DOD Personnel Clearances
Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain Gao ID: GAO-06-233T November 9, 2005Unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause up to exceptionally grave damage to national security. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million personnel with clearances that allow them access to classified information. While most of these clearances are for servicemembers and DOD's employees and contractors, DOD is also responsible for contractors' clearances for more than 20 other agencies, as well as for congressional staff. Due to long-standing problems with DOD's clearance program, GAO designated it a high-risk area in January 2005. In February 2005, when DOD transferred its personnel security investigative functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the average wait for a top secret clearance governmentwide was over 1 year. In June 2005, Executive Order 13381 gave the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) authority to retain or assign to any executive agency any process relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information. OPM is assisting OMB with the development of the plan. GAO was asked to assess the government plan. This testimony will provide GAO's preliminary review of how well the government plan (1) adheres to the standards of comprehensive strategic planning and (2) addresses the timeliness and quality of the security clearance process. Finally, GAO will discuss the actions required to remove DOD's program from GAO's high-risk list.
We are encouraged by the level of commitment demonstrated by OMB in overseeing the preparation of the government plan for addressing problems in the personnel security clearance process. The plan represents an important step toward addressing some long-standing concerns GAO has raised in this area. It includes some elements that a comprehensive strategic plan should contain, such as metrics that will be used to monitor the timeliness of the security clearance process governmentwide. However, the plan provides few details on other features that GAO looks for in a comprehensive strategic plan. For example, in some cases, the plan does not provide details on discrete actions the government would take or their projected completion dates. In addition, the plan does not always include details on the resources required to accomplish the plan's objectives. Finally, the plan does not describe potential risks or mitigation plans to address potential risks. Although the government plan establishes metrics to address the timeliness of the security clearance process, they focus on some phases of the process more than others. Specifically, the plan identifies a wide variety of metrics for monitoring the timeliness of security clearance investigations, but it does little to address timeliness in the adjudication phase of the process. The government plan also provides quarterly goals for different types of investigations. However, the plan does not identify baseline measures or interim goals for average adjudication processing time. Although it explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations and adjudications, the government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process. The plan's primary metric for measuring the quality of investigations--the percentage of investigations returned by requesting agencies due to incomplete case files--is not, by itself, a valid indicator of the quality of investigative work. Other or additional statistics, such as the number of counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance investigations, may be needed. The government plan did not identify a metric for assessing the quality of adjudications, although GAO and other agencies have identified actions that would facilitate monitoring and improvement of the quality of this portion of the personnel security clearance process. DOD must correct previously identified problems before its personnel security clearance program can be removed from the high-risk list. Before removing DOD's personnel security clearance program from the high-risk list, GAO will examine whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have satisfied certain criteria, including the establishment of leadership support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, and a corrective action plan. GAO's criteria also include the presence of a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of any corrective actions and the agency's ability to demonstrate the implementation of corrective measures.
GAO-06-233T, DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Longstanding Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 3:00 p.m. Wednesday, November 9, 2005:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing Problems with DOD's
Program, But Concerns Remain:
Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-06-233T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-233T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause up to
exceptionally grave damage to national security. The Department of
Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million personnel with
clearances that allow them access to classified information. While most
of these clearances are for servicemembers and DOD‘s employees and
contractors, DOD is also responsible for contractors‘ clearances for
more than 20 other agencies, as well as for congressional staff. Due to
long-standing problems with DOD‘s clearance program, GAO designated it
a high-risk area in January 2005. In February 2005, when DOD
transferred its personnel security investigative functions to the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the average wait for a top secret
clearance governmentwide was over 1 year. In June 2005, Executive Order
13381 gave the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) authority to
retain or assign to any executive agency any process relating to
determinations of eligibility for access to classified information. OPM
is assisting OMB with the development of the plan.
GAO was asked to assess the government plan. This testimony will
provide GAO‘s preliminary review of how well the government plan (1)
adheres to the standards of comprehensive strategic planning and (2)
addresses the timeliness and quality of the security clearance process.
Finally, GAO will discuss the actions required to remove DOD‘s program
from GAO‘s high-risk list.
What GAO Found:
We are encouraged by the level of commitment demonstrated by OMB in
overseeing the preparation of the government plan for addressing
problems in the personnel security clearance process. The plan
represents an important step toward addressing some long-standing
concerns GAO has raised in this area. It includes some elements that a
comprehensive strategic plan should contain, such as metrics that will
be used to monitor the timeliness of the security clearance process
governmentwide. However, the plan provides few details on other
features that GAO looks for in a comprehensive strategic plan. For
example, in some cases, the plan does not provide details on discrete
actions the government would take or their projected completion dates.
