Military Readiness
DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment Gao ID: GAO-06-141 October 25, 2005With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of dollars sustaining or replacing its inventory of key equipment items while also planning to spend billions of dollars to develop and procure new systems to transform the department's warfighting capabilities. GAO developed a red, yellow, green assessment framework to (1) assess the condition of 30 selected equipment items from across the four military services, and (2) determine the extent to which DOD has identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that these items can meet defense requirements. GAO selected these items based on input from the military services, congressional committees, and our prior work. These 30 equipment items included 18 items that were first assessed in GAO's 2003 report.
While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected for review varied, GAO's analysis showed that reported readiness rates declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items. The decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues caused by the advancing ages and complexity of the systems. Key equipment items--such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and rotary wing aircraft--have been used well beyond normal peacetime use during deployments in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting future requirements. Until the department completes this review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment are addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. GAO found that, in some cases, the services' near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address capability shortfalls, funding is not included in DOD's 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of the equipment items GAO reviewed in that future requirements are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet identified. Title 10 U.S.C. 2437 requires the military services to develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that GAO assessed as red had issues severe enough to warrant immediate attention because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not covered by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report sustainment plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to sustain or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other DOD priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, and replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete sustainment and modernization plans and identifying funding needs for all priority equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops these plans, Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD's budget decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-141, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment
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Report to Congressional Committees:
October 2005:
Military Readiness:
DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential Risks in Program
Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment:
GAO-06-141:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-141, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of
dollars sustaining or replacing its inventory of key equipment items
while also planning to spend billions of dollars to develop and procure
new systems to transform the department‘s warfighting capabilities. GAO
developed a red, yellow, green assessment framework to (1) assess the
condition of 30 selected equipment items from across the four military
services, and (2) determine the extent to which DOD has identified
near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that
these items can meet defense requirements. GAO selected these items
based on input from the military services, congressional committees,
and our prior work. These 30 equipment items included 18 items that
were first assessed in GAO‘s 2003 report.
What GAO Found:
While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected
for review varied, GAO‘s analysis showed that reported readiness rates
declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items.
The decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years
2003 and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of
equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues
caused by the advancing ages and complexity of the systems. Key
equipment items”such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles,
and rotary wing aircraft”have been used well beyond normal peacetime
use during deployments in support of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense
Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting
future requirements. Until the department completes this review and
ensures that condition issues for key equipment are addressed, DOD
risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could threaten its
ability to continue meeting mission requirements.
The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term
program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30
selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. GAO found that,
in some cases, the services‘ near-term program strategies have gaps in
that they do not address capability shortfalls, funding is not included
in DOD‘s 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance
issues that may affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term
program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of the
equipment items GAO reviewed in that future requirements are not
identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and
upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet
identified. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military services to
develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement
programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating
capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that GAO
assessed as red had issues severe enough to warrant immediate attention
because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not covered
by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report sustainment
plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to
sustain or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other
DOD priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes,
and replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete
sustainment and modernization plans and identifying funding needs for
all priority equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future
requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops
these plans, Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD‘s budget
decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment.
GAO‘s red, yellow, and green assessments of the condition, program
strategies, and funding plans for the 30 selected military equipment
items are shown on the following page.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD reassess and report annually on its near- and
long-term programs for all key equipment items until replacements are
fielded. DOD partially agreed that it needs to reassess its program
strategies but did not agree that it needed to provide this information
in an annual report to Congress. As a result, GAO is recommending that
Congress require DOD to report this information to ensure that key
equipment deficiencies are addressed in DOD‘s budget.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Condition of Some Selected Equipment Has Been Degraded by the High Pace
of Operations and the Advanced Age or Complexity of the Systems:
Services Near-and Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans Exist
for Most Equipment Reviewed, but Some Gaps Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items:
Army:
Marine Corps:
Navy:
Air Force:
Appendix III: Agency Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Primary Reasons for Rating Condition as Yellow or Red for
Selected Equipment Items:
Table 2: Primary Reasons for Rating Near-term Program Strategies and
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items:
Table 3: Unfunded Requirements for Four Selected Marine Corps Equipment
Items, Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions):
Table 4: Primary Reasons for Rating Long-term Program Strategies and
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items:
Figures:
Figure 1: Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items:
Figure 2: Abrams Main Battle Tank:
Figure 3: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Abrams Tanks, Fiscal
Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 4: Bradley Fighting Vehicle:
Figure 5: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 6: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier:
Figure 7: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army M113 Vehicles, Fiscal
Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 8: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
Figure 9: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army HEMTTs, Fiscal
Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 10: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle:
Figure 11: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army High Mobility
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 12: 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle:
Figure 13: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army Family of
Medium Tactical Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 14: AH-64 Apache Helicopter:
Figure 15: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army AH-64 A/D
Apache Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 16: CH-47D Chinook Helicopter:
Figure 17: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Chinook CH-47D/
F Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 18: OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter:
Figure 19: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army OH-58D Kiowa
Helicopters, Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 20: M1A1 Abrams Tank:
Figure 21: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps M1A1
Abrams Tanks, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 22: Light Armored Vehicle:
Figure 23: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps LAV-25 and
LAV C-2, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 24: Assault Amphibian Vehicle:
Figure 25: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Assault
Amphibian Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 26: Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement:
Figure 27: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement Fleet, Fiscal Years 2003 - 2004:
Figure 28: AV-8B Harrier Jet:
Figure 29: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AV-8B
Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 30: AH-1W Super Cobra:
Figure 31: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AH-1W
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 32: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter:
Figure 33: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-46E
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 34: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter:
Figure 35: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-53E
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 36: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer:
Figure 37: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate:
Figure 38: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship:
Figure 39: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft:
Figure 40: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy F/A-18 Aircraft,
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 41: EA-6B Prowler:
Figure 42: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy EA-6B Aircraft,
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 43: P-3 Orion Aircraft:
Figure 44: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy P-3 Aircraft,
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 45: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile:
Figure 46: F-15 Eagle:
Figure 47: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-15 Eagle and
Strike Eagle Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 48: F-16 Fighting Falcon:
Figure 49: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-16 Fighting
Falcon Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 50: B-1 Lancer Bomber:
Figure 51: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-1 Lancer
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 52: B-2 Spirit Bomber:
Figure 53: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-2 Spirit
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 54: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft:
Figure 55: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force C-5 Galaxy
Transport Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Figure 56: KC-135 Stratotanker:
Figure 57: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force KC-135
Stratotanker Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
Abbreviations:
AAV: Assault Amphibian Vehicle:
ARNG: Army National Guard:
C2: Command and Control or Command and Communications:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FMTV: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles:
FYDP: Future Years Defense Program:
GWOT: Global War on Terrorism:
HEMTT: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
HMMWV: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle:
LAV: Light Armored Vehicle:
MTVR: Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
USAR: U.S. Army Reserve:
Letter October 25, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of dollars
sustaining and transforming the current military force structure while
it is heavily involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All of
the military services have been utilizing selected equipment items for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and must plan to sustain,
recapitalize, or replace their existing equipment, while concurrently
planning to spend billions of dollars to develop and procure new
systems that will transform DOD's war-fighting capabilities.
In December 2003, we reported that the condition of 25 selected
military equipment items varied from very good to very poor and that,
although the services had program strategies for sustaining,
modernizing, or replacing most of the items reviewed, there were some
gaps in those strategies.[Footnote 1] The report further stated that
for 15 of the items reviewed, the funding requested by DOD did not
appear to match the services' program strategies to sustain or replace
the items. In that report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense
reassess the program strategies and funding priorities for key
equipment items to ensure that the equipment items are sustained until
replacement items are fielded. We also recommended that DOD highlight
for Congress the risks involved in not fully funding the sustainment of
these equipment items and the steps the department is taking to address
those risks. Congress included a provision in the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005[Footnote 2]
that amends Title 10 of the U.S. code to require that, whenever a new
major defense acquisition program begins development, the defense
acquisition authority responsible for that program shall develop a
sustainment plan for the existing system until the system under
development replaces that system.
Since our December 2003 report, DOD's continued operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have resulted in additional wear and tear on military
equipment. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the President requested, and
Congress appropriated, supplemental funds for ongoing military
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan that included funds to refurbish and
replace vehicles, weapons, and equipment used in the
operations.[Footnote 3] In February 2005, the President presented
Congress with his fiscal year 2006 budget request and out-year
projections that contained changes in DOD spending plans and delayed
the fielding of some equipment replacement systems, as documented in
DOD's Program Budget Decision 753. Congress is currently considering
this request as well as over $40 billion in additional fiscal year 2005
supplemental appropriations to include in the fiscal year 2006 regular
defense appropriation. The military services have also begun developing
the justification to request additional 2006 supplemental
appropriations. While supplemental funds may enable DOD to meet near-
term war-related equipment needs, the toll of continuing operations has
raised concerns about the ability of DOD's long-term programming and
funding strategies to meet equipment needs.
DOD recognizes that additional wear and tear is being put on equipment
used to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and has
conducted a study to measure the effects of the sustained use of
equipment at levels beyond normal peacetime use and in operations
outside of the equipment's normal operating parameters. According to
this study, equipment is being used at much higher rates in combat
operations than it is in routine peacetime missions. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, usage rates have run two to eight times higher than
comparable peacetime rates. In Iraq, for example, Army Bradley Fighting
Vehicles have been used at six times their peacetime rates. Moreover,
equipment is also employed in harsher environments and in more
demanding ways in these combat operations. Although initial results of
this study and related costs have been released, DOD is continuing to
assess the effects of high operating rates and harsh conditions on
equipment.
Since congressional interest in the wear and tear being placed on
military equipment and the funding needed to reconstitute this
equipment remains, we conducted an analysis of 30 selected military
equipment items, including 18 items from our December 2003 report, to
update your committees on which key equipment items warrant attention
by DOD and/or Congress. The specific objectives of this review were to
(1) assess the fleet-wide condition of selected key equipment items and
(2) determine the extent to which DOD has identified near-and long-term
program strategies and funding plans to ensure that selected key
equipment items can meet requirements. Our assessments apply only to
the 30 equipment items we reviewed; therefore, the results cannot be
projected to the entire inventory of DOD equipment.
We selected the 30 equipment items based upon input from the military
services, congressional committees, and our prior work. To assess the
condition of these equipment items, we obtained fleet-wide data on
equipment age, expected service life, and other specific service
performance indicators such as mission capable rates,[Footnote 4]
utilization rates,[Footnote 5] and various other metrics for fiscal
years 1999 through 2004. Our observations and assessments were made
across the military services--Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps-
-for both the active duty inventory as well as equipment in the
National Guard and reserve forces. In assessing fleet-wide equipment
condition, we also considered the extent to which each equipment item
was used for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and its associated
performance indicators while deployed.[Footnote 6] Our review of DOD's
near-and long-term program strategies for these equipment items focused
on the extent to which the services have developed or updated their
plans to sustain, modernize, or replace[Footnote 7] the equipment items
in order to meet mission requirements. Our review of near-and long-term
funding plans focused on the extent to which the funding for the
strategies is projected in the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP).[Footnote 8] According to DOD officials, the FYDP takes the
services' priorities into consideration, while balancing future
investment and risk. We defined the near term as fiscal years 2005,
2006, and 2007, and the long term as fiscal years 2008 and beyond.
To determine which equipment items require additional attention by the
department, the military services, and/or Congress, we developed an
assessment framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the
existence of a problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or
issue, and (3) how soon the problem or issue needs to be addressed. To
indicate the existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified for
the 30 selected equipment items, we used a traffic light approach--red,
yellow, or green--as follows:
* Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress.
* Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen.
* Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress.
While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the three
categories across all four of the military services, data availability
varied significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments,
therefore, are based on the data available from multiple sources;
however, we did not independently verify the data provided by these
sources. Our assessments also represent the problems and issues we
identified at the specific point in time that we conducted our work,
and can change quickly given current events. Although our assessments
for each of the three categories--condition, near-term program
strategies and funding plans, and long-term program strategies and
funding plans--are largely qualitative in nature and are derived from
consensus judgments, our analyses are based on data provided by the
military services and discussions with military service officials and
program managers for the individual equipment items. We assessed the
reliability of the services' equipment readiness data by (1) comparing
key data elements to our observations of equipment items at selected
units, (2) reviewing relevant documents, and (3) interviewing
knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data obtained from DOD,
the military services, and the combatant commands were sufficiently
reliable for our use. For a complete description of our methodology,
see appendix I. Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each
of the 30 equipment items. We performed our review from July 2004
through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Our assessments of the fleet-wide condition and near-and long-term
program strategies and funding plans for the 30 military equipment
items that we included in our review indicate that the items range from
some that have severe problems and require immediate attention to those
that do not have problems or issues warranting action by the DOD,
military services, and/or Congress, as shown in figure 1. Specifically,
we identified severe problems and issues related to the fleet-wide
condition and/or program and funding strategies of the Army's Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, and CH-47D/F
helicopter; the Marine Corps' M1A1 tank, CH-46E helicopter, and CH-53E
helicopter; the Navy's P-3 aircraft and Standard Missile-2; and the Air
Force's KC-135 aircraft and we rated all of these military equipment
items as red in figure 1. For example, the Marine Corps' CH-46E
helicopter received a red rating for its near-term program strategy and
funding plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term
requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages. The
fleet-wide condition or program strategies of many of the other
equipment items shown as yellow in figure 1, while not yet severe
enough to warrant immediate action by DOD, the military services, and/
or Congress, also showed signs of problems that, if not addressed,
could become severe. For example, we assessed the fleet-wide condition
of the Army's Abrams tank as yellow because, while it generally met or
exceeded the service mission capable goal, the rates were on a downward
trend as a result of shortages of both spare parts and the trained
personnel needed to replace these parts and to repair the equipment
items. Reserve military technicians who repair this equipment at home
are, in many cases, currently deployed overseas.
Figure 1: GAO's Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items:
[See PDF for image] --graphic text:
Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough to
warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress.
Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen.
Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress.
Equipment:
Army:
Abrams Tank;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
Bradley Fighting Vehicle;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
M113 Armored Personnel Carrier;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
CH-47 D/F Chinook Helicopter;
Condition: Red;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
Marine Corps:
M1A1 Abrams Tank;
Condition: Red;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
Light Armored Vehicle Command and Control and 25 variants;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
Assault Amphibian Vehicle- Personnel, C2, and Recovery variants;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
AV-8B Harrier Jet;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Red;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
Navy:
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
EA-6B Prowler Aircraft;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
P-3 Orion Aircraft;
Condition: Red;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
Air Force:
F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle Aircraft;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft;
Condition: Green;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
B-1 Lancer Bomber;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
B-2 Spirit Bomber;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green.
C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow.
KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft;
Condition: Yellow;
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow;
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[End of figure]
While the fleet-wide condition of 30 equipment items we selected for
review varied by service, level of current use, and age, our analysis
showed that reported readiness rates[Footnote 9] are declining between
fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items, particularly for
those equipment items we rated as red or yellow in figure 1. The
decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003
and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of
equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues
resulting from the advancing ages (such as equipment that is more than
20 years old) and complexity (such as Navy ships, which are systems of
systems) of the equipment items. Some key equipment items--such as Army
and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and helicopters--have been
used well beyond normal peacetime use while deployed. For example,
according to Marine Corps officials, the Assault Amphibian Vehicles
experienced utilization rates as high as 11 times the normal peacetime
rates while operating in Iraq. Army and Marine Corps officials stated
that a complete inspection of the deployed equipment will be necessary
once it returns from theater before the full extent of its readiness
deficiencies can be known. Many of the selected systems have either a
fleet-wide average age of more than 20 years, such as the Navy's LPD-4
Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, or entered the inventory prior to the
1980s, such as the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. These
systems are likely to reach the end of their useful lives in this
decade unless major modernizations, some of which are planned or
underway, are made. Some of the problems degrading the fleet-wide
condition of these aging systems include maintenance problems due to
parts shortages or obsolescence, shortages of trained maintenance
personnel, corrosion, deferred maintenance, and airframe fatigue. For 8
of the 30 items in this review we did not identify any specific
problems that warrant additional attention by DOD, the military
services, or Congress, or that previously identified problems were
already being addressed, so we assessed their fleet-wide condition as
green. Also, DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense
Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting
future requirements.[Footnote 10] Until the department completes this
review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment items are
addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which
could threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements.
The military services have not fully identified near-and long-term
program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30
selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. For the 30
selected equipment items, we found that some of the services' near-and
long-term program strategies have gaps, and we rated them as red or
yellow, as shown in figure 1, depending on the severity of the problem
and how soon it needs to be addressed. Our analysis found, in some
cases the services' near-term program strategies do not address
capability shortfalls, full funding is not included in DOD's 2006
budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may
affect near-term readiness. For example, the Marine Corp's CH-46E Sea
Knight helicopter was rated red because the service may not be able to
meet near-term requirements because of potential aircraft and parts
shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. Additionally, the long-
term program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of
the equipment items we reviewed in that future requirements are not
fully identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance
and technological upgrades may not be available, or replacement systems
were delayed or not yet identified. For example, the Army's Bradley
Fighting Vehicle received a red rating because the Army has not fully
identified the future requirements and funding for this item. Services'
near-term program strategies to sustain or modernize equipment and
address current condition issues include "resetting" or
"reconstituting" (i.e., restoring) equipment back to its predeployment
status, remanufacturing or recapitalizing equipment, procuring new
equipment, improving equipment through safety or technological
upgrades, or improving maintenance practices. Services' long-term
program strategies include improving the equipment through more complex
maintenance or upgrades, or replacing the equipment with newer, more
modern equipment, including those associated with DOD's force structure
changes. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military services to
develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement
programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating
capability before October 2008. Many of our selected military equipment
items are not currently covered by this law because their replacement
systems have either not begun development or will reach operational
capability before October 2008. As a result, DOD is not required to
report sustainment plans for these critical items. Most of the
equipment items rated red and warranting immediate attention because of
long-term planning and funding issues were not covered by this act. For
the next several years, funding to sustain or modernize aging equipment
will have to compete for funding with other DOD priorities, such as
current operations, force structure changes, and replacement system
acquisitions. Without sufficient plans that provide for sustaining and
modernizing all key equipment systems through the end of their expected
useful lives and without identifying the risks associated with not
fully funding or developing sustainment plans, DOD may be unable to
meet future requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until
DOD develops these plans, Congress is unable to track the progress of
equipment sustainment and modernization, or provide effective
oversight.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the secretaries of the military services, reassess the near-and long-
term program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment to
ensure that the plans for those items that are needed to meet future
defense capabilities, particularly those items not covered by 10 U.S.C.
§ 2437, are complete and will ensure that DOD can sustain the equipment
until it reaches the end of its serviceable life or a replacement
system is fielded. We are further recommending that the Secretary of
Defense provide this information in a report to Congress, at the same
time the department submits its annual budget request, to ensure that
Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective oversight
over DOD's program strategies.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the department partially
concurred with our first recommendation but did not agree that it
should report their plans to Congress. Therefore, we are also
suggesting that the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to report
on program strategies and funding plans to ensure that DOD's budget
decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment. DOD's
comments and our evaluation are discussed in detail in a later section
of this report.
Background:
The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review outlined a strategy to
sustain and transform the military force structure that had been in
place since the mid-1990s. In that review, DOD committed to selectively
recapitalize older equipment items, which the department recognized as
being neglected for too long, to meet near-term challenges and to
improve near-term readiness. DOD is currently conducting a new
Quadrennial Defense Review, with the report scheduled to be issued in
February 2006. The results of this Quadrennial Defense Review could
identify changes to DOD's future force structure and capabilities,
thereby impacting the funding needed for both current and replacement
systems.
Based on DOD guidance, the services develop a Program Objective
Memorandum that details the specific programs and funding needed to
meet DOD requirements as determined by the Quadrennial Defense Review.
As part of this process, the services analyze alternative force
structure, weapons systems, and support systems together with their
multiyear resource implications and evaluate various trade-off options.
Basically, it is a process for balancing and integrating resources
among the various programs according to service and DOD priorities.
The annual FYDP contains DOD's estimates of future funding needs for
programs and priorities. Through the FYDP, DOD projects costs for each
element of those programs through a period of either 5 or 6 years on
the basis of proposals made by each of the military services. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense considers the service proposals and
the policy choices made by the current administration and, where
needed, makes adjustments. For example, in preparing its 2006 budget,
DOD made a number of significant changes in its long-term acquisition
plans to meet budget targets established by the White House, as
documented in Program Budget Decision 753. The 2005 FYDP extended from
fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 and the 2006 FYDP extended from
fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011.
Condition of Some Selected Equipment Has Been Degraded by the High Pace
of Operations and the Advanced Age or Complexity of the Systems:
While the condition of the 30 equipment items[Footnote 11] we reviewed
varied, we found that average fleet-wide readiness rates for most of
these items declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. The decline in
readiness generally resulted from the high pace of recent operations
and the advanced age or complexity of the equipment systems. Therefore,
we rated the fleet-wide condition of 22 of the selected equipment items
as red or yellow. However, 8 of the 30 items--including several
tactical fighter aircraft and some newer equipment items such as the
Marine Corps' Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement--were assessed as
green (see fig. 1), indicating that we found no specific problems that
warrant additional attention by DOD, the services, or Congress or that
problems were already being addressed. DOD is currently conducting a
Quadrennial Defense Review that will examine defense programs and
policies and may change some equipment requirements.
