Technology Development
New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust Gao ID: GAO-05-155 January 28, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) is depending heavily on new space-based technologies to support and transform future military operations. Yet there are concerns that efforts to develop technologies for space systems are not tied to strategic goals for space and are not well planned or coordinated. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004, the Congress required DOD to develop a space science and technology (S&T) strategy that sets out goals and a process for achieving those goals. The Congress also required GAO to assess this strategy as well as the required coordination process.
DOD's new strategy for space S&T met four of the nine requirements set out by the Congress and plans are in place to meet the remaining requirements. These included requirements for setting short- and long-term goals and a process for achieving those goals as well as requirements that focused on ensuring the strategy was developed with laboratories, research components, and other organizations involved in space S&T and ensuring the strategy would be reviewed by appropriate entities and revised periodically. In addition to meeting these requirements, GAO found that development of the strategy itself helped spur collaboration within the DOD space S&T community since it required diverse organizations to come together, share knowledge, and establish agreement on basic goals. Since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to assess whether the direction and processes outlined in the strategy will be effective in supporting and guiding future space S&T efforts. Moreover, DOD officials are still working out the details of some implementation mechanisms. However, in order to better position DOD for successful implementation, GAO believes that the plan should contain stronger linkages to DOD's requirements setting process, identify additional measures for assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, and explicitly cover all efforts related to space S&T. Moreover, there are formidable barriers that stand in the way of optimizing DOD's investment in space S&T. DOD does not have complete visibility over all spending related to space S&T, including spending occurring within some S&T organizations and acquisition programs. Without a means to see where funding is being targeted, DOD may not be able to assure all spending on technology development is focused on achieving its goals. The S&T community itself may not have resources critical to achieving DOD's goals. In recent years, funding and opportunities for testing for the space S&T community have decreased. And, concerns have grown about the adequacy of the space S&T workforce. DOD acquisition programs continue to undertake technology development that should be occurring within an S&T environment, which is more forgiving and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program environment. Until this is done, cost increases resulting from technology problems within acquisitions may keep resources away from the S&T community. By using the strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing these challenges, DOD can better position itself for achieving its goals and also strengthen the S&T base supporting space.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-155, Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2005:
Technology Development:
New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy Provides Basis for
Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to Be More Robust:
GAO-05-155:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-155, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is depending heavily on new space-based
technologies to support and transform future military operations. Yet
there are concerns that efforts to develop technologies for space
systems are not tied to strategic goals for space and are not well
planned or coordinated. In the National Defense Authorization Act for
2004, the Congress required DOD to develop a space science and
technology (S&T) strategy that sets out goals and a process for
achieving those goals. The Congress also required GAO to assess this
strategy as well as the required coordination process.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s new strategy for space S&T met four of the nine requirements set
out by the Congress and plans are in place to meet the remaining
requirements. These included requirements for setting short- and long-
term goals and a process for achieving those goals as well as
requirements that focused on ensuring the strategy was developed with
laboratories, research components, and other organizations involved in
space S&T and ensuring the strategy would be reviewed by appropriate
entities and revised periodically. In addition to meeting these
requirements, GAO found that development of the strategy itself helped
spur collaboration within the DOD space S&T community since it required
diverse organizations to come together, share knowledge, and establish
agreement on basic goals.
Since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to
assess whether the direction and processes outlined in the strategy
will be effective in supporting and guiding future space S&T efforts.
Moreover, DOD officials are still working out the details of some
implementation mechanisms. However, in order to better position DOD for
successful implementation, GAO believes that the plan should contain
stronger linkages to DOD‘s requirements setting process, identify
additional measures for assessing progress in achieving strategic
goals, and explicitly cover all efforts related to space S&T.
Moreover, there are formidable barriers that stand in the way of
optimizing DOD‘s investment in space S&T. For example:
* DOD does not have complete visibility over all spending related to
space S&T, including spending occurring within some S&T organizations
and acquisition programs. Without a means to see where funding is being
targeted, DOD may not be able to assure all spending on technology
development is focused on achieving its goals.
* The S&T community itself may not have resources critical to achieving
DOD‘s goals. In recent years, funding and opportunities for testing for
the space S&T community have decreased. And, concerns have grown about
the adequacy of the space S&T workforce.
* DOD acquisition programs continue to undertake technology development
that should be occurring within an S&T environment, which is more
forgiving and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program
environment. Until this is done, cost increases resulting from
technology problems within acquisitions may keep resources away from
the S&T community.
By using the strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing these
challenges, DOD can better position itself for achieving its goals and
also strengthen the S&T base supporting space.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations that focus on assuring DOD has the right
tools and measures in place to meet its goals for space S&T and to take
steps needed to begin addressing barriers to effectively implementing
the new strategic plan. In commenting on the report, DOD agreed with
the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-155.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Mike Sullivan at (937)
258-9715 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Space S&T Strategy Addresses the Act's Requirements:
Additional Criteria Are Not Included in the Act That May Enhance the
Strategy:
Barriers May Hamper Strategy Implementation:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Budget Activity Descriptions:
Appendix II: Funding on Technology Development within Science and
Technology and Acquisition Communities:
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions:
Appendix IV: Organizations That Participated in Developing the Space
Science and Technology Strategy:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Requirements Met or Planned:
Table 2: Description of Department of Defense's Budget Activities:
Table 3: Funding by S&T Community:
Table 4: Advanced Component Development and Prototypes Funding for
Space Acquisition Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD S&T Activities within the RDT&E Appropriations:
Figure 2: Funding for Space Test Program:
Figure 3: Number of Experiments Carried Out by Space Test Program:
Abbreviations:
BA: budget activity:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
DDR&E: Director of Defense Research and Engineering:
DOD: Department of Defense:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NRO: National Reconnaissance Office:
RDT&E: research, development, test and evaluation:
S&T: science and technology:
TRL: technology readiness level:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 28, 2005:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is looking to its space systems to play
an increasingly pivotal role in future military operations. As such, it
is developing several families of new, expensive, and technically
challenging space systems, eventually including constellations of
satellites that will employ laser optics to transport information over
long distances in much larger quantities than radio waves; a new
generation of global positioning technology; and advanced infrared
sensors, radar sensors, and environmental monitoring sensors. At the
same time, DOD is seeking to improve technologies and materials that
are critical to enhancing satellite performance, such as propulsion
systems, cooling systems, onboard and ground processing systems, and
materials used to protect technologies and spacecraft in the harsh
space environment.