In addition, the plan does not always include details on the resources
required to accomplish the plan‘s objectives. Finally, the plan does
not describe potential risks or mitigation plans to address potential
risks.
Although the government plan establishes metrics to address the
timeliness of the security clearance process, they focus on some phases
of the process more than others. Specifically, the plan identifies a
wide variety of metrics for monitoring the timeliness of security
clearance investigations, but it does little to address timeliness in
the adjudication phase of the process. The government plan also
provides quarterly goals for different types of investigations.
However, the plan does not identify baseline measures or interim goals
for average adjudication processing time.
Although it explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about
the quality of investigations and adjudications, the government plan
devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the
personnel security clearance process. The plan‘s primary metric for
measuring the quality of investigations”the percentage of
investigations returned by requesting agencies due to incomplete case
files”is not, by itself, a valid indicator of the quality of
investigative work. Other or additional statistics, such as the number
of counterintelligence leads generated from security clearance
investigations, may be needed. The government plan did not identify a
metric for assessing the quality of adjudications, although GAO and
other agencies have identified actions that would facilitate monitoring
and improvement of the quality of this portion of the personnel
security clearance process.
DOD must correct previously identified problems before its personnel
security clearance program can be removed from the high-risk list.
Before removing DOD‘s personnel security clearance program from the
high-risk list, GAO will examine whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have
satisfied certain criteria, including the establishment of leadership
support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, and a corrective
action plan. GAO‘s criteria also include the presence of a program to
monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability
of any corrective actions and the agency‘s ability to demonstrate the
implementation of corrective measures.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-233T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the government plan for
addressing problems in the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel
security clearance program. Clearances granted through such programs
allow personnel access to classified information. Unauthorized
disclosure of classified information can cause exceptionally grave
damage to national security. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in January of
this year, we added DOD's personnel security clearance program to our
list of government high-risk operations.[Footnote 1] Our high-risk list
focuses on those major programs and operations that need urgent
attention and transformation in order to ensure that our national
government functions in the most economical, efficient, and effective
manner possible. Also, some federal programs and operations are
designated high risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement.
We declared DOD's personnel security clearance program a high-risk area
in January 2005, in part because of long-standing delays in completing
requests for security clearances. We have reported backlogs and
impediments to timeliness and quality throughout DOD's personnel
security clearance process. DOD has faced challenges in the past in
setting and projecting the requirements for clearances, submitting
requests for investigations, conducting timely investigations, and
adjudicating, or determining, whether someone is eligible for a
clearance. We also found that DOD had been unable to accurately
estimate the size of its clearance backlog.
Problems with timeliness and quality in the personnel security
clearance process can affect our national security. For example, delays
in renewing security clearances for personnel who are already doing
classified work can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of
classified information. Moreover, delays in providing initial security
clearances for previously noncleared personnel can result in other
negative consequences, such as additional costs and delays in
completing national security-related contracts, lost-opportunity costs,
and problems retaining the best-qualified personnel. Given the vast
scope of DOD's personnel security clearance program, these negative
effects resound across government. Within DOD, the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is responsible for the clearances
issued to approximately 2 million personnel and for coordinating and
implementing DOD-wide policies related to accessing classified
information. While most of the clearances DOD handles are for
servicemembers and DOD's federal employees and contractor personnel,
the Office of the Under Secretary for Intelligence is also responsible
for the clearances of contractors for more than 20 other federal
agencies, as well as the clearances of staff in the federal
government's legislative branch.
My testimony today will focus on the government plan and its relevance
to improving DOD's personnel security clearance process and how well it
addresses our past concerns. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
took the lead in developing the government plan, and the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), which is now responsible for 90 percent of
the clearance investigations in the federal government, assisted OMB in
developing this plan. Because we have had a limited time to review the
government plan, we have been unable to conduct a thorough assessment.
Therefore, my preliminary observations will focus on four key areas.
