DOD Acquisition Outcomes
A Case for Change Gao ID: GAO-06-257T November 15, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) is shepherding a portfolio of major weapon systems valued at about $1.3 trillion. How DOD is managing this investment has been a matter of concern for some time. Since 1990, GAO has designated DOD's weapon system acquisitions as a high-risk area for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOD has experienced cost overruns, missed deadlines, performance shortfalls, and persistent management problems. In light of the serious budget pressures facing the nation, such problems are especially troubling. GAO has issued hundreds of reports addressing broad-based issues, such as best practices, as well as reports focusing on individual acquisitions. These reports have included many recommendations. Congress asked GAO to testify on possible problems with and improvements to defense acquisition policy. In doing so, we highlight the risks of conducting business as usual and identify some of the solutions we have found in successful acquisition programs and organizations.
DOD is facing a cascading number of problems in managing its acquisitions. Cost increases incurred while developing new weapon systems mean DOD cannot produce as many of those weapons as intended nor can it be relied on to deliver to the warfighter when promised. Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are consuming a large share of DOD resources and causing the department to invest more money sooner than expected to replace or fix existing weapons. Meanwhile, DOD is intent on transforming military operations and has its eye on multiple megasystems that are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever. These costly conditions are running head-on into the nation's unsustainable fiscal path. DOD knows what to do to achieve more successful outcomes but finds it difficult to apply the necessary discipline and controls or assign much-needed accountability. DOD has written into policy an approach that emphasizes attaining a certain level of knowledge at critical junctures before managers agree to invest more money in the next phase of weapon system development. This knowledge-based approach results in evolutionary--that is, incremental, manageable, predictable--development and inserts several controls to help managers gauge progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. But DOD is not employing the knowledge-based approach, discipline is lacking, and business cases are weak. Persistent practices show a decided lack of restraint. DOD's requirements process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many highly complex and interdependent programs. Once too many programs are approved to start, the budgeting process exacerbates problems. Because programs are funded annually and departmentwide, cross-portfolio priorities have not been established, competition for funding continues over time, forcing programs to view success as the ability to secure the next funding increment rather than delivering capabilities when and as promised. Improving this condition requires discipline in the requirements and budgetary processes. Determining who should be held accountable for deviations and what penalties are needed is crucial. If DOD cannot discipline itself now to execute programs within fiscal realities, then draconian, budget-driven decisions may have to be made later.
GAO-06-257T, DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-257T
entitled 'DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change' which was
released on November 15, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, November 15, 2005:
DOD Acquisition Outcomes:
A Case for Change:
Statement of Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-06-257T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-257T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Airland, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is shepherding a portfolio of major
weapon systems valued at about $1.3 trillion. How DOD is managing this
investment has been a matter of concern for some time. Since 1990, GAO
has designated DOD‘s weapon system acquisitions as a high-risk area for
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOD has experienced cost
overruns, missed deadlines, performance shortfalls, and persistent
management problems. In light of the serious budget pressures facing
the nation, such problems are especially troubling. GAO has issued
hundreds of reports addressing broad-based issues, such as best
practices, as well as reports focusing on individual acquisitions.
These reports have included many recommendations.
The subcommittee asked GAO to testify on possible problems with and
improvements to defense acquisition policy. In doing so, we highlight
the risks of conducting business as usual and identify some of the
solutions we have found in successful acquisition programs and
organizations.
What GAO Found:
DOD is facing a cascading number of problems in managing its
acquisitions. Cost increases incurred while developing new weapon
systems mean DOD cannot produce as many of those weapons as intended
nor can it be relied on to deliver to the warfighter when promised.
Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are consuming a large share
of DOD resources and causing the department to invest more money sooner
than expected to replace or fix existing weapons. Meanwhile, DOD is
intent on transforming military operations and has its eye on multiple
megasystems that are expected to be the most expensive and complex
ever. These costly conditions are running head-on into the nation‘s
unsustainable fiscal path.