A broad array of entities is charged with responsibility for developing
the science and technology (S&T) supporting space systems, including
research laboratories and test facilities belonging to the military
departments and DOD as well as industry and academic organizations that
perform research and development for these organizations or for
specific DOD space acquisition programs. From fiscal years 2004 through
2009, DOD plans to spend about $3.8 billion on S&T efforts exclusive to
space applications within its military laboratories and contracts
through its laboratories. Considerably more money will be spent on
projects that have space and terrestrial applications (for example,
propulsion technologies and advanced materials) as well as on
technology development that occur within acquisition programs. In
addition, outside agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), also invest in S&T efforts that can support DOD
space systems and may benefit from S&T efforts being carried out by
DOD.
Though there are many diverse organizations carrying out S&T efforts
related to space and a considerable amount being invested, DOD has not
had an overarching strategy for space S&T in recent years that sets
goals for these efforts, helps direct how investments should be spent,
and tracks the overall progress of DOD's investment in space S&T.
Moreover, there have been concerns that the level of collaboration and
coordination among all DOD S&T organizations involved in space has not
been adequate, leading to redundant or unnecessary investments in some
areas or even too little investment in areas where it is critical for
the United States to maintain a lead over other nations. There has also
been concern that technologies have difficulty transitioning from the
laboratories to DOD's acquisition programs. In addition, our previous
reports have shown that weapon system acquisition programs have taken
on technology development that should occur in an S&T environment. In
doing so, acquisition programs have not been able to align customer
expectations with resources, and therefore minimize problems that could
hurt the program in its design and production phases. In fact, many of
the space programs we have reviewed over the past several decades have
incurred unanticipated cost and schedule increases because they began
without knowing whether technologies could work as intended and
invariably found themselves addressing technical problems in a more
costly environment.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (the act)
required DOD's Executive Agent for Space and its Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to develop and implement a space S&T
strategy. The act required us to review and assess the S&T strategy and
the effectiveness of the coordination process among DOD S&T elements
and to report our findings by September 1, 2004. As discussed with
committee staff, our objectives were to (1) assess whether the strategy
meets the act's requirements, (2) identify additional criteria above
and beyond the act that could enhance the usefulness of the strategy,
and (3) identify barriers that may hamper DOD's ability to successfully
enhance S&T efforts for space. We provided a briefing on our review to
your committees on our findings on September 1, 2004. This report
details our findings.
In conducting our work, we reviewed DOD and military department policy
documents on S&T activities, as well as pertinent S&T reports and
related material, to determine DOD's progress in achieving program
mission objectives. We assessed the DOD space S&T strategy for
compliance with the 2004 Defense Authorization Act. We developed
additional criteria with which to assess the space S&T strategy and
identified barriers that may influence DOD's ability to successfully
implement S&T efforts for space. In doing so, we consulted with subject
matter experts and reviewed our previous best practice reports. We
reviewed documents from and conducted interviews with officials in DOD,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), NASA, and
military department research laboratories. We also analyzed the fiscal
year 2004 virtual Major Force Program for Space and unclassified DOD
budget documents to identify the amount of space research, development,
test and evaluation (RDT&E) funding for fiscal years 2003 to 2009 and
confirmed with DOD officials responsible for maintaining this
information that our analysis was correct. Our review was conducted
from November 2003 to November 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to develop a
strategy for space S&T that identified short-and long-term space S&T
goals; a process for achieving the goals, including an implementation
plan; and a process for assessing progress made toward achieving the
goals. The act also required DOD to coordinate its efforts with various
organizations and agencies involved in space. The strategy met four of
nine specific requirements in the act, and plans are in place to meet
the remaining five requirements. We found that the strategy provides a
foundation for enhancing coordination among space S&T efforts since it
does specify overall goals and it establishes several mechanisms to
help senior leaders gauge whether investments are focusing on those
goals. Moreover, the development of the strategy itself helped spur
collaboration within the DOD space S&T community since it required
diverse organizations to come together, share knowledge, and establish
agreement on basic goals.
However, the strategy lacks details in key areas needed to achieve its
goals. For example, measures for gauging success have not been fully
defined. In addition, the strategy does not specifically address how
S&T efforts within space acquisition programs will be covered, even
though considerable money is being spent by acquisition programs on
technology development. Also, the strategy does not address how long-
standing barriers to optimizing DOD's investment in space S&T will be
addressed, including incomplete visibility over funding for space-
related S&T as well as testing and workforce deficiencies.
Concentrating on these issues would help ensure that DOD has the right
tools and measures in place to meet its goals for space. As such, we
are making recommendations focused on addressing these issues in future
versions of the strategy. In addition, there are barriers outside of
the space community that may hamper effective implementation of the
space strategy, including a lack of a DOD-wide investment strategy.
Such a strategy could be useful in guiding and directing S&T
investments, funding, and organizational incentives, which have been
encouraging technology development in acquisition programs rather than
the S&T community. DOD has initiated actions to address these issues,
but it is too early to assess their effectiveness.
Background:
Generally, DOD's S&T community (which includes DOD laboratories and
testing facilities as well as contractors and academic institutions
that support these facilities) conducts research and develops
technologies to support military applications, such as satellites or
weapon systems. Like the acquisition community in DOD, the S&T
community uses RDT&E funds, but the S&T community's work precedes the
acquisition cycle. Weapon system program managers, who receive most of
DOD's RDT&E budget, apply generic technologies to specific systems.
Figure 1 highlights activities the S&T community is involved in along
with the RDT&E budget categories, or "activities," which are used to
fund these efforts. More details on both are provided in appendixes I
and II.
Figure 1: DOD S&T Activities within the RDT&E Appropriations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The S&T community carries out its work within the first three
categories of research and development listed above. DOD has specified
that the work within the fourth category--testing and evaluation of
prototypes of systems or subsystems in a high fidelity or realistic
environment--involves efforts before an acquisition program starts
product development. However, according to DOD officials, it is assumed
that either the S&T community or an acquisition program may carry out
this work, and traditionally, weapon system acquisition programs have
taken on technology development within this stage. After this point,
any additional development is to be completed as part of a formal
acquisition or product development phase under the authority of the
weapon system manager and apart from the S&T community.
The DOD DDR&E is responsible for the overall direction, quality, and
content of the agency's S&T efforts. Each of the military departments-
-Army, Air Force, and Navy--has its own S&T programs, as do DOD
organizations such as DARPA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, MDA, and
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The DOD Executive Agent for
Space--who is also the space milestone decision authority for all space
major defense acquisition programs, the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, and the Director of the NRO--also influences S&T efforts for
space since he decides whether significant investments in space systems
are to move forward in the development process.
