Combating Terrorism
DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning Gao ID: GAO-04-855 August 12, 2004Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have underscored the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel and facilities from potential terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosive devices. In the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DOD to develop a comprehensive plan to help guide departmentwide efforts in improving installation preparedness against such attacks. The act also directed GAO to assess DOD's plan. DOD submitted its report to Congress in September 2003. This review addresses two questions: (1) Does DOD's report represent a comprehensive plan that can guide installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder DOD's ability to develop and effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation preparedness?
While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of the act, it does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan that could help guide DOD's installation preparedness efforts. For example, the report described annual performance goals that were general in nature and did not have good metrics to gauge progress; it did not describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve long-term goals; and it did not define an objective and formal process for evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how improvement goals will be achieved, what resources will be required, or when improvements are expected to be completed. In addition, it did not fully describe the national, regional, and local military response capabilities that will be developed, or how these capabilities will be integrated with local civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear how duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be avoided. DOD officials attributed the report's limitations to evolving organizational responsibilities, and a lack of resources and guidance. GAO believes that until a more results-oriented, comprehensive plan is developed that clearly articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and integrated with the civilian community, DOD's ongoing initiatives and other opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be effectively or efficiently implemented. Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. First, while a large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve installation preparedness, the responsibilities of two newly established organizations--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command--are evolving, and the installation preparedness related responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense is not clearly defined. Second, no single entity has been given the authority and responsibility to integrate and manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts. In discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, service and installation levels, there was general agreement that a lack of a single focal point having the appropriate authority and responsibility to integrate overall installation preparedness improvement efforts among the many organizations involved has adversely affected their ability to effectively plan for and manage departmentwide installation preparedness improvements. As a result, DOD has faced difficulties in developing departmentwide standards and concepts of operations and in preparing a comprehensive plan for installation preparedness. Until organization roles and responsibilities are clarified, and an integrating authority is designated, DOD will be limited in its ability to develop a comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing billion-dollar improvement initiatives at the installation level.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-855, Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2004:
COMBATING TERRORISM:
DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with
Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive PlanningCombating
Terrorism:
GAO-04-855:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-855, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Terrorist incidents in the United States and abroad have underscored
the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel
and facilities from potential terrorist attacks involving chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosive
devices. In the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress
directed DOD to develop a comprehensive plan to help guide
departmentwide efforts in improving installation preparedness against
such attacks. The act also directed GAO to assess DOD‘s plan. DOD
submitted its report to Congress in September 2003. This review
addresses two questions: (1) Does DOD‘s report represent a
comprehensive plan that can guide installation preparedness efforts?
and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder DOD‘s ability to develop and
effectively implement a comprehensive approach to installation
preparedness?
What GAO Found:
While DOD‘s September 2003 report generally met the requirements of the
act, it does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management
plan that could help guide DOD‘s installation preparedness efforts. For
example, the report described annual performance goals that were
general in nature and did not have good metrics to gauge progress; it
did not describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed to
achieve long-term goals; and it did not define an objective and formal
process for evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how
improvement goals will be achieved, what resources will be required, or
when improvements are expected to be completed. In addition, it did not
fully describe the national, regional, and local military response
capabilities that will be developed, or how these capabilities will be
integrated with local civilian capabilities. As a result, it is unclear
how duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be
avoided. DOD officials attributed the report's limitations to evolving
organizational responsibilities, and a lack of resources and guidance.
GAO believes that until a more results-oriented, comprehensive plan is
developed that clearly articulates the military response capabilities
to be developed and integrated with the civilian community, DOD‘s
ongoing initiatives and other opportunities to improve installation
preparedness may not be effectively or efficiently implemented.
Two obstacles impede DOD‘s ability to effectively develop a
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts.
First, while a large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to
improve installation preparedness, the responsibilities of two newly
established organizations”the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command”are evolving, and the
installation preparedness related responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Defense is not clearly defined. Second, no
single entity has been given the authority and responsibility to
integrate and manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts.
In discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, service
and installation levels, there was general agreement that a lack of a
single focal point having the appropriate authority and responsibility
to integrate overall installation preparedness improvement efforts
among the many organizations involved has adversely affected their
ability to effectively plan for and manage departmentwide installation
preparedness improvements. As a result, DOD has faced difficulties in
developing departmentwide standards and concepts of operations and in
preparing a comprehensive plan for installation preparedness. Until
organization roles and responsibilities are clarified, and an
integrating authority is designated, DOD will be limited in its ability
to develop a comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide
guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing billion-dollar
improvement initiatives at the installation level.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that a single authority be designated to integrate
installation preparedness efforts, and that the roles of key
organizations be clearly defined. It is also recommending that the 2003
plan be updated to fully incorporate results-oriented management
principles and describe what military response capabilities need to be
developed. DOD agreed with all the recommendations in this report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented
Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness:
Two Obstacles Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation
Preparedness:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements:
Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation
Preparedness:
Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited
or Contacted for this Assignment:
Figures:
Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise:
Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological
Exercise:
Abbreviations:
CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield
explosives:
DOD: Department of Defense:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 12, 2004:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Terrorist incidents within the United States and abroad have
underscored the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to safeguard
military personnel and infrastructure from potential terrorist attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[Footnote 1] While many of
the department's past efforts have focused on enhancing protection and
response capabilities against high-yield explosives, the new security
environment underscores the need for the department to expand its
safeguards to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
incidents. To address these potential threats, the department has begun
to direct billions of dollars toward departmentwide initiatives
designed to safeguard personnel and facilities. At the same time, the
military services are continuing to pursue initiatives at specific
installations to lessen their vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.
In recent years, both legislative actions and our prior work have
focused on DOD's need to develop an effective program to improve its
installation preparedness against terrorists' incidents. In response to
a committee mandate[Footnote 2] to review DOD's plans for improving
installation preparedness for WMD, we concluded in an April 2002 report
that while the department had made some progress, it did not have a
comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation
preparedness improvement efforts.[Footnote 3] We also discussed with
the department during the course of that work the importance of clearly
articulating the national, regional, and local response capabilities
that would be developed and integrated with the civilian community so
that unnecessary redundant capabilities could be avoided.