DOD knows what to do to achieve more successful outcomes but finds it
difficult to apply the necessary discipline and controls or assign much-
needed accountability. DOD has written into policy an approach that
emphasizes attaining a certain level of knowledge at critical junctures
before managers agree to invest more money in the next phase of weapon
system development. This knowledge-based approach results in
evolutionary”that is, incremental, manageable, predictable”development
and inserts several controls to help managers gauge progress in meeting
cost, schedule, and performance goals. But DOD is not employing the
knowledge-based approach, discipline is lacking, and business cases are
weak.
Persistent practices show a decided lack of restraint. DOD‘s
requirements process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal
resources can support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many
highly complex and interdependent programs. Once too many programs are
approved to start, the budgeting process exacerbates problems. Because
programs are funded annually and departmentwide, cross-portfolio
priorities have not been established, competition for funding continues
over time, forcing programs to view success as the ability to secure
the next funding increment rather than delivering capabilities when and
as promised.
Improving this condition requires discipline in the requirements and
budgetary processes. Determining who should be held accountable for
deviations and what penalties are needed is crucial. If DOD cannot
discipline itself now to execute programs within fiscal realities, then
draconian, budget-driven decisions may have to be made later.
What GAO Recommends:
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-257T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine V. Schinasi,
202-512-4841.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss why and how to get a better
return from the Department of Defense's (DOD) weapon system
investments. U.S. weapons are the best in the world, but the programs
to acquire them frequently take significantly longer and cost more
money than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and other
capabilities than planned. It is not unusual for estimates of time and
money to be off by 20 to 50 percent. When costs and schedules increase,
quantities are cut, and the value for the warfighter--as well as the
value of the investment dollar--is reduced.
DOD's planned investment in research, development, and procurement of
major weapon systems is approximately $1.3 trillion for its current
portfolio, with over $800 billion of that investment yet to be made.
The planned annual investment is expected to rise from around $149
billion in fiscal year 2005 to $178 billion in fiscal year 2011.
Marquee programs include the Army's Future Combat Systems; the Missile
Defense Agency's suite of land, sea, air, and space systems; the Navy's
advanced ships, such as the DD(X) Destroyer; the Air Force's
Transformational Satellite Communications System; and the Joint Strike
Fighter. Programs like these--and the Global Information Grid that is
designed to interconnect them--are likely to dominate the budget and
doctrinal debate well into the next decade. Not only do these programs
represent huge technological leaps over their predecessors, DOD is
proposing to deliver them faster.
The persistent nature of acquisition problems has perhaps made decision
makers complacent about cost growth, schedule delays, and quantity
reductions in weapon system programs. But fiscal realities, coupled
with the larger scale of acquisitions, will not allow budgets to
accommodate the typical margins of error. Thus, we must either make
tough decisions now to increase the chances for programs to be
executable within fiscal realities or brace ourselves for more
draconian decisions later driven by those fiscal realities. The means
to make the thoughtful decisions are known.
My statement today highlights the risks of conducting business as usual
and identifies some of the solutions we have found in successful
acquisition programs and organizations.
The Case for Change:
The way DOD develops and produces its major weapons systems has had
disappointing outcomes. There is a vast difference between DOD's
budgeting plans and the reality of the cost of its systems.
Performance, if it is defined as the capability that actually reaches
the warfighter, often falls short, as cost increases result in fewer
quantities of produced systems and schedule slips. Performance, if it
is defined as an acceptable return on investment, has not lived up to
promises.
Table 1 illustrates seven programs with a significant reduction in
buying power; we have reported similar outcomes in many more programs.
For example, the Air Force initially planned to buy 648 F/A-22 Raptor
tactical aircraft at a program acquisition unit cost of about $125
million (fiscal year 2006 dollars). Technology and design components
matured late in the development of the aircraft, which contributed to
cost growth and schedule delays. Now, the Air Force plans to buy 181
aircraft at a program acquisition unit cost of about $361 million, an
almost 189 percent increase.
Table 1: Examples of DOD Programs with Reduced Buying Power:
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
Initial investment: $189. 8 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 26.8%.
Program: Future Combat Systems;
Initial investment: $82.6 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 54.4%.
Program: F/A-22 Raptor;
Initial investment: $81.1 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 188.7%.
Program: Virginia Class Submarine;
Initial investment: $53.7 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 49.7%.
