Defense Acquisitions
Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program Gao ID: GAO-04-973 September 3, 2004The DD(X) destroyer--a surface ship intended to expand the Navy's littoral warfare capabilities--depends on the development of a number of new technologies to meet its requirements. The Navy intends to authorize detailed design and construction of the first ship in March 2005. GAO's past work has shown that developing advanced systems that rely heavily on new technologies requires a disciplined, knowledge-based approach to ensure cost, schedule, and performance targets are met. Best practices show, for example, that a program should not be launched before critical technologies are sufficiently matured--that is, the technology has been demonstrated in its intended environment--and that a design should be stabilized by the critical design review. Given the complexity of the DD(X) system and the number of new technologies involved, GAO was asked to describe the Navy's acquisition strategy for DD(X) and how it relates to best practices, and how efforts to mature critical technologies are proceeding.
To reduce program risk, the Navy plans to build and test 10 developmental subsystems, or engineering development models, that comprise DD(X)'s critical technologies. While using these models represents a structured and disciplined approach, the program's schedule does not provide for the engineering development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions are made. None of the technologies in the 10 engineering development models was proven to be mature when system design began, as best practices advocates. Moreover, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate DD(X) technology maturity and design stability until after the decision to authorize construction of the lead ship, creating risk that cost, schedule, and performance objectives will not be met. With many of the tests to demonstrate technology maturity occurring around the time of critical design review in late fiscal year 2005, there is the risk that additional time and money will be needed to address issues discovered in testing. Some of the technologies are progressing according to the Navy's plans, while others have experienced challenges. Four of the 10 engineering development models--the total ship computing environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups--are progressing as planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems. However, four other models--the integrated power system, the autonomic fire suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated deckhouse--have encountered some problems. At this point, the most serious appear to be the schedule delay in the dual band radar resulting from the Navy's decision to change one radar type and the additional weight of the integrated power system. The two remaining engineering development models--the integrated undersea warfare system and the advanced gun system--are progressing as planned, but will not culminate in the demonstration of complete subsystems before being installed on the first ship. While the Navy has fallback technologies for the hull form and the integrated power system, it does not have such plans for the other eight engineering development models.
GAO-04-973, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
September 2004:
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:
Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program:
GAO-04-973:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-973, a report to the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The DD(X) destroyer”a surface ship intended to expand the Navy‘s
littoral warfare capabilities”depends on the development of a number
of new technologies to meet its requirements. The Navy intends to
authorize detailed design and construction of the first ship in March
2005.
GAO‘s past work has shown that developing advanced systems that rely
heavily on new technologies requires a disciplined, knowledge-based
approach to ensure cost, schedule, and performance targets are met.
Best practices show, for example, that a program should not be launched
before critical technologies are sufficiently matured”that is, the
technology has been demonstrated in its intended environment”and that
a design should be stabilized by the critical design review.
Given the complexity of the DD(X) system and the number of new
technologies involved, GAO was asked to describe the Navy‘s acquisition
strategy for DD(X) and how it relates to best practices, and how
efforts to mature critical technologies are proceeding.
What GAO Found:
To reduce program risk, the Navy plans to build and test 10
developmental subsystems, or engineering development models, that
comprise DD(X)‘s critical technologies. While using these models
represents a structured and disciplined approach, the program‘s
schedule does not provide for the engineering development models to
generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions are made. None of
the technologies in the 10 engineering development models was proven
to be mature when system design began, as best practices advocates.
Moreover, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate DD(X) technology
maturity and design stability until after the decision to authorize
construction of the lead ship, creating risk that cost, schedule, and
performance objectives will not be met. With many of the tests to
demonstrate technology maturity occurring around the time of critical
design review in late fiscal year 2005, there is the risk that
additional time and money will be needed to address issues discovered
in testing.
DD(X) Lead Ship Schedule:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some of the technologies are progressing according to the Navy‘s plans,
while others have experienced challenges. Four of the 10 engineering
development models”the total ship computing environment, the peripheral
vertical launch system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups”are
progressing as planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems.