Following our initial assessment and report, in September 2002, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that called for the
development of a departmentwide integrated CBRNE approach to
installation preparedness, with complete integration of policies,
technologies, equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum noted
that the department would begin providing all installation personnel,
including military and civilian personnel, contractors, and others who
live or work on base, with protection against the wider range of
threats.
Also following our initial report, Congress, in section 1402 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (see app.
I),[Footnote 4] directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a
comprehensive plan, with annual updates in 2004, 2005, and 2006, for
improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for
terrorist incidents, including attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction. The legislation also directed us to review DOD's plan and
provide our assessment to the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees. In September 2003, the department complied with the section
1402 mandate by submitting its plan, entitled "Report to Congress on
Preparedness of Military Installations for Preventing and Responding to
Terrorist Incidents."
This report summarizes our assessment of DOD's September 2003 report to
Congress. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) Does the
department's report represent a comprehensive plan that can guide
installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any,
hinder the department's ability to develop and effectively implement a
comprehensive approach to installation preparedness?
In conducting our assessment, we examined DOD's 2003 report to
determine if it addressed the elements required by the act, and
evaluated the quality of the information by comparing it to management
principles embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993,[Footnote 5] such as the desired characteristics for long-term
goals and strategies to accomplish those goals, and performance
criteria for measuring progress. We also discussed the content of the
report with department officials who prepared it to better understand
how it was developed. To identify obstacles, if any, that may prevent
DOD from developing a comprehensive approach to improve installation
preparedness, we discussed with department, service, and installation
officials the roles and responsibilities of organizations and offices
involved in the department's installation preparedness efforts, as well
as the challenges they faced in planning and implementing preparedness
efforts. As part of our evaluation, we discussed and observed
installation preparedness capabilities at 13 military installations.
Although the information obtained at these locations cannot be
generalized to describe DOD's worldwide installation preparedness
improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on preparedness
challenges at the installation level. We assessed the reliability of
the data used in this report and determined that it was sufficiently
reliable for our purposes.
We conducted our review between April 2003 and May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
While DOD's September 2003 report generally met the requirements of
section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the
report does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management
plan to help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. For
example, the report described annual performance goals that were
general in nature and did not have adequate metrics to gauge progress,
it did not describe a comprehensive process and total resources needed
to achieve long-term goals, and it did not define an objective and
formal process for evaluating results. As a result, it is unclear how
long-term goals will be measured, what resources will be needed to
achieve the desired goals, when the goals are expected to be achieved,
and how the results of improvement efforts will be evaluated. In
addition, the report did not fully describe the national, regional, and
local military response capabilities that will be developed, or how
those capabilities will be integrated with local civilian capabilities.
As a result, it is unclear how duplication of requirements and
unnecessarily redundant capabilities will be avoided. Department
officials acknowledged that the report does not reflect the results-
oriented management elements we describe nor are military response
capabilities clearly articulated in the report, because, in their
opinion, DOD organizations' roles and responsibilities were still
evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, and because they had limited resources and guidance to prepare
the report. Officials also stated that responsibility for preparing the
legislatively required annual updates to the plan has not been
assigned, and that the department has not yet submitted the 2004
update, which was required to be sent with materials supporting the
fiscal year 2005 budget request in March 2004. Until a comprehensive
plan is prepared that more fully incorporates results-oriented
management principles and better defines the desired military response
capabilities, the department's installation preparedness improvement
initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and efficient
manner, the department may be limited in its ability to determine if
improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and
opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully
realized.
Two obstacles impede DOD's ability to effectively develop a
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts.
First, a large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to
improve the preparedness of military installations, but the
installation preparedness-related responsibilities of two recently
established organizations--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command--are still evolving. On
May 7, 2004, the U.S. Northern Command was assigned specific
antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for domestic
installations, which was a significant step toward clarifying its
installation preparedness role, but those of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense are still undefined. Secondly, no single
entity has been assigned the authority or responsibility to integrate
and manage departmentwide installation preparedness efforts. As a
result, DOD has not developed departmentwide installation preparedness
policies, including integrated concepts of operations and standards, as
required by the Assistant Secretary in his September 5, 2002,
memorandum; the comprehensive plan called for by the act was prepared
by an organization that had no formal authority to integrate
departmentwide efforts and resolve disagreements between the parties
involved; and DOD has not taken any specific steps to evaluate
the overall progress in implementing this plan. Until these obstacles
are removed, the department will be limited in its ability to develop a
comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide installation
preparedness guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing improvement
initiatives.
We are recommending the department take steps to fully incorporate
results-oriented management principles in the next update to the plan,
clarify the installation preparedness related responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and designate a
single integrating authority with the responsibility to coordinate and
integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts. In
comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed with our
recommendations, and stated it will take specific actions to implement
them.
Background:
The department's policies, programs, and organizational
responsibilities related to installation preparedness for attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction have been evolving over the last
few years as the department adapted to meet new challenges arising from
terrorist attacks. Especially since the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia, the general focus of the department's installation
preparedness activities emphasized antiterrorism, or defensive
measures such as gates, fencing, perimeter lighting, and security
patrols used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property.
After the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, antiterrorism
measures received even greater emphasis, resulting in additional
standards and measures to better protect military forces. The September
11, 2001, attacks in the United States heightened the emphasis and
focus on installation preparedness against a wider spectrum of threats.
DOD's Antiterrorism/Force Protection Policy and Guidance:
In August 2003, DOD updated its directive signed by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense that provides DOD's antiterrorism policy and
assigns responsibilities to defense organizations implementing
antiterrorism initiatives.[Footnote 6] This directive places
responsibility for developing antiterrorism policy and guidance with
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict. In this capacity, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense issued an instruction that established 31 antiterrorism
standards that DOD organizations, including the services, are required
to implement.[Footnote 7] These standards address antiterrorism
planning, training requirements, physical security measures, and
related issues. The Assistant Secretary also issued a handbook
containing additional detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies and
practices, including guidance on assessing these practices, which was
updated in February 2004.[Footnote 8] Representatives of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff manage antiterrorism funding, conduct inspections, and
work with the Assistant Secretary to develop DOD antiterrorism
policies. Additionally, each of the military services has issued
regulations, orders, or instructions to implement the DOD guidance and
establish its own specific policies and standards. Overseas, the
geographic combatant commanders have ultimate antiterrorism and force
protection authority and responsibility within their areas of
responsibility.[Footnote 9]
DOD Installation Preparedness Guidance and Improvement Initiatives:
In a September 5, 2002, memorandum, DOD clarified its policy to protect
military installations from CBRNE attacks, respond to these attacks
with trained and equipped emergency responders, and ensure that
installations are able to continue critical operations during an attack
and resume essential operations afterwards.[Footnote 10] The policy
also required DOD to approach preparedness from a departmentwide
perspective, with complete integration of policies, technologies,
equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum noted that the
department would begin providing all installation personnel, including
military and civilian personnel, contractors, and others who live or
work on base, with protection against the wider range of threats.
