Force Structure
Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements Need to Consider the Most Cost-effective Mix of Active and Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission Needs Gao ID: GAO-06-125 October 18, 2005In 2004, the Navy completed a study of how many selected reserve personnel are needed to support the active force in meeting current and future mission requirements. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 2005 mandated that GAO assess several aspects of the Navy's study. This report addresses (1) the criteria and process the Navy used to conduct the review and what limitations affected the Navy's analyses and implementation plan; and (2) how the recommendations from the review will affect the reserve's personnel, funding, and command and control relationship with the active force.
In conducting its review of Selected Reserve personnel requirements, the Navy established criteria and followed a structured process, but GAO noted two limitations that could have potentially affected the quality of the results. The Navy did not analyze the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve personnel and in some cases used outdated mission documents as the baseline for analysis. The Department of Defense personnel directive states that missions should be accomplished using the least costly mix of personnel. In addition, GAO's prior work has shown that when reserve forces can successfully meet deployment and operational requirements, they can perform missions for less cost than active forces, and that decisions about the number of personnel needed to perform government functions should be driven by valid and reliable data. The 10 activities' justification packages GAO reviewed did not indicate if or how commanders evaluated the cost-effectiveness of using active or reserve personnel. A key reason why cost-effectiveness was not evaluated is that the Fleet Forces Command provided no guidance requiring that such an analysis be conducted or submitted as part of the activities' justification packages. Additionally, because the Navy had not devoted the resources to update some of its baseline mission documents prior to the start of the review, some of the activities' analyses did not start with the best possible data, which may have resulted in inaccuracies in their determinations about capabilities and personnel requirements. Including cost-effectiveness in the criteria for the zero-based review and documenting such analyses, as well as ensuring data accuracy, could have better demonstrated a sound basis for the recommended personnel changes and, in some cases, may have led to different recommendations. The review's recommendations will result in a change in the force mix, some cost savings, and the active force assuming greater command and control over reserve forces. The Chief of Naval Operations approved personnel changes that would result in a net reduction of over 16,000 reserve positions, a net increase of about 880 positions in the active force, and a net increase of about 450 civilian personnel positions. The reasons for these recommended changes varied by activity. The Fleet Forces Command also initially estimated that the Navy could save approximately $283.5 million annually by implementing the personnel recommendations, although this estimate is changing as some activities reexamine their personnel requirements using more recent data. In addition to total force personnel changes, the active force is assuming greater command and control responsibility for the reserve force. For example, the active force is now responsible for the training and readiness of the reserve forces and is receiving their status reports. This realignment of responsibility is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operation's expectations for creating a more integrated total force.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-125, Force Structure: Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements Need to Consider the Most Cost-effective Mix of Active and Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission Needs
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Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission Needs' which was released on October
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Report to Congressional Committees:
October 2005:
Force Structure:
Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements Need to Consider the
Most Cost-effective Mix of Active and Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission
Needs:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-125]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-125, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2004, the Navy completed a study of how many selected reserve
personnel are needed to support the active force in meeting current and
future mission requirements. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for 2005 mandated that GAO assess several aspects of
the Navy‘s study. This report addresses (1) the criteria and process
the Navy used to conduct the review and what limitations affected the
Navy‘s analyses and implementation plan; and (2) how the
recommendations from the review will affect the reserve‘s personnel,
funding, and command and control relationship with the active force.
What GAO Found:
In conducting its review of Selected Reserve personnel requirements,
the Navy established criteria and followed a structured process, but
GAO noted two limitations that could have potentially affected the
quality of the results. The Navy did not analyze the most cost-
effective mix of active and reserve personnel and in some cases used
outdated mission documents as the baseline for analysis. The Department
of Defense personnel directive states that missions should be
accomplished using the least costly mix of personnel. In addition,
GAO‘s prior work has shown that when reserve forces can successfully
meet deployment and operational requirements, they can perform missions
for less cost than active forces, and that decisions about the number
of personnel needed to perform government functions should be driven by
valid and reliable data. The 10 activities‘ justification packages GAO
reviewed did not indicate if or how commanders evaluated the cost-
effectiveness of using active or reserve personnel. A key reason why
cost-effectiveness was not evaluated is that the Fleet Forces Command
provided no guidance requiring that such an analysis be conducted or
submitted as part of the activities‘ justification packages.
Additionally, because the Navy had not devoted the resources to update
some of its baseline mission documents prior to the start of the
review, some of the activities‘ analyses did not start with the best
possible data, which may have resulted in inaccuracies in their
determinations about capabilities and personnel requirements. Including
cost-effectiveness in the criteria for the zero-based review and
documenting such analyses, as well as ensuring data accuracy, could
have better demonstrated a sound basis for the recommended personnel
changes and, in some cases, may have led to different recommendations.
The review‘s recommendations will result in a change in the force mix,
some cost savings, and the active force assuming greater command and
control over reserve forces. The Chief of Naval Operations approved
personnel changes that would result in a net reduction of over 16,000
reserve positions, a net increase of about 880 positions in the active
force, and a net increase of about 450 civilian personnel positions.
The reasons for these recommended changes varied by activity. The Fleet
Forces Command also initially estimated that the Navy could save
approximately $283.5 million annually by implementing the personnel
recommendations, although this estimate is changing as some activities
reexamine their personnel requirements using more recent data. In
addition to total force personnel changes, the active force is assuming
greater command and control responsibility for the reserve force. For
example, the active force is now responsible for the training and
readiness of the reserve forces and is receiving their status reports.
This realignment of responsibility is consistent with the Chief of
Naval Operation‘s expectations for creating a more integrated total
force.