Program: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle;
Initial investment: $15.4 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 137.8%.
Program: Space Based Infrared System High;
Initial investment: $4.1 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 160.2%.
Program: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle;
Initial investment: $8.1 billion;
Percent of unit cost increase: 35.9%.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
Furthermore, the conventional acquisition process is not agile enough
for today's demands. Congress has expressed concern that urgent
warfighting requirements are not being met in the most expeditious
manner and has put in place several authorities for rapid acquisition
to work around the process. The U.S. Joint Forces Command's Limited
Acquisition Authority and the Secretary of Defense's Rapid Acquisition
Authority seek the ability to get warfighting capability to the field
faster. According to U.S. Joint Forces Command officials, it is only
through Limited Acquisition Authority that the command has the
authority to satisfy the unanticipated, unbudgeted, urgent mission
needs of other combatant commands. With a formal process that requires
as many as 5, 10, or 15 years to get from program start to production,
such experiments are needed to meet the warfighters' needs.
Today we are at a crossroad. Our nation is on an unsustainable fiscal
path. Long-term budget simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget
Office, and others show that, over the long term, we face a large and
growing structural deficit due primarily to known demographic trends
and rising health care costs. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal
path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our
standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Federal
discretionary spending, along with other federal policies and programs,
will face serious budget pressures in the coming years stemming from
new budgetary demands and demographic trends. Defense spending falls
within the discretionary spending accounts. Further, current military
operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, consume a large
share of DOD resources and are causing faster wear on existing weapons.
Refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned is putting further
pressure on DOD's investment accounts.
At the same time DOD is facing these problems, programs are commanding
larger budgets. DOD is undertaking new efforts that are expected to be
the most expensive and complex ever and on which DOD is heavily relying
to fundamentally transform military operations. And it is giving
contractors increased program management responsibilities to develop
requirements, design products, and select major system and subsystem
contractors. Table 2 shows that just 5 years ago, the top five weapon
systems cost about $291 billion combined; today, the top five weapon
systems cost about $550 billion.
Table 2: Total Cost of DOD's Top Five Programs in Fiscal Years 2001 and
2006 (in 2006 dollars):
Program: F/A-22 Raptor aircraft;
2001: Cost: $65.0 billion.
Program: DDG-51 class destroyer ship;
2001: Cost: $64.4 billion.
Program: Virginia class submarine;
2001: Cost: $62.1 billion.
Program: C-17 Globemaster airlift aircraft;
2001: Cost: $51.1 billion.
Program: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft;
2001: Cost: $48.2 billion.
2001: Total Cost: $290.8 billion.
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
2006: Cost: $206.3 billion.
Program: Future Combat Systems;
2006: Cost: $127.5 billion.
Program: Virginia class submarine;
2006: Cost: $80.4 billion.
Program: DDG-51 class destroyer ship;
2006: Cost: $70.4 billion.
Program: F/A-22 Raptor aircraft;
2006: Cost: $65.4 billion.
2006: Total Cost: $550.0 billion.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
If these megasystems are managed with traditional margins of error, the
financial consequences can be dire, especially in light of a
constrained discretionary budget.
Success for acquisitions means making sound decisions to ensure that
program investments are getting promised returns. In the commercial
world, successful companies have no choice but to adopt processes and
cultures that emphasize basing decisions on knowledge, reducing risks
prior to undertaking new efforts, producing realistic cost and schedule
estimates, and building-in quality in order to deliver products to
customers at the right price, the right time, and the right cost. At
first blush, it would seem DOD's definition of success would be very
similar: deliver capability to the warfighter at the right price, the
right time, and the right cost. However, this is not happening within
DOD. In an important sense, success has come to mean starting and
continuing programs even when cost, schedule, and quantities must be
sacrificed.
DOD knows what to do to improve acquisitions but finds it difficult to
apply the controls or assign the accountability necessary for
successful outcomes. To understand why these problems persist, we must
look not just at the product development process but at the underlying
requirements and budgeting processes to define problems and find
solutions.