Eighteen of the equipment items we reviewed for this report were also
included in our December 2003 report, and 12 of these equipment items
received the same condition assessment in both analyses.[Footnote 12]
For example, the surface ships examined in this study, the Navy's DDG-
51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class
Frigate, and the LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship received yellow
condition ratings in both studies, as did the Air Force's B-2 Spirit
Bomber, the C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft, and the KC-135 Stratotanker
Aircraft. However, for 6 of the items, the assessment changed--3
systems' fleet-wide condition improved, 2 going from red to yellow and
1 from yellow to green, and 3 systems' condition degraded, going from
green to yellow. The condition assessments for the Marine Corps' CH-46E
helicopter and the Navy's F/A-18 aircraft and Standard Missile-2
improved due, in part, to additional maintenance efforts and
improvements that appear to address the condition concerns noted in our
previous report. The condition assessments for the Army's Abrams tank
and Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck and the Marine Corps' Light
Armored Vehicle went from green to yellow largely as a result of
increased use in ongoing operations overseas.
Some Selected Equipment Items Have Significant Condition Issues that
Warrant Additional Attention by DOD, the Military Services, and/or
Congress:
For many of the equipment items included in our assessment, average
fleet-wide readiness rates have declined, generally due to the high
pace of recent operations or the advanced age or complexity of the
systems. We assessed the fleet-wide condition of 3 equipment items as
red, indicating that immediate attention is warranted by DOD, the
services, and/or Congress to address problems or issues. In addition,
we assessed the fleet-wide condition of 19 items as yellow, indicating
that attention is warranted to address existing problems that, if left
unattended, may worsen. Table 1 below shows the primary reasons used to
rate selected equipment items' condition and our assessment of those
items as either red or yellow.
Table 1: Primary Reasons for Rating Condition as Yellow or Red for
Selected Equipment Items:
Reason: High pace of operations increasing utilization beyond planned
usage;
Yellow rating: Army;
* Abrams Tank;
* Bradley Fighting Vehicle;
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck;
* AH-64A/D Apache Helicopter;
Marine Corps:
* Light Armored Vehicle;
* Assault Amphibian Vehicle;
* AV-8B Harrier Jet;
* AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter;
* CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter;
* CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter;
Red rating: Army;
* CH- 47D/F Chinook Helicopter;
Marine Corps:
* M1A1 Abrams Tank.
Reason: Maintenance issues resulting from the advancing ages and
complexity of the equipment items;
Yellow rating: Navy;
* DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer;
* FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate;
* LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship;
* EA-6B Prowler Aircraft;
* Standard Missile-2;
Air Force:
* B-1 Lancer Bomber;
* B-2 Spirit Bomber;
* C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft;
* KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft;
Red rating: Navy;
* P-3 Orion Aircraft.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[End of table]
High Pace of Operations Increasing Utilization Beyond Planned Usage:
Although selected equipment items have been able to meet wartime
requirements, the high pace of recent operations appears to be taking a
toll on selected equipment items and fleet-wide mission capable rates
have been below service targets, particularly in the Army and Marine
Corps. Further, according to officials, the full extent of the
equipment items' degradation will not be known until a complete
inspection of deployed equipment is performed. Elevated flying hours in
Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the harsh desert environment, have
negatively impacted helicopters. For example, our assessment of the
Army's CH-47D/F Chinook helicopter's condition as red reflects this
platform's mission capable rates, which were consistently below service
goals. Officials stated that the aircraft is currently being flown in
Iraq and Afghanistan at three times more than planned peacetime rates.
This usage has increased the amount of maintenance and number of parts
needed to sustain the aircraft, which in turn has negatively impacted
overall readiness. Ground equipment has also been affected by high
wartime usage. For example, the Marine Corps' M1A1 Abrams tank fleet,
also rated as red for condition, is being negatively impacted by
operations in Iraq and a shortage of equipment maintainers due to
transfers of personnel to units that are deploying. This system failed
to meet its service readiness goals and recent trends indicate a steady
decline away from these targets.
Several heavily used equipment items included in our review did not
have mission capable rates below their target; however, these rates
have recently declined, primarily due to the high wartime usage. For
example, while the Army's Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles
met or exceeded the Army mission capable goals, they are both on a
downward trend due to a shortage of spare parts and trained
technicians. The shortage of spare parts is driven by the number of
vehicles either deployed or being reset to a predeployment condition
and the shortage of trained technicians is primarily due to the number
of deployed National Guard military technicians. Both of these tracked
vehicles have experienced high use in operations overseas in the past
and will likely do so in the future. Similarly, while the readiness
rates of the Marine Corps' Assault Amphibian Vehicle varied by vehicle
type in recent years, the gap between mission capable rates and service
goals increased, indicating a decline in the material condition of this
equipment.
Maintenance Issues Resulting from the Advancing Ages and Complexity of
the Equipment Items:
While not all of the equipment included in our review has been heavily
used in recent overseas operations, in some cases, the advanced age or
complexity of the equipment items have contributed to readiness
declines. Many of the selected systems have either a fleet-wide average
age of more than 20 years, such as the Navy's LPD-4 Amphibious
Transport Dock Ship, or entered the inventory prior to the 1980s, such
as the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. These systems are
likely to reach the end of their useful lives in this decade unless
major modernizations, some of which are planned or underway, are made.
Some of the problems degrading the fleet-wide condition of these aging
systems include maintenance problems due to parts shortages or
obsolescence, shortages of trained maintenance personnel, corrosion,
deferred maintenance, and airframe fatigue. For example, the Navy's P-
3 Orion aircraft, while not as heavily tasked as Army and Marine Corps
helicopters, have played an important role in overseas operations as a
reconnaissance and surveillance asset despite consistently missing
their mission capable goals by a significant percentage. The condition
of the P-3 fleet, which has an average age of over 24 years, has been
primarily degraded by the effects of structural fatigue on its airframe
and the obsolescence of communication, navigation, and primary war-
fighting systems in this aircraft.
Some Air Force equipment also has age-related condition issues that
warrant attention and therefore received yellow ratings. For example,
mission capable rates for the C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft were
consistently below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.
Officials stated that the size and age of the C-5 aircraft make it
maintenance intensive, and that component items on the aircraft are
older, making it difficult to find manufacturing sources for some
parts, particularly avionics and engine components. In addition, the KC-
135 Stratotanker aircraft has not met its mission capable goals due to
issues associated with age and corrosion, such as problems with the
landing gear's steel brakes.
Similarly, Navy surface ships examined in this study had a number of
issues related to condition and these vessels also received yellow
ratings. The Navy is challenged to maintain surface ships that are, in
reality, a system of systems. The failure of any one of these complex
systems affects the entire ship. For example, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke
Class Destroyer, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate and the
LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship all had problematic subsystems,
for example, operating with limited communication ability or bandwidth,
which affects their day-to-day operations such as on-line training and
personnel activities. Older ships, such as the FFG-7 class which is, on
average, almost 21 years old and the LPD-4 class with an average age of
37 years, may be more challenging because as the ships age, more
maintenance will be required. Other older Navy equipment also had
condition issues in need of attention. For example, the EA-6B Prowler
consistently missed the Navy's mission capable goal due to problems
with communications equipment and wings.
Some Selected Equipment Items Are in Favorable Condition:
Our analysis showed that the fleet-wide condition of over one quarter
of the equipment items included in our review was generally favorable,
and consequently, we assessed the condition of 8 of the 30 selected
military equipment items as green, as shown in figure 1. Not all
equipment has been heavily used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and for some items, use has not increased significantly from that of
planned peacetime operations. This was the case for several tactical
fighter aircraft. In our assessment, all three selected aircraft that
provide this capability, the Air Force's F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle and F-
16 Fighting Falcon, and the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet, were at
or near-service mission capable rate goals.
Moreover, we found that new equipment that has been heavily tasked in
recent operations appears to be performing well. For example, the
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles has exceeded the Army's fully
mission capable rate goals despite operating overseas at a rate that is
nine times higher than in peacetime. In addition, the Marine Corps'
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles are being aggressively
used in support of operations in Iraq, but also met their mission
capable goals for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. These trucks are both
relatively new; the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles is on average 6
years old and the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement is on average 3
years old.
In addition, we assessed the fleet-wide condition of some older
equipment items favorably. For example, the average age of the Army's
OH-58D Kiowa is about 13 years with a life expectancy of 20 years;
however, these reconnaissance helicopters have met or exceeded their
mission capable goals from 1999 through 2004 while exceeding their
planned flight hours in recent operations. With an average age of
almost 16 years, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier has not experienced
a significant decline in mission readiness as a result of recent
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's High Mobility Multi-
Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) are experiencing usage (i.e.,
operational tempo)[Footnote 13] that is six times their normal
peacetime rate. Despite concerns over the availability of their armored
protection,[Footnote 14] these vehicles exceeded Army readiness goals
for the past 6 years and received a green rating.
Services Near-and Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans Exist
for Most Equipment Reviewed, but Some Gaps Remain:
The military services have identified near-and long-term program
strategies and funding plans to ensure that most of the 30 selected
equipment items can meet defense requirements, but some gaps remain.
For the 30 selected equipment items, we found that 20 of the services'
near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address
capability shortfalls, full funding is not included in DOD's 2006
budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may
affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term program
strategies and funding plans are incomplete for 22 of the equipment
items we reviewed in that future requirements are not fully identified,
studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and technological
upgrades may not be available, or replacement systems are delayed or
not yet identified. DOD is required to develop sustainment plans in 10
U.S.C. § 2437, but this statute only applies to 9 of the selected
equipment items.[Footnote 15] Although the services have identified
near-and long-term program strategies and funding for most of the
equipment items we reviewed, the gaps we identified may threaten DOD's
ability to meet some future capability requirements.
Services Have Not Fully Identified Near-Term Program Strategies and
Funding Plans for Some Selected Equipment:
The services have not fully identified near-term program strategies and
funding plans for 20 of the 30 equipment items we reviewed, including 7
of the 9 selected items covered by 10 U.S.C. § 2437. One of the items
that will not be covered by this statute, the Marine Corps' CH-46E Sea
Knight helicopter, was the only item we assessed as red for its near-
term program strategy and funding plan because it may be unable to meet
its near-term requirements. We assessed the near-term program
strategies and funding plans of 19 of the 30 equipment items in our
review as yellow because the services' program strategies for
sustaining equipment lack sufficient planning or full funding to meet
near-term requirements. Alternatively, the services have planned
program and funding strategies to correct equipment deficiencies or
improve equipment capabilities and safety for 10 of the 30 equipment
items in our review so that the equipment items can meet near-term
requirements, so we assessed their near-term program strategies and
funding plans as green as shown in figure 1. The services' near-term
program strategies to sustain or modernize equipment and address
current condition issues include restoring equipment back to its
predeployment condition, remanufacturing or recapitalizing equipment,
procuring new equipment, improving equipment through safety or
technological upgrades, or improving maintenance practices. Table 2
below shows the primary reasons used to rate selected equipment items'
near-term program strategies and funding plans and our assessment of
those items as either red or yellow. Without developing complete near-
term plans and identifying the associated funding needs to ensure that
all key equipment items can be sustained and modernized--and assessing
the risk involved if gaps in these strategies are not addressed--DOD
may be unable to meet some future requirements for defense
capabilities.
Table 2: Primary Reasons for Rating Near-term Program Strategies and
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items:
Reason: Existing plans do not address capability shortfalls;
Yellow rating: Marine Corps;
* Assault Amphibian Vehicle;
Navy:
* FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate;
* LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship;
* EA-6B Prowler Aircraft;
* P-3 Orion Aircraft.
Reason: Strategy not fully funded in DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget;
Yellow rating: Army;
* Bradley Fighting Vehicle;
* M113 Armored Personnel Carrier;
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck;
* High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle;
* Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles;
Marine Corps:
* M1A1 Abrams Tank;
* Light Armored Vehicle;
* AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter;
* CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter.
Reason: Anticipated parts shortages and maintenance issues;
Yellow rating: Army;
* Abrams Tank;
* CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter;
Navy:
* F/ A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft;
Air Force:
* C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft;
* KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft;
Red rating: Marine Corps;
* CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[End of table]
Existing Near-Term Plans for Some Selected Equipment Items Do Not
Address Capability Shortfalls:
Some of the services' near-term program strategies do not address the
issues that affect the condition of the equipment in the near-term,
thus 5 of the 30 selected equipment items received a yellow rating as
shown in table 2. For example, the Marine Corps identified a shortfall
in the capability of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle to conduct parts of
their war-fighting doctrine; however, instead of upgrading its
capabilities, their plan is to return the capability of the vehicle to
its original condition while they await its replacement. Although the
Navy has a plan to correct serious LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock ship
class deficiencies, those ships that are within 5 years of
decommissioning can, by law,[Footnote 16] only receive safety
modifications, resulting in a wide variance in the condition of ships
in the class. Furthermore, while the Navy is making structural
inspections and repairs to ensure that there will be sufficient P-3
Orion aircraft to meet day-to-day requirements next year, they have not
funded some improvements to communications and defense systems, which
will continue to degrade the ability of this aircraft to fulfill all of
its missions.
Some Near-Term Strategies Are Not Fully Funded in DOD's Fiscal Year
2006 Budget Request:
The full funding requirements for nine of the Marine Corps and Army
near-term strategies we reviewed were not included in DOD's fiscal year
2006 budget request; therefore, we rated these equipment items as
yellow as shown in table 2. According to service officials, the
services submit their budgets to DOD and the department has the
authority to increase or decrease the service budgets based upon the
perceived highest priority needs. As shown in table 3 below, the Marine
Corps identified requirements that were not funded in DOD's 2006 budget
request totaling $314.7 million for four of its selected equipment
items.
Table 3: Unfunded Requirements for Four Selected Marine Corps Equipment
Items, Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions):
Marine Corps equipment item: M1A1 Abrams Tank;
Unfunded requirements: $ 86.4.
Marine Corps equipment item: Light Armored Vehicle;
Unfunded requirements: $113.0.
Marine Corps equipment item: AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter;
Unfunded requirements: $63.6.
Marine Corps equipment item: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter;
Unfunded requirements: $51.7.
Marine Corps equipment item: Total;
Unfunded requirements: $314.7.
Source: DOD data.
[End of table]
The four equipment items for which the Marine Corps did not request
funding are a concern because a capability or need that the service
identified as a priority may not receive funding unless Congress
intervenes. For example, the Marine Corps identified but did not
request $113 million in funding needed to complete the standardization
of its older Light Armored Vehicles. The Marine Corps also identified
funding shortages in its tank remanufacturing program for fiscal years
2006 and 2007, noting that only 33 percent of the plan has been funded.
In addition, for five of the selected Army items, DOD has not included
funding for part of the near-term program strategies in its regular
2006 budget request. Instead the Army is relying on supplemental
appropriations or congressional adjustments to their regular
appropriations to fund these activities and we rated these items yellow
given the uncertainty of future supplemental appropriations or
congressional adjustments. For example, the Army requested $1.4 billion
in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in order to accelerate
recapitalization of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles by producing 93
vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 to meet its modernization
needs, and has begun planning another request for supplemental
appropriations to fund other near-term procurement requirements
associated with their transformational objectives. Further, in the
past, the Army has consistently relied on supplemental appropriations
and congressional adjustments for the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier,
and included $132 million in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding
request to recapitalize vehicles deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Anticipated Parts Shortages and Maintenance Issues May Affect Equipment
Condition and Indicate Near-Term Planning and Funding Concerns:
Anticipated parts shortages or maintenance issues may affect the
services' ability to maintain adequate condition of 6 of the 30
selected equipment items we reviewed; therefore, we assessed their near-
term program strategies and funding plans as yellow or, in one case,
red as shown in table 2. Of the 30 equipment items we reviewed, the
Marine Corps' CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter received a red rating for
its near-term program strategy and funding plan because the service may
be unable to meet its near-term requirements due to potential aircraft
and repair parts shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. Because
of fielding delays of its replacement aircraft, the MV-22, the CH-46E
will not be retired as originally scheduled, which may lead to
additional repair parts shortages. The uncertainty in whether the near-
term program strategy addresses existing parts shortages is also a
concern for items such as the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet
aircraft and resulted in a yellow rating. Although the Navy is
currently able to maintain readiness for the Super Hornet fleet, there
is an anticipated shortage for critical spare parts like extra fuel
tanks and bomb racks, and the current program strategy does not fund
the efforts necessary to ensure adequate replacements. Additionally, we
rated the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft as yellow because
officials expect its age-related maintenance issues, such as fuel
bladder leaks and parts obsolescence, to increase, resulting in
additional maintenance requirements. Officials also stated that the
severity of potential problems from newly discovered corrosion remains
unknown, so the potential exists for additional maintenance
requirements.
Some Selected Equipment Items Have No Near-Term Program Strategy or
Funding Issues of Concern:
We rated 10 of the 30 equipment items examined in this review as green,
as shown in figure 1, because we did not identify any significant
program or funding issues in the near term. The services had identified
program and funding strategies to correct these equipment items'
immediate deficiencies, or to improve the platforms' capabilities. For
the selected equipment items that are being heavily used for operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan and received a green rating, such as the Army's
AH-64A/D Apache helicopter and the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier jet, the
services are using a combination of activities, including restoring the
equipment to predeployment status, remanufacturing or recapitalizing
the equipment, or procuring new equipment. For example, the Army is
restoring the Apache helicopters being used in combat while
concurrently remanufacturing the older AH-64A variants into newer AH-
64D variants. In some cases, the services have funded plans that
upgrade the equipment items to address structural or safety concerns
and improve combat capabilities, such as for the Air Force's F-15 and F-
16 fighter aircraft and the Navy's DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class
destroyers. For other items, the services modified their maintenance
practices to increase efficiencies and address concerns. For example,
the Air Force modified its stealth maintenance procedures on its B-2
Spirit bomber, thus reducing the steps and time required to conduct it.
Services Lack Complete Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans
for Selected Equipment:
The services have not developed or fully funded the long-term program
strategies for 21 of the 30 selected equipment items. Title 10 U.S.C. §
2437, which requires that DOD develop sustainment plans, applies to
only 9 of the selected equipment items. We assessed 7 of the selected
equipment items as red, only 2 of which will be covered by this
statute, because the services' program strategies and funding plans to
meet long-term requirements are not fully identified, studies to
determine future system requirements are not complete, funding for
maintenance or technological upgrades may not be available, or
replacement systems were delayed or not identified, and in some cases,
the selected equipment items may be unable to meet their long-term
requirements. We assessed the long-term program strategies and funding
plans of 14 of the selected equipment items in our review as yellow
because they are experiencing similar gaps in their long-term program
strategies and funding plans, but the consequences would be less
severe. Alternatively, we assessed the long-term program strategies and
funding plans of 9 of the 30 equipment items in our review as green, as
shown in figure 1, because the services have program strategies and
funding planned to improve or upgrade equipment capabilities and safety
or replace the equipment items so that they can meet long-term
requirements. Some of the services' long-term program strategies
include improving or modernizing the equipment through upgrades,
recapitalizing older models to newer ones, or replacing the equipment
with newer, more modern equipment, including those associated with
DOD's force structure changes.
Table 4 below shows the primary reasons used to rate selected equipment
items' long-term program strategies and funding plans and our
assessment of those items as either red or yellow. As with incomplete
near-term strategies, without complete long-term plans to ensure that
all key equipment items can be sustained and modernized--and assessing
the risk involved if gaps in these strategies are not addressed--DOD
may be unable to meet some future defense requirements.
Table 4: Primary Reasons for Rating Long-term Program Strategies and
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items:
Reason: Future strategy and funding requirements are not fully
identified;
Yellow rating: Army;
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck;
* High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle;
* Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles;
Marine Corps:
* M1A1 Abrams Tank;
* Light Armored Vehicle;
Red rating: Army;
* Bradley Fighting Vehicle;
* M113 Armored Personnel Carrier.
Reason: DOD awaiting studies needed to develop strategies;
Yellow rating: Air Force;
* C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft;
Red rating: Air Force;
* KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft.
Reason: Availability of funding for maintenance and technological
upgrades affecting strategies;
Yellow rating: Marine Corps;
* AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter;
Navy:
* DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer;
* FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate;
* LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship;
* EA-6B Prowler Aircraft;
Red rating: Navy;
* P-3 Orion Aircraft;
* Standard Missile-2.
Reason: Replacement systems are delayed or not identified;
Yellow rating: Marine Corps;
* Assault Amphibian Vehicle;
* AV-8B Harrier Jet;
Navy:
* F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft;
Red rating: Marine Corps;
* CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter;
* CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter.
Source: GAO analysis of military service data.
[End of table]
Future Strategy and Funding Requirements Are Not Fully Identified:
At this time, DOD has not fully identified the future requirements or
the long-term funding needs for seven of our selected equipment items,
resulting in red or yellow assessments as shown in table 4, depending
on the urgency or severity of the gaps in program strategies or funding
plans. The Army's lack of identified future requirements and funding
plans led us to assess its Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M113 Armored
Personnel Carrier as red. In some cases, follow-on system requirements
have not been established, but the services have plans to sustain the
items until the replacement system is available, so we assessed these
items as yellow. For example, the Marine Corps plans to replace its
M1A1 Abrams tank and Light Armored Vehicle with the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force Expeditionary Force Fighting Vehicle, although at the time
of our review, they had not completely identified the program
requirements or funding needed for the replacement vehicle. However,
they do have plans in place to ensure that both the M1A1 and Light
Armored Vehicle are available until the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Expeditionary Force Fighting Vehicle is fielded and have received
supplemental funding for these plans.
The Army recently finalized the strategy for its wheeled vehicles, such
as the HMMWV, but some procurement and recapitalization plans have not
been fully funded or specific actions or time frames were not included.
