Chemical And Biological Defense
Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers Gao ID: GAO-05-8 January 28, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD doctrine calls for U.S. forces to be sufficiently trained to continue their missions in an NBC-contaminated environment. Given longstanding concerns about the preparedness of DOD's servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has undertaken a body of work covering NBC protective equipment and training. For this review, GAO was asked to determine the following: (1) To what extent do Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending combat training centers participate in NBC training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC tasks at the centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format that allows the services to identify lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?
Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique opportunity for units to perform advanced training under conditions that approximate actual combat, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. Although DOD and both services have stressed the importance of including NBC defense in all types of training, they have not established minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers. Commanders sometimes reduce NBC training to focus on other priority areas. As a result, the extent of NBC training actually conducted at these centers varies widely, and some units receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two Army training centers estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, a typical unit training rotation for a brigade-sized unit--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--experienced NBC events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train in full NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the Marine Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at its training center for at least 5 years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps began to introduce NBC training into its combined arms exercises in two rotations that occurred in January and February 2004 but suspended it because of other priorities related to preparing units for ongoing operations. Without minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the opportunity to use the centers' unique environment to improve units' proficiency in NBC defense. When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers noted that many units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army standards. For example, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades attending one center did not meet standards for basic NBC tasks such as donning protective gear, seeking overhead shelter, and conducting unmasking procedures. Observers at the Army centers often cited inadequate home-station training as the reason units were not performing basic NBC tasks to standards. Skills in these basic tasks are normally acquired during training at home stations and lay the foundation for acquiring more complex skills associated with large-unit NBC training. When units arrive at the centers with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be able to take full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit NBC training opportunities offered at these centers. The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on NBC training at the centers in a way that can be used to identify trends over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army and Marine Corps doctrine stresses the importance of identifying lessons learned during training to enable tailored training at home stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that similar problems will occur during operations. Because service guidance does not require standardized reporting formats, the training centers submit different types of after-action reports that might or might not mention NBC training. This lack of standardized reporting represents opportunities lost to the services to collect comparable data to identify NBC training trends and lessons learned.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-8, Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2005:
Chemical and Biological Defense:
Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and
Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers:
GAO-05-8:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-8, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely
that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
weapons against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD doctrine calls for U.S.
forces to be sufficiently trained to continue their missions in an NBC-
contaminated environment. Given longstanding concerns about the
preparedness of DOD‘s servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has
undertaken a body of work covering NBC protective equipment and
training. For this review, GAO was asked to determine the following:
(1) To what extent do Army and Marine Corps units and personnel
attending combat training centers participate in NBC training, and to
what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC tasks at the
centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine Corps
report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format that allows
the services to identify lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-
center comparisons?
What GAO Found:
Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique
opportunity for units to perform advanced training under conditions
that approximate actual combat, thereby enabling units to assess and
build upon skills learned at home stations. Although DOD and both
services have stressed the importance of including NBC defense in all
types of training, they have not established minimum NBC-related tasks
for units attending the centers. Commanders sometimes reduce NBC
training to focus on other priority areas. As a result, the extent of
NBC training actually conducted at these centers varies widely, and
some units receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two
Army training centers estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003,
a typical unit training rotation for a brigade-sized unit”which may
include up to 4,000 soldiers”experienced NBC events that required only
about 5 percent of these troops to train in full NBC protective
clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the Marine Corps, no NBC
training was conducted during combined arms exercises at its training
center for at least 5 years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps
began to introduce NBC training into its combined arms exercises in two
rotations that occurred in January and February 2004 but suspended it
because of other priorities related to preparing units for ongoing
operations. Without minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the
opportunity to use the centers‘ unique environment to improve units‘
proficiency in NBC defense.
When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers noted that many
units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army standards. For example,
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades attending one center
did not meet standards for basic NBC tasks such as donning protective
gear, seeking overhead shelter, and conducting unmasking procedures.
Observers at the Army centers often cited inadequate home-station
training as the reason units were not performing basic NBC tasks to
standards. Skills in these basic tasks are normally acquired during
training at home stations and lay the foundation for acquiring more
complex skills associated with large-unit NBC training. When units
arrive at the centers with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be
able to take full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit
NBC training opportunities offered at these centers.
The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on
NBC training at the centers in a way that can be used to identify
trends over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons.
Army and Marine Corps doctrine stresses the importance of identifying
lessons learned during training to enable tailored training at home
stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that similar problems
will occur during operations. Because service guidance does not require
standardized reporting formats, the training centers submit different
types of after-action reports that might or might not mention NBC
training. This lack of standardized reporting represents opportunities
lost to the services to collect comparable data to identify NBC
training trends and lessons learned.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD direct the services to (1) establish
minimum NBC tasks for units participating in training exercises at the
centers and (2) standardize reporting formats on NBC training that
occurs at the centers. DOD agreed with the report‘s findings and
recommendations and is now taking the necessary actions for
implementation when operating conditions permit.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-8.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do
Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards:
Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully
Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine
Corps:
Appendix III: NBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps
Combined Arms Exercise Program in January 2004:
Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for
After-Action Reporting for the Army's CTCs:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: NTC's Assessment of Brigades' Performance of NBC Tasks during
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003:
Figure:
Figure 1: Soldiers at CMTC Undergoing NBC Training:
Abbreviations:
CALL: Center for Army Lessons Learned:
CMTC: Combat Maneuver Training Center:
CTC: Combat Training Center:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
JRTC: Joint Readiness Training Center:
NBC: nuclear, biological, and chemical:
NTC: National Training Center:
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 28, 2005:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely
that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
(NBC) against U.S. forces as a means of offsetting superior
conventional warfare capabilities, for gaining an asymmetrical
advantage, or as an act of terrorism. Consequently, DOD policies
require U.S. forces to be provided with NBC protective equipment and to
be sufficiently trained not only to survive an NBC attack but also to
continue to perform their missions in a contaminated environment. Given
long-standing concerns about the preparedness of DOD's servicemembers
in this critical area, you requested that we undertake a body of work
covering DOD's management of its NBC protective equipment and training.
This report is one of a series on this subject that we have issued at
your request.
For this review, you asked that we examine the contribution of the
Army's and Marine Corps' combat training centers (CTCs) in preparing
servicemembers for surviving and accomplishing their missions under NBC
conditions. For the Army, these centers include the National Training
Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the
Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). The Marine Corps' combat
training center is located at Twentynine Palms, California. These two
military services introduce NBC training to their servicemembers in
basic training and continue with formal and on-the-job training at NBC
schools and home stations and during collective training field
exercises, such as those offered at the CTCs. The CTCs are large ground-
combat training sites where units can train collectively in a realistic
battlefield environment, including live fire.[Footnote 1] The centers
represent an opportunity for units to train on their mission- essential
tasks and to discover--through training lessons learned provided by
expert observers/controllers--areas requiring additional training at
their home stations or elsewhere that could improve their ability to
perform on an actual battlefield. Specifically, you asked that we
answer the following questions: (1) To what extent do Army and Marine
Corps units and their personnel attending CTCs participate in NBC
training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC
tasks to service standards while at the CTCs? (2) Do the Army and the
Marine Corps report NBC training at the CTCs in a standardized format
that allows the services to identify trends and lessons learned and to
do cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?
To obtain information on NBC training that occurred at the Army's and
Marine Corps' CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we interviewed
officials and analyzed relevant documents at each of the centers and
other Army and Marine Corps organizations related to NBC and CTC
training. We determined that the data and documents we reviewed were
sufficiently reliable for answering the above questions. We performed
our review from March 2003 through October 2004 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. A more thorough
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Army's and the Marine Corps' CTCs provide a unique opportunity for
brigade-sized units to perform advanced training under a variety of
conditions that are designed to approximate actual combat as closely as
possible, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills
learned at home station. Despite the unique opportunities offered by
these centers, the amount of NBC training that Army and Marine Corps
personnel and units experienced at the centers varied widely during
fiscal years 2002 and 2003. When units did undergo NBC training at the
centers, they often did not perform to the level of proficiency defined
by the services as acceptable. Furthermore, neither service has
identified the minimum NBC tasks for units attending CTCs. Neither do
the services always report their lessons learned on NBC training in a
useful manner.
Although DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the
importance of including NBC defense as a condition under which units
must perform their missions in training exercises, they have not
established minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers.
Commanders are given discretion to prioritize training needs, and
sometimes they reduce NBC training to allow time for units to focus on
other priority areas. As a result, the extent of NBC training actually
conducted at Army and Marine Corps CTCs varies widely, and some units
receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two Army CTCs
estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, on average, a typical
brigade-sized unit--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--experienced
NBC events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train
in the full NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more.