A Knowledge-Based Process Can Lead to Better Outcomes:
Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon
lessons learned from best product development practices. Leading
commercial firms expect that their program managers will deliver high-
quality products on time and within budget. Doing otherwise could
result in the customer walking away. Thus, those firms have created an
environment and adopted practices that put their program managers in a
good position to succeed in meeting these expectations. Collectively,
these practices comprise a process that is anchored in knowledge. It is
a process in which technology development and product development are
treated differently and managed separately. The process of developing
technology culminates in discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and
must, by its nature, allow room for unexpected results and delays.
Leading firms do not ask their product managers to develop technology.
Successful programs give responsibility for maturing technologies to a
science and technology organizations, rather than the program or
product development managers. The process of developing a product
culminates in delivery, and, therefore, gives great weight to design
and production. The firms demand--and receive--specific knowledge about
a new product before production begins. A program does not go forward
unless a strong business case on which the program was originally
justified continues to hold true.
Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge is
achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these
junctures as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated
indicators are defined as follows:
Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This point occurs when a
sound business case is made for the product--that is, a match is made
between the customer's requirements and the product developer's
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and capacity.
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment.
Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a
program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule and reliability
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-
level critical design review, usually held midway through development.
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable.
Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This point is
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the company can manufacture
the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best practice
is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in statistical
control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of
consistently producing parts within the product's quality tolerances
and standards--at the start of production.
A result of this knowledge-based process is evolutionary product
development, an incremental approach that enables developers to rely
more on available resources rather than making promises about unproven
technologies. Predictability is a key to success as successful product
developers know that invention cannot be scheduled and its cost is
difficult to estimate. They do not bring technology into new product
development unless that technology has been demonstrated to meet the
user's requirements. Allowing technology development to spill over into
product development puts an extra burden on decision makers and
provides a weak foundation for making product development estimates.
While the user may not initially receive the ultimate capability under
this approach, the initial product is available sooner and at a lower,
more predictable cost.
There is a synergy in this process, as the attainment of each
successive knowledge point builds on the preceding one. Metrics gauge
when the requisite level of knowledge has been attained. Controls are
used to attain a high level of knowledge before making additional
significant investments. Controls are considered effective if they are
backed by measurable criteria and if decision makers are required to
consider them before deciding to advance a program to the next level.
Effective controls help decision makers gauge progress in meeting cost,
schedule, and performance goals and ensure that managers will (1)
conduct activities to capture relevant product development knowledge,
(2) provide evidence that knowledge was captured, and (3) hold decision
reviews to determine that appropriate knowledge was captured to move to
the next phase. The result is a product development process that holds
decision makers accountable and delivers excellent results in a
predictable manner.
A hallmark of an executable program is shorter development cycle times,
which allow more systems to enter production more quickly. DOD itself
suggests that product development should be limited to about 5 years.
Time constraints, such as this, are important because they serve to
limit the initial product's requirements. Limiting product development
cycle times to 5 years or less would allow for more frequent
assimilation of new technologies into weapon systems, speeding new
technology to the warfighter, hold program managers accountable, as
well as make more frequent and predictable work in production, where
contractors and the industrial base can profit by being efficient.
Despite Policy, DOD Is Not Employing a Knowledge-Based Process:
DOD's policy adopts the knowledge-based, evolutionary approach used by
leading commercial companies that enables developers to rely more on
available resources rather than making promises about unproven
technologies. The policy provides a framework for developers to ask
themselves at key decision points whether they have the knowledge they
need to move to the next phase of acquisition. For example, DOD
Directive 5000.1 states that program managers "shall provide knowledge
about key aspects of a system at key points in the acquisition
process," such as demonstrating "technologies in a relevant environment
— prior to program initiation." This knowledge-based framework can help
managers gain the confidence they need to make significant and sound
investment decisions for major weapon systems. In placing greater
emphasis on evolutionary product development, the policy sets up a more
manageable environment for achieving knowledge.
However, the longstanding problem of programs beginning development
with immature technologies is continuing to be seen on even the newest
programs. Several programs approved to begin product development within
only the last few years began with most of their technologies immature
and have already experienced significant development cost increases. In
the case of the Army's Future Combat Systems, nearly 2 years after
program launch and with $4.6 billion invested, only 1 out of more than
50 critical technologies is considered mature and the research and
development cost estimate has grown by 48 percent.