DOD's September 2003 report to Congress was the first to offer a
definition of installation preparedness. It was defined as a
collective, proactive effort to prevent, detect, respond, and protect
department bases, personnel, their families, and infrastructure
critical to mission accomplishment against terrorists' use of weapons
of mass destruction. This definition combines the fundamental elements
of antiterrorism--defensive measures to prevent and detect attacks--
with elements related to responding to and mitigating the effects of an
attack.
DOD has recently committed significant resources and undertaken a
number of initiatives to improve installation preparedness to protect
personnel and facilities. For example, in September 2002, the
department began a $61 million project called the Joint Services
Installation Pilot Project, to provide equipment and training to
enhance chemical and biological detection and emergency response
capabilities on nine diverse DOD installations. In October 2003, it
started the Guardian project to improve the detection and protection
against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats at 200
domestic and overseas installations at an estimated cost of
$1.6 billion over the next 5 years. The project is designed to tailor
requirements according to installation needs, and will include the
design and installation of detection systems. Figure 1 illustrates a
decontamination operation during a recent installation training
exercise responding to a chemical/biological incident.
Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In a number of reports that we have issued during the past few years,
we have underscored the need for DOD to institute sound management
principles to guide its installation preparedness efforts. Such
management principles are embodied in the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 and consist of a number of critical elements
considered essential in developing an effective strategy, guiding
resource allocations, and monitoring results. In this previous work, we
concluded that without sound management principles, DOD faces, among
other things, the potential for inappropriate or redundant allocation
of resources and limited or lost preparedness and response
capabilities. In addition, Congress and DOD managers may not be able to
determine if desired program outcomes are being achieved.
DOD's Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, Results-Oriented
Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness:
While the department's report generally met the requirements of
section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the
report does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management
plan to help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. The
legislation required the department to address nine elements--seven
associated with management principles and two associated with military
response capabilities. The department's report described each of these
nine elements, but the management elements were not addressed in a
results-oriented manner, and the military capability elements were not
discussed in a manner that provides a clear description of the response
capabilities needed, or how they will be integrated with civilian
capabilities. As a result, installation preparedness improvement goals,
objectives, resource requirements, and methods to evaluate the outcome
of new initiatives remain unclear, as well as how the department
intends to develop national, regional and local military response
capabilities that are coordinated with civilian response capabilities.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required
DOD to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of
military installations for terrorist incidents. Specifically, it
required the department to address five elements of a preparedness
strategy, and four elements of a performance plan. We analyzed these
nine requirements and found that seven of them were collectively
related to management principles, and two of them were discussion
points related to the development of military response capabilities.
Table 1 lists these nine elements.
Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements:
Seven management-related elements:
1. Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
terrorist attacks.
2. Description of the process, together with a discussion of the
resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives.
3. A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and
objectives of the strategy.
4. Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that
could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.
5. Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary
to achieve those goals and objectives.
6. Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those
goals and objectives.
7. A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving
those goals and objectives.
Two military response capability discussion elements:
8. A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national
military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and
used.
9. A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities
referred to in #8 above with local, regional, or national civilian and
other military capabilities.
Source: GAO analysis of section 1402 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
[End of table]
DOD's September report to Congress discussed each of the nine
required elements and was therefore technically in compliance with
the requirements of the act. However, the report did not address the
seven management-related elements in a manner that fully incorporates
results-oriented management principles so that the report could serve
as a useful tool in guiding installation improvement efforts. The
following is our assessment of the adequacy of the information provided
in the department's report when compared to results-oriented management
principles:
* Long-Term Goals--Long-term goals should explain what results are
expected, should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way
that allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. They should
also describe how managers are to be held accountable for achieving
such goals. Although the department's report identifies four long-term
goals, which it calls "preparedness strategy elements"--prevention,
detection, protection, and emergency response--it does not clearly
express these goals in a way that would allow the department to measure
progress toward achieving them. For example, the prevention strategy
element was described as "The Department's antiterrorism (AT) strategy
is to maximize efforts to prevent, deter, and detect terrorist attacks
against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and
infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as the
preparation needed to defend against and respond to the consequences of
terrorist incidents." This description does not provide the information
necessary to explain what results are to be expected nor is it
described in a way that allows progress to be assessed. Furthermore,
the report did not identify the organizations accountable for achieving
the goals.
* Process to Achieve Goals--The act required that the plan describe the
process, together with a discussion of the resources, necessary to
achieve those goals and objectives. In describing how the installation
preparedness improvement strategy would be achieved, the department's
report provided some general narrative such as "DOD—policies support
this—strategy by ensuring a comprehensive and integrated approach that
continuously identifies and overcomes vulnerabilities, thereby
reducing risk to our personnel and resources; enhancing the planning,
training and equipping of the force; and providing prudent guidance and
direction—" The department's report also describes ongoing improvement
initiatives such as the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project and
the Guardian Program.[Footnote 11] Because of the general nature of the
discussion in the report, it was not clear the extent to which the
goals would be met with the cited initiatives, or, as discussed below,
the full extent to which resources would be required to achieve each
goal.
* Schedule with milestones--The act required the plan to include a
reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the installation
preparedness long-term goals. Such a schedule should include details on
incremental performance goals that are tangible, measurable, and
objective; usually expressed within certain timeframes such as "by the
end of 200X, at least 95 percent of commanders will have completed
required annual terrorism risk assessments." The department's report
contained 25 performance goals identified in the report as strategic
objectives. These objectives were general in nature, and most contained
a specific year in which the goal was to be either started or achieved.
However, as discussed in the performance criteria section below, they
all lacked specific targets that could be used to measure progress. For
example, one strategic objective listed in the plan states "beginning
in fiscal year 2003, improve robotic vehicles for [antiterrorism]
operations as well as for emergency responders."