Therefore, we assessed the three Army wheeled vehicles' long-term
program strategies and funding plans as yellow. For example, we noted
that the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and
Modernization Strategy showed anticipated procurements for the HMMWV
that were not reflected in DOD's 2006 budget request. Further, while
the strategy notes that future block upgrades for the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles are planned and describes the sustainment programs it
will include, it does not identify any specific actions or time frames
for these upgrades.
DOD Awaiting Studies to Develop Strategies:
DOD has not yet completed studies so that it can fully identify the
program strategies and funding plans needed for 2 of the 30 selected
equipment items assessed in this review. As shown in table 4, we
assessed the long-term program strategy and funding plan for the Air
Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft as red because the congressionally
mandated study to determine its replacement has experienced, and may
continue to experience delays. Meanwhile the KC-135 fleet, with an
average age of about 44 years, continues to experience age-related
problems and delays in fielding a replacement further exacerbate
problems in maintaining the existing fleet over the long term. We
assessed the long-term program strategy and funding plan for the Air
Force's C-5 transport aircraft, with an average fleet age of about 26
years, as yellow because the Air Force remains uncertain about the size
of the final C-5 fleet and whether to fund some additional C-5 aircraft
upgrades while awaiting completion of DOD's Mobility Capabilities
Study. This study is expected to be completed in the summer of 2005;
however, at the time this report was issued, results were not
available.
Availability of Funding for Maintenance and Technological Upgrades
Affecting Strategies:
The availability of funding for ongoing maintenance and technological
upgrades in past and future years may affect the long-term program
strategies and funding plans for seven of the selected equipment items.
As shown in table 4, we assessed the long-term strategies and funding
plans for two items, the Navy's P-3 Orion aircraft and the Standard
Missile-2, as red because the limited funding for maintenance and
technological upgrades may have serious consequences, such as
negatively affecting their ability to meet war-fighting requirements.
The Navy has identified a plan to address the obsolescence of the
mission systems in the P-3 Orion aircraft over the long term, but at
this time has not officially approved or funded this plan. In addition,
the Standard Missile-2, which has recently seen improved readiness
ratings because DOD increased operation and maintenance funding, is not
scheduled for the same level of funding in the long term, which may
reduce the number of available missiles.
DOD budget decisions to reduce funding for maintenance and upgrades
have the potential for adversely affecting five items, so we assessed
the long-term program strategies and funding plans for these items as
yellow. For example, decreases in the Navy's planned operation and
maintenance funding across all surface ships in the fleet may result in
deferred maintenance and may adversely affect the future material
condition of the three classes of ships included in this review, the
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry
Class frigates, and the LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock ships.
Long-Term Program Strategies Affected Because Replacement Systems for
Selected Equipment Are Delayed or Not Identified:
Replacement systems have either been delayed or are not yet identified
for 5 of the 30 selected equipment items examined in this review and we
rated these items as red or yellow as shown in table 4. Two of these
items were assessed as red because of the urgency and severity of the
delays impact on the services' capabilities and ability to meet future
requirements. For example, we assessed the long-term program strategy
and funding plan for the Marine Corps' CH-53E Super Stallion
Helicopters as red because the Marine Corps has not identified a
replacement for the CH-53E Super Stallion despite an initial fielding
planned for 2015. According to officials, the Marine Corps must
maintain enough CH-53E helicopters to support Marine Corps operations
until the initial fielding of the Heavy Lift Replacement aircraft.
Officials estimate that, if the current high usage rate and expected
attrition rates hold true, the number of CH-53E helicopters may fall
below the number necessary to remain in service until the Heavy Lift
Replacement becomes available.
The remaining three items' long-term program strategies and funding
plans were assessed as yellow because the effect of the uncertainties
or delays do not appear to be as urgent or severe. In some instances,
delays and uncertainties affecting the sustainment programs of selected
equipment items are related to DOD difficulties in acquiring their
replacements. For example, uncertainty over the potential for delays in
the Joint Strike Fighter Program affects the long-term strategy and
funding for the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier jet and the Navy's F/A-18
fighter aircraft and these systems were rated yellow.[Footnote 17]
Some Selected Equipment Items Have No Long-Term Program Strategy and
Funding Issues of Concern:
We determined that 9 of the 30 selected equipment items examined in
this review have no significant program or funding issues in the long
term and therefore received green ratings as shown in figure 1. For
example, the Air Force's F-15 aircraft upgrades are fully funded and
designed to keep the aircraft viable and functioning through at least
2025. In addition, the Marine Corps' plans provide sufficient numbers
of Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles to equip all of its
units in the long term. Moreover, the Army has reprogrammed funds from
the cancellation of the Comanche program to fund other aviation
modernization strategies, including those that improve the capability
and lifespan of the CH-47D/F Chinook and the AH-64A/D Apache
helicopters.
Conclusions:
Since our last review of the condition of selected military equipment
in 2003, overall readiness rates for most selected equipment items have
continued to decline and some of the services' near-and long-term
program strategies lack complete sustainment and modernization plans or
are not fully funded. Continued high use of these equipment items to
support current operations and the advancing ages of the systems
suggest that DOD will be challenged in meeting future equipment
requirements without significant upgrades to its inventory.
Furthermore, because activities to refurbish and replace vehicles,
weapons, and equipment used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are
being funded primarily through supplemental appropriations as opposed
to being programmed in DOD's Future Years Defense Program, future
funding is uncertain. Moreover, DOD faces challenges to sustain and
modernize its current equipment while continuing these operations and
transforming to a new force structure. DOD is currently conducting its
Quadrennial Defense Review, which could change the future requirements
for some military equipment. In light of these challenges, it is
increasingly important that DOD focus its resources on the equipment
items that are key to meeting future defense requirements. Without a
more focused investment strategy, DOD runs the risk of a continued
decline in future equipment readiness. While DOD is required to provide
sustainment plans, including time frames and projected budgetary
requirements, for some military equipment in accordance with 10 U.S.C.
§ 2437, this statute does not apply to many key military equipment
items we reviewed. For example, those equipment items that do not have
a replacement system in development are not covered by this statute. In
fact, most of the equipment items that we assessed as red because of
long-term strategy and funding issues were not covered by this statute.
Without developing complete sustainment and modernization plans and
identifying funding needs for all priority equipment items, including
those not already covered by law through the end of their expected
useful lives, DOD risks not being able to meet some future equipment
requirements. Furthermore, without communicating these plans and
funding needs to Congress, lawmakers will not have the clear picture of
DOD's progress on equipment sustainment and modernization they need to
provide effective oversight over these processes.
Recommendations:
To ensure that DOD can sustain key equipment items to meet future
equipment requirements and to provide greater visibility over key
equipment items to Congress, we recommend that, after the department
completes its Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Services, take the
following two actions:
* Reassess the near-and long-term program strategies for sustaining and
modernizing key equipment, particularly those items not covered by 10
U.S.C. § 2437, to ensure that the plans are complete and that the items
are sustainable until they reach the end of their serviceable life or a
replacement system is fielded. Specifically, this reassessment should:
* detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems
until they are retired or replaced;
* report the costs associated with the sustainment and modernization of
key equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years Defense
Program; and:
* identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding the
strategies, and the steps the department is taking to mitigate the
associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not
fully funded.
* Provide the information in the above recommendation to Congress at
the same time the department submits its annual budget request, to
ensure that Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective
oversight over DOD's program strategies.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Congress should require the Secretary of Defense to report on program
strategies and funding plans to ensure that DOD's budget decisions
address deficiencies related to key military equipment. We suggest that
this report be provided in conjunction with DOD's annual budget
submissions and reflect the results of the department's Quadrennial
Defense Review. Specifically, as stated in our recommendations, the
report should (1) detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key
equipment systems until they are retired or replaced; (2) report the
costs associated with the sustainment and modernization of key
equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years Defense Program
and; (3) describe the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding
the strategies, and the steps the department is taking to mitigate the
associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not
fully funded.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendation that it should reassess the near and long-term
program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment after
the department's Quadrennial Defense Review, but did not concur with
our recommendation that the department report these plans to Congress.
The department's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix III.
In partially concurring with our first recommendation that it should
reassess the near-and long-term program strategies for sustaining and
modernizing key equipment, the department stated that, through its
current budget processes, it is already executing an annual procedure
to assess program strategies to ensure equipment sustainment and
modernization that can support the most recent defense strategy.
According to the department, these budget reviews consider strategies
and costs to sustain and modernize equipment, and the risks incurred by
not fully funding these strategies; therefore, the resulting budget
reflects the department's best assessment of a balanced, fully funded
budget that most efficiently accomplishes the national security mission
within its limited resources.
While we acknowledge that these budget processes may provide a
department-level review of what is needed to accomplish the national
security mission, the department's budget processes and the Future
Years Defense Program do not provide detailed strategies that include
identifying both the costs associated with sustaining and maintaining
key equipment and the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding
the strategies. Without detailed plans, the department does not have
sufficient information to ensure that adequate funding is provided or
that it is taking the necessary steps to mitigate risks associated with
strategies that are delayed or are not fully funded. We continue to
believe that the department, in conjunction with the military services,
needs to develop a more comprehensive and transparent approach for
assessing the condition of key equipment items, developing program
strategies to address critical equipment condition deficiencies,
prioritizing the required funding, and mitigating risks associated with
delaying or not fully funding these strategies upon completion of the
Quadrennial Defense Review. Therefore, we continue to believe our
recommendation has merit.
The department did not concur with our second recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense provide detailed strategies and costs of
sustaining key equipments items and the associated risks in delaying or
not fully funding these strategies in an annual report to Congress to
ensure that Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective
oversight over DOD's program strategies. DOD believes that submitting
an additional report concurrent with the annual budget would be a
duplication of effort.
We believe that the information included in the President's Budget does
not provide Congress with sufficient information on the strategies,
funding, and risks associated with maintaining key equipment items
until their replacement systems are fielded. In our report, we identify
a number of examples of inconsistencies between the program strategies
and the funding needed to sustain and maintain key equipment items not
reported in the department's budget documents. The department is not
currently required to report sustainment plans for some of these
critical items to Congress. We believe that Congress needs to be
assured that DOD's budget decisions address deficiencies related to key
military equipment that must be maintained and sustained until the end
of their serviceable lives, including those currently not covered by
Title 10 U.S.C§ 2437. Therefore, we have added a Matter for
Congressional Consideration.
Lastly, DOD provided technical comments concerning our assessments of
specific equipment items in appendix II. We reviewed and incorporated
these technical comments, as appropriate. In some instances, the data
the department provided in its technical comments resulted from program
and funding decisions that were made subsequent to our review. In one
case, we changed our original color-coded assessment of a key equipment
item based on these decisions. The Army approved the replacement for
the OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and
therefore we changed our original assessment of the Kiowa's long-term
program strategy and funding plans from a yellow rating to a green
rating.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of
the Marine Corps; and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions, please contact me on (202) 512-
8365 or by e-mail at solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Major contributors to this report are included in
appendix IV.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To update congressional committees on key equipment items that warrant
immediate attention by the Department of Defense (DOD) and/or Congress,
we conducted an analysis of 30 selected military equipment items. We
performed an independent evaluation of the (1) condition of key
equipment items and (2) services' near-and long-term program strategies
and funding for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of these
equipment items.
This report follows our December 2003 report[Footnote 18] which
assessed the condition, program strategy, funding, and wartime
capability of 25 selected military equipment items. The current report
increases the number of equipment items to 30, and instead evaluates
the condition, near-term program strategy and funding plans, and long-
term program strategy and funding plans of each system. These changes
reflect the current operational environment, and the critical linkage
between a successful program strategy and funding. We examined the near
and long terms separately to delineate the impact of current operations
on the near term and their possible effect on long-term
transformational efforts.
To select the 30 equipment items we reviewed, we included 18 of the
equipment items reviewed in our December 2003 report, and based upon
input from the military services, your offices, and our prior work, we
judgmentally selected an additional 12 items. We did not include 7 of
the 25 items from our previous review so that we could focus on other
selected systems that we believed were more in need of examination. Our
final selections included those items that the military services
believed were most critical to their missions, and which have been in
use for a number of years. The 30 equipment items include 9 from the
Army, 6 from the Air Force, 7 from the Navy, and 8 from the Marine
Corps. Our observations and assessments were made on active duty
inventory as well as equipment in the National Guard and reserve
forces; including reserve equipment represents another difference
between this review and our December 2003 report. Our assessments apply
only to the 30 equipment items we reviewed, and the results of our
assessments cannot be projected to the entire inventory of DOD
equipment. Because Section 805 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005--which amends Title 10 of the
U.S. code (Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 805.)--does not apply to existing
systems for which a replacement system will reach initial operational
capability before October 1, 2008, we did not assess compliance with
this section of the act.
Each equipment item was assessed individually on its condition, and
near-and long-term program strategy and funding. To determine which
equipment items require additional attention by the department, the
military services, and/or Congress, we developed an assessment
framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the existence of a
problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or issue, and (3) how
soon the problem or issue needs to be addressed. To indicate the
existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified for the 30
selected equipment items, we used a traffic light approach-red, yellow,
or green-as follows:
* Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress.
* Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and that if
left unattended may worsen.
* Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
immediate action, or already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress.
Individual assessments were based on systematic decisions with clear
and, wherever possible, measurable criteria. Input from relevant
officials--program managers, unit staffs, operators, maintainers, and
engineers--was incorporated in every step of the process.
We interviewed officials from components (active, guard, and reserve
forces) of all four of the military services, two selected combatant
commands, and several major service commands. We visited selected units
and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment items during
operation or under maintenance. We also discussed deployed and
nondeployed equipment condition, program strategy, and funding with
program managers and equipment operators and maintainers, and included
these indicators where appropriate. The specific military activities we
visited or obtained information from include the following:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs,
Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va;
* U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill;
* U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, Wright Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio;
* U.S. Air Force, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base,
Utah;
* U.S. Air Force, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force
Base, Okla;
* U.S. Air Force, Pacific Command, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;
* U.S. Air Force, Plans and Programs, Air Force Headquarters,
Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Ga;
* U.S. Air Force, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force
Base, Ga;
* U.S. Air National Guard, Headquarters, Andrews Air Force Base, Md;
* U.S Air National Guard, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii;
* U.S. Army, Headquarters, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Army National Guard, Headquarters, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Army National Guard, 81st Brigade, Washington National Guard,
Camp Murray, Wash;
* U.S. Army National Guard, Hawaii National Guard, Ft. Ruger, Hawaii;
* U.S. Army, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Ala;
* U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala;
* U.S. Army, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Tex;
* U.S. Army, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Lewis, Wash;
* U.S. Army, First Army, Ft. Gillem, Ga;
* U.S. Army, Fifth Army, Ft. Hood, Tex;
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Ga;
* U.S. Army, 4TH Infantry Division, Ft. Hood, Tex;
* U.S Army Headquarters, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Army Material Command, Ft. Belvoir, Va;
* U.S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii;
* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Ga;
* U.S. Army Tank - Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich;
* U.S. Army, III Corps, Ft. Hood, Tex;
* U.S. Central Command, McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policies, Programs, Budgets, Joint
and External Matters Branch, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Weapons Systems Requirements Branch,
Pentagon, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Installations and Logistics, Navy Annex,
Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Logistics Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility
Division, Navy Annex, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, 3rd Marine Air Wing, Miramar, Calif;
* U.S. Marine Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton,
Calif;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Station,
Patuxent River, Md;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Programs and Resources, Office of the Deputy
Commandant, Pentagon, Arlington, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Reserve Command, New Orleans, La;
* U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command,
Warren, Mich;
* U.S. Navy, Commander Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va;
* U.S. Navy, Commander Electronic Attack Wing, Pacific, Whidbey Island,
Wash;
* U.S. Navy, Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 10, Whidbey,
Island, Wash;
* U.S. Navy, Commander Strike Fighter Wing, Atlantic, Virginia Beach,
Va;
* U.S. Navy, Commander Strike Fighter Wing, Pacific, Lemoore, Calif;
* U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;
* U.S. Navy, Headquarters, Washington, D.C;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Depot, Jacksonville, Fla;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Depot, North Island, Coronado, Calif;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md;
* U.S. Naval Reserve Command, New Orleans, La;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command Washington, D.C;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Force/US Naval Air Force--Atlantic, Norfolk,
Va;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Force/US Naval Air Force--Pacific, San
Diego, Calif;
* U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, Calif; and:
* U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii.
Assessments on the condition of these 30 equipment items were based on
a comparison of readiness metrics against service goals, and the
existence, severity, or urgency of condition problems. We obtained data
on equipment age, expected service life, mission capable
rates,[Footnote 19] utilization rates,[Footnote 20] and various other
metrics for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. Readiness metrics, such as
material readiness rates and mission capable rates, were a primary
component of our assessments. We were particularly cognizant not only
of whether the equipment item met its readiness goals but, if it failed
to meet this metric, we examined the gap between the readiness achieved
by these equipment items and the services readiness objectives--and the
significance of that difference. Equipment items were further evaluated
against metrics such as utilization rates, cannibalization rates,
failure rates, and depot maintenance data. We gauged the significance
of the rates and data as they reflected on the item's condition.
Further, this analysis also evaluated the extent to which each of the
equipment items is being used for current operations, and their
performance while deployed. Finally, we assessed specific problems with
each item that may or may not have been captured in other metrics.
Our evaluations of DOD's near-and long-term program strategy and
funding plans were based on the existence of near-and long-term plans,
and the extent to which there were gaps in funding for these plans as
projected in DOD's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).[Footnote 21]
Both near-and long-term plans include sustainment, modernization, or
recapitalization of the equipment items in order to meet mission
requirements.[Footnote 22] Near-term plans are those that address
current condition problems, as well as those projected until 2007; long-
term plans address issues anticipated from 2008 until the replacement
system enters the inventory or until the system reaches the end of its
expected service life. We first assessed whether near-and long-term
plans were realistic and comprehensive. For our short-term assessment,
we examined whether the plans meet near-term requirements and address
issues related to current condition and the need for near- term
technological upgrades. For our long-term evaluation, we considered if
modernizations or sustainment plans were sufficient given the timing of
the replacement and the expected service life of the equipment item.
Next, we determined the extent to which there were gaps in funding for
both near-and long-term programs as projected in the FYDP. We then
considered whether the strategy and its funding, in the near and long
term, addressed other concerns which might significantly affect the
program.
While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the three
categories across all four of the military services, data availability
varied significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments
are based on the data available from multiple sources, and represent
the problems and issues we identified at the specific point in time
that we conducted our work. These can change quickly given current
events. Although our assessments for each of the three categories--
condition, near-term program strategies and funding plans, and long-
term program strategies and funding plans--are largely qualitative in
nature and are derived from consensus judgments, our analyses are based
on data and information provided by the military services and
discussions with military service officials and program managers for
the individual equipment items. We assessed the reliability of the
services' equipment readiness data by (1) comparing key data elements
to our observations of equipment items at selected units, (2) reviewing
relevant documents, and (3) interviewing knowledgeable officials. We
determined that the data obtained from DOD, the military services, and
the combatant commands were sufficiently reliable for our use. We
performed our review from July 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items:
For the 30 equipment items, each assessment provides the status of the
equipment item at the time of our review. The profile presents a
general description of the equipment item. Each assessment area--
condition, near-term program strategy and funding, and long-term
program strategy and funding--includes a green, yellow, or red rating
indicating the existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified
based on our observations of each equipment item, discussions with
service officials, and reviews of service-provided metrics.
Army:
Abrams M1A1/M1A2 Tank:
First delivered in the early 1980s, the Abrams is the Army's main
battle tank and destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and
firepower. Variants of the Abrams include the M1,[Footnote 23] M1A1,
and M1A2 and there are a total of 5,848 tanks of all variants in the
fleet. The M1A1 and M1A2 have a 120 mm main gun, a powerful turbine
engine, and special armor. There are 5,109 M1A1 and M1A2 tanks in the
inventory, and their estimated average age is 12 years. Officials state
that in the future, the Army is planning to use only a two-variant
fleet of the Abrams, consisting of the M1A1 Abrams Integrated
Management and the upgraded M1A2 System Enhancement Program--the
primary difference being the digital architecture of the System
Enhancement Program variant. The M1 variant is expected to be phased
out by 2015. The Abrams is expected to remain in the Army's inventory
until at least 2045.
Figure 2: Abrams Main Battle Tank:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
In our previous report we assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as
green because it consistently met its mission capable goal of 90
percent from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 24]
However, in this review we assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as
yellow because, while it generally met or exceeded the Army's mission
capable goal between fiscal years 1999 and 2003 as shown in figure 3
below, the rates declined between fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According
to program officials, the recent downward trend is a result of parts
and technician shortages. Officials stated that the shortage in parts
is driven by the number of vehicles either deployed or being reset to a
predeployment condition and the shortage of technicians is primarily
due to the number of deployed National Guard military technicians.
Additionally, as of September 2004 there were a relatively small
percentage of Abrams tanks, around 5 percent, deployed in support of
operations in Iraq. Due to the high use in theater, these operations
may accelerate the aging process of the tank fleet.
Figure 3: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Abrams Tanks, Fiscal
Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the Abrams
tank as yellow because while the Army possesses plans for resetting
tanks as they return from operations in Iraq and recapitalizing the
fleet to ensure that the tank's systems remain updated, they continue
to identify shortages of repair parts and technicians as major causes
of decreased material readiness. Without adequately addressing these
issues, the condition of the Abrams fleet could be significantly
impacted in the near term. Another potential issue affecting the Abrams
in the near term is a break in the production line, which is being used
to retrofit a lesser variant Abrams to the M1A2 System Enhancement
Program, occurring in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Army officials plan
to mitigate this issue by providing $40 million to maintain critical
skills at the production facilities until production resumes in fiscal
year 2008.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Abrams
tank as green because the Army has identified a plan to reduce the
current inventory of 5,109 to about 3,000 tanks in keeping with current
Army transformation plans and has programmed funding to recapitalize
the remaining fleet. The Army plans to move to a two-variant fleet of
the Abrams, the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management and M1A2 System
Enhancement Program, which they plan to utilize until at least 2045.