In March 2005, we reported that very few programs--15 percent of the
programs we assessed--began development having demonstrated high levels
of technology maturity. Acquisition unit costs for programs leveraging
mature technologies increased by less than 1 percent, whereas programs
that started development with immature technologies experienced an
average acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 21 percent over the
first full estimate.
Establishing a Sound Business Case Depends on Disciplined Requirements
and Funding Process:
The decision to start a new program is the most highly leveraged point
in the product development process. Establishing a sound business case
for individual programs depends on disciplined requirements and funding
processes. Our work has shown that DOD's requirements process generates
more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can support. DOD
compounds the problem by approving so many highly complex and
interdependent programs. Moreover, once a program is approved,
requirements can be added along the way that increases costs and risks.
Once too many programs are approved to start, the budgeting process
exacerbates problems. Because programs are funded annually and
department wide, cross-portfolio priorities have not been established,
competition for funding continues over time, forcing programs to view
success as the ability to secure the next funding increment rather than
delivering capabilities when and as promised. As a result, there is
pressure to suppress bad news about programs, which could endanger
funding and support, as well as to skip testing because of its high
cost. Concurrently, when faced with budget constraints, senior
officials tend to make across-the-board cuts to all programs rather
than make the hard decisions as to which ones to keep and which ones to
cancel or cut back. In many cases, the system delivers less performance
than promised when initial investment decisions were made.
So, the condition we encounter time after time describes a predictable
outcome. The acquisition environment encourages launching product
developments that embody more technical unknowns and less knowledge
about the performance and production risks they entail. A new weapon
system is encouraged to possess performance features that significantly
distinguish it from other systems and promises the best capability. A
new program will not be approved unless its costs fall within forecasts
of available funds and, therefore, looks affordable. Because cost and
schedule estimates are comparatively soft at the time, successfully
competing for funds encourages the program's estimates to be squeezed
into the funds available. Consequently, DOD program managers have
incentives to promote performance features and design characteristics
that rely on immature technologies and decision makers lack the
knowledge they need to make good decisions.
The Path to Better Decisions:
A path can be laid out to make decisions that will lead to better
program choices and better outcomes. Much of this is known and has been
recommended by one study or another. GAO itself has issued hundreds of
reports. The key recommendations we have made have been focused on the
product development process:
* constraining individual program requirements by working within
available resources and by leveraging systems engineering;
* establishing clear business cases for each individual investment;
* enabling science and technology organizations to shoulder the
technology burden;
* ensuring that the workforce is capable of managing requirements
trades, source selection, and knowledge-based acquisition strategies;
and:
* establishing and enforcing controls to ensure that appropriate
knowledge is captured and used at critical junctures before moving
programs forward and investing more money.
As I have outlined above, however, setting the right conditions for
successful acquisitions outcomes goes beyond product development. We
are currently examining how to bring discipline to the Department's
requirements and budgetary process and the role played by the program
manager.
As we conduct this work, we will be asking:
* who is currently accountable for acquisition decisions;
* who should be held accountable;
* how much deviation from the original business case is allowed before
the entire program investment is reconsidered; and:
* what is the penalty when investments do not result in meeting
promised warfighter needs?
We can make hard, but thoughtful, decisions now or postpone them,
allowing budgetary realities to force draconian decisions later.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee
may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
Katherine V. Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or schinasik@gao.gov.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Paul L.
Francis, David B. Best, David J. Hand, Alan R. Frazier, Adam Vodraska,
and Lily J. Chin.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment
Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. GAO-05-891T.
Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005.
Air Force Procurement: Protests Challenging Role of Biased Official
Sustained. GAO-05-436T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005.
Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications
for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-591T. Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.
GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects
for Success. GAO-05-428T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393.
Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,
but More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 10,
2003.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February
11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best
Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Program
Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, D.C.: August
16, 1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: July 30,
1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1998.
Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD's Earned Value
Management Process. GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1997.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26,
1996.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site.
To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon,
go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Paul Anderson, Manager, AndersonP@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