However, four other models”the integrated power system, the autonomic
fire suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated
deckhouse”have encountered some problems. At this point, the most
serious appear to be the schedule delay in the dual band radar
resulting from the Navy‘s decision to change one radar type and the
additional weight of the integrated power system. The two remaining
engineering development models”the integrated undersea warfare system
and the advanced gun system”are progressing as planned, but will not
culminate in the demonstration of complete subsystems before being
installed on the first ship. While the Navy has fallback technologies
for the hull form and the integrated power system, it does not have
such plans for the other eight engineering development models.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Program officials
agreed with our assessment of DD(X) program risks, but believe these
risks can be mitigated.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-973.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-2811 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Program Strategy Has Good Features but Demonstrates Technologies after
Key Commitments:
Some DD(X) Development Models Progressing as Planned by the Navy;
Others Are Experiencing Challenges:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: DD(X) Engineering Development Models:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models:
Table 2: Engineering Development Model Test Schedule:
Figure:
Figure 1: DD(X) Lead Ship Schedule of Events:
Letter September 3, 2004:
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Projection Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The DD(X) destroyer is a surface ship intended to expand the Navy's
land attack and littoral warfare capabilities. The program is currently
in the system design phase and the Navy plans to authorize detailed
design and construction of the lead ship in March 2005. A number of
technology advancements are necessary for the DD(X) to meet its
requirements. The Navy plans to demonstrate the technologies by
building and testing 10 developmental subsystems, referred to as
engineering development models.
In response to your February 26, 2004, request, we assessed the DD(X)
program's acquisition strategy and technology maturation efforts, and
briefed your staff on May 18, 2004. As agreed in that meeting, we have
prepared this report, which updates and further explains the
information briefed. This letter addresses: (1) the program's strategy
for maturing technologies and how it compares to best practices and
(2) how efforts to mature critical technologies are proceeding.
To assess the program's strategy for maturing technologies, we reviewed
the program's acquisition strategy, test and evaluation master plan,
and other relevant documents and information. We also drew on our prior
work on best practices in developing complex systems. To address the
progress of technology development efforts, we analyzed reviews of
current test activities and design assessments, cost performance
reports, and other program information. We also met with program
officials including those leading each of the engineering development
models. In addition, we met with officials of companies under contract
to design DD(X), including the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman Ship
Systems, and several of its subcontractors. We compared data obtained
from various documents and program officials against each other to
ensure data reliability. We conducted our work from April 2004 to July
2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
The engineering development models used by the program to mature
technologies and reduce risk represent a structured and disciplined
approach. The models generally call for designing, developing, and
testing the DD(X) subsystems that house the key technologies before
ship construction begins. Formal risk assessments and risk reduction
strategies are an element of each model. However, the program's
schedule does not provide for the models to demonstrate high levels of
maturity when needed. Best practices call for demonstrating
technologies before entering system design and stability of system
design before proceeding with production. None of the 10 engineering
development models were demonstrated when system design began. DD(X)
technology maturity and design stability will not be demonstrated
before the decision to authorize construction of the lead ship,
creating risks for establishing and meeting realistic cost, schedule,
and performance objectives. With many of the tests to demonstrate
technology maturity occurring around the time of critical design review
in late fiscal year 2005, there is a risk that additional time and
money will be necessary to address issues discovered in testing.
Program officials acknowledge the risks associated with the advanced
technologies, but believe that taking such risks is warranted to ensure
that DD(X) technologies are not obsolete and that they have taken
adequate steps to mitigate the risks before ship construction begins.
Of the 10 engineering development models, four are progressing as
planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems, including the total
ship computing environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the
hull form, and the infrared mockups. Four models have encountered some
problems, including the integrated power system, the autonomic fire
suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated deckhouse.
At this point, the most serious appear to be the schedule delay in the
radar resulting from the Navy's decision to change one radar type and
the additional weight of the integrated power system. The two remaining
engineering development models-the integrated undersea warfare system
and the advanced gun system-are progressing as planned, but will not
culminate in the demonstration of complete subsystems before being
installed on the first ship. The Navy does have backup approaches as a
contingency for the hull form and the integrated power system, but not
for the other engineering development models.