There are mechanisms within the space community and DOD designed to
ensure S&T efforts are coordinated and are focused on achieving broader
goals and that redundancy is minimized. Within the space community, a
forum called the Space Technology Alliance was established in 1997 to
coordinate the development of space technologies with an eye toward
achieving the greatest return on investment. Its membership includes
the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, MDA, DARPA, and NRO. At the DOD-wide
level, there is a Defense Science and Technology Strategy, which lays
out goals for DOD-wide S&T efforts based on goals set by higher-level
documents, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review. This strategy is
used, in turn, to develop a DOD-wide basic research plan, which
reflects DOD's objectives and planned investments for basic research
conducted by universities, industry, and laboratories and a DOD-wide
technology area plan, which does the same for applied research and
advanced technology development. There is also a Joint Warfighting S&T
Plan, which ties S&T projects to priority future joint warfighting
capabilities identified by higher-level documents. These overall plans,
in turn, are used by DOD laboratories to direct investments in S&T.
They are also used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide
guidance to the military departments and the defense agencies as they
develop and vet their proposed budgets. In addition, DOD puts together
teams of outside experts in 12 technology areas to assess whether
particular investments across DOD's S&T community are redundant or
unnecessary. These are known as Technology Area Reviews and
Assessments. The teams make recommendations to a board comprised of
senior DOD S&T officials and chaired by the DDR&E for action to
terminate, adjust, and/or enhance investments to better align the S&T
program to comply with the planning document guidance. The DDR&E, which
reports to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics), has oversight of the RDT&E budget activities used to
research and develop new technologies, specifically, RDT&E budget
activities 1 (basic research), 2 (applied research), and 3 (advanced
technology development). Recently, the DDR&E was given oversight of
RDT&E budget activity 4 (advanced component development and prototypes)
in an effort to ensure this development had sufficient oversight from
the S&T community.
DOD's Space S&T Strategy Addresses the Act's Requirements:
The act required DOD to develop a strategy for its space S&T efforts
that identified short-and long-term space S&T goals; a process for
achieving the goals, including an implementation plan; and a process
for assessing progress made toward achieving the goals. The act also
required DOD to coordinate its strategy development efforts.[Footnote
1] The strategy, yet to be delivered to the Congress at the time of our
review, met four of nine requirements, and plans are in place to meet
the remaining five. We found that the strategy provides a foundation
for enhancing coordination among space S&T efforts since it does
specify overall goals and that it establishes several mechanisms to
help senior leaders gauge whether investments are focusing on those
goals. However, since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is
too early to assess whether the direction and processes outlined in the
strategy will be effective in supporting and guiding future space S&T
efforts.
Table 1: Requirements Met or Planned:
Requirement: Identify short-and long-term goals; Requirement met?
Yes.
Requirement: Address a process for achieving the goals, including an
implementation plan;
Requirement met? Yes.
Requirement: Address a process for assessing progress made toward
achieving the goals;
Requirement met? Yes.
Requirement: Strategy developed in consultation with DOD laboratories,
research components, and other organizations;
Requirement met? Yes.
Requirement: Strategy to be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised
annually;
Requirement met? Planned.
Requirement: Strategy to be made available for review by the
congressional defense committees;
Requirement met? Planned.
Requirement: Strategy to be included as part of the annual National
Security Space Plan;
Requirement met? Planned.
Requirement: Strategy to be provided to DOD components and DOD S&T
entities to support DOD's planning, programming, and budgeting
processes;
Requirement met? Planned.
Requirement: In carrying out the space S&T strategy, DOD laboratories,
research components, and other organizations shall each (1) identify
research projects that contribute directly and uniquely to the
development of space technology and (2) inform the DDR&E and the DOD
Executive Agent for Space of the planned budget and schedule for those
projects;
Requirement met? Planned.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The strategy identified goals for space S&T along six main areas--
assured access to space, responsive space capability, assured space
operations, spacecraft technology, information superiority, and S&T
workforce. Except for the goal of enhancing the workforce, the strategy
laid out short-term goals (within 5 years) and long-term goals (in the
year 2020 or beyond). Under spacecraft technology, for example, the
strategy identified a short-term goal of on-orbit assessment of
satellite servicing and repair and long-term goals of on-orbit
assembly, deployment, repair, and upgrades. Under assured space
operations, the strategy identified a short-term goal of detecting,
identifying, and characterizing natural and man-made objects in space
and a long-term goal of complete space situational awareness. According
to S&T community officials we spoke with, the mere identification of
goals should be useful in helping DOD laboratories and other S&T
facilities to direct their investment as this type of guidance had not
been provided for space previously.
The strategy also establishes several mechanisms for implementation.
Primarily, it calls for semiannual space S&T summit meetings to
coordinate user expectations, highlight technologies, provide
guidance, and establish priorities.[Footnote 2] DDR&E officials, agency
S&T executives as well as Service Program Executive Officers for Space
who will ultimately transition new capabilities, and major command
leadership will attend these meetings. The strategy also implements an
Industry Independent Research and Development coordination conference,
where industry and government officials can come together to
collaborate in their S&T planning activities. Details on both of these
mechanisms are still being worked out, according to the developers of
the strategy.
The strategy also identifies some tools and measures that will be used
to track progress in meeting goals. These tools and measures include
"technology roadmaps," which identify timelines, milestones, and
transition dates for specific projects as well as interdependencies
with other projects and "technology readiness level" (TRL), an
analytical tool that assesses the maturity level of technology. Our
prior work has found TRLs to be a valuable decision-making tool since
it can presage the likely consequences of incorporating a technology at
a given level of maturity into a product development. [Footnote 3]
Appendix III details criteria for each TRL.
In addition, DOD has plans in place to ensure that the strategy is
reviewed and revised, as necessary, annually and that it be made
publicly available for review by congressional defense committees.
Other DOD S&T entities will be provided the strategy to support the
planning, programming, and budgeting processes. DOD also plans to
include the strategy as an annex to the National Security Space Plan,
even though the plan is thought to be a lower-level tactical document
and not a strategic document.
The developers of the strategy worked with a wide range of
organizations in establishing goals, measures, and implementation
plans. These include military department laboratories, DARPA,
intelligence agencies, MDA, the Air Force Space Command, NASA, the
Space and Missile Systems Center, the U.S. Strategic Command, the
National Security Space Office, and others.[Footnote 4] Officials
within the space community we spoke with commented that it has
historically been difficult to gain agreement from these organizations.
Even though they all have ties to space, these organizations have
different views as to what overall goals the space community should
strive for and how they should be achieved. According to officials
within the space community we spoke with, just getting these
organizations to work together and to gain agreement was a significant
benefit to the community at large since it helped foster more
collaborative working relationships and greater knowledge sharing.
