition program.
In particular, our past work has shown that for space systems, product
development was often started based on a rigid set of requirements that
proved to be unachievable within a reasonable development time frame.
Other cases involved unstable requirements. In some cases where
requirements had been identified and approved, even more requirements
were added after the program began. When technology did not perform as
planned, adding resources in terms of time and money became the primary
option for solving problems because the customer's expectations about
the product's performance capabilities already had been set.
The path traditionally taken by space programs--and other DOD weapon
system programs--stands in sharp contrast to that taken by leading
commercial firms. Our extensive body of work shows that leading
companies use a product development model that helps reduce risks and
increase knowledge when developing new products. This best practices
model enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their
products at critical junctures during development and helps them make
informed investment decisions. This knowledge-based process can be
broken down into three cumulative knowledge points.
* Knowledge point 1: A match must be made between the customer's
requirements and the developer's available resources before product
development starts. As noted earlier, DOD plans to start SBR product
development in 2006.
* Knowledge point 2: The product's design must be stable and must meet
performance requirements before initial manufacturing begins.
* Knowledge point 3: The product must be producible within cost,
schedule, and quality targets and demonstrated to be reliable before
production begins.
Systems engineering is a technical management tool that provides the
knowledge necessary at knowledge point 1 to translate requirements into
specific, achievable capabilities. With systems engineering knowledge
in hand, acquisition decision makers and developers can work together
to close gaps between requirements and available resources--well before
product development starts. Some gaps can be resolved by the
developer's investments, while others can be closed by finding
technical or design alternatives. Remaining gaps--capabilities the
developer does not have or cannot get without increasing the price and
timing of the product beyond what decision makers will accept--must be
resolved through trade-offs and negotiations. Effective use of this
tool enables decision makers to move on to knowledge point 2 and to
produce a stable product design.
DOD has recently issued a new acquisition policy for space systems,
partly intended to address past acquisition problems and provide
capability to users quicker. However, we recently reported that the
policy is not likely to achieve these goals because it allows programs
to continue to develop technologies after product development starts.
Our past work has shown that this approach makes it more difficult to
estimate cost and schedule at the onset of product development and
increases the likelihood that programs will encounter technical
problems that could disrupt design and production and require more time
and money to address than anticipated. Over the long run, the extra
investment required to address these problems could reduce funding for
developing other technological advances, slow the overall modernization
effort, delay capabilities for the warfighter, and force unplanned--and
possibly unnecessary--trade-offs between space and other weapon system
programs. By contrast, DOD's revised policy for other weapon
acquisitions encourages programs to mature technologies to the point of
being tested in an operational environment before beginning product
development. We recommended that DOD modify its policy to separate
technology development from product development so that needs can be
matched with available technology, time, and money at the start of a
new program.
We also reported that DOD's space acquisition policy does not require
DOD to commit to setting aside funding for space acquisitions. Hence,
there is no guarantee that the resources needed to meet requirements
will be there on any individual program when needed. This makes it
difficult for DOD as a whole to make corporate-level and trade-off
decisions--which will likely be needed when DOD begins the SBR
acquisition because (1) costs are significantly increasing for other
critical space systems such as the Space-Based Infrared System High,
the Transformational Satellite, and the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle and (2) DOD is planning to undertake additional new programs,
such as the Space-Based Space Surveillance system and a new version of
the Global Positioning System.
DOD is revising its new space acquisition policy partly to address
these issues; however, the revision was not available for review at the
time of this review.
DOD Moving Forward on Acquiring Critical Knowledge but Gaps Remain in
Approval for SBR Requirements:
DOD has bolstered the SBR acquisition program by increasing senior
leader and stakeholder involvement in setting requirements. However,
DOD is not fully documenting commitments made during the requirements
approval process before progressing to the next acquisition phase, nor
has it established a process to resolve potential disagreements that
may occur after approval. Clouding the approval of requirements is that
DOD's current space acquisition policy does not provide specific
guidance for acquisitions that involve partnerships between DOD and the
intelligence community.
SBR Managed by New Executive Oversight Structure:
Providing senior-level oversight are three new groups created expressly
for the SBR program: the Executive Steering Group, which advises the
Requirements/Capabilities Group and the Joint Senior Acquisition Group.
Members of these groups come from DOD, National Reconnaissance Office,
and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. All key stakeholders are
expected to have open and honest discussions about what can and cannot
be done within desired time frames, budgetary constraints, and
achievable technologies. Figure 2 shows how these groups work with
SBR's joint program office and requirements review boards for DOD and
the intelligence community.
Figure 2: SBR's Oversight Structure:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A primary benefit of having an oversight structure for the SBR program,
which involves many decision makers from across multiple organizations,
is that the right people are involved in the decision-making process
and can work together to lock in their requirements. The intent is to
avoid problems of the past in which a program incurs cost, schedule,
and performance risks because decision makers continue to negotiate and
make trade-offs even after designers and engineers have started
technology development and design work. Figure 3 shows the likely
outcomes if requirements are poorly defined and are not approved or, in
the case of SBR, if requirements are adequately defined and approved
early in the study phase.
Figure 3: Requirements-Setting Can Impact Acquisition Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SBR's Requirements-Setting Process Lacks Formal Approval and
Documentation:
DOD officials reported to us that the oversight groups have achieved
informal consensus on requirements for SBR. However, this approval has
not been formalized and it is unclear as to whether and how it might be
formalized. Moreover, it is unclear how disagreements that may occur
after initial approval will be resolved.
Regardless of how many stakeholders have been invited to join in
decision making or how much expertise is included in SBR's oversight
function, overall success of the SBR program hinges in part on whether
the requirements are clear, stable, and achievable and whether DOD and
the intelligence community demonstrate commitment and accountability by
formally approving the requirements. In an acquisition decision
memorandum, the Under Secretary of the Air Force requested that DOD and
the intelligence community approve the initial capabilities document
and concept of operations before the request for proposals was released
in January 2004 for concept development contracts. DOD officials told
us that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the intelligence
community's Mission Requirements Board approved the initial
capabilities document, and there are memoranda documenting these
decisions. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the
concept of operations, provided comments, but did not approve it.