First, I will describe how well the government plan adheres to the
standards of comprehensive strategic planning. Next, I will provide our
evaluation of how well the plan addresses concerns about the timeliness
and the quality of personnel security clearances. Finally, I will
discuss the actions required to remove the program from our high-risk
list. I would like to note that, at your request, we have recently
begun a review focusing on the quality of top secret security clearance
investigations and adjudications for contractor personnel. As of
February 2005, these personnel waited, on average, over 1 year for DOD
to determine clearance eligibility. As part of that review, we will
examine the government plan more fully and provide an assessment in our
report to the Subcommittee.
My statement is based on our preliminary review of the government plan
and previous GAO reports and analyses. Our work was performed from
October 2005 through November 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. In our preliminary review, we
considered what was presented in the government plan in light of
elements from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 as well as relevant prior reports from GAO and DOD's Inspector
General.
Summary:
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the government plan represents an important
step toward addressing some of the long-standing concerns we have
raised about the personnel security clearance process. We are
encouraged by the high level of commitment that OMB has demonstrated in
preparing this plan. The government plan provides many metrics that
will be used to monitor the timeliness of the clearance process
governmentwide, but it provides few details on other elements that a
comprehensive strategic plan might contain. For example, in some cases,
the plan does not provide details on discrete actions the government
would take or projected completion dates for actions the plan
identifies. In addition, the plan does not always include details on
the resources required to accomplish the plan's objectives. Finally,
the plan does not describe potential risks or mitigation plans to
address potential risks.
The government plan identifies a wide variety of metrics for monitoring
the timeliness of security clearances. Passage of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 addressed many of our past
concerns about metrics and monitoring the program. For example, the act
requires that, during the period between December 17, 2006, and
December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a
determination on at least 80 percent of all applications for personnel
security clearances within an average of 120 days of receiving the
security clearance request. However, the government plan is
inconsistent in its treatment of some timeliness issues. Specifically,
the plan provides quarterly goals for different types of
investigations, but it does not identify interim goals for average
adjudication processing time. In addition to metrics, the government
plan describes the use of information technology to positively affect
the timeliness of clearances.
The government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and
improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process,
although it explicitly acknowledges that agencies have concerns about
the quality of investigations and adjudications. The primary metric
found in the government plan for measuring the quality of
investigations is the percentage of investigations returned by
requesting agencies because of incomplete case files. Because the
number of investigations returned for rework is not--by itself--a valid
indicator of the quality of investigative work, use of other or
additional statistics such as the number of counterintelligence leads
generated from investigations may be needed. The government plan did
not identify a metric for assessing the quality of adjudications,
although we and other agencies have identified actions that would
facilitate monitoring and improvement of the quality of this portion of
the security clearance process. However, the government plan contains
provisions for an investigator training and quality assurance program.
Before removing the security clearance process from our high-risk list,
we will examine whether OMB, OPM, and DOD have satisfied the criteria
we have established for removing a high-risk designation. As we
established in November 2000, these criteria include leadership
support, sufficient resources to resolve the risk, and a corrective
action plan. Our criteria also include the presence of a program to
monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability
of any corrective actions and the ability to demonstrate the
implementation of corrective measures. DOD must undertake many
corrective actions to implement our recommendations and to correct
previously identified problems before its personnel security clearance
program can be removed from its high-risk list.
Background:
On June 28, 2005, I testified before this subcommittee on DOD's
personnel security clearance program.[Footnote 2] I noted that while
DOD has taken steps to address some of the problems that led us to
designate its personnel security clearance program a high-risk area, we
found continuing challenges in each stage of DOD's clearance process. I
also noted that, despite partially concurring with our May 2004
recommendation,[Footnote 3] DOD had not developed and implemented an
integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the backlog,
reduce the delays in conducting investigations and determining
eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the impediments that
could allow such problems to recur.
On the day before your June hearing, the President signed Executive
Order 13381, which is to expire on July 1, 2006, and has the stated
purpose of strengthening processes for determining eligibility for
access to classified national security information.[Footnote 4] The
order stated that the Director of OMB may assign, in whole or in part,
to the head of any agency, either solely or jointly, any process
relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified
national security information.
