Force Structure
Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but Some Factors Could Affect Implementation
Gao ID: GAO-04-900 August 13, 2004
The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act and the Senate Report for the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. In response to these mandates, this report addresses (1) how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force structure, and procurement costs change; (2) the methodology and assumptions the services used to analyze the potential for integrating the forces; (3) the analytical process the services used to decide which reserve squadrons to decommission; and (4) other factors that might affect implementation of the Plan.
Concerns about the affordability of their prior tactical aviation procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a new Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. Under this Plan, the two services will perform their missions using fewer units of more capable aircraft and reducing total program aircraft procurement costs by $28 billion over the next 18 years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force to accomplish both services' missions. The Plan also reduces the services' tactical aviation force structure by decommissioning five squadrons, thus decreasing the number of Navy and Marine Corps squadrons to 59, and reduces the total number of aircraft they plan to buy from 1,637 to 1,140. The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the Navy and Marine Corps' operational requirements with a smaller force primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures. GAO's review of the contractor's methodology and assumptions about force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies suggests that much of the analysis appears reasonable. However, GAO noted some limitations--including the lack of analytical support for reducing the number of backup aircraft--increase the risk that the smaller force will be less effective than expected. The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in selecting a reserve squadron to decommission. The Marine Corps made a clear and well-documented analysis of the operational, fiscal, logistical, and personnel impacts of different options that appears to provide decision makers with a reasonable basis for selecting the Reserve unit to decommission. By contrast, the Navy selected its reserve squadron without clear criteria or a documented, comprehensive analysis, and thus with less transparency in its process. Two other factors that might affect successful implementation of the Plan are the potential unavailability of readiness funding and delays in fielding the new force. Although the contractor recommended that the Navy identify future readiness-funding requirements, to date, the Navy has not conducted this analysis. In addition, the Department of the Navy is experiencing engineering and weight problems in developing the Joint Strike Fighter that will cause it to be delayed until 2013, at least 1 year later than had been projected, and other high risks to the program remain. Because these delays will cause the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected, they might also increase operations and maintenance costs, making an analysis of future readiness funding requirements even more important.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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GAO-04-900, Force Structure: Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, but Some Factors Could Affect Implementation
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2004:
FORCE STRUCTURE:
Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation Integration Plan Is
Reasonable, but Some Factors Could Affect Implementation:
GAO-04-900:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-900, a report to the Senate and House Committees
on Appropriations and the Senate and House Committees on Armed
Services:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act and the Senate Report
for the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO
examine the Navy and Marine Corps‘ Tactical Aviation Integration Plan.
In response to these mandates, this report addresses (1) how Navy and
Marine Corps operational concepts, force structure, and procurement
costs change; (2) the methodology and assumptions the services used to
analyze the potential for integrating the forces; (3) the analytical
process the services used to decide which reserve squadrons to
decommission; and (4) other factors that might affect implementation of
the Plan.
What GAO Found:
Concerns about the affordability of their prior tactical aviation
procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a new
Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. Under this Plan, the two services
will perform their missions using fewer units of more capable aircraft
and reducing total program aircraft procurement costs by $28 billion
over the next 18 years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will
increase the extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as
a combined force to accomplish both services‘ missions. The Plan also
reduces the services‘ tactical aviation force structure by
decommissioning five squadrons, thus decreasing the number of Navy and
Marine Corps squadrons to 59, and reduces the total number of aircraft
they plan to buy from 1,637 to 1,140.
The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the
Navy and Marine Corps‘ operational requirements with a smaller force
primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the
relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures.
GAO‘s review of the contractor‘s methodology and assumptions about
force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies suggests
that much of the analysis appears reasonable. However, GAO noted some
limitations”including the lack of analytical support for reducing the
number of backup aircraft”increase the risk that the smaller force will
be less effective than expected.
The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in
selecting a reserve squadron to decommission. The Marine Corps made a
clear and well documented analysis of the operational, fiscal,
logistical, and personnel impacts of different options that appears to
provide decision makers with a reasonable basis for selecting the
Reserve unit to decommission. By contrast, the Navy selected its
reserve squadron without clear criteria or a documented, comprehensive
analysis, and thus with less transparency in its process.
Two other factors that might affect successful implementation of the
Plan are the potential unavailability of readiness funding and delays
in fielding the new force. Although the contractor recommended that the
Navy identify future readiness-funding requirements, to date, the Navy
has not conducted this analysis. In addition, the Department of the
Navy is experiencing engineering and weight problems in developing the
Joint Strike Fighter that will cause it to be delayed until 2013, at
least 1 year later than had been projected, and other high risks to
the program remain. Because these delays will cause the Navy to operate
legacy aircraft longer than expected, they might also increase
operations and maintenance costs, making an analysis of future
readiness funding requirements even more important.
What GAO Recommends:
To enhance the potential that the future tactical aviation force will
meet the services‘ mission needs and ensure more transparency in future
decommissioning decisions, GAO recommends that the Secretary of
Defense:
* direct that the number of needed backup aircraft be assessed,
* develop guidance and methodology for analyzing future decommissioning
decisions, and
* direct that future readiness funding for the future tactical aviation
force be analyzed.
In written comments, the Department of Defense generally agreed with
the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-900.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact George Morse at (757)
552-8108 or morseg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Plan Changes the Navy and Marine Corps' Operational Concepts and
Reduces Force Structure to Achieve Procurement Savings:
Navy's Analysis Generally Appears Reasonable, but Some Limitations
Could Understate Risks:
In the Absence of DOD Criteria, the Marine Corps and Navy Used
Different Methods and Documentation Standards to Determine Which
Reserve Units to Decommission:
Two Other Factors Could Affect the Plan's Implementation and Add Risk:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Force Structure Summary for the Previous Program and the Navy
and Marine Corps' Integration Plan:
Table 2: Previous Program and the Navy and Marine Corps' Integration
Plan Aircraft Procurement Summary:
Table 3: Marine Corps Criteria for Selecting a Reserve Unit
to Decommission:
Figures:
Figure 1: Navy's Projected Tactical Aviation Procurement Budget
Compared with Original Procurement Plan, Fiscal Years 2002-26:
Figure 2: Capability Scores Determined by Contractor's Panel
of Experts:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 13, 2004:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of the Navy formerly planned to spend almost $92 billion
by fiscal year 2021 to replace legacy F/A-18C/D, F-14, and AV-8
aircraft with newer F/A-18E/Fs and the future Joint Strike Fighter
aircraft. Concerned that it could not afford to purchase as many of
these aircraft as originally planned, however, in fiscal year 2002 the
Department of the Navy announced a new Tactical Aviation Integration
Plan, whereby the Navy and Marine Corps concluded that they would be
able to achieve their missions with fewer aircraft and units by
operating as a combined force.