Background:
The DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to provide
advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. Among its
planned features is the ability to engage land targets from long ranges
using its 155-millimeter guns and Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles.
The ship will also feature reduced radar, acoustic, and heat signatures
to increase survivability in the littorals. In November 2001, the Navy
restructured the program to focus on developing and maturing a number
of transformational technologies. These technologies will provide a
baseline to support development of a range of future surface ships such
as the future cruiser and the Littoral Combat Ship.
The DD(X) program is managing risk by designing, developing, and
testing 10 engineering development models for the program's critical
technologies. Each of the 10 engineering development models represents
an experimental subsystem of DD(X) and may incorporate more than one
transformational technology.
The key events in the DD(X) schedule are shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: DD(X) Lead Ship Schedule of Events:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The program completed its system-level preliminary design review
March 2004 and is currently in system design. The next major event
occurs in March 2005, when the Navy will seek authority to commit
research, development, test and evaluation funds for detailed design
and construction of the lead ship. The program's system-level critical
design review will be held late in fiscal year 2005 after the lead ship
authorization and will assess design maturity. The current contract for
design and development of DD(X) ends in September 2005. Further design
and development activities, including detailed design and construction,
will take place under a new contract to be awarded in March 2005.
The Conference Report to the fiscal year 2005 Defense Appropriations
Act states that the funds appropriated for DD(X) in the act are limited
to design and advanced procurement requirements for the first two
ships. The Conference Report further directs that no funds are
available for the procurement of materials dependent upon delivery of
key DD(X) technologies unless those technologies have undergone
testing. The Conference Report also states that the Navy should
complete land-based testing of the advanced gun system and integrated
power system prior to the completion of the critical design
review.[Footnote 1]
Program Strategy Has Good Features but Demonstrates Technologies after
Key Commitments:
The Navy is developing 12 technologies for DD(X) using 10 engineering
development models. Engineering development models seek to demonstrate
key DD(X) subsystems and may involve more than one critical technology
(see table 1).
Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models:
Engineering development models: Advanced Gun System;
Description: Will provide long-range fire support for forces ashore
through the use of unmanned operations and the long-range land attack
projectile.
Engineering development models: Autonomic Fire Suppression System;
Description: Intended to reduce crew size by providing a fully
automated response to fires.
Engineering development models: Dual Band Radar;
Description: Horizon and volume search improved for performance in
adverse environments.
Engineering development models: Hull Form;
Description: Designed to significantly reduce radar cross section.
Engineering development models: Infrared Mockup;
Description: Seeks to reduce ship's heat signature in multiple areas.
Engineering development models: Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures;
Description: A composite structure that integrates apertures of radar
and communications systems.
Engineering development models: Integrated Power System;
Description: Power system that integrates power generation, propulsion,
and power distribution and management.
Engineering development models: Integrated Undersea Warfare System;
Description: System for mine avoidance and submarine warfare with
automated software to reduce workload.
Engineering development models: Peripheral Vertical Launch System;
Description: Multipurpose missile launch system located on the
periphery of the ship to reduce damage to ship systems.[A].
Engineering development models: Total Ship Computing Environment;
Description: Provides single computing environment for all ship systems
to speed command while reducing manning.
Source: DD(X) program office and contractors.
[A] The Navy refers to both the enclosure for the launcher and the full
subsystem as the Peripheral Vertical Launch System.
[End of table]
The engineering development models are the most significant aspect of
the program's risk reduction strategy. To demonstrate technologies,
each DD(X) development model follows a structured approach for design,
development, and testing. Initially, requirements for each of the
development models are defined and recorded in a common database.
The risk of not meeting these requirements is assessed and strategies
are formulated to reduce these risks. Once designs are formulated,
components are tested to build knowledge about a subsystem's viability.
In testing, the performance of engineering development models is
confirmed. It is these tests that provide confidence in a technology's
ability to operate as intended. Once the technology is demonstrated,
the subsystem can be integrated into the ship's system design.