Officials believe this plan should reduce maintenance costs as the
service will have reduced maintenance and logistics requirements from
the current fleet arrangement. As noted in our previous report, the
Army reduced the original number of recapitalized M1A2 System
Enhancement Program tanks from 1,174 to 588. In the fiscal year 2006
President's Budget, the Army identified funding to increase the number
of M1A2 System Enhancement Program tanks to 803. This increase realigns
the recapitalization funding with the Army's upgrade schedule so that
they are on target to meet their current transformation plans.
Bradley Fighting Vehicle:
Brought into service in 1981, the Army uses the family of Bradley
Fighting Vehicles to provide armored protection and transportation to
infantry units. The Bradley is able to close with and destroy enemy
forces in support of mounted and dismounted infantry and cavalry combat
operations. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle family currently consists of
two vehicles: the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M3 Cavalry
Fighting Vehicle. There are four variations of each of these two
vehicles: the A0, A2, A2 Operation Desert Storm, and A3, each having
different capabilities and technology. For example, the A3 variants
possess all of the capabilities as the A2 variants, but utilize a
digital architecture, which is compatible with the Army's net-centric
warfare plans and the M1A2 System Enhancement Program Abrams tank. The
Army currently maintains 6,583 M2 and M3 variants of the Bradley in
their fleet and plans to use the Bradley Fighting Vehicle until at
least 2045.
Figure 4: Bradley Fighting Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the Bradley as yellow because, as shown in
figure 5 below, the vehicles nearly met or exceeded the Army's
readiness goal of 90 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2002;
however, the mission capable rates showed a downward trend between
fiscal years 2002 and 2004. According to officials, Operation Iraqi
Freedom demands and efforts to reset the vehicles to their
predeployment status have had a significant impact on repair parts
availability. The National Guard has experienced further difficulty
with availability of trained maintainers due to the high pace of
operations that has resulted in the need to transfer personnel among
units to fill shortages. Additionally, program officials stated that
the composition of the fleet of Bradley Fighting Vehicles is
insufficient to meet all of the Army's current requirements, especially
those associated with training and predeployment exercises. However,
the Bradley vehicles are able to meet all of their operational
requirements.
Figure 5: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Bradley
program as yellow because the Army does not currently possess a funding
strategy through regular appropriations for developing the proper
composition of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles fleet to meet the Army's
near-term transformation requirements. The Army requested $1.4 billion
in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
in order to accelerate the recapitalization of vehicles by producing 93
vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 others for the Army's
modularity needs. Without having funding programmed for the A2 or the
A3 variants of the Bradley, Army officials have begun planning for the
fiscal year 2006 supplemental in order to fulfill Army transformation
plans. Program officials stated that the Army is relying on
supplemental funding and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
reprogramming actions in order to meet equipment requirements for the
Army's transformation plans.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Bradley
Fighting Vehicles as red because the Army plans to significantly
increase the number of vehicles and change the composition of the fleet
but has not established a long-term funding strategy. Officials stated
that the Army plans to convert to a fleet of Bradley vehicles which
will be aligned with the Abrams tank fleet. The A3, matched with the
M1A2 System Enhancement Program tank, and a lesser variant, operating
with the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management tank, will make up the
Army's future Brigade Combat Teams.[Footnote 25] Neither the A3 variant
nor the lesser variants, which officials believe will be the A2 and the
Operation Desert Storm variant, have long-term program funding
identified.
M113 Armored Personnel Carrier:
The Army uses the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier in its primary mission
of personnel transportation on the battlefield, though there are many
other combat support missions for the family of vehicles, including
command and control, cargo transportation, and battlefield obscuration.
The Army originally introduced the M113 family of vehicles in 1960. The
current fleet of M113A2 and A3 Personnel Carriers, totaling 7,579, has
an average age of almost 16 years.[Footnote 26] Prior to operations in
Iraq the Army planned to discontinue use of the M113; however, the Army
now plans to utilize the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier through 2045 in
accordance with its latest modularity plans. The A3 variant of the M113
has a digital architecture, increased suspension, and is capable of
carrying add-on-armor kits to provide additional protection for the
troops.
Figure 6: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition of the M113 as green because, as shown in
figure 7 below, the mission capable rates have been near the Army's
goal of 90 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. As of September
2004, the Army had 666 A2 and A3 variants in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
or roughly 10 percent of the combined fleet. The M113 family of
vehicles has not experienced a significant decline in mission readiness
as a result of recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The National
Guard has generally maintained its M113 vehicles at a higher readiness
rate than the active units of the Army.
Figure 7: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army M113 Vehicles, Fiscal
Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the M113 as
yellow because the Army has consistently relied on supplemental
funding, congressional adjustments, and OSD reprogramming actions in
order to complete modifications on the M113 family of vehicles. The
Army requested $132 million in DOD's fiscal year 2005 supplemental
funding request to Congress in order to recapitalize 368 M113s. This
represents about 55 percent of the vehicles that were deployed to
Operation Iraqi Freedom in September 2004. Due to its armor protection,
the M113 has been used in place of less armored vehicles, such as High
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the M113 as
red because the Army has not identified either a long-term procurement
or maintenance strategy for the M113. The Army's funding strategy for
the M113 family of vehicles has been impacted by the Army's plans to
remove these vehicles from service. However, according to Army
officials, the M113 family of vehicles will continue to play a
significant role as the Army transitions into the new modular force.
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
The Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) is used extensively
to provide transport capabilities for resupply of the combat vehicles
and weapons systems used by heavy combat forces and support units. The
five basic HEMTT variants are used to transport ammunition, petroleum,
oils and lubricants, and missile systems, and can also serve as a
recovery vehicle for other vehicle systems. There are approximately
12,700 HEMTTs in the Army's inventory. The average age of the HEMTT
fleet is about 15 years, and although the expected useful life is 20
years, the HEMTTs are expected to remain in the Army's inventory
through 2030.
Figure 8: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
In our previous report we assessed the condition of the HEMTT as green
because the mission capable rates were close to the Army's goal for
fiscal years 1998 to 2002.[Footnote 27] However, in this review we
assessed the condition as yellow. While the fully mission capable rates
for the HEMTTs were near the Army's goal from fiscal years 1999 through
2003, the trend since fiscal year 2002 for both active and reserve
components has been declining, as shown in figure 9 below. In one of
the Army's fiscal year 2004 readiness reports to DOD, the high pace of
operations and aging fleet were cited as factors affecting HEMTT
readiness for the active component. The decline in readiness rates for
the U.S. Army Reserves was attributed to the lack of maintenance
technicians. Program management officials said that the failure to meet
readiness goals was also due to parts problems. According to Army
officials, approximately 12-15 percent of the HEMTT fleet is in theater
and is being used at rates 10 times higher than during peacetime. In a
February 2005 statement to congressional committees, Army officials
stated that all wheeled vehicles being used in Iraq and Afghanistan
would be armored by March 2005. Despite concerns over armor protection,
Army officials that we visited stated that the HEMTTs have performed as
intended in theater without any significant issues.
Figure 9: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army HEMTTs, Fiscal
Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the HEMTT as yellow
because the Army's near-term strategy for sustaining, modernizing, and
procuring HEMTTs has not been fully funded. In addition, the program
received significant funding from supplemental appropriations and a
congressional adjustment in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the
remanufacture and upgrade program has continued at a slower pace than
planned, and at the time of the fiscal year 2006/2007 budget estimate
submission, the impact of modularity changes on the final acquisition
objective was still unknown. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and
Trailer Modularity and
Modernization Strategy[Footnote 28] has been updated several times and
has undergone significant changes. In addition, the strategy states
that while investment is not sufficient to meet the Army's goals, it
does address its most critical requirements. In fiscal year 2004 the
family of heavy tactical vehicles, which includes the HEMTTs, was
authorized an additional $47 million in supplemental funding and
another $39 million in congressional adjustments and DOD's fiscal year
2005 supplemental funding request for $74.3 million was to replace
combat losses and procure additional vehicles to equip, backfill, and
modularize various Army units. The Army is planning to include another
request for additional HEMTTs in DOD's fiscal year 2006 supplemental
budget request. The Extended Service Program, which the Army uses to
remanufacture and upgrade existing HEMTTs, has continued at the slower
pace noted in our December 2003 report,[Footnote 29] but the
justification for an additional $90.3 million included in the fiscal
year 2005 supplemental funding request cited the program's importance
to the Army's modularization efforts. Finally, while the Army's
acquisition objective for HEMTTs has continued to increase, it still
may not meet the Army's modularity requirements.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the HEMTT as
yellow because the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and
Modernization Strategy for both procurement and
recapitalizations[Footnote 30] has not been fully funded and the Army's
plans and funding for procurement, recapitalization, and sustainment of
its oldest models are continuing to evolve. The strategy has been
updated several times and has undergone significant changes. The June
2005 version of the strategy concluded with a statement that while
investment is adequate to address the Army's most critical
requirements, it still falls short of the Army's goals. In addition,
the goals have changed significantly. For example, in the fiscal year
2006/2007 budget estimate, dated February 2005, the Army acquisition
objective for HEMTTs was 14,269, but in July 2005 the goal was 17,850.
Funding plans also continue to change. In our December 2003 report, we
noted that the Army had reduced funding for the recapitalization
program which was used to upgrade HEMTTs. Currently, the June 2005
version of the strategy shows that the Army plans to recapitalize 4,726
HEMTTs between fiscal years 2012 and 2018. However, past history shows
that this may not occur. For example, while the fiscal year 2003 budget
estimate shows that the Army originally planned to recapitalize 608
HEMTTs in fiscal year 2004, the fiscal year 2005 budget estimates show
that only 129 were recapitalized. The Army's plans to eliminate its
oldest HEMTT models, which can reduce fleet operating and support
costs, have also been scaled down. In a fiscal year 2004 draft, the
strategy stated that 9,200 of the oldest HEMTT models would be
eliminated by fiscal year 2018. In a 2005 version however, that number
was reduced to 7,728. In addition to receiving regular appropriations
for procuring, recapitalizing, and sustaining HEMTTs, the Army is also
relying on funds received through OSD's reprogramming actions to
support its long-term strategy for HEMTTs. The June 2005 version of the
Army's strategy shows that between fiscal years 2006 and 2011, an
additional 3,559 HEMTTs and other heavy vehicles will be procured with
funds received through OSD's reprogramming actions.
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle:
The High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is a light,
highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle that has six
configurations: troop carrier, armament carrier, shelter carrier,
ambulance, missile carrier, and Scout vehicle. There are approximately
120,000 HMMWVs in the Army's inventory. HMMWVs entered the Army's
inventory in 1985. Currently, the average age of the HMMWV fleet is
about 13 years and the expected service life of HMMWVs is 15 years. The
HMMWV represents 50 percent of the Army's total tactical truck fleet.
Figure 10: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition of the HMMWV as green because, as shown in
figure 11, it exceeded the Army's fully mission capable goal from
fiscal years 1999 through 2004 for both the active and reserve
components. However, Army officials noted that the HMMWVs supporting
Operation Iraqi Freedom are experiencing usage (i.e., operational
tempo)[Footnote 31] that is six times their normal peacetime usage
rate. HMMWV production has now transitioned primarily to the Up-Armored
platforms to enhance force protection and mobility for deployed units.
While the Up-Armored variant is built to support the weight of the
vehicle's armor, Army officials have expressed concern regarding the
long-term impact from the stress placed on the frame, engines, and
transmissions by the additional weight of add-on armor that the HMMWVs
were not reinforced to handle. DOD has initiated a Stress Study to try
and quantify the effects of high usage, additional weight, and harsh
operating conditions on future maintenance/replacement needs of
vehicles such as the HMMWV. In February 2005, in a statement to
congressional committees, Army officials stated that all wheeled
vehicles being used in Iraq and Afghanistan would be armored by March
2005.
Figure 11: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army High Mobility
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the HMMWV as
yellow because the Army has not fully funded its Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy and the Army
Acquisition Objective continues to change. In the near term, in
addition to receiving regular appropriations, the Army has received
additional funding for HMMWVs from supplemental appropriations and
congressional adjustments. In fiscal year 2004, the Army received $239
million of supplemental funds and about $39 million in congressional
adjustments. In fiscal year 2005 the Army requested almost $290 million
in supplemental funds to procure HMMWVs to activate units and to supply
existing units. An additional $31 million in supplemental funds was
requested to replace combat losses and another $123 million was
requested to begin recapitalizing older HMMWV models and converting
them to newer models capable of accepting the add-on armor. The June
2005 version of the Army's strategy shows that it is planning to
request additional supplemental funding in fiscal year 2006. The Army's
Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs has increased significantly since
2001. In the Army's fiscal year 2002 amended budget estimate, submitted
in June 2001, the Army's Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs was about
121,000 whereas in an April 2004 version of the Army's plan, the Army
was projecting a need for 145,000 HMMWVs. Currently, neither the fiscal
year 2006/2007 nor the June 2005 version of the Army's plan show the
Army's Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs. Army officials noted in an
August 2004 version of the strategy that they had resourced all known
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements and their projected battle
losses.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the HMMWV as
yellow because again, the Army has not fully funded its Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy. In
addition, the Army's initial plans for the HMMWV recapitalization
programs have been significantly reduced. The June 2005 version of the
Army's strategy shows anticipated procurement requirements of about
30,000 vehicles between fiscal years 2008 and 2011. However, the Army's
fiscal year 2006/2007 budget request is only for about 18,000 vehicles
during those years. The Army is planning on using funds resulting from
OSD reprogramming actions to procure the additional 12,000 vehicles
needed to meet requirements for those fiscal years. In the long term,
according to an August 2004 version of the strategy, the Army plans to
eliminate about 45,000 of its oldest models by fiscal year 2018. About
19,000 of the oldest models would be converted to newer models capable
of handling add-on armor kits in order to provide better soldier
protection through a recapitalization program. However, those plans,
and the associated costs, continue to change. For example, a February
2005 version of the strategy estimated a cost of about $1.8 billion to
recapitalize 20,114 HMMWVs for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, but the
Army's fiscal year 2006/2007 budget request, dated February 2005,
contained about $1.9 billion in order to recapitalize 17,694 vehicles
during those years. The June 2005 version of the Army's plan shows an
estimated cost of about $2 billion to recapitalize 16,522 HMMWVs
between fiscal years 2008 and 2011.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles:
The Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) is a series of vehicles
based on a common chassis which vary by payload and mission
requirements. It is currently the only medium fleet vehicle that is in
production with state-of-the-art technology. The FMTV includes the
Light Medium Tactical Vehicle with a 2.5-ton capacity in both the cargo
and van models and the Medium Tactical Vehicle with a 5-ton capacity in
the cargo, tractor, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV is the
replacement for the obsolete and maintenance-intensive 2.5-and 5-ton
trucks, some of which have been in the Army's inventory since the
1960s. The FMTV's missions include performing local and line hauling,
unit resupply, and other missions in combat, combat support, and combat
service support units. FMTVs are rapidly deployable and can operate in
various terrains and in all climatic conditions. The commonality of
parts across the various models is intended to reduce both the
logistics burden and operating and support costs. The FMTVs entered the
Army inventory in 1996 and currently there are approximately 19,400
vehicles with an average age of about 6 years. The average useful life
is expected to be between 20 and 22 years.
Figure 12: 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition of the FMTV as green because, as shown in
figure 13, it exceeded the Army's fully mission capable goal from
fiscal years 1999 through 2004 for both the active and reserve
components with the exception of the National Guard in fiscal year
2000. Despite operating during GWOT operations at a rate that is nine
times higher than in peacetime, officials stated that the FMTVs are not
experiencing any problems. However, in response to concerns about
armored protection, Army officials, in a February 2005 statement to
congressional committees, stated that all wheeled vehicles being used
in Iraq and Afghanistan would be armored by March 2005.
Figure 13: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army Family of
Medium Tactical Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the FMTV as
yellow because the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer
Modularity and Modernization Strategy is not fully funded and states
that although planned investment is adequate to address critical
requirements, it still falls short of the Army's goals. According to an
April 2004 version of the strategy, the Army did not consider it to be
either cost or operationally effective to recapitalize older model
vehicles. Instead, the Army's plan is to meet readiness and operational
shortfalls through replacement with newer, technologically improved
vehicles. However, this plan will not fill the Army's goals in the near
term. For example, the fiscal year 2005 budget estimate states that
procurement of FMTVs through fiscal year 2005 will only fill
approximately 32 percent of the Army's Acquisition Objective for FMTVs.
Funding for FMTVs in the near term relies on supplemental
appropriations, congressional adjustments, and OSD reprogramming
actions, in addition to regular appropriations. For example, in fiscal
year 2004, the FMTV program was authorized about $3.4 million from
DOD's supplemental funding request and received another $34 million as
a congressional adjustment. DOD's fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding
request included $217 million for the Army to procure FMTV trucks to
replace those lost in theater and to support modularity requirements.
The Army also added an additional $122.5 million in the fiscal year
2005 supplemental funding request to meet modularity requirements and
to replace combat losses of the 2.5-ton FMTV vehicles. The June 2005
version of the plan shows that for fiscal year 2006, the Army is not
planning to request supplemental funding, but in fiscal year 2007, they
are planning to use additional funds received as a result of OSD
reprogramming actions to procure additional FMTVs to fill unit
shortfalls.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the FMTV as
yellow because again, the Army has not fully funded its Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy and
although an April 2004 version of the strategy states that an
incremental upgrade modernization strategy that will include a
combination of field modernizations and new procurement is envisioned,
no specific actions or time frames are identified. The June 2005
version of the Army's plan shows that, between fiscal years 2008 and
2011, the Army is planning to continue using OSD reprogrammed funds to
procure FMTVs in order to fill unit shortfalls. In addition, the June
2005 plan shows that the Army plans to remove 25,000 of the old model
2.5-ton and 5-ton trucks from the inventory. FMTV production has been
done in phases. As reported in an April 2004 version of the strategy,
the first two phases together will deliver over 20,000 vehicles. The
third phase is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2005 and the fourth
phase, an outgrowth of vehicle component design and integration under
ongoing program technology/insertion efforts, does not have an
identified start date but is planned to begin shortly after the
completion of the current production contract.
AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter:
The Apache is a multimission aircraft designed to perform rear, close,
deep operations and precision strikes, armed reconnaissance, and
security during the day, at night, and in adverse weather conditions.
There are two Apache variants: the AH-64A, which entered service in
1984, and the AH-64D Longbow, an improved version of the AH-64A, which
entered service in 1998. The Army plans to convert most of the AH-64A
helicopters into AH-64D models, and to improve the safety features on
the remaining AH-64A models. In total, there are about 703 Apache
helicopters in the Army's inventory: 263 A models and 440 D models. The
average fleet age of the A model is about 13 years, and the average age
of the D model fleet is about 4 years.
Figure 14: AH-64 Apache Helicopter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
Our assessment of the Apache's condition as yellow is unchanged since
our prior report. As shown in figure 15, the average mission capable
rates for the AH-64A models have been below the Army's goal between
fiscal years 1999 and 2004, and the average mission capable rates for
the AH-64D fleet have been above goal for 3 of the 6 years. In our
December 2003 report, safety restrictions were cited as the cause of
not meeting mission capable goals but since then, all of the issues
have been addressed throughout the fleet.[Footnote 32] However,
according to officials, elevated flying hours in Iraq and Afghanistan,
coupled with the harsh environment, continue to increase demands for
limited spare parts and for maintenance for such items as engines and
rotor blades. Officials further stated that the peacetime usage rate
for the AH-64 is 15 hours a month and the actual number of flight hours
is averaging 31 hours per month in Iraq and 55 per month in
Afghanistan. Despite these challenges, officials stated that the AH-64
is capable of conducting its mission and, between February 2003 and
December 2004, its mission capable rates in both Iraq and Afghanistan
exceeded the Army's goal.
Figure 15: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army AH-64 A/D
Apache Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the Apache
as green because the Army has recapitalization and sustainment
strategies, both of which are funded. As stated in our December 2003
report, the Apache Recapitalization Program addresses cost,
reliability, and safety problems, fleet groundings, aging aircraft, and
obsolescence. The Army is continuing to remanufacture the AH-64A models
to AH-64D models with the remaining helicopters beginning conversion
during fiscal year 2005. In addition, Apaches that have been deployed
are being returned to predeployment conditions through a combination of
unit and contractor actions. The Army received an additional $321.1
million in the fiscal year 2005 supplement to replace 13 Apaches that
were lost in theater.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Apache
as green because the Army's modernization strategy to improve combat
capability and aircraft safety appears likely to allow the Apache to
remain in service until 2040 and, as we reported previously, is
consistent with the Army's stated requirements. A total of 597 AH-64A
models will be converted to AH-64D models by fiscal year 2010. All
remaining AH-64A models are scheduled to receive additional reliability
and safety modifications as part of the Army's response to concerns of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress. There are plans
for additional upgrades to AH-64D models and funding to support the
Army's current long-term strategy has been programmed through fiscal
year 2020.
CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter:
The CH-47 helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed
for transporting cargo, troops, and weapons, and is the only Army
helicopter that can operate at high altitudes. By 1994, all CH-47
models were upgraded to the CH-47D version, which comprises the Army's
heavy lift fleet. The CH-47D will be replaced by the CH-47F, a
remanufactured version of the CH-47D with a new digital cockpit and
modified airframe to reduce vibrations. The CH-47F was approved for
full-scale production in November 2004, and officials state the Army
plans to convert the entire fleet by fiscal year 2018. There are 395 CH-
47D models and 3 CH-47F models in the Army inventory, but the CH-47F
models are not assigned to units. The average age of the CH-47D model
is about 17 years. Army aircraft generally have life cycles of 20
years.