* External factors that could impede achievement of the long-term
goals--External impediments should be identified, and the actions
needed to mitigate these impediments should be addressed. Although the
department's report identifies a number of external impediments (e.g.,
the feasibility, availability, and affordability of technological
solutions and the degree to which state and local responders are
trained and equipped), it does not clearly describe how these factors
may affect the department's ability to achieve its goals, or ways of
reducing the potential impact of these impediments.
* Identification of budget and other resources--Good management
principles call for the identification of resources, including funding,
personnel, and equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level
of performance. Although the department's report identifies funding
resources needed for antiterrorism and consequence management[Footnote
12]--for example, $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2004--the report
indicates that this amount is part of a larger funding requirement, but
it does not provide further details. In addition, the report does not
include any information on additional personnel or equipment that would
be needed.
* Performance criteria--Performance criteria or measures are indicators
used to measure progress in achieving goals and objectives. They should
be objective and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet
performance goals. The department's report identifies 25 performance
indicators (one for each performance goal), which it calls measures of
effectiveness. However, many of them are not outcome-oriented and all
of them lack specific targets or baselines that could be used to
measure progress. For example, as discussed previously, although the
report notes that robotic vehicles will be improved, it does not
provide a quantifiable target, nor does it present a baseline to assess
progress. In another example, a strategic objective listed in the plan
is "develop standardized installation CBRNE scenario exercises for
training and equipment requirements." The related measure of
effectiveness described in the report is "standardized exercise
scenarios will improve efficiencies and consistency in equipment and
training, leading to improved interoperability." This measure of
effectiveness is highlighting the potential benefit of achieving the
objective; it does not provide specific criteria for how it will be
measured, or any baseline data that can be used to measure progress in
achieving the stated goal.
* Process for evaluating results--Program evaluations are defined as
objective and formal assessments of the results, impact, or effects of
a program or policy. Such information can be used to assess the extent
to which performance goals were met and identify appropriate strategies
to meet those goals that were not met. The department's report
indicates that it will provide general oversight, semiannual review of
action plans, and annual reviews of antiterrorism plans. However, the
report does not define how it will evaluate the impact of current
initiatives or describe how such evaluations could be used to improve
the department's overall efforts to improve installation preparedness.
In addition to the seven management-related elements, the legislation
required DOD to discuss two elements related to military response
capabilities. In the first element, the department was required to
discuss the extent to which local, regional, or national military
response capabilities were to be developed, integrated, and used. In
our view, it is important that DOD articulate the extent to which it
will develop such capabilities because national and regional
capabilities can supplement or enhance those available at individual
installations and redundant capabilities could be avoided. In the
report, however, DOD discussed non-military capabilities, such as the
Federal Response Plan, which provides a government-integrated response
to disasters through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The
report also discussed the department's Joint Task Force for Civil
Support, which serves as a military headquarters unit responsible for
coordinating department activities supporting civil authorities, but
does not have specific operational response capabilities of its own.
In the second discussion element, DOD was directed to discuss how it
would coordinate its proposed military response capabilities with
civilian capabilities. Such a discussion would provide information on
how overlap and duplication of efforts between military and civilian
organizations at all levels could be reduced. However, DOD's report
discussed the need to use memorandums of agreement between, for
example, military installations and civilian local-community first
responders to fill in the gaps in emergency response capabilities on
and off base. However, because it did not address how military regional
and national response capabilities were to be developed, integrated,
and used, the report did not describe how those capabilities would be
coordinated with those of the civilian sector. Furthermore, while the
report discussed a national-level response exercise, called "Top
Officials,"[Footnote 13] involving cooperation and coordination
between the federal response community (such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency) and local and regional civilian response
organizations, the report did not describe how military response
capabilities would be integrated into such exercises, nor how lessons
learned from national exercises would be shared with military
organizations.
In discussions with us, officials from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who were responsible for
preparing the report, agreed that the report does not fully reflect the
results-oriented management elements that we have described above. In
addition, they agreed that the report does not clearly articulate the
military response capabilities to be developed at the national,
regional and local levels. They told us that, in their opinion, the
department organizations' roles and responsibilities were still
evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001 (discussed in more detail later in this report), and they prepared
the report with limited staff and limited guidance. As a result, they
approached the preparation of the report by generally summarizing the
key efforts underway in the department to improve installation
preparedness, and by drawing on key elements of the existing
antiterrorism program.
Based on the concerns of Congress regarding the need for DOD to
effectively plan for installation preparedness improvements against
terrorist incidents, and our past work concluding that DOD did not have
a comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation
preparedness improvement efforts, we believe that without clearly
articulated results-oriented management elements, the report--and the
comprehensive plan it is supposed to reflect--cannot serve as a useful
tool to guide and manage installation improvement efforts and provide a
mechanism to adequately assess progress. For example, DOD's report is
unclear in its discussion of how long-term goals will be measured, what
resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when the goals
are expected to be achieved, and how the results of ongoing improvement
efforts will be evaluated. In addition, without a clear description of
how national, regional, and local military response capabilities will
be developed and integrated with civilian capabilities, it is unclear
how duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be
avoided. Therefore, without a comprehensive plan that more fully
incorporates results-oriented management principles and better defines
the desired military response capabilities, the department's
installation preparedness improvement initiatives may not be
implemented in the most effective and efficient manner, the department
may be limited in its ability to determine if improvement efforts are
achieving the desired outcome, and opportunities to improve
installation preparedness may not be fully realized.
Furthermore, the act requires that DOD submit annual updates to the
plan in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 that include a discussion of
any revision to the plan, and an assessment of the progress made in
achieving the goals and objectives of the strategy set forth in the
plan. DOD, however, has not assigned responsibility for preparing the
required updates to any organization and has not taken any specific
steps to evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan. In
fact, the first annual update, which was due March 2004 with the
materials that the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress in support
of the budget submission, has not yet been submitted. According to the
officials we spoke with, until specific responsibility for updating the
plan is assigned, it is unclear who will prepare the updates or when
they will be prepared.
Two Obstacles Hinder DOD's Ability to Improve Installation
Preparedness:
Two obstacles have impeded DOD's ability to effectively develop a
comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts.