Out of concern about how the Navy and Marine Corps' future plans for
their tactical aviation forces would affect mission capability,
Congress mandated that GAO examine the Navy and Marine Corps' Tactical
Aviation Integration Plan.[Footnote 1] In the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense
Appropriations Act, Congress directed GAO to assess Navy and Marine
Corps requirements for tactical aviation and the role of Navy and
Marine Corps Reserve assets in meeting such requirements.[Footnote 2]
In addition, the Senate Report for the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 directed GAO to analyze the Navy and Marine
Corps' Plan to determine the validity of the assumptions made in
formulating the Plan, the expected impact of the Plan on Navy and
Marine Corps force structure, and the ability of the smaller force
structure to meet operational requirements.[Footnote 3] After meeting
with your offices, we agreed on a strategy for completing work in
response to both mandates and agreed to provide an interim briefing and
a final report. We briefed your offices on our results from late
February through April 2004.
Based on our work in response to these mandates, this final report
addresses the following questions:
1. How would Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force
structure, and procurement costs change under the Plan?
2. What methodology and assumptions did the Navy and Marine Corps use
to analyze the potential for integrating tactical aviation assets, and
what, if any, limitations affect the services' analysis?
3. To what extent did the Navy and Marine Corps use a thorough and
well-documented process to assess which reserve squadrons should be
decommissioned in fiscal year 2004 to implement the Plan?
4. What other factors might affect the implementation of the Plan?
To accomplish these objectives, we analyzed the contractor study that
supports the Plan by reviewing its methodology, major assumptions, and
modeling input and approach. We also obtained information from
officials at Navy and Marine Corps Headquarters, Navy and Marine Corps
Reserve Headquarters, Joint Forces Command, Atlantic and Pacific Naval
Air Forces Headquarters, and Marine Forces Atlantic Headquarters in
order to verify and assess both the information contained in the study
and the resulting decisions about force structure, procurement plans,
and operational impacts. We assessed the reliability of the services'
data by reviewing the methodology and pertinent contractor and service
information used for the study and the Plan. In addition, as part of
our analysis, we visited selected Navy and Marine Corps Reserve
tactical aviation units in order to get their perspective on the
possible decommissioning of reserve squadrons as well as future roles
and missions.
Results in Brief:
Concerns about the affordability of their future tactical aviation
procurement plan prompted the Navy and Marine Corps to agree to a Plan
whereby the two services will be performing their missions using fewer
units of more capable aircraft and reducing total program aircraft
procurement costs from $92 billion to about $64 billion over the next
18 years. Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps will increase the
extent to which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined
force for both services. The Plan will also reduce the services'
tactical aviation force structure by decommissioning three active and
two reserve squadrons, thus decreasing the number of Navy and Marine
Corps squadrons to 59. By decreasing the number of squadrons, the
number of aircraft in some squadrons, and the number of backup
aircraft, the Department of the Navy would decrease the total tactical
aviation aircraft procurement from the original program's 1,637 to
1,140 aircraft, a reduction of 497 aircraft.
The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet the
Navy and Marine Corps' operational requirements with a smaller force
primarily on the findings of a contractor study that evaluated the
relative capability of different tactical aviation force structures.
Although our review of the contractor's methodology and assumptions
about force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies
suggests that much of the contractor's analysis appears to be
reasonable, we also noted some limitations in the study that add risk.
Specifically, we found the following:
* The contractor modeled the Joint Strike Fighters aboard Navy carriers
as if all would have the same performance characteristics despite
knowing that the Marine Corps' Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
version has significantly less range and payload capability than the
Navy's carrier version.
* Following the contractor's recommendation, the Navy decided to reduce
the number of backup aircraft it would buy predicated on expected lower
attrition rates and improvements in maintenance management without
fully analyzing the feasibility of achieving these efficiencies.
* The contractor's force structure analysis showed that the new force
had significantly more capability than the current force but relied on
aircraft performance scores assigned by a panel of experts. However, a
sensitivity analysis performed by the contractor also showed that
variations in these scores significantly affected the forces' relative
capability and therefore the increased effectiveness might not be as
high as reported.
Each of these factors increases the risk that the future smaller force
will not be as effective at accomplishing the Navy and Marine Corps'
tactical missions as the Department of Navy expects.
The Navy and Marine Corps each followed a different process in
selecting a reserve squadron to decommission. The process developed by
the Marine Corps Reserve produced a well-documented analysis of the
operational, fiscal, logistical, and personnel impacts of different
options that appears to provide decision makers with a sound basis for
selecting the reserve unit to decommission. By contrast, the Navy
selected the reserve squadron to decommission without clear criteria or
a documented comprehensive analysis supporting its decision. In the
absence of standard Department of Defense guidance for analyzing and
documenting decommissioning alternatives, a lack of transparency could
occur in conjunction with future service force structure decisions.
Two other factors might affect successful implementation of the Plan,
including the potential uncertainty about future requirements for
readiness funding and delays in fielding the new force. Although the
contractor recommended that the Navy identify future readiness-funding
requirements and ensure that a mechanism be in place for fully funding
these accounts, to date, the Navy has not conducted this analysis.
Without an examination of future funding requirements, the Navy cannot
know whether sufficient funds will be available to maintain readiness
levels that are adequate for the smaller tactical aviation force to
meet the mission needs of both the Navy and Marine Corps. In addition,
the Department of the Navy is also experiencing engineering and weight
problems in developing the Joint Strike Fighter that will cause it to
be delayed until 2013--at least 1 year beyond when it had been
projected to begin receiving the aircraft--and other risks to the
program remain. Because these delays will cause the Navy to operate
legacy aircraft longer than expected, they might also increase
operation and maintenance costs, making an analysis of future readiness
funding requirements even more important.
