Defense Management
Actions Are Needed to Improve the Management and Oversight of the National Guard Youth Challenge Program Gao ID: GAO-06-140 November 29, 2005The fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act established the National Guard Youth Challenge Program as a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness of providing military based training to improve the life skills of high school dropouts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for overall policy for the program. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides direct management and oversight. In 1998, Congress permanently authorized the program and began decreasing the federal cost share until it reached its current level of 60 percent in 2001. Conference Report 108-767 directed GAO to review the program. Specifically, GAO reviewed (1) historical trends of the program; (2) the extent of analyses performed to determine program costs and the need to adjust the federal and state cost share; and (3) NGB oversight of the program. GAO is also providing information on Reserve Affairs' and states' efforts to obtain funding from alternative sources.
Between fiscal years 1998 and 2004, total expenditures for the Challenge Program, including funds spent to cover the federal and state cost shares and federal management expenses, have increased from about $63 million to $107 million. During this same period, participation in the program has grown from 10 sites in 10 states to 29 sites in 24 states and Puerto Rico. Since the program's inception, NGB has reported positive performance outcomes in academic performance, community service activities, and post-residential placements. For example, in 2004, NGB reported graduating 7,003 students, or 79 percent of those enrolled, with 70 percent of those graduates earning a high school equivalent diploma. While Reserve Affairs and NGB have expressed concern about the current program funding level and have suggested increasing both the cost basis used to determine funding needs and the federal cost share, neither has performed analyses to support the need for such changes. Federal financial standards state that reliable cost information is crucial for effective management of government operations. Since 1993, NGB has used $14,000 per student as the basis for determining the amount of funds needed to cover program operating costs, and applied the federal-state cost share to this amount. To keep pace with inflation, NGB has suggested increasing the per student cost to $18,000. Reserve Affairs has reported some states are having difficulty meeting their share and, in 2004, recommended the federal share be increased from 60 percent to 75 percent. However, neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has compiled or analyzed data on actual program costs, states' financial situations, or the impact of adjusting the federal and state cost-share. Without better cost and financial information, the Department of Defense (DOD) cannot justify future funding requests or a change in the cost-share ratio. Although NGB uses various oversight mechanisms, it lacks a complete oversight framework, making it difficult to measure program effectiveness and to adequately address audit and review findings. Also, some audits have not been performed as required. The Government Performance and Results Act suggests a complete oversight framework including goals and measures against which to objectively evaluate performance. While NGB requires states to report certain performance outcomes, it does not require states to establish performance goals in these areas, and therefore does not have a firm basis for evaluating program outcomes and DOD's return on investment. Existing agreements require state programs to be audited at least every three years. However these audits have not been conducted as required and no provisions exist for submitting audit results to NGB. Without regular audits and access to results, NGB cannot be assured that programs are using federal funds appropriately and that audit findings are addressed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-140, Defense Management: Actions Are Needed to Improve the Management and Oversight of the National Guard Youth Challenge Program
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2005:
Defense Management:
Actions Are Needed to Improve the Management and Oversight of the
National Guard Youth Challenge Program:
GAO-06-140:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-140, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act established the
National Guard Youth Challenge Program as a pilot program to evaluate
the effectiveness of providing military based training to improve the
life skills of high school dropouts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, under the authority of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for overall policy
for the program. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides direct
management and oversight. In 1998, Congress permanently authorized the
program and began decreasing the federal cost share until it reached
its current level of 60 percent in 2001. Conference Report 108-767
directed GAO to review the program. Specifically, GAO reviewed (1)
historical trends of the program; (2) the extent of analyses performed
to determine program costs and the need to adjust the federal and state
cost share; and (3) NGB oversight of the program. GAO is also providing
information on Reserve Affairs‘ and states‘ efforts to obtain funding
from alternative sources.
What GAO Found:
Between fiscal years 1998 and 2004, total expenditures for the
Challenge Program, including funds spent to cover the federal and state
cost shares and federal management expenses, have increased from about
$63 million to $107 million. During this same period, participation in
the program has grown from 10 sites in 10 states to 29 sites in 24
states and Puerto Rico. Since the program‘s inception, NGB has reported
positive performance outcomes in academic performance, community
service activities, and post-residential placements. For example, in
2004, NGB reported graduating 7,003 students, or 79 percent of those
enrolled, with 70 percent of those graduates earning a high school
equivalent diploma.
While Reserve Affairs and NGB have expressed concern about the current
program funding level and have suggested increasing both the cost basis
used to determine funding needs and the federal cost share, neither has
performed analyses to support the need for such changes. Federal
financial standards state that reliable cost information is crucial for
effective management of government operations. Since 1993, NGB has used
$14,000 per student as the basis for determining the amount of funds
needed to cover program operating costs, and applied the federal-state
cost share to this amount. To keep pace with inflation, NGB has
suggested increasing the per student cost to $18,000. Reserve Affairs
has reported some states are having difficulty meeting their share and,
in 2004, recommended the federal share be increased from 60 percent to
75 percent. However, neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has compiled or
analyzed data on actual program costs, states‘ financial situations, or
the impact of adjusting the federal and state cost-share. Without
better cost and financial information, the Department of Defense (DOD)
cannot justify future funding requests or a change in the cost-share
ratio.
Although NGB uses various oversight mechanisms, it lacks a complete
oversight framework, making it difficult to measure program
effectiveness and to adequately address audit and review findings.
Also, some audits have not been performed as required. The Government
Performance and Results Act suggests a complete oversight framework
including goals and measures against which to objectively evaluate
performance. While NGB requires states to report certain performance
outcomes, it does not require states to establish performance goals in
these areas, and therefore does not have a firm basis for evaluating
program outcomes and DOD‘s return on investment. Existing agreements
require state programs to be audited at least every three years.
However these audits have not been conducted as required and no
provisions exist for submitting audit results to NGB. Without regular
audits and access to results, NGB cannot be assured that programs are
using federal funds appropriately and that audit findings are
addressed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends a number of actions designed to improve the management
and oversight of the National Guard Youth Challenge Program. DOD
concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-140.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results In Brief:
Background:
Challenge Program Expenditures and Participation Have Increased and NGB
Has Reported Positive Performance Outcomes:
Reserve Affairs and NGB Have Not Analyzed Data to Determine Actual
Program Costs or the Need to Adjust the Federal and State Cost Share:
The National Guard Bureau Lacks a Complete Framework for Oversight of
the Challenge Program, Making It Difficult to Measure Program
Effectiveness:
Reserve Affairs Lacks a Formal Approach for Securing Alternative
Funding Support for the Challenge Program, While Some Participating
States Have Obtained Alternative Funding Support as a Result of Their
Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: National Guard Youth Challenge Program Sites:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment:
Tables:
Table 1: Hypothetical Examples Showing How Changing the Cost Basis or
Cost-Share Ratio Would Affect Yearly Challenge Program Funding Amounts:
Table 2: States Selected for Site Visits or Interviews:
Figures:
Figure 1: Annual Expenditures for the National Guard Youth Challenge
Program:
Figure 2: Number of National Guard Youth Challenge Program Sites by
Reporting Year:
Figure 3: Youth Participation in National Guard Youth Challenge
Program:
Figure 4: Challenge Program Sites by 2004 Graduation Results:
Figure 5: Number of GEDs Earned by Challenge Students:
Figure 6: Post-Residential Placement Data, 2003-2005:
Abbreviations:
DMARS: Data Management and Reporting System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DOL: Department of Labor:
ED: Department of Education:
GED: general educational development:
NGB: National Guard Bureau:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 29, 2005:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
After Operation Desert Storm and the end of the Cold War, Congress
began to reevaluate the focus of U.S. military activities and proposed
using some military assets and training to help address critical
domestic challenges such as drugs, poverty, and unemployment. In
particular, some policymakers saw an opportunity to use the military's
capabilities to address domestic needs by providing role models for
youth and training and educational opportunities for the disadvantaged.
Section 1091 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 established the National Guard Youth Challenge Program (Challenge
Program) as a pilot program to evaluate the feasibility and
effectiveness of military based training to improve the life skills and
employability of high school dropouts. After the program was
permanently authorized in 1998, Congress began limiting the share of
state operating costs covered by the federal government through the
Department of Defense (DOD), which initially paid for 100 percent of
these costs. DOD now pays 60 percent of state operating costs, and
states provide 40 percent. In addition, the authorizing legislation for
the Challenge Program allows the Secretary of Defense to use nondefense
funding sources in support of the program.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, under the
authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, is responsible for management oversight of the Challenge
Program, including policy and funding issues, while the National Guard
Bureau (NGB) is responsible for the administration of the program,
including daily management and oversight. For example, NGB maintains
frequent contacts with state programs and conducts program evaluations
through a contractor, while Reserve Affairs prepares the program budget
based on input from NGB and ensures that states are able to provide
their required share. To participate in the program, states must sign a
cooperative agreement with NGB that lays out roles and responsibilities
among the states and NGB, and also provides guidance on the content of
the program. Since 1993, NGB has used a cost of $14,000 per student as
a basis for providing funds to state programs.
