Military Training
Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements Gao ID: GAO-06-193 December 8, 2005DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint training as exercises involving the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs under a joint headquarters. To guide the services' plans to train forces for urban operations and construct related facilities, in May 2002, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring training capabilities within the services and across DOD by November 1, 2005. Due to DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training.
Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD's executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Command began working with the services to review the study's results and to develop the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the draft strategy identifies some facility needs, as of October 2005, the Command and services have not reached consensus on the level or types of joint training exercises needed to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, the Command has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the required baseline on time and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Until the Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans, and related funding requests. Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for training that places troops from different services on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine both require forces to be prepared to operate jointly across the full range of military operations. Various factors account for the lack of joint training opportunities, such as the services' focus on service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific training requirements, and a formal mechanism to schedule joint training at service facilities. Without a strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of training facilities. While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is to train as it expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing operations, DOD has made several adjustments, including constructing urban structures, using civilian role players, and adding training on techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics. Persons GAO interviewed cited the need for more live-fire capability, larger numbers of role players, information gathering and cultural awareness training, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans more improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific requirements as discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and guide its improvement efforts and investment decisions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-193, Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements
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Report to Congressional Committees:
December 2005:
Military Training:
Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities
Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-193]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-193, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces to
conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint training as
exercises involving the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs
under a joint headquarters. To guide the services‘ plans to train
forces for urban operations and construct related facilities, in May
2002, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish
facility requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to
complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring
training capabilities within the services and across DOD by November 1,
2005. Due to DOD‘s focus on joint urban operations and congressional
interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, GAO, on
the authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which
(1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and
related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban
operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from
ongoing operations into its training.
What GAO Found:
Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall
joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and
training requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint
Forces Command, designated as DOD‘s executive agent for urban
operations training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005,
to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the
Command began working with the services to review the study‘s results
and to develop the detailed facility and training requirements needed
to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the draft
strategy identifies some facility needs, as of October 2005, the
Command and services have not reached consensus on the level or types
of joint training exercises needed to prepare troops for urban
operations. As a result, the Command has been unable to finalize the
strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form
the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across
DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the
required baseline on time and instead plan to provide criteria for the
Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Until the Command
develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and
related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress
will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility
plans, and related funding requests.
Despite DOD‘s increasing emphasis on the importance of training for
joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently
exist for training that places troops from different services on the
ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine
both require forces to be prepared to operate jointly across the full
range of military operations. Various factors account for the lack of
joint training opportunities, such as the services‘ focus on service-
specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint
urban operations training, specific training requirements, and a formal
mechanism to schedule joint training at service facilities. Without a
strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD
cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or
that it will maximize the joint usage of training facilities.
While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO
interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD‘s training goals
is to train as it expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing
operations, DOD has made several adjustments, including constructing
urban structures, using civilian role players, and adding training on
techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics. Persons GAO interviewed
cited the need for more live-fire capability, larger numbers of role
players, information gathering and cultural awareness training, and
training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans more
improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific requirements as
discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and
guide its improvement efforts and investment decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to improve DOD‘s approach to joint urban
operations training. In written comments on a draft report, DOD did not
concur with one of GAO‘s two recommendations. After reviewing DOD‘s
comments, GAO continues to believe that both its recommendations are
still valid.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-193.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or PickupS@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD's Joint Urban Operations Training
Strategy:
Despite DOD's Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train
Together for Joint Urban Operations:
While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training
Personnel Suggested Further Training Enhancements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations Training
Facility Enhancements:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Current Training Facilities that Can Support Joint Urban
Operations Training:
Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Figures:
Figure 1: Army Urban Operations Training Site at Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Figure 2: Marines Execute a Helicopter-Borne Raid Exercise Using Flat-
top Roofs
Figure 3: Army Troops Practice Communicating with Role Players as Part
of Their Training Exercise in Hohenfels, Germany
Figure 4: Army Live-Fire Convoy Training Exercise in Germany:
Letter December 8, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the
challenges facing U.S. forces as they conduct military operations in
urban environments, typically referred to as urban operations. These
challenges include the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, a
high density of buildings that complicate the coordination of firing
weapons, a diminished effectiveness of communications equipment, and an
increased ability of insurgents or guerrilla fighters to conceal their
whereabouts. Based on ongoing operations, which often require U.S.
forces to conduct urban operations, military commanders have
increasingly called for more training in this area. In response, the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have begun
placing a higher priority on urban operations training. DOD has also
increasingly emphasized the importance of joint training, including
exercises to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint urban operations. DOD
defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint forces or joint
staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to joint doctrine
that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational requirements. DOD
has designated the Joint Forces Command as the command responsible for
joint training, and in particular, to act as the executive agent, for
urban operations training.