At the request of the OMB Deputy Director, OMB and GAO officials met on
July 12, 2005, to discuss OMB's general strategy for addressing the
problems that had led to our high-risk designation for DOD's personnel
security clearance program. Among other things, the Deputy Director
indicated that (1) OMB staff would work with DOD and OPM to develop
preliminary milestones and metrics for correcting problems associated
with the program and (2) GAO would be asked to comment on that
information in August or September. We indicated that GAO would need to
remain independent, but could provide general comments to OMB about
milestones, timeframes, criteria, and other materials developed by OMB
and other executive branch agencies. The timeframe of August or
September for the next meeting with OMB corresponded roughly with the
up to 90 days after selection that was specified in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 for the head of the
identified lead agency to develop, in consultation with the appropriate
committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency, a plan
to reduce the length of the personnel security clearance
process.[Footnote 5]
Plan Identifies Metrics but Lacks Details on Other Critical Elements of
a Strategic Plan:
The government plan provides many metrics that will be used to monitor
the timeliness of the clearance process governmentwide, but the plan
detailed few of the other elements that a comprehensive strategic plan
might contain. The Government Performance and Results Act of
1993[Footnote 6] identified some of the elements that might be found in
a comprehensive strategic plan. Those elements include a comprehensive
mission statement, general goals and objectives, a description of how
the goals and objectives are to be achieved, key external factors that
could significantly affect the achievement of the goals and objectives,
and a description and schedule of the program evaluations used in
establishing and revising general goals and objectives. GAO has also
published an evaluator's guide to use in evaluating strategic plans.
This guide discusses key performance indicators and the means to verify
and validate the measured values.[Footnote 7]
The government plan provides numerous metrics to monitor the timeliness
of the clearance process. For example, the plan requires more accurate
projections of the numbers of clearances needed, statistics on how long
it takes to process a request for the investigation once the request
has been made, information on the time required to perform various
types of investigations, and the amount of time needed to determine
clearance eligibility. Many of the metrics will be monitored on a
quarterly or yearly basis according to the example tables contained in
the plan. Another positive feature of the plan is that the same metrics
will be used in many governmental agencies, making it possible to roll
the data up and obtain a larger federal government perspective.
Many portions of the government plan fail to include important elements
of strategic planning that could influence how effectively and
efficiently the plan is carried out. I will illustrate our concerns
using two example sections from the plan. In the first case, the plan
includes a section on how the government intends to address
reciprocity.[Footnote 8] For those who are unfamiliar with that term,
reciprocity is the extent to which departments, agencies, or military
services accept clearances and access granted by other departments,
agencies, or military services. The government plan does not include
discrete actions with projected completion dates that could be used to
monitor interim progress toward the goal of greater reciprocity. The
plan overlooks such actions and related timeframes even though a June
17, 2005, memorandum written by the Deputy Director of OMB indicates
that the plan for each of the 25 areas on GAO's high-risk list should
set goals and milestones that, if implemented will reduce the risk of
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. A second example of the
security clearance plan's failure to follow principles of strategic
planning can be found in the plan's section on requirements for access
to national, state, and local record systems. Nothing in this section
of the plan mentions actions and milestones for actions, or how OMB or
the federal government could affect access to state and local records.
The plan also fails to consider whether additional monetary or human
capital resources would be needed for that effort, what external risks
could adversely affect the government plan, or what steps the
government could use to mitigate those risks.
Plan Emphasizes Timeliness of the Clearance Process:
The government plan identifies a wide variety of metrics that can be
used to track the timeliness of clearances, and it describes generally
some initiatives for speeding the processing of clearances. In February
2004, we expressed continuing concerns about the size of DOD's backlog
and its accurate measurement.[Footnote 9] At that time, we recommended
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develop timeliness
definitions and measures, and monitor the security clearance backlog at
each stage of the personnel security clearance process.
Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
addressed our concerns about metrics and monitoring within the larger
context of the total federal government, specifying timeframes for the
completion of both investigations and adjudications and requiring an
annual report to Congress detailing the timeliness of the clearance
process. Specifically, the act requires that not later than December
17, 2006, and ending December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative
agency shall make a determination on at least 80 percent of all
applicants for personnel security clearances within an average of 120
days--90 days to complete the investigation and 30 days to complete the
adjudication--of receiving the security clearance application.[Footnote
10] Also, not later than February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter
through 2011, OMB must provide a report to appropriate congressional
committees on the progress made during the preceding year toward
meeting these goals.[Footnote 11]
The government plan identifies numerous management reports and metrics
that can be used to monitor all stages of the personnel security
clearance process. To monitor the submission of requests for
investigations, the plan indicates that the government will require
that submissions be processed within an average of 14 calendar days of
the subject completing the security clearance questionnaire. For the
investigation stage, the plan shows baseline measures for how long it
took to complete the average investigation and the investigative
workload. This type of information is shown for multiple quarters in
fiscal year 2005. The plan also provides quarterly goals--expressed as
average days taken to complete an investigation--for different types of
investigations. The adjudication-timeliness goals mandated by the
National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 are
noted in the plan, but it does not identify baseline measures or
interim goals for average adjudication processing time.