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure that ongoing and future reserve personnel analyses consider
cost-effectiveness in determining the mix of active and reserve
personnel and are based on up-to-date data, GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to
* establish guidance to ensure that ongoing and future workforce
reviews include an analysis of cost-effectiveness and that such
analysis is documented and
* allocate the required resources to maintain current Navy mission
documents that would provide a valid baseline for ongoing and future
workforce reviews.
In written comments, the Department of Defense concurred with the
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-125.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Zero-Based Review Used a Structured and Participatory Process, but Two
Limitations Could Have Impacted Results:
Zero-Based Review Results Would Change the Mix of Active and Reserve
Forces, Reduce Manpower Costs, and Change Some Command and Control
Responsibilities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Selected Navy Activities Visited:
Activity 1: Headquarters, Naval Air Forces, San Diego, California:
Activity 2: Headquarters, Naval Submarine Forces, Norfolk, Virginia:
Activity 3: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C.:
Activity 4: Naval Security Group, Fort Meade, Maryland:
Activity 5: Headquarters, Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Planned Changes in Navy Manpower Levels as a Result of the
Zero-Based Review:
Table 2: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Aviation Reserve Manpower:
Table 3: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Submarine Forces Reserve
Manpower:
Table 4: Zero-Based Review Results for Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Reserve Manpower:
Table 5: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Security Group Reserve
Manpower:
Table 6: Zero-Based Review Results for Mine Warfare Command Reserve
Manpower:
Figure:
Figure 1: Department of the Navy's Human Capital Strategy:
Letter October 18, 2005:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The role of the Navy Reserve is to provide mission-capable units and
manpower to support Navy peacetime and wartime operations. In fiscal
year 2004, the Navy Reserve was authorized 85,900 selected reservists,
the primary source of reserve mobilization manpower to support the
369,800 military personnel in the active force.[Footnote 1] The
Secretary of Defense noted in a July 2003 memorandum[Footnote 2] that
the balance of capabilities between the active and reserve forces was
not right to meet future mission requirements. In response, the Chief
of Naval Operations announced an effort to transform the Navy Reserve
and create a more integrated total force in which Navy Reserve
capabilities are tied directly to active units in support of Sea Power
21[Footnote 3] mission requirements. As part of a continuing process to
fully integrate its active and reserve forces, in August 2004 the Navy
completed a zero-based review of the requirements for Navy selected
reservists.[Footnote 4] The objective of the review was to determine
how many selected reserve personnel are needed to support the active
force in meeting current and future Navy mission requirements.
In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
2005,[Footnote 5] Congress mandated that we assess several issues
related to the Navy's review of selected reserve manpower requirements,
including (1) the extent that the Navy used clearly defined and
consistent criteria and a sound methodology in determining the future
mix of active and reserve components and (2) the extent the Navy's zero-
based review process considered operational concepts and emerging
mission requirements. As agreed with your offices, we provided an
interim briefing addressing these objectives on March 29, 2005. To
summarize the results of our work, this final report addresses the
following questions:
1. What criteria and process did the Navy use to conduct its zero-based
review of reserve manpower requirements, and what, if any, limitations
affect the Navy's analyses and implementation plans?
2. How will the recommendations from the zero-based review affect the
reserve's manpower, funding, and command and control relationship with
the active force?
To answer these questions, we analyzed the criteria, process, and
guidance the Fleet Forces Command used to conduct the zero-based review
by reviewing the documentation for selected Navy activities. As part of
our analysis, we examined the review results for 10 Navy activities and
visited the Naval Air Forces Command and four other selected activities
to assess the zero-based review process at the activity level and
obtain detailed information about recommended reserve manpower changes.
In addition, we obtained information from Navy Headquarters and Navy
Reserve Headquarters to determine how the review's results would impact
active and reserve command and control relationships and reviewed
planned funding documents to assess the extent that recommended reserve
manpower changes were reflected in future budgets. We also obtained
information from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Manpower and Reserve Affairs to determine the relationship between the
Department of the Navy Human Capital Strategy and the Navy's zero-based
review. Except for some outdated mission documents used as the baseline
for manpower requirements, we concluded the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purpose of this report. We conducted our review from
September 2004 through September 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed description of
the scope and methodology used in our review can be found in appendix
I.
Results in Brief:
In conducting its zero-based review of reserve manpower requirements,
the Navy established criteria for its review and consistently followed
a structured process that reassessed requirements in light of changing
mission requirements and strategic goals. However, the review did not
analyze the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve manpower to
perform validated missions or always use updated data in conducting its
analyses. The Department of Defense's directive that covers manpower
management states that missions should be accomplished using the least
costly mix of manpower.[Footnote 6] In addition, our prior work has
shown that when reserve forces can successfully meet deployment and
operational requirements, they can perform missions for less cost than
active forces,[Footnote 7] and that decisions about the manpower needed
to perform government functions should be driven by valid and reliable
data that clearly link manpower levels and strategic goals.[Footnote 8]
In conducting the zero-based review of reserve requirements, the Navy's
Fleet Forces Command developed specific criteria and guidance to
facilitate a consistent approach by its subordinate activities that
participated in the review. However, we found that the 10 activities'
justification packages we reviewed did not indicate if or how
commanders evaluated the cost-effectiveness of using active or reserve
manpower. A key reason why cost effectiveness was not evaluated is that
Fleet Forces Command did not require that such an analysis be conducted
or submitted as part of the activities' justification packages.