Conference Report 108-767 directed the Comptroller General to conduct a
study of the Challenge Program.[Footnote 1] Specifically, we examined:
(1) historical trends of the Challenge Program, including program
expenditures, participation, and performance; (2) the extent to which
Reserve Affairs and NGB have determined actual program costs and the
consequent need to adjust the federal and state cost share; and (3) the
extent to which NGB has provided oversight of the program. We also
determined the extent to which Reserve Affairs and participating states
have made an effort to obtain alternative funding support for the
Challenge Program.
In performing our work, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; NGB; the
Departments of Education, Labor, and Justice; the contractor that
monitors and evaluates state programs; the National Guard Youth
Foundation; and selected states. We also reviewed the program's annual
reports and other documents provided by Reserve Affairs and NGB as well
as the data management system used by states to collect Challenge
Program student information and track individual and program
activities. We concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for
our purposes. We analyzed program evaluations, resource management
reviews, and audits, in addition to reviewing existing policies and
procedures for managing the program. We conducted a survey of all 29
established programs to collect information on their budgets and
expenditures, federal and state funding levels, each state's ability to
fund their individual program, and the availability of funding from
other sources. We also visited or contacted eight Challenge Program
sites in seven states and asked them about any alternative sources of
funding for their programs. A detailed description of our scope and
methodology is presented in appendix I. We conducted our work from
January 2005 to October 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results In Brief:
According to NGB, program expenditures and state participation in the
Challenge Program have increased since the program began, and the
program has achieved positive performance outcomes. Between fiscal
years 1998 and 2004, total expenditures for the Challenge Program,
including funds spent to cover the federal and state cost shares and
federal management expenses, have increased from about $63 million to
about $107 million. For fiscal year 2004, for example, NGB spent
approximately $61.6 million for the federal share of the program and
$5.8 million for NGB management costs, while states contributed
approximately $40.5 million. Ten states participated in the first year
of the pilot program in 1993; and today there are 29 Challenge Program
sites in 24 states and Puerto Rico. Additionally, 9 states remain on a
waiting list to start new programs, and several states have expressed
an interest in expanding their existing programs. Some common
performance outcomes that NGB reports include the number of graduates
earning a general educational development credential, changes in
program students' scores on standardized math and reading tests, and
the number of community service hours performed by Challenge Program
students. For example, the Challenge Program reported that 70 percent
of graduates in 2004 earned a general education development credential.
Another performance outcome that NGB reports is the number of
placements of program graduates in continuing education, the military,
or the labor force at the time they complete their 12-month post-
residential phase. For example, in 2004, 3,698 graduates were placed in
one of these categories by the end of the post-residential phase of the
program.
Although Reserve Affairs and NGB have expressed concern about the
current program funding level and have suggested increasing both the
cost basis used to determine funding needs and the federal cost share,
we found that neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has performed analyses to
support the need for such changes. Good budget practices, included in
the Office of Management and Budget's Federal Financial Accounting
Standards, state that agencies should determine actual costs of their
activities on a regular basis and that reliable cost information is
crucial for effective management of government operations. Since 1993,
NGB has used a cost of $14,000 per student as the basis for determining
the amount of funds needed to cover program operating costs. However,
due to cost variations between states, program officials that we
surveyed reported that they actually spent between $9,300 and $31,031
per graduate. According to NGB, all 29 programs are providing the
services required by the cooperative agreements, and several states
have added program enhancements such as field trips or vocational
classes. However, some of these states reported that they reduced
nonrequired services to stay within their budgets. For example, they
implemented staff pay and hiring freezes, eliminated the student
stipend, and eliminated some enrichment activities such as field trips
and vocational classes. In addition, Reserve Affairs, NGB, and
participating states have suggested that the cost-share ratio be
changed from its current 60 percent federal share to a 75 percent
federal share because they believe that the current required 40 percent
state share is sometimes difficult for states to meet. However, neither
Reserve Affairs nor NGB has compiled or analyzed data on actual program
costs, states' financial situations, or the impact of adjusting the
federal and state cost share. Reserve Affairs has asked the National
Guard Bureau to determine a new funding formula for the program based
on individual state needs, but, at the time of our review, NGB had not
yet done so and Reserve Affairs has not given NGB a deadline for
completion. Without better cost and financial information, DOD cannot
justify future funding requests or a change in the cost share ratio.
Although NGB has several mechanisms in place for overseeing the
Challenge Program, it lacks a complete oversight framework, making it
difficult to measure the effectiveness of the program and to adequately
address audit and review findings. NGB conducts several oversight
activities, including informally communicating with state program
directors and having an outside evaluator conduct yearly operational
evaluations and biennial resource management reviews of the Challenge
Program, and these reports have prompted some changes to the program.
However, until recently, NGB did not have a formal mechanism for
tracking the findings of these reports. In response to our review, NGB
recently implemented a mechanism for tracking these findings. As part
of its oversight activities, NGB does require each state program to
report certain performance outcome measures, such as academic test
scores. However, it does not require states to establish performance
goals in these areas. A complete oversight framework includes
performance goals and measures against which to objectively measure
performance as well as a mechanism for tracking findings of audits or
reviews and responding to those findings. Without clear and agreed upon
performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to
fully measure program performance and effectiveness and thereby assess
DOD's return on investment. In addition, Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government states that agencies need to ensure that the
findings of audits and reviews are promptly resolved. Under the
cooperative agreements governing the Challenge Program, United States
property and fiscal officers in each state are required to conduct full
audits of the individual Challenge Programs at least once every three
years. However, according to property and fiscal officers that we spoke
with, all of these audits have not been conducted as required, due to
the low priority placed on these audits and lack of staff for the
property and fiscal officer. If these audits are not conducted, it may
be difficult to ensure that federal interests are adequately protected.
Copies of these audits are not currently being provided to program
managers at NGB because, according to the Chief of Property and Fiscal
Affairs at NGB, there is no specific requirement to do so. If the
National Guard does not see the audits, it cannot ensure that the
findings of these audits are promptly resolved.
The authorizing legislation for the Challenge Program allows the
Secretary of Defense to use nondefense funding sources in support of
the program, and allows states to supplement program funds from other
resources. However, Reserve Affairs has not adopted a formal strategy
for pursuing nondefense funding, while some states have been successful
in securing alternative funding support for their programs. Reserve
Affairs has primarily adopted informal strategies to contact agencies
outside DOD to inform them about the Challenge Program and seek
opportunities for partnerships, but has not been successful in securing
funds from these agencies. We found that because Reserve Affairs has
not made a formal business case to request funds from these nondefense
agencies, these agencies are unable to determine whether or not they
are specifically able to fund the Challenge Program. Officials from
some federal agencies told us that that their agencies have general
authority to provide funds to other programs if those programs are
consistent with their agency's interests. However, officials at the
Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, and the Department of
Education stated that Reserve Affairs needed to present more specific
information to them before they could determine whether funds could be
provided to the Challenge Program. According to those officials, at a
minimum, any such request should contain the amount of funding sought
and a sufficiently detailed description of the program to allow the
agency receiving the request to determine whether it would be an
appropriate use of funds. Until Reserve Affairs makes a more formal
request for funding, other agencies will be unable to determine if they
can provide funds for the Challenge Program. At the state level, some
states we contacted had made efforts to obtain alternative funding
support to enhance or maintain their program's operations. For example,
some state programs organized into charter schools to obtain funding
from local school districts, applied for National School Lunch Program
funding, obtained grants from nonprofit organizations, and received
additional funding from the state government beyond the required match.
Some states reported obstacles in securing supplemental funding, such
as the prohibition against using Challenge funds to hire grant writers.
We are making recommendations designed to improve DOD's management and
oversight of the Challenge Program and to strengthen efforts in
obtaining alternative funding support for the program. In commenting on
a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD's
comments and our evaluation of them appear later in this report.
Background:
The National Guard Youth Challenge Program is a 17-month program that
serves at-risk youth at 29 sites in 24 states and Puerto Rico. The
purpose of the program is to improve the education, life skills, and
employment potential of students by providing military-based training,
supervised work experience, and knowledge in eight core program
components.[Footnote 2] Students must be 16 to 18 years old, drug-free,
unemployed, high school dropouts, and not in trouble with the law. NGB
reports that more than 59,000 students have been graduated from the
Challenge Program since it began as a pilot in 1993. The program was
authorized by 32 U.S.C. §509 on a permanent basis in fiscal year 1998,
at which time states were to begin paying a share of operating costs.
Challenge Program Structure:
Each Challenge Program site operates two residential classes per year,
one of which begins in January and the other around July.[Footnote 3] A
typical graduation goal is 100 students per class, or 200 per year,
although several programs graduate more students. In 2004, for example,
Illinois graduated almost 800 students in 2004, and Louisiana's three
sites combined graduated more than 950 students. The residential phase
of the program runs 22 weeks and includes a 2-week Pre-Challenge phase.