Our reviews of commercial and Department of Defense acquisition
programs have identified a number of specific practices that ensure
that high levels of knowledge are achieved at key junctures in
development and used to make investment decisions.[Footnote 2] The most
important practice is achieving a high level of technology maturity at
the start of system development. A technology reaches full maturity
when its performance is successfully demonstrated in its intended
environment. Maturing a technology to this level before including it
into system design and development can reduce risk by creating
confidence that a technology will work as expected and allows the
developer to focus on integrating mature technologies into the ship
design. This improves the ability to establish realistic cost,
schedule, and performance objectives as well as the ability to meet
them. Including the technologies in system development before reaching
maturity raises the risk of discovering problems late that can increase
the cost and time needed to complete design and fabrication.
The Navy's use of engineering development models to mature DD(X)
technologies represents a disciplined process for generating the
information needed for development, and corresponds with portions of
the best practices approach. In using engineering development models,
the Navy seeks to achieve high levels of technology maturity by first
defining the requirements and risks of a developmental technology and
then executing a series of tests to reduce these risks and prove the
utility of a technology in its intended environment. The progress of
technology maturity is recorded and communicated clearly through the
use of established metrics, affording the program manager and others
readily available information for use in decision making.
The program's schedule, however, does not allow most engineering
development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key
decisions are made. None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10
engineering development models were mature at the start of system
design and none are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to
authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship. Under the
current schedule, 7 of the 10 subsystems will not be demonstrated until
the end of program's critical design review in August 2005 or beyond.
The decision to authorize award of the contract for detail design and
construction of the lead ship will thus be made before the technologies
are proven and the design is stable. By the end of the critical design
review, only three subsystems are expected to have completed testing:
the autonomic fire suppression system, the hull form, and the infrared
mockups. The integrated power system, peripheral vertical launch
system, and total ship computing environment complete testing just
after the critical design review. The remaining four subsystems
complete testing well after critical design review or are not tested as
fully integrated systems until after installation on the first ship.
The Navy is aware of the risks presented by its schedule but stated
that exit criteria have been established for milestone decisions which
ensure requirements will be met. Program officials further stated that,
according to the Department of Defense acquisition policy, technologies
for ships do not have to be mature until shipboard installation.
Our reviews of commercial best practices identified a second critical
practice that increases a program's chances of success: achieving
design stability by the system-level critical design review. For a
stable design, subsystems are integrated into a product that meets the
requirements of the user. Design stability requires detailed knowledge
of the form, fit, and function of all technologies as well as the
integration of individual, fully matured subsystems. Stability of
design allows for testing to prove system reliability and leads into
production planning.
Most of the testing of the engineering development models will take
place in the months immediately before and after critical design review
and beyond. Even if the models proceed with complete success, they will
not be done in time to achieve design stability at the critical design
review. If problems are found in testing-as has been the case with
other programs-they could result in changes in the design, delays in
product delivery, and increases in product cost.[Footnote 3] Detailed
knowledge about subsystems and their component technologies is
necessary for developing the system design. If this information is not
available and assumptions about operating characteristics have to be
made, redesign may be necessary when reliable information becomes
available. This can increase the schedule and the costs of system
design. Unstable system design could also affect construction. Higher
construction costs are likely to be incurred if work is done
inefficiently or if changes result in rework.
One example of the consequences of technology and design immaturity
already apparent in the DD(X) program is the development of the dual
band radar and its impact on the integrated deckhouse. The dual band
radar consists of two separate radar technologies and will not complete
testing until fiscal year 2008. Due to this lengthy period of testing,
the dual band radar may not be installed until the first ship is
afloat. Contractors have stated that this schedule has led to the need
for increased funding. Because the dual band radar will not be fully
tested by critical design review, program officials have had to make
some assumptions about where in the deckhouse it will be placed. If the
weight of the radar increases or if other technical factors cause it to
be relocated, a redesign effort may be needed to assure that
requirements are met. As the deckhouse forms a significant portion of
the DD(X), redesign could have an impact on the ship as a whole.