Figure 16: CH-47D Chinook Helicopter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
Our assessment of the CH-47D's condition as red is unchanged since our
prior report.[Footnote 33] Mission capable rates for the fleet, as
shown in figure 17, were consistently below service goals for fiscal
year 1999 through fiscal year 2004. Officials stated that the aircraft
is currently being flown in Iraq and Afghanistan three times more than
planned peacetime rates, with the CH-47D flying 200 hours in 6 months
when it was originally planned to fly 200 hours in 18 months.
Deployment cycles for the CH-47D are often longer than other equipment.
While most Army helicopters remain in theater for about a year,
officials report that some CH-47D helicopters have been in theater for
almost 2 ½ years. This usage, particularly in a desert environment, has
increased the amount of maintenance and number of parts needed to
sustain the aircraft, which in turn has negatively impacted overall
readiness. According to officials, current shortages of CH-47D
helicopters and the requirement to fill nearly simultaneous competing
priorities with limited resources may require additional CH-47D
helicopters to remain in theater as stay-behind equipment. Despite
these challenges, officials state that the CH-47D has proven itself in
theater. For example, between February 2003 and December 2004 the CH-
47D's mission capable rates in Afghanistan exceeded the Army's goal.
Figure 17: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Chinook CH-47D/
F Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the Chinook as yellow
because the Army has plans to address the issues affecting the current
condition but has yet to implement all of the solutions. Officials
stated that the components that affect readiness the most can be
repaired at the depot; however, the emphasis (e.g., transportation
priorities) is on pushing parts to units but not necessarily returning
the broken parts to the depot for repair. According to officials, the
Army is working in coordination with depot personnel to become more
efficient at identifying and returning the broken parts for repair, as
well as developing relationships with original equipment manufacturers
to allow for a faster replacement of spare parts. However, whether
these efforts will be successful and the degree to which they resolve
parts shortages remains to be seen.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy for the CH-47 as green
because the Army has and is funding a modernization strategy to improve
the CH-47 capability and lifespan. The Army plans to have a final CH-
47F fleet size of 452 aircraft, to include 397 CH-47F aircraft that
were remanufactured from the CH-47D and 55 new build CH-47F aircraft.
Officials stated that conversion from the CH-47D to the CH-47F adds
about 20 years to the service life of an aircraft, as well as improving
performance and reducing overall operations and sustainment costs.
OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter:
The Kiowa is a multimission armed reconnaissance helicopter designed to
support combat and contingency operations. Deliveries of the OH-58D
began in 1985, and the last new one was delivered to the Army in 1999.
There are 354 Kiowa helicopters in the Army's inventory, and their
average age is about 13 years. While the expected service life for an
OH-58Ds is 20 years, the Army plans to retire the entire OH-58D fleet
by fiscal year 2013 and to replace it with the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter.
Figure 18: OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition of the Kiowa as green because the mission
capable rates have been consistently above service goals for calendar
years 1999 through 2004. As seen in figure 19, the OH-58D has remained
at or above the 80 percent mission capable rate. Further, 96 OH-58Ds
have deployed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have
exceeded their planned flight hours; specifically, peacetime average
usage for the OH-58D is about 20 hours per month, but the actual flight
hours for deployments has averaged between 80 and 100 hours per month.
The Army attributes higher readiness rates of the OH-58D in part to
simple design and a lighter airframe. For example, the OH-58D's mission
capable rates in Iraq between February 2003 and December 2004 almost
met the Army's goal. In addition, routine maintenance is performed on
the Kiowa after every 40 hours of operation instead of the 300-400
hours for other aircraft, and the original equipment manufacturer, Bell
Helicopter, conducts the depot-level repairs.
Figure 19: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army OH-58D Kiowa
Helicopters, Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the OH-58D
as green because the Army's plans and funding will allow the aircraft
to meet its requirements in the near term. The OH-58D reset and safety
enhancement programs, which are fully funded, include safety
enhancements, weight reduction, and other maintenance actions. Funding
for the Kiowa since fiscal year 1999 has been near Army
requests.[Footnote 34] Additionally, due to the planned replacement of
the Kiowa beginning in fiscal year 2008, public law limits funds that
can be spent on the aircraft to basic sustainment, maintenance and
safety measures.[Footnote 35] For that reason Kiowa battle losses are
not being replaced; however, according to the Army, the existing fleet
is sufficient to meet requirements over the next 1-3 years, even at
higher usage rates.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Kiowa as
green because the Army has a funded strategy to field its replacement,
the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. According to the Army, this
aircraft is a relatively inexpensive armed aerial platform that will
integrate a commercial off the shelf aircraft with non-developmental
mission equipment packages to the extent possible. The Army's
acquisition objective is to have a fleet of 368 armed reconnaissance
aircraft. The plan is for the Kiowa to be phased out of the Army's
inventory beginning in fiscal year 2008 as the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter is fielded.
Marine Corps:
M1A1 Abrams Tank:
First delivered to the Marine Corps at the beginning of Operation
Desert Storm, the Abrams is the Marine Corps' main battle tank and
destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower provided by
a powerful turbine engine and a 120 millimeter main gun. The Marine
Corps possesses only one variant of the Abrams, the M1A1. The M1A1
variant fleet consists of a depleted uranium turret version and a
"Plain Jane" version, which lacks the enhanced armor. There are 403
M1A1 tanks in the inventory, and the estimated average age is 16 years.
The Marine Corps plans to use the M1A1 as its main battle tank until it
is replaced by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of
Fighting Vehicles which is planned to be fielded in 2025.
Figure 20: M1A1 Abrams Tank:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the condition of the Abrams tank fleet as red because the
Marine Corps has failed to meet its stated readiness goal of 90 percent
on several occasions during the fiscal years 1999 to 2004 period and,
as shown in figure 21, recent readiness trends indicate a steady
decline away from the readiness goal. Marine Corps officials attribute
the decline of the condition of the tank fleet to the demand on
equipment as a result of operations in support of the Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Marine Corps manpower levels. Since 2003, the Marine Corps
has deployed tanks to Operation Iraqi Freedom, a theater where
equipment has been used aggressively in rugged environments. Shortages
of maintenance personnel are a result of the transfers of personnel to
units that are deploying and unit staffing levels.
Figure 21: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps M1A1
Abrams Tanks, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the M1A1
Abrams tank fleet as yellow because the Marine Corps has not fully
funded its tank remanufacture program and has identified additional
unfunded priorities for fiscal year 2006. The Marine Corps is
conducting a remanufacture program on the M1A1 tank that is intended to
improve the quality of the existing equipment by applying all equipment
modifications and replacing worn components. The Marine Corps has fully
funded the remanufacture of 79 tanks during fiscal year 2005; however,
it only identified funding for about 33 percent of the scheduled tank
remanufactures during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Marine officials
believe that they will be able to meet all remanufacturing requirements
because the tank program has identified similar funding requirement to
Marine Corps Logistics Command in the past and has received sufficient
funding to meet the remanufacture needs. The Marine Corps identified
$77 million in unfunded priorities for the Abrams program in fiscal
year 2006. The majority of this amount, $40 million, is to support
continued depot maintenance operations and the remainder is to procure
Firepower Enhancement Program suites, which increase the detection,
recognition, and identification of targets.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the M1A1
Abrams tank fleet as yellow because the Marine Corps has not completely
identified the program requirements or funding for its replacement
system, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of
Fighting Vehicles; however, they are taking steps to increase the
service life of the M1A1. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles is scheduled to be the
replacement for the Abrams tank and other Marine Corps ground fighting
systems. In order to extend the life of the current fleet of Abrams
tanks, the Marine Corps has identified funding for 80 percent of the
scheduled tank remanufactures during fiscal years 2008 and 2009. The
Marine Corps has tentatively established plans to conduct a Service
Life Extension Program for the M1A1 fleet in future years. As this
program is to start in years beyond the current Future Years Defense
Program budget, no funding has been identified currently. The Service
Life Extension Program may be essential to ensure that the current
fleet of Abrams tanks remains serviceable until the replacement vehicle
is fielded.
Light Armored Vehicle - C2 and 25 Variants:
The LAV-C2 Command and Control and the LAV-25 are two variants from the
family of Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) that we included in our review.
Both variants are all-terrain, all-weather vehicles with night
capabilities and can be fully amphibious within 3 minutes. The LAV-C2
variant is a mobile command station providing field commanders with the
necessary resources to command and control Light Armored Reconnaissance
units. The average age of the LAV-C2 is 18 years and there are 50 in
the inventory. The LAV-25 provides rapid maneuverability, armor
protection, and firepower to the Light Armed Reconnaissance units. The
average age of the LAV-25 is 19 years and there are 407 in the
inventory. The family of Light Armored Vehicles is expected to be
replaced by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of
Fighting Vehicles.
Figure 22: Light Armored Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
In our previous report we assessed the condition of the LAV-C2 as green
because the Marine Corps had initiated a fleet-wide Service Life
Extension Program to extend the service life of the vehicle.[Footnote
36] However, in this review we assessed both the LAV-C2 and the LAV-25
variants of the Light Armored Vehicles and we assessed the condition of
these vehicles as yellow. While the material readiness rates[Footnote
37] for the two variants were near the readiness goal of 85 percent
between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 (see fig. 23); the overall material
readiness rate trend declined during this period. Marine Corps
officials stated that despite the fact that the vehicles did not meet
the Marine Corps' readiness goal they were able to fulfill all mission
requirements during this period. However, the vehicle's high usage in
support of contingency operations has placed a strain on the supply
system and has led to shortages of key Light Armored Vehicle
components, such as struts and drive train components.
Figure 23: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps LAV-25 and
LAV C-2, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Light
Armored Vehicle as yellow because although a service life extension
program and some upgrades are planned and funded, there are some
essential program requirements that remain unfunded. A service life
extension program designed to improve the quality and extend the life
of the vehicles has already been performed on a majority of the
vehicles. In addition to the service life extension program, the LAV-C2
and LAV-25 are planned to receive upgrades to address capabilities
deficiencies. The upgrade to the LAV-C2 will enhance communications
capabilities, affording more commonality with other vehicles and
helicopter systems. The upgrade to the LAV-25 will enhance target
recognition and the lethality upgrade will increase the fire power of
the vehicle's 25-millimeter main gun. A program is also funded to
address any obsolescence issues. Additionally, as a result of force
structure changes, the Marine Corps is establishing five new light
armored reconnaissance units and has received fiscal year 2005
supplemental appropriations to purchase new upgraded vehicles to equip
these units and begin upgrades on the legacy fleet. However, the Marine
Corps has identified $113 million as an unfunded requirement that is
needed to complete the standardization of the older LAVs.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Light
Armored Vehicle as yellow because while the Marine Corps has not
completely identified the requirements for its replacement system or
established associated program strategy or funding, the completion of
the near-term plans may help the Marine Corps sustain its fleet of LAVs
until the replacement is fielded. Both the LAV-C2 and the LAV-25
upgrades to address capabilities deficiencies have achieved or will
achieve initial operational capability by fiscal year 2009.
Assault Amphibian Vehicle:
Three variants represent the family of Assault Amphibian Vehicles
(AAV). The AAVs are armored full-tracked landing vehicles. The
Personnel variant carries troops from ship to shore and to inland
objectives and there are 930 in the inventory. The C2 Command and
Communications variant provides a mobile task force communication
center in water operations and from ship to shore and to inland areas
and there are 76 in the inventory. The Recovery variant recovers
similar or smaller sized vehicles. It also carries basic maintenance
equipment to provide field support maintenance to vehicles in the
field. There are 51 Recovery variants in the inventory. The average age
of the vehicle is 28.6 years. All of the AAVs will be remanufactured
under the Reliability, Availability and Maintainability/Rebuild to
Standard upgrade program, which began in 1998 to lengthen the vehicle's
expected service life. The fleet of AAVs is scheduled to be replaced by
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle beginning in 2010.
Figure 24: Assault Amphibian Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
Our assessment of the condition of the AAV fleet as yellow is unchanged
since our prior report.[Footnote 38] Although the fleet material
readiness rates varied by vehicle type and by year, as shown in figure
25, the overall readiness trend for the fleet during the fiscal years
1999 to 2004 period declined. Despite the declining material readiness,
Marine Corps officials stated that the AAVs were able to meet all
operational requirements. Wartime utilization rates for the vehicles in
Operation Iraqi Freedom were as high as 11 times the normal peacetime
rate.
Figure 25: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Assault
Amphibian Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the near-term program strategy and funding
of the AAV fleet as yellow because while the Marine Corps is completing
the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard
upgrade on all of the remaining 377 vehicles in its fleet, this upgrade
only returns the vehicle to its original operating condition and does
not add any upgraded capability. While Marine Corps officials stated
that the vehicles have been able to perform all of their operational
requirements, the AAVs lack some capabilities in areas such as target
acquisition (day and night) and land/water mobility, which are needed
to carry out their warfighting doctrine--Operational Maneuver from the
Sea. The Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to
Standard upgrade program for 327 of the 377 vehicles has been funded
through regular Marine Corps procurement appropriations, supplemental
appropriations, and congressional adjustments over the past few years.
Funding for the conversion of the remaining 50 vehicles, plus 8 for
future replacements of combat losses, was included in the fiscal year
2005 supplemental request. In addition to funding the upgrades, the
requested procurement will also fund engineering changes to help
sustain the AAV fleet and purchase add-on armor.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the AAV fleet
as yellow because while the Marine Corps will have completed an
extensive upgrade of the fleet with the Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard program, the timely fielding of the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle remains in question. DOD reduced
funding, thus delaying the initial fielding of the Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle to fiscal year 2010, 4 years past the original date.
Operators and maintainers we spoke with are concerned about the delay
because the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to
Standard program is expected to help the AAV fleet serve until the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is fully fielded, but the current rate
of usage in Operation Iraqi Freedom could significantly shorten the
serviceable life of the current fleet. Officials expect that all
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard
vehicles will need to go through an Inspect and Replace Only As
Necessary maintenance program[Footnote 39] since they will have to stay
in the fleet longer than expected.
Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement:
The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is a family of trucks
with 7-ton capacity that consists of six variants. Comprising the
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement fleet is a standard 7-ton cargo
variant, an extended bed 7-ton vehicle, a dump truck, and a wrecker.
The MTVR began replacing two aging variants of 5-ton vehicles in fiscal
year 2002. The MTVR is capable of moving personnel and cargo cross
country in support of maneuver units. The MTVR has increased
capabilities compared to the 5-ton truck and is capable of being
delivered by cargo aviation assets.
Figure 26: Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition as green because, as can be seen in figure
27, the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement fleet has met the Marine
Corps' stated material readiness goal of 85 percent for the 2 years
that data were available, fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Though the MTVRs
are being aggressively used in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
officials stated that they are fairly easy to maintain and there are
sufficient repair parts to meet current requirements. Officials also
attribute much of the Marine Corps' success at keeping high material
readiness rates to the maintenance personnel.
Figure 27: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement Fleet, Fiscal Years 2003 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the MTVR as
green because, despite experiencing some combat losses and the lack of
funding to replace these losses, the Marine Corps has made plans to
meet 7-ton vehicle demands of the Marine Corps in the short term. The
Marine Corps possesses an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
contract with Oshkosh Trucks, which allows it to increase the number of
vehicles in the fleet without negotiating a new contract. The Marine
Corps has utilized this contract to procure an additional 1,850 MTVR
upgrade armor kits, which will be used to provide additional protection
to deploying Marine Expeditionary Units and as a reserve for Marine
Expeditionary Brigades. In the fiscal year 2006 Unfunded Programs List,
the Marine Corps identified $1.4 million to procure seven new MTVRs
that will help replace actual and projected combat losses.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the MTVR as
green because the Marine Corps plans provide sufficient numbers of
MTVRs to equip all Marine Corps units in the long-term. Marine Corps
officials stated that they have plans to reconstitute equipment
returning from deployment and may rotate equipment between deploying
units and prepositioned forces. The officials believe that these
actions could balance out the usage rates of the fleet and therefore
maintain the fleet's life expectancy. As discussed in the near-term
program strategy and funding, the Marine Corps possesses an indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity contract with the original equipment
manufacturer and program officials believe the Marine Corps can source
equipment in the future to meet requirements.
AV-8B Harrier Jet:
The AV-8B Harrier Jet's mission is to attack and destroy surface
targets during day and night conditions and to escort assault support
aircraft. It has a short takeoff and vertical landing capability to
enable it to deploy and operate from amphibious assault ships and
remote tactical landing sites. There are 154 in inventory (131 combat
capable aircraft, 17 noncombat capable training aircraft, and 6
aircraft in storage), with an average age of 9 years. The Joint Strike
Fighter is expected to replace the AV-8B beginning in 2012.
Figure 28: AV-8B Harrier Jet:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the AV-8B as yellow because it
consistently failed to meet the Marine Corps' mission capable rate goal
of 76 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 (see fig. 29 below).
However, despite missing the mission capable goal, the mission capable
trend showed some improvement through fiscal year 2003. Further, the AV-
8B aircraft nonmission capable rates for maintenance and supply also
showed improvement during that time frame. Marine Corps officials
commented favorably on the aircraft's performance in support of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the aircraft's wartime
utilization was about one and one-half times the normal peacetime rate.
A defense panel has analyzed past problems with the aircraft and they
have recommended improvements to maintenance cycles and technician
availability.
Figure 29: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AV-8B
Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the AV-8B as
green because the Marine Corps has several initiatives and programs
established and funded to improve the capabilities, safety, and
reliability of the aircraft. The Marine Corps has procured, either
through upgrades or remanufacture, 93 aircraft with radar/night attack
which increases the ability of the aircraft to complete assigned
missions in a greater variety of weather and light conditions.
Officials also report that they have fully equipped all AV-8B aircraft
with LITENING pods which increase image resolution for ground
targeting. The Marine Corps has also developed new maintenance
practices and policies that will increase readiness and decrease
downtime spent in maintenance. According to Marine Corps officials, as
a result of these policies the Marine Corps has seen an approximately
66 percent increase in the serviceable life of the aircraft.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the AV-8B as
yellow given the potential for delays in the Joint Strike Fighter
program which will require the AV-8B to fly longer than expected.
Increasing program costs and unproven critical technologies could
further delay the Joint Strike Fighter program's initial entry into
service, which is currently planned for 2012 with complete fielding in
2024. The Marine Corps currently plans to fly the AV-8B until the 2011-
2020 time frame. Marine Corps officials note that funding is sufficient
to execute the long-term program strategy for the AV-8B through the
Future Years Defense Program.
AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter:
The AH-1W Super Cobra is a day/night, marginal weather, Marine Corps,
attack helicopter that provides en route escort and protection of troop
assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the assault
phase, and fire support during ground escort operations. There are 179
aircraft in the inventory with an average age of 15 years.
Figure 30: AH-1W Super Cobra:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
As in our prior report,[Footnote 40] we assessed the condition of the
AH-1W Super Cobra as yellow because the aircraft consistently failed to
meet its mission capable rate goal of 85 percent during the fiscal year
1999 to 2004 period, as shown in figure 31. Despite the aircraft's low
mission capable rates, officials stated that the AH-1W was able to meet
all of its mission requirements during this period. Further, the AH-1W
upgrade program may decrease maintenance needs due to parts commonality
with other Marine Corps utility helicopters. The AH-1W has served in
both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and
deployed mission capable rates were higher than for those aircraft that
were not deployed. The aircraft wartime utilization is about two times
that of peacetime operations. The Marine Corps rotates the Super Cobras
out of these theaters and conducts depot-level maintenance on the
aircraft upon their return.
Figure 31: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AH-1W
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the AH-1W as
yellow because while the Marine Corps has established a program to
remanufacture the current fleet of AH-1W Super Cobras to a more capable
AH-1Z, they may experience a shortage of AH-1Ws during the
remanufacturing process. Officials stated that they may be short as
many as 40 AH-1Ws due to operational requirements and forecasts for
future attrition. Marine Corps officials further stated that if there
is a shortfall, it would largely occur in the reserves due to the
current operational requirements for the active squadrons. This could
seriously impact the reserve air wing's ability to train pilots and
meet operational requirements in the future. Additionally, the Marine
Corps identified $50 million in unfunded requirements for engineering
efforts associated with the remanufacturing program.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the AH-1W
Super Cobra as yellow because, as discussed in the near-term program
strategy and funding, the Marine Corps potentially faces many years of
AH-1W shortages as the remanufacturing effort and future operational
requirements place demands on the fleet. According to Marine Corps
officials, if the upgrade program remains on schedule, the entire fleet
of AH-1W will be upgraded to the AH-1Z by fiscal year 2017.
CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter:
The CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter provides all-weather, day/night, and
night vision goggle assault transport of combat troops, supplies, and
equipment during amphibious operations ashore. The total inventory of
CH-46Es is 223 and the average age is 36 years. The Marine Corps plans
to replace the fleet of CH-46E with the MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft
beginning in 2007.