For the Marine Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined
arms exercises at the Marine Corps' training center for at least 5
years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps began to introduce NBC
training into its combined arms exercises in two training rotations
that occurred in January and February 2004, but this training was then
suspended because of other training priorities related to preparing
units for ongoing operations. In the absence of minimum NBC tasks, the
services often miss the opportunity to use the unique environment of
the CTCs to improve the proficiency of units in NBC defense.
When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers/controllers at the
CTCs noted that many units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army
standards. For example, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most
brigades attending one center did not meet standards for basic NBC
tasks, such as donning protective gear, seeking overhead shelter, and
conducting unmasking procedures. Observers/controllers at the Army's
CTCs often cited inadequate home-station training as the reason that
units did not perform basic NBC tasks to these standards. Skills in
these basic tasks are normally maintained during training at home
stations and lay the foundation for acquiring the more complex skills
associated with large-unit NBC training. When units arrive at these
CTCs with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be able to take
full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit NBC training
opportunities available at these CTCs.
Army and Marine Corps policies and doctrine stress the importance of
capturing lessons learned during training, which enable units to tailor
training at home stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that
the same problems will occur during operations. However, the services
do not always report lessons learned on NBC training at the CTCs in a
way that can be used to identify trends over time and allow for cross-
unit and cross-CTC comparisons. Because the services' policies do not
require standardized reporting formats to capture NBC training that
occurs at the CTCs, the training centers submit different types of
after-action reports and lessons learned that might or might not
mention NBC training. For example, while Army CTC observers/controllers
produce extensive written and recorded video material that is intended
to help commanders identify needs for subsequent training to address
their units' training needs, including training in NBC tasks, there is
little consistency in the Army's after-action reports in the structure,
format, and content when NBC training is described. The Marine Corps'
after-action reporting system for exercises at Twentynine Palms does
not include any discussion of NBC training because NBC training has
been included only twice in combined arms exercises during the last 5
years and because Marine Corps orders do not require the discussion of
NBC training even when it does occur. NBC lessons learned during
training rotations at the CTCs would be very useful for the services in
their attempts to anticipate, train for, and minimize the occurrence of
NBC problems during operations. Consequently, the lack of standardized
reporting to capture NBC training lessons learned at CTCs represents
opportunities lost to Army and Marine Corps units to benefit from other
units' training experiences and to better identify needs for subsequent
home-station and other NBC training to prepare units for missions.
We are making recommendations to establish minimum NBC training tasks
for units attending training exercises at the CTCs and to standardize
reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at the CTCs. Our
recommendations are intended to help ensure that the NBC training
opportunities offered to Army and Marine Corps units attending their
combat training centers are maximized and that NBC lessons learned at
these centers are uniformly recorded and archived. DOD agreed with the
report's findings and recommendations and established programs to fully
implement the recommendations when operating conditions permit.
Background:
The Army has three large combat training centers that train brigade-
sized units during exercises, referred to as "rotations," that last for
13 to 25 days: the National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin,
California; the Joint Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk,
Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center, located at
Hohenfels, Germany.[Footnote 2] Figure 1 illustrates NBC training being
conducted at the Army's Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany. The Marine Corps has an Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine
Palms, California, where it trains brigade-sized units in a combined
arms exercise that similarly allows Marine Corps units to train to
perform their missions in large maneuver areas and to fire their ground
and air weapons.
Figure 1: Soldiers at CMTC Undergoing NBC Training:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Both the Army and the Marine Corps believe that it is important to
leave to commanders' discretion, on the basis of the approved wartime
mission-essential task list, the decisions on what particular missions
require most of their units' time while at the CTCs and the extent to
which units need to train to perform their missions under NBC
conditions. At the same time, the Army and the Marine Corps also
believe that the CTCs provide a unique opportunity for units to conduct
realistic training that approximates actual combat and that complements
units' home-station training. This opportunity includes, among many
other things, the possibility for units to train to perform their
mission-essential tasks under NBC defense conditions, with the benefit
of real-time feedback from observers/controllers who are NBC training
experts. In its regulation on the CTC program, the Army states that the
CTCs provide the "capstone collective live training event in the
combined arms training strategies." The regulation stresses the
importance of home-station training in preparing units for their CTC
rotations: "Homestation training," the regulation states, "should
prepare units to gain the maximum benefit from their CTC
experience."[Footnote 3] The Army's CTC plan states that:
"A CTC experience is the closest thing to combat the Army's soldiers,
leaders, staffs and units ever experience. It is a battlefield where
soldiers can die, come back to life, correct their mistakes, and fight
again. . . . the Army must look at harnessing the role of the CTCs in
developing doctrine and collecting data so it can maximize their
potential and draw the right conclusions from lessons learned in a
training environment."[Footnote 4]
During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 57 active and reserve component
rotations took place at the three Army CTCs. Rotation costs are
significant: In 1999 we reported that the Army spent about $1 billion a
year to provide training at the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC.[Footnote
5] These centers are equipped with instrumentation and simulators that
allow the units to have their battle effectiveness measured, recorded,
and commented on by observers/controllers, who are Army subject-matter
experts for NBC defense and other mission areas. During fiscal years
2002 and 2003, approximately 12 active and reserve battalion-sized
Marine units underwent combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms.
DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the importance of
fully integrating NBC scenarios into their training exercises, whether
conducted at a unit's home station, at a CTC, or elsewhere. The U.S.
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction acknowledges
that NBC weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists
represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United
States.[Footnote 6] At the DOD level, Joint Publication 3-11, Joint
Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
Environments, states that "US forces must be prepared to conduct and
sustain operations in NBC environments with minimal degradation" and
urges that individuals and organizations train often and realistically
while wearing NBC protective clothing so that they are better prepared
for the constraints it imposes on communication, vision, and
movement.[Footnote 7]
Army and Marine Corps regulations, orders, and doctrine similarly
stress the importance of fully integrating NBC scenarios into training
exercises. For example, Army Regulation 350-1, "Army Training and
Education," which establishes Army-wide baseline NBC defense training
policy, requires that NBC defense tasks, such as contamination
avoidance, protection, and decontamination, be fully integrated into
units' mission training, including field training exercises.
Specifically, Army Regulation 350-1 states that "The NBC defense
training must be fully integrated into unit exercises . . . for both
offensive and defensive operations."[Footnote 8] This integration is
intended to develop and test the capability of commanders, staffs, and
units to perform their missions under extended NBC conditions. In other
words, NBC skills are not seen as isolated tasks, but NBC defense is
viewed as a condition under which units should be able to do their
mission-essential tasks. Similarly, Marine Corps Order 3400.3F,
paragraph 6, establishes Marine Corps-wide baseline NBC defense
training requirements and states that "Every unit and commander will
fully integrate NBCD [NBC defense] training into every combat, combat
support, combat service support, and command and control exercise
during offensive and defensive operations, to include live fire
evolutions." [Footnote 9] Like the Army, the Marine Corps intends to
integrate NBC training into its exercises in order to develop and test
the ability of Marines at all levels not only to survive an NBC attack
but to perform their missions under NBC conditions.
Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders also require after-action
reporting for unit training exercises, including those that occur at
the CTCs. The Army believes that it is important to capture lessons
learned during training in order to identify combat-relevant lessons
learned that will enhance the Army's ability to perform its missions
and that will support tailored training for anticipated conditions of
combat. Army regulations for the JRTC and the CMTC state that NBC
defense training should be addressed in every training unit commander's
after-action report, but guidance for the NTC and the overall Army
lessons learned program does not. Like Army regulations, Marine Corps
orders state that after-action reports should be prepared for all
training exercises and maintained in a central lessons learned
facility. The Marine Corps uses training lessons learned to identify
unit strengths and weaknesses that must be addressed for the overall
benefit of the Marine Corps.[Footnote 10]
NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do
Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards:
Although the Army and the Marine Corps stress in their doctrine,
regulations, or orders the need to fully integrate NBC training into
training exercises and both have defined what they consider to be
essential NBC skills, neither has established minimum NBC tasks for
units to perform while they are training at the CTCs. They believe that
it is important to leave decisions on the amount and type of training
that occur at the CTCs to commanders. Consequently, during fiscal years
2002 and 2003, Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending the
CTCs received widely varying amounts of NBC training, with some
receiving little or none. Furthermore, Army units that do undergo NBC
training at the CTCs often do not perform to the proficiency levels
defined by the Army as acceptable. Based on commanders' discretion,
both services' CTC exercises currently are oriented toward preparing
units for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and do not emphasize NBC
defense training. Because of this variation in NBC training at the
CTCs, the Army and the Marine Corps often miss the unique opportunity
offered by the CTCs to be assured through objective observer/controller
assessments that every servicemember who trains at a CTC has training
in a minimum number of NBC tasks essential to survive and perform in an
NBC-contaminated environment.
