Military Readiness
Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing Gao ID: GAO-06-84 November 22, 2005The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century needs. Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50 billion annually for the Navy to operate and maintain its forces and support around 376,000 military personnel. In recognizing that the Navy faces affordability issues in sustaining readiness within its historical share of the defense budget, the Chief of Naval Operations announced a concept called the Fleet Response Plan to enhance its deployment readiness status. The Fleet Response Plan is designed to more rapidly prepare and sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. GAO evaluated the extent to which the Navy has (1) employed a sound management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2) tested and evaluated the effectiveness of the plan and shared results to improve implementation.
In establishing the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has embraced a major change in the way it manages its forces. However, the Navy's management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not fully incorporated sound management practices needed to guide and assess implementation. These practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and strategic goals, including resource commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline; and (3) establishing a communication strategy. While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to implement the plan, it has not provided readiness goals for units other than carrier strike groups; resource and maintenance goals; performance measures and timelines; or a communications strategy. Sound management practices were not fully developed because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the plan in response to changes in the security environment. However, without an overall management plan containing all of these elements, it may be difficult for the Navy to determine whether its efforts to improve the fleet's readiness are achieving the desired results, adequately measuring overall progress, or identifying what resources are needed to implement the Fleet Response Plan. The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its implementation and success over time. Systematic testing and evaluation of new concepts is an established practice to gain insight into how systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy. This approach could impair the Navy's ability to validate the plan and evaluate its success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool to evaluate the progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the Navy's ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-84, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2005:
Military Readiness:
Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a Comprehensive
Management Approach and Rigorous Testing:
GAO-06-84:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-84, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century
needs. Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50 billion
annually for the Navy to operate and maintain its forces and support
around 376,000 military personnel. In recognizing that the Navy faces
affordability issues in sustaining readiness within its historical
share of the defense budget, the Chief of Naval Operations announced a
concept called the Fleet Response Plan to enhance its deployment
readiness status. The Fleet Response Plan is designed to more rapidly
prepare and sustain readiness in ships and squadrons.
GAO evaluated the extent to which the Navy has (1) employed a sound
management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2)
tested and evaluated the effectiveness of the plan and shared results
to improve implementation.
What GAO Found:
In establishing the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has embraced a major
change in the way it manages its forces. However, the Navy‘s management
approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not fully
incorporated sound management practices needed to guide and assess
implementation. These practices include (1) establishing a coherent
mission and strategic goals, including resource commitments; (2)
setting implementation goals and a timeline; and (3) establishing a
communication strategy. While the Navy has taken a number of positive
actions to implement the plan, it has not provided readiness goals for
units other than carrier strike groups; resource and maintenance goals;
performance measures and timelines; or a communications strategy. Sound
management practices were not fully developed because senior leaders
wanted to quickly implement the plan in response to changes in the
security environment. However, without an overall management plan
containing all of these elements, it may be difficult for the Navy to
determine whether its efforts to improve the fleet‘s readiness are
achieving the desired results, adequately measuring overall progress,
or identifying what resources are needed to implement the Fleet
Response Plan.
The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its
implementation and success over time. Systematic testing and evaluation
of new concepts is an established practice to gain insight into how
systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However,
instead of methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of
the plan by relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an
overall test and evaluation strategy. This approach could impair the
Navy‘s ability to validate the plan and evaluate its success over time.
In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share
the results of its Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool
to evaluate the progress of the plan and improve implementation, which
limits the Navy‘s ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the
fleet.
The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
Participate in an Exercise:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, GAO recommends
that the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and
performance measures. GAO also recommends that the Navy develop a
comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the
plan has been successful. The Department of Defense generally agreed
with GAO‘s recommendations and described efforts to address them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-84.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound Management
Practices:
Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
Developed Lessons Learned:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
Participate in an Exercise:
Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide
Eight Carriers for Surge Deployments:
Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 22, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
A key goal of Navy senior leadership is to transform the Navy to better
meet 21st century security challenges. Since 2000, Congress has
appropriated about $50 billion annually for the Navy to operate and
maintain its forces and support around 376,000 active military
personnel. Nonetheless, the Navy recognizes it is facing affordability
issues related to sustaining readiness while developing and procuring
several types of new ships within its historical share of the defense
budget. One area where the Navy has made significant changes is in its
operational posture. In March 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations
initiated the development of a concept, which became known as the Fleet
Response Plan,[Footnote 1] to enhance the Navy's deployment readiness
status. The Fleet Response Plan, as implemented by Fleet Forces Command
in May 2003, is designed to more rapidly prepare and then sustain
readiness in ships and squadrons. To achieve this capability, the plan
alters prior manning, maintenance, and training practices to allow for
a more responsive and ready naval force. The Navy expects this new
readiness approach will enable its forces to provide not only presence
and engagement in forward areas, but also surge a greater number of
ships on short-notice in response to significant crises without
increasing the readiness budget. The Fleet Response Plan modifies the
Navy's pre-2001 rotational deployment policy, replacing 6-month routine
deployments with more flexible deployment options for as many as eight
carrier strike groups when and where needed.
The Fleet Response Plan represents a major change in the way the Navy
manages its forces. Implementing large-scale change management
initiatives, such as organizational transformations, can be a complex
endeavor. Our prior work shows that failure to adequately address--and
often even consider--a wide variety of management issues is at the
heart of unsuccessful transformations. We have identified a number of
key best practices and lessons learned from major public and private
sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and
transformations.[Footnote 2] These sound management practices include,
for example, establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic
goals to guide the transformation, including resource commitments;
setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show
progress from day one; and establishing a communication strategy to
create shared expectations and report related progress.
We prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and
are providing it to you because of your oversight of defense issues. We
have previously reported on the maintenance aspects of the Navy's Fleet
Response Plan.[Footnote 3] This report focuses on the following two
questions: (1) To what extent has the Navy employed a sound management
approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan? (2) To what extent
has the Navy tested and evaluated the effectiveness of its Fleet
Response Plan and shared results to improve its implementation?