Therefore, while the review enabled the Navy to better align reserve
missions with emerging requirements due to the changing security
environment, its results may not have reflected the most cost-effective
mix of active and reserve manpower. Additionally, because the Navy had
not devoted the resources to update some of its baseline mission
documents prior to the start of the review, some of the activities'
analyses did not start with the best possible data regarding the
manpower needed for future mission requirements. Including cost-
effectiveness in the criteria for the zero-based review and documenting
such analyses, as well as ensuring data accuracy, could have better
demonstrated a sound basis for the manpower changes recommended or in
some cases might have led to different recommendations.
When implemented, the recommendations from the Navy's zero-based review
will result in a changed mix of active and reserve forces, some cost
savings, and the active force assuming greater command and control over
the reserve forces. The Chief of Naval Operations approved manpower
changes recommended by the activities that would result in a net
reduction of over 16,000 reserve positions, a net increase of about 880
positions in the active force, and a net increase of about 450 civilian
personnel positions. The basis for these recommendations varied by
activity. For example, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery recommended
cutting 2,198 reserve positions because it had reduced the number of
fleet hospitals from three to two and had rarely filled all of its
specialized medical reserve positions in the past. By contrast, the
Naval Security Group had a net increase of 156 manpower positions
because the National Security Agency had a need for two new
capabilities (cryptologic linguists and signal intelligence analysts)
totaling 200 new positions, while anticipated technology improvements
allowed it to eliminate 44 reserve positions. The Fleet Forces Command
initially estimated that the Navy could save approximately $283.5
million annually by implementing the initial zero-based review manpower
recommendations, although this estimate is changing as some active
component activities are reexamining their manpower requirements using
more recent data. For example, the Naval Air Forces now plans to
eliminate 3,120 reserve positions, which is 378 more than in its
original plan, because the Navy now plans to retire more aircraft due
to airframe fatigue problems. In addition to total force manpower
changes, the active force will assume greater command and control
responsibility for the reserve force. For example, the active force
will now be responsible for the training and readiness of the reserve
forces and the reserve forces are reporting their readiness status to
the active force. This realignment of responsibility is consistent with
the Chief of Naval Operation's expectations for creating a more
integrated total force.
To ensure that ongoing and future reserve manpower requirements are
based on up-to-date data and cost-effectiveness is a consideration in
determining the mix of active and reserve manpower, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to (1)
establish guidance to ensure that ongoing and future workforce reviews
include an analysis of cost-effectiveness and that such analysis is
documented and (2) allocate the required resources to maintain current
Navy mission documents that would provide a valid baseline for ongoing
and future workforce reviews. The Department of Defense concurred with
our recommendations.
Background:
The Navy has 690,000 men and women in the Ready Reserve, the Standby
Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve, which at the time
of the zero-based review, consisted of 85,900 members in the Selected
Reserve and 65,066 in the Individual Ready Reserve, is the primary
manpower pool for the Navy Reserve. The Selected Reserve contains those
units and manpower that are most essential to the wartime missions
because it provides mission-capable units and individuals to augment
the active Navy force when required. For example, the Selected Reserve
consist of Naval aviation units, Naval coastal warfare groups, medical
personnel, and submarine forces personnel. The Individual Ready Reserve
consists of individuals who have received training in the active Navy
force or Selected Reserve. Members of the Selected Reserve receive
priority over other reservists for training and equipment and they
generally are the first to be called to active duty by a presidential
order.
In August 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander of
the Fleet Forces Command[Footnote 9] to validate the Navy Selected
Reserve manpower requirements and determine the ability of the Navy
Reserve to provide required capabilities to the Navy forces. To
accomplish this, the Fleet Forces Command conducted a zero-based review
over a 10-month period, from October 2003 to August 2004. Based on the
review, the Command recommended reducing the size of the Selected
Reserve from 85,900 authorized positions to about 70,000 by fiscal year
2011--a decrease of about 16,000 authorized positions. The Chief of
Naval Operations approved the zero-based review results for
implementation in August 2004.
The zero-based review is a component of the Navy's ongoing
active/reserve integration initiative. This initiative is an essential
element of the Department of the Navy's Human Capital Strategy, which
was announced in June 2004. According to the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy as well as Navy and Marine Corps manpower officials, accelerating
manpower costs, changes in the global military environment, and
evolving military requirements prompted the Department of the Navy to
develop this strategy. The overall goal of the strategy is to have the
best people with the proper skills, training, and experience in the
right jobs. The strategy serves as high-level guidance for the Navy and
Marine Corps to use in developing their own implementation plans. As
shown in figure 1, the strategy consists of three elements: civilian
personnel transformation, naval military personnel transformation, and
Navy active/reserve integration.
Figure 1: Department of the Navy's Human Capital Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Implementing the National Security Personnel System will facilitate the
Department of Defense's civilian personnel transformation
efforts,[Footnote 10] while the Navy military personnel transformation
is driven by the implementation of the Navy's Sea Warrior
Initiative.[Footnote 11] The active/reserve integration segment of the
human capital strategy is aimed at ensuring the proper balance between
the Navy's active and reserve forces. Although the Navy initiated the
zero-based review prior to the announcement of the human capital
strategy, the review is intended to satisfy a major tasking of the
active/reserve integration element--validating the requirements for
reserve manpower.
Zero-Based Review Used a Structured and Participatory Process, but Two
Limitations Could Have Impacted Results:
The Navy's zero-based review process included specific criteria and
guidance on how to evaluate the number of reservists needed and
involved consistent reporting and documentation by Navy activities. The
Navy's iterative review process allowed extensive communications
between Navy activities, the Fleet Forces Command, and others to
finalize proposals for reserve manpower requirements and validate the
results. However, our analysis showed two review limitations. First,
Navy activities identified capability gaps by comparing its current
active force to mission requirements, but did not conduct analyses to
determine the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve manpower.