Figure 32: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
In our previous report, the CH-46E received a red rating because the
aircraft consistently failed to meet mission capable goals.[Footnote
41] However, in this review we rated the condition of the CH-46E as
yellow because although the mission capable rate trend is declining as
shown in figure 33, rates were near the goal of 80 percent between
fiscal years 1999 and 2004. Further, deployed mission capable rates
were higher than nondeployed aircraft. Marine Corps officials noted
that the CH-46E was able to meet mission requirements for operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the aircraft's wartime utilization was three
times the normal peacetime rate. To help improve the condition of the
aircraft, the Marine Corps has completed an analysis on the airframe
and all major aircraft subsystems and has established a calendar-based
depot maintenance cycle. Additionally, as of the end of August 2005,
234 engine upgrades have been completed. The engine upgrade is expected
to improve capability and reduce maintenance requirements. However,
Marine Corps officials stated that sustainment of the aircraft is still
a concern due to its age and the fact that the aircraft may have to be
in service longer due to fielding delays and funding cuts for the MV-
22.
Figure 33: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-46E
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the CH-46E
as red because the Marine Corps may be unable to meet its near-term
operational requirements due to aircraft and potential repair part
shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. Despite funding upgrades
and modifications to the CH-46E to improve its safety, reliability, and
survivability, repair parts may not be available through normal
procurement lines because some of the original production lines have
been closed. The Marine Corps is planning to rely on retiring aircraft
to provide replacement parts for operating aircraft. Due to fielding
delays of the MV-22, the CH-46E will not be retired at the pace
anticipated and, according to Marine Corps officials this could lead to
some repair parts shortages. Given the continued demands to support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, pilot training, and the current
scheduled fielding of the MV-22, the Marine Corps may be short one CH-
46E squadron for a period of 2 years starting in January 2006. Marine
Corps officials stated that this squadron is necessary to support
current contingency operations and operational plans developed at
combatant command headquarters. They also stated that they are
considering options to mitigate these issues by engineering repair
parts to extend the serviceable life of aircraft components and
utilizing other types of aircraft to fill in for the decommissioned
squadron.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the CH-46E
as red because delays in the MV-22 fielding will force the CH-46E to
continue flying much longer than planned and this could impact the
Marine Corps' ability to support future operations. DOD reduced
procurement funding for the MV-22 aircraft in its 2006 budget request,
which delays the full authorized fielding of all MV-22 squadrons until
fiscal year 2016 versus 2011. This delay will force some squadrons,
especially in the reserves, to continue to fly the older CH-46E despite
the fact that it may not be able to support Marine Corps operational
doctrine. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, a Marine Corps war-
fighting doctrine, calls for forces to cross great distances to engage
an enemy. These requirements currently exceed the capabilities of the
CH-46E.
CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter:
The CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter provides assault support by
transporting heavy weapons, equipment (such as High Mobility Multi-
Wheeled Vehicles and Light Armored Vehicles), supplies, and troops. The
CH-53E is capable of in-flight refueling. The average age is 17 years
and there are 147 CH-53Es in the inventory. The expected replacement
for the CH-53E is the Heavy Lift Replacement, but the requirements are
still being determined. The Heavy Lift Replacement is expected to enter
service in 2015.
Figure 34: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We rated the condition of the CH-53E as yellow because the aircraft did
not meet its mission capable goal of 70 percent in some years and
between fiscal years 2003 and 2004 the mission capable rates declined
as shown in figure 35. The aircraft wartime utilization is about two
times that of peacetime operations, and the aircraft mission capable
rates for deployed aircraft are higher than those for aircraft that are
not deployed. According to Marine Corps officials, fatigue issues
related to age, as well as structural cracks in the tail boom area of
the aircraft, have been ongoing problems with the CH-53E fleet. The
higher-than-expected usage rates in Operations Iraqi and Enduring
Freedom have accelerated the need to repair these areas. The Marine
Corps is addressing the structural cracks and engine upgrades through
several programs. The engine upgrades are expected to improve
capability and reduce maintenance requirements. Further, despite the
declining readiness rates, officials stated that the CH-53E was able to
meet all operational requirements.
Figure 35: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-53E
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the CH-53E as
yellow because, although the Marine Corps has several initiatives
underway that will help sustain and improve capabilities of the CH-53E,
some of the upgrades and safety issues are on the service's fiscal year
2006 unfunded program list. The Marine Corps has received funding from
congressional adjustments and supplemental appropriations to fully
outfit their CH-53E squadrons with aircraft armor systems, but it lacks
sufficient funds to upgrade all engines or completely field diagnostic
systems. According to Marine Corps officials, the diagnostic systems
assist maintainers by identifying maintenance issues ahead of scheduled
maintenance programs and will reduce the maintenance man hours required
to support the aircraft. The Marine Corps identified $30.6 million for
these diagnostic systems and engine upgrades as unfunded priorities in
fiscal year 2006.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We rated the long-term program strategy and funding of the CH-53E as
red because the requirements for the Heavy Lift Replacement, the
replacement aircraft for the CH-53E, are still being established
despite an initial fielding planned for 2015. According to officials,
the Marine Corps must maintain at least 120 CH-53Es until the initial
fielding of the Heavy Lift Replacement in order to support Marine Corps
operations. Repair of the structural cracks found in the aircraft is
critical to maintaining an adequate inventory of CH-53Es until the
Heavy Lift Replacement becomes operational. Officials estimate that, if
the current high usage rate and estimates of attrition hold true, the
number of CH-53Es may fall below the number necessary to remain in
service until the Heavy Lift Replacement becomes available unless
required funding and maintenance are available.
Navy:
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer:
Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG-51 class) provide multimission
offensive and defensive capabilities and can operate independently or
as part of a carrier strike group, surface action group, or
expeditionary strike group. The primary missions of the Arleigh Burke
Class Destroyers are the destruction of enemy cruise missiles,
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines and to attack land targets in
support of joint or combined operations. The first ship of this class
was commissioned in 1991. The Navy plans to build 62 ships of this type
and 47 of these platforms have been commissioned to date. The average
age of DDG-51s in the fleet is 6.45 years. The final DDG-51 class ship
will be delivered in fiscal year 2011.
Figure 36: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the DDG-51 class as yellow due to
maintenance issues related to major ship systems and bandwidth
limitations experienced by this ship class. Similarly, this ship class
received a yellow rating in our previous report.[Footnote 42] Each year
a number of ships in the DDG-51 class are evaluated by Navy inspectors;
most of the DDG-51 class ships inspected in recent years have done well
in important inspection areas, such as the destroyer's electrical and
combat systems. However, areas such as the environmental protection
systems and damage control systems performed poorly in these
evaluations. For example, watertight doors are problematic in this type
of ship and generally are in poor condition in all surface ships. In
addition, the DDG-51 also has issues with corrosion, insufficient
bandwidth for Web-based communication, and cracks on its bow, or the
front, of the ship. Sufficient bandwidth is critical to the ability of
these ships to operate with the rest of the Navy, which relies heavily
on the internet for day-to-day operations.
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the DDG-51
class as green because the Navy has an effective strategy to address
near-term condition and concerns and sufficient funding is available
for these plans. The Navy strategy identifies classwide deficiencies,
prioritizes their importance, and then addresses the most significant
issues. The Navy closely monitors corrosion, and has taken preventative
measures to reduce its impact. Finally, the Navy will install Super
High Frequency capabilities in the DDG-51 class to improve bandwidth
limitations, and a review of the bow cracks is in progress.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the DDG-51
class as yellow because the Navy has a strategy to address long-term
condition and concerns, but it is not fully funded. The Navy plans a
Midlife Modernization to ensure that the DDG-51 class of ships remains
a relevant fleet asset for its full life expectancy. The fully funded
modernizations are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2010, and include
upgrades to DDG-51 combat systems that may reduce personnel costs.
However, the Navy has reduced planned future operation and maintenance
funding across all surface ships in the fleet. These reductions have
the potential to affect the material condition of the DDG-51 class, and
cause higher costs in later years to make up for deferred maintenance.
The DDG-51 class is expected to remain in the fleet until fiscal year
2046.
FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate:
Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates (FFG-7 class) are surface combatants
with antisubmarine warfare and limited antiair warfare capabilities.
Frigates conduct escort for amphibious expeditionary forces, protection
of shipping, maritime interdiction, and homeland defense missions.
There are 30 FFGs in the fleet, with an average age of 20.8 years. The
FFG-7 class is expected to remain in service until 2019. There is no
planned replacement for this ship; however, the Littoral Combat Ship
will perform many of the missions currently performed by these ships.
Figure 37: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of FFG-7 class as yellow, the same rating it
received in the last report,[Footnote 43] due to maintenance issues
related to major ship systems and bandwidth limitations experienced by
this ship class. These frigates operate using diesel engines and these
systems' older engines need more maintenance than modern gas turbine
engines. Additionally, the water and ventilation systems must be
replaced to ensure that the ship can operate until it reaches the end
of its required service life. Each year a number of ships in the FFG-7
class are evaluated by Navy inspectors, and they have also found
shortfalls in damage control equipment and the environmental protection
systems of these ships. Moreover, these frigates have only a limited
amount of bandwidth and this affects their ability to operate with the
rest of the Navy, which relies heavily on electronic communications for
its day-to-day operations. Naval inspectors determined that other
systems on board FFG-7 class ships were in good condition, including
its propulsion and combat systems.
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the FFG-7
class as yellow because the Navy's near-term plan to correct FFG-7
class condition problems does not address all issues. The Navy has
decided not to install a Super High Frequency communication system on
these ships to improve their access to bandwidth and improve their
access to Web-based communication. Instead, these ships will continue
to operate with a limited amount of available bandwidth in the future,
despite the Navy's increasing use of the internet to share operational,
training, and personnel data.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term strategy of the FFG-7 class as yellow because
of plans to decrease future operation and maintenance funding. The Navy
plan to modify and modernize the FFG-7 fleet will be complete by fiscal
year 2011; however, these modifications may not address all of the
problems that may arise in the aging FFG-7 class. DOD intends to
decrease the amount of operation and maintenance funding available for
its surface ships in the future, which may limit the Navy's ability to
address any emerging maintenance issues. While all surface ships will
likely have maintenance funding cuts, the FFG-7 class and other older
ships may be the most affected by these shortfalls.
LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship:
Austin-class amphibious transport dock ships (LPD-4 class) are warships
that embark, transport, and land elements of a Marine landing force and
its equipment. Austin class ships also act as helicopter refueling
stations and limited casualty receiving and treatment ships. There are
currently 11 LPD-4 class ships in the inventory with an average age of
37 years. The LPD-4 class ships are expected to remain in the fleet
until 2014. The San Antonio-class LPD-17 is beginning to replace the
LPD-4 class in fiscal year 2005.
Figure 38: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the LPD-4 class as yellow due to
maintenance issues related to major ship systems and bandwidth
limitations experienced by this ship class. The LPD-4 received the same
yellow rating
in our previous report.[Footnote 44] Insufficient air conditioning is a
habitability concern on many LPD-4 class ships, especially given
current operations in high-temperature regions. The LPD-4 class also
has issues with electrical systems, propulsion, and insufficient
bandwidth for Web-based communication. Sufficient bandwidth is critical
to the ability of these ships to operate with the rest of the Navy,
which relies heavily on the internet for day-to-day operations. While
these maintenance issues are significant, some LPD-4 class ships have
completed an Extended Sustainability Program that addressed the most
severe maintenance problems affecting this class.
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the LPD-4
class as yellow because the Navy has a plan to address near-term
condition and concerns, but it excludes those ships scheduled to
decommission within 5 years and the decommission dates have
historically slipped. The Navy is in the midst of an Extended
Sustainability Program that corrects serious LPD-4 class deficiencies,
for example, its inadequate onboard electrical system. The Navy has
selected 5 of 11 LPD-class ships for this program, and will have
completed 4 by the end of fiscal year 2005. The ships that will not
undergo the Extended Sustainability Program are all within 5 years of
decommissioning, and therefore can only undergo normal repairs and
maintenance. In the past, this decommissioning date has been moved back
by several years, but ships have retained their decommissioning status-
-thus preventing any upgrades or modernizations. This will lead to a
wide variance of condition between different ships in the LPD-4 class.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the LPD-4
class as yellow because of plans to decrease future operation and
maintenance funding, and uncertainty concerning the LPD-4's service
life. The Navy has reduced planned future operation and maintenance
funding across all surface ships in the fleet. These reductions have
the potential to affect the material condition of the LPD-4 class.
Additionally, procurement of the LPD-4 class replacement, the LPD-17
class, has been reduced from 12 ships to 9. However, the Navy
requirement remains the same--the ability to transport two and a half
Marine Expeditionary Brigades.
F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft:
The F/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft with 6 models:
the F/A-18 A, B, C, and D, also known as the Hornet; and the E and F
also known as the Super Hornet. The capabilities of the Hornet and
Super Hornet include fighter escort, fleet air defense, force
projection, and close and deep air support. The current inventory of F/
A-18's is 914: A, 123; B, 28; C, 396; D, 139; E, 102; and F, 126. The
average age in years is: A, 18.5; B, 20.2; C, 12.7; D, 12.1; E, 2.5;
and F, 2.4. The Navy plans to gradually replace the Hornet with the
Super Hornet and the Joint Strike Fighter.
Figure 39: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition of the F/A-18 as green given that it
generally is available in sufficient numbers to meet Navy requirements
and though mission capable goals vary, all models are close to or
exceed mission capable goals between calendar years 1999 and 2004, as
shown in figure 40. Additionally, all variants of the F/A-18
consistently meet their daily availability requirements. In our
previous study, the condition of the F/A-18 was rated yellow because it
missed its mission capable goals, but including the daily availability
factor in our analysis improved its rating to green. However, both the
Hornet and Super Hornet have deficiencies with fuel systems and the
Super Hornet also has deficiencies with cockpit canopies, all of which
degrade mission capable rates. In addition, the Navy is beginning a
long-term effort to replace the overstressed center section of the
Hornet fuselage, the center barrel. This effort addresses the
predictable rate of wear and deterioration on the aircraft due to
factors such as carrier takeoff and landings and increases the expected
service life of the aircraft. The aircraft is not available for
operations during the 1 year scheduled for this process. According to
officials, during this period the Navy takes advantage of aircraft time
out of service to conduct scheduled maintenance and other modifications
on those aircraft.
Figure 40: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy F/A-18 Aircraft,
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the F/A-18 as
yellow because some funding is not identified for their program
strategy, which includes important Hornet modernizations, and the Super
Hornet lacks critical spare parts. The Navy is unable to fund improved
detection and targeting systems for the Hornet, for example, the
Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared system, and the Joint
Helmet Mounted Cueing System. Similarly, the Super Hornet will, in the
near term, experience shortfalls in the availability of Government
Furnished Equipment: equipment directly acquired by the government and
subsequently made available to a contractor. These equipment shortfalls
for the Super Hornet include extra fuel tanks and bomb racks.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the F/A-18 as
yellow because of the uncertain status of its replacement, the Joint
Strike Fighter, and the complexity of the center barrel replacement
effort. The Navy has plans to maintain enough operational F/A-18
aircraft to meet the Navy's tactical air requirements until the Joint
Strike Fighter is available by replacing the center barrels of 40
Hornets per year, a challenging goal given the complex nature of this
effort. The Joint Strike Fighter is already behind schedule and a
number of its critical technologies are immature, indicating that it
may be delayed even further. Program officials confirmed that another
delay in arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter would require the F/A-18
program to seek other alternatives to meet requirement goals, such as
to replace more center barrels on Hornets, manage the normal wear and
tear on the aircraft, or procure additional Super Hornets. Moreover,
center barrel stress is not the only factor used when determining the
expected service life of an aircraft; flying hours and takeoff and
landings also impact the F/A 18's life expectancy. If Hornets are
required to operate longer than currently planned, these aging aircraft
may not be available in sufficient numbers to meet Navy requirements
for tactical aircraft.
EA-6B Prowler Aircraft:
The EA-6B Prowler provides Electronic Attack and Anti-Radiation Missile
capabilities against enemy radar and communications systems. The
Prowler's primary mission is to support strike aircraft and ground
troops by jamming enemy radar, data links, and communications. The
current inventory is 119 with an average age of 21.9 years. The Prowler
fleet consists of carrier-based squadrons, and land-based expeditionary
squadrons. The expeditionary capability will be replaced by the Air
Force's B-52 electronic jammer suites, while the EA-18G Super Hornet
Airborne Electronic Attack aircraft will begin to replace the carrier-
based capabilities in 2009.
Figure 41: EA-6B Prowler:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the EA-6B as yellow, as we did in our
previous report,[Footnote 45] because it consistently misses the Navy's
mission capable goal of 73 percent between calendar years 1999 and
2004, as shown in figure 42, due to a number of maintenance problems.
However, Navy officials believe the EA-6B will meet its daily
availability requirements later this year. Much of this improvement is
due to replacement of the center wing, which had shown signs of fatigue
due to the stress of operations, on a number of these aircraft. The
Navy will have completed this complex effort, which removed aircraft
from the fleet for a number of months, on enough Prowlers to meet their
requirements. Despite this improvement, the EA-6B's mission capable
rates have been degraded by problems with communications equipment,
canopies, and wings. Other problems with fuel cells and environmental
control systems have also diminished mission capable rates. The EA-6B's
utilization rates have also been high, given its role as a high-demand
asset in current operations.
Figure 42: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy EA-6B Aircraft,
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the EA-6B as
yellow because the Navy has not funded all of its short-term
requirements. The Navy has plans to address the major degraders of
mission capable rates; however, not all of these plans are fully
funded. Navy plans include replacing aging center wing sections in the
EA-6B fleet. The condition of the Prowler fleet will continue to
improve in the near term because of this funded initiative.
Additionally, EA-6B officials have been working with manufacturers to
correct canopy deficiencies and have resolved this problem. Current
Navy plans for purchasing canopies are also fully funded for all
aircraft. However, currently no plans or funding have been identified
to correct communications equipment issues. Furthermore, the Navy has
not fully funded equipment that improves the EA-6B's ability to use its
unique electronic warfare capabilities to counter an emerging threat.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the EA-6B as
yellow because only a limited number of aircraft will receive an
upgrade that is critical to transition the EA-6B fleet to the EA-18G
aircraft. In the long term, the Navy has outlined an effective strategy
to modernize and replace the Prowler. This strategy includes wing
replacement and Improved Capability III upgrades on the EA-6B. The
Prowler's capabilities will be replaced by the EA-18G and Air Force B-
52 electronic jammer suites. However, this strategy has not been fully
funded. Specifically, the Navy has a stated requirement to provide the
Improved Capability III upgrade on 21 aircraft, but has only funded the
upgrade for 14 aircraft. This improved third-generation capability is a
significant technology leap beyond the EA-6B's current jamming
capabilities, and according to program officials, an important
component in the Navy's transition to the EA-18G. Moreover, aircraft
with this capability will be used by the Marine Corps until 2015, at
which time they plan to replace their EA-6B aircraft with a version of
the Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is already behind
schedule and a number of its critical technologies are immature,
indicating that it may be delayed even further.
P-3 Orion Aircraft:
The P-3 Orion is a four-engine turboprop antisubmarine and maritime
surveillance aircraft. It provides undersea warfare; antisurface
warfare; and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities to naval and joint
commanders. There are 173 aircraft in the fleet and their average age
is 24.4 years. The Navy will replace P-3 capabilities with the Multi-
mission Maritime Aircraft in 2013, and the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Un-manned Aerial Vehicle.
Figure 43: P-3 Orion Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the condition of the P-3 as red because it has consistently
missed its mission capable goals by a significant percentage, as shown
in figure 44, and the Orion is not available in sufficient numbers to
meet day-to-day Navy requirements. Overall, the condition of the P-3
has been primarily degraded by the effect of structural fatigue on its
airframe and the obsolescence of communication, navigation, and primary
war-fighting systems. To address airframe issues, specifically cracks
in the aircraft's wings, the Navy has instituted a special structural
inspection and repair program. A number of aircraft are currently
undergoing these special structural inspections and repairs, and are
not available for fleet operations. Moreover, the obsolescence of the
communication, navigation, and war-fighting systems resulted in only
about 26 percent of these aircraft being rated as fully capable of
performing all of their missions last year.
Figure 44: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy P-3 Aircraft,
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the P-3 as
yellow because the Navy's near-term plans do not address all condition
and obsolescence issues. However, the Navy will have completed enough
structural inspections and repairs to ensure that there are sufficient
P-3 Orions available to meet day-to-day requirements next year. While
this mitigates serious airframe issues, obsolescence of electronics and
avionic systems will continue to degrade the ability of this aircraft
to fulfill all of its missions. The Navy will address some of these
obsolescence issues in the short term, such as installing an improved
high-frequency radio. However, other needed improvements have not been
funded, for example, efforts to improve the aircraft's over the horizon
communications and upgrades for the aircraft's missile defense system.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the P-3 as
red because while the Navy has identified what can be done to address
the obsolescence of the mission systems over the long term, this
program has not been approved or funded. The Navy plan, known as the
Anti-submarine Maritime Improvement Program, ensures the continued
relevance of the P-3 mission systems until the Multi-mission Maritime
Aircraft is operational. This improvement program has not been fully
approved, nor has it been funded. The obsolescence of its mission
system may have a significant impact on its war-fighting capabilities.
Moreover, it is still not certain that the fixes identified for the P-
3 airframe will ensure that sufficient numbers of this aircraft will be
available until it is fully replaced in 2019.
Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile:
The Standard Missile-2 is a medium to long-range, shipboard surface-to-
air missile. The primary mission of the Standard Missile-2 is fleet
area air defense and ship self-defense; its secondary mission is
antisurface ship warfare. There are four different blocks of the
Standard Missile-2 in service (III, IIIA, IIIB, and IV). The
inventories of these blocks are classified, but over 88 percent of the
inventory is greater than 11 years of age, and some blocks are older
and less capable than others The capabilities of the Standard Missile-
2 will be replaced by the Standard Missile-6 Extended Range Active
Missile beginning in fiscal year 2009.