Additional Criteria Are Not Included in the Act That May Enhance the
Strategy:
In addition to the requirements specified by the act, we found that
optimizing space S&T efforts also depends on whether (1) the strategy
is clearly linked to other strategies and plans; (2) all DOD space S&T
efforts are covered by the strategy; and (3) the strategy identifies
metrics beyond TRLs that focus on success. Linkage to other strategies
and plans is important to providing clear guidance to S&T laboratories
and other organizations making investments since there are a number of
DOD-wide "strategies" for S&T as well as a number of space-related
higher level strategic plans as well as tactical plans relating to S&T.
Coverage of all space S&T efforts is important since S&T is carried out
not only by DOD laboratories but also by large acquisition programs and
other agencies that have a large stake or investment in space S&T. For
example, NRO develops new satellites for the intelligence community and
could potentially leverage its S&T efforts with DOD's. Lastly, having
additional measures beyond TRLs is important to gauging the success of
the implementation of the strategy as well as the relevancy and
feasibility of specific progress toward achieving DOD's overall goals
for space. We found that the strategy clearly identified linkages to
some, but not all, key plans and strategies, and it did not provide
coverage over all S&T efforts or establish additional measures.
Links to Other Strategies and Plans:
The space S&T strategy identifies links to higher-level documents, such
as the National Security Space Strategy, which sets overall strategic
goals for DOD space and identifies capabilities to be pursued, and the
Defense S&T Strategy, which provides overall goals for DOD S&T based on
higher-level strategic documents. The strategy also references lower-
level plans including the National Security Space Plan discussed
earlier and DOD-wide S&T plans, such as the Basic Research Plan, the
Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan.
However, the strategy did not provide links to other documents and
assessments that impact the space S&T community. For example, it is
unclear how the document will link to DOD's Space Technology Guide,
which describes the current state of space and space-related technology
activities underway, including key enabling technologies, that is,
those that "must be done right" since they play a pivotal role in
making revolutionary advancements in space applications. The guide is
being revised and could serve as a useful implementation tool for the
new space S&T strategy. It is also unclear how the strategy links to
architectures in areas such as responsive space operations, protection
for space mission assurance, and integrated intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance being developed by the National Security Space
Office. These architectures are to define the future desired state for
DOD's space assets. It is important that DOD reflect these other
documents in the new space S&T strategy so that the space community
clearly understands where the strategy fits in relation to other plans
and guides and can ensure decision making is consistent. Moreover, by
establishing closer links with the Space Technology Guide and
architectures under development, DOD may have more avenues to implement
its short-and long-term goals.
In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the
development of the strategy, including offices responsible for DOD's
new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).
JCIDS is replacing DOD's requirements generation process for major
acquisitions in an effort to shift the focus to a more capabilities-
based approach for determining joint warfighting needs rather than a
threat-based approach focused on individual systems and platforms.
Under JCIDS, boards comprised of high-level DOD civilians and military
officials are to identify future capabilities needed around key
functional concepts and areas, such as command and control, force
application, and battlespace awareness, and to make trade-offs among
air, space, land, and sea platforms in doing so. Although the JCIDS
officials were not required to participate in developing the strategy,
it is important that they do so in the future since their work could
have a significant impact on the direction of investments for space S&T
projects.
Coverage of All S&T Efforts:
The space S&T strategy does not explicitly address technology
development efforts within DOD acquisition programs. According to DOD
officials, space acquisition programs are typically using RDT&E funds
from budget activity 4 to mature technology and build the first two
satellites. Our analysis showed that space acquisition programs plan to
spend as much as $16 billion from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 on
budget activity 4. Our annual assessments of space systems have shown
that the portion of the $16 billion that is to be spent on maturing
technology (which we could not readily separate from the portion spent
building the first two satellites) is often being used to carry out
activities that should be carried out in an S&T environment. For
example, the Transformational Satellite program, which is focused on
building advanced communication satellites, entered system development
in early 2004 with only one of seven critical technologies matured to a
point of being tested in a relevant environment. Most of the
technologies were at a TRL 3, meaning analytical studies and some
laboratory tests had been conducted, but components had not yet been
demonstrated to work together. If DOD does not explicitly include
acquisition programs in the space S&T strategy, it will not be able to
ensure the S&T community has oversight over a considerable amount of
ongoing technology development.
We were not provided access to NRO to discuss how it collaborated with
the DDR&E and the Executive Agent for Space in developing the space S&T
strategy and how they intended to work with the DDR&E and the Executive
Agent for Space in implementing the strategy. However, DOD officials
stated that NRO had participated in the development of the strategy and
would participate in all S&T coordination activities identified by the
space S&T strategy. Moreover, according to DOD officials, NRO and other
intelligence agencies already participate in some DOD space S&T
coordination and review efforts, such as the Space Technology Alliance.
In addition, the DDR&E and the DOD Executive Agent for Space are
continuing to work on increasing coordination between DOD and the
intelligence community. DOD officials also noted that the current
Executive Agent for Space also serves as the Director of NRO, which has
helped to increase coordination between the intelligence community and
DOD. While these efforts may be helping to increase coordination
between DOD and the intelligence S&T communities, it is still important
to specifically include the DOD intelligence agencies in the strategy
itself and to identify protocols that can help foster greater knowledge
sharing between both communities.
Success Measures:
While the strategy identifies TRLs as a measure for tracking progress,
it does not prescribe metrics that focus on the value of S&T projects
relative to specific goals or knowledge being gained from projects.
Such metrics would help provide a foundation for assessing progress in
achieving strategic goals. Strategy developers stated that technology
development organizations are better suited to develop and use their
own specific metrics to measure success because different technologies
may require different types of metrics. The developers stated that by
design, the strategy sets the direction but leaves it up to the
laboratories and other S&T entities to establish their own metrics.
However, they acknowledged that some of the organizations they worked
with did not have adequate metrics. It is important that DOD attempt to
identify and use metrics that help assess progress, since these will
enable DOD to evaluate investments against its short-and long-term
goals and make informed investment decisions.
Barriers May Hamper Strategy Implementation:
Though the new space S&T strategy takes important first steps toward
optimizing investments, there are significant barriers that will make
it difficult to make advancements in the way S&T efforts are planned,
managed, and transitioned into acquisition programs. Some barriers
relate specifically to the space community--principally, incomplete
RDT&E funding visibility, inadequate testing resources, and workforce
deficiencies. These can potentially be addressed through further study,
resource shifts, increased management attention, and/or changes to how
funding is captured. Other barriers are more systemic and require more
difficult management and cultural changes to be made throughout DOD.