According to DOD officials, during a meeting of the SBR Executive
Steering Group, high-level officials from the intelligence community
verbally approved the concept of operations, but there is no
documentation recording this approval.
Agreement is critical because DOD and the intelligence community are
placing different emphasis on desired capabilities for SBR. An
independent assessment of the SBR program determined that requirements
were adequate to enter the study phase, which started in August 2003,
but cautioned that the requirements needed to be converged among all
stakeholders and users. Table 1 shows the type of knowledge that
decision makers expect to gain from the initial capabilities document
and the concept of operations.
Table 1: Knowledge Provided by SBR's Initial Capabilities Document and
Concept of Operations:
Document: Initial capabilities document;
Key knowledge provided:
* Identifies current gaps in capability,
* Identifies the overall desired capabilities of the SBR system;
* Lists users' performance requirements for SBR;
* Identifies the functional relationships between users;
* Specifies the desired capability for DOD's capability development
document, which is prepared at the end of the study phase;
* Identifies validated requirements.
Document: Concept of operations;
Key knowledge provided:
* Describes the components of the SBR system;
* Identifies how SBR information is to be processed and disseminated to
the warfighters and others;
* Describes how SBR fits into architectures involving other space and
non-space systems in meeting requirements;
* Identifies external threats to SBR and the perceived operational
environment.
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
A defined requirements approval process helps decision makers resolve
disagreements that may occur and ensure they will remain committed to
their decisions after formal approval. Based on our past reports on
uncovering problems and our best practice work, we believe that the
steps in a formal approval process include:
* explaining how decision makers' requirements and comments are
obtained and addressed;
* identifying the officials and/or the organizations responsible for
taking specific approval action;
* establishing a mechanism and time frame for providing approval or
disapproval;
* establishing a system for addressing unresolved issues as they relate
to key program documentation; and:
* assessing changes to approved requirements based on their effect on
the program's cost and schedule.
While DOD has taken steps to increase senior leader and stakeholder
involvement in setting requirements and addressing acquisition issues,
DOD is not fully documenting commitments made during the requirements
approval process, nor has it established a process to resolve potential
disagreements that may occur after approval.
DOD Taking Proactive Steps to Gain Knowledge about Resources, but
Critical Gaps May Remain at Product Development:
DOD is also taking positive steps to attain the knowledge needed to
understand what resources will be needed to develop SBR's capabilities
and to mitigate risks. These include:
* relying on systems engineering to translate requirements into
specific, achievable capabilities and to close gaps between
requirements and resources;
* adopting a more comprehensive cost estimating technique to identify
SBR's life-cycle costs;
* exploring alternatives for SBR if TCA--the infrastructure that DOD is
depending on to transmit SBR's data--incurs schedule slips; and:
* asking two concept development contractors to each propose at least
two different operations concepts for SBR with and without TCA.
However, the path that SBR is on has potential for knowledge gaps when
making investment decisions, the types of gaps that have hampered other
space programs in the past. Specifically, it is expected that some
critical SBR technologies will not be mature when product development
starts, that is, not tested in a relevant or operational environment.
Typical outcomes of this lack of knowledge are significant cost and
schedule increases because of the need to fix problems later in
development. Furthermore, TCA, a new, more robust communications
infrastructure that could transmit SBR's imagery data much more quickly
than the current infrastructure, is facing uncertainties. Specifically,
one of TCA's primary components, the Transformational Satellite, may
not be ready in time to support SBR.[Footnote 2] Without mature
technologies and faced with a possible slip in the Transformational
Satellite's schedule, DOD will be less able to accurately estimate
total system costs before the start of product development. In
addition, DOD and the Air Force may not have knowledge needed to make
corporate level trade-offs between SBR and other air-based radar
systems at the time it plans to make a commitment to invest in the SBR
acquisition program. DOD has undertaken an analysis to weigh the merits
of space-based radar. At this time, it is not known whether this
analysis will be a detailed examination of the capabilities and costs
of each individual radar option and combined with other radar platforms
or whether the analysis will be a less rigorous examination of the mix
of radar options.
DOD Taking Positive Steps to Build Foundation of Knowledge about
SBR Resources:
DOD is planning to aggressively address technology, affordability, and
integration issues by, in part, instituting robust systems engineering
processes and procedures. Systems engineering is a technical management
tool for gaining information on a broad array of activities related to
the development of a system. For SBR, DOD plans to perform systems
engineering work on requirements and their allocation, interface
definitions, trade studies, risk management, performance analysis and
modeling, environmental and safety planning, test planning, program
protection planning, information assurance, and configuration control.
Applying systems engineering to these activities would give DOD the
insight and knowledge it needs to better manage the program, including
ways to reduce risk and ensure the viability of concepts and
requirements.
DOD has also decided to take a more comprehensive approach to
estimating SBR's life-cycle costs. According to the SBR program
director, this marks the first time DOD has willingly presented all
related costs to develop, acquire, produce, maintain, operate, and
sustain the system. DOD officials stated that they wanted to identify
not just direct costs, but also costs for associated infrastructure
such as the costs related to modifying the ground system that will be
used to support SBR as well as other systems. According to DOD, about
$8 billion of the $28.6 billion life-cycle cost estimate represents
costs that in the past, would not have been included in space program
total cost estimates. Taking steps to more comprehensively identify SBR
and SBR related costs is a positive step and will help DOD manage its
portfolio of space programs.
Although DOD hopes to rely on TCA to support SBR data transmissions, it
is taking a proactive approach to identify and assess the viability of
TCA alternatives. First, in April 2004, DOD awarded two 2-year
contracts for concept development efforts that call for the
identification of alternatives to TCA. For each alternative identified,
the contractor is to conduct an assessment of the cost, risk, and
effect on SBR's performance. DOD officials told us that when SBR
initiates product development in 2006, it would know whether TCA will
be available to support SBR or whether to pursue a TCA alternative. In
addition, DOD also awarded two contracts totaling $510,000 for a
yearlong study to propose several alternatives to TCA capable of
supporting SBR's communications requirements and to analyze the
viability of such alternatives. These actions have put DOD in a better
position to ensure the program is successful.