During Pre-Challenge, applicants are assessed for their ability and
motivation to complete the remaining 20 weeks of the residential
program. Those who successfully complete Pre-Challenge are then
formally enrolled in the Challenge Program in numbers that equal each
program's graduation target plus normal program attrition rate. In the
residential phase, students receive military-based training and
supervised work experience. Additionally, each state develops a
curriculum that incorporates the eight core components and the tasks,
conditions, and standards that students must complete to demonstrate
progress in those components.[Footnote 4] Each student must receive a
score of at least 80 percent on each core component to be graduated
from the program.
During the 12-month post-residential phase, individuals who have
successfully completed the residential phase are involved in placement
activities, which include employment, education, volunteer activities,
or any combination of the three or military service. The graduates work
with adult mentors who were matched with them during the residential
phase. These mentors provide guidance and support to the graduates and
are required to contact the youths twice each month at a minimum.
Program staff use the written, post-residential action plan that each
student prepares and updates during the residential phase to monitor
placement activities. Mentors also use this plan during their
interactions with graduates. The Challenge Program reports youth
placement activities at the end of the 12-month follow-up period. To
further assess the long-term impact of the program, NGB has contracted
with AOC Solutions to conduct a retrospective longitudinal study of
program graduates as well as students who did not complete the program.
Program Funding:
Prior to 1998, the federal government, through DOD, completely funded
the Challenge Program. In fiscal year 1998, Congress began requiring
states to provide a minimum of 25 percent of their programs' operating
costs. The state cost share increased 5 percent each year until fiscal
year 2001, when it reached the current funding requirement of 40
percent.[Footnote 5] Although some states had provided more funds than
required in the past, program funding each year is now determined by
the 40 percent share, which is based on $14,000 for each youth targeted
for graduation. In addition to the federal and state funds used to
operate the program sites, DOD also provides funds for NGB management
expenses such as program evaluations, contractor-provided training, and
travel for training and workshops. These NGB program management costs
are not subject to the federal/state 60/40 cost share requirement.
Each state submits a budget to NGB that is based on that state's target
for number of graduates. Since the program's inception, the funding
provided by NGB has been based on a cost per student of
$14,000.[Footnote 6] For example, if a state has a target of 100
students per class (200 per year) to graduate, the estimated program
costs would be $2.8 million. The federal contribution, or 60 percent of
the total, would be $1.68 million, while the state contribution would
be $1.12 million.
To receive federal funding, a state must certify that it has sufficient
funds to provide its 40 percent share. State funds can be composed of
cash, noncash supplies, services, or a combination of these sources.
States are allowed to provide additional funding (over and above the 40
percent share) to the program from sources such as individual and
corporate donations, additional moneys from the state general fund or
other state revenue sources, or other federal funding. Some Challenge
Program sites, for example, operate as alternative schools and are
reimbursed by their state education agencies for portions of their
program costs.
Management, Oversight, and Support:
Reserve Affairs, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for preparing the annual
budget and reviewing state budgets and funding certifications. Reserve
Affairs is to monitor program compliance with DOD policy, issue
supplemental policy guidance, and submit the Challenge Program annual
report to Congress. NGB provides day-to-day administration and
oversight of the Challenge Program, issuing regulations, and submitting
budgets and annual report drafts to Reserve Affairs. NGB has contracted
with AOC Solutions to assist with the oversight of the Challenge
Program. AOC Solutions performs the annual operational evaluations and
the biennial resource management reviews. This contractor also pulls
together the program information for the annual report and maintains
and oversees the Data Management and Reporting System (DMARS), which is
used to collect student data and report on individual and program
activities. NGB has also contracted with Dare Mighty Things to provide
training and technical assistance to Challenge Program staff.[Footnote
7] Finally, NGB has United States property and fiscal officers in each
state who are responsible for receiving and accounting for all federal
Challenge Program funds and property under control of the National
Guard in that state. The property and fiscal officers are also
responsible for ensuring that federal funds are properly obligated and
expended.
NGB enters into cooperative agreements with governors of states
approved to participate in the Challenge Program. The cooperative
agreements describe the responsibilities of the states and NGB as well
as the funding, costs, and regulations for operating National Guard
Youth Programs.[Footnote 8] The cooperative agreements also define the
eight core components and provide guidance on how to run the
residential and post-residential phases and other aspects of the
Challenge Program. Each Challenge Program state is also required to
submit state plans and budget estimates for their state. These state
plans must include details on the state's procedures and be consistent
with overall program guidance provided by DOD. For example, state plans
include information on application and selection procedures, staffing
and staff training, and a detailed budget.
Challenge Program Expenditures and Participation Have Increased and NGB
Has Reported Positive Performance Outcomes:
According to NGB, Challenge Program expenditures and state
participation have increased since the program began, and the program
has achieved positive program performance outcomes over time. Since the
program's inception, total expenditures have increased from about $63
million to about $107 million per year. The number of states
participating in the Challenge Program has also increased, and several
states have expressed interest in adding a program or expanding
existing ones. Challenge sites must account for their activities
throughout the year, and NGB has reported positive performance outcomes
over time.
Program Expenditures Have Increased Over Time:
NGB reports that overall federal expenditures for the Challenge Program
have increased over time, but states have also increased their
expenditures since the program was permanently authorized in fiscal
year 1998. Between fiscal years 1998 and 2004, total expenditures for
the Challenge Program, including funds spent to cover the federal and
state cost shares and federal management expenses, have increased from
about $63 million to about $107 million. For fiscal year 2004, for
example, NGB expenses included $61.6 million for the federal cost share
and $5.8 million for NGB management costs, while states contributed
approximately $40.5 million.[Footnote 9] In addition, in 2000 and 2001,
the Challenge Program received $5 million and $7,483,500 respectively
from the Department of Justice. Reserve Affairs stated that the primary
use of these funds has been to start new Challenge Program sites. Since
2001, four programs were established using these funds and three
programs' operations were maintained in 2002. In total, approximately
$5.97 million remain unspent in a nonexpiring account. Officials at
Reserve Affairs and NGB told us that these funds remain unspent because
no new Challenge Programs have started. According to these officials,
new programs have not been established because state governments have
not committed the required 40 percent match. (See fig. 1 for total
program expenditures from fiscal year 1998 to 2004, broken down by
federal and state cost share and NGB management expenses.)
Figure 1: Annual Expenditures for the National Guard Youth Challenge
Program:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Federal cost shares for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 include $6.5
million from Department of Justice. State cost share amounts are the
required state matches only and do not include any additional funding
or in-kind support the states might have provided.
[End of figure]
The Number of States Participating in the Challenge Program Has
Increased:
When the pilot program began in 1993, there were 10 Challenge Program
sites in 10 states. The program has now grown to 29 sites in 24 states
and Puerto Rico.[Footnote 10] In fiscal year 2005, Wyoming received
funds to start up a program site. According to NGB, Wyoming will begin
its first class in January 2006. In addition to those states currently
operating Challenge Program sites, there are also nine states that have
expressed interest in establishing new programs.[Footnote 11] For
example, according to NGB officials, representatives from Washington
and Indiana National Guard units have visited some existing program
sites and are in the process of developing state programs. Other states
are interested in expanding their programs to serve more youth at
existing sites or to open new locations. On the other hand, for various
reasons including difficulty meeting the state match requirement, lack
of state support, and substandard facilities, four states have
discontinued their Challenge Programs. Connecticut, a pilot program
state, dropped its program in 1994 after two classes. Colorado
discontinued its program after 1999, Missouri after 2002, and New York
after 2003. Figure 2 describes the number of Challenge Program sites
for each year since the program began. Appendix II identifies the
individual states with Challenge Program sites.
Figure 2: Number of National Guard Youth Challenge Program Sites by
Reporting Year:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Reporting year is the time frame covered in annual reports. It
includes the July class from the previous year and the January class
from the current year.
[End of figure]
Student participation in and graduation from the Challenge Program have
also increased over time. States are required to track the number of
youth who have applied to the Challenge Program, enrolled in the third
week of the program (after the 2-week Pre-Challenge phase), and were
graduated from the residential phase. According to NGB, the target
graduation rate for 2004 was 6,961; the actual number of enrollees was
8,920; and 7,003 students were graduated, or 79 percent of those
enrolled, from the Challenge Program. Figure 3 shows the target
numbers, the actual number of students who were enrolled in the
residential phase at week 3, and the number that graduated from the
program from 2000 through 2004.
Figure 3: Youth Participation in National Guard Youth Challenge
Program:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Reporting year is the time frame covered in annual reports. It
includes the July class from the previous year and the January class
from the current year.
[End of figure]
Although all Challenge Programs graduate two classes per year, the
number of graduates per class varies. In addition, some states have
multiple programs. For example, Louisiana has three Challenge Programs
and, in 2004, graduated a total of 952 students. Figure 4 identifies
those states currently participating in the Challenge Program by the
number of graduates they reported for 2004.