To mitigate the risks associated with implementing the Navy and Marine
Corps' Plan and enhance future decommissioning decisions, we are
recommending that (1) the Secretary of the Navy conduct additional
analyses of the expected efficiencies essential to reducing the number
of backup aircraft and the necessary readiness funding and (2) the
Secretary of Defense require comprehensive and well-documented analyses
when services make decisions about which units to decommission. In
written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
generally agreed with our recommendations and cited actions it plans to
take to implement them. Although some of the department's proposed
actions appear consistent with our recommendations, we believe it needs
to take further steps. The department should develop clear criteria for
the services to use in making future unit decommissioning decisions and
require them to retain documentation of their analyses to facilitate
oversight and transparency. The department's comments and our
evaluation are on page 21 of this report.
Background:
The Department of Defense's 2001 Defense Planning Guidance tasked the
Department of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive review to assess the
feasibility of fully integrating Navy and Marine Corps aviation force
structure to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency. The Department
of the Navy narrowed the study to include only fixed-wing tactical
aviation assets because of affordability concerns. Specifically, Navy
officials were concerned that the projected procurement budget would
not be sufficient to buy as many F/A-18E/Fs and Joint Strike Fighter
aircraft as originally planned. The difference between the funding
needed to support the Navy's original plan for procuring tactical
aircraft and the Navy's projected procurement budget is shown in figure
1.
Figure 1: Navy's Projected Tactical Aviation Procurement Budget
Compared with Original Procurement Plan, Fiscal Years 2002-26:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The profile shown for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for
fiscal years 2005-11 reflects funding for both the F/A-18E/F and the
Joint Strike Fighter.
[End of figure]
Figure 1 shows that, starting in fiscal year 2005, the Navy's typical
aviation allocation of $3,200 million per year would not be sufficient
to support the previous procurement plan for F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike
Fighter aircraft.
In December 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps jointly commissioned a contractor to study the
feasibility of integrating Naval tactical aviation. The study prompted
a memorandum of agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps in August
2002 to integrate their tactical aviation assets and buy fewer aircraft
than originally planned.
Plan Changes the Navy and Marine Corps' Operational Concepts and
Reduces Force Structure to Achieve Procurement Savings:
The Plan proposes that the Navy and Marine Corps (1) merge operational
concepts; (2) reduce the number of squadrons, aircraft per squadron,
and backup aircraft; and (3) reduce the total number of aircraft to be
procured in the future. The Department of the Navy anticipates that
these changes will save approximately $28 billion in procurement costs
over the next 18 years through fiscal year 2021.
Navy and Marine Corps Merge Concepts of Operation:
Operationally, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase the extent to
which their tactical aviation units are used as a combined force for
both services. Under the Plan, the Navy and Marine Corps would increase
cross deployment of squadrons between the services and would further
consolidate missions and operations through changes in aircrew training
and the initiation of command-level officer exchanges.
Under the Plan, the Marine Corps would increase the number of squadrons
dedicated to carrier air wings, and the Navy would begin to dedicate
squadrons to Marine Aircraft Wings. In 2003 the Marine Corps began to
provide the Navy with the first of six additional dedicated squadrons
to augment four squadrons already integrated into carrier air wings
during the 1990s. As a result, each of the Navy's 10 active carrier air
wings would ultimately include one Marine Corps squadron by 2012.
Concurrently, the Navy would integrate three dedicated squadrons into
Marine Aircraft Wings by 2008, primarily to support the Marine Corps
Unit Deployment Program[Footnote 4] rotations to Japan. The first Navy
squadron to deploy in support of Marine Corps operations would occur in
late fiscal year 2004, with other squadrons to follow in fiscal years
2007 and 2008.
As part of the new operating concept, the Department of the Navy would
satisfy both Navy and Marine Corps missions using either Navy or Marine
Corps squadrons. Traditionally, the primary mission of Navy tactical
aviation has been to provide long-range striking power from a carrier,
while Marine Corps tactical aviation provided air support for ground
forces. Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons will retain
their primary mission responsibilities, but units that integrate would
additionally be responsible to train as well as perform required
mission responsibilities of the other service. For example, if a Navy
squadron were assigned to the Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program, its
pilots would receive more emphasis on training for close air support
missions, and, similarly, Marine Corps pilots would place more emphasis
on long-range strike missions before deploying with a carrier air wing.
Moreover, Navy and Marine Corps officers would exchange Command
positions to further develop a more unified culture. For instance, a
Marine Corps colonel would command a carrier air wing, while a Navy
captain would command a Marine Corps Aircraft Group.
Plan Expected to Reduce Total Number of Squadrons, Aircraft
per Squadron, and Backup Aircraft:
As indicated in table 1, the Department of the Navy would create a
smaller tactical aviation force structure consisting of fewer
squadrons, reduced numbers of aircraft per squadron, and fewer backup
aircraft. The number of tactical aviation squadrons would decrease from
68 under the previous plan to 59 by 2012. To achieve this reduction of
nine squadrons, the department would:
* cancel plans to reestablish four active Navy squadrons as anticipated
under its prior procurement plan,
* decommission one Marine Corps Reserve squadron as well as one Navy
Reserve squadron in 2004, and:
* decommission three active Navy squadrons. The first active squadron
is scheduled to be decommissioned in fiscal year 2006; two other
squadrons are to be decommissioned from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal
year 2012.
Table 1: Force Structure Summary for the Previous Program and the Navy
and Marine Corps' Integration Plan:
Service/Component: Navy-Active;
Force structure under previous program: 40 squadrons/500 aircraft[A];
Force structure under integration plan: 33 squadrons/370 aircraft;
Reductions in force structure: 7 squadrons/130 aircraft.
Service/Component: Navy-Reserves;
Force structure under previous program: 3 squadrons/36 aircraft;
Force structure under integration plan: 2 squadrons/22 aircraft;
Reductions in force structure: 1 squadron/14 aircraft.
Service/Component: Marine Corps-Active;
Force structure under previous program: 21 squadrons/308 aircraft;
Force structure under integration plan: 21 squadrons/210 aircraft;
Reductions in force structure: 0 squadrons/98 aircraft.
Service/Component: Marine Corps-Reserves;
Force structure under previous program: 4 squadrons/48 aircraft;
Force structure under integration plan: 3 squadrons/30 aircraft;
Reductions in force structure: 1 squadron/18 aircraft.
Service/Component: Total operational aircraft;
Force structure under previous program: 68 squadrons/892 aircraft;
Force structure under integration plan: 59 squadrons/632 aircraft;
Reductions in force structure: 9 squadrons/260 aircraft.