The two 2-year contracts that DOD awarded in April 2004 also require
that at least two different viable SBR operations concepts be proposed.
DOD is expecting each contractor to fully develop the alternative
operations concepts. These alternative concepts could involve using
unique radar processing techniques. According to DOD, it will work with
each of the contractors to pare down the alternatives to a single best
concept for each contractor. For the remainder of the contract
performance period, the contractors would focus their attention on
fleshing out the details associated with these concepts. This approach
will put DOD in a better position when the time comes to select a
single contractor to design the SBR system.
Technologies Will Not Be Mature at Product Development Start:
DOD officials have said that SBR will likely be the most technically
challenging, software-intensive, and complex space system ever built by
DOD. The two key pieces of hardware needed to give SBR a radar
capability from space--the electronically scanned array (which steers
the radar signal to an area of interest) and the on-board processor
(the radar-processing unit aboard SBR)--face the highest amount of
risk. The electronically scanned array can scan multiple areas of
interest virtually simultaneously, allowing for simplified satellite
design over conventional technology offering mechanical slew radar. The
on-board processor is expected to allow the processing radar data to
assure the timely and thorough delivery of imagery data that will be
downlinked for transmission to the warfighter.
To minimize the potential for technology development problems after the
start of product development, DOD uses an analytical tool to assess
technology maturity for many weapon system acquisition programs.
Called Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), this tool associates a TRL
with different levels of demonstrated performance, ranging from paper
studies to actual application of the technology in its final form. The
value of using a tool based on demonstrated performance is that it can
presage the likely consequences of incorporating a technology at a
given level of maturity into a product's development, enabling decision
makers to make informed choices. Our previous reviews have found the
use of TRLs, which range from 1 to 9, to be a best practice. (See app.
I for a description of the TRL levels.)
The critical technologies that will support the SBR program currently
range from TRL 3 to 5. A TRL 3 means that most of the work performed so
far has been based on analytical and laboratory studies. At a TRL 5,
the basic technology components are integrated and tested in a
simulated or laboratory environment. Table 2 shows the current TRL for
each of SBR's critical technologies and the expected TRL at product
development start in 2006. In general, the program office's key risk
reduction efforts are scheduled to mature these technologies to TRL 5
by the middle of fiscal year 2006. These efforts include the awarding
of research and development contracts to three payload contractors for
efforts to continue to develop and mature these components (the
electronically scanned array and on-board processor). The period of
performance of each contract is about 2.5 years.
Table 2: Technology Readiness Levels of SBR Critical Technologies:
Critical technology: Electronically scanned array;
Current TRL level[A]: 4;
Expected TRL level: 5;
Fiscal year[B]: 2006.
Critical technology: On-board processor;
Current TRL level[A]: 3;
Expected TRL level: 5;
Fiscal year[B]: 2006.
Critical technology: Signal processing algorithms (for moving target
indication);
Current TRL level[A]: 4-5;
Expected TRL level: 5;
Fiscal year[B]: 2006.
Critical technology: Information management system;
Current TRL level[A]: 3;
Expected TRL level: 5;
Fiscal year[B]: 2006.
Critical technology: Moving target indication exploitation hardware
and software;
Current TRL level[A]: 3-4;
Expected TRL level: 5;
Fiscal year[B]: 2006.
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis).
[A] A TRL range is shown because of varying maturities between the
viable suppliers.
[B] Even if the SBR program office chooses to pursue a different SBR
concept alternative, these technologies still would be considered
critical; however, the specific technology readiness date could be
different for each proposed alternative.
[End of table]
To mature the electronically scanned array and on-board processor
technologies from a TRL 3/4 to 5, the contractors plan to conduct
various developmental and integrative tasks in about 3 years. For
example, one contractor plans to conduct 18 tasks to develop the
electronically scanned array and 8 tasks to integrate the on-board
processor with other system components. In addition, the development of
the integrated circuits and programmable microcircuits that support the
on-board processor requires extensive tests and evaluations and the
radiation-hardening requirement further complicates the development.
Given the challenges of the state-of-the-art technologies being
developed and the algorithms involved, the testing programs must be
rigorous and transparent and the results fully documented. We have
determined that the time allotted to mature the SBR technologies to TRL
5 is ambitious given the tasks that need to be accomplished.
Furthermore, the development of the signal processing algorithms and
communications downlink involves significant software development.
Based on our past experience of software assessments in other programs,
the establishment of a structured testing regime for software
development has always been underestimated.
By planning to start product development in fiscal year 2006 with
technologies at TRL 5, DOD is very likely to continue designing the
system and to conduct other program activities at the same time it
builds representative models of key technologies and tests them in an
environment that simulates space conditions (such as a vacuum chamber).
This approach is common with DOD space acquisitions but has a
problematic history. Our past work[Footnote 3] has shown that it can
lead to significant cost and schedule increases because of the need to
fix problems later in development. A continuing problem is that
software needs are poorly understood at the beginning of a program. We
have previously recommended that DOD not allow technologies to enter
into a weapon system's product development until they are assessed at a
TRL 7, meaning a prototype has been demonstrated in an operational
environment.[Footnote 4] DOD has accepted lower TRL thresholds for
space programs because testing in an operational environment--in space,
for example, or even in a relevant environment--is difficult and
costly. However, DOD's new space acquisition policy does not identify
what the minimum TRL level should be before starting product
development for space programs, how risks should be mitigated if
technologies are included in programs without full testing, or how
lower TRL levels affect the confidence of cost and schedule estimates.
Moreover, the policy does not address the option of maturing
technologies outside a program and pulling them in once they prove to
be viable.
One way to mitigate technology risk is to rely on backup technologies,
should newer technologies prove to be problematic during product
development. According to DOD officials, there are backup technologies
that are more mature for each of SBR's critical technologies. The
backups are the same technologies but rely on a previous and more
mature version. Using previous versions of these technologies would
result in a lower level of desired performance--such as a reduced area
collection rate, a reduction in the total number of targets collected
per satellite per day, increased product delivery time frames to the
user, an increased weight of the spacecraft, and higher cost. For
example, more mature versions of the electronically scanned array exist
and if used, would result in a reduction in its performance level. In
addition, some previous versions of SBR technologies have not been
demonstrated or tested in space. But according to DOD officials, even
with backup technologies, the total performance of the SBR system can
be maintained through systems engineering trades. DOD says it has been
able to leverage some of the key technologies (such as the
electronically scanned array) that were under development during the
previous effort, Discoverer II, to demonstrate a space-based radar
capability.