As the military services continue to develop plans for urban operations
training and to construct or upgrade training facilities, and submit
related funding requests, the Senate Armed Services Committee has
directed DOD to develop requirements to guide the services' plans.
Specifically, in May 2002, Senate Report 107-151, accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, directed DOD
to establish facility requirements and, in May 2005, Senate Report 109-
69, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, directed DOD to complete its efforts and provide a requirements
baseline for measuring training capabilities within each service and
across DOD by November 1, 2005. In the latter report, the Senate Armed
Services Committee noted the services will continue to address urban
operations training requirements and expend resources independently
with minimal coordination and cooperation until a comprehensive joint
training plan and investment strategy are approved and implemented
within the department. In response, the Joint Forces Command has been
working with the military services to develop an overall training
strategy that addresses the need for troops to train jointly for urban
operations, and related facility and training requirements. According
to Joint Forces Command, this strategy and the related requirements,
once complete, is intended to satisfy the baseline required by Senate
Report 109-69.
Because of DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional
interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, we, on
the authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which
(1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and
related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban
operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from
ongoing operations into its training.
To address these objectives, we interviewed knowledgeable DOD
officials, and analyzed relevant documents including DOD training
doctrine, the draft urban operations training strategy, and the results
of joint urban operations working group meetings. Additionally, we
visited several service training installations and combat training
centers in the United States as well as overseas, observed exercises,
and analyzed training documents to identify the extent of joint
participation in exercises and improvements made to urban operations
training as a result of lessons learned from ongoing operations. We
also conducted interviews with training personnel and troops recently
returned from Iraq and Afghanistan to obtain their views on the type of
urban operations training needed to realistically train troops as they
will fight. We determined that the data we analyzed were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review. We performed our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from
January 2005 through September 2005. More details on our scope and
methodology are presented in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall
joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and
training requirements. In response to congressional direction, the
Joint Forces Command contracted for a study, completed in early 2005,
to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Joint
Forces Command began working with the services to review the study's
results and develop the detailed facility and training requirements
needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the
services have identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command and
service representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the
level or types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban
operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to
finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements
that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each
service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to
deliver the required baseline by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to
provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility
plans. Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for
joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the
Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for
evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding
requests. As a result, we are recommending that DOD finalize
development of its joint urban operations training strategy, including
development of training and facility requirements, before approving
service plans to construct or upgrade training facilities to support
urban operations training.
Despite DOD's increased emphasis on the importance of training for
joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently
exist for joint urban operations training that places troops from
different services on the ground working under a joint headquarters.
Joint and service doctrine both require forces to be prepared to
operate as a joint team across the full range of military operations.
Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for transforming military training to
better enable joint force operations by increasing the level of joint
context in military training. Many existing urban operations training
exercises include some joint aspects, such as training on coordination
between ground forces and the Air Force, and a few exercises have also
incorporated the use of a joint headquarters to train its battle staff
on joint command and control. However, most urban operations training
events fall short of the definition of a joint exercise as articulated
in DOD's joint training policy--the interaction of joint forces or
joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters in a manner that
prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational requirements. Various
factors account for the lack of joint urban operations training
opportunities, such as the services' focus on service-specific skills,
and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations
training, specific joint urban operations training requirements, and a
formal mechanism for the services to schedule joint urban operations
training at each other's facilities. Without a strategy, defined
requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured
that joint urban operations training will occur or that it will
maximize the joint usage of training facilities. To increase the
opportunities for joint urban operations training, we are recommending
that DOD establish a mechanism for joint scheduling of joint urban
operations training at major training centers.