Second, some activities used outdated mission documents which were
critical for determining the manpower needed to perform missions. These
limitations could have adversely impacted the results of the review.
Structured Process Included Detailed Guidance and Specific Criteria,
and Was Consistently Documented:
The Navy's Fleet Forces Command created a structured process for
performing the zero-based review by providing detailed guidance and
specific criteria to determine the reserve manpower needed to augment
the active forces to perform current and future Navy missions. The
guidance was provided to 37 active component activities, consisting of
664 functions. The criteria for assessing reserve manpower requirements
included the importance of the reserve component to the mission,
reserve component's warfighting capability, current status of the
reserves' capability, and the reserves' warfighting capability role in
the Sea Power 21 operational concept. In following the guidance and
applying these criteria, the functions conducted a capability gap
analysis by determining (1) the extent to which the active forces could
meet the mission requirement and (2) how many reserve personnel would
be required to fill any remaining gaps in the active forces'
capability.
The zero-based review guidance also required review results to be
reported and documented in a standardized format. Our review of 10 of
37 activity packages submitted to the Fleet Forces Command confirmed
that each of the 232 functions associated with the 10 activities
completed a structured electronic spreadsheet containing pertinent
information about mission capability requirement, current manpower
authorizations, and proposed manpower changes to justify the reserve
manpower needed to perform its assigned mission. Each function also
cited that its mission linked to one of the pillars of Navy Sea Power
21. For example, all eight of the Naval Security Group activity's
functions linked their missions to Sea Shield, the pillar that provides
sea-based theater and strategic defense. The functions also considered
the manpower needs of emerging mission requirements. For example, the
Naval Coastal Warfare Groups from the Naval Surface Forces activity
identified the need for an additional 1,028 reserve positions to
support homeland defense by increasing port security and harbor defense
at our port facilities in the United States and overseas.
Participatory and Iterative Process Helped the Navy Finalize Proposals
and Validate Results:
The zero-based review involved substantial interaction between Navy
activities, the Fleet Forces Command, and outside subject matter
experts to develop the final justification for reserve manpower and
perform multilevel reviews of proposed reserve manpower changes. While
the active component conducted the review, the Navy activities
occasionally relied on the Navy Reserve Command for needed manpower
data according to a command official. The Commander of the Navy Reserve
Force also participated in the high-level review of the proposed
reserve manpower changes. The process allowed multiple two-way
communications to finalize proposals for reserve manpower requirements
and validate the results. In instances where the Fleet Forces Command
disagreed with an activity's initial proposal, the activity revised and
resubmitted its proposal or provided additional justification until the
disagreement was resolved. After the Fleet Forces Command made a
decision about the number of authorized reserve positions, it notified
the activities and allowed them to again officially request
reconsideration by providing additional documentation and support. For
example, the Naval Air Systems Command first submitted justification
for 652 reserve positions. However, after reviewing the justification
package, the Fleet Forces Command recommended eliminating all of the
Naval Air Systems Command's reserve positions because they were not
linked to mobilization requirements. The Naval Air Systems Command
resubmitted justification for 226 reserve positions to provide special
skills and support for contingency operations. The justification
convinced the Fleet Forces Command to approve 226 reserve positions.
Within the Fleet Forces Command, the activities' packages were first
reviewed by analysts and an initial review board. A subject matter
expert review board then reviewed the proposals before passing them on
to an executive board of senior officers. After the executive board
approved the results, they were given to the Commander of the Fleet
Forces Command, who also reviewed and approved the results. The
criteria the Fleet Forces Command used for validating the reserve
manpower requirements included whether (1) the particular mission is
suitable for the reserve component, (2) the position is required to be
filled by a military person, (3) the position fills a gap in the active
component's capabilities, and (4) the reserve component can perform the
mission. The validation process included a mission risk assessment by
the Fleet Forces Command of how important the reserve forces were to
performing the mission. The Command then assigned a low, moderate, or
high-risk designation as to whether the active component could perform
the mission without the planned contribution from the reserve
component. For example, the Fleet Forces Command assessed that there
was a low risk that the Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance function could
not perform the mission without the reserves' contribution. After the
results were validated, they had to be approved by the Total Force Flag
Steering Group, a group of senior officers, including the Commander of
the Navy Reserve Force, charged with ensuring continued progress in the
integration of Navy active and reserve forces. At the end of the
review, the Fleet Forces Command recommended reserve manpower changes
to the Chief of Naval Operations for his approval.
Two Review Limitations Could Have Adversely Affected Results:
The Navy's zero-based review had two limitations that could have
changed the number of active and reserve manpower recommended to the
Chief of Naval Operations. The Navy (1) did not assess the most cost-
effective mix of active and reserve manpower to perform the mission and
(2) used outdated critical mission documents as a baseline for manpower
requirements.
Identifying Capability Gaps in the Active Force May Not Have Produced
the Most Cost-effective Mix of Active and Reserve Forces:
The Navy's zero-based review process focused on identifying the extent
to which the active force could perform Navy missions and then
determining whether reserve manpower could fill any remaining gaps,
which may not have resulted in the most cost-effective mix of active
and reserve forces. Given the Department of the Navy's affordability
challenges and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy's concern about
accelerating manpower costs, the service must find ways to ensure it is
accomplishing its mission with the most cost-effective mix of active,
reserve, and civilian forces. In his guidance for 2004, the Chief of
Naval Operations stated his commitment to fully integrating the active,
reserve, and civilian forces. However, he also noted the need to
minimize the total number of personnel on payroll and stated, "but we
do not want to spend one extra penny for manpower we do not need."