Communications Infrastructure May Not Be Ready in Time to Support SBR:
Current plans call for TCA to transmit SBR's large volume of data to
ground-, air-, ship-, and space-based systems. However, one of TCA's
primary components, the Transformational Satellite--which will use
technologies that DOD has never before tried in space--is facing
uncertainties in its scheduled 2011 launch. DOD started product
development for the Transformational Satellite in December 2003 even
though technologies were immature. If the Transformational Satellite
falters but SBR launches as expected in 2012, then DOD will have a
fully operational, new-generation satellite that is missing its primary
means of data transmission. Recognizing the challenges, DOD is to
decide by November 2004 whether to move forward or delay the
Transformational Satellite's acquisition program and instead procure
another Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite, which already are
under development and are based on mature technologies.
Our analysis shows that alternatives to TCA may involve a greater
reliance on processing aboard the SBR satellites, thereby increasing
software development efforts. This approach would reduce the volume of
data requiring transmission, allowing conventional satellite systems,
such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites, to handle the
transmission. Another likely alternative is to have SBR satellites
transmit only selected portions of data, again, so that the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite could handle the lower volume of
information. Finally, a dedicated system of satellites could be fielded
for the sole purpose of transmitting SBR data, significantly increasing
program cost and raising affordability issues. Currently, DOD is
working closely with officials from the Transformational Satellite
program office to evaluate the relative merits of various alternatives
and to document the interfaces needed between SBR and the
Transformational Satellite for each alternative. During the course of
our audit work, SBR program officials met weekly with the
Transformational Satellite program's integrated product teams and were
coordinating efforts on a memorandum of agreement on requirements
development, joint engineering practices, and studies of air-and space-
based options.
SBR's Cost Estimate Unlikely to Be Realistic Because of Multiple
Uncertainties:
Based on a notional constellation of nine (plus one spare) satellites
operating in low-earth orbit, an independent cost assessment in 2003
put SBR's cost at the $28.6 billion mark, making SBR the most expensive
DOD space system ever built. When this initial cost estimate is revised
in 2006, before SBR's product development starts, DOD is to have
decided a number of issues, such as how many satellites are to be
acquired, what their capabilities will be, and at what altitude(s) the
satellites are to operate. This system refinement allows DOD to develop
a more realistic total system cost estimate--a critical knowledge point
if a successful match between requirements and resources is to be made.
However, if DOD begins product development with less than mature
technologies and without knowing the availability of TCA, accurate cost
estimates for SBR will be much more difficult to prepare. We have
previously reported that improving the reliability of cost estimates is
critical[Footnote 5] and affords DOD decision makers with the
appropriate information to decide whether a weapon system is worth the
overall investment and whether the time is right to proceed with such
an investment. Once a total cost is known, DOD needs to secure the
funding so it can design, produce, operate, and sustain the system.
DOD may also lack knowledge needed to make a corporate-level decision
as to how much it should invest in SBR versus air platforms with
similar capabilities at the time it begins the SBR acquisition program.
In November 2003, the Air Force completed an analysis of alternatives
(AOA) for SBR, which was supposed to evaluate whether space-or
air-based radar platforms (such as manned and unmanned aircraft with
radar capabilities) or a combination of both are better suited for
tracking moving targets on land or at sea and analyze the capabilities
and costs of each suitable option. However, DOD officials raised a
concern that the AOA only weighed the merits of various space-based
solutions. The Air Force decided to undertake a follow-on study to
explore the optimal ways to gather information on ground moving targets
from radars based in space versus air. The plan is to also use this
follow-on study as part of DOD's preparations for submitting a fiscal
year 2006 budget to Congress to secure funding for SBR and other radar
systems on air platforms. A more thorough AOA, completed before the
start of the study phase, might conceivably have determined that
air-based radar could provide many or most of the capabilities promised
by space-based radar but at a fraction of the cost. Moreover, this type
of analysis could help DOD officials better decide whether SBR should
be initiated at a later date, when critical technologies will have been
matured, or when the communications infrastructure to support SBR will
be available.
DOD officials have mentioned other ongoing studies that are examining
the optimal mix between SBR and other platforms for specific
capabilities, such as ground-moving target indication. However, it is
unclear as to the extent these studies will be factored into the SBR
product development start decision.
Conclusions:
DOD has recently embarked on a discovery and exploration phase for its
SBR program. During this period, it is critical for programs to work
toward closing knowledge gaps about requirements, technologies,
funding, and other resources so they can be positioned to succeed when
DOD decides to commit to making significant investments. For SBR, this
would mean testing technologies to the point of knowing they can work
as intended before starting program development, securing agreement on
requirements with the intelligence community, and fully assessing the
cost and benefits and risks of relying on TCA and alternatives,
including different mixes of air and space-based platforms. DOD is
taking positive steps toward this end, but without maturing critical
technologies or securing formal commitment on requirements, it will not
be able to assure decision makers that the program can be completed
within cost and schedule estimates. Should DOD decide to proceed on a
path that leaves open important questions, including those about
technologies, then it should do so with (1) assessments of technical
risks and what additional resources (in terms of time and money) would
be needed to address problems that may occur during development as well
as what trade-offs would need to be made with other space programs
should DOD need to invest additional resources in SBR, and (2) a formal
commitment for providing additional resources if problems do occur.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better ensure that DOD and its intelligence community partners
obtain the additional knowledge they need to determine whether and when
to begin the SBR acquisition program, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to:
* Direct the SBR Executive Steering Group to ensure that outcomes from
the requirements management process are formally approved and
documented as the program proceeds through product development before
an investment is made beyond technology and concept development for the
SBR program. This group should identify how key document review
comments are to be obtained and addressed and identify all the
officials and/or organizations responsible for taking specific approval
action. In addition, the group should establish a mechanism and time
frame for providing approval/disapproval. Finally, the group should
establish a formal mechanism for addressing unresolved issues as they
relate to key program documentation, as well as how changes to approved
requirements will be assessed.