Figure 4: Challenge Program Sites by 2004 Graduation Results:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The 2004 reporting year covers NGB classes 21 and 22, which began
in July 2003 and January 2004.
[End of figure]
NGB Has Reported Positive Performance Outcomes:
NGB has reported positive performance outcomes in academic performance,
community service activities, and post-residential placements. Program
performance information is tracked by each Challenge site and submitted
to NGB. Each year, the Challenge Program reports on outcomes for the
two classes completing the 22-week residential phase during that
reporting year and for the two preceding classes as they complete their
1-year post-residential follow-up phase. The Challenge Program sites
use the same automated system, DMARS, to collect information on
students and report on their progress and activities. The information
collected in DMARS is reviewed by the contractor through weekly and
monthly reports and during random checks of source documents during
operational evaluation site visits.
Some residential phase outcomes of the Challenge Program, such as the
number of graduates earning a general educational development (GED)
credential or high school degree and changes in scores on standardized
math and reading tests, are tied to the core component of Academic
Excellence.[Footnote 12] For example, NGB reported that 70 percent of
graduates in 2004 earned a GED. Figure 5 illustrates the outcomes of
GED attainment for the past 5 reporting years. Students also take the
Tests of Adult Basic Education, a series of tests that identify
individual education levels in various academic subject areas. Each
state program tests its students early in the residential phase and
then toward the end of the 22-week period, and it reports the changes
in test scores. In 2004, for example, NGB reported that graduating
students improved 1.7 grade levels in reading and 1.8 grade levels in
math during the residential phase. Another core component, Service to
the Community, requires each student to perform a minimum of 40 hours
of service to the community or conservation project activities. The
number of community service hours performed by each student is tracked,
and the total number of hours for each site is another outcome that the
Challenge Program reports annually. For example, in 2004, NGB reported
that Challenge Program students performed more than 590,000 hours of
community service, such as maintaining historical cemeteries and parks
and supporting organizations such as Special Olympics and Habitat for
Humanity.
Figure 5: Number of GEDs Earned by Challenge Students:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Each month of the post-residential phase, each Challenge
Program graduate, or that individual's mentor, reports on the
graduate's post-residential activities. Following the 12-month post-
residential phase, each Challenge Program site reports graduate
placements in continuing education, the military, or the labor force.
These placements are verified with schools, the military, and employers
and are documented. Program representatives are not always able to
contact all graduates for placement information and therefore placement
data reflect only the students contacted, not all graduates. Education
placements include returning to high school or going to a post-
secondary or vocational-training institution, which students may be
attending full-or part-time. Some Challenge Program graduates also
enter the military, into either the active or the reserve forces. Post-
residential employment placements can be full-or part-time, and they
include those graduates who are self-employed. Graduates can have
placements in more than one of these categories. For example, an
individual might be attending school and working part-time. Challenge
Program sites continue to update their placement records after the 12-
month follow-up period when they come in contact with former students.
During the longitudinal study, for example, the contractor has been
able to update placement data based on information received from state
program officials and graduates. Figure 6 shows post-residential
placement trends for the past 3 reporting years. The total numbers of
graduates placed in these 3 years are 2,407 in 2003; 3,698 in 2004; and
4,086 in 2005.
Figure 7: Post-Residential Placement Data, 2003-2005:
[See PDF for image]
Notes: Program representatives are not always able to contact all
graduates for placement information and therefore placement data
reflect only the students contacted, not all graduates.
[A] According to DOD, data for 2005 are preliminary, may change, and
have not yet been officially published in an annual report.
[B] Miscellaneous placements include caregivers, volunteers,
homemakers, incarcerated, or individuals who are unable to hold an
approved placement due to disability and/or hospitalization. Graduates
must care for an individual or work as a volunteer for a minimum of 30
hours per week to be considered placed as a caregiver or volunteer.
[End of figure]
Reserve Affairs and NGB Have Not Analyzed Data to Determine Actual
Program Costs or the Need to Adjust the Federal and State Cost Share:
Although Reserve Affairs and NGB have expressed concern about the
current program funding level and have suggested increasing both the
cost basis used to determine funding needs and the federal cost share,
we found that neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has performed analyses to
support the need for such changes. Good budget practices, included in
the Office of Management and Budget's Federal Financial Accounting
Standards,[Footnote 13] state that agencies should determine actual
costs of their activities on a regular basis and that reliable cost
information is crucial for effective management of government
operations. Without better cost and financial information, DOD cannot
justify future funding requests or a change in the cost-share ratio.
Other than calculating how inflation has affected program costs, NGB
has not analyzed data on actual program costs. Since 1993, NGB has used
a cost of $14,000 per student as the basis for determining the amount
of funds needed to cover program operating costs. In 2003, NGB
calculated that if that amount were adjusted for inflation, it would be
$18,000. The results of our survey of all Challenge Programs showed
that in 2004, states actually spent between $9,300 and $31,031 per
graduate with an average of $15,898 per graduate.[Footnote 14] In
addition, our survey showed that, on average, states estimated that the
program should be funded at approximately $16,900 per target graduate
to cover all of the services in the cooperative agreements, although
the estimates ranged from $14,000 to $31,800.[Footnote 15] Most
Challenge Program officials also told us that increasing the cost per
student funding level for the program without increasing the federal
cost share would negatively impact their programs because their states
would be unlikely to come up with the additional state match money.
Because costs vary between states due to regional differences in salary
levels, staff benefits, and facility costs, Reserve Affairs has asked
NGB to determine a new funding formula for the program based on
individual state needs. At the time of our review, NGB had not yet done
this and Reserve Affairs has not given NGB a deadline for completion.
In addition to expressing a desire to change the amount of funding per
student, Reserve Affairs, NGB, and participating states have suggested
that the cost-share ratio be changed from its current 60 percent
federal share to a 75 percent federal share because they believe that
the current 40 percent state share is sometimes difficult for states to
meet; however, neither Reserve Affairs nor NGB has analyzed states'
financial situations or the impact of adjusting the federal and state
cost share. Challenge Program officials told us that increasing the
federal cost share of the program would be beneficial because it would
enable states to expand their existing programs; give states more
flexibility in funding their programs; and allow programs to restore to
students some services that had been eliminated due to budgetary
constraints. Although we did not analyze how changing the cost basis or
the cost-share ratio would affect specific states, we prepared
hypothetical examples for illustrative purposes. Table 1 shows how
changing the cost basis and the cost-share ratio would affect federal
and state required funding levels.
Table 1: Hypothetical Examples Showing How Changing the Cost Basis or
Cost-Share Ratio Would Affect Yearly Challenge Program Funding Amounts:
Current funding situation of $14,000 per student and 60 percent
federally funded;
Per individual program: Typical number of students per program: 200;
Per individual program: State cost share per program: $1,120,000;
Per individual program: Federal cost share per program: $1,680,000;
Per individual program: Total number of students in program[A]: 7,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required state cost share: $39,200,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required federal cost share:
$58,800,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total program cost[B]: $98,000,000.
Change in cost basis to $16,900[C] per student and 60 percent federally
funded;
Per individual program: Typical number of students per program: 200;
Per individual program: State cost share per program: $1,352,000;
Per individual program: Federal cost share per program: $2,028,000;
Per individual program: Total number of students in program[A]: 7,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required state cost share: $47,320,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required federal cost share:
$70,980,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total program cost[B]: $118,300,000.
Change in funding ratio to 75 percent federally funded with cost basis
of $14,000 per student;
Per individual program: Typical number of students per program: 200;
Per individual program: State cost share per program: $700,000;
Per individual program: Federal cost share per program: $2,100,000;
Per individual program: Total number of students in program[A]: 7,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required state cost share: $24,500,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required federal cost share:
$73,500,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total program cost[B]: $98,000,000.
Change in cost basis to $16,900[C] per student and 75 percent federally
funded;
Per individual program: Typical number of students per program: 200;
Per individual program: State cost share per program: $845,000;
Per individual program: Federal cost share per program: $2,535,000;
Per individual program: Total number of students in program[A]: 7,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required state cost share: $29,575,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total required federal cost share:
$88,725,000;
Total Challenge Program: Total program cost[B]: $118,300,000.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Approximate number of students currently in program.
[B] This amount does not include NGB overhead costs.
[C] This amount is based on the average amount that states estimated in
our survey would cover all of the services outlined in the cooperative
agreements.
[End of table]
In our survey, states reported varying views on whether they were
experiencing difficulty in meeting their share of program costs. We did
not verify the basis for their responses. Our survey showed that some
states are able to provide funds above the required match; some states
provide only the required match; and some states are unable to provide
a match based on $14,000 per student and therefore fund the program at
a lower level and receive less money from NGB. For example, California
is able to provide additional support beyond the required match through
additional money provided from the state general fund and funding from
the program's local school district. In 2004, California spent
approximately $20,200 per graduate. Oregon, on the other hand, funds
its program primarily through state education money. Due to recent
state budget difficulties, Oregon cannot fund the program at $14,000
per student. In 2004, Oregon spent approximately $12,600 per graduate.