To assess the Navy's management approach in implementing the Fleet
Response Plan, we obtained and analyzed key messages, briefings, and
instructions on the Fleet Response Plan and interviewed Department of
Defense (DOD) and Navy headquarters and fleet officials, and compared
the Navy's approach with best practices for transformations of large
organizations. To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the
effectiveness of the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to improve
its implementation, we obtained briefings from and interviewed Navy
officials, reviewed and queried the Navy Lessons Learned System to
determine relevant lessons recorded, and examined Navy guidance on test
and evaluation efforts. We reviewed and validated the Navy Lessons
Learned System data and determined the data were sufficiently reliable
for our analysis. We conducted our review from January 2005 through
August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described
in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to establish the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive
management approach to effectively guide, monitor, and assess
implementation. Sound management practices that provide a framework for
implementing and managing programs include (1) establishing a coherent
mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation,
including resource commitments; (2) establishing a communication
strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress; and
(3) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and
show progress. The Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has
included some aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has
established strategic goals for progressive readiness levels for
carrier strike groups. However, the Navy has not established specific
readiness goals for the rest of the fleet or determined the resources
needed to achieve its goals, although it has stated the plan will be
budget neutral. The Navy also does not have an official written
definition of the Fleet Response Plan or communications strategy that
clearly establishes a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals
to guide the transformation, including resource commitments. These
sound management practices were not fully implemented because senior
leaders wanted to implement the Fleet Response Plan as quickly as
possible in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' direction.
Although Navy officials recently tasked the Center for Naval Analyses
to conduct the study to identify potential goals and performance
measures, it is not clear what the study will recommend or how long it
will take for the Navy to take action. Until an overall management plan
is developed, neither the Navy nor Congress may be able to determine
whether the Fleet Response Plan has effectively achieved its goals,
measure the plan's overall progress, or determine what resources are
needed to implement the plan.
In addition, the Navy has not fully developed a comprehensive set of
plans to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and has not
developed formal lessons learned from past exercises to evaluate the
plan's effectiveness. DOD has long recognized the importance of testing
new concepts by using war games and experimentation, and recent Navy
guidance stresses the importance of establishing a long-range plan for
testing complex and novel problems. The Navy has identified three
loosely linked events that Navy officials say demonstrate the viability
of the plan. However, none of the three events cited by the Navy were
part of an overall test and evaluation strategy to assess the value of
the plan in increasing readiness. The Navy has not developed an
overarching test and evaluation plan because Navy officials believe
existing readiness reports provide adequate information to assess the
Fleet Response Plan. However, readiness reports do not produce
information on important factors such as costs, long-term maintenance
implications, or quality of life issues. Additionally, the Navy did not
analyze and evaluate the results of these three events and submit
formal lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned System. Without
systematic testing and evaluation and use of the lessons learned
system, the Navy's ability to validate a complex change like the Fleet
Response Plan, identify and correct problem areas, and disseminate
lessons learned throughout the fleet is limited. This not only prevents
ship and command staffs from learning from the experiences of others,
but it also prevents the Navy Lessons Learned System from possibly
identifying problems and patterns across the fleet that may require a
high-level, Navy-wide response.
To facilitate implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, we recommend
that the Navy develop a comprehensive management plan with goals and
performance measures. We also recommend that the Navy develop a
comprehensive testing and evaluation plan to help determine whether the
Fleet Response Plan has been successful. In its comments on a draft of
this report, DOD generally concurred with the report's recommendations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive
management plan with goals and performance measures, citing several
actions it has underway or planned. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendation to test and evaluate the Fleet Response Plan. However,
DOD does not plan to conduct no-notice surges as we recommended because
it views such exercises as unnecessary and costly. We continue to
believe that no-notice surges are important because they can serve as
an effective means of gauging whether the Navy is ready to respond to
real world events, which can occur with little notice. DOD comments and
our evaluation are discussed on pages 21 and 22.
Background:
Composition of a Carrier Strike Group:
Carrier strike groups are typically centered around an aircraft carrier
and its air wing, and also include a guided missile cruiser; two guided
missile destroyers; a frigate; an attack submarine; and one or more
supply ships with ammunition, fuel, and supplies (such as food and
spare parts). These groups are formed and disestablished on an as
needed basis, and their compositions may differ though they contain
similar types of ships. Figure 1 shows a carrier strike group sailing
in a group formation as it prepares to participate in an exercise.
Figure 1: The U.S.S. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Sailing to
Participate in an Exercise:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Origin of the Fleet Response Plan:
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, only those Navy
ships and air squadrons at peak readiness were deployed overseas,
usually for 6 months at a time. Most of the Navy's remaining units were
not available because they were in early stages of their maintenance or
training cycles, or because the Navy did not have good visibility of
the readiness of these units. This prompted the Chief of Naval
Operations in March 2003 to task the Commander, Fleet Forces Command,
to develop the Fleet Response Plan concept to enhance the Navy's surge
capability. The Chief of Naval Operations approved the concept in May
2003 and further directed the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, to be
responsible and accountable for effectively implementing the plan.
Fleet Response Plan Believed to Provide Increased and Flexible
Readiness:
The Fleet Response Plan emphasizes an increased level of readiness and
the ability to quickly deploy naval forces to respond to crises,
conflicts, or homeland defense needs. The plan applies broadly to the
entire fleet; however, it only sets specific requirements for carrier
strike groups. For example, the plan calls for eight carrier strike
groups to be ready to deploy within 90 days of notification. Six of
them would be available to deploy within 30 days and the other two
within 90 days. This is commonly referred to as the 6 + 2 goal. Under
the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has developed a surge capability
schedule that it uses to manage and identify the level of training a
ship has completed and its readiness to deploy. The schedule contains
three progressive readiness goals: emergency surge, surge-ready, and
routine deployable status.[Footnote 4] Each readiness goal specifies
phases of training that must be completed to achieve the goal. To be
placed in emergency surge status, a ship or an air squadron needs to
have completed its unit-level phase training. Achieving surge-ready
status requires the completion of integrated phase training. Attaining
routine deployable status requires achievement of all necessary
capabilities, completion of underway sustainment phase training, and
certification of the unit for forward deployed operations.[Footnote 5]
The surge capabilities schedule provides a readiness snapshot for each
ship, allowing decision makers to quickly determine which ships are
available to meet the needs of the mission. Figure 2 illustrates how
the Navy notionally identifies the eight aircraft carriers available
for surge deployments. The carriers numbered 1 through 6 are expected
to be ready to deploy within 30 days notice. The carriers labeled "+1"
and "+2" are expected to able to surge within 90 days notice. The six
surge-ready carriers include two carriers on deployment (numbered 3 and
4), one carrier that is part of the forward deployed naval force based
in Japan (number 6), and three carriers in the sustainment phase
(numbered 1, 2, and 5). These six carriers are expected to have
completed postdeployment depot-level maintenance and their unit-level
phase training. The two additional surge carriers are expected to have
completed depot-level maintenance but not to have completed unit-level
phase training. The remaining four carriers are in the maintenance
phase or deep maintenance.[Footnote 6]
Figure 2: Fleet Response Plan Readiness Cycle Is Intended to Provide
Eight Carriers for Surge Deployments:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Revised Fleet Response Plan Is Being Developed:
Based on the Navy's experiences during the past 2 years, Fleet Forces
Command has convened a cross-functional working group to develop a
refined version of the Fleet Response Plan. This update, known as Fleet
Response Plan-Enhanced, is intended to further define the Fleet
Response Plan, modify terminology for progressive readiness states to
better reflect their meaning, tie in elements such as a human capital
strategy, and expand the focus of the plan beyond carrier strike groups
to the entire Navy. It may also extend the Fleet Response Plan's
current employment cycle length of 27 months. The Fleet Response Plan-
Enhanced is still under development at this time.