Army and Marine Corps Have Defined Essential NBC Skills but Do Not
Specify That Minimum Tasks Must Be Trained at the CTCs:
Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications
what they believe are the essential NBC skills that all soldiers and
Marines should have. Also, as described in the background section of
this report, both services stress in their doctrine, regulations, or
orders the need to fully integrate NBC defense training into their
exercises.
The Army has defined what it considers are the NBC skills essential for
soldiers to know in its Army Universal Task List.[Footnote 11] Army
commanders select training tasks, including NBC training tasks, from
this and other task lists. For each task, the Army provides an extended
definition, along with suggested ways to measure a soldier's
proficiency in doing the task. For example, for the task of using
individual and collective NBC protective equipment, one measure a
commander may select to evaluate a soldier's competence includes the
time it takes a soldier to don chemical protective gear in response to
enemy use of NBC weapons. In addition, the Army requires that units
conduct weapons qualifications on individual and crew-served weapons
with personnel wearing chemical protective equipment.[Footnote 12]
Neither the task list nor the regulation specifies where such training
is to be conducted.
U.S. Forces Command, which oversees the training and readiness of U.S.-
based Army operational forces, has issued a list of predeployment NBC
tasks, but it also does not specify where training for these tasks must
take place. Forces Command directs that soldiers spend approximately 8
hours per quarter under NBC defense conditions. These tasks are all in
the Army's most basic NBC skill level category and include wearing and
maintaining chemical protective equipment and identifying chemical
agents.
Like the Army, the Marine Corps has defined what it considers to be NBC
tasks essential for Marines to know, both to survive an NBC attack and
to continue performing the unit's mission. In Marine Corps Order
3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense (NBCD) Training,"
the Marine Corps lists essential individual survival standards, such as
maintaining and wearing protective chemical equipment, detecting
chemical agents, and decontaminating one's skin and equipment. It also
lists essential "basic operating standards," such as using crew and
personal weapons while wearing NBC protective gear, maintaining NBC
equipment, avoiding contamination while continuing the mission, and
decontaminating units if necessary.[Footnote 13] The order does not
state that any of these tasks must be included in exercises such as the
combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.
Appendix II provides a listing of Army and Marine Corps definitions of
essential NBC skills.
NBC Training at Army CTCs Varies Widely:
NBC training at the Army's CTCs varies widely, and many Army subunits
receive little NBC training at the CTCs. For example, in fiscal years
2002 and 2003, observers/controllers from the NTC and the JRTC
estimated that only about 5 percent of soldiers underwent NBC training
during a brigade rotation that required them to wear their full
protective gear for at least 18 hours.[Footnote 14] This is because
Army regulations do not mandate that NBC training must occur at the
CTCs, leaving commanders to decide what skills training to include in
the unit's CTC rotation. For the NBC training that did occur at the
CTCs, observers/controllers frequently reported that the units did not
perform even basic NBC tasks to the level of proficiency defined as
acceptable by the Army.
Many Army Subunits Receive Little NBC Training at the CTCs:
During our review of Army CTC training that occurred during fiscal
years 2002 and 2003, we found that, while most units were exposed to
some NBC training at the CTCs, the overall percentage of Army battalion-
or brigade-sized units that received extensive NBC training during a
rotation was small. One measure of intensive unit training under NBC
defense conditions is the extent to which soldiers are required to
dress and operate for extended periods of time in their individual
protective clothing, including their masks and gloves. NTC training
officials estimated that, on average since fiscal year 2002, a typical
20-to 25-day brigade rotation--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--
includes NBC events that cause the entire unit to don the full chemical
protective suit for a total of 2 to 3 hours and about 150 to 200
soldiers to train in full protective gear for a total of 18 to 24
hours. In other words, only about 5 percent of the brigade is affected
by NBC training that requires wearing full protective gear for more
than 2 to 3 hours. Similarly, an Army JRTC training official reported
that during a typical brigade rotation, an average of only 200 soldiers
operate in full protective gear for a total of 16 to 20 hours. The
number of personnel who receive this training at the JRTC ranges from
as few as 50 soldiers up to 400 or more, depending on the type of
contamination and the location of the attack, and the time that a
soldier spends in protective gear can range from as little as 1 hour to
as much as 48 hours.[Footnote 15]
Army Unit Commanders Determine Units' Training at the CTCs:
Because Army regulations do not state what NBC training must occur at
the CTCs, the commander of the unit to be trained may choose not to
emphasize it during the unit's CTC rotation. Typically, up to 180 days
before the rotation is to start, the brigade commander, in coordination
with the division or other senior commander, begins to coordinate with
the CTC to specify what training objectives will be included in the
unit's training rotation. A unit rotation traditionally emphasizes the
warfighting skills a unit requires to perform its mission and combat
operations. Because training to survive and operate under potential NBC
conditions is generally treated as a condition of training for all
mission-essential tasks for units, rather than as a separate mission
task, the CTCs, which develop the training scenarios, generally propose
some types of NBC conditions in all rotations. However, unit commanders
may specify that a CTC include more or fewer NBC conditions in training
scenarios.
During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the Army's CTCs generally included
three to seven chemical events in each standard rotation's training
scenarios. A particular chemical attack by an "enemy" is generally
targeted at a specific area of the simulated battlefield and thus
involves those units that may be affected by a chemical attack in that
area. Chemical events during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included the
simulated use of chemicals that were categorized as "persistent"
(defined as lasting for 24 hours or more) and "nonpersistent" (defined
as lasting for 24 hours or less) and that were delivered by "enemy"
artillery, rockets, aircraft bombs, truck bombs, rucksack bombs, and
spray. At the NTC and the CMTC, observers/controllers use CS (tear) gas
to simulate chemical agents. Flares, ground-burst simulators, air-burst
simulators, or spray tanks mounted on helicopters may also be used to
simulate enemy chemical weapons. At the JRTC and the NTC, observers/
controllers also frequently simulate a biological event by such means
as simulating that the "enemy" has sabotaged the water supply by
poisoning it with a biological contaminant.
The CTCs have increasingly emphasized training rotations specifically
tailored to preparing units for expected deployments. These rotations
might or might not include chemical or biological events. Many of the
units completing the tailored rotations at the Army's CTCs in fiscal
years 2002 and 2003 later deployed for combat operations in Afghanistan
or Iraq. NBC defense training at CTCs has been emphasized less for
units training for Bosnia and Kosovo or for Afghanistan and Iraq after
NBC weapons were not found there. Because the NBC defensive training
for each soldier varies so widely at the CTCs, the Army continues to
have no assurance that all servicemembers attending a CTC have trained
on a minimum number of essential NBC tasks.
Units Often Did Not Perform NBC Tasks to Army Standards:
Our review of after-action reports from the three Army CTCs for fiscal
years 2002 and 2003 indicated that units frequently arrived at the CTCs
at the beginning of their training periods without having mastered
basic NBC skills. Observers/controllers frequently comment on units'
NBC skills when they first arrive at training at the NTC to assess the
units' needed level of NBC training and note that, often, units do not
perform even basic NBC tasks to the level of proficiency that the Army
defines as acceptable. Observers/controllers at all three CTCs noted
that because units had not adequately prepared for basic NBC training
at their home stations, they were not able to fully train on the more
sophisticated collective and mission tasks under NBC conditions that
could be practiced at the CTCs. Of the three CTCs, the NTC had the most
complete information on the NBC skills of the units being trained
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Unlike the other CTCs, the NTC often
uses a standard format to assess incoming units on six basic NBC tasks
while they are receiving their equipment and assembling to begin
training. For example, one of these early NTC training scenarios
subjects a brigade arriving at a deployment destination to an attack by
a chemical weapon. Table 1 summarizes the assessments made by NTC
observers/controllers of the NBC skills of brigades that arrived for
training during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The table lists the six NBC
tasks assessed at the NTC and shows whether the brigades did or did not
perform the tasks to the level of proficiency defined as acceptable by
the Army. Most brigades failed to perform to standard NBC tasks 3, 4,
and 6, which are ranked at the most basic skill level, called skill
level 1.
Table 1: NTC's Assessment of Brigades' Performance of NBC Tasks during
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003:
NBC task: 1. Employ NBC warning and reporting system;
Performance standard: Army tasks, skill levels 3 and 4: The unit must
plot and disseminate appropriate NBC warnings. Higher-level
headquarters staff must execute effective command and control;
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 0;
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 5.
NBC task: 2. Employ chemical alarms and detectors;
Performance standard: Each task force must have at least one M-8
chemical agent detector paper/M-22 alarm operational and properly
positioned around the perimeter, personnel, vehicles, and equipment. M-
9 chemical agent detector paper must be checked in each unit after the
chemical weapon attack;
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 1;
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 9.