In addition to metrics, the government plan describes the use of
information technology to positively affect the timeliness of
clearances. For example, OPM has deployed the electronic Questionnaire
for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system for a subgroup of users
and indicates that all agencies will be required to submit their
requests for investigations with e-QIP by March 2006. OPM is also
involved in an effort to streamline clearance processing by digitally
sending completed investigation files to adjudicative agencies for
review, approval, and submission to the investigation provider.
However, the plan provides few details that would allow us to assess
the maturity of either initiative.
Plan Needs to Build More Quality into the Clearance Process:
The government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and
improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process. At
the same time, the government plan explicitly acknowledges that
agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations and
adjudications. Specifically, the plan says that "a lack of reciprocity
often arises due to reluctance of the gaining activity to inherit
accountability for what may be an unacceptable risk due to poor quality
investigations and/or adjudications." These concerns exist despite the
fact that since 1997, all federal agencies have been subject to a
common set of general personnel security investigative standards and
adjudicative guidelines for determining whether service members,
government employees, government contractors, and others are eligible
to receive security clearances.[Footnote 12]
The primary metric found in the government plan for measuring quality
of investigations is the percentage of investigations returned by
requesting agencies due to incomplete case files, but use of that
metric is problematic. In 1999, we reported that the number of
investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator
of the quality of investigative work, because adjudication officials
said they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in
anticipation of further delays.[Footnote 13] Regardless of whether this
metric remains a part of the plan, developers of the plan may want to
consider adding other indicators of the quality of investigations, such
as the number of counterintelligence leads generated from security
clearance investigations and forwarded to relevant units. Our 1999
review of a random sample of investigations is another example of a
method that can be used to evaluate quality. This type of periodic
review could be performed by an office of the inspector general or some
other unit that is not affiliated with OPM's investigations facility in
order to insure the independence of the findings.
The government plan indicates that OPM has developed an investigator
training and quality assurance program. This is a positive step. Our
prior work has shown that investigation quality can be negatively
affected when investigators are insufficiently trained. However, the
plan does not discuss implementation of the training program or the
metrics associated with the quality assurance program.
The government plan does not identify a metric for assessing the
quality of adjudications. As the Defense Personnel Security Research
Center has noted, it is difficult to measure the degree to which
adjudicative standards are met.[Footnote 14] Nevertheless, GAO and
other agencies have identified actions that would facilitate monitoring
and improvement of the quality of this portion of the security
clearance process. For example, a 2001 GAO report recommended that DOD
require adjudicators to use common explanatory guidance and document
adjudication determinations.[Footnote 15] In addition, a 1998 DOD
Inspector General report suggested implementation of a peer review
program among DOD adjudication facilities.[Footnote 16]
The government plan does not contain initiatives for improving
adjudication quality. We have, however, previously reported
recommendations for improving DOD's adjudication quality.[Footnote 17]
In our 2001 report, we recommended that DOD make four major
improvements to its adjudicative process. First, DOD should establish
detailed documentation requirements to support adjudication decisions.
Second, the department should require that all DOD adjudicators use
common explanatory guidance. Third, it should establish common
adjudicator training requirements and develop appropriate continuing
education opportunities for all DOD adjudicators. Finally, DOD should
establish a common quality assurance program to be implemented by
officials in all DOD adjudication facilities and monitor compliance
through annual reporting. DOD has indicated progress on some of these
initiatives such as professional adjudicator certification and
continuing education opportunities. The government plan may be able to
broaden the DOD initiatives to governmentwide actions for improving
adjudication quality.