Other shipbuilding programs have developed strategies that call for
maturing critical technologies while still providing decision makers
with relatively high levels of knowledge at key decision points. For
example, the CVN-21 future aircraft carrier program has a risk
reduction strategy that defines a timeline for making decisions about a
technology's maturity. The majority of these decisions are made early
in the system design phase prior to the system critical design review.
This should allow the system design to proceed in integrating
technologies with the assurance that they will work in their intended
environment. Lead ship authorization occurs after critical design
review so that the maturity of the design can be demonstrated before a
decision is made.
Some DD(X) Development Models Progressing as Planned by the Navy;
Others Are Experiencing Challenges:
The DD(X) program entered its system design phase without the majority
of its technologies completing their design or component testing stage.
These activities include events like design reviews for the integrated
power system and damage testing on components of the peripheral
vertical launch system. The only development model beyond these initial
stages is the hull form, which has completed its initial tests and
simulations and is now entering a second design and test phase.
Testing subsystems to demonstrate whether they will work in their
intended environment is scheduled to begin for most development models
in fiscal year 2005 and will continue, in some cases, beyond fiscal
year 2006, as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Engineering Development Model Test Schedule:
Engineering development model: Advanced Gun System: Advanced Gun
System;
Begin testing: June 2005;
End testing: August 2005.
Engineering development model: Advanced Gun System: Long Range Land
Attack Projectile;
Begin testing: September 2004;
End testing: September 2005.
Engineering development model: Advanced Gun System: Integrated
System[A];
Begin testing: --;
End testing: --.
Engineering development model: Autonomic Fire Suppression System;
Begin testing: January 2005;
End testing: August 2005.
Engineering development model: Dual Band Radar: Multi-Function Radar;
Begin testing: October 2004;
End testing: April 2006.
Engineering development model: Dual Band Radar: Volume Search Radar;
Begin testing: September 2006;
End testing: June 2007.
Engineering development model: Dual Band Radar: Integrated System;
Begin testing: August 2007;
End testing: January 2008.
Engineering development model: Hull Form;
Begin testing: August 2003;
End testing: July 2004.
Engineering development model: Infrared Mockup;
Begin testing: March 2005;
End testing: July 2005.
Engineering development model: Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures;
Begin testing: Integrated Power System: February 2005;
End testing: Integrated Power System: June 2005[B].
Engineering development model:
Begin testing: July 2005;
End testing: September 2005.
Engineering development model: Integrated Undersea Warfare System:
Begin testing: [C];
End testing: [C].
Engineering development model: Peripheral Vertical Launch System:
Advanced Vertical Launch System (Launcher):
Begin testing: May 2005;
End testing: September 2005.
Engineering development model: Peripheral Vertical Launch System:
Peripheral Vertical Launch System (Enclosure);
Begin testing: March 2005;
End testing: May 2005.
Engineering development model: Peripheral Vertical Launch System:
Integrated System;
Begin testing: May 2005;
End testing: May 2005.
Engineering development model: Total Ship Computing Environment;
Begin testing: August 2005;
End testing: September 2005.
Source: DD(X) program office and contractors.
[A] Tests using both the gun system and projectile are not performed
until after ship installation.
[B] Tests with volume search portion of dual band radar are not
performed under the current contract.
[C] Tests of the undersea warfare system to demonstrate components will
occur between May 2004 and December 2005 the full system will not be
demonstrated until after ship installation.
[End of table]
Four of the 10 engineering development models--the total ship computing
environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and
the infrared mockups--are progressing as planned toward demonstrating
complete subsystems. However, challenges have arisen with other
development models. The impact of some of these challenges has been
mitigated with minimal change to the program, but others remain
unresolved or have resulted in rescheduling and cost growth. Only two
of the engineering development models, the hullform and the integrated
power system, have fallback technologies that could be used if current
technologies do not meet requirements. All other engineering
development models could necessitate system level redesign if they fail
to mature technologies to meet requirements. We have already noted the
challenges with the dual band radar and its impact on the integrated
deckhouse. Other challenges are highlighted below. Program officials
agreed with our assessment of DD(X) program risks, but believe these
risks can be mitigated through use of fallback technologies and design
budgeting. Design budgeting refers to the practice of building in extra
margins, such as weight and space, to accommodate growth as the design
matures. Appendix I provides details on the status of all 10
engineering development models.