NBC task: 3. Go to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4 within 8
minutes;
Performance standard: Army common tasks, skill level 1: 100 percent of
soldiers must don complete Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4
in 8 minutes. All zippers, buttons, and ties must be correctly
fastened. Boots and gloves must be tucked into chemical protective
equipment. No simulated gear is authorized;
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 2;
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 7.
NBC task: 4. Seek overhead shelter;
Performance standard: Army common tasks, skill level 1: 100 percent of
soldiers must seek the best available overhead cover when appropriate;
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 0;
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 10.
NBC task: 5. Perform NBC reconnaissance mission;
Performance standard: The NBC reconnaissance unit must reach the
objective, conduct appropriate NBC reconnaissance, maintain
communication with higher headquarters staff throughout the operations,
and have a team providing security;
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 4;
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 1.
NBC task: 6. Conduct unmasking procedures using M256 kits;
Performance standard: Army common tasks, skill level 1: Soldiers must
confirm the presence or absence of an agent. At least one M256 kit
should be assigned per task force;
Number of brigades that performed to standard: 2;
Number of brigades that did not perform to standard: 5.
Source: NTC.
Notes: Each number in the table represents an entire brigade that was
assessed in its performance of the listed task during its NTC rotation.
The numbers do not total 10 because not all brigades were tested on all
tasks. An entire brigade is assessed as performing a task "to standard"
or "not to standard." In some cases, supplementary notes indicate what
percentage of the entire brigade succeeded in the task and what
percentage failed. Or supplementary notes might indicate which
battalions in the brigade failed a particular task. An entire brigade
would be described as not going to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
level 4 (or the highest level of protection) within 8 minutes when some
of its battalions failed to do so. In some cases, a battalion failed to
go to this level of protection within 8 minutes because some personnel
did not have complete chemical protective suits. For other tasks, the
unit of measure differs. For example, for the task of employing
chemical alarms and detectors, supplementary notes generally state how
many of the total chemical alarms that were placed were operational.
For the task of performing NBC reconnaissance, the brigade is judged on
the performance of its NBC reconnaissance unit.
[End of table]
We were unable to compile summaries, such as the NTC summary in table
1, of how well brigades did in basic NBC tasks at the JRTC and the CMTC
because these centers did not routinely assess and collect this
information. However, JRTC and CMTC after-action reports frequently
noted deficiencies in units' NBC training attributable to their
incomplete preparation at home stations. For example, for several
rotations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, JRTC observers/controllers
reported that soldiers and leaders lacked training and knowledge of
critical NBC tasks. Observers/controllers recommended that units
"Develop an NBC training plan at home station that addresses the
individual, leader, and collective soldier skills necessary to sustain
operations in an NBC environment." A similar CMTC recommendation called
for "more emphasis on NBC training and integration at home station."
The observation that units do not get adequate NBC training at their
home stations is not new and has been repeatedly reported by DOD and
the Army. In 1998, for example, the DOD Office of the Inspector General
reported that unit commanders generally were not fully integrating
chemical and biological defense into their units' collective mission
training exercises. The report noted that "units rarely trained for
their mission-essential tasks under [chemical/biological]
conditions."[Footnote 16] In 2002, the Army Audit Agency reported that
it had evaluated training for chemical and biological defense provided
to soldiers at the unit level and found that this training needed to be
more effectively integrated and supplemented.[Footnote 17] In DOD's
2002 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological Defense Program,
the department stated that the Army's CTCs continued to see units at
the company, battalion, and brigade levels that were unable to perform
all NBC tasks to standard.[Footnote 18] The report concluded that this
less-than-satisfactory performance at the CTCs was directly
attributable to a lack of home-station NBC training. The report stated
the need for increased emphasis in educating senior leaders on the
necessity for NBC training and expressed concern that NBC training
consist not only of NBC survival but also of continuous operations in
an NBC environment.
We have also reported for more than a decade on problems with Army
units' inadequate home-station training. In 1991, we reported that Army
home-station training lacked realism and often did not include NBC
training.[Footnote 19] In 1996, we reported that officials from Army
major commands, corps, divisions, and individual units said that
chemical and biological defense skills not only tended to be difficult
to attain and were highly perishable but were also often given a lower
priority because of, among other things, too many other higher priority
taskings.[Footnote 20] In 1999, we noted that training units lacked
proficiency when they arrived at the training centers, and as a result,
the content of the CTC training was frequently modified to provide less
challenging scenarios than would normally be expected.[Footnote 21] We
also reported that, although units should have been proficient at
battalion-level tasks when they arrived at the CTCs, many had trained
only up to company level, and the units' leaders struggled with the
more complicated planning and synchronization tasks required for the
battalion-and brigade-level exercises conducted at the
centers.[Footnote 22]
NBC Training Was Not Conducted at the Marine Corps' Combined Arms
Exercises at Twentynine Palms:
No NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at the
Marine Corps' training center at Twentynine Palms for at least 5 years
prior to our review.[Footnote 23] While Marine Corps orders and
doctrine emphasize the need to include NBC defense training in combined
arms exercises, they do not provide any clearly articulated NBC defense
training tasks or requirements that must be accomplished in conjunction
with these exercises. In the absence of specific training requirements,
NBC defense training has historically been left up to the discretionary
control of the unit commander, and Marine Corps commanders decided to
remove it to make room for other training. According to a Marine Corps
training official, unit commanders gave several reasons that NBC
defense training at the combined arms exercise was given a lower
priority, including that it was difficult to perform tasks in
cumbersome and uncomfortable protective gear, chemical training was
time-consuming, and the likelihood of NBC warfare was perceived as low.
In November 2001, the Naval Audit Service issued a report on infantry
and armor readiness in the Marine Corps.[Footnote 24] One of its
findings was that the Marine Corps was not fully integrating chemical
and biological training into its collective unit exercises in a
consistent manner. The Naval Audit Service attributed this condition to
the fact that Marine Corps officers did not consider chemical and
biological training a high priority, even though they considered it
important. One of the Naval Audit Service's recommendations was for the
Marine Corps to "integrate [chemical and biological defense] training
into unit field exercises under realistic conditions, and insure that
[chemical and biological defense] training is appropriately integrated
into such major events as Combined Armed Exercises . . . ." In a
February 2004 memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the
Commanding General of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command
stated that in response to the Naval Audit Service's recommendation,
NBC training and assessment had been added to the formal schedule at
the combined arms exercise program in January 2004. The memorandum
stated that "Due to world events, it continues to be a challenge
concerning the 'full integration' of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
Defense [NBCD] training into unit exercise programs."
In 2003, in response to the Naval Audit Service's recommendation, the
Marine Corps began its planning for introducing NBC training into the
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. In that year, the Marine
Corps assigned two NBC staff specialists to Twentynine Palms to begin
devising a training plan for the combined arms exercise program. Also,
chemical protective equipment was obtained for use at Twentynine Palms
by rotating Marine Corps units. In January 2004, the Marine Corps
introduced NBC defense classroom courses and one field exercise into
the combined arms exercise program. Appendix III provides a listing of
the classroom NBC courses that were introduced in the first week of
rotations in fiscal year 2004 and were conducted at the platoon to
company levels.
According to a Marine Corps official, eight combined arms exercise
rotations were conducted in fiscal year 2004. NBC training was
introduced into the third and fourth rotations in January and February,
respectively. Rotations five and six concentrated on stability and
support operations but did include NBC classroom training. Rotations
seven and eight, for reserve units, also received the NBC classroom
training but no NBC field exercises. Planned rotations 9 and 10 were
canceled. The Marine Corps is introducing a shortened, revised combined
arms exercise scenario that is more oriented to current operational
requirements. Exercise revisions include an emphasis on small-unit
leadership and stability and support operations, which encompass
asymmetric and counterinsurgency operations. A Marine Corps official
told us that the current design of the revised combined arms exercise
scenario does not include NBC training. However, an extensive home-
station training period for units precedes attendance at the revised
combined arms exercise, and Marine Corps units are required to
accomplish NBC training required for their units' mission-essential
tasks. According to the Marine Corps, when it resumes its standard
combined arms exercise rotations, units will participate in whatever
NBC task training the combined arms exercise scenarios include at that
time.
NBC Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan Reflect Problems
Identified at Training Centers:
For both the Army and the Marine Corps, lessons learned during
Operation Iraqi Freedom identified many NBC skill deficiencies that
were highlighted earlier by observers/controllers during individual
brigade rotations through the Army's CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and
2003. These continuing deficiencies illustrate the importance of
requiring Army and Marine Corps units to establish minimal NBC defense
training tasks for units training at their respective CTCs. Problems
identified by both the Marine Corps and the Army during this operation
included:
* units arriving without appropriate NBC equipment and suits,
* units arriving without necessary individual and collective NBC skills,
* units unable to properly set up and operate their NBC detection
equipment,
* chemical personnel not included in battlefield decisions, and:
* units unable to properly decontaminate their equipment.