Service/Component: Backup aircraft;
Force structure under previous program: 745;
Force structure under integration plan: 508;
Reductions in force structure: 237.
Total aircraft;
Force structure under previous program: 1,637;
Force structure under integration plan: 1,140;
Reductions in force structure: 497.
Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[A] The Navy currently has 36 active squadrons instead of 40 as listed
in the table. The difference in numbers is due to four Marine Corps
squadrons that are currently integrated aboard Navy carriers. The
Navy's previous plan was to buy enough aircraft to reestablish those
four squadrons as Navy units.
[End of table]
Under the Plan, the number of aircraft assigned to some tactical
aviation squadrons would be reduced. All Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18C
squadrons that transition to the future Joint Strike Fighter aircraft
would be reduced from 12 to 10 aircraft. In addition, Navy F/A-18F
squadrons will be reduced from 14 to 12 aircraft. Furthermore, by 2006,
aircraft assigned to the remaining two Navy and three Marine Corps
Reserve squadrons would be reduced from 12 to 10. By reducing the
aircraft assigned to squadrons, the size of Navy air wings will
transition from 46 to 44 aircraft in 2004, as the Navy procures new
aircraft. A notional air wing in the Navy's current force is made up of
46 aircraft comprising a combination of F/A-18C and F-14 squadrons.
However, by 2016, carrier air wings would contain 44 aircraft made up
of two squadrons of 10 Joint Strike Fighters, one squadron of 12 F/A-
18E fighters, and one squadron of 12 F/A-18F fighters.
The Department of the Navy's Plan would also reduce the number of
backup aircraft to be procured from 745 (under the previous program) to
508, for a total reduction of 237 aircraft. Backup aircraft consist of
those aircraft that are not primarily assigned to active or reserve
squadrons. Specifically, backup aircraft are necessary to meet a
variety of needs such as:
* training new pilots;
* replacing aircraft that are either awaiting or undergoing depot-level
repair;
* meeting research, development, and test and evaluation needs;
* attrition during peacetime or wartime operations; and:
* meeting miscellaneous requirements, such as adversary training and
the Blue Angels demonstration team.
Plan Expected to Reduce Procurement of Tactical Fighters and Save
Procurement Costs:
In implementing the Plan, the Department of the Navy expects to reduce
the number of tactical aviation aircraft it will purchase by 497--from
1,637 to 1,140. As indicated in table 2, it plans to procure,
respectively, 88 and 409 fewer F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike Fighter
aircraft. Almost half (237, or 48 percent) of the expected reduction in
aircraft procurement is attributable to the plan to have fewer backup
aircraft. By reducing the total number of new tactical aviation
aircraft to be procured, the Department of the Navy now expects that
its new procurement program will cost about $64 billion, as compared
with nearly $92 billion for the previously planned force, resulting in
a savings of approximately $28 billion.
Table 2: Previous Program and the Navy and Marine Corps' Integration
Plan Aircraft Procurement Summary:
Aircraft type: F/A-18E/F;
Previous program procurement: 548;
Integration plan procurement: 460;
Reductions in aircraft procurement: 88.
Aircraft type: Joint Strike Fighter;
Previous program procurement: 1,089;
Integration plan procurement: 680;
Reductions in aircraft procurement: 409.
Total;
Previous program procurement: 1,637;
Integration plan procurement: 1,140;
Reductions in aircraft procurement: 497.
Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
Navy's Analysis Generally Appears Reasonable, but Some Limitations
Could Understate Risks:
The Department of the Navy based its conclusion that it could meet its
operational requirements with a smaller force primarily on the results
of a contractor study. The contractor's analysis generally appeared
reasonable because it assessed the relative capability of different
tactical aviation force structures and included important assumptions
about force structure, budget resources, and management efficiencies.
However, from our review of the contractor's methodology and
assumptions, we identified some limitations in its analysis that may
understate the risk associated with implementing some aspects of the
Plan. These limitations include (1) the contractor's decision to model
only the carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter despite the Marine
Corps' plans to operate Short Take Off and Vertical Landing aircraft on
carriers, (2) the contractor's limited studies supporting recommended
reductions in backup aircraft, and (3) the contractor's method for
determining aircraft capabilities used in the force analyses.
Methodology Compared Relative Force Structure Capabilities:
The contractor modeled the effectiveness of the current force, the
larger force that the Navy had previously planned to buy, and the
study's recommended smaller force at three stages of a notional
warfight. The warfight was based on a generic composite scenario that
was developed with input from the Air Force and Army. It has been
previously used by the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office to assess
the effectiveness of a joint strike force in terms of phases of a
warfight; geographical location of combat forces; the characteristics
of targets, such as type and hardness; and whether targets are mobile.
During the forward presence phase of the contractor's modeling
scenario, one carrier battle group and one amphibious readiness group
were deployed, and aircraft operated at a maximum distance of 400
nautical miles from the carrier. In the buildup phase, three carrier
battle groups and three amphibious groups were deployed in one theater,
and aircraft operated at a maximum distance of 150 nautical miles.
During the mature phase, eight carrier battle groups, eight amphibious
readiness groups, and 75 percent of all other assets were deployed to
land-based sites, and aircraft operated at a maximum distance of 150
nautical miles from the carrier.
To measure combat effectiveness levels, the contractor methodically
compared the estimated capabilities of the current force, the
previously planned force, and the recommended force to hit targets and
perform close air support. To determine the relative capabilities of
each aircraft comprising these forces, the contractor convened a panel
of experts who were familiar with planned capability and used official
aircraft performance data to score the offensive and defensive
capabilities of different aircraft across a range of missions performed
during the three stages of the warfight. As indicated in figure 2, the
experts determined that the Joint Strike Fighter, which is still in
development, will be the most capable aircraft and assigned it a
baseline score of 1 compared with the other aircraft.
Figure 2: Capability Scores Determined by Contractor's Panel
of Experts:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2 also shows that based on the capability scores assigned other
aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter is expected to be approximately nine
times more capable than the AV-8B Harrier aircraft, about five times
more capable than the F-14D and F/A-18 A+/C/D aircraft, three times
more capable than the first version of the F/A-18 E/F aircraft, and
50 percent more capable than the second version of the F/A-18E/F. In
addition, the contractor measured the percentage of units deployed in
order to ensure that Navy and Marine Corps personnel tempo and
operational tempo[Footnote 5] guidelines for peacetime were not
exceeded.