Additionally, the Department of Defense's directive that covers
manpower management states that missions should be accomplished using
the least costly mix of manpower.[Footnote 12] We have shown that when
the reserve force can successfully meet deployment and operational
requirements, it can generally perform missions at a lower cost than
the active force because active units have all full-time personnel
assigned whereas reserve units have mostly part-time personnel
assigned.[Footnote 13] By identifying capability gaps in the active
force as the primary criterion for determining the required reserve
manpower, the Navy failed to assess whether the lower cost reserve
force could be used to meet capabilities currently provided by the
active force.
While the Fleet Forces Command's general guidance indicated that the
manpower requirements review should consider cost in determining an
adequate return on investment,[Footnote 14] it also stated that the
return on investment should be based on commanders' judgment. However,
the Command did not require the activities to perform cost analyses to
determine the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve forces
needed to perform assigned missions as a basis for proposing the future
mix of active and reserve manpower. If the most cost-effective mix of
active and reserve forces had been a major criterion in the review
process, the results might have been different and the Navy may have
been able to realize additional savings for some activities. For
example, our current analysis of Navy data showed that the manpower
costs for a reserve squadron of nine P-3 Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance aircraft would be approximately $20 million annually--
about $8 million or 29 percent less than the estimated manpower cost of
$28 million for an active squadron.
Outdated Mission Documents May Have Resulted in Inaccurate Manpower
Recommendations:
The Navy's use of outdated critical mission documents as a baseline may
have resulted in inaccurate recommendations about the Navy reserve
manpower needed to perform missions in the future. According to the
Navy's instruction,[Footnote 15] the documents that provide information
about a unit's mission and the specific operating environment of the
units are the most critical element for developing manpower
requirements. Additionally, our prior work has shown that decisions
about the manpower needed to perform government functions should be
driven by valid and reliable data.[Footnote 16] However, in its
briefing to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Fleet Forces Command
acknowledged that many of these critical mission documents were
outdated. Our analysis confirmed this shortcoming. For example, 25 of
the 31 functions belonging to the five activities we visited did not
have recently validated mission documents on which to base their
manpower reviews. The Fleet Forces Command stated that the critical
mission documents had not been updated because of the large amount and
rapidity of change and the lack of sufficient manpower analysts to keep
up with changes. According to a Command official, the activities'
commanders generally applied their judgment to update the most recently
approved mission documents before conducting their analyses to mitigate
the risks. However, this official agreed that use of these outdated
mission documents may have increased the likelihood that manning was
not correct in the associated manpower documents. Without validated and
accurate mission documents to serve as a baseline for manpower numbers,
some of the zero-based review's determinations about capabilities and
manpower requirements may have been inaccurate.
Zero-Based Review Results Would Change the Mix of Active and Reserve
Forces, Reduce Manpower Costs, and Change Some Command and Control
Responsibilities:
Implementation of the Navy's zero-based review's recommendations will
change the mix of active and reserve forces by decreasing the number of
reserve personnel and increasing the number of active and civilian
personnel. Some cost savings are projected as a result of the
recommended changes. The zero-based review's recommendations will also
have the active force assume greater command and control responsibility
over the reserve force.
Number of Reserve Personnel Would Substantially Decrease While Number
of Active and Civilian Personnel Would Increase Slightly:
The Navy's zero-based review's recommendations will substantially
decrease the number of reserve personnel and slightly increase the
number of active and civilian personnel. As indicated in table 1, the
Chief of Naval Operations approved a net reduction of over 16,000
reserve positions, a net increase of about 880 positions in the active
force, and a net increase of 450 civilian personnel positions.[Footnote
17]
Table 1: Planned Changes in Navy Manpower Levels as a Result of the
Zero-Based Review:
Positions created; Reserve component positions: 4,338;
Active component positions: 2,626;
Civilian personnel positions: About 450 full-time positions.
Positions divested; Reserve component positions: 20,356;
Active component positions: 1,744;
Civilian personnel positions: 0.
Net change; Reserve component positions: (16,018);
Active component positions: 882;
Civilian personnel positions: 450.
Source: United States Navy.
[End of table]
At the activities we visited, we found that the reasons for these
recommended changes in manpower varied. For example, the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery recommended cutting 2,198 reserve positions
because it had reduced the requirement for the number of fleet
hospitals from three to two and had rarely filled all of its
specialized medical reserve positions in the past. By contrast, the
Naval Security Group expected a net increase of 156 manpower positions
because the National Security Agency had a need for two new
capabilities (cryptologic linguists and signal intelligence analysts)
totaling 200 new positions, while anticipated technology improvements
would allow the Naval Security Group to eliminate 44 reserve positions.
The Mine Warfare Command will make its airborne and surface mine
countermeasure units an all active force by cutting 1,016 reserve
positions from their airborne and surface mine countermeasures mission
and converting 537 full-time reserve positions to active duty positions
because the command could not recruit sufficient manpower to fill its
reserve positions. With the additional active duty positions, the
Command stated that the airborne and surface mine countermeasures
missions could be fully accomplished without the reserve component's
participation. The Navy's zero-based review results for the five
activities that we visited are shown in appendix II.
Manpower Changes Would Result in Some Cost Savings:
The Fleet Forces Command initially estimated that implementing the
manpower changes recommended by the zero-based review would save
approximately $283.5 million annually. However, these original
estimated savings are changing. Some active component activities are
reexamining their manpower requirements and submitting changes to their
original proposals because of organizational changes and other ongoing
refinements to manpower requirements. For example, the Naval Air Forces
now plans to eliminate an additional 378 reserve positions because the
Navy plans to retire additional P-3 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance
aircraft due to airframe fatigue problems. In another case, subsequent
to the zero-based review, the Navy established the Maritime Force
Protection Command that assumed reserve functions that were previously
within the Surface Forces and the Military Sealift Commands. However,
upon its establishment, the Maritime Force Protection Command
determined that 5,250 reserve positions would be needed versus the
5,840 positions the Fleet Forces Command originally approved.