Actions Required to Remove DOD's Clearance Program from the High-Risk
List:
DOD must undertake many corrective actions to implement our
recommendations and to correct previously identified problems before we
will remove DOD's personnel security clearance program from our high-
risk list. Many of the issues about timeliness and quality are being
addressed in actions that OMB and OPM will monitor as part of the
government plan. Those actions need to address the criteria that we use
in determining whether or not to remove a high-risk designation. These
criteria, which we defined in November 2000, are shown in Figure
1.[Footnote 18]
Figure 1: Criteria Agencies Must Meet Before High-Risk Designations Can
Be Removed:
* A demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support to
address the risk(s);
* The capacity (that is, the people and other resources) to resolve the
risk(s);
* A corrective action plan(s) that:
- defines the root causes,
- identifies effective solutions, and;
- provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near
term, including but not limited to steps necessary to implement
solutions we recommend;
* A program instituted to monitor and independently validate the
effectiveness and sustainability of corrective actions;
* The ability to demonstrate progress in having implemented corrective
measures.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Since our high-risk list began in 1990, the government has taken high-
risk problems seriously and has made long-needed progress toward
correcting them. During the past 15 years, those efforts have resulted
in 16 high-risk areas being removed from the list. For example, in
January 2005, sufficient progress had been made to warrant the removal
of a high-risk designation from three areas: student financial aid
programs, Federal Aviation Administration financial management, and
Forest Service financial management.
We will remove a high-risk designation when agency actions, including
those in response to our recommendations, result in significant
progress toward resolving a high-risk problem.
Concluding Observations:
Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged that OMB has undertaken the development
of a governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance
process. Still, much remains to be done to develop a more comprehensive
plan for improving the timeliness and quality of the security clearance
process. Developing specific steps to address the general concerns that
I identified today should move OMB and the executive branch agencies
closer to that goal. As we stated in our high-risk report, perseverance
by OMB and the agencies to implement our prior recommendations and
continued oversight, such as that shown by you and this committee, are
both essential to bringing lasting solutions to this high-risk area. In
short, this is a good first step in the right direction. We will
continue to monitor the security clearance program, as we do for all of
the programs on our high-risk list.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
Staff Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
202-512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt A.
Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; Sara Hackley; Kenneth E. Patton; William J.
Rigazio; and Jennifer L. Young.
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues
Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06-71SU.
Washington, D.C.: November 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for
DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed. GAO-06-113T. Washington, D.C.:
October 6, 2005.
Questions for the Record Related to DOD's Personnel Security Clearance
Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
GAO 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February 17,
2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January
2005.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce
Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for
Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local
Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2004.
Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,
D.C.: February 9, 2004.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for
Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18,
2001.
DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.
DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August
24, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February
16, 2000.
DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose
National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27,
1999.
Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to
Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to
and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245.
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998.
Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R.
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.
Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R.
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.
Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive
Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19,
1995.
Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in
Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 14,
1995.
Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations
and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March
24, 1995.
Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the
Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.
Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.:
March 4, 1994.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.
Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative
Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
1993.
DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided
When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 1993.
Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security
Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993.
Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by
Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
1992.
Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security
Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.
(350778):
FOOTNOTES
[1] See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[2] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but
Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation, GAO-05-842T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005).
[3] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to
Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance
Eligibility for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May
26, 2004).
[4] The White House, Executive Order 13381, Strengthening Processes
Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National
Security Information (June 27, 2005).
[5] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(g).
[6] Pub. L. No. 103-62.
[7] GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency
Annual Performance Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.20 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1,
1998).
[8] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(d)(1) provides that "all security clearance
background investigations and determinations completed by an authorized
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be
accepted by all agencies." Exceptions to reciprocity are, however,
permitted on a case-by-case basis under the conditions specified in the
U.S. Code.
[9] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[10] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(g)(3). Section (g)(2) also provides that the
timeframe for completing clearances will reduce further once 5 years
have elapsed from the enactment of the section. At that time, the
section indicates that to the extent practical, the plan shall require
each authorized adjudicative agency to make a determination on at least
90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance
within an average of 60 days--40 days to complete the investigation and
20 days to complete the adjudication.
[11] 50 U.S.C. § 435b(h).
[12] The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968,"
Memorandum (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum approves
the adjudication guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order 12968, Access to
Classified Information (Aug. 2, 1995).
[13] GAO, DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations
Pose National Security Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
27, 1999).
[14] Ralph M. Carney, Joanne Marshall-Mies, Daniel G. Youpa, and
Whitney B. Helton-Fauth, Quality Assurance in Defense Adjudication: An
Adjudicator Workshop for Defining and Assessing Quality, PERSEREC TR 02-
04 (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, March
2003).
[15] GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining
Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 18, 2001).
[16] DOD Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Department of
Defense Adjudication Program, DoDIG 98-124 (Washington, D.C.: 1998).
[17] GAO-01-465.
[18] GAO-01-159SP.