The study concluded that, because of the expected increase in the
capabilities of F/A-18 E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, both
the previously planned force and the recommended new smaller force were
more effective than today's force. Furthermore, the new smaller force
was just as effective in most instances as the previously planned force
because the smaller force had enough aircraft to fully populate
aircraft carrier flight decks and therefore did not cause a reduction
in the number of targets that could be hit. However, the analysis
showed that beginning in 2015, there would be a 10 percent reduction in
effectiveness in close air support during the mature phase of a
warfight because fewer squadrons and aircraft would be available to
deploy to land bases. The analysis also showed that the smaller force
stayed within personnel and operational tempo guidelines during
peacetime.
Analysis Included Reasonable Assumptions:
The contractor's analysis was based on three key assumptions that
generally appeared to be reasonable and consistent with DOD plans.
First, it assumed that the future naval force structure would include
12 carrier battle groups, supported by 1 reserve and 10 active carrier
air wings, and 12 amphibious readiness groups. The 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review validated this naval force structure and judged that
this force structure presented moderate operational risk in
implementing the defense strategy. Second, it assumed that the Navy and
Marine Corps' tactical aviation procurement budget would continue to be
about $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2002 dollars annually through 2020.
This was based on the Department of the Navy's determination that the
tactical aviation procurement budget would continue to represent about
50 percent of the services' total aircraft procurement budget as it had
in fiscal years 1995 to 2002. Third, it assumed that the Department of
the Navy could reduce the number of backup aircraft it buys based on
expected efficiencies in managing its backup aircraft inventory.
Some Limitations in the Navy's Analysis Understate Risks in
Implementing the Plan:
Our analysis also showed, however, that certain limitations derived
from the contractor's study could add risk to the expected
effectiveness of the future smaller force. These limitations are:
* the study's modeling assumption that the effectiveness of the Marine
Corps' Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version of the Joint Strike
Fighter would be the same as the Navy's carrier version despite
projected differences in their capability;
* the study's assumption that certain efficiencies in the management of
backup aircraft could be realized, without documenting and providing
supporting analyses substantiating how they would be achieved; and:
* the study's process for assigning capability measures to aircraft
which, because of its subjectivity, could result in an overestimation
of the smaller force's effectiveness.
Projected Capability Differences of Joint Strike Fighter Versions Could
Affect Expected Effectiveness of Smaller Tactical Aviation Force:
The contractor's study assumed that all Joint Strike Fighters aboard
Navy carriers, including those belonging to the Marine Corps, would
have the performance characteristics of the carrier version of that
aircraft. However, the Marine Corps plans to operate only the Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing version of the aircraft, which is
projected to be significantly less capable than the carrier version in
terms of range and payload (number of weapons it can carry). The Marine
Corps believes this version is needed to satisfy its requirement to
operate from austere land bases or amphibious ships in order to quickly
support ground forces when needed. But the carrier version's unrefueled
range and internal payload are expected to exceed those of the Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing version by approximately 50 and
100 percent, respectively.
The contractor mitigated the differences in the two versions'
capabilities by modeling a scenario whereby the aircraft would operate
from carriers located 150 miles from the targets during the mature
phase of the warfight--well within the range of the Marine Corps'
version. By contrast, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the
targets struck from carriers would have been outside the range of the
Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version of the aircraft unless in-
flight refueling was performed, thereby reducing its effectiveness. The
study noted that because of the differences in performance,
substitution of the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing version for the
carrier version would result in decreased effectiveness when the Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing version's performance parameters are
exceeded. However, the study did not conduct additional analyses to
quantify the impact of using Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
aircraft aboard carriers. Therefore, if the Plan is implemented whereby
the Marine Corps operates the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
version of the aircraft exclusively as one of four tactical aviation
squadrons aboard each carrier, under a different scenario featuring a
greater range to targets, the overall effectiveness of the tactical
fighter group could be less than what the contractor's study predicted.
Navy officials acknowledged that operating the Short Takeoff and
Vertical Landing Joint Strike Fighter aircraft from carriers presents a
number of challenges that the Navy expects to address as the aircraft
progresses through development.
Projected Efficiencies in Managing Backup Aircraft Were Based on
Limited Analysis:
The contractor's study recommended cutting 351 backup aircraft based on
expected improvements and efficiencies in the Navy's management of such
aircraft. The study identified three main factors prompting its
conclusion that fewer backup aircraft would be needed.
* Actual historical attrition rates for F/A-18 aircraft, according to
the Navy, suggest that the attrition rate for the F/A-18E/F and Joint
Strike Fighter could be lower than expected. The Navy determined that
attrition might be only 1 percent of total aircraft inventory, rather
than the expected 1.5 and 1.3 percent included in the Navy's original
procurement plan for the aircraft respectively[Footnote 6]; thus, fewer
attrition aircraft would suffice.
* Business practices for managing aircraft in the maintenance pipeline
could be improved. According to the contractor, if Navy depots
performed as much maintenance per day as Air Force depots, it appears
that the Navy could reduce the number of aircraft in the maintenance
pipeline; thus, fewer aircraft could suffice.
* Testing, evaluating, and aircrew training could become more
efficient. According to the contractor's study, fewer aircraft would be
needed to test and evaluate future technology improvements because of
the Navy and Marine Corps' two Joint Strike Fighter variants (the
carrier and Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing versions would have many
common parts). In addition, advances in trainer technology and the
greater sortie generation capability of the newer aircraft could enable
them to achieve more training objectives in a single flight; thus,
fewer aircraft could suffice.
Although the contractor recognized the potential of these efficiencies
when recommending the reduction to the number of backup aircraft, it
did not fully analyze the likelihood of achieving them. According to
the contractor, it recommended the reduction based on limited analysis
of the potential to reduce the number of attrition and maintenance
pipeline aircraft. As a result, the contractor also recommended that
the Department of the Navy study whether it could achieve expected
maintenance efficiencies by improving its depot operations. However,
the department has not conducted such an assessment.