Fleet Response Plan Does Not Fully Incorporate Sound Management
Practices:
The Navy's management approach in establishing the Fleet Response Plan
as its new readiness construct has not fully incorporated sound
management practices needed to effectively guide, monitor, and assess
implementation.[Footnote 7] Studies by several organizations have shown
that successful organizations in both the public and private sectors
use sound management practices to assist agencies in measuring
performance, reporting results, and achieving desired outcomes. These
practices provide management with a framework for effectively
implementing and managing programs and shift program management focus
from measuring program activities and processes to measuring program
outcomes. Sound management practices include (1) establishing a
coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the
transformation, including resource commitments; (2) setting
implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress
from day one; and (3) establishing a communication strategy to create
shared expectations and report related progress.
The Navy's implementation of the Fleet Response Plan has included some
aspects of these practices. For example, the Navy has established some
strategic goals needed to meet the intent of the plan, such as the
progressive readiness levels of emergency surge, surge-ready, and
routine deployable status. The Navy also has established specific
training actions to support these goals, such as that carrier strike
groups must complete unit-level training to be certified as emergency
surge-ready. However, other actions taken by the Navy do not fully
incorporate these practices. For example, the Navy has identified the 6
+ 2 surge capability as a readiness goal and performance measure for
carrier strike groups, but no such goal was established for the rest of
the fleet. The Navy also has some unofficial goals and performance
measures regarding manning and maintenance, but these unofficial goals
and performance measures have not been formally established. For
example, briefings on the Fleet Response Plan state that the Navy
desires and needs fully manned ships (i.e., manning at 100 percent of a
ship's requirement) for the program to be successful. Moreover,
according to Navy officials, the Navy has not established milestones
for achieving its results.
In addition, 2 years after initiating implementation of the Fleet
Response Plan, the Navy still does not have an official written
definition of the Fleet Response Plan that clearly establishes a
coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the
transformation, including resource commitments. This definition would
describe the Fleet Response Plan's total scope and contain guidance
with formal goals and performance measures. The Navy recently has taken
some action to address this area. In February 2005, the Navy directed
the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct a study to develop formal
definitions and guidance as well as identify goals and performance
measures for the plan. However, it remains to be seen whether this
study will be completed as planned by November 2005; if it will
recommend developing and implementing sound management practices, such
as goals, measures, milestones, and timelines; and whether any
management improvement recommendations made in the study will be
implemented by the Fleet Forces Command, the Navy command responsible
for implementing the Fleet Response Plan. Without goals, performance
measures, timelines, milestones, benchmarks, and guidance to help
effectively manage implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and
determine if the plan is achieving its goals, the Navy may find it more
difficult to implement the Fleet Response Plan across the entire naval
force.
Moreover, despite the Navy's unofficial goal that the Fleet Response
Plan be budget neutral, as articulated in briefings and by senior
leaders, the Navy has not yet clearly identified the resources needed
to achieve its goals or provided a rationale for how these resources
will contribute to achieving the expected level of performance. Navy
officials have said that current operations and maintenance funding
levels, as well as manning at 100 percent of required positions, have
contributed to successful implementation of the Fleet Response Plan.
However, officials do not know what level of manning or funding is
actually required for program success over the long term to avoid any
unintended consequences, such as greater amounts of deferred
maintenance. According to Navy officials, it is difficult to attribute
costs to the plan because there is no single budget line item that
tracks the costs associated with the Fleet Response Plan. Without
knowing the funding needed, the Navy may not be able to assess the
impact of possible future changes in funding on implementing the plan.
Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links costs with
performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor Congress may be
able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is actually achieving its
unofficial goal of being budget neutral.
Finally, the Navy also has not developed a comprehensive communications
strategy that reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and
seeks to genuinely engage them in a two-way exchange, which is a
critical step in successfully implementing cultural change or
transformation. We looked for formal mechanisms that communicated the
details of the Fleet Response Plan and spoke with personnel from
carrier strike groups, aircraft carriers, air wings and an air
squadron, one surface combatant ship, and other command staff.[Footnote
8] We found that while the Fleet Response Plan was communicated
extensively to senior-level officers, and the Navy provided numerous
briefings and messages related to the plan, communication and
understanding of the plan did not flow through to the lower ranks.
While the concept of the Fleet Response Plan is generally understood by
some senior-level officials, many of the lower grade personnel on these
ships were unaware of the scope, goals, and other aspects of the plan.
In the absence of clear communication throughout the fleet via an
overall communications strategy that could increase employee awareness
of the Fleet Response Plan, its successful implementation could be
impeded.
Sound management practices, such as those noted above, were not fully
used by the Navy because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the
Fleet Response Plan in response to the Chief of Naval Operations'
desires. However, without an overall management plan containing all of
these elements to guide the implementation of such a major change, it
may be difficult for the Navy and Congress to determine the extent to
which the Fleet Response Plan is achieving the desired results, measure
its overall progress, or determine the resources needed to implement
the plan.
Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
Developed Lessons Learned:
The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or
developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its
implementation and success over time. The methodical testing,
exercising, and evaluation of new doctrines and concepts is an
established practice throughout the military to gain insight into how
systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However,
instead of methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of
the plan by relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an
overall test and evaluation strategy, which impairs the Navy's ability
to validate the plan and evaluate its success over time. In addition,
the Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the results
of its Fleet Response Plan tests or as an analytical tool to evaluate
the progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the
Navy's ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet.
Methodical Tests and Evaluations of New Concepts Are Important:
Methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating new doctrines and
concepts is an important and established practice throughout the
military. DOD has long recognized the importance of using tabletop
exercises, war games, and experimentation[Footnote 9] to explore
military doctrine, operational concepts, and organizational
arrangements. Collectively, these tests and experiments can provide
important insight into how systems and capabilities will perform in
actual operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command, which has lead
responsibility for DOD experimentation on new concepts of operation and
technologies, states that its experimental efforts aim to foster
military innovation and improvement by exploring, developing, and
transferring new concepts and organizational ideas into operational
reality.