Many of these problems were also noted in the Army's lessons learned
reporting from earlier conflicts, including those in the Balkans,
Somalia, and Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Establishing minimal NBC
tasks for units attending CTCs could provide an opportunity for units'
NBC defense capabilities to be objectively assessed and for CTC
observers/controllers to identify units' NBC equipment shortfalls. This
information may aid commanders in decisions on units' training needs.
Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully
Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends:
The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on
NBC training at the CTCs in a way that can be used to identify trends
over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army
and Marine Corps regulations and orders strongly encourage after-action
reporting for all training exercises, including those that occur at the
CTCs. However, Army and Marine Corps after-action reviews of CTC
training do not always discuss NBC training and, when they do, the
reporting is not standardized to allow for uniform reporting to fully
support the identification of NBC trends.
Army and Marine Corps Regulations and Orders State That Lessons Learned
Should Be Reported for CTC Training:
Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders state that after-action
reports and lessons learned should be prepared to capture the results
of training that occurs at the CTCs, but they do not always state that
NBC training must be covered in these documents or encourage NBC
training results to be presented in a standardized format. As a result,
different types of after-action reports and lessons learned are
prepared for CTC training, and these documents might or might not
mention NBC training.
The Army's regulation that establishes the purpose and objectives of
its CTC program states that as part of their mission to provide
realistic joint combined arms training, the CTCs will provide the Army
and joint participants with feedback to improve warfighting, to
increase units' readiness for deployment and warfighting, and to
provide a data source for lessons learned.[Footnote 25] This regulation
also requires that each CTC conduct doctrinally based after-action
reviews for each unit that undergoes a rotation at a CTC.[Footnote 26]
The Army regulation on the Army's lessons learned system requires that
these after-action reports be submitted to the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL) no later than 120 days from the end of an
exercise.[Footnote 27] Each of the Army's CTC regulations describes a
general format to be used in the after-action reports and lists
specific topics to be included. Though the CTC and lessons learned
regulations agree on some general points, they differ on what should be
covered specifically in after-action reports. For example, the JRTC and
CMTC regulations indicate that NBC defense training should be addressed
in the training unit commander's after-action report, but the CTC, NTC,
and overall Army lessons learned program regulations do not. Appendix
IV includes specific details of how the various Army regulations differ
in recommended formats for after-action reports.
Like the Army regulations, the Marine Corps order on its lessons
learned system states that after-action reports should be prepared for
all training exercises.[Footnote 28] However, the Marine Corps order
for the combined arms exercise program at Twentynine Palms does not
specify that written after-action reports must be prepared, only that a
structured debrief be conducted upon the conclusion of each event or
exercise. Though not required by Marine Corps order, Twentynine Palms
does prepare a Microsoft PowerPoint (computer software) presentation
describing events that took place during the final 3 days of the
exercise.[Footnote 29] For the two rotations in 2004 in which NBC field
training was included in the combined arms exercise, NBC training was
not included in after-action reporting because it did not occur during
the 3 training days covered by the reporting.
Army's CTC Reports Might or Might Not Contain Information on NBC
Training:
All Army regulations do not require that NBC training completed at a
CTC be discussed in the written after-action reports that are prepared
for each training rotation at the three Army CTCs, and thus the reports
do not always include information on NBC training. These reports are
primarily intended to be feedback for the units being trained to help
them assess their own training levels and craft home-station training
plans to address identified deficiencies. The after-action reporting
and supplementary materials provided to the units that are trained,
such as videos of training, are called "take-home packages" and may
include as many as five or six compact discs containing Microsoft
PowerPoint presentations and summaries of observers/controllers. The
structure, format, and content of the after-action reporting vary by
center.
The NTC typically includes Microsoft PowerPoint briefings and written
after-action reports for the units training during each rotation. When
subunits of a brigade experience NBC "events," or NBC training
scenarios, during their rotations, observers/controllers generally
include a description of the units' performance in an "NBC executive
summary," which cites areas in which subunits need to improve
proficiency, along with specific recommendations for home-station
training and citations of applicable NBC-related field manuals. When
subunits do not experience NBC events, this section is absent from
after-action reporting for the overall unit. Nowhere in the report does
the NTC include an overall brigade summary for the entire rotation
period of 20 to 25 days that indicates the number of NBC events that
occurred during a single rotation, the percentage of subunits that
conducted NBC tasks, the type of tasks performed, or how well all
individual subunits did. The NTC does include, in many cases, an
assessment of a brigade's NBC skills in its first week of training. Out
of the 21 rotations conducted by the NTC during fiscal years 2002 and
2003, take-home packages for 12 brigades contained such scorecards,
which assessed units' ability to perform six essential NBC tasks when
they first arrived for training.
Like a take-home package for the NTC, a take-home package prepared by
the JRTC contains multiple types of documents and after-action
reporting. One document lists the types of NBC events planned for the
rotation and their timing. When NBC events are not planned for the
rotation, this document is absent, and when planned NBC events are
canceled, there is no documentation stating that these scenario events
did not occur or why. Neither is there a document that contains an
overall summary of how many NBC events occurred during a single
rotation, the percentage of subunits performing NBC tasks and the type
of tasks performed, or how well all individual subunits did. Unlike the
NTC, the JRTC includes no "scorecard" for assessing units' ability to
perform basic NBC tasks. When subunits do experience NBC events, JRTC
observers/controllers cite areas in which subunits need to "sustain" or
"improve" proficiency, along with specific recommendations for home-
station training and citations of applicable NBC field manuals.
A CMTC take-home package also contains multiple Microsoft PowerPoint
briefings, written after-action reporting, and videotapes. However, a
package might or might not mention NBC training that occurred during a
rotation, as this is not a mandatory reporting section. When a subunit
experiences an NBC event, an observer/controller may mention how the
unit performed if the subunit's performance was considered to be
notable. When NBC events are discussed in an after-action report, CMTC,
like NTC and JRTC, includes general observations of a unit's
performance, comments on what it did well, and recommendations for
improvement. Because there is no overall NBC summary document, however,
CMTC's take-home packages seldom provide information on how many NBC
events occurred during a rotation, what these events were, what
percentage of the overall rotating unit participated, and how well they
did on particular NBC tasks. Because no NBC section is required, it is
not possible to calculate what percentage of CMTC rotations experience
NBC events.
Twice a year, CALL publishes "trends" documents for each Army CTC.
These publications cover all rotations that occurred during a 6-month
period and expunge any information from the reporting that would
identify a particular unit. The trends documents are compiled from
after-action reports prepared for CTC training. They are prepared by
observers/controllers and given to CALL representatives at each CTC,
who then forward these reports to CALL analysts at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. When NBC training is determined to reveal a "trend" to report,
it is included in the trends publications. Individual take-home
packages and after-action reports that identify particular units are
not generally made available. Rather, they are protected to prevent
them from becoming public "report cards." CALL is now limited in its
ability to identify NBC trends in its trends reports because NBC
training completed at CTCs is not now uniformly reported in a
standardized format that can reliably provide comparable data to
support the identification of NBC trends.
The Army has a large portion of CTC after-action reports located in a
database at CALL. However, because each CTC sends different or no
information on NBC training, CALL does not have information available
that would make it possible to do cross-unit or cross-center
comparisons. CALL also stores compact discs and videotapes, some of
which are entered into the electronic database. The CALL representative
at each CTC maintains some portions of the take-home packages on site.
However, at least in part because the take-home packages are considered
the property of the units being trained, they are not made widely
available. Also, many of the Army's after-action reports for NBC
training at the CTCs for fiscal years 2002 to 2003 were not received,
not locatable, or never loaded into the database located at CALL for
archiving and subsequent research. We found during our visit to CALL
that its researchers were very skilled in performing database analysis,
but they were limited by incomplete and nonstandard reporting for NBC
training data.
Marine Corps' Written After-Action Reports Do Not Include NBC Training
Information:
The Marine Corps' written after-action reporting system does not
address NBC training conducted in the combined arms exercise primarily
because NBC training has not been included in that training. At
Twentynine Palms, a final written exercise report containing lessons
learned is prepared by the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training
Command for the last 3 days of the combined arms exercise. However, the
command does not prepare written after-action reports for the other
major segments of the exercise. After-action feedback is primarily
given orally throughout the exercise period. This oral feedback is
based on observations by observers/controllers assigned to each unit
being trained. In the combined arms exercises that included NBC
training in 2004, the written final exercise reports did not include
any lessons learned on NBC operations because this training did not
occur during the final 3 days. At that time, NBC exercise scenarios had
not been fully integrated into the combined arms exercises.