According to the National Guard Bureau, all 29 programs are providing
the services required by the cooperative agreements, and several states
have added program enhancements such as field trips or vocational
classes. However, some states reported that they reduced nonrequired
services to stay within their budgets. For example, they implemented
pay and hiring freezes; eliminated the student stipend; and eliminated
program enrichment activities, such as field trips and vocational
classes. Some states told us that additional funding, provided by a
change in the cost-share ratio or an increase in the per student
funding amount, would allow them to restore some of these services.
The National Guard Bureau Lacks a Complete Framework for Oversight of
the Challenge Program, Making It Difficult to Measure Program
Effectiveness:
Although NGB has several mechanisms in place for overseeing the
Challenge Program, it lacks a complete oversight framework, making it
difficult to measure the effectiveness of the program. A complete
oversight framework, as suggested by the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act)[Footnote 16] and Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 17] includes
performance goals and measures against which to objectively measure
performance as well as a mechanism for tracking findings of audits or
reviews and responding to those findings. Currently, NGB does not
require participating states to establish performance goals for
individual programs and therefore does not have a firm basis for
evaluating program outcomes and DOD's return on investment. In
accordance with the cooperative agreements, U.S. property and fiscal
officers in each state are required to conduct full audits of state
Challenge Programs at least every 3 years. However, these audits have
not been conducted as required; and, when audits are conducted, copies
of the results are not provided to NGB for review. Without regular
audits and access to results, NGB cannot be assured that programs are
using federal funds appropriately and that audit findings are
addressed.
The National Guard Bureau Conducts Several Oversight Activities and
Recently Implemented a Mechanism for Tracking Audit Findings:
NGB conducts several oversight activities for the Challenge Program. In
accordance with the DOD Instruction[Footnote 18] and cooperative
agreements governing the Challenge Program, NGB is responsible for the
overall administration of the program, including program oversight. NGB
uses both informal and formal mechanisms to oversee the program. On an
informal basis, NGB frequently communicates with state program
directors via e-mail and telephone calls. In addition, according to
NGB, if a program director has a problem or an issue that he or she
feels NGB needs to be involved with, he or she will initiate contact.
Formal oversight of the program is conducted by NGB through AOC
Solutions with yearly operational evaluations and biennial resource
management reviews of all 29 Challenge Programs. The purpose of the
operational evaluations is to assess the programs' compliance with the
cooperative agreements and the implementation of the eight core
components. The resource management reviews focus on assessing
programs' financial accountability and reviewing resources including
staffing levels and salaries; food service costs; and physical
inventory of property.
Both the operational evaluations and the resource management reviews
have identified areas for improvement and, according to NGB, changes
were made to the program. For example, the operational evaluation of
one state program conducted in fiscal year 2004 reported that program
staff was calling the students inappropriate names. According to NGB, a
staff member was dismissed as a result of this finding. Another
operational evaluation of a different program conducted in fiscal year
2005 found that over 90 percent of the community service hours
accumulated by the students were for kitchen patrol. The cooperative
agreements state that work in the dining facility may not be counted
towards community service hours. According to NGB, this program has
completely revamped its community service program and students now
participate in such activities as visiting with residents of the local
veterans' home and caring for a historic cemetery.
Until recently, NGB did not have a formal mechanism for tracking the
findings of the reports conducted by AOC Solutions. During our review,
we discussed with NGB the importance of keeping track of review
findings in order to adequately respond to these findings, in
accordance with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government. In response to our review, in October 2005, NGB provided
new guidance to AOC Solutions regarding the operational evaluations and
resource management reviews, which required, among other things, AOC
Solutions to review findings from previous evaluation reports to
determine whether corrective actions have been taken where warranted.
In addition, officials at NGB told us that they currently monitor
responses to audit and review findings informally with individual
program directors.
The National Guard Bureau Does Not Require Participating States to
Establish Performance Goals for the Challenge Program:
Although NGB requires state Challenge Programs to report on certain
outcome measures, such as GED attainment and number of graduates, NGB
does not require states to establish any performance goals in these
areas to measure the effectiveness of the program. The establishment of
performance goals is consistent with the principles of effective
management as set forth in the Results Act and would allow NGB to
better evaluate the overall performance of the program and to assess
DOD's return on its investment. Without clear and agreed upon
performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to
fully measure program performance and thereby assess DOD's return on
investment.
Although it may not be reasonable to have the same performance goal for
all state programs, it would be appropriate for each state program to
negotiate a performance goal for defined performance areas such as
increases in standardized test scores or physical fitness levels.
Similar state programs, overseen by the Department of Labor, set
individual negotiated levels of performance for specified core
performance measures. These measures are used to provide information
for systemwide reporting and evaluation for program improvement. For
example, state Workforce Investment Act[Footnote 19] programs negotiate
performance measures for youth ages 14 to 18 in three areas: attainment
of basic skills; attainment of high school diplomas or their
equivalents; and placement in education, the workforce, or the
military. For the area of diploma attainment, the goals range from 42.8
percent of participants in Louisiana to 68 percent of participants in
New Hampshire.
Currently, Challenge Program states are required to submit state plans
annually. These state plans are required to contain long-term and
annual performance goals and are to be updated annually. However, NGB
has not provided guidance on specific performance areas where states
should focus their goals; therefore, states may not have goals in the
same performance areas, making it difficult for NGB to compare
performance across programs. For example, California's state plan
contains a goal to acquire additional sources of funding through grants
and charitable contributions. Oregon's state plan, on the other hand,
contains a goal stating that 80 percent of graduates from the
residential portion of the program will be placed in education, the
military, or employment but does not contain any goal related to
acquiring additional sources of funding. In addition, states are not
currently held accountable to the goals that they do set since the
evaluation process does not measure the states' performance against
their goals. NGB told us that beginning in January 2006, states would
be held accountable to the goals outlined in their state plans.
U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers Have Not Conducted Required Audits
and Audit Results Are Not Provided to NGB:
Although the cooperative agreements governing the Challenge Program
currently require U.S. property and fiscal officers to perform full
audits of state Challenge Programs at least every 3 years, and prior to
January 2005, the cooperative agreements required full audits every
year, these audits have not been conducted as required. For example,
according to NGB, out of a required 29 audits, only 14 were conducted
in 2003, and only 7 audits were conducted in 2004. According to
property and fiscal officers that we spoke with, audits were not
conducted due to the lower priority placed on these audits compared to
other audits that needed to be conducted within the state and a lack of
staff to conduct the audits. Because the property and fiscal officers
are responsible for ensuring that federal dollars are appropriately
spent, if these audits are not conducted, it may be difficult to ensure
that federal interests are adequately protected.
When the property and fiscal officers do conduct audits of the
Challenge Program, they are not currently providing copies of the audit
results to NGB because, according to the Chief of Property and Fiscal
Affairs at NGB, there is no specific requirement to do so. Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agencies
need to ensure that the findings of audits and reviews are promptly
resolved. If NGB does not review these audits, it cannot ensure that
audit findings are resolved or identify trends across programs that may
require action at a programwide level. According to officials at NGB,
the audits remain internal to the state and the property and fiscal
officer works directly with the state Challenge Program site to resolve
any issues. In addition, if any audit findings require action from NGB,
the state property and fiscal officer will contact NGB and ask for
assistance. NGB needs to be aware of all audit findings, including
those reported by the property and fiscal officers to effectively
manage the Challenge Program.
We reviewed the most recent property and fiscal officer audits for each
Challenge Program participating state and found that they did identify
areas that needed improvement. For example, an audit conducted of one
program in fiscal year 2004 found unspent program dollars totaling
approximately $180,000 that needed to be returned to the NGB. According
to a follow-up report by the property and fiscal officer, this money
was returned to NGB. Another audit conducted during fiscal year 2003
found that oversight of budget expenditures for one program was not
adequate to ensure accurate, timely, and complete accounting of
expenditures and recommended that key management controls over the
program be identified, documented, published and tested. A follow-up
audit of the program found that this recommendation was implemented.
Reserve Affairs Lacks a Formal Approach for Securing Alternative
Funding Support for the Challenge Program, While Some Participating
States Have Obtained Alternative Funding Support as a Result of Their
Efforts:
Reserve Affairs has not adopted a formal strategy for pursuing
nondefense funding, while some participating states have obtained
alternative funding support for their programs as a result of their own
efforts. Because Reserve Affairs has not made a formal business case to
request funds from nondefense agencies, these agencies are unable to
determine whether or not they are able to fund the Challenge Program.
As a result, Reserve Affairs is potentially missing out on additional
sources of funding that could enhance the program. Some participating
states have obtained alternative funding support to enhance or maintain
services provided to Challenge Program students.