Nevertheless, until barriers are largely removed, the impact of a new
strategy for space S&T may be limited. The developers of the strategy
agreed that the barriers we identified were important and needed to be
addressed through efforts beyond the development of the strategy.
Visibility over S&T Spending on Space Is Incomplete:
The current budget process does not readily capture all RDT&E funding
for space S&T efforts. In 2001, DOD established a "virtual" Major Force
Program for space to increase the visibility of resources allocated for
space activities. This is a programming mechanism that aggregates most
space-unique[Footnote 5] funding by military department and function.
However, the mechanism does not align funding with RDT&E budget
activities, making it more difficult for DOD to assess the balance of
funding among basic research, applied research, and advanced technology
development.[Footnote 6] In working with DOD officials to categorize
the virtual Major Force Program by RDT&E budget activity, we identified
about $3.8 billion from fiscal years 2004 through 2009 for budget
activities 2 (applied research) and 3 (advanced technology
development). However, funding for budget activity 1 (basic research)
cannot be specifically associated to either space or terrestrial
platforms, and therefore does not appear in the virtual Major Force
Program, which is focused on space-unique funding. Funding in RDT&E
budget activities 2 and 3 that is not space unique is also not
captured. In addition, some DOD agencies develop space assets but have
primary missions that are not associated with space and are therefore,
not included in the virtual Major Force Program. For example, MDA's
space efforts are not included in the virtual Major Force Program for
space even though MDA is developing a new generation of missile
tracking satellite systems using advanced infrared sensors. MDA plans
to spend about $4.12 billion on this system from fiscal years 2004-
2009, and a considerable portion of this funding is expected to be used
to mature technologies for future satellites. Moreover, DARPA reports
its space funding by project so space S&T efforts cannot be readily
identified without additional knowledge of whether these projects are
space related. Currently, DARPA has funded about $200 million annually
on projects that are space unique and considerably more on projects
that have both space and terrestrial applications. Until the virtual
Major Force Program or some other tool can capture and categorize the
total amount of RDT&E dollars supporting space-unique S&T projects at a
minimum, DOD will be limited in guiding and directing all space
investments.
Testing Resources Declining:
Testing resources for space technologies are on the decline. In
particular, funding for testing has decreased, costs to launch
experiments have increased, and opportunities have been reduced with
the loss of the space shuttle, which had been partially used for DOD-
related technology experiments. DOD's Space Test Program, which is
designed to help the S&T community find opportunities to test in space
relatively cost-effectively, was funded at $62.3 million in fiscal year
1990 but only $38.6 million in fiscal year 2004 (see fig. 2). And
because the cost to launch experiments has increased, the program has
only been able to launch an average of seven experiments annually in
the past 4 years (see fig. 3). According to Space Test Program
officials, demand for testing has not diminished. S&T officials cited
dwindling testing resources as a barrier to their efforts. While the
strategy states that appropriate resources need to be allocated for on-
orbit testing, it does not address how this can or will be done.
Figure 2: Funding for Space Test Program:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Number of Experiments Carried Out by Space Test Program:
[See PDF for image]
Note: This does not include funding for testing that occurs within
acquisition programs. Chart is in FY 04 constant dollars.
[End of figure]
Space S&T Workforce Facing Shortages:
The workforce needed to carry out S&T for space is facing shortages.
DOD officials cited staff shortages with science and engineering
backgrounds and had more concerns about the future since their
workforces were reaching retirement age. These concerns were echoed by
DOD and industry studies. A 2002 study on the space research and
development industrial base conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton, for
example, found that over half of the current space R&D workforce is
over 45 years old and that departure of key talent could be especially
worrisome in 10 years, as scientists and engineers now in the 45-to 49-
year-old group begin to retire from the workforce and are replaced by a
smaller pool of less experienced personnel.[Footnote 7] In its report,
the Space Commission noted that both industry and the U.S. government
face substantial shortages of scientists and engineers and that
recruitment of new personnel is difficult since the space industry is
one of many sectors competing for the limited number of trained
scientists and engineers.[Footnote 8] Booz Allen noted that areas in
which either recruitment efforts are difficult or a critical mass is
lacking include systems engineering and software engineering. The 2004
National Defense Authorization Act[Footnote 9] directed the Secretary
of Defense to promote the development of space personnel career fields
within each of the military departments. However, we recently reported
that the military services vary in the extent to which they have
identified and implemented initiatives to develop and manage their
space cadres.[Footnote 10] Moreover, the space S&T strategy itself
merely lays out goals for workforce without identifying actions or
resources needed to achieve those goals.
In recognizing that more needs to be done to develop, attract, and
retain staff with critical skills, the Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 Conference Report[Footnote 11] directed DOD to develop
detailed implementation plans for enhancing the space cadre and to
study the ability of academia, industry, and government to educate and
train a community of space professionals and to address the definition
and development of key competencies and skill levels in the areas of
systems engineering, program management, financial management,
operations, and tactics. We believe that S&T skill areas should also be
included in the strategy given the importance of advancing space
technologies and potential future workforce shortages.
Investment Strategy Needed to Support S&T Planning:
DOD does not yet have a departmentwide investment strategy that could
provide a good foundation for space S&T planning. While desired
capabilities are regularly identified by military commanders and are
vetted through strategic reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense
Review, DOD has limited ability to make trades among space, air, land,
and sea platforms in deciding how best to meet those capabilities,
document those decisions, and follow through on those decisions. For
example, DOD would like to achieve persistent surveillance to enhance
military operations. But it has not been decided how much of the earth
needs to be covered and the extent to which air-based assets, such as
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, can achieve this capability versus
space-based assets, such as the planned space-based radar system. If
DOD conducted thorough and independent analyses of alternatives
weighing the pros and cons of using different combinations of both
assets and made trade-off decisions that could be enforced across the
military services, the S&T community could have a better basis for
deciding how much S&T dollars should go toward space-based radar
technologies versus technologies supporting air platforms.
The need for an investment strategy DOD-wide or for particular
functional areas has been cited in a variety of recent studies,
including a 1999 Defense Science Board study on tactical battlefield
communications and a 2004 study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. The recently established JCIDS process is
designed to identify future capabilities by functional areas and to
make trades between space and other platforms. However, it is unknown
as to how this work will translate into an investment strategy that
could be used to enhance S&T planning. And it is unknown how
effectively decisions made through JCIDS will be enforced. DOD has also
made changes to its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution[Footnote 12] process to provide higher-level guidance to the
budgeting process. However, it is also unclear as to how effectively
these changes will be implemented over time and whether they can serve
as a foundation for directing science and technology investments.