Although the Chief of Naval Operations approved the zero-based review
results in August 2004, the changes were not included in the Department
of the Navy's fiscal year 2005 budget. The Fleet Forces Command has
required each Navy activity to complete a transition plan and the Navy
has included the recommended manpower changes in the Future Years
Defense Program beginning in fiscal year 2006. All changes resulting
from the zero-based review are to be completed by 2011.
Active Force to Assume Greater Command and Control of Reserve Force:
The zero-based review prompted changes in the command and control
relationships between the Navy active and reserve forces, whereby the
active force will assume greater command and control over the reserve
force. Under the recommended changes, the active force will assume
responsibility for the training and readiness of the reserve force. For
example, the Commander, Navy Reserve Force, will now report to the
Commander, Fleet Forces Command, for the training and readiness of the
reserve force. In addition, the Commander, Naval Air Force Reserve, has
physically moved from New Orleans to San Diego to be colocated with the
Commander, Naval Air Forces, to whom he reports for readiness and
training of reserve aviation forces. This realignment of responsibility
is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operations' objective to create a
more integrated total force.
Conclusions:
The Navy's zero-based review was an important first step in its overall
strategy to assess the role of the Navy reserve in the total Navy
force. The review is also a critical element in helping the Navy
achieve its desire to reduce manpower costs and move toward a more
affordable total force. However, the Navy's approach of using
capability gaps in the active force as the means to determine Navy
reserve manpower requirements was too narrow. Without consideration of
manpower cost-effectiveness as directed by Department of Defense
guidance, this approach did not provide assurance that the Navy will
have the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve forces in the
future. Furthermore, using outdated mission documents as a baseline for
determining manpower requirements substantially reduced assurance that
the Navy activities started with the best data for making quality
manpower assessments. As the Navy continues to update and review its
manpower requirements and identify ways to reduce its manpower costs in
order to make resources available for other investments, it is
important that all future assessments consider the most cost-effective
force mix and be based on current mission documents.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist the Navy in meeting its human capital strategy goals and
ensure that ongoing and future Navy active and reserve manpower
requirement assessments result in the most cost-effective force, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Navy to take the following two actions:
* develop and implement guidance to ensure that (1) ongoing and future
workforce reviews include cost analyses to determine the most cost-
effective mix of active and reserve manpower and (2) the methodology
for and results of cost analyses are documented and:
* allocate the required resources to maintain current Navy mission
documents that would provide a valid baseline for ongoing and future
workforce reviews.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense concurred with our recommendations. The department provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The
department's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy, and other interested congressional committees
and parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or [Hyperlink, stlaurentj@gao.gov]
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the criteria and process the Navy used to conduct its zero-
based review of reserve manpower requirements and the limitations that
could affect the Navy's analyses and implementations plans, we obtained
and analyzed the guidance and expectations the Chief of Naval
Operations provided to the Fleet Forces Command concerning the zero-
based review. We also obtained and analyzed detailed information about
the guidance and instructions the Fleet Forces Command provided to Navy
activities concerning (1) the criteria to use for determining the
required reserve manpower, (2) how the activities should report their
review results to the Fleet Forces Command, (3) the review and
validation process for the results reached during the zero-based
review, and (4) plans for implementing the zero-based review results.
Additionally, we met with Fleet Forces Command officials, as well as
officials from the five activities we visited, and analyzed 10 of 37
justification packages the activities submitted to the Fleet Forces
Command to further understand how the zero-based review was conducted
at the different command levels, identify the extent to which cost-
effectiveness of manpower changes was considered, and assess the
consistency with which the activities reported their review results.
Moreover, we analyzed prior GAO reports and applicable Navy
publications for criteria and best practices in conducting manpower
requirement reviews.
To determine how the recommendations from the zero-based review will
affect the reserve's manpower, funding, and command and control
relationships with the active force, we obtained and analyzed the
justification packages submitted by the 10 Navy activities, the
recommended changes in the number of required reserve manpower and the
cost factors used to calculate manpower savings as well as the
corresponding projected funding requirements for reserve manpower. We
also obtained information about, and discussed how the Navy plans to
implement the results from the zero-based review with officials at the
Fleet Forces Command and the five activities we visited. Additionally,
we reviewed communications from the Chief of Naval Operations and
discussed how the zero-based review would change command and control
relationships between the active and reserve forces with officials at
the Fleet Forces Command and the Navy Reserve Command.
We assessed the reliability of pertinent data about information
supporting the activities' proposals for reserve manpower changes and
projected manpower changes. We examined 10 activity justification
packages for consistency in the Navy's validation and reserve manpower
requirements reporting processes. We also verified the manpower budget
programming factors the Navy used to calculate projected manpower
savings and performed a sample calculation to test the reliability of
the projections. Except for the problem with outdated mission documents
we noted in the body of the report, we concluded that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report.