The Marine Corps has no formal evaluation requirements for the combined
arms exercise. The applicable Marine Corps order states that "A
structured debrief will be conducted upon conclusion of each event or
exercise." A Microsoft PowerPoint briefing on the final 3 days of the
exercise does identify training objectives that the participant forces
used to guide them through their training exercises, and in a sample
briefing we reviewed, we found an assessment of the unit's performance
for each training objective. However, NBC operations were not
identified as a training objective, and the briefing included no
lessons learned or recommendations for NBC defense training. NBC
content is being added to the standard combined arms exercise scenario.
However, the standard combined arms exercises have recently been
replaced by revised combined arms exercises oriented toward current
operations, and the revised combined arms exercise scenarios for
Twentynine Palms contain no NBC defense training.
In addition, the Marine Corps has not been archiving at any central
location its reporting on any unit training--NBC or otherwise--
completed at Twentynine Palms or submitting related training issues to
its lessons learned system. Therefore, no after-action reports on the
combined arms exercises that occur at Twentynine Palms are being placed
into the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System's database. The Marine
Corps recently determined that its overall lessons learned system was
not functioning well. In December 2003, a working group that studied
the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System found that problems with
reporting and maintaining lessons learned were Marine Corps-wide. A
Marine Corps information paper reported that throughout the Marine
Corps, only eight reports had been submitted to the Marine Corps
Lessons Learned System in 2002. The information paper also stated that
the Marine Corps plans to implement an improved Web-based lessons
learned system in the future. It also plans to establish a permanent
organization to collect, review, and maintain this improved lessons
learned system. Separately, an Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team
was formed in 2001 to collect lessons learned in Afghanistan. In 2003,
the team was restructured to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Conclusions:
The CTCs represent a rare opportunity for Army and Marine Corps units
to perform advanced training under conditions that are designed to
approximate actual combat as closely as possible, thereby enabling
units to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. The
services stress the importance of including NBC defense training in
their exercises. Yet only a small percentage of the servicemembers
passing through the CTCs encounter NBC defense training tasks because
an Army or Marine Corps regulation or order requiring it is lacking. We
recognize that commanders' discretion in determining unit training
plans for CTC rotations is, and should continue to be, a central part
of Army and Marine Corps training doctrine. However, until units are
required to perform at least minimum NBC tasks while attending the
CTCs, the services will continue to risk missing a unique opportunity
to (1) uniformly assess these units' proficiency while they are
operating in a field environment and (2) leverage the benefits of an
objective assessment by an expert staff of units' NBC skills.
NBC lessons learned during training rotations at the combat training
centers would be very useful for the services in their attempts to
anticipate and train for NBC problems that may occur later during
operations. Service regulations or orders specify that (1) all units at
CTCs should conduct doctrinally based after-action reviews of events
supported by observers/controllers, (2) lessons learned should be
entered into an archived database, and (3) training unit commanders'
after-action reports should be analyzed for trends and lessons learned.
However, service regulations or orders do not now state that NBC
training at the CTCs must be captured in a standardized format. In the
absence of such a requirement, the Army's archived NBC data on training
at the CTCs will remain incomplete or noncomparable and thus will not
fully support research and reporting on NBC trends and lessons learned.
The Marine Corps also does not employ a standard method of reporting
NBC training at Twentynine Palms or providing the Marine Corps' trend
and lessons learned reporting systems with NBC training information.
Until the Marine Corps standardizes the reporting formats to capture
service-defined NBC training at Twentynine Palms, it will be unable to
analyze, over time, the units' NBC skills at these exercises, the
effectiveness of NBC training at Twentynine Palms, or NBC trends and
lessons learned. Overall, improvements to collecting, archiving, and
using NBC training data could help the services capitalize on their
substantial investment in maintaining CTCs and in sending units to
train there, as well as to monitor the quality of NBC training and
units' NBC skill levels.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the NBC training opportunities offered to Army and
Marine Corps units from training at their combat training centers are
maximized and that NBC lessons learned at these centers are uniformly
recorded and archived, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following two actions:
* Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending training
exercises at CTCs.
* Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at
the CTCs.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the
following two actions:
* Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending the combined arms
exercise at Twentynine Palms.
* Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs
during a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments, DOD stated that it agreed with the findings and
recommendations of the report and that the Army and Marine Corps have
established programs to implement the recommendations. Army and Marine
Corps officials indicated that they are currently taking those actions
necessary to develop the NBC content to be included in future CTC
rotations and modify their after-action reporting systems and
regulations to ensure that NBC training completed at CTCs is
appropriately reported. However, because of current operational
requirements, full implementation of NBC training at CTCs will be
delayed. DOD's comments are printed in their entirety in appendix V.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9619 or e-mail me at pickups@gao.gov.
Additional contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which Army and Marine Corps units
participate in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training at the
combat training centers (CTC) and the extent to which these units and
personnel perform NBC tasks at the centers to service standards, we
interviewed appropriate officials and reviewed pertinent documents and
after-action reports at the following locations:
* Office of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,
Washington, D.C;
* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Battle Command Training Program,
Combined Arms Center-Training, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas;
* U.S. Army Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Army
Maneuver Support Center Academic Library, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri;
* Training Division, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson,
Georgia;
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training,
Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
* Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;
* Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana;
* Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany;
* Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and:
* Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.
To compile a collection of planning documents and after-action reports
for the Army CTC rotations that occurred during fiscal years 2002 and
2003, we visited and obtained documents from various locations. The
largest collection of planning documents and after-action reports was
located at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), though we also
obtained some documents from other locations, including the CTCs. We
were able to obtain at least some parts of after-action reporting for
41 of the 57 rotations that occurred at the National Training Center
(NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat
Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The
following organizations provided us with the planning documents and
after-action reports for units attending the CTCs:
* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;
* National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;
* Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and:
* Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.
To determine the extent of NBC training completed at the Army CTCs
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we analyzed all available planning
and after-action reports. As mentioned in our report, we found that NBC
training that occurred was not always discussed in after-action
reports; that subunits of an entire brigade experienced chemical or
biological events that did not affect the overall brigade; and that
observers/controllers frequently noted deficiencies in units' basic NBC
skills, often attributing them to inadequate home-station training.
Because the CTCs' formatting of NBC reporting differed and none
contained an overall summary document of all the NBC training that
occurred during a single rotation, we were not able to definitively
determine whether we had been able to collect all pertinent documents,
though we did examine all of the reporting that the CTCs and CALL said
was available.
The Marine Corps provided us with only two after-action reports for
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. It told us that there was
no central repository for these after-action reports and that only two
reports were located. However, because NBC training had not been
introduced to the combined arms exercise until January 2004 and was
suspended thereafter, we were able to determine that no after-action
reports on NBC training would have been submitted. The one after-action
report that the Marine Corps provided us with, for the January 2004
combined arms rotation, did not mention NBC training because this
training did not occur during the last 3 days of the exercise--the only
time period captured in the after-action report.
To determine whether the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training
at the CTCs in a standardized format that allows the services to
identify trends and lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-
center comparisons, we collected all available after-action reports
from the above-listed locations. These reports were all part of the
after-action reporting contained in "take-home packages"--that is, the
materials prepared for the units to take with them to document training
completed and to aid in units' development of home-station training
plans. Because these reports contained particular names of units and
comments on unit performance, they are not made generally available,
which required us to obtain these reports from lessons learned
repositories and the CTCs. We also compared these reports with general
trends documents prepared by the Army and the Marine Corps, which
expunge units' identification and summarize the results of groups of
rotations, and learned that not all NBC training at CTCs was reported
because of the lack of standardized reporting formats.
We conducted our review from March 2003 through October 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine
Corps:
Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications
what they believe are the essential nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) skills that all soldiers and Marines should have. In no case,
however, do service regulations or orders prescribe where the training
must take place. Specifically, applicable documents do not state that
any particular NBC tasks must be included in training that units
receive while they are at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), but they
do state that NBC training should be incorporated into all types of
exercises. The services' guidance and policy have left it to the
discretion of commanders to determine where their units should train in
the required NBC skills. The following is a listing of Army and Marine
Corps definitions of essential NBC skills.
Army Universal Task List:
In Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, the Army provides a
common, doctrinal foundation and catalog of the Army's tactical
missions, operations, and collective tasks. A commander can use this
list as a menu in developing the unit's mission-essential task list.