Funding Process Encourages Technology Development to Occur within
Acquisition Programs:
We have previously reported that an S&T environment is more forgiving
and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program
environment. Events such as test "failures," new discoveries, and time
spent in attaining knowledge are considered normal in this environment,
while they are seen as a negative event in an acquisition program.
Moreover, separating technology development and product development
enables organizations to align customer expectations with resources,
and therefore minimize problems that could hurt a program in its design
and production phases. Budget realities within DOD, however, make it
more advantageous to fund technology development in an acquisition
program. Historically, S&T organizations receive about 20 percent of
DOD's research and development budget, while weapon system programs
receive about 80 percent. The money going toward S&T is spread over
several thousand projects, while the money going toward weapons systems
is spread out over considerably fewer projects. This "distribution of
wealth" makes it easier to finance technology development within an
acquisition program. In addition, even though more money is distributed
to weapon systems, there is still considerable competition for funding.
Such competition makes it advantageous for programs to include in their
design immature technologies that offer significant performance gains.
Within the space community, there is also a perception that the length
of time it takes to develop space systems (which have only "one shot"
at incorporating technologies) demands that DOD push for continual
advancement of technologies, even after starting an acquisition
program.
The impact of acquisition programs taking on technology development
that should be done in an S&T environment is considerable. Our work
over the past several decades has shown that this practice invariably
leads to unanticipated cost and schedule increases for space and other
weapon system programs since technical problems occurring within
acquisition require more time and money to fix. For some large programs
for space, cost increases have amounted to billions of dollars and
delayed schedules by years. Aside from removing technology development
from a more protective environment and from S&T oversight processes,
problematic acquisitions may also rob the S&T community and other
acquisition programs of investment dollars.
Some actions have been taken recently to address this dilemma. In
particular, DOD issued a revised directive in November 2003 expanding
the DDR&E's oversight authority to include efforts to develop advanced
components and prototypes--RDT&E budget activity 4.[Footnote 13]
According to DDR&E officials, this authority was intended to keep
technology development out of the acquisition programs and within the
S&T community, but it will take at least 2 years to determine its
success. In addition, DOD's revised acquisition policy for weapon
systems encourages programs not to commit to undertaking product
development until technologies are matured, that is, at a minimum
tested in a relevant environment (TRL 6) and preferably in an
operational environment (TRL 7). However, in October 2003, DOD also
issued a separate acquisition policy for space, which allows technology
development to continue into product development up until a decision is
made to build the first product. At the time of our review, DOD was
revising the space acquisition policy and reexamining how long
technology development should continue within an acquisition program.
Conclusions:
DOD has taken an initial positive step in optimizing investments in
space S&T projects by establishing short-and long-term goals, which can
be used to direct spending by S&T organizations, and by establishing a
forum by which senior leaders can assess whether spending is going in
the right direction. However, there will be significant challenges
ahead for DOD in implementing the strategy. Namely, DOD must maintain
momentum toward greater collaboration, which began under this effort.
This will not be an easy task, given the varied and competing interests
of organizations with a stake in DOD's space S&T investment and the
fact that the strategy does not explicitly cover organizations that
fall outside the realm of traditional DOD S&T oversight. Moreover,
there are formidable barriers that stand in the way of achieving and
measuring progress, including inadequate funding visibility, decreased
testing resources, workforce deficiencies, and long-standing
incentives that encourage technology development to take place within
acquisition programs rather than the S&T community. By using the
strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing these challenges, DOD
can better position itself for achieving its goals and also strengthen
the S&T base supporting space.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the (1) Executive
Agent for Space and (2) the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) (to whom the DDR&E reports) to make the
following improvements to space S&T strategic planning.
* Establish protocols and mechanisms for enhancing coordination and
knowledge sharing between the DOD S&T community, acquisition programs
involved in space, and DOD intelligence agencies.
* Ensure that the space S&T strategy fully reflects warfighter needs by
establishing links between space S&T strategic planning and DOD's new
JCIDS. In addition, establish links to architectural development
processes to assure that S&T projects align with future technology
requirements identified in space-related architectures.
* Continue to ensure that DOD has the right tools for measuring
progress in achieving its goals for space by identifying metrics that
could be used for assessing the value of S&T projects relative to
strategic goals and knowledge being gained relative to goals.
* Develop plans for addressing barriers to achieving strategic goals
for S&T, including deficiencies in RDT&E funding visibility, testing
resources, and workforce. A first step would be to include skills
critical to S&T in the workforce study identified in the Fiscal Year
2005 Defense Authorization Act Conference Report.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and identified actions being taken to address them.
(See app. V for DOD's comments.)
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
the Air Force and interested congressional committees. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (937) 258-7915. Key contributors to this report were
Cristina Chaplain, Maricela Cherveny, Jean Harker, and Rich Horiuchi.
Signed by:
Michael Sullivan:
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Budget Activity Descriptions:
Table 2: Description of Department of Defense's Budget Activities:
Name: Basic research;
Budget activity: 1;
Description: Basic research is systematic study directed toward greater
knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and
of observable facts without specific applications towards processes or
products in mind. It includes all scientific study and experimentation
directed towards increasing fundamental knowledge and understanding in
those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life
sciences related to long-term national security needs. It is farsighted
high-payoff research that provides the basis for technological
progress.
Name: Applied research;
Budget activity: 2;
Description: Applied research is systematic study to understand the
means to meet a recognized and specific need. It is a systematic
expansion and application of knowledge to develop useful materials,
devices, and systems or methods. Applied research may translate
promising basic research into solutions for broadly defined military
needs, short of system development. Applied research precedes system-
specific technology investigations or development.
Name: Advanced technology development;
Budget activity: 3;
Description: Advanced technology development includes development of
subsystems and components and efforts to integrate them into system
prototypes for field experiments and/or tests in a simulated
environment. The results of this type of effort are proof of
technological feasibility and assessment of subsystem and component
operability and producibility rather than the development of hardware
for service use. Projects in this category have a direct relevance to
identified military needs. Program elements in this category involve
pre-acquisition efforts, such as system concept demonstration, joint
and service-specific experiments, or technology demonstrations, and
generally have technology readiness levels (TRLs) of 4, 5, or 6.
Projects in this category do not necessarily lead to subsequent
development or procurement phases, but should have the goal of moving
out of space science and technology (S&T) and into the acquisition
process within the future years defense program.