Particularly large and complex issues may require long-term testing and
evaluation that is guided by study plans. Joint Forces Command's Joint
Warfighting Center has an electronic handbook that provides guidance
for conducting exercises and lays out the steps in an exercise life
cycle: design; planning; preparation; execution; and analysis,
evaluation, and reports. The Army also has well-established
guidance[Footnote 10] governing service studies, analyses, and
evaluations that the Navy feels is representative of best practices for
military operations research. This provides an important mechanism
through which problems pertaining to critical issues and other
important matters are identified and explored to meet service needs. As
shown in figure 3, the Army's process involves six major steps that
create a methodical process for developing, conducting, documenting,
and evaluating a study. Following a formal study process enables data
evaluation and development of lessons learned that could be used to
build on the existing knowledge base. In a roundtable discussion with
the Fleet Forces Command on the rationale behind Summer Pulse 2004, the
Navy's major exercise for the Fleet Response Plan, a senior Navy
official stated, "From the concept, — you need to exercise, — you need
to practice, — you need to demonstrate it to know you got it right and
what lessons are there to learn from how we did it."[Footnote 11]
Figure 3: Best Practice Steps for a Methodical Study Plan Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Other governmental agencies, like GAO, and the private sector also rely
on detailed study plans, or data collection and analysis plans, to
guide the development of studies and experiments and the collection and
analysis of data, and to provide a feedback loop that links the
outcomes of the study or experiment event and subsequent analysis to
the original goals and objectives of the study or event. GAO guidance
states that data collection and analysis plans "should carry forward
the overall logic of the study so that the connection between the data
that will be collected and the answers to the study questions will
become evident."[Footnote 12]
Recent Navy guidance also recognizes the need for a thorough evaluation
of complex initiatives. In April 2005, the Navy issued a Study Planning
and Conduct Guide assembled by the Navy Warfare Development
Command.[Footnote 13] This guide stresses the importance of
establishing a long-range plan for complex and novel problems and lays
out the rationale for detailed study plans for exercises and
experiments, as they establish a structure in which issues are explored
and data are collected and analyzed in relation to the established
goals or objectives for the event. Furthermore, the Navy's guide notes
that random, inadequately prepared events and a determination just to
study the problem do not lead to successful resolution of problems that
may arise in programs and concepts that the Navy is testing and
evaluating.
Navy Events to Show Viability of the Fleet Response Plan Have Lacked
Methodical Testing and Evaluation:
The Navy has not methodically conducted realistic tests of the Fleet
Response Plan to demonstrate the plan's viability and evaluate its
progress and success over time, instead relying on loosely linked
events and some routine data to demonstrate the viability of the plan.
The events identified by the Navy as successful tests of the Fleet
Response Plan are Summer Pulse 2004, the emergency deployment of the
U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, and Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005, but of
these events only Summer Pulse 2004 was driven by the Fleet Response
Plan with the intent of demonstrating that large numbers of ships could
be surged. In addition, these events were not part of an overall test
and evaluation strategy that yielded specific information from which to
assess the value of the plan in increasing readiness and meeting the
new 6 + 2 surge capability goal for carrier strike groups.
Summer Pulse 2004 encompassed a number of previously scheduled
deployments, exercises, and training events that took place between
June and August of 2004. The intent of Summer Pulse 2004 was to
demonstrate the Fleet Response Plan's new readiness construct and the
Navy's ability to deploy multiple carrier strike groups of varying
levels of readiness. However, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a methodical
and realistic test of the Fleet Response Plan for three reasons. First,
Summer Pulse 2004 did not follow best practices regarding study plans
and the ability to evaluate the impact and outcomes of the plan. The
Navy did not develop a formal study plan identifying study objectives,
data collection requirements, and analysis, or produce a comprehensive
after-event report describing the study's findings. Navy officials have
stated that the elements of a formal study plan were there for the
individual deployments, exercises, and training events constituting
Summer Pulse 2004, but were not brought together in a single package.
While the Navy may have had the study elements present for the
individual exercises, they were not directly linked to testing the
Fleet Response Plan. Without such a comprehensive study plan and
overall evaluation, there is no ability to discern potential impacts on
fleet readiness, maintenance, personnel, and other issues that are
critical to the Fleet Response Plan's long-term success. Second, Summer
Pulse 2004 was not a realistic test because all participating units had
several months' warning of the event. As a result, five carriers were
already scheduled to be at sea and only two had to surge. Because six
ships are expected to be ready to deploy with as little as 30 days'
notice under the plan and two additional carriers within 90 days, a
more realistic test of the Fleet Response Plan would include no-notice
or short-notice exercises.[Footnote 14] Such exercises conducted
without advance notification to the participants would provide the
highest degree of challenge and realism. Without such exercises, the
Navy might not be able to realistically practice and coordinate a full
surge deployment. Third, Summer Pulse 2004 was not a sufficient test
because the Navy involved only seven carriers instead of the eight
carriers called for in the plan. Therefore, it did not fully test the
Navy's ability to meet deployment requirements for the expected force.
Another event cited by the Navy as evidence of the Fleet Response
Plan's success is the deployment of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln carrier
strike group while it was in surge status in October 2004. Originally
scheduled to deploy in the spring of 2005, the Lincoln was deployed
early to support operations in the Pacific Command area of operation
and provide aid to areas devastated by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in
December 2004. Navy officials said that the Fleet Response Plan enabled
the Navy to identify a carrier to send to the Pacific and to quickly
tailor its training package based on its progressive readiness status.
The Navy touted this rapid response relief work by a strike group
deployed during surge status as a Fleet Response Plan success story. We
agree that the Lincoln carrier strike group was able to respond
quickly. However, the extent to which this event realistically tested
the Fleet Response Plan's expectations for surging one carrier strike
group is not known. As with Summer Pulse 2004, the Lincoln deployment
was not a methodical test of the Fleet Response Plan because there was
no plan to systematically collect or analyze data that would evaluate
the outcomes of the Lincoln deployment against Fleet Response Plan-
related study goals.
The Navy also pointed to a third event, its recent Global War on
Terrorism Surge 2005,[Footnote 15] as an indicator that the Fleet
Response Plan works. The Global War on Terrorism surge was a response
to a request for forces[Footnote 16] from which the Navy is looking to
glean Fleet Response Plan-related information about what did and did
not work when the ships return. However, this is not a good test of the
Fleet Response Plan because there is no plan showing what specific data
are being collected or what analytical approaches are being employed to
assess the ships' experiences. As of September 2005, no other events
had been scheduled to further test and evaluate the Fleet Response
Plan.
The Navy has not developed the kind of comprehensive plans to test and
evaluate the Fleet Response Plan as recommended by DOD and Navy
guidance and best practices because Navy officials have stated that
existing readiness reporting processes effectively evaluate the Fleet
Response Plan's success on a daily basis. They said after-action
reports[Footnote 17] from training exercises and the Joint Quarterly
Readiness Review[Footnote 18] assist with this function. Navy officials
explained that they implemented the Fleet Response Plan the same way
they had implemented the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle, the
predecessor to the Fleet Response Plan's Fleet Readiness Training Plan.