Nondefense Agencies Are Unable to Determine If They Can Fund the
Challenge Program without a More Formal Request for Funding:
Reserve Affairs has not made a formal business case to request funds
from nondefense agencies and therefore these agencies are unable to
determine whether or not they are able to fund the Challenge Program.
Although the authorizing legislation for the Challenge Program allows
the Secretary of Defense to use nondefense funding sources in support
of the program, Reserve Affairs has not adopted a formal strategy for
pursuing nondefense funding. Rather, Reserve Affairs has primarily
adopted informal strategies to contact agencies outside DOD to inform
them about the Challenge Program and seek opportunities for
partnerships. For example, Reserve Affairs officials have sent
information via e-mail to officials at federal agencies with programs
targeting at-risk youth (i.e. Department of Justice (DOJ), Department
of Labor (DOL), and Department of Education (ED)) to inform them about
the Challenge Program. These e-mails did not include specific requests
for program funding. In addition, in July 2003, Reserve Affairs
presented senior DOL officials with a proposal for forming an
interagency partnership with the Challenge Program, but did not ask for
a commitment of funding from DOL in a specified amount. Additionally,
officials from these agencies have been invited to events sponsored by
the National Guard Youth Foundation in support of the Challenge
Program. Lastly, Reserve Affairs officials told us that they
participate or have participated on a number of interagency councils
and working groups that represent at-risk youth such as the President's
Crime Prevention Council, the White House Federal Interagency Working
Group on Service, the Corporation for National and Community Service,
the National Civilian Community Corps, the Math Science Initiative, and
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Council.[Footnote 20]
Officials from DOJ, DOL, and ED noted that their agencies have general
authority to provide funds to other programs if the transferred funds
were used to support a program consistent with their agency's
interests. It is not unprecedented for an agency to transfer funds to
the Challenge Program. In fiscal years 2000 and 2001, DOD and DOJ
signed an interagency agreement under which DOJ agreed to provide $5
million in 2000 and $7,483,500 in 2001 to the Challenge
Program.[Footnote 21] As DOJ concluded in this situation, and as
officials at DOJ, DOL and ED stated, the transfer of funds to another
agency must be consistent with the purpose and legal requirements of
the program from which funds would be transferred. Moreover, these
officials stated that sufficient funding must be available in the
program from which the funds would be transferred, and making such a
transfer must be in the interest of the agency.
Officials at DOJ, DOL, and ED stated that Reserve Affairs needed to
present more specific information to them before they could make a
determination as to whether funds could be provided to the Challenge
Program. These officials stated that an executive branch agency that
wishes to make a request for funding from another executive branch
agency could make such a request in any number of ways, either formally
or informally. At a minimum, they noted, any such request should
contain the amount of funding sought and a sufficiently detailed
description of the program to allow the agency receiving the request to
determine whether it would be an appropriate use of funds. At the time
of our review, none of the agency officials we met with were aware of
any specific request from Reserve Affairs concerning this matter. Until
Reserve Affairs makes a more formal request for funding, other agencies
will be unable to determine if they are able to provide funds for the
Challenge Program.
Some Participating States Have Obtained Alternative Funding Support to
Enhance or Maintain Services Provided to Challenge Program Students:
Under cooperative agreements with NGB, states are not required to seek
funding support beyond the required federal and state contributions;
however, some states have made efforts to obtain alternative funding
support for their programs to enhance or maintain the services provided
to Challenge Program students. Under authorizing legislation for the
Challenge Program, states may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or
donations of money, other property, or services for the Challenge
Program. Reserve Affairs and NGB officials said that they encouraged
states to seek out additional funding sources for their programs if
they want to enhance the services provided to program students.
To assist state programs in their efforts to obtain that additional
support, NGB, through its contractor Dare Mighty Things, shares
information among state programs on strategies for successfully
organizing a 501 (c) (3) corporation,[Footnote 22] developing a
fundraising policy that focuses on the long-term vision of the
Challenge Program, accessing and sharing a grant writer with other
programs, applying for National School Lunch Program funds, and
educating state legislators to secure funding support. By providing
information and examples of programs that are currently implementing
these strategies, other state Challenge Programs have the information
available to them on how to obtain additional funding support for their
programs. In our review of the program, we found that some states had
identified strategies for soliciting additional funding support from
nonprofit organizations. For example, in the annual plans submitted to
NGB, some states developed specific strategies for obtaining additional
funding support such as setting a goal for the number of grants they
would apply for and establishing a 501 (c) (3) corporation to raise
funds on behalf of the program.
We saw further evidence of states' efforts to obtain additional funding
support through our site visits and in our survey of the 29 Challenge
Program sites. For example, in one state we visited, the Challenge site
was also a charter school, which allowed the program to receive
additional funding from the local school district. Moreover, in four
states we visited, the state legislatures provided additional funding
beyond the required state match of 40 percent to pay for additional
staffing costs or facilities. According to our survey of all Challenge
Programs, 28 out of 29 programs identified receiving some type of
funding support beyond the required federal and state contributions to
pay for program expenditures incurred during 1999 through 2004. These
programs identified receiving additional funding from the states'
general fund beyond the required state match as well as support from
other state agencies such as the state Department of Education.
Additionally, the programs we surveyed relied on funding assistance
from other federal agencies such as the Department of Agriculture,
which provides funding under the National School Lunch Program;
nonprofit organization grants; the programs' private 501 (c) (3)
corporation; and donations from private individuals.
Results from our site visits and national survey also showed that state
Challenge Programs rely on donations of goods and services to support
the program. For example, states we visited relied on donations from
private citizens, corporations, schools, and the states' National Guard
units for such items as computers and software, exercise equipment,
books, uniforms, and shoes. Some programs also received support from
the surrounding community in the form of donated services such as
transportation assistance and medical services from local doctors and
nurses. Our survey further showed that 21 out of 29 programs received
some form of donated goods and services. Program officials we met
stated that donations of goods and services were vital to programs
because many times they do not have funds available to acquire
equipment or services for the program. Donations of goods and services
can enhance the basic program beyond the military-based training and
academics required under the cooperative agreements adding little or no
cost to the program.
Despite the success that many states had in obtaining additional
funding support and donations of goods and services for their programs,
some states reported obstacles in securing supplemental funding. For
example, the cooperative agreements governing the Challenge Program do
not allow states to use Challenge Program funds to hire full-time grant
writers. Lastly, some programs we visited expressed concern that if
they received funding support outside the federal and state required
contributions, then their state governments might reduce their
allocations.
Conclusions:
Although Reserve Affairs, NGB, and participating states have suggested
the current cost basis of $14,000 per student is not sufficient to
sustain the program and that the cost-share ratio should be changed,
Reserve Affairs and NGB have done little analysis to show what the
actual costs of the program are and how changing the cost-share ratio
for the program would impact participating states. Without better cost
and financial information, DOD cannot justify future funding requests
or a change in the cost-share ratio.
Until NGB establishes clear and agreed upon performance goals, there is
no objective yardstick against which to fully measure program
performance. Without these performance goals in place, NGB does not
have a firm basis for evaluating program outcomes and DOD's return on
investment.
Although property and fiscal officers are required to conduct full
audits of the Challenge Program at least every 3 years, these audits
have not been conducted due to competing priorities at the state level
and a lack of staff. Without these audits, it may be difficult to
ensure that federal interests are adequately protected. Also, because
NGB does not receive copies of audits conducted by property and fiscal
officers, it cannot know what the findings of these audits were and if
changes were made to the programs based on these findings.
Until Reserve Affairs makes a more formal request for funding, other
agencies will be unable to determine if they can provide funds for the
Challenge Program. Without a more formal process that outlines the
amount of funding needed and a detailed description of the Challenge
Program and its specific funding needs, Reserve Affairs is potentially
missing out on additional sources of funding that could enhance the
program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the management and oversight of the National Guard Youth
Challenge Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, direct
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in
consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to take the
following three actions:
* Determine the actual costs of the Challenge Program, including
states' ability to fund their share of the program, and use this
information, as appropriate, to support funding requests or a request
to change the cost-share ratio.
* Establish performance goals to measure the effectiveness of the
Challenge Program.
* Direct U.S. property and fiscal officers to conduct audits as
required and require that copies of audit results are provided to the
appropriate office at the National Guard Bureau in order to ensure that
the results of audits are promptly reviewed and resolved.
To strengthen efforts at obtaining alternative funding in support of
the National Guard Youth Challenge Program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, to develop more formal strategies for requesting
alternative funding support for the Challenge Program. Such strategies
may include submitting requests for funding that include the amount of
funding requested and a sufficiently detailed description of the
proposed program to allow potential providers of funds, such as
nondefense agencies, to determine whether it would be an appropriate
use of their funds.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. In its overall comments, DOD asserts that our report
reaffirms that the program met its congressional mandate to improve the
life skills and employment potential of participants by providing
military-based training and supervised work experience. Further, DOD's
comments state that our report validates the core program components of
assisting participants to receive a high school diploma or its
equivalent; developing leadership skills; promoting fellowship and
community service; developing life coping and job skills; and improving
physical fitness, health and hygiene. DOD also states that it
appreciates GAO's confirmation that it is properly executing the
program.