First, although numerous organizations currently engaged in
installation preparedness improvement efforts have clear roles and
responsibilities, two key organizations--the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command--have only
been recently established, and their installation preparedness
responsibilities are still evolving. On May 7, 2004, the Northern
Command was assigned specific antiterrorism and force protection
responsibilities for domestic installations, which was a significant
step toward clarifying its installation preparedness role, but those of
Homeland Defense are still undefined. Second, no organization has been
given the authority and responsibility to integrate and coordinate
installation preparedness policies and improvement efforts and monitor
progress in achieving the plan's objectives. Until these issues are
resolved, DOD will be unable to pursue installation preparedness
improvements in a comprehensive and integrated manner, and the
significant resources being applied to accomplish improvement goals may
not be spent in the most efficient and effective manner.
Numerous Organizations Involved in Installation Preparedness and
Two Have Evolving Roles and Responsibilities:
Many organizations at various levels within DOD are engaged in
activities to improve installation preparedness. The military services
and their installation commanders play a key role in safeguarding their
individual bases, while combatant commanders are responsible for
protecting forces within their geographic areas of responsibility. In
addition, there are several department and Joint-Staff-level
organizations that have key roles and responsibilities for installation
preparedness policies and procedures. The roles of most of these
organizations are clearly defined but those of two recently established
department organizations--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern Command--are still evolving. Table
2 lists the key organizations involved in installation preparedness at
the department and Joint Staff levels, and briefly describes their
roles and responsibilities.
Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation
Preparedness:
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities:
Develops worldwide antiterrorism policy and guidance for the DOD
components. Such guidance currently includes DOD Directive 2000.12,
"DOD Antiterrorism Program"; DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD
Antiterrorism Standards"; and DOD O-2000.12-H, "DOD Antiterrorism
Handbook.".
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Provides overall
supervision of homeland defense activities of the department under the
authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy. As such, will oversee homeland defense activities, develop
policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, and make recommendations
on homeland defense, support to civil authorities, emergency
preparedness and domestic crisis management matters with the
department. DOD defines homeland defense as the military protection of
United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and aggression.
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Oversees the
Chemical Biological Defense Program, including programs such as Project
Guardian, run by the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical-
Biological Defense.
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Prepares and
defends the Military Construction Bill, which funds installation
construction projects that include antiterrorism measures; monitors and
reports on installations' readiness; and is responsible for the
development of DOD's minimum antiterrorism standards for buildings.
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics: Defense Threat Reduction Agency[A];
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: The Director of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency reports directly to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
Safeguards America's interests from weapons of mass destruction by
controlling and reducing the threat and providing tools and services
for the warfighter;
Provides direction and oversight of the Joint Services Installation
Pilot Project to upgrade nine military installations to be model sites
for biological and chemical safety;
Manages the Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Defense program, in
conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Organization: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Requirements
Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Develops
departmentwide concepts of operations and comprehensive CBRNE standards
for the preparedness of military installations, as directed by the
Joint Staff; Serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
focal point for all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
defense issues in passive defense, force protection, consequence
management, and homeland security, including installation protection
responsibilities.
Organization: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Program Executive
Office for Chemical-Biological Defense;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Implements the
Guardian Program to improve CBRN capabilities on 200 installations
under the purview of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense programs; Developed
equipment standards for selecting equipment for its installations, and
will update that equipment list on an annual basis throughout different
phases of the Guardian program.
Organization: Combatant Commands: Geographic Combatant Commanders;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Responsible for
implementing antiterrorism policies and programs for the protection of
all department elements and personnel in their area of responsibility.
Organization: Combatant Commands: U. S. Northern Command;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Responsible for
conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the continental United States and other nearby
areas within its area of responsibility; Effective not later than
October 1, 2004, will exercise tactical control for department force
protection and assume overall department antiterrorism program and
force protection responsibility in the continental United States.
Organization: Military Services: Military departments;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Each of the
military services has issued regulations, orders, or instructions to
implement the DOD guidance and establish its own specific policies and
standards. The services assign responsibility for protecting
installations from terrorist attacks to installation commanders.
Organization: Military Services: Installation commanders;
Installation preparedness related responsibilities: Responsible for
protecting installations from terrorist attacks, including identifying
and prioritizing requirements using annual assessments of threat,
vulnerability, and the criticality of assets.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Combat Support Agency.
[End of table]
Three organizations have responsibilities for recent departmentwide
improvement initiatives. First, the Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical-Biological Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, is in charge of implementing the Guardian program to safeguard
200 military installations within the next 5 years, at an estimated
cost of $1.6 billion. Oversight of this project is assigned to the
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Second, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, a combat support agency that reports to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is
responsible for managing the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project-
-an initiative to enhance chemical/biological detection and emergency
response capabilities at nine installations. Figure 2 shows a first
responder in protective gear assisting a person exposed to a chemical/
biological agent during a Pilot Project exercise. Third, the Joint
Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is
responsible for developing CBRNE concepts of operations and standards
for installation preparedness.
Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological
Exercise:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Two recently established organizations have key roles in homeland
defense, but their roles and responsibilities for improving the
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
terrorist attacks are still evolving. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, which was established as
part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003,[Footnote 14] has responsibility for the overall supervision of
homeland defense (including land, maritime, and aerospace) activities.
More specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense is to lead and focus the department's activities in homeland
defense and homeland security; ensure internal coordination of DOD
policy direction; provide guidance to the U.S. Northern Command for its
homeland defense mission and its military activities in support of
homeland security, support to civil authorities; and coordinate with
the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies.
However, as of May 2004, DOD had not yet published or promulgated a
charter for this organization that would clearly define its roles and
responsibilities for installation preparedness. Although this
organization prepared DOD's September 2003 report to Congress, it does
not have the authority or responsibility to integrate and coordinate
the various aspects of installation preparedness, which are currently
scattered throughout the department.
Similarly, an April 2002 revision to DOD's Unified Command
Plan,[Footnote 15] approved by the President, created the new U.S.
Northern Command, a geographic combatant command with the
responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States and
other nearby areas. More specifically, the command is responsible for
conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the United States and its territories and interests
within its area of responsibility; moreover, as directed by the
President or Secretary of Defense, it provides military assistance to
civil authorities, including consequence management operations in
response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive events.