Name: Advanced component development and prototypes;
Budget activity: 4;
Description: Advanced component development and prototypes consists of
efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies or prototype
systems in a high fidelity and realistic operating environment. These
activities include system-specific efforts that help expedite
technology transition from the laboratory to operational use. Emphasis
is on proving component and subsystem maturity prior to integration in
major and complex systems and may involve risk reduction initiatives.
Advanced component development and prototypes efforts are to occur
before an acquisition program starts product development.
Name: System development and demonstration;
Budget activity: 5;
Description: System development and demonstration consists of newly
initiated acquisition programs and includes engineering and
manufacturing development tasks aimed at meeting validated requirements
prior to full-rate production. Characteristics of this activity involve
mature system development, integration, and demonstration to support a
production decision.
Name: Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) management
support;
Budget activity: 6;
Description: RDT&E management support includes efforts to sustain and/
or modernize the installations or operations required for general
RDT&E. Such efforts may relate to test ranges, military construction,
maintenance support of laboratories, operation and maintenance of test
aircraft and ships, and studies and analyses in support of the RDT&E
program.
Name: Operational system development;
Budget activity: 7;
Description: Operational system development includes development
efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or have received
approval for full-rate production and anticipate production funding in
the current or subsequent fiscal year.
Source: DOD Financial Management Regulation (DOD 7000.14-R, Volume 2B,
Chapter 5, June 2004).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Funding on Technology Development within Science and
Technology and Acquisition Communities:
Table 3: Funding by S&T Community:
Dollars in millions.
Multi-Disciplinary Space Technology[A];
BA: 2;
Category: 6.2;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: $95.8;
FY04: $101.4;
FY05: $84.6;
FY06: $81.1;
FY07: $101.4;
FY08: $123.2;
FY09: $122.1.
Space Technology 1[A];
BA: 2;
Category: 6.2;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 74.9;
FY04: 101.5;
FY05: 88.9;
FY06: 89.6;
FY07: 97.6;
FY08: 119.0;
FY09: 126.7.
Advance Spacecraft Technology;
BA: 3;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 52.4;
FY04: 96.9;
FY05: 60.1;
FY06: 65.9;
FY07: 72.1;
FY08: 88.2;
FY09: 91.0.
Maui Space Surveillance System;
BA: 3;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 47.1;
FY04: 51.6;
FY05: 6.3;
FY06: 6.3;
FY07: 6.4;
FY08: 6.5;
FY09: 6.6.
Multi-Disciplinary Adv Dev Space Tech;
BA: 3;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 51.7;
FY04: 62.1;
FY05: 51.1;
FY06: 59.6;
FY07: 76.3;
FY08: 81.8;
FY09: 73.1.
Command, Control, Communications;
BA: 3;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Army;
FY03: 8.7;
FY04: 11.3;
FY05: 10.0;
FY06: 14.4;
FY07: 14.9;
FY08: 11.2;
FY09: 6.5.
Advance Aerospace Systems;
BA: 3;
Category: 6.3;
Component: DARPA;
FY03: 111.6;
FY04: 201.6;
FY05: 249.2;
FY06: 233.6;
FY07: 261.8;
FY08: 296.9;
FY09: 327.0.
Integrated Broadcast System;
BA: 3;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 0.0;
FY04: 8.5;
FY05: 2.3;
FY06: 0.0;
FY07: 0.0;
FY08: 0.0;
FY09: 0.0.
Total Space S&T funding;
FY03: $442.2;
FY04: $634.9;
FY05: $552.5;
FY06: $550.5;
FY07: $630.5;
FY08: $726.8;
FY09: $753.0.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: The above R&D categories include (6.2) Exploratory Development
and (6.3) Advanced Development. R&D category (6.1) Basic Research is
not included because these efforts are general in nature and not
specific to space.
[A] Funding going toward a variety of projects and sources.
[End of table]
Table 4: Advanced Component Development and Prototypes Funding for
Space Acquisition Programs:
Title: Army Missile Defense Systems Integration;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Army;
FY03: $57.0;
FY04: $35.5;
FY05: $4.9;
FY06: $8.3;
FY07: $11.9;
FY08: $11.7;
FY09: $15.8.
Title: Navstar Global Positioning System III;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 46.6;
FY04: 0.0;
FY05: 40.6;
FY06: 180.0;
FY07: 291.0;
FY08: 779.5;
FY09: 794.0.
Title: Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite system;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 802.7;
FY04: 802.3;
FY05: 612.1;
FY06: 410.0;
FY07: 316.8;
FY08: 189.5;
FY09: 131.1.
Title: Polar Milsatcom;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 22.4;
FY04: 5.5;
FY05: 1.0;
FY06: 0.0;
FY07: 0.0;
FY08: 0.0;
FY09: 0.0.
Title: National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 232.1;
FY04: 264.7;
FY05: 0.0;
FY06: 0.0;
FY07: 0.0;
FY08: 0.0;
FY09: 0.0.
Title: Space Control Technology;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 12.8;
FY04: 14.6;
FY05: 15.1;
FY06: 14.1;
FY07: 23.0;
FY08: 30.5;
FY09: 40.3.
Title: International Space Cooperative R&D;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 0.6;
FY04: 0.5;
FY05: 0.6;
FY06: 0.6;
FY07: 0.6;
FY08: 0.6;
FY09: 0.6.
Title: Transformational Satcom;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 111.5;
FY04: 335.4;
FY05: 774.8;
FY06: 1,192.4;
FY07: 1,346.7;
FY08: 1,830.1;
FY09: 1,038.6.
Title: Integrated Broadcast System;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 38.4;
FY04: 16.2;
FY05: 23.9;
FY06: 20.2;
FY07: 20.8;
FY08: 21.3;
FY09: 21.6.
Title: Wideband Gapfiller System;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 13.8;
FY04: 36.3;
FY05: 73.5;
FY06: 16.0;
FY07: 9.3;
FY08: 5.7;
FY09: 6.4.
Title: Scamp Block II;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Army;
FY03: 14.1;
FY04: 27.7;
FY05: 10.2;
FY06: 92.5;
FY07: 0.0;
FY08: 0.0;
FY09: 0.0.
Title: Air Force/Nat Prog Coop;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 2.3;
FY04: 0.0;
FY05: 0.0;
FY06: 0.0;
FY07: 0.0;
FY08: 0.0;
FY09: 0.0.
Title: Space-Based Radar;
BA: 4;
Category: 6.3;
Component: Air Force;
FY03: 45.4;
FY04: 172.6;
FY05: 327.7;
FY06: 466.2;
FY07: 502.7;
FY08: 1177.7;
FY09: 1550.0.