The integrated power system is currently exceeding its weight
allowances by a significant amount and has used up its entire
additional design margin for weight. This means that any further
increases in weight could affect other systems or result in an
unplanned and unbudgeted weight reduction program. The power system has
also experienced some software compliance issues with the total ship
computing environment. Program officials have defined the software
issue and are working toward a solution. In addition, the testing
schedule for the power system has been altered due to changes to the
dual band radar. Program officials had planned to test the two
subsystems together in at-sea tests on a surrogate vessel. When the
delays in testing for dual band radar occurred, at-sea tests for the
power system were cancelled. To compensate for the loss of knowledge
that was to be gained by this testing, the program office plans for
increased fidelity in land based testing. Plans for the integrated
power system do include the use of a fallback technology. Use of the
technology would require some trade-offs in performance, weight, and
noise requirements. In their comments on this report, the Department of
Defense stated that the Navy has allocated additional margin from the
total ship design to account for weight growth in the integrated power
system. While this adjustment in overall ship margin does not directly
impact the overall ship design, it may leave less space for future
growth in other systems.
While the early tests of the autonomic fire suppression system exceeded
expectations, by sustaining significant damage and still controlling
the fire, some challenges have arisen that delayed later testing. Like
the power system, the fire suppression system experienced compatibility
issues with the total ship computing environment. These issues have
been recognized and the program office has identified solutions to
resolve them. These software compatibility issues caused a delay in the
system tests that pushed their completion beyond the system-level
critical design review.
The current testing plans for the integrated undersea warfare system
include testing of the dual frequency sonar array for internal
interference, the ability of the high frequency portion of this array
to detect mines, and the software necessary to integrate all functions
and reduce the sailor's workload. Though these tests may prove the
functionality of components and technologies within the undersea
warfare system, they do not demonstrate the system as a whole. As a
result, when the current series of testing concludes in May 2005, the
undersea warfare system will not have demonstrated operations in the
intended environment.
While development of the advanced gun system is proceeding as planned
and has even overcome early challenges in design and development, the
current plans do not include fully demonstrating the maturity of the
subsystem. Land based testing of the gun system, including the
automated mount and magazine, is planned for the summer of 2005 and
flight tests for the munition are set to complete in September of 2005.
However, the two technologies will not be tested together until after
ship installation. Program officials cited lack of adequate test
facilities as the reason for the separate tests.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it is
appropriate to undertake a reasonable amount of risk in the DD(X) lead
ship, given the long production lead time in shipbuilding. It noted
that the DD(X) risk mitigation approach represents the management of
finite resources to achieve innovation and to implement a cost
effective test plan designed to address those risks. DOD stated that
the DD(X) schedule supports readiness of all the engineering
development models in time for ship installation, which for
shipbuilding programs, is the most relevant point of reference for
technology maturity as DOD policy indicates technologies for ships do
not have to be mature until that time. DOD concluded that the DD(X)
engineering development models are on track to support a milestone B
decision in March 2005 to authorize the lead ship and to achieve
maturity prior to installation. DOD pointed out that it had selected
exit criteria for that decision to provide for assessments of critical
technologies and that results of all required tests will be available
for the decision. DOD made specific comments on individual engineering
development models, which we address elsewhere in the report.