While this may be true, the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle was focused
on the specific training needed to prepare units for their next
deployment, not for implementing a new readiness construct that
emphasized surge versus routine deployments. Furthermore, the Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle did not contain stated goals whose validity
the Navy needed to test. In addition, ongoing readiness reports do not
provide information on important factors such as costs, long-term
maintenance implications, and quality of life issues.
The Summer Pulse 2004, Lincoln surge deployment, and Global War on
Terrorism Surge 2005 testing events were not part of a methodical test
and evaluation approach. Therefore, the Navy is unable to convincingly
use these events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan and determine
whether the plan has been successful in increasing readiness or
achieving other goals. Moreover, without effective evaluation of the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy may be unable to identify and correct
potential problem areas across the fleet. Without a comprehensive long-
range plan that establishes methodical and realistic testing of the
Fleet Response Plan, the Navy may be unable to validate the Fleet
Response Plan operational concept, evaluate its progress and success
over time, and ensure that it can effectively meet Navy goals over the
long term without any adverse, unintended consequences for maintenance,
quality of life, and fleet readiness.
Navy Lessons Learned System's Repository and Analytic Resources Have
Not Been Used to Catalog and Share Fleet Response Plan Lessons:
The formal Navy repository for lessons learned, the Navy Lessons
Learned System, has not been used to disseminate Fleet Response Plan-
related lessons learned or to analyze test results to evaluate the
progress of the plan and improve implementation. The Navy Lessons
Learned System has been designated by the Chief of Naval Operations as
the singular Navy program for the collection, validation, and
distribution of unit feedback as well as the correction of problems
identified and derived from fleet operations, exercises, and
miscellaneous events. However, there are no mechanisms or requirements
in place to force ships, commands, and numbered fleet staffs to submit
all lessons learned to the Navy Lessons Learned System, although such
mechanisms exist for the submission of port visit and other reports.
For the events that the Navy cites as tests of the Fleet Response Plan,
it did not analyze and evaluate the results and produce formal lessons
learned to submit to the Navy Lessons Learned System for recordation
and analysis. Any evaluation done of the testing events has not been
incorporated into the Lessons Learned System, preventing comprehensive
analyses of lessons learned and identification of problems and patterns
across the fleet that may require a high-level, Navy-wide response.
Some ship and carrier strike group staff informed us that they prefer
informal means of sharing lessons learned, because they feel the
process through which ships and commands have to submit lessons learned
for validation and inclusion in the database can be complex and
indirect. This may prevent ship and command staffs across the fleet
from learning from the experiences of others, but it also prevents the
Navy Lessons Learned System from performing comprehensive analyses of
the lessons learned and possibly identifying problems and patterns
across the fleet that may require a high-level Navy-wide response. In
addition, the lessons learned are recorded by mission or exercise
(e.g., Operation Majestic Eagle) and not by operational concept (e.g.,
the Fleet Response Plan), making identification of Fleet Response Plan-
specific lessons learned difficult and inconsistent.
Over the last 10 years, we have issued several reports related to
lessons learned developed by the military. We have found that service
guidance does not always require standardized reporting of lessons
learned[Footnote 19] and lessons learned are not being used in training
or analyzed to identify trends and performance weaknesses.[Footnote 20]
We emphasized that effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned
are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate efficient
operations. We found that despite the existence of lessons learned
programs in the military services and the Joint Staff, units repeat
many of the same mistakes during major training exercises and
operations. Our current review indicates that the Navy still does not
include all significant information in its lessons learned database.
Therefore, Navy analysts cannot use the database to perform
comprehensive analyses of operational concepts like the Fleet Response
Plan to evaluate progress and improve implementation.
Officials from the Navy Warfare Development Command stated that the
Navy is currently drafting a new Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
governing the Navy Lessons Learned System that will address some of
these issues.[Footnote 21] Navy Warfare Development Command officials
hope that the new instruction will result in several improvements over
the current system. First, they would like to see a dual reporting
system, so that lessons learned are simultaneously sent to the Navy
Lessons Learned System for preliminary evaluation when they are
submitted to the numbered fleets for validation. This would allow Navy
Lessons Learned analysts to look at unvarnished data for patterns or
issues of interest to the Chief of Naval Operations, without taking
away the numbered fleets' validation processes. In addition, officials
would like to establish deadlines for the submission of lessons learned
to ensure timeliness. Not only will these changes add value to the data
stored in the Navy Lessons Learned System, but they will keep the data
flowing while ensuring that data are actually submitted and not lost as
they move up the chain of command. According to Navy Lessons Learned
officials, other branches of the military already allow operators in
the field to submit lessons learned directly to their lessons learned
systems, enabling value-added analysis and the timely posting of
information. By addressing these issues, the Navy can help ensure that
the lessons learned process will become more efficient, be a command
priority, and produce actionable results.
Conclusions:
Two years after implementing a major change in how it expects to
operate in the future, the Navy has not taken all of the steps needed
to enable the Navy or Congress to assess the effectiveness of the Fleet
Response Plan. As the Navy prepares to implement the Fleet Response
Plan across the entire naval force, it becomes increasingly important
that the Navy effectively manages this organizational transformation so
that it can determine if the plan is achieving its goals. The absence
of a more comprehensive overarching management plan to implement the
Fleet Response Plan has left essential questions about definitions,
goals, performance measures, guidance, timelines, milestones,
benchmarks, and resources unanswered, even though sound management
practices recognize the need for such elements to successfully guide
activities and measure outcomes. The absence of these elements could
impede effective implementation of the Fleet Response Plan.
Furthermore, without a comprehensive plan that links costs with
performance measures and outcomes, neither the Navy nor Congress may be
able to determine if the Fleet Response Plan is budget neutral. More
effective communications throughout the fleet using an overall
communications strategy could increase employee awareness of the plan
and help ensure successful implementation.
The Navy also has not developed a comprehensive long-range plan for
testing and evaluating the Fleet Response Plan. Without a well-
developed plan and methodical testing, the Navy may not be aware of all
of the constraints to successfully surging its forces to crises in a
timely manner. Moreover, the absence of an overarching testing and
evaluation plan that provides for data collection and analysis may
impede the Navy's ability to use its testing events to determine
whether the Fleet Response Plan has been successful in increasing
readiness and to identify and correct problem areas across the fleet.