We do not agree with DOD's characterization of our report. Whereas our
report provides background data on program performance and mentions
that DOD has reported positive outcomes from the Challenge Program, we
do not assess whether or not DOD met its congressional mandate; we do
not validate the program's core components, nor do we confirm that DOD
is properly executing the program, as DOD's comments suggest. Rather
our objectives were to examine: (1) historical trends of the National
Guard Youth Challenge Program, including program expenditures,
participation, and performance; (2) the extent to which Reserve Affairs
and the NGB have determined actual program costs and the need to adjust
the federal and state cost-share; and (3) the extent to which the NGB
has provided oversight of the program. We also determined the extent to
which Reserve Affairs and participating states have made an effort to
obtain alternative funding support for the Challenge Program.
In response to our recommendation to determine the actual costs of the
Challenge Program, including the ability of states to fund their share,
DOD concurred, but claims that the matching fund requirement makes the
program vulnerable to state budget cuts. DOD also contends that until
recently, sluggish state revenues made the cost share requirement more
burdensome and inhibited the ability of both the NGB and the states to
focus on determining the actual costs of the Challenge Program. DOD
claims that the budget shortfalls required the states to reduce and/or
eliminate program services and that, with state revenues slowly closing
their budget gaps, restoring funding for needed program services is
being considered. DOD also notes that it is currently working on a new
funding formula for the program.
Although DOD's comments suggest that adequate funding was not available
for needed services, through our survey and other work, we found that
all 29 programs were able to provide the services required by the
cooperative agreements, and several states reported they added program
enhancements such as field trips or vocational classes. However, some
states reported that they reduced nonrequired services to stay within
their budgets. Furthermore, the basis for DOD's comment regarding the
effect of the matching fund requirement and the level of state revenues
on the program is unclear. As we reported, neither Reserve Affairs nor
NGB has compiled or analyzed data on actual program costs, states'
financial situations, or the impact of adjusting the federal and state
cost share. We continue to believe that any future funding request, or
a request to change the cost share requirement, should be based on an
analysis of the actual costs of the program.
DOD's comments are printed in their entirety in appendix III.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. This report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine historical trends of the National Guard Youth Challenge
Program, including program expenditures, participation, and
performance, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the National Guard Bureau
(NGB); and the contractor that monitors and evaluates state programs,
AOC Solutions. We reviewed other documentation provided by Reserve
Affairs and NGB, such as program funding summaries. We also reviewed
the Challenge Program's annual reports submitted to Congress from 1994
through the present, excluding 1997,[Footnote 23] which provided us
background information on the program. For data on participation and
performance outcomes, including general education development
credential attainment, community service hours, and post-residential
placements, we relied on the Data Management and Reporting System
(DMARS) that is used by NGB to collect participant information and
track individual and program activities. DMARS was implemented for the
2003 reporting year, and the contractor has performed procedures to
clean up the data as far back as 2000. We conducted data reliability
tests on the program's annual reports and data management system to
conclude that the data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We
did not compare the costs or outcomes of this program to other similar
youth programs currently funded by the federal government since that
was not within the scope of this engagement.
To assess the extent to which Reserve Affairs and NGB determined actual
program costs and analyzed states' ability to fund their share of the
program, we interviewed officials at Reserve Affairs and NGB as well as
officials at state programs. We reviewed and analyzed internal budget
documents prepared by state programs and submitted to NGB annually as
well as documents prepared by individual program directors that
discussed the funding situation in their state. We also reviewed and
analyzed good budget practices as described in federal financial
accounting standards. Using a semi-structured questionnaire, we
interviewed eight state Challenge Program directors and their budget
officers in seven states and discussed sources of funding for their
programs, actual costs of operating their programs, and the types of
services that are provided to program participants given the available
funding. States selected for site visits or telephone interviews are
shown in table 2. There were a number of factors which affected the
judgmental sampling of these state programs. States were chosen because
of their length of time in the program, size, geographic location,
experience of the program's director, and whether or not there were
multiple programs in the state. Additionally, in July 2005, we surveyed
all 29 participating Challenge Programs and asked them about the actual
costs of their programs and their assessment of their states' ability
to fund the programs. This survey had a response rate of 100 percent.
Table 2: States Selected for Site Visits or Interviews:
State: Arizona;
Program Name: Arizona Project Challenge.
State: California;
Program Name: California Grizzly Youth Academy.
State: Illinois;
Program Name: Illinois Lincoln's Challenge Academy.
State: Maryland;
Program Name: Maryland Freestate Challenge Academy.
State: Oregon;
Program Name: Oregon National Guard Youth Challenge Program.
State: South Carolina;
Program Name: Camp Long.
State: South Carolina;
Program Name: Columbia.
State: Wisconsin;
Program Name: Wisconsin National Guard Challenge Academy.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess the extent to which NGB has provided oversight of the
Challenge Program, we interviewed officials at Reserve Affairs and NGB
as well as program officials at the state level. To determine the
oversight responsibilities of federal and state officials involved in
the program, we reviewed and analyzed pertinent laws, the Department of
Defense's (DOD) Instruction governing the program, and the NGB Master
Cooperative Agreement, which defines the terms and conditions of the
program in each state. We also interviewed the independent contractor
hired by NGB to conduct yearly and biennial on-site program reviews,
AOC Solutions. We obtained access to its data management system and
analyzed the program evaluations and resource management reviews it
completed on behalf of NGB since 2003. We also reviewed and analyzed
individual state program's annual plans and NGB's strategic plan to
identify the types of goals set by the Challenge program. We consulted
previous GAO work regarding performance measurement and evaluations,
identified best practices for establishing and measuring performance
goals, and reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. We
interviewed representatives of the U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer's
Office in six states as well as the NGB Chief of Property and Fiscal
Affairs to determine the time frame for completing audits and
mechanisms for reporting, tracking, and resolving issues that arise out
of the PFO audits.
To determine the extent to which Reserve Affairs and participating
states have obtained alternative funding support for the program, we
reviewed relevant laws, policies, and reports to determine the relevant
authorities for receiving and transferring funds between federal
agencies. We also interviewed federal officials at Reserve Affairs and
the Departments of Labor, Education, and Justice to determine the
extent to which these agencies discussed the possibility of
transferring funds to DOD in support of the Challenge program. To
determine states' efforts at obtaining alternative funding support for
their program's operations, we conducted a survey of all 29
participating programs to collect information about their sources of
funding for the program, how funding is distributed across different
program operational functions, the sources and types of donated goods
and services, and descriptions of strategies programs use to obtain
alternative funding support. Using a semi-structured questionnaire, we
interviewed eight state Challenge Program directors and members of
their staff in seven states and discussed sources of funding for their
programs, the strategies these specific programs use for obtaining
alternative funding support and donations, and the difficulties these
states face in seeking out other funding.
We provided a draft of this report to officials at DOD for their review
and incorporated their comments where appropriate. We conducted our
work from January 2005 to October 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: National Guard Youth Challenge Program Sites:
State: Alaska;
Program name: Alaska Military Youth Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1994;
Number of graduates in 2004: 192.
State: Arizona;
Program name: Arizona Project Challenge;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 182.
State: Arkansas;
Program name: Arkansas National Guard Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 181.
State: California;
Program name: California Grizzly Youth Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1998;
Number of graduates in 2004: 204.
State: Florida;
Program name: Florida Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 2001;
Number of graduates in 2004: 227.
State: Georgia;
Program name: Georgia - Fort Gordon Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 2000;
Number of graduates in 2004: 276.
Program name: Georgia - Fort Stewart Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 444.
State: Hawaii;
Program name: Hawaii National Guard Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1994;
Number of graduates in 2004: 207.
State: Illinois;
Program name: Illinois Lincoln's Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 785.
State: Kentucky;
Program name: Kentucky Bluegrass Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 160.
State: Louisiana;
Program name: Louisiana Youth Challenge Program - Camp Beauregard;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 407.
Program name: Louisiana Youth Challenge Program - Camp Minden;
Calendar year first class began: 2002;
Number of graduates in 2004: 214.
Program name: Louisiana Youth Challenge Program - Gillis W. Long;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 331.
State: Maryland;
Program name: Maryland Freestate Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 224.
State: Michigan;
Program name: Michigan Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 174.
State: Mississippi;
Program name: Mississippi National Guard Youth Challenge Program;
Calendar year first class began: 1994;
Number of graduates in 2004: 404.
State: Montana;
Program name: Montana Youth Challenge Program;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 144.
State: New Jersey;
Program name: New Jersey Youth Challenge Program;
Calendar year first class began: 1994;
Number of graduates in 2004: 178.