* Modify DOD's space acquisition policy to reflect protocols for
setting requirements when DOD undertakes programs in partnership with
the intelligence community.
* Delay approval to commit funding to product development (key decision
point B) for SBR until technologies have been demonstrated in a
relevant or operational environment so DOD can more reliably estimate
the resources needed to complete the program. If the Under Secretary
determines that the program should go forward with less mature
technologies, then we recommend that the Under Secretary (1) undertake
an assessment of the backup technologies that may lessen capability and
add cost to the program and the additional time and money that may be
required to meet SBR's performance objectives to address those risks,
(2) undertake an assessment of trade-offs that may need to be made with
other space programs to assure SBR's successful outcome, and (3) secure
formal commitments from DOD to provide funding for total estimated
costs as well as costs estimated to address potential technical risks.
* Strengthen the ongoing study of options for tracking ground-moving
targets by ensuring this work includes: (1) a full range of air and
space options; (2) measures of effectiveness that would help justify
choosing SBR over air options; and (3) the possibility of having to
rely on TCA alternatives for space options. This work should also
consider the results of analyses being conducted by other DOD entities
on tracking ground-moving targets.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Programs, Requirements, and Resources)
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
DOD generally agreed with our findings and our recommendation to
strengthen its study of SBR alternatives. DOD partially agreed with our
recommendations to strengthen its requirement setting process for SBR
and to demonstrate SBR technologies in a relevant or operational
environment before committing to product development. DOD did not agree
with our recommendation to modify its acquisition policy to strengthen
requirements setting.
In commenting on our recommendations, DOD agreed in principle with the
need to extensively define, analyze, and validate requirements for SBR,
but it did not believe this necessitated a different requirements
setting process than the one that is in place for SBR or changes to its
space acquisition policy or that additional controls were needed within
the program's study phase. To clarify, our recommendation was not
intended to construct a new requirements setting process or supplant
activities undertaken by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council or
the Mission Requirements Board, as DOD asserts. Rather, we recommend
that DOD build on the positive requirements setting procedures it has
already put in place by instituting controls and mechanisms that ensure
transparency, discipline, and accountability with requirements
setting. As noted in our report, while DOD has taken steps to increase
senior leader and stakeholder involvement in requirements setting, it
is not fully documenting commitments made during the requirements
approval process, nor has it established a process to resolve potential
disagreements that may occur after approval. It is important that this
discipline be instilled in the study phase and throughout the SBR
effort. As noted in previous reports, many space programs have not been
executed within cost and schedule estimates because of an inability to
establish firm requirements and to make and enforce trade-off
decisions. For SBR, the potential for difficulty in requirements
setting is higher because of the distinct needs of the intelligence
community and DOD's desire to integrate SBR with other radar platforms.
Moreover, revising the acquisition policy to clearly communicate
protocols that should be followed when DOD undertakes space programs in
the future involving diverse users--such as the intelligence community,
military services, industry, and/or other agencies--would further help
DOD to rationalize requirements setting and to solidify relationships
with users, which DOD reported was a top SBR management issue.
In regard to our recommendation to delay product development until SBR
technologies are sufficiently matured, DOD stated that it has planned
for critical and most other enabling technologies to be demonstrated at
least at the component level in a relevant environment on the ground.
DOD also stated that where technically feasible and fiscally feasible,
it planned to pursue on-orbit demonstrations. It also stated it has
taken some actions relating to our recommendation such as accounting
for technical risks in the costing and budgeting process. DOD asserted,
however, that our recommendation encourages pursuit of older, more
proven, technologies. We recommended that DOD pursue relevant or
operational environment demonstrations of all critical technologies and
even an integrated system before committing to a formal acquisition
program because this practice enables a program to align customer
expectations with resources, and therefore minimize problems that could
hurt a program in its design and production phase and drive up costs
and schedule. Further, we agree that continuing to develop leading edge
technology is important for space system capabilities. However, history
has shown and we have repeatedly reported that conducting technology
development within a product environment consistently delays the
delivery of capability to the user, robs other programs of necessary
funds through unanticipated cost overruns, and, consequently, can
result in money wasted and fewer units produced than originally stated
as necessary. A technology development environment is more forgiving
and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program
environment. Events such as test "failures," new discoveries, and time
spent in attaining knowledge are considered normal in this environment.
Further, judgments of technology maturity have proven to be
insufficient as the basis for accurate estimates of program risks as it
relates to cost, schedule, and capability. Lastly, our report noted
that DOD was taking positive actions to gain knowledge about technology
readiness, including strengthening systems engineering, undertaking
risk assessments, and assessing various technical concepts. Given the
potential cost of the program, our recommendation focuses on taking
these steps further by assessing what trade-offs may need to be made
with other space programs should the program encounter technical
problems that require more time and money than anticipated and securing
commitments to provide resources needed to address such problems.
DOD's detailed comments are provided in appendix II.
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional
committees. We will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Arthur Gallegos at (303) 572-7368.
Other key contributors to the report include Tony Beckham, Cristina
Chaplain, Lily Chin, Maria Durant, Nancy Rothlisberger, and Hai V.
Tran.
Signed by:
Katherine V. Schinasi:
Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: TRL Scale for Assessing Critical Technologies:
TRL: Basic principles observed and reported;
TRL description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific
research begins to be translated into applied research and development
(R&D). Examples might include paper studies.
TRL: Technology concept and/or application formulated;
TRL description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. Examples are still limited to
paper studies.
TRL: Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
characteristic proof of concept;
TRL description: Active R&D is initiated. This includes analytical
studies and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical
predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include
components that are not yet integrated or representative.
TRL: Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment;
TRL description: Basic technological components are integrated to
establish that they will work together. This is relatively "low
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration
of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory.
TRL: Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment;
TRL description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases
significantly. Basic technological components are integrated with
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be
tested in simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity"
laboratory integration of components.
TRL: System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment;
TRL description: Representative model or prototype system, which is
well beyond the breadboard tested for level 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high- fidelity
laboratory environment or in a simulated operational environment.