Until recently, Northern Command's specific role in supporting the
department's efforts to improve installation preparedness was not
clearly defined. On May 7, 2004, however, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff assigned U.S. Northern Command the responsibilities for
force protection and the department's antiterrorism program in the
continental United States, effective no later than October 1,
2004.[Footnote 16] This step significantly clarified the command's
role, but the specific details of how those responsibilities will be
carried out are still being developed. In addition, because the
Northern Command's area of responsibility covers domestic
installations, its efforts to support installation preparedness may be
much more complex than in overseas locations, due to the additional
responsibilities to provide military assistance to civil authorities,
including consequence management operations.
The Department Lacks a Focal Point for Installation Preparedness
Efforts:
DOD has not designated a single focal point with the authority and
responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of installation
preparedness, thereby hindering its ability to develop a comprehensive
approach to installation preparedness. This has been evident in a
number of areas, for example:
* Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense does not have overall authority to integrate
installation preparedness activities for the department, its staff was
tasked with preparing DOD's report on installation preparedness.
Homeland Defense officials told us that developing the report and
obtaining agreement on its content from the many organizations involved
in preparedness activities was hampered because they did not have
overall authority and responsibility for planning the department's
approach to installation preparedness. For example, they said they had
limited ability to resolve disagreements among various organizations
over many issues, such as the definition of installation preparedness
or the specific language used in the report, and thus faced delays in
moving the report forward.
* DOD has not assigned responsibility to any organization for updating
the 2003 report or monitoring progress in achieving its goals. Although
the 2003 report discussed some oversight and coordination mechanisms,
these were primarily related to the department's existing antiterrorism
program. Because of the lack of an assignment, the 2004 update was not
submitted to Congress, and the department has not taken any specific
steps to evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan.
* Responsibilities for developing DOD policy, standards and other
guidance related to installation preparedness are fragmented. On
one hand, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for preparing worldwide
antiterrorism policies,[Footnote 17] standards,[Footnote 18]
implementation guidance,[Footnote 19] and an antiterrorism strategic
plan.[Footnote 20] The mission of the DOD antiterrorism program,
according to officials drafting the new antiterrorism strategic plan,
is to provide worldwide protection of DOD personnel and their families;
selected DOD contractors; and installations, infrastructure, and key
assets/information essential to mission accomplishment from acts of
terrorism, including CBRNE hazards. Over the past 10 months, this
office has updated the antiterrorism policy and implementation
guidance, drafted the antiterrorism strategic plan, and is currently
revising the antiterrorism standards. The Assistant Secretary was also
tasked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his September 5, 2002,
memo to ensure that CBRNE standards were developed in coordination with
the Joint Staff; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics; and the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program, with a target issue date of May 2003. However, as of May 2004,
the Joint Requirements Office, tasked by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with preparing these standards, together with the
concepts of operations, had not been able to obtain final approval for
either of these documents. Furthermore, according to agency officials,
future updates to the CBRNE emergency response guidelines will be
prepared under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense.[Footnote 21]
* Military installations are facing challenges in prioritizing
requirements for funding and personnel resources because DOD has been
unable to develop departmentwide CBRNE concepts of operations and
standards, which provide the basis for calculating requirements. Until
they receive this guidance, the military services and installations
will not be able to develop rational funding and personnel
requirements; in addition, they may encounter difficulties in operating
and maintaining new detection and protection equipment that they
receive as a result of departmentwide initiatives such as the Joint
Services Installation Pilot Project or the Guardian program. For
example, at three installations participating in the Joint Services
Installation Pilot Project, officials noted the need for additional
resources to support the new equipment, which created unfunded
requirements in fiscal year 2004 ranging from $2.1 to $6.5 million at
each installation.
In our discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff,
service, and installation levels, there was general agreement that the
lack of a single focal point with the appropriate authority and
responsibility to integrate departmentwide installation preparedness
improvement efforts among the many organizations involved has adversely
affected their ability to effectively plan for and manage these
efforts. More specifically, the officials said that this lack of a
focal point has hindered their ability to develop needed overarching
guidance, such as the comprehensive plan, concepts of operations, and
CBRNE standards.
The evolving roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and the Northern Command as the Combatant Command responsible
for domestic military installations and facilities, combined with the
lack of an integrating authority to oversee the efforts of various
department organizations and improvement efforts, has limited the
department's ability to develop a comprehensive improvement plan,
integrated concepts of operations, and specific installation
preparedness standards. The recent decision to assign antiterrorism and
force protection responsibilities for domestic installations to
Northern Command has been a significant step in clarifying its overall
responsibilities, but the role of Homeland Defense remains unclear
because its charter has not been approved. Until Homeland Defense roles
and responsibilities are clarified as to how it will support the
department's plan to improve installation preparedness, and an
integrating authority is established, the department may continue to
struggle with these issues, and the improvement efforts at all levels
within the department may not be fully coordinated or efficiently
executed.
Conclusions:
Improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for
attacks using weapons of mass destruction is a challenging and complex
task that will require a significant allocation of resources; involve
numerous organizations within the department; and necessitate the
coordination with other federal agencies and civilian organizations
within the United States, and host nation organizations in overseas
locations. Although the department has taken several steps and
committed significant resources to immediately begin installation
preparedness improvements, it lacks a comprehensive approach required
by Congress that incorporates results-oriented management principles to
guide improvement initiatives in the most efficient and effective
manner. Congress has also required the department to prepare annual
updates to the plan, which presents an opportunity to address the
plan's weaknesses, but several obstacles exist that have stymied the
department's ability to develop a comprehensive, results-oriented plan.
The major obstacle we identified is the lack of a single organization
or entity with the responsibility and authority to oversee and
integrate the installation preparedness improvement efforts of various
DOD organizations. This is a complex issue, because it involves those
installations located within the continental United States, and
those located in foreign countries. Other obstacles we noted include
evolving or unclear responsibilities of key organizations, and an
unassigned responsibility to update the plan. Without a revised plan
that fully incorporates results-oriented management principles and
clearly articulates the military response capabilities to be developed
and integrated with the civilian community, the significant resources
being applied to improve preparedness may not be spent in the most
efficient and effective manner, and more importantly, opportunities to
improve preparedness and protect military personnel, facilities, and
capabilities from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be
lost.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To develop a more useful plan to guide installation preparedness
improvement efforts, and to address barriers that inhibit DOD's ability
to develop a comprehensive approach to improve installation
preparedness, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the
following five actions:
* Designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to
coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness
improvement efforts at the department, service and installation levels.