State: New Mexico;
Program name: New Mexico Youth Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 2001;
Number of graduates in 2004: 197.
State: North Carolina;
Program name: North Carolina Tarheel Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1994;
Number of graduates in 2004: 200.
State: Oklahoma;
Program name: Oklahoma Thunderbird Youth Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 221.
State: Oregon;
Program name: Oregon National Guard Youth Challenge Program;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 221.
State: Puerto Rico;
Program name: Puerto Rico Youth Challenge Program;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 208.
State: South Carolina;
Program name: South Carolina Youth Challenge Academy - Camp Long;
Calendar year first class began: 2002;
Number of graduates in 2004: 108.
Program name: South Carolina Youth Challenge Academy - Columbia;
Calendar year first class began: 1998;
Number of graduates in 2004: 257.
State: Texas;
Program name: Texas Seaborne Challenge Corps;
Calendar year first class began: 1999;
Number of graduates in 2004: 188.
State: Virginia;
Program name: Virginia Commonwealth Challenge Program;
Calendar year first class began: 1994;
Number of graduates in 2004: 140.
State: West Virginia;
Program name: West Virginia Mountaineer Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1993;
Number of graduates in 2004: 175.
State: Wisconsin;
Program name: Wisconsin National Guard Challenge Academy;
Calendar year first class began: 1998;
Number of graduates in 2004: 154.
Total Graduates: 7,003.
Source: GAO analysis of data from AOC Solutions, Inc. for NGB Classes
21 and 22.
Note: The Wyoming Youth Challenge Program received start-up funds in
2005, and will begin its first class in January 2006. Nevada does not
have a Challenge Program site but sends approximately 24 youths per
year to the Arizona site. Until fiscal year 2005, the District of
Columbia sent 60 youths per year to the Maryland site.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:
NOV 15 2005:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Actions
are Needed to Improve the Management and Oversight of the National
Guard Youth Challenge Program," dated October 24, 2005 (GAO Code
350643/GAO-06-140).
The report reaffirms that the Department met its congressional mandate
to improve life skills and employment potential of participants by
providing military-based training and supervised work experience. It
also validated the core program components of assisting participants to
receive a high school diploma or its equivalent, leadership
development, promoting fellowship and community service, developing
life coping skills and job skills, and improving physical fitness and
health and hygiene. A more appropriate title might be "The National
Guard Youth Challenge Program: Statutory Requirements Being Met -
Management and Oversight Can Be Strengthened."
The Department appreciates GAO's confirmation that the DoD is properly
executing the National Guard Youth Challenge Program, and the
suggestions for improvement.
The DoD comments on the draft report findings and recommendations are
enclosed. The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the draft report. If there are any questions, my point of
contact is Mr. Ernie Gonzales, (703) 693-8630.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
T. F. Hall:
Enclosure: As stated:
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE DRAFT REPORT DATED OCTOBER 24, 2005
(GAO CODE 350643/GAO-06-140):
"DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Actions Are Needed to Improve the Management and
Oversight of the National Guard Youth Challenge Program"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense,
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in
consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to determine the
actual costs of the Challenge Program, including states' ability to
fund their share of the program, and use this information, as
appropriate, to support funding requests or a request to change the
cost-share ratio. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur, but the matching fund requirement makes the
Challenge Program vulnerable to state budget cuts. Until recently,
sluggish state revenues made the cost-share burden more burdensome and
prohibited both the National Guard Bureau and the states to focus on
determining the actual costs of the Challenge Program. The budget
shortfalls required the states to reduce and/or eliminate program
services. With state revenues slowly closing their budget gaps,
restoring funding for needed program services are being considered. In
the report, the GAO affirmed that the Department is currently working
on a new funding formula for the program based on individual state
needs. This new formula will adequately address and determine funding
for required program services.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the
Defense, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to establish
performance goals in order to measure the effectiveness of the
Challenge Program. (p. 34/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur, but although the Department does not specifically
define program objectives, the GAO noted that the Department does
report annually to Congress positive performance outcomes in academic
performance, community service activities, and post-residential
placements.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the
Defense, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to direct
U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers to conduct audits as required and
require that copies of audit results are provided to the appropriate
office at the National Guard Bureau in order to ensure that the results
of audits are promptly reviewed and resolved. (pp. 34 and 35/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in
consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs to develop more formal strategies for requesting alternative
funding support for the Challenge Program. Such strategies may include
submitting requests for funding that include the amount of funding
requested and a sufficiently detailed description of the proposed
program in order to allow potential providers of funds, such as non-
defense agencies, to determine whether it would be an appropriate use
of their funds.
(p. 35/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department acknowledges that it will need to
take more formal actions for requesting supplemental funding and
recognized that the informal meetings, presentations and discussions
with other federal agencies did not result in formal commitments.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup (202) 512-9619:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Harold Reich, Karyn Angulo,
Leslie Bharadwaja, Susan Ditto, K. Nicole Harms, Wilfred Holloway,
Jessica Kaczmarek, Stanley Kostyla, Julia Matta, Renee McElveen, and
John Van Schaik made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Conference Report 108-767 accompanied the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375
(2004).
[2] The eight core program components are: leadership/followership, job
skills, responsible citizenship, health and hygiene, service to the
community, academic excellence, life-coping skills, and physical
fitness.
[3] NGB reports on site activities by NGB class numbers. The first
class under the pilot program, NGB-1, began in July 1993, and NGB-25
started in July 2005.
[4] A task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by
an individual. Condition describes the training situation, environment,
or field conditions under which the cadet must perform the task. The
standard establishes criteria for how well a task must be performed.
[5] 32 U.S.C. §509(d)(4).
[6] Funding allocations to the states have historically been based on
target enrollments; that is, the maximum number of students per class
that are funded annually in a program's budget. Beginning with fiscal
year 2004, funding allocations are now based on target graduation,
which is the maximum number of students identified in a program's
budget for participation in and graduation from the program. According
to NGB officials, although allocations were originally based on a
site's target enrollment, this figure was treated as a graduation goal.
These numbers differ by state.
[7] Contracts with AOC Solutions and Dare Mighty Things were
competitively awarded for a 1-year base period with four 1-year
options.
[8] The Master Youth Programs Cooperative Agreement covers two youth
programs: the National Guard Youth Challenge Program and the National
Guard STARBASE Program. The STARBASE Program was established to improve
the knowledge and skills of at-risk youth in math, science and
technology.
[9] At the time of our review, final expenditure reports for fiscal
year 2005 were unavailable.
[10] Louisiana has three Challenge Program sites, and Georgia and South
Carolina each operate two sites.
[11] According to NGB, as of August 2005, the District of Columbia and
eight states had expressed interest in starting a Challenge Program:
Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.
[12] In some states, younger youths are not eligible to take the GED
due to age restrictions, and some youths are not academically prepared
to take the tests. Some programs offer alternative degrees, such as
adult education diplomas; some programs are accredited high schools and
can offer high school diplomas or credits; and many youths return to
their home high schools to earn their diplomas.
[13] Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Federal Financial
Accounting Standards, Number 4, Managerial Cost Accounting Concepts and
Standards for the Federal Government, (Washington, D.C.: July 31,
1995).
[14] We calculated this number with information provided to us by
individual states on our survey. According to our calculations, in
2004, the Fort Gordon, Georgia Program spent $9,300 per graduated
student and Alaska spent $31,031 per graduated student. In order to
cover the high personnel costs in Alaska and to provide program
enhancements, the state contributes more than its required 40 percent
share.
[15] Five programs said that the current funding level of $14,000 per
graduate was sufficient: Ft. Gordon, Georgia; Camp Beauregard,
Louisiana; Montana; New Mexico; and Puerto Rico.
[16] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
[17] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[18] Department of Defense, Instruction 1025.8, National Guard
Challenge Program, March 20, 2002.
[19] The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 was passed with the goal of
consolidating, coordinating, and improving employment, training,
literacy, and vocational rehabilitation programs in the United States,
Pub. L. No. 105-220 (1998). Youth programs under the Workforce
Investment Act seek to assist youth with employment and educational
goals and the services needed to achieve those goals.
[20] As of 1997 and 2000, respectively, the President's Crime
Prevention Council and the White House Federal Interagency Working
Group on Service no longer hold meetings.
[21] Specifically, the interagency agreement was signed between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The
authority for this transfer of funds was found in the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, as amended (codified at 42
U.S.C. §5665). According to the interagency agreement signed in 2001,
the funds were to be used to fund up to eight new Challenge Programs;
reduce negative behaviors of program youth including delinquency,
violence, substance use, school suspensions and expulsions, and
unplanned teen pregnancies; and to engage up to 200 youth in each of
the program sites in constructive programming.
[22] According to the Internal Revenue Code, a 501 (c) (3) corporation
is an organization exempt from taxation, and organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes (26 U.S.C. §501 (c) (3)).
[23] According to NGB, there was no annual report published for 1997
because program officials were not sure whether or not Congress would
permanently authorize the program.
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