The NBC tasks cited in the Army's Universal Task List are:
* take measures to avoid or minimize the effects of NBC attacks and
reduce the effects of NBC hazards,
* identify NBC hazards,
* warn personnel/units of contaminated areas,
* report NBC hazards throughout the area of operations,
* use individual/collective NBC protective equipment,
* perform immediate decontamination,
* perform operational decontamination,
* perform thorough decontamination,
* perform area decontamination, and:
* perform patient decontamination.
NBC Tasks Required by Army Forces Command:
The tasks listed by U.S. Army Forces Command,[Footnote 30] which are
all skill level-1 NBC survival-oriented tasks, are:
* protect yourself from chemical and biological injury/contamination
using your M40-series protective mask with hood,
* replace the canister on your M40-series protective mask,
* maintain your M40-series protective mask with hood,
* react to chemical or biological hazard/attack,
* protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination with chemical
protective equipment,
* identify chemical agents using M8 detector paper,
* protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination when drinking from
your canteen while wearing your protective mask,
* administer first aid to a nerve agent casualty,
* administer nerve agent antidote to self (self-aid),
* decontaminate your skin using the M291 skin decontaminating kit,
* decontaminate your skin and personal equipment using an M258A1
decontamination kit, and:
* decontaminate your individual equipment using the M295 individual
equipment decontamination kit.
In addition, the Army requires that "Units will conduct weapons
qualification on individual and crew-served weapons with personnel
wearing protective equipment."[Footnote 31]
Marine Corps' NBC Survival Standards:
The Marine Corps lists NBC "survival standards" for each individual in
Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
Training." They are as follows:
* Identify North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC markers.
* Properly maintain Individual Protective Equipment.
* Properly don, clear, and check their field protective mask within 9
seconds of an NBC alarm or attack.
* Properly don the appropriate individual protective clothing and
assigned field protective mask to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
Level 4.
* Perform basic functions (e.g., drinking, waste removal, sleep) while
in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Level 4.
* Perform NBC detection measures with issued detection equipment, i.e.,
M256A1 Chemical Detection Kit, M8 detection paper, M9 detection tape,
and DT 236 radiac detector.
* Decontaminate skin and personal equipment using M291 skin
decontamination kit or other appropriate decontaminants.
* Perform individual (emergency) Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
equipment exchange.
* React to a nuclear attack.
* React to a chemical attack.
* React to a biological attack.
* Take the specific actions required to operate efficiently before,
during, and after NBC attacks to reduce the effects of NBC
contamination.
* Recognize or detect chemical agent contamination and perform
immediate decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing,
equipment, position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.
* Treat a chemical agent casualty.
* Be able to drink water from a canteen or other water container while
masked.
* Be able to properly format and send an NBC 1 report.
Marine Corps' NBC Basic Operating Standards:
The Marine Corps lists NBC "basic operating standards" for units in
Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
Training." They are as follows:
* The unit will maintain its collective nuclear, biological, and
chemical defense equipment in a high state of serviceability at all
times.
* The unit must be proficient in taking the specific actions required
to operate efficiently before, during, and after NBC attacks to reduce
the effects of NBC contamination.
* The unit must be able to recognize or detect chemical agent
decontamination and perform immediate individual and operational
decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing, equipment,
position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.
* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in contamination avoidance
procedures when crossing NBC-contaminated areas.
* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in performing primary military
duties, to include the use of crew/personal weapons and minimum/basic
combat skills, while wearing Individual Protective Equipment for
extended periods.
* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in operational and thorough
decontamination procedures.
* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the principles of collective
protection, including passage through contamination control areas,
where applicable.
* The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the use of dosimetric
devices; chemical and biological detection; and monitoring equipment,
where applicable.
* The unit must be able to send and receive NBC-1 reports and plot NBC-
3 reports.
* The unit must be able to properly conduct monitor/survey missions as
directed by higher headquarters personnel.
* The unit must be able to conduct unmasking procedures.
[End of section]
Appendix III: NBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps
Combined Arms Exercise Program in January 2004:
NBC training objective:
* Perform unit actions before, during, and after a nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) attack;
* Exercise the NBC warning and reporting system;
* Conduct thorough decontamination;
* Monitor and survey decontamination operations;
Course title and description: Command Brief (1 hour): All NBC personnel
will receive this instruction as a one-time prerequisite to nuclear,
biological, and chemical defense instruction.
Course title and description: Vulnerability Analysis (2 hours):
Students learn to source, develop, and contribute to unit intelligence
preparation of the battlefield; conduct hazard assessments; and finally
develop and recommend courses of action from NBC.
Course title and description: Control Center (Nuclear) (3 hours):
Students rehearse the use of the NBC warning and reporting procedures
for nuclear detonations. Includes manual plotting methods,
communication protocols, and operational aspects. Time of stay/exit,
shielding, and decay problems are illustrated.
Course title and description: Control Center (Chem-Bio) (2 hours): This
course instructs and rehearses the student in the use of the NBC
warning and reporting procedures for chemical and biological attack.
Includes manual plotting methods, communication protocols, and
operational aspects. Incident response through consequence management.
Course title and description: Joint Warning and Reporting Network (3
hours): This is the prescribed automated platform for integration of
NBC warning and reporting to command and control systems and networks.
Course title and description: Radiation Safety/Depleted Uranium (1
hour): Designed to be refresher instruction for the unit. Addresses
types and characteristics of ionizing radiation, medical effects, and
protection standards/tasks. Reviews the current inventory of
radioactive sources in the Department of Defense's use and the handling
of accidents.
Course title and description: Unit Sustainment (3 hours): Formerly
referred to as "decontamination," sustainment is the units' effort to
recover personnel and equipment for continued use on the battlefield.
This period of instruction develops the principles of decontamination
and updates the NBC specialist/officer on the latest equipment and
decontaminants.
Course title and description: Special Sustainment (1 hour): The special
requirements for decontamination of casualties and aircraft are
instructed per current doctrine. Instruction covers site reconnaissance
and the development of best practices in areas that every unit may not
encounter.
Course title and description: Biodefense and Medical Management (2
hours): Designed for both NBC and medical personnel, the lecture covers
casualty identification, triage, and decontamination requirements. Part
2 of this instruction highlights the biological sampling and modeling
of the battlefield; how to collect, escort, and ship etiologic agents;
laboratory protocols; reporting requirements; and fundamentals of
epidemiology.
Course title and description: Joint Mission Essential Task List (1
hour): Class begins with a review of mission-essential task development
and NBC tasks at the strategic national, strategic theater, and
operational levels. Lecture then details the Marine Corps' Task List
and the seven mission-essential task areas for the Marine Air Ground
Task Force, focusing on sense, shape, shield, and sustain. Puts Marine
Air Ground Task Force requirements into perspective and sets the stage
for joint and combined operations.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for
After-Action Reporting for the Army's CTCs:
Army Regulation 11-33 (Army Lessons Learned):
After Action Report, Part I: Executive Summary (completed by
commander):
* Mission objectives;
* General description;
* Dates, locations, and major participants;
* Significant issues;
* Limitations;
After Action Report, Part II: Lessons Learned;
* Observation;
* Discussion;
* Lessons learned;
* Recommended action;
* Comments;
After Action Report, Part III: Optional;
* Chronology of events;
* Operation (plans/orders);
* Standing operating procedures;
U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation 350-50 (CMTC Training):
After Action Report, Part I: Executive overview:
* Mission objectives;
* General description;
* Participating units (including specific information) such as troop
list, number of personnel who participated, and number and type of
vehicles used;
* Required task organization (must coincide with the current
modification table of organization and equipment, broken down by
vehicle type, unit requirement, and unit shipped);
* Optional and added units (broken down by vehicle type, unit
requirement, and unit shipped);
* Significant issues;
* Limitations;
* Funding (including personnel, transportation type and cost, total
vehicle transportation cost, and total cost reimbursed to the Combat
Maneuver Training Center [CMTC]);
After Action Report, Part II: Lessons Learned;
* Observation;
* Discussion;
* Lessons learned;
* Recommended action;
* Comments;
Tactical lessons learned, to include command and control; maneuver
(offense/defense); fire support; intelligence; air defense;
mobility/countermobility; electronic warfare; nuclear, biological,
chemical defense; and combat service support;
Administrative and logistics lessons learned (including deploying to,
training at, and redeploying from the CMTC);
General narrative comments, to include the following:
* Benefits of training at the CMTC;
* Recommendations for doctrinal improvement;
* Recommendations and lessons learned on preparatory training;
* Recommendations for improving the training exercise;
Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1 (NTC Training):
Tactical lessons learned. Address the Battle Functions; Administrative
lessons learned, including deployment, redeployment, equipment draw,
and regeneration;
* Benefits of training at the National Training Center (NTC);
* Recommendations for doctrinal improvement;
* Recommendations/lessons learned on preparatory training, including
comments on usability of the Army Training and Evaluation Program or
any other training and training support product developed by the
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC);
* Recommendations for improvement of the NTC experience;
* Logistics or Resource Management lessons learned;
Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (JRTC Training):
Tactical lessons learned. Address the battlefield operating system;
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense; electronic warfare;
deployment; and any other pertinent topics;
Administrative lessons learned, including deployment, redeployment, and
any other pertinent topics;
* Benefits of training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC);
* Recommendations for improving existing doctrine;
* Recommendations for improving preparatory training, including
comments on the usability of TRADOC publications or other training
support products;
* Recommendations for improving the JRTC experience.