As noted in the draft report, we believe the approach the Navy has
taken to demonstrate DD(X) technologies through the engineering
development models is both structured and disciplined. However, the
short amount of time between lead ship authorization and ship launch (5
years and 3 months), together with the fact that virtually every major
subsystem on the ship depends on a new technology or novel use of
existing technologies, frame a challenge that involves significant
risk. While tests on some key subsystems are scheduled to be conducted
by the milestone B decision, these tests are to demonstrate the
functionality of components but not the subsystems. Thus, the full
demonstration of technology maturity and the resolution of unknowns
will continue beyond the milestone decision. Our past work on best
practices has shown that technological unknowns discovered later in
product development lead to cost increases and schedule delays. Two key
factors that can mitigate the effect of such risks--time in the
schedule to address problems and the availability of backup
technologies--are largely unavailable for the DD(X) program. While DOD
policy allows for technologies to mature up to the point of ship
installation, it does not necessarily follow that this is a best
practice. In fact, DD(X) will proceed from the start of development to
initial capability in about the same time as other non-shipbuilding
systems for which DOD does call for demonstration of technology
maturity before development start.[Footnote 4]
We plan to provide copies of this report to the Senate Armed Services
Committee; the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Defense; and the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Defense. We also will provide copies to the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of
the Navy. We will make copies available to others upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4841; or Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director,
on (202) 512-6785. Major contributors to this report are J. Kristopher
Keener, Angela D. Thomas, and Karen Sloan.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: DD(X) Engineering Development Models:
[See PDF for image]
[End of slide presentation]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
AUG 20 2004:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer
Program," dated August 2004 (GAO Code 120321/GAO-04-973).
The GAO offered no recommendations; however, the Department would like
to provide technical corrections and additional information
(enclosure).
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 2004 GAO CODE 120321/GAO-04-973:
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program"
(GAO Code 120321)":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE:
Comments regarding the content of the report follow.
1 - Page 3: The report identifies "Ship Launch" as September 2009. The
correct date is June 2010.
2 - Table 2, page 7: The report's EDM Test Schedule, identifies "IPS
EDM Begin Testing" date as September 2005. The correct date is February
2005.
3 - "GAO Highlights": The ability of DD(X) to deliver revolutionary
capabilities to the fleet with reduced crew necessitates some element
of development and production risk. Given the long production lead time
in shipbuilding, the Navy believes it is appropriate to undertake a
reasonable amount of risk in the DD(X) lead ship, in order to deliver
technological benefits to the rest of the class. The DD(X) risk
mitigation approach represents the management of finite resources to
achieve innovation and to implement a cost effective test plan designed
to address those risks with the greatest potential to challenge the
ship's ability to conduct its mission. The concerns expressed by GAO
regarding that approach, as it relates to the DD(X) schedule and the
execution of the EDMs are discussed below. The DD(X) schedule supports
readiness of all of the DD(X) EDMs in time for ship installation, which
for shipbuilding programs, is the most relevant point of reference for
technology maturity. In the case of DD(X), lead ship contract award
(FY05) precedes scheduled system installations by as much as four years
(FY09), thus allowing additional time for system development and test.
As the GAO notes, DOD acquisition policy indicates that technologies
for ships do not have to be mature until shipboard installation. In
conclusion, the DD(X) EDMs are on track to support a Milestone B
decision and to achieve maturity prior to ship installation.
4 - Page 1: The GAO states that the DD(X) schedule "does not provide
for the models to demonstrate high levels of maturity when needed." The
DD(X) program is on track to support the demonstration of certain
fundamental capabilities at Milestone B (prior to lead ship contract
award), to complete necessary testing by ship Critical Design Review
(CDR), and to mature systems in time for ship installation.
5 - Page 5: The Department selected the exit criteria for DD(X)
Milestone B to provide assessments of critical technologies prior to
the contract award. Results of all tests required in support of
Milestone B including Long Range Land Attack Projectile guided
flights, and testing of the Advanced Gun System, Multi-Function Radar,
and Integrated Power System, will be available in time to support the
review in March 2005, prior to the Phase IV contract award. Following
Milestone B and lead ship contract award, the Navy will complete
additional testing to provide data necessary to feed into the CDR,
which will be a series of events stretching across the summer of 2005.
6 - Page 8: Integrated Power System (IPS). The GAO notes that IPS has
exceeded its weight allowance and consumed the additional design margin
for weight, as well. While IPS has exceeded its original weight
allocation, the Navy allocated additional margin from the total ship
margin without impact to the overall ship design. As such, the Navy
does not consider IPS weight status to be indicative of significant
risk. GAO also concludes that the Navy altered at-sea test plans for
IPS due to changes in the schedule for the Dual Band Radar EDM.