* Assign that organization with responsibility for preparing the 2004,
2005, and 2006 updates to the plan, which are required by section 1402
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
* Clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
* Require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate results-
oriented management principles in the legislatively required elements.
Specifically, the plan should contain:
* Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are
results-oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be
assessed in terms of achievement.
* Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the
organization's goals and describe how managers are to be held
accountable for achieving such goals.
* Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones to
measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible and
measurable.
* A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and the
actions needed to mitigate these impediments;
* Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and
equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of performance.
* Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in
achieving goals and objectives; these criteria should be objective and
outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals.
* Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the
results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement
efforts.
* Require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military
response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional,
and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in
conjunction with civilian capabilities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report provided by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the department agreed with
our recommendations recognizing the need for centralized management and
operational oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program. The
Assistant Secretary's comments also stated that oversight and policy
development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,
and the charter directive for that organization will promulgate
responsibility and required authority for worldwide installation
preparedness. The Assistant Secretary will also be responsible for
preparing the 2004, 2005, and 2006 updates to the comprehensive plan
required by section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003. DOD agreed that these future updates would fully
incorporate results-oriented management principles in the
legislatively required elements, clearly describe the military response
capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional, and
local levels, and address how those capabilities will be developed in
conjunction with civilian capabilities. In regard to the military
response capabilities, DOD stated it was of paramount importance that
the department work with other local, state, and federal entities to
ensure redundant capabilities are avoided.
We believe the actions DOD has outlined, when implemented, will be
responsive to our recommendations, and they represent positive steps
toward integrating installation preparedness improvement efforts and
establishing a more results-oriented management framework to guide
these efforts. The future updates to the comprehensive plan will also
serve as a mechanism to provide Congress, DOD managers, and other
organizations with an annual assessment of the progress achieved in
improving installation preparedness.
DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant
of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of the Management and
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions
regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402, or my
Assistant Director, Robert L. Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003:
SEC. 1402. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE PREPAREDNESS OF
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR TERRORIST INCIDENTS:
(a) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN--The Secretary of Defense shall develop a
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks,
including attacks involving the use or threat of use of weapons of mass
destruction.
(b) PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY--The plan under subsection (a) shall include
a preparedness strategy that includes each of the following:
(1) Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the
preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to
terrorist attacks.
(2) Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary
to achieve those goals and objectives.
(3) Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that
could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives.
(4) A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national
military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and
used.
(5) A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities
referred to in paragraph (4) with local, regional, or national civilian
and other military capabilities.
(c) PERFORMANCE PLAN.--The plan under subsection (a) shall include a
performance plan that includes each of the following:
(1) A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and
objectives of the strategy under subsection (b).
(2) Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those
goals and objectives.
(3) A description of the process, together with a discussion of the
resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives:
(4) A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving
those goals and objectives.
(d) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.--The Secretary shall submit the
comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) to the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND REPORT.--Not later than 60 days
after the date on which the Secretary submits the comprehensive plan
under subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall review the plan and
submit to the committees referred to in subsection (d) the Comptroller
General's assessment of the plan.
(f) ANNUAL REPORT.--(1) In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, the Secretary
of Defense shall include a report on the comprehensive plan developed
under subsection (a) with the materials that the Secretary submits to
Congress in support of the budget submitted by the President that year
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.
(2) Each such report shall include-
(A) a discussion of any revision that the Secretary has made in the
comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) since the last report
under this subsection or, in the case of the first such report, since
the plan was submitted under subsection (d); and:
(B) an assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals and
objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan.
(3) If the Secretary includes in the report for 2004 or 2005 under this
subsection a declaration that the goals and objectives of the
preparedness strategy set forth in the comprehensive plan have been
achieved, no further report is required under this subsection.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To determine if the Department of Defense's (DOD) September 2003 report
to Congress represents a comprehensive plan that can guide installation
preparedness efforts, we based our analysis on our past work that
addressed the need for DOD to develop comprehensive strategies and
implementation plans with results-oriented elements that focused on
program outcomes or results, rather than program activities and
processes. We discussed the concerns of Congress with committee staffs
who were involved in developing section 1402 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 to better understand the
requirements of the Act. We also discussed the report content with
department officials who prepared it to ensure we had an agreed upon
interpretation of the elements presented in the report. We then
compared the nine elements discussed in the report with those
specifically required by the legislation. We also compared the report's
seven management-related elements with those developed from sound
management principles as embodied in the Government Results and
Performance Act (GPRA) of 1993 and further refined in GPRA user guides
and prior GAO reports. To assess the two discussion elements related to
military response capabilities required by the legislation, we reviewed
information presented in the report to determine if it presented a
clear discussion of the national, regional, local response
capabilities, and how they would be developed in conjunction with
civilian capabilities. We also discussed the content of the report in
these two areas with officials at the department, Service, and
installation levels to obtain their views on the report content and the
usefulness of that information.
To identify obstacles that may hinder the department's ability to
develop and implement an integrated and comprehensive installation
preparedness approach, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military
services who are responsible for policies, programs, and key
initiatives related to various aspects of installation preparedness
against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive incidents. We also gathered and reviewed relevant policy
guidance, instructions, and implementation documents for current
improvement initiatives, including the Joint Services Installation
Pilot Project and project Guardian, and discussed these initiatives
with department and service headquarters and installation officials.
We discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at
13 military installations. We selected east and west coast military
installations, representing each of the military services, including
locations in close proximity to large civilian communities, some that
were more isolated, and some that were participating in the Joint
Services Installation Pilot Project. Specific discussions with military
installation officials included installation preparedness criteria,
roles and responsibilities, major efforts to improve installation
preparedness as well as the financial impact to the installations with
regard to current improvement initiatives, efforts to ensure effective
coordination among and between military and civilian organizations,
particularly first responders and those involved in consequence
management, and what they believe should be included in the
comprehensive plan to make it a useful management tool. In addition, we
observed installation preparedness exercises in the Norfolk and San
Diego areas. Although the information obtained at these locations
cannot be generalized to describe DOD's worldwide installation
preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on
preparedness challenges at the installation level. Table 3 lists the
military organizations and installations we visited or contacted to
obtain our data.
Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited
or Contacted for this Assignment:
Department headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area:
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict.
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and
Defense Programs.
* Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
* National Guard Bureau, Homeland Defense.
Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters organizations, Washington
metropolitan area:
* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operations J-3.
* Joint Program Executive Office, Chemical Biological Program.
* Joint Requirements Office.
Military service headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan
area:
* Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans (G-3)
and Army Installation Management Agency.
* Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics (N4)) and Chief of Navy
Installations.
* Commandant of the Marine Corps.
* Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations & Logistics.
Military Installations:
* Army--Fort Lewis, Wash.
* Marine Corps--Camp Lejeune, N.C.
* Army--Fort Eustis, Newport News, Va.
* Navy Region Mid-Atlantic.
* Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Va.
* Naval Station Norfolk, Va.
* Oceana Master Jet Base, Va.
* Navy Region Northwest, Wash.
* Sub Base Bangor, Wash.
* Naval Station Everett, Everett, Wash.
* Navy Region Southwest, San Diego, Calif.
* Navy Base Point Loma, San Diego, Calif.
* Navy Station San Diego, Calif.
* Navy Base, Coronado, Calif.
* Langley Air Force Base, Va.
* McChord Air Force Base, Wash.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
To estimate fiscal year 2004 unfunded requirements for installation
preparedness at three installations, we requested and obtained budget
estimates from installation officials. We also obtained fiscal year
2005 unfunded requirements as prioritized by the services and analyzed
them to determine that installation preparedness activities were
included in their estimates. Based on our discussions with department
officials and the budget documentation provided, we determined that the
data we used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
We conducted our review from April 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600:
HOMELAND DEFENSE:
27 JUL 2004:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report,
"Combating Terrorism: DoD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness
Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive
Planning." We concur with the recommendations made by the GAO
recognizing the need for centralized management and operational
oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 reinforced the need to review and
strengthen installation preparedness response capabilities worldwide.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense had reviewed the conclusions of
related GAO reports, and had already begun, prior to this report,
significant actions to establish centralized policy control and
operational oversight of DoD's preparedness programs.
In line with the recommendations of your report, oversight and policy
development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Tactical control of Antiterrorism/Force Protection has already been
assigned to US Northern Command. We believe these steps will
significantly address the recommendations in your report.
Let me take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for producing
a reasoned and accurate report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul McHale:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JUNE 18, 2004 GAO CODE 350465/GAO-04-855:
"COMBATING TERRORISM: DoD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness
Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive
Planning":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to
coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness
improvement efforts at the Department, service and installation levels.
The Secretary of Defense should assign that organization with
responsibility for preparing the 2004, 2005, and 2006 updates to the
plan, which are required by Section 1402 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003. (p. 26/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs and will designate a single
integrating authority to coordinate worldwide installation
preparedness at the Assistant Secretary level. The charter directive
for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will
promulgate responsibility and required authority for worldwide
installation preparedness. Accordingly, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be responsible for
updating the comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of
military installations for terrorist incidents as required by Section
1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs, and as noted above, will
designate the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense as
the single integrating authority for coordination of worldwide
installation preparedness.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate results-
oriented management principles in the legislatively required elements.
Specifically, the plan should include contain:
* Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are results-
oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be assessed in
terms of achievement;
* Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the
organization's goals and describe how managers are to be held
accountable for achieving such goals;
* Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones to
measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible and
measurable;
* A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and the
actions needed to mitigate these impediments;
* Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and
equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of performance;
* Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in
achieving goals and objectives, these criteria should be objective and
outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet performance goals;
and:
* Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the
results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement
efforts. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs and will ensure updates to the
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
installations for terrorist incidents addresses the legislatively
required elements outlined in the recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military
response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional,
and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in
conjunction with civilian capabilities. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department concurs and will ensure updates to the
comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
installations for terrorist incidents addresses the legislatively
required elements outlined in the recommendation. It is of paramount
importance that DoD work with other local, state, and federal entities
to ensure redundant capabilities are avoided. The designation of a
single integrating authority for installation preparedness will better
enable DoD to plan for the coordination of capabilities with local,
state, and federal partners.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Hugh Brady, Nancy Benco, Pat Seaton,
Elisabeth Ryan, and Corinna Wengryn made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation
for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: March 10,
2004.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism
Efforts at Installations. GAO-03-14. Washington, D.C.: November 1,
2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.:
March 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-
and Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November
7, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Issues. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909.
Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. GAO/
T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for
Forces Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-00-181. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180. Washington, D.C.:
May 24, 2000.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken
to Protect Military Forces. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:
November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74.
Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-97-207. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD defines weapons of mass destruction as weapons that are capable
of a high order of destruction and are used to destroy large numbers of
people. WMD can consist of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons and high-yield explosives (CBRNE).
[2] S. Rep. No. 107-62, at 352 (2001).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Preparedness
of Military Installations for Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, GAO-02-644R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2002).
[4] Pub. L. 107-314, §1402 (2002).
[5] Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act to
provide for, among other things, the establishment of strategic
planning and performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L.
103-62 (2003).
[6] DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18,
2003.
[7] DOD Instruction 2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14,
2001.
[8] DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9,
2004.
[9] DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards § E3.1.1.11
(June 14, 2001).
[10] Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Preparedness of U.S. Military
Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack,"
Memorandum, Sept. 5, 2002.
[11] Referred to in the report as the "Chemical, Biological
Installation/Force Protection Program."
[12] Consequence management is defined in DOD Directive 2000.12 as
those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to
governments, business, and individuals affected by the consequences of
a CBRNE situation.
[13] Congress mandated the Department of State and Department of
Justice to conduct a series of challenging, role-playing exercises
involving the senior federal, state, and local officials who would
direct crisis management and consequence management response to an
actual WMD attack. The result was Top Officials (TOPOFF), a national-
level domestic and international exercise series designed to produce a
more effective, coordinated, global response to WMD terrorism.
[14] Pub. L. 107-314, § 902 (2002).
[15] Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and
establish their missions, responsibilities, force structure,
geographic area of responsibility, and other attributes.
[16] In a message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May
7, 2004, with subject: Executive Order for standup of U.S. Northern
Command's antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for the
continental United States.
[17] DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18,
2003.
[18] DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism Standards," June 14,
2001.
[19] DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9,
2004.
[20] DOD O-20012-P Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan,
June 15, 2004.
[21] DOD Instruction 2000.18, "DOD Installation Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response
Guidelines," December 4, 2002.
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