While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we
interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals
is to train as it expects to fight. On the basis of feedback from
ongoing operations, DOD has made several adjustments to its urban
operations training, including expanding and upgrading its urban
training structures to more closely reflect urban conditions that
troops can expect to face in current operations, using civilian role
players to a greater extent to simulate the presence of urban
populations, building convoy operations training courses, and training
troops in techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics such as the use
of improvised explosive devices. Discussions held with troops and
training personnel revealed additional items that they believed could
further enhance training, such as the need for additional live-fire
capability, a larger number of civilian role players and more cultural
awareness training to prepare troops for the required interaction with
a large civilian populace once in theater, and training with newly
fielded equipment such as the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle, the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight, and the Blue Force
Tracker. While DOD plans additional improvements to current training,
until it develops specific training requirements, it will lack a solid
basis to evaluate suggestions and make improvements and investment
decisions.
DOD concurred with our recommendation on finalizing the joint urban
operations training strategy and related requirements. DOD did not
concur with our recommendation for establishing a mechanism to schedule
joint urban operations training at major training centers. Our report
shows that the lack of a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban
operations training at major training centers is one of the key factors
accounting for the limited number of joint urban operations training
opportunities. Our recommendation is intended to facilitate increased
multi-service participation in urban operations training events.
Without implementing this recommendation, DOD will continue to rely on
the current service-centric scheduling systems that have resulted in
few joint urban operations training opportunities that meet DOD's
definition of a joint exercise. Therefore, we continue to believe our
recommendation has merit. The department also provided technical
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
Half the world's population lives in urban areas, and the trend towards
global urbanization is continuing. Within the last 40 years, the United
States military has conducted urban operations in locations such as
Saigon, Hue, Beirut, Panama City, Kuwait City, Mogadishu, and the
villages of the Balkans. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
highlighted the trend towards urban operations and the many challenges
they present U.S. forces. Military planners recognize this trend and
acknowledge the likelihood that enemies will continue to draw U.S.
forces into cities to degrade U.S. military advantages. According to
DOD, in the future, U.S. forces will likely conduct military operations
in urban areas, which are characterized by multiple structures,
numerous noncombatants, and complex infrastructure. These areas are
also political, cultural, and economic centers, as well as hubs for
transportation, information, and manufacturing. Thus, the urban
environment constrains many of the advantages that U.S. forces
currently enjoy in open environments, increasing the risks of high
casualties to friendly forces and noncombatants, and extensive
collateral damage.
Moreover, once deployed, forces generally find themselves part of joint
operations. In testimony the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Readiness reiterated comments made earlier by the Secretary of Defense:
"The wars and the conflicts of the 21st century will not be fought by
individual services. Rather, they will be fought by joint forces, and
more often than not, by combined forces. Therefore, we will have to
think, train, and exercise jointly and combined, because let there be
no doubt that is the way that we will fight."[Footnote 1]
As part of its Training Transformation Program, DOD is attempting to
provide more of a joint context to its training.[Footnote 2] DOD
defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint forces and/or
joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to joint
doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational
requirements. To develop a stronger program of joint training, DOD
designated the Joint Forces Command as the joint trainer for DOD to
support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as senior
commanders worldwide in meeting joint training objectives. In 2002, DOD
published its Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations[Footnote 3] and,
recognizing the need to place a stronger emphasis on urban operations
training, assigned the role of joint urban operations executive agent
for training to Joint Forces Command. While the Office of the Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall responsibility for
training policies, Joint Forces Command, as DOD's executive agent, is
the "primary DOD point of contact and proponent for joint urban
operations doctrine, training, and equipment," and is to lead,
coordinate, and integrate the activities of the other DOD components on
such matters. In this role, Joint Forces Command has conducted
experiments on concepts of operations for joint urban operations and
monitored lessons learned from ongoing urban operations.
The training of U.S. forces for urban operations is primarily the
responsibility of the services. Both the Army and Marine Corps, the
services that conduct most urban operations, have developed fairly
robust urban operations training programs for their ground forces.
Figure 1 shows an Army training facility at Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
with structures built to train troops in conducting urban operations.