TRL: System prototype demonstration in an operational environment;
TRL description: Prototype near, or at, planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration of an
actual system prototype in an operational environment such as an
aircraft, vehicle, or space.
TRL: Actual system completed and qualified through test and
demonstration;
TRL description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form
and under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents
the end of true system development. Examples include Developmental Test
and Evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine
if it meets design specifications.
TRL: Actual system proven through successful mission operations;
TRL description: Actual application of the technology in its final
form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in
Operational Test and Evaluation. Examples include using the system
under operational mission conditions.
Source: DOD Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, app.6 (Oct. 30,
2002).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000:
INTELLIGENCE:
Ms. Katherine V. Schinasi:
Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Schinasi,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, 'DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Space-Based Radar Effort Needs
Additional Knowledge Before Starting Development,' dated May 25, 2004
(GAO Code 120267/GAO-04-759). This report did an excellent and thorough
job reviewing the Space Based Radar (SBR) program and we agree with
many of your findings and comments; however we can only partially
concur with the entire report, particularly your recommended actions.
Detailed responses to these recommendations are provided in the
attachment.
In summary, the recommendation to provide more formal documentation to
the requirements process assumes that DoD and the Intelligence
Community (IC) have committed to SBR as a joint (i.e., DoD/IC) program,
which is not the case. The current SBR acquisition strategy requires an
iterative process of reviewing several concept design proposals from
multiple vendors to determine whether a single space radar system can
satisfy the broad spectrum of DoD and IC requirements. This does not
alleviate the need to extensively define, analyze, and validate
requirements; however a process outside of, and more formalized than,
the one currently in place is not required. Also, a modification of the
space acquisition policy is not required specifically for this program.
As far as your recommendation to delay funding for product development
until SBR technologies have been demonstrated in an operational
environment, we have planned for critical and most other enabling
technologies to be demonstrated at least at the component level in a
relevant environment on the ground. Where technically and fiscally
possible and technically warranted, the JPO is pursuing on-orbit
demonstrations. Nevertheless, we cannot accept your recommendation to
employ a more mature technology which would produce "a lower level of
desired performance." The SBR Joint Program Office has established a
risk reduction and technology readiness process which ensures extensive
testing and validation of related technologies. In addition, we are
planning a classified demonstration which will prove the utility of
SBR-like capabilities. If your staff has not been briefed on this
project, we can arrange for appropriately cleared personnel from your
office to receive this briefing. Finally, while the Air Force-conducted
Analysis of Alternatives clearly demonstrates the utility of SBR (in a
variety of constellations) to satisfy warfighting needs, more studies
are required to analyze contributions of airborne assets in a variety
of scenarios and to further refine SBR and Moving Target Indicator
(MTI) contributions to intelligence problems. These studies are either
underway or in various stages of completion, and both DoD and the IC
are extensively involved. In addition, the relationship and
dependencies of SBR and TCA are understood. The Joint Staff has tasked
additional study of this relationship for formal review as part of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council process. Communications
alternatives to TCA are an integral part of the SBR Phase A studies.
Again, I commend your staff on a professional effort, both in their
investigation, in their dealings with DoD personnel, and in the
preparation of the final report. My point of contact for this effort is
Mr. Brian P. Levengood, 703-607-0423. Please contact him if you have
any questions or comments.
Signed by:
Letitia A. Long:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
(Programs, Requirements, & Resources):
GAO DRAFT REPORT -DATED MAY 26, 2004 GAO CODE 120267/GAO-04-759:
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: SPACE-BASED RADAR EFFORT NEEDS ADDITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE BEFORE STARTING DEVELOPMENT":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Space-Based
Radar (SBR) Executive Steering Group to ensure that outcomes from the
requirements management process are formally approved and documented as
the program proceeds through product development before an investment
is made beyond technology and concept development for the SBR program.
The Steering Group should identify how key document review comments are
to be obtained and addressed and identify all the officials and/or
organizations responsible for taking specific approval action. The
Steering Group should also establish a mechanism and time frame for
providing approval/disapproval of requirements and a formal mechanism
for addressing unresolved issues as they relate to key program
documentation, as well as how changes to approve requirements will be
addressed. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. If the SBR concept development phase
results in a satellite design and constellation that satisfactorily
provides the capabilities needed to satisfy both Department of Defense
(DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) requirements, a more formal
process, with appropriate supporting documentation may be required as
the acquisition progresses beyond Key Decision Point (KDP) B. The
current acquisition process (now in Phase A) includes requirements from
both the DoD and the IC to ascertain whether a single satellite system
can satisfy the broad spectrum of cross-community needs. It is
imperative that the respective requirements validation processes (the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for DoD, and the Mission
Requirements Board (MRB) for the IC) function in accordance with their
charters. The process put in place specifically to review and approve
requirements for SBR (Requirements and Capabilities Group (RCG) and the
Executive Steering Group (ESG)) was designed to build on the existing
requirements validation process, not to replace it or usurp any JROC or
MRB authorities. The inference drawn in the GAO report that the
apparent informality of the Executive Steering Group process renders
that process ineffective in providing direction and stability for SBR
requirements is not correct. The senior level representation of the ESG
(e.g., Under Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, Directors of Defense Agencies, Under Secretary of the Air
Force, etc.), militates against reversals of requirements and strategic
direction that have been adjudicated and approved by this group. The
Under Secretary of the Air Force has stood up the National Security
Space Office organization to provide valuable staff support and
integration of several functional areas and will provide documentation
of SBR ESG findings. The GAO report also points out that the Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD) was approved by the JROC and MRB through
memoranda, but that neither provided written approval of the Concept of
Operations (CONOPS). In accordance with Title X, DoD Instructions, and
DCI Instructions; neither the JROC nor the MRB have formal approval
authority over acquisition program CONOPS. However, the JROC does
routinely review CONOPS as part of the supporting documentation for
capability documents and, in response to the Under Secretary of the Air
Force's request, noted their support for using the current CONOPS for
Phase A "Concept Development" in formal memoranda, JROCM 221-03. There
is a concerted and cooperative effort between the DoD and IC to come to
a convergence of capability needs using the RCG process to draft the
Capabilities Development Document (CDD). The CDD is the formal
statement of capability needs required for a KDP B decision to enter
Phase B "Development." In accordance with CJCSI 3170 and DCID 1/10, the
final draft CDD will be submitted to the JROC and MRB prior to KDP B
for formal review, comment adjudication, and approval.