We performed our review from September 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Selected Navy Activities Visited:
After performing substantial review work at Navy Headquarters and the
Fleet Forces Command to obtain overall review results and general
information about how the Navy conducted its zero-based review, we
visited five Navy activities to obtain more detailed information:
Headquarters, Naval Air Forces; Headquarters, Naval Submarine Forces;
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; Naval Security Group; and Headquarters,
Mine Warfare Command. We selected these particular activities because
of special interest from the professional staff of the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees and because the zero-based review results
involved major changes to reserve manpower requirements for these
activities. The purpose of our visits was to understand in detail the
review procedures at the activity level and assess the consistency with
which the activities (1) followed the guidance and criteria provided by
the Fleet Forces Command and (2) reported their review results. During
our visits at these activities, we also discussed with officials the
rationale for recommending major changes to their reserve manpower
requirements.
The information below summarizes the results of the zero-based review
for each of the five activities we visited. These summaries are based
on the activities' justification packages and our discussions with
Fleet Forces Command and activity officials about the rationale for
their changes to reserve manpower requirements. All Navy reserve
positions have been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as
of August 2004.
Activity 1: Headquarters, Naval Air Forces, San Diego, California:
Headquarters, Naval Air Forces provides combat-ready and sustainable
naval air forces that are trained and equipped to operate in an
environment that emphasizes safety, interoperability, and efficient
resource management. As shown in table 2, the zero-based review
recommended almost a 25 percent reduction in naval aviation reserve
manpower.
Table 2: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Aviation Reserve Manpower:
Reserve positions before review: 11,157;
Activity's proposed reserve positions: 8,843;
CNO-approved reserve positions: 8,415;
Change: (before - approved): (2,742);
Percentage change: -24.58%.
Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
Of the 2,742 total decrease in reserve positions in naval aviation
forces, 2,242 (82 percent) are from the Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance (P-3 aircraft), Helicopter, and Aviation Intermediate
Maintenance Division communities. The decreases in these three
communities were supported by different rationales.
First, Naval Air Forces decided to cut 1,323 positions from the
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance units because P-3 airframe fatigue
problems caused the Navy to remove some aircraft from the active
inventory. To provide the active force with additional aircraft, the
activity decommissioned four reserve squadrons, totaling 24 aircraft,
and formed three fleet response units, totaling 18 aircraft. As a
result, the activity needed fewer personnel and 6 additional aircraft
were provided to the active force.
Additionally, the activity cut 491 positions from helicopter squadrons
to better provide projected surge capability for the Fleet Response
Plan. The activity combined five reserve helicopter squadrons of 36
aircraft into three fleet response units of 24 aircraft. As a result,
the activity needed fewer personnel.
Finally, the activity cut 428 positions from the aviation intermediate
maintenance divisions. The Fleet Forces Command decided to eliminate
all reserve positions from functions in which reserve personnel were
not able to meet deployment requirements.
Activity 2: Headquarters, Naval Submarine Forces, Norfolk, Virginia:
The Naval Submarine Forces provide antisubmarine warfare, antisurface
ship warfare, precision land strike, mine warfare, intelligence,
surveillance and early warning, and special warfare capabilities to the
U.S. Navy, and strategic deterrence capabilities to the U.S. Strategic
Command. As shown in table 3, the zero-based review recommended more
than a 41 percent reduction in naval submarine forces reserve manpower.
Table 3: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Submarine Forces Reserve
Manpower:
Reserve positions before review: 2,669;
Activity's proposed reserve positions: 2,742;
CNO-approved reserve positions: 1,564;
Change: (before - approved): (1,105);
Percentage change: -41.40%.
Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
Of the total 1,105 decrease in reserve positions in Naval Submarine
Forces, 1,061 (96 percent) resulted from decommissioning a submarine
tender (maintenance support ship) and decreasing reserve positions for
logistics and administrative support operations.
The activity cut 939 positions from an inactive submarine tender
because the Fleet Forces Command decided that this mission was not
essential and could be performed by a contractor. The activity also cut
122 positions from logistics and administrative support operations
because, according to officials, the reservists' part-time duty status
would not allow them to participate in submarine training deployments.
Activity 3: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C.
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery provides health care to about
700,000 active duty Navy and Marine Corps members and to 2.6 million
family members of active duty and retired personnel, while supporting
contingency, humanitarian, and joint operations around the world. As
shown in table 4, the zero-based review recommended almost a 29 percent
reduction in medical reserve manpower.
Table 4: Zero-Based Review Results for Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Reserve Manpower:
Reserve positions before review: 7,810;
Activity's proposed reserve positions: 5,619;
CNO-approved reserve positions: 5,569;
Change: (before - approved): (2,241);
Percentage change: -28.69%.
Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
Of the total 2,241 decrease in reserve positions for the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery, 2,198 (98 percent) are from cuts in medical
treatment facilities and fleet hospitals.
The activity cut 1,388 positions from medical treatment facilities
because most of these positions were associated with special medical
skills that were never filled. The activity also cut 810 positions due
to a reduction in the number of fleet hospitals. The Navy reduced the
number of fleet hospitals from three to two because it does not expect
to need as many hospitals to meet mission requirements under new
defense planning guidance.
Activity 4: Naval Security Group, Fort Meade, Maryland:
The Naval Security Group performs cryptologic and logistics support
functions for the fleet. As shown in table 5, the zero-based review
recommended more than a 16 percent increase in naval security reserve
personnel.
Table 5: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Security Group Reserve
Manpower:
Reserve positions before review: 950;
Activity's proposed reserve positions: 1,150;
CNO-approved reserve positions: 1,106;
Change: (before - approved): 156;
Percentage Change: 16.42%.
Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
The activity had a net increase of 156 reserve positions, which was
achieved through reductions of some positions and additions of other
positions.
The activity added 180 cryptologic linguists and 20 applied research
and development positions. The number of positions for intelligence
collection and analysis increased because the National Security Agency
agreed to pay for the additional positions to meet its operational
requirements. At the same time, the activity cut 44 information
operations positions because anticipated technological advances in
telephone and computer security allowed the activity to reduce the
number of personnel.