However, the decision to eliminate at-sea testing for IPS reflected the
determination that it is possible to get the same information at the
land based test site in a more controlled and cost effective manner by
utilizing a dynamic load machine that simulates propeller loading and
not ship motions. The cancellation of at-sea testing for IPS allowed
the Navy to instead focus resources on IPS integration, which the Navy
has identified as an area of technical risk.
7 - Page 9: Advanced Gun System (AGS). The GAO expresses concern that
the Navy will not test the AGS and Long Range Land Attack Projectile
(LRLAP) together until after ship installation and cites the lack of
adequate test facilities as the reason. Although the Navy will not test
the AGS and LRLAP together prior to ship installation, the current test
program incorporates overlapping interfaces to mitigate that risk. Gun
and magazine testing at Army Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah,
incorporates LRLAP-like slugs and actual tactical propellant charges.
Similarly, the projectile testing at Naval Air Warfare Center/Weapons
Division, Point Mugu, California, utilizes an AGS barrel. Lastly, Navy
decided to forego the testing based on an assessment that the
investment required to test AGS and LRLAP together would not be cost
effective in terms of the additional risk mitigation achieved.
8 - Page 6: Dual Band Radar (DBR). The GAO cites the development of the
DBR as "one example of the consequences of technology and design
immaturity already apparent in the DD(X) program." In fact, the changes
to the DBR development schedule were the result of a deliberate Navy
decision to change the Volume Search Radar (VSR) frequency from L-band
to S-band, not of issues with the technical approach. The Navy's
investment decision was intended to leverage development resources for
a scalable radar for possible use on the next generation cruiser,
CG(X).
9 - Page 6: Integrated Deck House and Apertures (IDHA). The GAO
expresses concern that redesign of the integrated deck house, which is
currently on schedule to support CDR, could be required if the weight
of the DBR changes or if other technical factors cause it to be
relocated. In order to mitigate that risk, the Navy sized the DBR
array design to support potential future improvements and to allow the
system to absorb design adjustments without impact to the IDHA.
Similarly, the IDHA design incorporates sufficient power and cooling
margins to address changes resulting from the S-band testing. VSR
interface commonality with the Multi-Function Radar portion of DBR is
expected to serve as an effective risk reducer for integration.
10 - Page 8: Autonomic Fire Suppression System (AFSS). The GAO
references AFSS compatibility issues with the Total Ship Computing
Environment and notes that, as a result, Navy delayed tests beyond the
system CDR. It is important to understand that the tests rescheduled
are for supervisory software, which the Navy does not consider a
significant system risk. The AFSS EDM has demonstrated its ability to
extinguish fire and to successfully reconfigure. Therefore, the Navy
has addressed key risks before the CDR.
11 - Page 8: Integrated Undersea Warfare (IUSW). The GAO indicates that
the IUSW system will not demonstrate operations in the intended
environment. The Navy is testing the components of the IUSW system,
vice the entire system, in a relevant environment to mitigate that
risk. For IUSW, the Navy decided to focus resources on key performance
technologies of the EDM with higher perceived risk.
GAO Comments:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated August 20, 2004.
1. Change to the ship schedule incorporated into the body of the
report.
2. The period from February to July includes only testing of the
permanent magnet motor, one component of the integrated power system.
The date in the report was changed to July 2005 to reflect the
beginning of full system testing of the integrated power system.
3. This is not a GAO conclusion. The statement is based on statements
provided by the Navy as well as industry contractors.
4. Our discussion of the technology and design maturity of the dual
band radar and the integrated deckhouse deals with the impact of the
Navy's decision to change radar frequency, not the reason for the
decision.
[End of section]
(120365):
FOOTNOTES
[1] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-622, at 188 and 310 (2004).
[2] For more information see GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-
99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999) and Best Practices: Capturing
Design Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
[3] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems'
Features, Risks, and Alternatives, GAO-04-635T (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
1, 2004).
[4] Examples include the F/A-22 Raptor (14.5 years), the Joint Strike
Fighter (10 years 5 months to 11 years 5 months), and the Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle (7 years 9 months). DD(X) will take 8 years and 2
months.
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