We believe the processes in place to validate requirements for the DoD
and IC are adequate and should not be replaced. Further, the SBR-unique
process is sufficient, when acting in concert with the JROC and MRB, to
adjudicate any differences and to support Phase A of the SBR
acquisition process. We partially concur with your recommendation that
a joint single SBR acquisition may require a more formalized, document-
supported process beyond Phase A.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to modify DOD's space
acquisition policy to reflect protocols for setting requirements when
DOD undertakes programs in partnership with the intelligence community.
(p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The Under Secretary of the Air Force also
acts as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The
National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy (03-01) combines
elements of the DoD acquisition process with those used by the NRO.
This process outlined in NSS 03-01 also requires Key Decision Points
and Defense Space Acquisition Boards which include IC participation.
Further, the term "partnership" throughout the GAO report implies a
programmatic commitment which does not currently exist. SBR is wholly
funded in the Defense budget (primarily in the Air Force Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities and partially in the Joint Military
Intelligence Program). We believe that, even if the IC agreed to a co-
funding arrangement for SBR, NSS 03-01 sets out procedures which do not
need to be modified specifically for SBR. NSS 03-01 supports the steps
already underway to improve joint requirements protocol. An example is
that NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 embraces the new Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) concept as outlined in CJCSI
3170.01d, which talks extensively about working closer with the
Intelligence Community MRB. Under this construct, the JROC reviews
programs at the request of the USecAF (as DOD Space Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA)) or the MRB. When national intelligence capabilities
exist, capabilities integration and development efforts by the
Intelligence Community are encouraged to follow a parallel path between
the defense and national intelligence communities with resulting
capabilities documents validated and approved by the JROC and the
Director of Central Intelligence MRB.
Further, the Functional Capability Boards Principal Membership roster
includes positions for, when appropriate, Defense Intelligence Agency
representatives, the Under Secretary of the Air Force (as the DOD Space
Milestone Decision Authority), the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and MRB Executive Staff. JCIDS products (e.g., ICD, CDD,
CPD) are required as part of the DSAB/KDP process described in NSS 03-
01. Further, the dual responsibilities of the USecAF/DNRO facilitate
management of SBR acquisition while protecting DoD and IC equities and
providing the capabilities required to satisfy the cross-community
requirements.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to delay approval to commit
funding to product development (key decision point B) for SBR until
technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant or operational
environment so DOD can more reliably estimate the resources needed to
complete the program. If the Under Secretary determines that the
program should go forward with less mature technologies, then we
recommend that the Under Secretary: (1) undertake an assessment of the
backup technologies which may lessen capability and add cost to the
program and the additional time and money that may be required to meet
SBR's performance objectives to address those risks; (2) undertake an
assessment of trade-offs that may need to be made with other space
programs to assure SBR's successful outcome; and (3) secure formal
commitments from DOD to provide funding for total estimated costs as
well as costs estimated to address potential technical risks.
(p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. We agree that SBR product development
should not proceed until technologies have been sufficiently
demonstrated; however, The Secretary of Defense need not direct the
Under Secretary of the Air Force to delay approval of KDP-B to meet GAO
recommended technology maturity levels, because the current program
baseline already includes demonstration of all critical and most other
enabling technologies in a relevant or operational environment prior to
KDP-B. Further, while NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 does state that
technology development is part of Phase B, this phase is primarily
focused on risk reduction; component level technology development is
finished by PDR. These risk reductions activities are similar to the
DoDI 5000.2 Phase B activities to reduce integration and manufacturing
risks. In addition, technology maturity is assessed at each KDP:
"At each KDP, the program office should identify the key technology
components of the system and provide their assessment of the maturity
of each key component using the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) method
identified in the Interim DoD Acquisition Guidebook. The IPAT will
review the program office assessment and determine if, in their view,
all key technology components of the program have been identified. The
IPA will also provide its own independent assessment of the maturity of
the key components using the TRL method. The intent is not to require a
specific TRL for each key component in order to proceed into the next
acquisition phase, but to instead allow for the DoD Space MDA to be
made knowledgeable of the state of key component maturity so
appropriate direction can be given in the ADM for additional technology
maturation/risk reduction activities."
The GAO Report recommends that we pursue lower risk technology which
admittedly "would result in a lower level of desired performance."
(p.14) Concepts developed under Phase A should maximize capability and
employ technological advances, but they must be affordable and
producible, not technically feasible at some future date. We believe
the Technology Readiness Level processes in place will ensure that. If
the MDA, based on the findings and recommendations of the Independent
Cost Assessment Team, Independent Program Assessment Team, and the
larger Defense Space Acquisition Board process, is not convinced the
technology is mature, he will provide the appropriate direction to the
program to ensure maturation occurs, including possibly delaying entry
into the next phase until ready or directing the program to conduct
additional reviews to assess maturity within a given timeframe.
Key and critical and most other enabling technologies will be
demonstrated at least at the component level in a relevant environment
on the ground. Select technologies have been identified for
demonstration in a relevant environment at a system or subsystem level,
and, where technically and fiscally possible and technically warranted,
the JPO is pursuing on-orbit demonstrations. A classified program plans
to demonstrate certain aspects of an SBR MTI capability. Appropriately
cleared members of your staff are invited to receive this briefing.
The SBR Program is putting a major focus on technology maturity to
mitigate the performance, schedule and cost risks represented by the
critical and most other enabling technologies. Going back as far as the
Discoverer II (DII) activities and continuing through the recently
completed Concept Definition activities and the on-going Phase A
activities, the SBR Program has, and is continuing, to invest heavily
in technology maturation. One example of continued technology
maturation is the Electronically Scanned Array (ESA) Technology
development that was initiated under DII activities, and has been
leveraged since then by the JPO. To ensure that the risks remaining are
accounted for in the costing and budgeting process, the cost estimating
approach includes discrete technology related development risks and
more general cost estimating uncertainties due to technical and
schedule issues. Our cost estimating approach has been validated by the
OSD CAIG at the 18 Mar 04 USECAF SBR Cost Review.