Sources: U.S. Army, "Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development
and Application," Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989); "Training:
Combat Maneuver Training Center," U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50
(Aug. 4, 1994); "Training at the National Training Center," Forces
Command Regulation 350-50-1 (July 1, 2002); and "Training at the Joint
Readiness Training Center," Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (June
15, 1998).
Note: CTC = Combat Training Center.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
November 29, 2004:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-05-8, "CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE: Army and Marine
Corps Need to Establish Minimum Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat
Training Centers," dated October 22, 2004 (GAO Code 350328).
We have reviewed the draft report and our comments to the GAO's draft
recommendations are enclosed. We fundamentally agree with the overall
findings and recommendations of the report. The Army and Marine Corps
have established programs to implement these recommendations. However,
due to current operational requirements, most units currently training
at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) are currently conducting training
that commanders determine are essential for accomplishment of their
directed missions. Full implementation of Nuclear Biological Chemical
(NBC) training at CTC rotations is being deferred in order to focus on
those tasks.
When missions, threats, and operating conditions allow, both Services
will return to more traditional CTC training events with the GAO's
recommendations fully implemented.
We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
Readiness:
GAO-05-8/GAO CODE 350328:
"CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE: ARMY AND MARINE CORPS NEED TO
ESTABLISH MINIMUM TASKS AND IMPROVE REPORTING FOR COMBAT TRAINING
CENTERS"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish the minimum nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) tasks for units attending training
exercises at combat training centers. (Page 30/Draft Report):
Doll) RESPONSE: Concur with comment. While the Army is instituting a
plan to train NBC tasks within the next year for all units during the
reception phase of CTC rotations, the implementation of this plan will
be delayed. The CTCs are currently conducting mission rehearsal
exercises (MRE) prior to deployment in support of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The MREs focus exclusively on those tasks
that commanders determine are essential for accomplishment of their
directed mission. The NBC training will be fully implemented when
missions, threats, and operating conditions allow.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to standardize reporting formats to
capture NBC training that occurs at the combat training centers. (Page
30/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army will standardize the training unit after
action report formats for CTC rotations in the next published revisions
to specifically include NBC training.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending the
combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms. (Page 31/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The Marine Corps is prepared to
integrate NBC training in their Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) on short
notice. However, full implementation has been delayed due to focus of
CAX training being modified to prepare units for threats that
commanders have determined are essential for accomplishment of their
directed mission. The NBC training will be fully implemented when
missions, threats, and operating conditions allow.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine
Corps standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs
during a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms. (Page 31/Draft
Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The Marine Corps is developing a
standardized system for recording CAX NBC training that will provide
current trend information necessary to identify deficiencies and take
corrective actions. This system will be available when current
missions, threats and operating conditions allow a return to the more
traditional CAX training program.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William W. Cawood, Jr., (202) 512-3959:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Beverly Schladt, Mike Avenick,
Matthew Sakrekoff, James Lawson, Leslie Bharadwaja, Gerald Winterlin,
Jim Melton, R.K. Wild, Dave Mayfield, and Jay Smale made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] At the NTC, brigades conduct live-fire offense and defense
missions. At the JRTC and CMTC, live-fire training is focused at the
company level.
[2] The Army has a fourth primary CTC, called the Battle Command
Training Program, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This report will
concentrate on the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC because the training at
these "maneuver" combat training centers consists principally of live
training. The Battle Command Training Program, which is called the
"traveling CTC," conducts computer-assisted Command Post Exercises.
[3] U.S. Army, "Combat Training Center Program," Army Regulation 350-50
(Jan. 24, 2003).
[4] Department of the Army, Combat Training Center Master Plan (Aug.
30, 2003), p. 1-5.
[5] See GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's
Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/NSIAD-99-210
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 1999). In fiscal year 2004 dollars, this
amount would be $1.1 billion.
[6] NSPD-17/HSPD-4 [unclassified version], National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), p. 1.
[7] DOD, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Environments, Joint Publication 3-11 (July 11, 2000),
pp. III-6 and III-7.
[8] U.S. Army, "Army Training and Education," Army Regulation 350-1
(Apr. 9, 2003), paragraph 4-11.
[9] U.S. Marine Corps, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
(NBCD) Training," Marine Corps Order 3400.3F (Mar. 1, 2004). See also
U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) Program,"
Marine Corps Order 3500.11E (Nov. 21, 2001).
[10] Army regulations and Marine Corps orders containing provisions on
preparing lessons learned at the CTCs include U.S. Army, "Army Lessons
Learned Program: System Development and Application," Army Regulation
11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989); U.S. Army, "Training at the National Training
Center," Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1 (July 1, 2002); U.S. Army,
"Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center," Forces Command
Regulation 350-50-2 (June 15, 1998); U.S. Army, "Training: Combat
Maneuver Training Center," U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50 (Aug. 4,
1994); U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Lessons Learned System," Marine
Corps Order 5000.17A (Apr. 25, 1994); and U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine
Corps Combined Arms Exercise Program," Marine Corps Order 3500.11E
(Nov. 21, 2001).
[11] U.S. Army, The Army Universal Task List, Field Manual 7-15,
Section 5.3 (Oct. 4, 2002).
[12] Army Regulation 350-1, paragraph 4-11(c)5.
[13] Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, enclosure 1.
[14] The rotation period is 24 hours per day times about 25 days, for a
total of about 600 hours.
[15] In 2001 an Army-directed study conducted by the RAND Corporation
found that a brigade's subunits did not always experience intensive NBC
training while at the NTC in fiscal years 1999 to 2001. This study
showed that, on average, units faced an NBC event on only about half of
their training missions; almost 40 percent of the units never
encountered NBC conditions during their entire rotation; and one-third
of the battalions never conducted decontamination. The RAND study also
showed that NBC events at the NTC varied widely in their scope and
intensity, ranging from something as simple as avoiding a contaminated
area to a full-scale attack with a persistent chemical agent that
required a unit to decontaminate its equipment. (See the RAND
Corporation article, "NBC at the NTC: Distraction or Necessity?"
[2001]. This article is a summary of a longer RAND report that the Army
has not yet released.)
[16] Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Unit
Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training, Report No. 98-174
(Arlington, Va.: July 17, 1998).
[17] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Unit-Level Training for Chemical and
Biological Defense, A-2002-0486-IME (Alexandria, Va.: July 10, 2002).
[18] Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program,
Annual Report to Congress, Volume I (Apr. 2002) p. 120.
[19] GAO, Army Training: Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not
Always Reliable, GAO/NSIAD-91-72 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 1991).
[20] GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems, GAO/NSIAD-96-103
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1996).
[21] GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-92 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 26, 1999).
[22] GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/NSIAD-99-210 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 17, 1999).
[23] Twentynine Palms normally conducts 10 combined arms exercise
rotations per fiscal year, lasting 22 days for active duty forces and
15 days for reserve component forces. These exercises emphasize
warfighting skills required for a unit's mission-essential tasks.
However, in recent years, training at Twentynine Palms has emphasized
preparation for "real-world" missions, such as stability and support
operations and combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
[24] Naval Audit Service, Marine Corps Infantry/Armor Readiness
Reporting, N2002-0011 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001).
[25] Army Regulation 350-50, paragraph 1-5(b).
[26] Individual CTC regulations also contemplate the preparation and
dissemination within command channels of extensive after-action
reports. (See Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1, Forces Command
Regulation 350-50-2, and U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50.)
[27] U.S. Army, "Army Programs: Army Lessons Learned Program: System
Development and Application," Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989).
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, as executive agent for the
Army Lessons Learned Program, is responsible for establishing a
facility that has the resources to "receive, process, archive, analyze,
and disseminate information from the combat training centers and major
training." This facility is the Center for Army Lessons Learned,
located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
[28] Marine Corps Order 5000.17A.
[29] Marine Corps Order 3500.11E.
[30] The Forces Command list of NBC tasks is contained in its message
dated July 17, 2003, "Training Guidance for Follow-on Forces Deploying
ISO Operation Iraqi Freedom."
[31] U.S. Army, "Army Training and Education," Army Regulation 350-1
(Apr. 9, 2003).
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Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