The Department of the Navy considered the risk of cutting 351 aircraft
too high and instead decided to cut only 237 backup aircraft--the
number reflected in the Navy's plan. Historically, the Navy's backup
inventory has equaled approximately 95 percent of the number of combat
aircraft. The contractor recommended that the Navy reduce its backup
aircraft requirement to 62 percent of its planned inventory of combat
aircraft. Concerned that this might be too drastic a cut, the Navy
decided to use 80 percent when determining the number of backup
aircraft in its Plan. Although the Plan's higher ratio of backup
aircraft to combat aircraft will reduce operational risk by having more
aircraft available for attrition and other purposes, the Navy's
80 percent factor was not based on a documented analysis. Navy
officials noted that because of budget limitations, it would be
difficult to purchase additional aircraft to support the smaller
tactical aviation force in case some of the projected efficiencies are
not realized.
Subjectivity in Aircraft Capabilities Scoring Could Reduce Expected
Force Effectiveness:
The contractor relied on aircraft capability scores assigned by a panel
of experts as a basis for comparing the relative effectiveness of the
aircraft and alternative force structures examined. The results showed
that by 2020, the previously planned and new smaller force would be
four times more effective at hitting targets than the current force.
However, the panelists subjectively determined the capability scores
from official aircraft performance parameters provided by the Navy. The
contractor reportedly conducted a "sensitivity analysis" of the
aircraft capability scores and found that changing the scores affected
the forces' relative effectiveness. Since the contractor did not retain
documentation of the analysis, we could not verify the quality of the
scoring, nor attest that the relative effectiveness of the new force
will be four times greater than the current force as the study
reported. Nevertheless, the contractor's acknowledgement that score
variations could affect relative force effectiveness raises the
possibility that the estimated increases in effectiveness, both for the
previously planned force and for the recommended smaller force, might
not be as high as the study concluded. Navy and Marine Corps officials
agreed that gaining a significant increase in total capability was key
to accepting a smaller, more capable tactical aviation force. However,
if the capability of the recommended smaller force is significantly
less than that indicated by the study, the smaller force's ability to
meet both Navy and Marine Corps' mission requirements could be
adversely affected.
In the Absence of DOD Criteria, the Marine Corps and Navy Used
Different Methods and Documentation Standards to Determine Which
Reserve Units to Decommission:
The Navy and Marine Corps took significantly different approaches
toward the task of assessing and documenting their decisions on which
reserve units to decommission. The Marine Corps used a well-documented
process that clearly showed what criteria were applied to arrive at its
decision, whereas the Navy's approach lacked clarity and supporting
documentation about how different options were evaluated. DOD has not
developed criteria to guide such decommissioning decisions. In a
previous report, we reviewed the Air Force's decision to reduce and
consolidate the B-1B bomber fleet and found that Air Force officials
did not complete a formal comprehensive analysis of potential basing
options in order to determine whether they were choosing the most cost-
effective units to keep.[Footnote 7] We also stated that in the absence
of standard guidance for analyzing basing alternatives, similar
problems could occur in the future. In this instance, the absence of
standard DOD guidance for analyzing and documenting decommissioning
alternatives allowed the Navy to use a very informal and less
transparent process to determine which reserve squadron to decommission
in fiscal year 2004. The lack of a formal process could also hinder
transparency in making such decisions in the future, which adversely
affects Congress's ability to provide appropriate oversight.
The Marine Corps Conducted a Comprehensive Analysis to Support
Decommissioning Decision:
The Marine Corps established a team that conducted and documented a
comprehensive review to support its decision about which Marine Corps
Reserve squadron to decommission.[Footnote 8] In conducting its
analysis, the Marine Corps assumed that (1) reserve assets that had not
been decommissioned must be optimized for integration in future combat
roles, (2) mission readiness and productivity are crucial, and (3) the
political and legal ramifications of deactivating reserve units must be
considered. The study team established a set of criteria consisting of
personnel, operational, fiscal, logistical, and strategic factors and
applied these criteria when evaluating each of the Marine Corps' four
reserve squadrons. Table 3 identifies the selection criteria applied to
each squadron.
Table 3: Marine Corps Criteria for Selecting a Reserve Unit
to Decommission:
Personnel: Detailed demographics analysis was conducted to determine
the number and status of personnel for each location. The implications
of relocating and retraining squadron personnel were examined.
Operational: Unit, pilot, and aircraft readiness, productivity, and
efficiency were assessed. Sortie[A] analysis was conducted, and
aircraft utilization rates were examined. Support provided for training
exercises and other events was analyzed.
Fiscal: Operational and training costs were examined. Cost per flight
hour, cost to support combined arms training at Marine Corps Air/Ground
Task Force Training Center Twenty-nine Palms, Calif., and operations/
maintenance and personnel costs were assessed.
Logistical: Basing impacts and divestiture expenses were examined.
Suitability of facilities (billeting, work areas, messing, etc.) and
operations, training, and maintenance supportability were assessed.
Strategic: Doctrinal, organizational, and regional issues were
examined.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
[A] A single mission or flight of an aircraft.
[End of table]
The study results were presented to the Marine Requirements Oversight
Council for review and recommendation and to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps.[Footnote 9] The Commandant decided in May 2004 to
decommission reserve squadron VMFA-321 located at Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland, by September 2004.
The Navy Did Not Conduct a Formal Analysis or Provide Documentation
to Support Its Decommissioning Decision:
In December 2003, the Navy decided to decommission one of three Navy
Reserve tactical aviation squadrons, VFA-203, located in Atlanta,
Georgia. The Chief of Naval Reserve stated that the Navy used a variety
of criteria in deciding which unit to decommission. These criteria
included the squadrons' deployment history, the location of squadrons
in relation to operating ranges, and the location of a reserve
intermediate maintenance facility. Navy officials, however, could not
provide documentation of the criteria or the analysis used to support
its decision. Without such documentation to provide transparency to the
Navy's process, we could not determine whether these criteria were
systematically applied to each reserve squadron. Furthermore, we could
not assess whether the Navy had systematically evaluated and compared
other factors such as operational, personnel, and financial impacts for
all Navy Reserve squadrons.
Two Other Factors Could Affect the Plan's Implementation and Add Risk:
Two other factors could adversely affect the successful implementation
of the Plan and increase the risk level assumed at the time the
contractor completed the study and the Navy and Marine Corps accepted
the Plan. These factors are (1) uncertainty about requirements for
readiness funding to support the tactical aviation force and
(2) projected delays in fielding the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that
might cause the Department of the Navy not to implement the Plan as
early as expected and might increase operations and maintenance costs.
If these factors are not appropriately addressed, the Department of the
Navy may not have sufficient funding to support the readiness levels
required for the smaller force to meet the Navy and Marine Corps'
missions, and the transition to the Plan's force might be more costly
than anticipated.