(1) The SBR JPO is aggressively pursuing technology paths that will
best satisfy SBR requirements. At the same time, the JPO is maintaining
back up technologies, which have been proven on other programs, to
ensure there are mitigation paths if the desired technologies run into
issues. Phase A also includes a robust systems engineering effort which
will maintain technology focus and ensure overall performance does not
suffer even if the JPO has to sub-optimize with older backup
technologies. The technology maturity assessment process described in
NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 will ensure an objective assessment of the
most appropriate technology path for program execution. The JPO cost
and schedule estimates will be updated for KDP-B to reflect the chosen
path.
(2) According to analysis thus far, a delay in the deployment of TCA is
something SBR could absorb without substantial impact. Since the ADM
was released by Mr. Teets on 19 Aug 2003, SBR JPO has been evaluating
an extensive trade space for its communications architecture during its
deployment period. Deliverables due by KDP-B include one schema that
incorporates TCA and another that allows SBR to function independently
during its deployment phase. Current trades for SBR's initial
deployment period include leveraging residual national resources and
future MILSATCOM assets or incorporating RF downlink capabilities
directly from SBR for dissemination in theater or through the future
Global Information Grid. Furthermore, the prime contractors for SBR are
incorporating and expanding on the ongoing analysis done by the JPO.
(3) Both the independent program assessment team and the independent
cost assessment team stated that the FYDP funding was adequate for
Phase A efforts. The on-going Phase A efforts with industry will result
in more detailed technical and programmatic baseline definition. This
more detailed definition will support KDP-B, the generation of an
acquisition program baseline, and updated cost estimates and supporting
budgets.
We agree that SBR contains some technology risk, but we believe we can
reduce this risk sufficiently to proceed with our desired SBR
capabilities without reducing performance at this point in the program.
Therefore, we can only partially concur with this recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to strengthen ongoing study
of options for tracking ground-moving targets by ensuring this work
includes: (1) a full range of air and space options; (2) measures of
effectiveness that would help justify choosing SBR over air options;
and (3) the possibility of having to rely on Transformational
Communications Architecture alternatives for space options.
(P. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. We agree that SBR studies must include air/space
options, comparable measures of effectiveness, and communications
considerations. We believe that studies currently underway incorporate
these criteria; however, not all of these studies are being performed
under the auspices of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Therefore,
direction from the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of the
Air Force to incorporate these criteria would be redundant in some
cases and not relevant in others. The Air Force Analysis of
Alternatives proved the utility of SBR to warfighter requirements, and
it also included airborne collectors in certain scenarios; however, it
was not chartered to and did not undertake an extensive evaluation of
specific airborne platforms in cooperative collection operations. For
this reason, a follow-on Air Force study as well as an OSD Programs
Analysis and Evaluation Study are looking more specifically at aircraft
contributions. In addition, the IC continues to work with the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency to ascertain the contribution of MTI to
intelligence problems. We concur that measures of effectiveness are
critical in understanding the relative contributions of each collection
asset and will critically review the results of these ongoing studies
to ensure valid comparisons are being made. The relationship of SBR and
TCA are of concern to DoD, and the JROC has recently sanctioned a study
to analyze the interdependencies and impacts of SBR and TCA remaining
in synch. SBR's key dependency on TCA is an area that will require
close monitoring and review prior to a KDP B decision. The JROC will
rely heavily on the Battlespace Awareness and Net Centric Functional
Capability Boards to provide a joint assessment of related trade
analysis conducted during Phase A. SBR Phase A studies, as directed by
USecAF, are looking at a number of communications alternatives to TCA.
The SBR program has a flexible communication strategy intended to
reduce dependencies on any specific TCA implementation at this early
stage (Phase A) of the program. Initial SBR constellation
configurations are not expected to be fully dependent on
Transformational Communications. Specific risk mitigation alternatives
have been identified in order to facilitate SBR operations during the
initial SBR deployment phase while the TCA is also being deployed.
GAO's Comments:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated June 29, 2004.
1. DOD stated that DOD does not require formal approval for the
concepts of operations from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council or
the Mission Requirements Board, but noted that the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council communicated agreement in a memo. As we reported, the
Under Secretary of the Air Force requested that both DOD and the
intelligence community approve the initial capabilities document and
concept of operations in light of the complexity of SBR's acquisition
process, the partnership with the intelligence community, and the
proposed integration with other radar platforms.
2. DOD stated that it is not engaged in a partnership with the
intelligence community on SBR, as our report states. Specifically, DOD
stated that SBR is wholly funded in the defense budget and that a
programmatic commitment with the intelligence community does not exist.
DOD's SBR System Acquisition Strategy was signed by senior-level
officials from DOD, National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and approved on January 14, 2004. This
strategy states that the Air Force, in close partnership with the
National Reconnaissance Office and National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, is responsible for leading development of an SBR capability.
This strategy further identifies the responsibilities related to SBR
that each mission partner (National Reconnaissance Office and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) is supposed to carry out. We disagree
with DOD's assertion that these organizations must provide funding to
SBR in order to consummate a partnership. Because SBR is being
justified on the basis of the system's ability to provide intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance products to both DOD and the
intelligence community, the part of the budget used is not relevant to
our finding.
To clarify, we did not recommend that DOD pursue lower risk
technologies that would result in lower levels of desired performance.
Instead, we reported that DOD might have to resort to using backup
technologies if the current ones prove to be problematic during product
development. We recommended that DOD should assess the cost to the
program of having to use the backup technologies DOD has already
identified in terms of time and money.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Space Operations: Common
Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-
03-825R (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Acquisitions: Committing
Prematurely to the Transformational Satellite Program Elevates Risks
for Poor Cost, Schedule, and Performance Outcomes, GAO-04-71R
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2003).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Space Operations: Common
Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-
03-825R (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Management
of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/
NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Improvements
Needed in Space Systems Acquisition Management Policy, GAO-03-1073
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2003).
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