Figure 45: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the Standard Missile-2 as yellow because
it has consistently failed to meet its asset readiness goal of 87
percent. The asset readiness goal is the missile equivalent of the
mission capable goal. Timely certifications of missiles--assessments of
equipment condition and necessary repair and replacement of missile
components--are critical to these readiness rates. These certifications
must be done approximately every 4 years and a missile is not ready for
issue until certified. These assessments have not been done at a rate
sufficient to meet asset readiness goals. In GAO's previous study, the
condition of the Standard Missile-2 was rated red; however, the asset
readiness rates of these missiles have improved since that time.
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Standard
Missile-2 as green because the Navy has a plan to address near-term
condition, and the missile's inventory meets Navy requirements in the
near term. The Navy has been able to deliver a more maneuverable
version of this missile--the Block IIIB-MU--ahead of schedule. In
addition, the Navy has increased the amount of operation and
maintenance funding over the next couple of years to maintain the asset
readiness rate close to the goal. Both of these steps will allow the
Navy to meet inventory requirements in the near term.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Standard
Missile-2 as red because future funding shortfalls will significantly
affect missile availability. The Navy plans to meet requirements by
procuring new missiles and modernizing existing ones. However, the new
procurements and missile modernizations are not in sufficient numbers
to allow the Navy to meet inventory requirements in the long term.
Furthermore, the operation and maintenance funding planned for the long
term is not sufficient for the Navy to meet asset readiness goals.
Funding for certifications was limited until fiscal year 2004;
subsequently, increased funding improved assets readiness rates.
Funding will be limited again beginning in fiscal year 2007, affecting
the long-term availability and ready-for-issue rate of the Standard
Missile-2. While the Standard Missile-6 is currently ahead of schedule,
this weapon will not be available in a timely manner or in sufficient
numbers to allow the Navy to meet long-term inventory requirements.
Air Force:
For the six Air Force aircraft in this appendix, fiscal year 2004 data
are through July 2004.
F-15 Eagle and Strike Eagle:
There are two types of F-15 aircraft: the F-15 Eagle (A-D variants) and
the F-15E Strike Eagle. The F-15 A and F-15C are single-seat,
supersonic fighter aircraft used for air-to-air combat, and the B and D
variants are their dual-seat training counterparts. The F-15E Strike
Eagle is a dual-seat, supersonic fighter aircraft used for both air-to-
air combat and air-to-ground combat. There are 513 F-15 Eagles and 221
F-15E Strike Eagles in the Air Force inventory, and the average age
depends upon the variant, with F-15 Eagles ranging from about 21 years
to 26 years, and the F-15E Strike Eagles averaging about 12 years. The
F/A-22 is the designated replacement for the F-15 Eagle. The Air Force
plans to retire most of the F-15 Eagle fleet, retaining 179 F-15C/D
variants beyond 2015 to augment the F/A-22 through 2025, while
maintaining the entire fleet of F-15Es through at least 2025.
Figure 46: F-15 Eagle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the condition of the F-15 C/D and F-15E as green because
mission capable rates have been near the Air Force's stated goal and
have either improved or remained constant between fiscal years 1999 and
2004. The Air Force's stated goal depends on the variant, and ranges
from 79 percent to 82 percent. As shown in figure 47, mission capable
rates for the F-15 C/D and F-15 E variants, which are expected to
remain in the fleet after retirement of the older F-15 aircraft, have
increased to about 79 percent. Officials stated that cracks and issues
related to the age of the aircraft are the most common problems
affecting the aircraft, but noted that the Air Force is addressing
these issues through programmed depot maintenance. Officials also
stated that the F-15 is a viable and capable system, noting that the F-
15E models were used during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Figure 47: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-15 Eagle and
Strike Eagle Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the F-15 and F-15E as
green because the Air Force has developed and funded a strategy to
address known problems, to include retirement of the older F-15 C/D
variants. For capability and reliability upgrades, the Air Force has
funded and is currently implementing replacements and upgrades for a
variety of different systems on 179 F-15C/D variants, to include
engines, radars, and various structural improvements. For the F-15E,
the Air Force has funded modernization of different systems--computer
processors, avionics, and software--which is collectively known as a
Suite 5E upgrade. This upgrade, which is fully funded for the F-15E
fleet, is scheduled to occur from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year
2011, and is expected to increase the survivability and weapons
delivery capability of the aircraft. Officials also stated that
technological obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources are a
concern for the entire F-15 fleet; however, they also stated that it is
manageable, and were confident that the Air Force had the correct
procedures to address the issue.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy for the F-15 fleet as green
because the Air Force near-term upgrades are fully funded and designed
to keep the aircraft that will remain in the fleet viable and
functioning through at least 2025. The F/A-22 Raptor is the F-15
Eagle's designated replacement, and officials stated that delays to its
fielding schedule will not impact the retirement schedule of the F-15
fleet. Retirements for the F-15A/B aircraft are scheduled to begin in
fiscal year 2005 with a total of 84 retirements expected to occur
through fiscal year 2009, and retirement of 26 F-15 C/D aircraft is
scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. The F/A-22 is expected to
achieve operational capability in December 2005, and the entire fleet
of 179 aircraft is currently scheduled to be procured through fiscal
year 2008. Officials stated that the effect of changes in the F/A-22
fleet composition on further F-15 C/D aircraft retirements beyond
fiscal year 2009 remains to be seen, as the total structure of the
combat air fleet will be reviewed during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense
Review.
F-16 Fighting Falcon:
The F-16 is a compact, multirole fighter with air-to-air combat and air-
to-surface attack capabilities. There are four F-16 variants - the A
and C models are designed for one pilot, while the B and D models are
two-seat tandem cockpit aircraft, which are used for training and can
also be flown individually. Of the four variants, the F-16 C and D
models incorporate the latest technology and have the capability to
suppress or destroy enemy air defenses. The Air Force currently has
1,353 F-16 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 15
years. The Air Force plans to retire the A and B variants because they
are not expected to be structurally viable past 2008, although the
specific schedule has yet to be published. The Air Force also plans to
replace the F-16 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter beginning in 2013.
Figure 48: F-16 Fighting Falcon:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
Consistent with the findings of our December 2003 report,[Footnote 46]
we assessed the condition of the F-16 as green because mission capable
rates have been near the Air Force's stated goal and have remained
relatively constant. For the A/B variants, mission capable rates were
about 72 percent with an Air Force stated goal of 75 percent in fiscal
year 2004 and, as shown in figure 49, mission capable rates for the C/
D variants were about 76 percent compared to a goal of 81 percent.
Officials stated that the most significant factor affecting the F-16 is
cracks, which occur mostly on older aircraft and because of the stress
caused by repeatedly landing without dropping its two 2,000 pound
bombs. Despite these concerns, the Air Force has plans to address
cracking. Further, although the rates for all variants are below the
goals, officials stated the F-16 was able to meet operational
requirements.
Figure 49: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-16 Fighting
Falcon Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the F-16 as green
because the Air Force has developed and funded a strategy to address
known problems. As we noted in our December 2003 report, structural
issues related to age and use are affecting the F-16. To address these
concerns, the Air Force began a structural augmentation program that
strengthens the airframe in areas prone to cracking, namely the wings
and fuselage. The structural augmentation program is expected to affect
over 1200 of the aircraft and be completed by 2013. Other near-term
initiatives that are being implemented to improve combat capabilities
include the common configuration implementation program, which
incorporates improvements to targeting, communications, and computer
systems, and improvements to radar, avionics, and targeting systems.
Officials stated that these programs are currently funded and being
implemented, although not for the entire F-16 fleet.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy for the F-16 as green
because current and projected funding for aircraft modernizations
identified in the near-term program strategy are designed to ensure
longer-term viability for the next 15 years. Although the Air Force has
yet to publish an F-16 retirement schedule, officials indicate that the
older variants will be retired, as will be reflected in future budget
documents. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the designated replacement
for the F-16 but, according to officials, the retirement of the older F-
16 variants will not be affected by the F-35 fielding schedule, since
operational capability of the Air Force F-35 aircraft is not expected
to occur until fiscal year 2013 and the exact quantity remains to be
determined.
B-1 Lancer Bomber:
The B-1 Lancer Bomber is a long-range, high-speed, large payload global
attack aircraft that was originally designed for nuclear missions but
was transitioned to a conventional role. In 2002, the Air Force began
consolidating the fleet, reducing the B-1 inventory from 93 to 67
aircraft and transferring all remaining B-1 bombers to the active
component. Beginning operations in 1986, the average age of the B-1 is
about 17 years. The Air Force plans to keep the B-1 in use through at
least 2040,[Footnote 47] so there are no immediate plans to replace the
aircraft.
Figure 50: B-1 Lancer Bomber:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the condition of the B-1 as yellow because mission capable
rates were below the Air Force stated goal most of the time between
fiscal years 1999 and 2004. As shown in figure 51, mission capable
rates have increased between 1999 and 2004. Parts shortages were
identified as a reason keeping rates below goals, and officials
identified generators, automatic pilot controllers, and various pump
and hydraulic systems as the items that were most often in short
supply. After consolidation of the B-1 fleet in fiscal year 2002, the
numbers of parts in the supply system increased as parts were taken
from retired B-1 aircraft. To compensate for the smaller fleet size,
the Air Force increased the mission capable goals from 67 percent in
fiscal year 2002 to 76 percent in fiscal year 2003. The increase in the
goal occurred as B-1 usage to support operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan increased. Although the aircraft's mission capable rate was
about 69 percent in fiscal year 2004, the rate for deployed aircraft
was 80 percent. Additionally, officials noted that the B-1 is capable
of accomplishing the Air Force's current needs.
Figure 51: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-1 Lancer
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the B-1 as green because
the Air Force has planned and funded programs to address the near-term
sustainment issues affecting the aircraft. According to officials, the
forecasted number of flight hours serves as the basis for funding
planned maintenance activity and expected number of parts required for
the aircraft. The fluctuations in the fleet size, coupled with the
increase in usage for operations overseas, caused instability in the
supply chain and increased the difficulty in efficient planning of
maintenance cycles. For the near term, the Air Force has addressed this
concern by increasing the number of forecasted flight hours for fiscal
year 2005, which increases the funding for supply and maintenance
activities and is expected to correct the disparity. In addition to
addressing near-term sustainment issues, the Air Force has already
funded and will complete plans to increase the sustainability and
wartime capabilities of the B-1, to include the planned fielding of
increased munitions capabilities, and upgrades to the central computer
systems and radar.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy for the B-1 as green because
the Air Force has a proactive strategy to address anticipated shortages
and deficiencies in the aircraft, and has funded modernization efforts
to meet requirements. Although a newer system in the Air Force's fleet,
officials stated that technology has advanced significantly since the B-
1 was fielded in the 1980s, resulting in a reduction in the number of
manufacturers that make the original B-1 component parts. For example,
the original computer technology in the B-1 used processors that, while
cutting edge at the time, are slower than home computer processors. To
address these issues, the Air Force has funded efforts to modernize and
upgrade B-1 components, to include cockpit flight instrument displays
and navigation systems. In addition to resolving potential supply chain
concerns, these upgrades are also expected to enhance the aircraft's
combat capability.
B-2 Spirit Bomber:
The B-2 is a multirole heavy bomber with stealth characteristics,
capable of employing nuclear and conventional weapons. The aircraft was
produced in limited numbers to provide a low observable (i.e., stealth)
capability to complement the B-1 and B-52 bombers. Its unique stealth
capability enables the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. The Air
Force has 21 B-2 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is
about 10 years. The B-2 was deployed to support both Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The B-2 is expected
to remain in the Air Force's inventory until 2058, so there are no
immediate plans to replace the aircraft.
Figure 52: B-2 Spirit Bomber:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
For the reasons associated with maintenance of stealth characteristics
that we identified in our December 2003 report,[Footnote 48] we
continue to assess the condition of the B-2 as yellow. As shown in
figure 53, the B-2 did not consistently meet the Air Force mission
capable goal of 50 to 51 percent between fiscal years 1999 and
2004.[Footnote 49] Officials stated that the small B-2 fleet size
increases the difficulty in achieving goals, noting that a change in
the mission capable status of one aircraft results in about a 7 percent
change in the overall mission capable rate; however, when viewing other
metrics, the B-2 condition is comparable with other bombers.
Maintenance of stealth characteristics continues to be the primary
driver of lower mission capable rates, and the Air Force is continuing
to implement solutions. Despite difficulties associated with stealth
maintenance, the B-2 is capable of accomplishing its wartime missions,
achieving mission capable rates of 64 percent for Operation Enduring
Freedom and 73 percent during the initial months of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
Figure 53: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-2 Spirit
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the B-2 as green because
the Air Force has developed and funded the strategy for sustaining the
B-2 inventory. The Air Force funded and continues to implement its
Alternate High Frequency Material modification, which reduces the
number of steps and the overall length of time required to conduct
stealth maintenance. Thus far, three aircraft have received the
modification, and the entire fleet has been funded and scheduled to
receive the upgrade by the end of the decade. Other areas of concern
include cracking on the aft deck and cracking in the windshield. For
the aft deck cracks, officials stated that the extremely high
temperatures from the engine cause the cracking, and have fielded kits
to stiffen the aft decks, making them less affected by the extreme
heat. For windshield cracks, officials stated that redesigning the
spacing of drill holes will address the problem; delivery of the new
windshields is scheduled to begin in late 2005. Additionally, the Air
Force has funded and is implementing improvements in B-2 connectivity
and interoperability, to include integrating advanced weapons.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military
services, and/or Congress).
We assessed the long-term program strategy for the B-2 as green because
the Air Force is addressing immediate issues for the aircraft while
concurrently developing and funding longer-term solutions. In addition
to continuing efforts to address stealth maintenance and aft deck
cracks, the Air Force is also addressing the issue of diminishing
manufacturing sources. Officials stated that technological advancements
and the small size of the B-2 fleet are a disincentive for
manufacturers to continue making B-2 unique parts. To compensate, the
Air Force is modernizing components and systems within the B-2,
developing internal processes to contract out management of B-2 unique
parts, and closely monitoring all parts to ensure that the supply chain
has ample time to adjust.
C-5 Galaxy Transport:
The C-5 Galaxy is the largest Air Force transport aircraft, and can
carry large cargo items over intercontinental ranges at jet speeds and
can take off and land in relatively short distances. The C-5 is one of
only two aircraft that can carry very large military equipment. With
aerial refueling, the aircraft's range is limited only by crew
endurance. The first C-5 was delivered in 1970. There are 112 C-5
aircraft in the Air Force's inventory, and their average age is 26
years. Although the C-5 is expected to remain in service through 2040,
the exact length of service and composition of the C-5 fleet is
dependent upon the Mobility Capabilities Study[Footnote 50] and the
Quadrennial Defense Review, which were not completed at the time of our
review.
Figure 54: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
For the reasons identified in our December 2003 report,[Footnote 51] we
continue to assess the condition of the C-5 as yellow. As shown in
figure 55, mission capable rates for the C-5 consistently remained
below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. Officials
stated that the size and age of the aircraft make the C-5 maintenance
intensive, and provided the example of fatigued metal and adhesives,
which take time to replace. They further stated that the age of the C-
5 makes it difficult to find manufacturing sources for some parts,
particularly avionics and engine components. Additionally, the avionics
systems and engines are noncompliant with upcoming global airspace and
air traffic requirements, potentially limiting where and how the
aircraft can be used. Despite these challenges, officials stated that
the C-5 can currently perform its missions, including providing
transport for tsunami relief efforts and moving supplies for operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Figure 55: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force C-5 Galaxy
Transport Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the near-term program strategy for the C-5 as yellow
because of delays and funding shortages in key modernization efforts.
The two modernizations for the C-5 are to improve avionics and engines;
avionics upgrades must occur before engine modernization can begin.
When complete, the programs are expected to address many manufacturing
source issues, ensure compliance with global air traffic standards, and
increase the aircraft's capability. However, officials stated that the
avionics upgrades are experiencing software integration problems,
resulting in a delay of at least 3 months and cost increases of $20
million. Since engine modernization is predicated on avionics upgrades,
the costs for engine modernization have also increased by $30 million.
Additionally, after a projectile attack damaged a C-5 during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, officials stated that defensive systems became a top
priority, and the Air Force requested and received funding through
fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriations to upgrade defenses
against infrared guided surface-to-air missiles for 51 C-5 aircraft.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the Air Force's long-term strategy for the C-5 as yellow
because requested funding is inconsistent with long-term requirements
to sustain and modernize the inventory. With upgrades to avionics and
engines, officials stated that the C-5 could last through 2040. The Air
Force has requested funding for engine upgrades for the entire fleet of
112 C-5 aircraft; however, the Air Force has only funded the
procurement and installation of avionics upgrades for 59 aircraft,
resulting in 53 aircraft not receiving the necessary avionics upgrades
to support the new engines. Officials stated that the Air Force remains
uncertain about the size of the final C-5 fleet and whether to fund the
remaining C-5 upgrades, but will have a better idea following the
completion of the Mobility Capabilities Study.
KC-135 Stratotanker:
The KC-135 is among the oldest aircraft in the Air Force's inventory
and represents 90 percent of the aircraft in the tanker fleet. Its
primary mission is air refueling fixed-wing aircraft and it supports
Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aircraft. There are three KC-
135 variants currently in the fleet: the E, R, and T models. Each model
is a reengined version of the original KC-135A. Of these three
variants, the E model belongs to the Air Force Reserve and Air National
Guard. The first KC-135 was delivered in June 1957. There are 531 KC-
135 aircraft in the Air Force's inventory and the average age is about
44 years. Currently, there is no replacement:
Figure 56: KC-135 Stratotanker:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Condition:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
Consistent with our December 2003 report,[Footnote 52] we assessed the
condition of the KC-135 aircraft as yellow because, as shown in figure
57, it has not met its mission capable goals and issues associated with
age and corrosion continue to be a concern. Officials stated that age
is the primary driver of KC-135 maintenance issues, and that
maintainers discover new problems with the aircraft every time it
undergoes scheduled depot maintenance. Age-related issues with the
aircraft include fuel bladder leaks, parts obsolescence, and problems
with the landing gear's steel brakes. Corrosion has regularly been
discovered in new areas on the aircraft, requiring increased amounts of
depot maintenance time. The Air Force has yet to determine the extent
of problems caused by newly discovered corrosion. The older variants
also have a higher incidence of problems; for example, the Air Force
removed 29 KC-135E aircraft from flight status due to engine strut
problems and corrosion.
Figure 57: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force KC-135
Stratotanker Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left
unattended may worsen).
We assessed the Air Force's near-term strategy for the KC-135 as yellow
because age-related maintenance issues are expected to increase and the
severity of potential age-related issues remains unknown. Although
officials stated that maintenance problems with the aircraft are
currently manageable during programmed depot maintenance, they expect
the number of maintenance man-hours to increase by 2.5 percent each
year. Officials also stated that the severity of potential problems
from newly discovered corrosion remains unknown, so the potential for
additional maintenance requirements is likely to occur. Officials
further stated that the effects of KC-135 operations to support Iraq
and Afghanistan are still unknown, but the Air Force has instituted
additional inspections and procedures to address potential effects
associated with higher usage. The only major modification for the KC-
135, Global Air Traffic Management avionics system upgrades, remains on
schedule and is fully funded.
Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding:
Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or
Congress).
We assessed the Air Force's long-term strategy for the KC-135 as red
because the future of the KC-135 fleet and the Air Force's tanker
strategy are unknown. Before acquiring new tankers, the Air Force must
complete a Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives, which is a study
to narrow the field of possible future tanker options. Originally
scheduled for completion in December 2004, the analysis has been
delayed until at least August 2005. Regardless of the option, officials
stated that all recapitalization efforts will require use of the KC-135
in the near term and delays in fielding a replacement exacerbate
problems in maintaining the existing fleet over the long term, as well
as delaying modernization efforts that are predicated on the
replacement time line. In fiscal year 2005, $100 million was
appropriated for a tanker replacement transfer fund, and $9.7 billion
has been requested for the tanker replacement program in DOD's 2006
Future Years Defense Program. For the six Air Force aircraft in this
appendix, fiscal year 2004 data are through July 2004.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Agency Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
SEP 26 2005:
Mr. William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-05-978 `MILITARY READINESS: DOD Needs to Identify and
Address Gaps and Potential Risks in Program Strategy and Funding
Priorities for Selected Equipment,' dated August 24, 2005 (GAO Code
350548).
The DoD partially concurs with one recommendation, and nonconcurs with
one recommendation. Specific comments on each recommendation are
enclosed. Technical comments regarding the assessments made in the
appendices are also provided in the attachment.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Signed by:
Nancy L: Spruill:
Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis:
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED August 24, 2005 GAO CODE 350548/GAO-05-978:
"MILITARY READINESS: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and
Potential Risks in Program Strategy and Funding Priorities for Selected
Equipment"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that, after the Department
completes its Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of the Services, reassess the near
and long-term program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key
equipment, particularly those items not covered by 10 U.S.C. 2437, to
ensure that the plans are complete and that the items are sustainable
until they reach the end of their serviceable life or a replacement
system is fielded. Specifically, this reassessment should:
* detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems
until they are retired or replaced;
* report the costs associated with the sustainment and modernization of
key equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years Defense
Program; and:
* identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding the
strategies, and the steps the Department is taking to mitigate the
associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not
fully funded. (Pages 32/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. Through the current Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) processes, the Department
is already executing an annual procedure to reassess program strategies
to ensure equipment sustainment and modernization can support the most
recent Defense strategy. The PPBE process ensures that, at the
corporate Department of Defense level, the Future Years Defense Program
developed each year balances operational, recapitalization/
modernization, maintenance, manning, and facilities requirements in
order to accomplish the national defense mission. The review for the FY
2007 President's Budget is already taking place, and does not require
completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review in order to reassess
equipment sustainment and modernization plans. Reviews consider
strategies and costs to sustain and modernize equipment, and the risks
incurred by not fully funding those strategies. The resulting
President's Budget reflects the Department's best assessment of a
balanced, fully funded budget that most efficiently accomplishes our
national security mission, within our limited resources.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
provide the information bulleted in Recommendation 1 in an annual
report to Congress at the same time the Department submits its annual
budget request. (Page 32/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The annual Defense Budget represents a
balanced program, within the resources available, as a result of the
process described in the DoD response to Recommendation 1. The
strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems, and the
costs associated with the sustainment and modernization are already
provided in the budget documentation submitted with each year's
President's Budget. The draft recommendation would also require the
Department to identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully
funding the strategies. When the Department submits the President's
Budget, the overall strategy for accomplishing the national defense
mission is fully funded. The risks associated with alternative resource
allocations for specific equipment systems have been fully considered.