Failure to document and record the results of testing and evaluation
efforts in the Navy Lessons Learned System could limit the Navy's
ability to validate the value of the concept, identify and correct
performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, perform
comprehensive analyses of lessons learned, and disseminate these
lessons and analyses throughout the fleet.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To facilitate successful implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and
enhance readiness and ensure the Navy can determine whether the plan
has been successful in increasing readiness and is able to identify and
correct performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
* Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive
overarching management plan based on sound management practices that
will clearly define goals, measures, guidance, and resources needed for
implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, to include the following
elements:
* establishing or revising Fleet Response Plan goals that identify what
Fleet Response Plan results are to be expected and milestones for
achieving these results,
* developing implementing guidance and performance measures based on
these goals,
* identifying the costs and resources needed to achieve each
performance goal, and:
* communicating this information throughout the Navy.
* Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive plan for
methodical and realistic testing and evaluation of the Fleet Response
Plan. Such a comprehensive plan should include a description of the
following elements:
* how operational tests, exercises, war games, experiments,
deployments, and other similar events will be used to show the
performance of the new readiness plan under a variety of conditions,
including no-notice surges;
* how data will be collected and analyzed for these events and
synthesized to evaluate program success and improvements; and:
* how the Navy Lessons Learned System will collect and synthesize
lessons from these events to avoid repeating mistakes and improve
future operations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with our recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement
the recommendations.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Navy should develop a
comprehensive overarching management plan based on sound management
practices that would clearly define the goals, measures, guidance, and
resources needed for successful implementation of the Fleet Response
Plan, including communicating this information throughout the Navy. DOD
noted that the Navy has already taken action or has plans in place to
act on this recommendation, and described several specific
accomplishments and ongoing efforts in this regard. DOD also noted that
the Navy intends to communicate through message traffic, white papers,
instructions, lectures, and meetings with Navy leadership. We agree
that these means of communication are an important part of an effective
communication strategy; however, we do not believe that these methods
of communication constitute a systemic strategy to ensure communication
at all personnel levels. We believe the Navy would benefit from a
comprehensive communication strategy that builds on its ongoing
efforts, but encompasses additional actions to ensure awareness of the
plan throughout the Navy.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to test and evaluate
the Fleet Response Plan. DOD noted that it plans to use a variety of
events and war games to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, but it does
not see a need to conduct no-notice surges to test the Fleet Response
Plan. DOD stated that it believes no-notice surges are expensive and
unnecessary and could lead to penalties on overall readiness and the
ability to respond to emergent requirements. DOD also noted that the
Navy has surged single carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike
groups, and individual ships or units under the Fleet Response Plan,
and it cited several examples of such surges. We commend the Navy's
plans to use a variety of events to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan
and its use of the Navy Lessons Learned System to report and evaluate
the lessons learned in the Global War on Terrorism Surge 2005 exercise
held earlier this year. However, we continue to believe that no-notice
surges are critical components of realistic testing and evaluation
plans and that the benefits of such exercises can outweigh any
additional costs associated with conducting such tests on a no-notice
basis. Both we and Congress have long recognized the importance of no-
notice exercises. For example, in a 1989 report, we noted that DOD was
instituting no-notice exercises to assess the preparedness of combatant
commands' state of training of their staffs and components.[Footnote
22] In addition, in 1990 the Department of Energy conducted no-notice
tests of security personnel in response to our work and out of
recognition that such tests are the best way to assess a security
force's ability at any given time.[Footnote 23] Furthermore, in recent
years, the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and
others have conducted no-notice exercises because they add realism and
demonstrate how well organizations are actually prepared to respond to
a given situation. Despite the importance of no-notice exercises, the
Navy has not conducted no-notice exercises to test and evaluate the
centerpiece surge goal of 6 + 2 for carrier strike groups. We believe
that the smaller surges cited by DOD can provide insights into the
surging process, but we do not believe that such surges can effectively
test the Navy's readiness for a full 6 + 2 carrier strike group surge.
DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix
II of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Navy has employed a sound management
approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan, we interviewed Navy
headquarters and fleet officials; received briefings from relevant
officials; and reviewed key program documents. In the absence of a
comprehensive planning document, we compared best practices for
managing and implementing major efforts to key Navy messages,
directives, instructions, and briefings, including, but not limited to,
the Culture of Readiness message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations
(March 2003); the Fleet Response Concept message sent by the Chief of
Naval Operations (May 2003); the Fleet Response Plan Implementation
message sent by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (May 2003); the
Fleet Response Plan Implementation Progress message sent by the
Commander, Third Fleet (September 2003); and the U.S. Fleet Forces
Command's Fleet Training Strategy instruction (May 2002 and an undated
draft). We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding
officers, executive officers, and department heads of selected carrier
strike groups, aircraft carriers, and air wings to obtain information
on how the plan had been communicated, how the plan had changed their
maintenance and training processes, the impact on their quality of
life, the cost implications of the plan, and other factors.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has tested the effectiveness of
the Fleet Response Plan and shared results to improve its
implementation, we obtained briefings; interviewed Navy headquarters
and fleet officials; and reviewed test and evaluation guidance for both
the Navy and other federal agencies. To evaluate the three Fleet
Response Plan demonstrations identified by the Navy, we interviewed
officials from the Fleet Forces Command and the Navy Warfare
Development Command, reviewed existing documentation on the
demonstrations, queried the Navy Lessons Learned System for lessons
learned from the demonstrations, and compared our findings to accepted
best practices for tests and evaluations. Further, we reviewed Navy
Lessons Learned System instructions and queried the system to determine
recorded lessons learned pertaining to the Fleet Response Plan.
We validated the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the
data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our
review from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards at the following
locations:
* The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii:
* Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
* Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:
* Offices of the Fleet Forces Command:
* Commander, U.S. Second Fleet:
* Commander, Naval Air Forces:
* Commander, Submarine Forces:
* Commander, Naval Surface Force:
* U.S. Marine Corps Forces:
* Afloat Training Group:
* Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island:
* Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii:
* Offices of the U.S. Pacific Fleet:
* Commander, Naval Submarine Force:
* Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii:
We held group discussions with selected personnel such as commanding
officers, executive officers/chief of staffs, department heads, and
crew members from the following units, all located in the Norfolk,
Virginia, area:
* U.S.S. Bulkeley:
* U.S.S. Enterprise:
* U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt:
* U.S.S. Harry S. Truman:
* Carrier Air Wing 3:
* Carrier Air Wing 8:
* Carrier Strike Group 2:
* Carrier Strike Group 10:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
OCT 31 2005:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-06-84, "MILITARY READINESS: Navy's Fleet Response Plan
Would Benefit From a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous
Testing" (GAO Code 350625)," dated September 27, 2005.
DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. DoD
concurs with Recommendation 1 and partially concurs with Recommendation
2. Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations and report are
enclosed:
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph J. Angello:
Director:
Readiness Programming & Assessment:
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED September 27, 2005 GAO CODE 350625/GAO-06-84:
"MILITARY READINESS: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit From a
Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive overarching
management plan based on sound management practices that will clearly
define goals, measures, guidance, and resources needed for
implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, to include the following
elements:
* establish or revise Fleet Response Plan goals that identify what
Fleet Response Plan results are to be expected and milestones for
achieving these results;
* develop implementing guidance and performance measures based on these
goals;
* identify the costs and resources needed to achieve each performance
goal; and:
* communicate this information throughout the Navy.
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Navy has either already developed or is in
process of developing guidance, performance measures, and a methodology
to capture Fleet Response Plan (FRP) costs and efficiencies.
Additionally, the Navy leadership is continuously working to educate
and inform personnel, at all levels, on the dynamics, requirements, and
benefits of the FRP.
Since its very inception, the FRP is designed as a dynamic and flexible
operational process that affords all levels of command an ability to
adapt to changing world environments and requirements. Therefore, the
management and process tracking of FRP will also change in concert with
those emergent requirements.
Specific accomplishments and ongoing efforts are described below:
* FRP goals and expectations were initially established and
communicated to the Fleet via formal message traffic and guidance from
subordinate commanders. CNO's "personal for" Commanders, Commanding
Officers, and Officers in Charge dated 22 May 2003 outlined the
requirement to develop a process that would improve Navy's speed of
response. It announced the approval of the Fleet Response Concept and
directed CFFC to develop FRP to make the concept a reality.
Supplemental guidance from CFFC explained FRP and delineated key
implementation milestones. More recent and expanded guidance can be
seen in the draft CFFC Instruction 3501.3A titled Fleet Training
Continuum. This document discusses and identifies in-depth guiding
principles, roles and responsibilities, business rules, and critical
training enablers.
* Overarching guidance in the form of a CNO FRP instruction is in work
with OPNAV N43 as lead agent. This instruction will address all facets
of FRP and will include references and descriptions of performance
based measures and consolidate implementation guidance. Additionally,
significant progress has been made to standardize performance measures
via a capabilities-based approach, using the Navy Mission Essential
Task Lists (NMETLs). These are the basic building blocks used in
determining Fleet training requirements, plans, execution, and
readiness assessment.
* Identification of costs and resources needed to efficiently operate
the FRP has been undertaken by several organizations under the
cognizance of CFFC. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) will deliver
the results of a comprehensive study on the "Resource Implications of
the FRP". This study is currently expected to be published in November
2005. Fleet Forces Command is also developing the Fleet Training
Capability Cost System (FTCCS) which is an Activity Based
Costing/Management system (ABC/M) designed to trace Fleet resource
utilization and costs.
* As previously described, Navy leadership has worked diligently to
communicate evolving changes to Fleet plans to prepare and respond to
our changing security environment. This work will continue through
message traffic, white papers, instructions, and face-to-face lectures
and meetings with Navy leadership.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive plan for
methodical and realistic testing and evaluation of the Fleet Response
Plan. Such a comprehensive plan should include a description of the
following elements:
* how operational tests, exercises, war games, experiments,
deployments, and other similar events will be used to show the
performance of the new readiness plan under a variety of conditions,
including no-notice surges;
* how data will be collected and analyzed for these events and
synthesized to evaluate program success and improvements, and:
* how the Navy Lessons Learned System will collect and synthesize
lessons from these events to avoid repeating mistakes and improve
future operations.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. Continual evaluation is a key tenet of
the revised Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and the Navy plans on using a
variety of events to include deployments and war games to evaluate FRP.
However, conducting no-notice surges to "test' 'the Fleet Response Plan
is an expensive and unnecessary means to evaluate the FRP, and could
lead to penalties on overall readiness and ability to respond to future
emergent requirements. The FRP is an operational construct which is
subject to methodical and realistic "testing and evaluation" during
ongoing deployments and operations. To expand:
The Navy's mission is global response and providing our nation and
allies dominant naval power wherever and whenever required. Our
maritime forces do this through persistence, precision, reach, speed,
and agility. The FRP is the operational framework that capitalizes on
investments that have been made to readiness accounts and leverages
force provider capability to meet global Combatant Commander demand
signals for traditional roles, e.g. forward presence, and new emerging
mission areas such as Detention Facility Security, JTF HOA, and Air
Ambulance. The FRP is an on-going mission-driven response plan that
provides the right readiness at the right time, enables responsive
forward presence, and drives our ability to answer the Combatant
Commanders' demand signals. With FRP the Navy has deployed and
developed a more agile, flexible and scalable naval force capable of
surging quickly to deal with unexpected threats, humanitarian disasters
and contingency operations.
* A key objective in the FRP evolution is the continual evaluation and
re-evaluation of mission essential tasks, in response to Combatant
Commander demands, to create an adaptive capability earlier in the
training cycle. The Navy has and will continue to use both Unit Level
Training (ULT) and the ability to respond to Requests For Forces (RFF)
to evaluate both current training funding levels and FRP sustainment
funding levels. By aligning key training milestones in accordance with
national strategy, and Component and Combatant Commander
feedback/lessons learned our naval forces will deliver a tailored
combat ready force in the highest state of readiness.
* To specifically address the no-notice surge requirement, any FRP
surge is in fact no notice. Should world events require a large no-
notice surge, the Navy will capture those lessons learned and
incorporate improvements into the FRP. For example, Global War on
Terrorism Surge 05 (European and Central Command surges) was no notice.
The demand signal and supply signal were both generated in May 05 and
ships deployed 27 May 05, NWDC is currently analyzing. Other surge
examples:
- HSV surge in support of PACOM Tsunami relief:
- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Navy response (HARRY S TRUMAN underway 96
hours after notification):
* Salvage/Recovery ship/EOD/Divers:
* Mine Countermeasure ships:
* Hospital ship (surge from reduced operational status):
* SEABEES/Cargo Handling/Helicopters/Tactical Air Control/AEW/Maritime
Preposition:
* Expeditionary medical facilities:
* Causeway transport:
- SAIPAN Expeditionary Strike Group readiness to surge in 96 hours to
support Haiti operations (JCS did not execute):
- SAIPAN Expeditionary Strike Group 96 hour readiness to surge to PACOM
in support of Tsunami relief operations (JCS did not execute):
- THEODORE ROOSEVELT Carrier Strike Group surged 7 days early from
planned deployment to meet CENTCOM increased demand signal for Iraqi
elections.