The contractor's study stated that because the Navy and the Marine
Corps would have a combined smaller tactical aviation force under the
Plan, the services' readiness accounts must be fully funded to ensure
that the aircraft readiness levels are adequate to meet the mission
needs of both services. Furthermore, the contractor recommended that
the Navy conduct an analysis to determine the future readiness funding
requirements and ensure that the Navy has a mechanism in place to fully
fund the readiness accounts. So far, the Navy has not conducted this
analysis, nor has it addressed how it will ensure that the readiness
accounts will be fully funded because Navy officials noted that they
consider future budget estimates to be adequate. However, a recent
Congressional Research Service evaluation of the Plan noted that
operations and maintenance costs have been growing in recent years for
old aircraft and that new aircraft have sometimes, if not often, proved
more expensive to maintain than planned.[Footnote 10] Furthermore, our
analysis of budget data for fiscal years 2001-3 indicates that the
Department of the Navy's operations and maintenance costs averaged
about $388 million more than what was requested for tactical aviation
and other flight operations. Without a review of future readiness
funding requirements, the Navy cannot be certain that sufficient
funding will be available to maintain the readiness levels that will
enable the smaller tactical aviation force to meet the mission needs of
both the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Delays in fielding the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, both known and
potential, could also affect the successful implementation of the Plan.
As a result of engineering and weight problems in the development of
the Joint Strike Fighter, there will be at least a 1-year delay in when
the Navy and Marine Corps had expected to begin receiving the Joint
Strike Fighter aircraft. As noted in the Department of the Navy's most
recent acquisition reports to Congress, the Navy has delayed the Short
Takeoff and Vertical Landing version from 2010 to 2012 and the Navy's
carrier version from 2012 to 2013. Furthermore, in March 2004 we
reported that numerous program risks and possible schedule variances
could cause additional delays.[Footnote 11]
Recent Joint Strike Fighter program cost increases could also delay the
fielding of the aircraft. In DOD's December 31, 2003, procurement plan,
the average unit cost of the aircraft increased from $69 million to
$82 million. Assuming that the Department of the Navy procures the 680
Joint Strike Fighter aircraft as proposed under the Plan, the total
procurement cost will be approximately $9 billion higher. This increase
in cost, when considered within the limits of the expected $3.2 billion
annual procurement budget, will likely prevent the Department of the
Navy from fielding the smaller but more effective tactical aviation
force as early as expected. Additionally, these delays will oblige the
Department of the Navy to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected,
which could result in increased operations and maintenance costs. A
potential increase in operations and maintenance costs makes it even
more important for the Department of the Navy to conduct an analysis to
determine its future readiness funding requirements.
Conclusions:
The contractor's study results provided the Department of the Navy with
a reasonable basis for concluding that it could afford to buy a smaller
but more capable force that would meet its future operating
requirements by using fewer Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation
squadrons of more capable aircraft as a combined force and achieving
efficiencies that allow it to reduce the number of backup aircraft
needed. However, there are known management and funding risks to
realizing the new smaller forces' affordability and effectiveness.
Until Navy management assesses the likelihood of future lower attrition
rates and aircraft maintenance, test and evaluation, and training
requirements, the Navy runs the risk that the number of backup aircraft
it plans to procure will not be adequate to support the smaller
tactical aviation force and add concern to the Plan's affordability.
Furthermore, in the absence of clear DOD guidance citing consistent
criteria and documentation requirements for supporting decisions that
affect units, such as which Navy and Marine Corps Reserve squadrons to
decommission, we remain concerned about the transparency of the process
for reducing the force to those with oversight responsibility. The
inconsistency in the Marine Corps' and Navy's approaches and supporting
documentation confirms the value of such guidance to ensure clear
consideration of the best alternative. Finally, until the Department of
the Navy knows the readiness funding requirements for operating the new
smaller force, it cannot be certain that it can maintain the readiness
levels required to meet operational demands. Such an assessment of
these requirements would provide a sound basis for seeking proper
funding.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance the potential that the future Navy and Marine Corps
integrated tactical aviation force will meet the mission needs of both
services and ensure more transparency when making future
decommissioning decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
take the following three actions:
* direct the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly assess all of the
factors that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft needed
to support a smaller tactical aviation force under the plan to
integrate Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces,
* develop guidance that (1) identifies the criteria and methodology for
analyzing future decisions about which units to decommission and
(2) establishes requirements for documenting the process used and
analysis conducted, and:
* direct the Secretary of the Navy to analyze future readiness funding
requirements to support the tactical aviation integration plan and
include required funding in future budget requests.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Director, Defense
Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, stated that the
department generally agreed with our recommendations and cited actions
that it is taking. The department's comments are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix I.
In partially concurring with our first recommendation to thoroughly
assess all of the factors that provide the basis for the number of
backup aircraft, DOD stated that the Department of the Navy's Naval Air
Systems Command would complete an effort to review all aircraft
inventories to determine the optimum quantity required by July 2004.
However, we were not able to evaluate the Navy's study because Navy
officials have since told us that it will not be completed until late
September or early October 2004.
With regard to our second recommendation to develop guidance that would
identify criteria and a methodology for analyzing future
decommissioning decisions and require documenting the process, DOD
stated that it would change Directive 5410.10, which covers the
notification of inactivation or decommission of forces, and require it
to contain the criteria and methodology used to make the force
structure decision. While we agree that the new guidance, if followed,
would disclose these aspects of the decision-making process, it does
not appear sufficient to meet the need we identified for consistency
and documentation to support force structure decisions. Therefore, we
believe that DOD should take additional steps to meet the intent of our
recommendation by developing consistent criteria and requiring
documentation to ensure transparency for those providing oversight of
such decisions in the future.
In partially concurring with our third recommendation related to future
readiness funding requirements, the Department of Defense stated that
the Department of the Navy is currently developing analytical metrics
that would provide a better understanding of how to fund readiness
accounts to achieve a target readiness level. We support the
development of validated metrics that would link the amount of funding
to readiness levels because they would provide decision makers with
assurance that sufficient funding would be provided.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine how Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, force
structure, and procurement costs would change under the Plan, we
obtained information about the Navy and Marine Corps' current roles and
mission, force structure, and projected tactical aviation procurement
programs and conducted a comparative analysis. We also met with Navy
and Marine Corps officials at the headquarters and major command levels
as well as Congressional Research Service officials to further
understand and document the operational, force structure, and
procurement cost changes expected if the Plan is implemented.