Allocating additional resources to equipment programs may require
diversion of resources from other functional areas, such as personnel,
construction, or research and development. The overall balance of the
Defense program, within limited resources, is our foremost concern.
Each year's President's Budget attempts to reflect this balance, and
our budget documentation details the strategies and costs. Therefore,
all key equipment items will be fully funded, within available
resources, at appropriate levels to accomplish our mission. Submitting
an additional report concurrent with the annual budget would be a
duplication of effort.
Technical Comments DRAFT GAO Report GAO-05-978, GAO Code 350548:
AIR FORCE TECHNICAL COMMENTS:
F-16 Fighting Falcon:
Issue: Page 105, Condition paragraph, line 6. Draft Report States: The
sentence reading: "Officials stated that the most significant factor
affecting the F-16 cracks, which occur mostly on older aircraft because
of the stress caused by repeatedly landing without dropping its twelve
2,000 pound bombs." is incorrect.
Change to read: Officials stated that the most significant sustainment
factor affecting the F-16 are structural cracks resulting from frequent
operations near maximum gross weight limitations, with older aircraft
being more susceptible.
At absolute minimum, need to change "twelve" to "two" as an F-16
aircraft is incapable of carrying 24,000 pounds of bombs.
C-5 Galaxy Transport:
Issue: Page 111, general paragraph, line 3.
Delete the sentence: "The C-5 provides a unique capability in that it
is the only aircraft that can carry any piece of Army equipment,
including a 74-ton mobile bridge" and replace with "The C-5 is one of
only two aircraft in the Air Force inventory that can carry outsized
equipment." Rationale: Many aircraft can carry Army equipment. However,
the C-5 and C-17, which are complementary, are the only two weapon
systems capable of transporting Army outsized equipment.
Issue: Page 111, general paragraph, line 9.
Delete: ", which is expected to be complete in the summer of 2005,"
Rationale: Study has not completed.
Issue: Page 111, paragraph on "Condition," line 2.
Delete the sentence: "As shown in figure 54, mission capable rates for
the C-5 consistently remained below the Air Force stated goal of 75
percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004" and replace with "As shown
in figure 54, mission capable rates for the C-5 consistently remained
below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004."
Rationale: It is best to discuss low mission capable rates in general
terms since there are wide variances between users. For instance, the
Air Force wartime goal is 75 percent while peacetime goals vary between
active duty units (75%) and reserve component units (55%).
B-2 Spirit Bomber:
Issue: Page 110, Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding, line 10.
Change the last sentence to read: "For windshield crack, officials
stated that redesigning the spacing of drill holes will address the
problem: delivery of new windshields is scheduled to begin in late
2005."
Rationale: The new B-2 windshields will not be delivered by the end of
2005.
Issue: Pages 109-110.
Comment: The entire B-2 section focuses on sustainment issues and does
not address any of the plans/programs to increase the combat
capabilities of the B-2. This does not provide a complete picture of
the B-2 program.
B-1B Lancer Bomber:
Issue: Pages 107-108.
Comment: Change all references from B-1B to B-1.
Rationale: The Air Force has changed the aircraft's name to B-1.
Issue: Page 108, Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding, line 8.
Change sentence to read: "To address these issues, the Air Force has
funded effort to modernize and upgrade B-1 components, to include
cockpit flight instrument displays and navigation systems."
Rationale: The Vertical Situation Display (VSD) modification replaces
the pilot and copilot's flight instrument displays, not all situational
displays.
Issue: Page 107, Paragraph l, line 6.
Change sentence to read: "keep the B-1B in use through at least 2040."
Rationale: This is the correct service life projection and is
consistent with the DODIG Exit Briefing.
F-15 Eagle and Strike Eagle:
Pages 102, Paragraph 1, Line 7:
Change sentence: "ranging from about 21 years to 27 years," to read
"Ranging from about 21 to 26 years".
Rationale: This is the correct service life projection and is
consistent with DODIG Exit briefing.
KC-135 Stratotanker:
Issue: Pages 115, Paragraph 1, Line 5.
Delete sentence: "..they expect the number of maintenance man-hours to
increase by 2.5 percent each year."
Rationale: This statement is not verifiable.
NAVY TECHNICAL COMMENTS:
AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter:
Issue: Page 21, Table 4.
Comment: We do not understand the basis for the $63.6 million unfunded
requirement listed in Table 4. It is assumed that $50 million is the
same requirement to fund NRE for Build new Z called out on page 80.
NAVAIR has requested clarification from the GAO audit team and is
awaiting their reply.
Comment: Page 79, the correct inventory for AH-1W is 179, not 180.
AV-8B Harrier Jet:
Comment: Page 77, the correct inventory for AV-8B is 154, not 156.
CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter:
Comment: Pages 9, 20, and 23 include statements regarding the lack of
repair parts due to aircraft age. The first-time fill rate for H-46
spares is at historic highs. Also, the A/C sortie rate and Mission
Capable rates compare favorably with any other rotary wing A/C in the
Naval Aviation Enterprise. This would not be possible if there were
spare part availability problems. While a CH-46E parts problem in the
future cannot be ruled out, it's supply support posture is currently
green.
Issue: Page 81, "Condition" paragraph.
Comments: The paragraph references 180 engine upgrades. The actual
number of upgrades is 234, as of 30 August 2005.
Issue: Page 82, "Near-term Program Strategy and Funding paragraph.
Comments: The statements about repair parts shortages and availability
are misleading. First-time fill rates for supply parts are at
historically high levels and the high readiness levels in OIF bear this
out. While original production lines have been shut down at the OEM, we
still have sources for all key repair parts. If a source goes away, a
new one would be qualified. This is a common occurrence in aviation
industrial support.
CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter:
Issue: Page 5, "Results in Brief' paragraph, 3rD sentence.
Draft Report States: "For example, the Marine Corps' CH-53E helicopter
received a red rating for its near-term program strategy and funding
plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term
requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages".
Change to Read: "For example, the Marine Corps' CH-53E helicopter
received a red rating for its long-term program strategy and funding
plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term
requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages".
Table 1 on page 7, and page 85 of Appendix 11 state the near-term
program strategy and funding plan as yellow.
Issue: Page 20, Table 3.
Comment: Table 3 utilizes the reason, "Strategy not funded in DOD's
fiscal year 2006 budget" to categorize the CH-53E. This is not entirely
accurate. Sustainment strategy for the CH-53E is funded to start FY2006
and continue throughout the FYDP.
Issue: Page 84, "Condition" paragraph.
Comments: This paragraph implies that high utilization has caused
structural cracks; this is not correct. The tail pylon crack has been
an ongoing issue long before OIF/OEF operations, as well as a fatigue
issue concerning the transition section bulkhead that is related to
aircraft flight hours. OIF and OEF operations and increased utilization
have accelerated the need to repair these areas, and repair kits are
available, but the operations have not caused the issues.
Issue: Page 85, "Near-term Program Strategy and Funding paragraph, last
sentence. Comments: The funding identified for diagnostic systems and
engine upgrades as unfunded 2006 priorities is actually $31.0 million,
not $35.6 million. The additional $4.6 million includes other unfunded
issues.
Issue: Page 85, "Long-term Program Strategy and Funding" paragraph.
Comments: Heavy Lift Replacement requirements are stable, and were
approved through the JROC in December 2004.
F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft:
Issue: Page 92, First Paragraph, inventories.
Comment: The correct inventory for F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet is 914,
not 904. For other models: F/A-18A -123, not 142; F/A-18B - 28,
correct; F/A-18C - 396, correct; F/A-18D - 139, not 141; F/A-18E -102,
not 93; F/A-18F -126, not 104.
Issue: Page 92, "Condition" paragraph.
Comment: The last two sentences should be amended and an additional
sentence added as follows (changes in italics and bolded):
"This effort addresses the predictable rate of wear and deterioration
on the aircraft due to factors such as carrier take-off and landings
and contributes to overall life extensions. The aircraft is not
available for operations during the 1 year scheduled for this process."
During this period the Navy takes advantage of aircraft time out of
service to conduct scheduled maintenance and other modifications on
those aircraft.
Issue: Page 93, "Long-term Program Strategy and Funding" paragraph.
Comment: The ending of the last paragraph should read:
"Program officials confirmed that another delay in arrival of the Joint
Strike Fighter may require the FIA-18 program to seek other
alternatives to meet requirement goals, such as, replace more center
barrels on Hornets, management of aircraft fatigue life, or additional
procurement of super hornets. Moreover, fatigue life is not the only
factor used when determining the expected service life of an aircraft;
flying hours and takeoff and landings also impact the F/ A 18's life
expectancy. If Hornets are required to operate longer.."
P-3 Orion Aircraft:
Issue: Pages 98 and 99.
Comment: Some of the impact statements may, if taken out of context,
seem misleading. For example, the first sentence of the Condition
paragraph states, "The Orion is not available in sufficient numbers to
meet day-to-day Navy requirements." This statement should be addressed
by CNAF. It's possible that the Fleet is meeting deployed requirements,
but not all at-home training requirements. Does this mean they are not
meeting day-to-day requirements? Also, the impact statements are valid
only for the snapshot in time that the interviews were conducted. For
example, the P-3 is rated as red for long-term program strategy and
funding. Since we can only comment to Congress on program of record
(PB06, in this case), then the statement that shows the AMIP program
"has not been fully approved, nor has it been funded," (page 99) is
only partially true. Part of the program has Navy support, but through
the NAVCOMPT07 budget cycle, a cycle not yet recognized by OSD or
Congress, and therefore not part of the Program of Record. The bottom
line is that the program has evolved naturally over the preceding 7
months and the statements are correct if they have a caveat that
identifies the snapshot in time of the interviews (around January
2005).
ARMY TECHNICAL COMMENTS:
Bradley Fighting Vehicle/Abrams Tank:
Issue: Page 9, Line 15.
Draft Report States: "For example, the Army's Bradley Fighting Vehicle
received a red rating because the Army has not fully identified the
future requirements and funding for this item." Comment: The GAO report
uses only the Base budget as a measurement for funding strategy. The
report mentions the use of supplemental funding and PBD 753 but does
not refer to it in any explanations of the system strategies. Both (and
the M113) were heavily funded through PBD 753, as indicated by the PBD
direction below.
(U) Abrams/Bradley Upgrade. The Army currently has three distinct
variants of the Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicle fleets. The
additional funding coupled with Base programs improves the Army's Heavy
Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) modular force/modernization posture to 16
(MIA2 SEP/M2A3 Bradley)/ 14 (MIA I AIM/M2A2 ODS Bradley)/ 5 (MIA I
Heavy Armor/M2A2 Bradley) HBCTs. Funding provides the Army with a more
balanced lethal, survivable and sustainable heavy combat force.
(U) M113, Selected Procurement and MODS Procures 1,075 M113A3 Family of
Vehicles (FOV) - M1068A3, M577A3, M113A3, and M1064A3 to meet M113
shortfalls in 30 HBCTs, 12 FIRES BDEs, 12 Mine Clearance Companies, 70
Sapper Companies, and 56 Mobility Augmentation Companies.
OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter:
Issue: Page 26. Table 5.
Draft Report States: "Replacement systems are delayed or not
identified."
Comment: The Chief of Staff approved the requirement for 368 Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) to replace the obsolete OH-58D fleet
during the FY05-11 period. The First Unit Equipped date is Sept 08 and
the source selection board went with the Bell version for the ARH (it
was signed about three weeks ago). The report should be updated with
this current information.
CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter:
Issue: Page 60, Condition: line 7.
Comment: "While most Army helicopters remain in theater.." This line
suggests the entire deployed CH-47 fleet remained in theater for more
than one rotation. This is not true. To date only one CH-47 Heavy
Helicopter Company (12 aircraft) left their aircraft in theater for
back to back rotations; however, current shortages of CH-47 aircraft
and the requirement to fill nearly simultaneous competing priorities
with limited resources may require additional SBE of CH-47 aircraft.
OSD COMMENTS:
Bradley Fighting Vehicle:
Issue: Page 22 and 45.
Draft Report States: "For example, the Army requested $1.4 billion in
the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in order to purchase 93 new Bradley
Fighting Vehicles and recapitalize 554 others.."
Recommended Change: "For example, the Army requested $1.4 billion in
the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in order to accelerate
recapitalization of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles; producing 93
vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 to meet the needs of Army
modernization..", or remove the BFV as an example entirely.
Rationale: The Bradley Fighting Vehicle is no longer in production; the
FY 2005 supplemental pays for recapitalization of vehicle hulls to
replace combat losses, reduce fleet age, or upgrade the existing fleet
to meet the needs of modularity. The logic behind this example is
flawed as BFV recapitalization is part of the Army modularity/
modernization plan. Part of that plan is paid for initially with
supplemental funding, and starting in FY 2007 it will be incorporated
into the base budget.
M113 Armored Personnel Carrier:
Issue: Page 47, Army M113 inventory. "The Army originally introduced
the M113 in 1960 and the current fleet of A2 and A3 variants, totaling
6,672, has an average age of almost 16 years." Recommended Change: "The
Army originally introduced the M113 in 1960 and the current fleet of A2
and A3 variants, totaling approximately 16,000, has an average age of
almost 16 years." Rationale: The GAO report appears to have only
included the A3 variant, not the A2 which they referenced in the same
sentence. The average age is very close to that already listed even
though the inventory dramatically increased.
Assault Amphibian Vehicle:
Issue: Page 71, AAV equipment. "The average age of the vehicle is 28.6
years" Recommended Change: "The average age of the vehicle is 19 years
which includes compensating for a 1985 Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP) which reset the age to zero or restarted the age calculations."
Rationale: The military undertakes upgrades, SLEPs and other
modifications that in some cases restarts the age calculations or in
others extends the service life. In this case, the GAO did not take
that into account in listing the original average age.
AV-8B Harrier Jet:
Issue: Page 77, AV-8B. "There are 156 in inventory"
Recommended Change: "There are a total of 154 aircraft broken out as
follows: 131 combat capable aircraft, 17 non-combat capable training
aircraft, and 6 in storage."
Rationale: There are 131 combat capable AV-8B's; 38 original night
attack, and 93 radar variants (both original and remanufactured). The
16 active 2-seat trainer aircraft, TAV-813's, are not combat capable
and should not be included in combat assumptions. An additional
unsupportable 5 single seat and 1 TAV-8B, are in storage and may be
upgraded in the near future.
F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft:
Issue: Page 93, F/A-18A Near-Term Program Strategy. "The Navy is unable
to fund improved detection and targeting systems for the (legacy)
Hornet, for example, the Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared
system, and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System."
Recommended Change: Remove the sentence:
Rationale: The Navy has fully funded the Advanced Targeting Forward
Looking Infrared system (ATFLIRS) for legacy Hornets (all Super Hornets
have the ATFLIR) so the GAO statement is incorrect. The JHMCS is fully
funded for FA-18 aircraft lots 13 and higher. Lots 12 and below (about
25% of the total FA-18A,B,C,D Hornets) are not funded and will decided
upon in the FY2008 budget.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also
made major contributions to the report: David Schmitt, Assistant
Director; Patricia Lentini; Vipin Arora; Janine Cantin; Alissa Czyz;
Barbara Hills; Barbara Gannon; Stanley Kostyla; Josh Margraf; Brian
Mateja; Kimberly Mayo; Jim Melton; Kenneth Patton; Malvern Saavedra;
and John Trubey.
(350548):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy,
Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112
(Washington, D.C.: December 2003).
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 805 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2437).
[3] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106
(2003); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L No. 108-
287, (2004); and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13.
[4] Mission capable rates are measures of material condition that
indicate the equipment can perform at least one and potentially all of
its designated missions.
[5] Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming
days.
[6] If we were able to collect data on deployed mission capable rates
for the selected equipment items, we discussed this information in the
relevant appendix section.
[7] Sustaining refers to maintaining the equipment to prolong its
operations; modernizing refers to upgrading equipment items or
replacing specific parts; and replacing refers to complete replacement
of one equipment item with a new equipment item, e.g., the Marine Corps
plans to replace the CH-46E with the MV-22 Osprey.
[8] The Future Years Defense Program reflects the department's official
projection of the forces and resources needed to support the programs
approved by the Secretary of Defense for the biennial budget years and
the following 4 years.
[9] The military services report readiness on selected military
equipment based upon mission capable or operational readiness rates.
[10] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a comprehensive internal review
of its forces, resources, and programs that DOD performs every 4 years.
The next review is scheduled to be completed in February 2006.
[11] Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each of the 30
equipment items.
[12] The only question that appeared in both reports concerned the
condition of equipment. In the earlier report, strategy and funding
were assessed separately. See GAO-04-112.
[13] An operational tempo of 6:1 equates to putting 6,000 miles in a
war-time 1-year period versus 1,000 miles under a normal peacetime
operational tempo.
[14] In early 2005, officials stated that all vehicles entering Iraq
would have armor.
[15] This act applies or will soon apply to the following equipment
items included in our review based upon the replacement system
beginning development: Marine Corps' M1A1, Light Armored Vehicle,
Assault Amphibian Vehicle, AV-8B Harrier jet, and CH-53E; the Navy's F/
A-18, EA-6B, and P-3; and the Air Force's F-16.
[16] 10 U.S.C. § 2241, note provides that, except for safety
modifications, funds should not be used for the modification of an
aircraft, weapon, ship, or other equipment that the military department
concerned plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within 5 years after
completion of the modification.
[17] GAO reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems
with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls. In our most recent study of these problems, GAO
assessed 54 programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, and found
that the majority of the programs assessed are costing more and taking
longer to develop. See, GAO, Defense Acquisition: Assessment of
Selected Major Weapons Programs, GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: March
2005).
[18] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy,
Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003).
[19] Mission capable rates are measures of material condition that
indicate the equipment can perform at least one and potentially all of
its designated missions.
[20] Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming
days.
[21] The Future Years Defense Program reflects the department's
official projection of the forces and resources needed to support the
programs approved by the Secretary of Defense for the biennial budget
years and the following 4 years.
[22] We did not independently verify or validate the requirements as
part of this audit.
[23] There are 739 M1 tanks in the Army's inventory averaging 20 years
in age and they are found primarily in the National Guard. The M1 is
similar to the M1A1 and M1A2 except that it possesses a 105 mm cannon
and lacks the special armor protection. Due to its age and limited
usage, our analysis did not include this variant.
[24] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy,
Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003).
[25] Brigade Combat Teams are the foundation of the Army's new
modularized force structure.
[26] There are approximately 15,785 vehicles that use the common M113
chassis. However, our analysis only focused on the M113A2 and A3
personnel carriers.
[27] GAO-04-112.
[28] The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and
Modernization Strategy lays out a comprehensive strategy for meeting
modularity requirements and modernizing the current tactical wheeled
vehicle fleet.
[29] GAO-04-112.
[30] The HEMTT Extended Service Program is a recapitalization program
that supports modularity by remanufacturing and upgrading existing
HEMTT vehicles.
[31] An operational tempo of 6:1 equates to putting 6,000 miles in a
wartime 1-year period versus 1,000 miles under a normal peacetime
operational tempo.
[32] The five restrictions identified in last year's report were
aircraft Teflon bushings, transmissions, the main rotor blade attaching
pins, generator power cables, and the auxiliary power unit clutch. The
bushings, rotor blade attaching pins, and power cable issues have been
resolved. The corrections for the transmission should be completed
across the fleet by 2009 and the clutch should be completed in July
2005.
[33] GAO-04-112.
[34] Fiscal year 2003 funding authorizations were about 7 percent less
than requested, and fiscal year 2004 funding authorizations were about
11 percent more than requested.
[35] 10 U.S.C. § 2241, note. This law provides that, except for safety
modifications, funds should not be used for the modification of an
aircraft, weapon, ship, or other equipment that the military department
concerned plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within 5 years after
completion of the modification.
[36] GAO-04-112.
[37] The material readiness rate reflects the operational capability of
Marine Corps ground equipment and is comparable to mission capable
rates.
[38] GAO-04-112.
[39] During an Inspect and Replace Only As Necessary maintenance
program, vehicles are disassembled and inspected for deficiencies and
only those deficiencies that are identified are repaired or replaced.
[40] GAO-04-112.
[41] GAO-04-112.
[42] GAO-04-112.
[43] GAO-04-112.
[44] GAO-04-112.
[45] GAO-04-112.
[46] GAO-04-112.
[47] Officials state that the calculated service life for a B-1 is
18,000 hours, and they estimate that the fleet would reach that point
in 2040.
[48] GAO-04-112.
[49] The Air Force did not have a mission capable goal for the B-2 in
fiscal year 1999.
[50] The Mobility Capabilities Study is a DOD effort to address the
size of the required number of mobility airframes and aircrews
necessary to support implementation of the National Defense Strategy.
[51] GAO-04-112.
[52] GAO-04-112
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