- LINCOLN Carrier Strike Group surge (from Emergency Surge status) to
cover for KITTY HAWK in maintenance:
- BOXER/BATAAN and KEARSARGE surge in support of Marine Corps Air
Combat Element transport to Iraq.
* The FRP was demonstrated in response to Operation Iraqi Freedom,
where 6 carriers where deployed to Iraq, and again during SUMMER PULSE
2004. During SUMMER PULSE over 40 Broad categories of data were
captured. Prior to conduct of the surge, analysis was conducted to
predict performance, and was then compared to SUMMER PULSE results, all
of which were in the expected (fiscally, flight hour, weapons
expenditure and steaming days constrained) and predicted readiness
levels. Navy analyzed:
- Cost/sorties/flight hours;
- Combat readiness/Mobility ratings;
- Steaming days/PASSEX events;
- Mil to Mil exchanges/Conduct of Argentinean and Brazilian aircraft
aboard USS REAGAN;
- Training events conducted/weapons expended/ranges utilized (TAN TAN
in Morocco noteworthy);
- Anti-submarine warfare time;
- Logistics/maintenance;
- Personnel qualification gains;
- Information Operations/Public Affairs;
- FRP total ordnance posture;
- Strategic/Operational and Tactical gains (Theater Security
Cooperation) with International organizations and foreign nations.
The Navy will continue to capitalize on the investments to the
readiness accounts under the Fleet Response Plan framework/operational
construct. FRP provides a superb base to meet the challenges faced in
the Global War on Terror and transforming, trans-national threats while
maintaining significant presence abroad; to assure our allies, dissuade
our adversaries and respond with scalable Major Combat Operations
capable forces. It provides the framework to rapidly adapt to new
mission requirements and meet the demands of Combatant Commanders. It
is an evolving operational construct that incorporates lessons learned,
adapts to the changing landscape and maintains the capability to manage
risk and fiscal responsibilities.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Richard Payne, Assistant
Director; Renee Brown; Jonathan Clark; Nicole Collier; Dawn Godfrey;
David Marroni; Bethann Ritter; Roderick Rodgers; John Van Schaik; and
Rebecca Shea made significant contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Fleet Response Plan is also known as the Fleet Readiness
Program, or simply "FRP."
[2] See GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum on Mergers and Transformation:
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal
Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); and Results-
Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[3] See GAO, Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance
Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan, GAO-04-724R (Washington,
D.C.: June 18, 2004).
[4] Emergency surge status means a unit can be employed in case of
urgent need but does so at levels of operational risk correlating to
the level of capability achieved at the time of emergency surge. Surge-
ready status means that units are ready to be employed at more
acceptable levels of operational risk commensurate with the level of
capability achieved at the time of the requirement to surge. Routine
deployable status means a unit has achieved all required capabilities,
completed underway training requirements, and is certified for forward
deployed operations.
[5] Unit-level phase training focuses on completion of unit-level
training requirements, including team training both on board and
ashore; unit-level exercises in port and at sea; and unit inspections,
assessments, certifications, and qualifications. During this phase, a
unit becomes proficient in all required capabilities, meets the
training commander's certification criteria, and becomes ready for more
complex integrated training events. Integrated phase training brings
individual units together to conduct strike-group-level integrated
training and operations in a challenging operational environment as a
foundation for performing their anticipated deployed mission.
Sustainment phase training exercises units and staffs in multimission
planning and execution, including the ability to interoperate
effectively in a wartime environment.
[6] The maintenance phase consists of depot-level shipyard maintenance
for a period of 6 to 12 months. Deep maintenance is for a period of 2
to 3 years for a nuclear-refueling overhaul.
[7] The Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 to provide for, among other things, the establishment of strategic
planning and performance measurement in the federal government. Pub. L.
No. 103-62 (1993).
[8] We met with people individually and in groups. Personnel included
commanding officers, executive officers, and senior and junior enlisted
personnel. Additionally, we met with command master chiefs and command
career counselors.
[9] Tabletop exercises are analytical tools that require fewer
resources than full-fledged live exercises. They provide a means to
develop both immediate and long-term solutions among functional areas,
to develop standardization and interoperability of procedures, and to
document best practices for others to utilize.
[10] Army Regulation 5-5, Army Studies and Analyses (June 30, 1996).
[11] Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem, "Roundtable: Summer Pulse
Discussions With Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem," Summer Pulse '04
News Archive (July 8, 2004),
http://www.cffc.navy.mil/summerpulse04/stufflebeem-transcript.htm.
[12] See GAO, Quantitative Data Analysis: An Introduction, GAO/PEMD-
10.1.11, ch. 7 (Washington, D.C.: May 1992).
[13] The Navy Warfare Development Command's responsibilities include
being a champion for Navy warfare innovation, operating concepts, and
concept of operations development in a naval, joint, and coalition
environment; coordinating the planning and implementation of the Navy's
experimentation process; managing development, approval, and rapid
dissemination of naval, joint, and allied doctrine; and managing the
Navy's Lessons Learned Program.
[14] No-notice exercises demonstrate participants' ability to rapidly
respond to unexpected situations. This type of exercise is valued
because it can lead to improvements in procedures by exercising
participants in a near-real-world context.
[15] In the spring of 2005, the Navy surged five ships in support of
the Global War on Terrorism to work with allies to detect, disrupt, and
deny international terrorist organizations the use of the maritime
environment. These ships will also work to build regional security and
long-term stability. The five ships are the U.S.S. Saipan (LHA 2),
U.S.S. Nashville (LPD 13), U.S.S. Nicholas (FFG 47), the U.S.S. Gunston
Hall (LSD 44), and the U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CG 58).
[16] A request for forces is a special request by a geographic
combatant commander through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for
forces in addition to the normal, preapproved force deployments or
forces assigned.
[17] An after-action report is a professional discussion of an event,
focused on performance standards, that enables participants to discover
for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain
strengths and address weaknesses. It is a tool that leaders, trainers,
and units can use to get maximum benefit from every mission or task.
[18] The Joint Quarterly Readiness Review is a quarterly readiness
assessment that identifies capability shortfalls and risks in mission
execution and identifies appropriate measures for risk reduction.
[19] See GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps
Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for
Combat Training Centers, GAO-05-8 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005),
and Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide
Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing,
GAO- 05-10 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 11, 2004).
[20] See GAO, Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to
Avoid Past Mistakes Is Largely Untapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 9, 1995).
[21] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37D, currently being
drafted, would replace Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C,
March 19, 2001, Navy Lessons Learned System.
[22] See GAO, Defense Reorganization: Progress and Concerns at JCS and
Combatant Commands, GAO/NSIAD-89-83 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 1989).
[23] See GAO, Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los
Alamos and Other DOE Facilities, GAO/RCED-91-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
11, 1990).
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