Activity 5: Headquarters, Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas:
The Mine Warfare Command develops and evaluates mine warfare doctrine,
tactics, and equipment to conduct offensive and defensive mine warfare
operations throughout the world. It is responsible for removing all
types of mine threats, providing intelligence on foreign mine
capabilities, and developing tactics to counter other nations' mining
capabilities. As shown in table 6, the zero-based review recommended
more than a 90 percent decrease in mine warfare reserve manpower.
Table 6: Zero-Based Review Results for Mine Warfare Command Reserve
Manpower:
Reserve positions before review: 1,280;
Activity's proposed reserve positions: 122;
CNO-approved reserve positions: 122;
Change: (before - approved): (1,158);
Percentage change: -90.47.
Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).
[End of table]
Of the total 1,158 decrease in reserve positions for the Mine Warfare
Command, 1,016 (88 percent) were taken from the Airborne and Surface
Mine Countermeasures Units. This decrease was a result of converting
reserve positions to active positions.
The activity cut 541 Airborne Mine Countermeasures positions by
reorganizing its two Airborne Mine Countermeasures squadrons, each of
which consisted of six active aircraft and four reserve aircraft, into
two squadrons of eight active aircraft each. The activity decided to
man the two squadrons with only active manpower because the reserve
functions could not recruit sufficient manpower needed in specific
specialties.
The activity also cut 475 Surface Mine Countermeasures positions. The
activity decided to convert all reserve positions authorized for its 15
ships to active positions because it had experienced reduced
operational effectiveness due to the inability to fill the reserve
positions.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:
SEP 20 2005:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Assessment of Navy Reserve Manpower
Requirements Need to Consider the Most Cost Effective Mix of Active and
Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission Needs", dated August 22, 2005 (Code
350588/GAO-05-965). The Department concurs with recommendations 1 and
2. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and report are
enclosed.
The point of contact for this office is Captain Michael Herman, U. S.
Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(RT&M), at (703 695-4125).
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
T. F. Hall:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 22, 2005 GAO CODE 350588/GAO-05-965:
"FORCE STRUCTURE: Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements
Need to Consider the Most Cost Effective Mix of Active and Reserve
Manpower to Meet Mission Needs"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: To assist the Navy in meeting its human strategy
goals and ensure that ongoing and future Navy active and reserve
manpower requirement assessments result in the most cost-effective
force, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Navy to develop and implement guidance to ensure that:
(1) ongoing and future workforce reviews include cost analyses to
determine the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve manpower;
and (2) the methodology for and results of cost analyses are
documented. (Pages 16 and 17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 2: To assist the Navy in meeting its human strategy
goals and ensure that ongoing and future Navy active and reserve
manpower requirement assessments result in the most cost-effective
force, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Navy to allocate the required resources to maintain
current Navy mission documents that would provide a valid baseline for
ongoing and future workforce reviews. (Page 17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 ([Hyperlink, StlaurentJ@GAO.GOV]):
Acknowledgments:
Richard G. Payne, Assistant Director; George O. Morse; Willie J.
Cheely, Jr; Nicole L. Collier; Bethann E. Ritter; Renee S. Brown;
Jonathan Clark; and Rebecca Shea also made significant contributions to
this report.
(350588):
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Navy Reserve consists of the Ready Reserve (of which the
Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve are components), the
primary manpower augmentation pool; the Standby Reserve which consists
of individuals who have a temporary disability or hardship and those
who hold key defense-related positions in their civilian jobs that may
be involuntarily ordered to active duty in case of a full mobilization;
and the Retired Reserve which consists of personnel who are receiving
retired pay as a result of their reserve service, active service, or
both and may be involuntarily ordered to active duty in case of a full
mobilization.
[2] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Rebalancing Forces (July 9, 2003).
[3] Sea Power 21 is the Navy's vision of how it will organize,
integrate, and transform its forces to perform missions in the 21st
century. Its pillars are (1) Sea Strike, which is projecting precise
and persistent offensive power; (2) Sea Shield, which is projecting
global defensive assurance; and (3) Sea Basing, which is projecting
joint operational independence. Its ForceNet concept integrates the
three pillars.
[4] A zero-based review is a review conducted without consideration of
funding requirements, availability of personnel, and organizational
limitations.
[5] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 518 (2004).
[6] Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower
Management, Section 3.2.3 (Feb. 12, 2005).
[7] GAO, Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could Save
Millions Without Reducing Mission Capability, GAO/NSIAD-98-64
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998).
[8] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven
Analysis of Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the
Defense Strategy, GAO-05-200 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).
[9] The Fleet Forces Command is responsible for manning, training, and
equipping naval operating forces.
[10] The National Security Personnel System is the Department of
Defense's new human resource management system. The system will govern
basic pay, staffing, classification, performance management, labor
relations, adverse actions, and employee appeals. The department has
begun to implement the system with full implementation scheduled for
the July 2007 through January 2008 time frame.
[11] The Sea Warrior Initiative is designed to implement the Navy's
commitment to the growth and development of its people and will serve
as the foundation of warfighting effectiveness by ensuring the right
skills are in the right place at the right time.
[12] DOD Directive 1100.4.
[13] GAO/NSIAD-98-64.
[14] The term "return on investment" included consideration of the
total ownership cost of the position.
[15] Department of the Navy Instruction 1000.16J, Manual of Navy Total
Force Manpower Policies and Procedures (Washington, D.C.: January
1998).
[16] GAO-05-200.
[17] Contractors were not assessed as part of the review.
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