Title: Total Space 6.3 funding in BA4;
FY03: 1,399.7;
FY04: 1,711.3;
FY05: 1,884.4;
FY06: 2,400.3;
FY07: 2,522.8;
FY08: 4,046.6;
FY09: 3,598.4.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: The above R&D category is Advanced Development (6.3).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions:
Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties.
Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented.
Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative.
Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory.
Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components.
Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment.
Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle, or space.
Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications.
Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. Examples include using the system under operational
mission conditions.
Source: GAO analysis based on NASA and DOD guidance.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Organizations That Participated in Developing the Space
Science and Technology Strategy:
Air Force Research Laboratory:
Air Force Space Command:
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition:
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology:
Central Intelligence Agency:
Community Management Staff:
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
Defense Research and Engineering:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology:
Missile Defense Agency:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency:
National Reconnaissance Office:
National Security Agency:
National Security Space Office:
Naval Operations Staff:
Naval Research Laboratory:
Office of Naval Research:
Space and Missile Defense Command:
Space and Missile Systems Center:
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command:
U.S. Marine Corps:
U.S. Strategic Command:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING:
3030 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3030:
JAN 21 2005:
Mr. Michael Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO 05-155, "TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: New DOD Space Science and
Technology Strategy Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, But
Future Versions Need to Be More Robust," dated December 16, 2004 (GAO
Code 120384).
The draft report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to
direct the Director, Defense Research and Engineering to work with the
Executive Agent for Space to make improvements to space S&T strategic
planning. Four specific recommendations were made. The Department
concurs with the recommendations and provides comments on these
recommendations in the enclosure.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Ronald M. Sega:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED DECEMBER 16, 2004 GAO-05-155 (GAO CODE 120384):
"TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy
Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, But Future Versions Need to
Be More Robust"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE DRAFT GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to direct the DDR&E to work with the Executive Agent for
Space to establish protocols and mechanisms for enhancing coordination
and knowledge sharing between DOD S&T community and organizations not
explicitly included in the strategy-that is, acquisition programs
involved in space as well as DOD intelligence agencies. (p. 16/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR. DDR&E and the DoD Executive Agent for Space
recognize the need for, and benefit from, continually enhancing
coordination and knowledge sharing between the DoD Space S&T community
and the larger National Security Space enterprise. DDR&E and the
Executive Agent for Space have formally agreed, and documented in the
Space S&T Strategy, to jointly hold semi-annual Summit reviews of Space
S&T investments. Acquisition organizations, DoD, and Intelligence
Community organizations are represented in these forums. This effort
will continue to enhance the coordination of Space S&T development
among the National Security Space community. To date, two Summits have
been convened with the next planned for March 2005. In addition, the
DDR&E and Executive Agent for Space have embarked on a detailed
Independent Research and Development (IRAD) review of the Space related
industry efforts.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to direct the DDR&E to work with the Executive Agent for
Space to ensure that the space S&T strategy fully reflects war fighter
needs by establishing links between S&T strategic planning and DOD's
new Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. In addition,
establish links to architectures being developed by the National
Security Space Office to assure that S&T project align with future
technology requirements identified in the architectures. (p.16/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR. Activities are underway to ensure Space S&T
investments, guided by strategic operational vectors, are synchronized
with needs identified by both the Warfighter and Intelligence
Community, and by the respective acquisition organizations. During
formulation of the Space S&T Strategy, the Department specifically
included Flag-level representatives from the Joint Staff, U.S.
Strategic Command, and U.S. Air Force Space Command. These
representatives provided warfighter perspective. DDR&E agrees the Joint
Capabilities and Development System (JCIDS) is the appropriate
mechanism to ensure space capability investments reflect warfighting
needs. DDR&E has habitual relationships with the Joint Capability
Working Groups which feed the JCIDS process, and will leverage these
linkages to inject warfighter requirements through the appropriate
Joint Capability Board (JCB). Applying the linkages from this
recommendation with Recommendation One, above, will allow the National
Security Space Office (NSSO) to align future technology requirements
identified in the architectures.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to direct the DDR&E to work with the Executive Agent for
Space to ensure that DOD has the right tools for measuring progress in
achieving its goals for space by identifying metrics that could be used
for assessing the value of S&T projects relative to strategic goals and
knowledge gained relative to goals. (p.16/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR. Metrics will be established and used to monitor
level of effort, progress, and Technology Readiness Level (TRL).
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) to direct the DDR&E to work with the Executive Agent for
Space to develop plans for addressing barriers to achieving strategic
goals for S&T, including deficiencies in RDT&E funding visibility,
testing resources, and workforce. (p. 16/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR. Implementation of the Space S&T Strategy and
recent internal initiatives address the identified barriers (funding
visibility, testing resources, and workforce). The virtual Major Force
Program (vMFP) program element assignment process, one method already
in place, will provide improved funding visibility as the vMFP moves to
a `steady state.' The Executive Agent for Space is also working with
the S&T community on two initiatives (DT&E Facilities Database and S&T
Space Flight Opportunities Survey) to help address the need for
improved testing resources. Finally, the state of the Space S&T
workforce is a top priority for both DDR&E and the Executive Agent for
Space and, as such, is being worked in concert with larger DoD manpower
efforts.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The act's requirements for the strategy have been codified at 10
U.S.C. § 2272 (2004).
[2] The DDR&E and the DOD Executive Agent for Space signed a Memorandum
of Understanding to conduct organized reviews of the S&T enterprise as
outlined in the space S&T strategy.
[3] See Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can
Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.:
July 30, 1999).
[4] Appendix IV lists the organizations that participated in developing
the space S&T strategy.
[5] Space unique means the virtual Major Force Program that was
designed to include program elements that represent space activities
only. In other words, land, sea, and air platforms with space
components, and work on sensors or propulsion, are not included in the
virtual Major Force Program for space.
[6] Instead, funding is categorized by program element, the smallest
aggregation of resources controlled by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
[7] Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Space Research and Development Industrial
Base Study Phase One Final Report, McLean, Va., February 2002, and
Phase Two Final Report in August 2002.
[8] Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2001.
[9] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Public Law
108-136.
[10] See Defense Space Activities: Additional Actions Needed to
Implement Human Capital Strategy and Develop Space Personnel GAO-04-697
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2004).
[11] H.R. Conference Report Number 108-354, at 281 (2004).
[12] The process was established in 2003 and evolved from the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System. DOD uses the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution process to determine priorities, allocate
resources, and evaluate actual output against planned performance and
adjust resources as necessary.
[13] Department of Defense Directive, Number 5134.3, "Director of
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E)," November 3, 2003.
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