To determine what methodology and assumptions the Navy and Marine Corps
used to analyze the potential for integrating tactical aviation assets
and any limitations that could affect the services' analysis, we
analyzed numerous aspects of the contractor's study that provided the
impetus for the Plan. Specifically, we met with the contractor
officials of Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc., to gain first-hand
knowledge of the model used to assess aircraft performance capability
and the overall reasonableness of the study's methodology. We also
reviewed the scenario and assessed the key analytical assumptions used
in order to evaluate their possible impact on the implementation of the
Plan. We examined operational and aircraft performance factors to
determine the potential limitations that could affect the services'
analysis. Additionally, we held discussions with officials at Navy and
Marine Corps headquarters, Joint Forces Command, Naval Air Forces
Pacific and Atlantic Commands, Marine Forces Atlantic Command, and the
Air Combat Command to validate and clarify how the Plan would or would
not affect the ability of tactical aviation forces to meet mission
needs.
To determine the process the Navy and Marine Corps used to assess which
reserve squadrons should be decommissioned in fiscal year 2004, we
obtained information from the Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters and the
4TH Marine Air Wing showing a comparative analysis of Marine Corps
Reserve squadrons. In the absence of comparable information from the
Navy, we held discussions with the Chief of Naval Reserve and the
Director, Navy Air Warfare, and visited the Naval Air Force Reserve
Command to obtain information about the decision-making process for
selecting the Navy reserve unit to be decommissioned. We also visited
the Commander of the Navy Reserve Carrier Air Wing-20, along with four
reserve squadrons, two each from the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves, to
clarify and better understand their roles, missions, and overall value
to the total force concept.
To determine what other factors might affect the implementation of the
Plan, we analyzed the contractor's study, Congressional Research
Service reports, and prior GAO reports for potential effects that were
not considered in the final results of the analysis. We discussed these
factors with officials from Navy and Marine Corps headquarters as well
as Naval Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic Commands and Marine Forces
Atlantic Command to assess the impact of the Plan on day-to-day
operations.
We assessed the reliability of pertinent data about aircraft
capability, force structure, and military operations contained in the
contractor's study that supports the Plan by (1) reviewing with
contractor officials the methodology used for the analysis;
(2) reviewing the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, prior GAO reports,
and service procurement and aircraft performance documents; and
(3) conducting discussions with Navy and Marine Corps officials. We
concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of
this report.
We performed our review from July 2003 through May 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
congressional committees and parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-4402 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are
included in appendix I.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable David R. Obey:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
JUL 28 2004:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-04-900, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Department of the Navy's Tactical
Aviation Integration Plan Is Reasonable, But Some Factors Could Affect
Implementation," dated June 25, 2004 (GAO Code 350414):
The DoD reviewed the draft report and generally concurs with the
report's recommendations. The rationale for the DoD's position is
provided at enclosure 1.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JUNE 25, 2004 GAO CODE 350414/GAO-04-900:
"FORCE STRUCTURE: Department of the Navy's Tactical Aviation
Integration Plan Is Reasonable, But Some Factors Could Affect
Implementation":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly assess all of the
factors that provide the basis for the number of backup aircraft needed
to support a smaller tactical aviation force under the plan to
integrate Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces.
(Page 20/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department partially concurs with this
recommendation. The DoN is currently reviewing all aircraft inventories
to determine the optimum quantity required for each type of aircraft.
Naval Air Systems Command is leading this effort in conducting
productive ratio (inventory optimization) reviews for all aircraft by
July 2004.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop guidance that: (1) identifies the criteria and methodology for
analyzing future decisions about which units to decommission and (2)
establishes requirements for documenting the process used and analysis
conducted. (Page 20/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department partially concurs with this
recommendation. DoD Directive 5410.10 currently provides for a DoD
notification of any significant inactivation or decommissioning. We
agree that this can be implemented through paragraph 3.2.2 of this
directive modified to read:
3.2.2. The written request will contain all pertinent information
concerning the matter, including the reason for the action; the
criteria and methodology used in making this force structure decision,
the number of personnel affected by the action; the total number of
employees, when appropriate; dollar amounts involved; the estimated
effect on the local economy, and anticipated Congressional interest,
including the names of members who will be notified. A draft of any
proposed press announcement should accompany this request, or a
statement will be included that no press announcement is contemplated.
The Department will make the appropriate change.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to analyze future readiness funding
requirements to support the tactical aviation integration plan and
include required funding in future budget requests. (Page 20/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: The Department partially concurs with this
recommendation. The DoN is currently developing analytical metrics that
they expect will provide them a better understanding of how to fund
readiness accounts to achieve a target readiness level. These metrics
and modeling techniques are being applied to the flight hour,
maintenance and training accounts to better support fleet readiness.
The DoN has implemented the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) with a goal to
have six carriers deployed within thirty days and two more by ninety
days. Execution of this plan in FY06 is envisioned to have these
carriers' target readiness levels of C1.7 (very good) to C3.0 (good).
The Department supports this effort, and will wait to see how the
results of the current execution compare to past readiness before
considering any additional actions.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Richard G. Payne (757) 552-8119 George O. Morse (757) 552-8108:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Willie J. Cheely, Jr; Kelly
Baumgartner; W. William Russell, IV; Michael T. Dice; Cheryl A.
Weissman; Katherine S. Lenane; and Monica L. Wolford also made
significant contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Hereinafter referred to as the Plan.
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-87, §8141 (2003).
[3] S. Rep. No. 108-46, at 123 (2003).
[4] Marine Corps Unit Deployment program maintains three tactical
aviation squadrons at Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, to meet
contingency operations throughout the Western Pacific Theater.
[5] Personnel tempo measures the frequency of deployments and time away
from home. Operational tempo measures the intensity of actions for
military units by tracking the number of days per quarter that the unit
is deployed.
[6] We did not assess the reliability of the Navy's data generating the
attrition rates for the F/A-18 aircraft.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Review of B-1
Process Identifies Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis, GAO-02-846
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2002).
[8] The study team submitted the report to the Commander, 4th Marine
(Reserve) Air Wing, on December 7, 2002.
[9] The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of
the Marine Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force
structure, and requirements validation.
[10] Congressional Research Service, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air
Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 2003).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments
of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
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