Figure 1: Army Urban Operations Training Site at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The services train ground forces for urban operations based on a
building-block approach beginning with specialty-focused individual
training at their assigned installation, which normally focuses on
individual basic skills needed to successfully conduct operations in
urban terrain. Then they progress through collective training that
sometimes includes other services on a limited basis. Training ends
with a culminating exercise at a major training center, such as the
Joint Readiness Training Center or Twenty-Nine Palms, and is based on
real-time scenarios that troops may encounter in the urban environment.
The Army and Marine Corps currently have plans to construct new or
upgrade existing facilities to support urban operations training.
Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD's Joint Urban Operations Training
Strategy:
Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall
joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and
training requirements. In response to direction from the Senate Armed
Services Committee in May 2002, Joint Forces Command, designated as
DOD's executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a
study, completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training
requirements. In May 2005, the committee directed DOD to establish
joint urban operations facility requirements and a training
requirements baseline by November 1, 2005. In May 2005, Joint Forces
Command began working with the services to review the study's results
and develop the detailed facility and training requirements needed to
form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the services have
identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command and service
representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the level or
types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban
operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to
finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements
that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each
service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to
deliver the baseline as required by November 1, 2005, and instead plan
to provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service
facility plans. Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy
for joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither
the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for
evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding
requests.
DOD Directed to Develop Urban Operations Training and Facility
Requirements:
In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 4] the Senate Armed Services
Committee required a report by the Secretary of Defense that would
establish requirements for facilities that support urban operations
training within DOD. In response to the committee's direction, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the joint urban operations
executive agent, Joint Forces Command, contracted for a study that
would examine urban operations training requirements and the resulting
facilities that would be needed to conduct the necessary training.
The study was completed in early 2005. According to DOD officials,
while the study results have helped to inform the process, the detailed
training and facility requirements contained in the study have not been
formally adopted because there was not enough agreement among the
services as to the usefulness or veracity of the identified urban
operations training requirements in that study. Consequently, in May
2005 Joint Forces Command convened a working group to develop joint
urban operations training and facilities requirements on which to base
a joint urban operations training strategy.
In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 5] the Senate Armed Services
committee directed DOD to complete its efforts to establish the
requirements for facilities and also directed it to establish, by
November 1, 2005, a training requirements baseline against which the
ability to train for urban operations within the services and across
DOD could be measured. In the report, the committee expressed concern
that the services would otherwise continue to address urban operations
training requirements and expend resources independently with minimal
coordination and that a critical opportunity to develop capabilities
for joint training in urban operations was not being effectively
pursued. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces Command
began working with the services to develop an overall strategy for
joint urban operations and related facility and training requirements.
According to DOD, this effort is intended to meet the congressional
directive for a requirements baseline.
Current Strategy Focuses on Need for Facilities:
To date, the draft Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy, as
currently drafted, primarily focuses on the need to enhance training
facilities to accommodate larger, more realistic joint urban operations
training events. The current draft strategy's focus is to identify the
necessary locations for joint urban operations training for two
audiences: (1) troops executing urban operations at the tactical level
and (2) officers serving on the staffs of commanders conducting urban
operations. As envisioned, the troops that execute the operations would
undergo training that places members of different services together to
learn to operate together and to overcome differences in standard
practices, terms, and organizational cultures that can limit the
effectiveness of operations. The draft strategy also envisions using
three training range complexes comprised of existing training
facilities in the western, central, and eastern United States, as well
as improvements and expansions planned for some of these training
facilities.
For its second audience, the strategy suggested building new facilities
in order to train staff officers in the skills associated with serving
on a joint staff of a commander conducting urban operations. According
to DOD, officers serving on a joint staff rarely receive significant
and realistic training for this complex role in which they are called
upon to make recommendations to the joint task force commander based on
a myriad of facts and assumptions in a limited time frame. The draft
strategy notes that many officers often spend more time in the course
of their careers working on command staffs than they do in command of
troops. In order to establish staff training, the strategy proposes
building four new joint staff training centers large enough to handle
battalion or combatant-command-level staffs to replicate the sort of
command and control arrangements and joint staff processes they will
encounter while serving as staff officers under a joint force
commander. According to a Joint Forces Command official, these centers
can provide adequate throughput for staff training if used in
conjunction with the current Joint Operations Centers in Grafenwoehr,
Germany, and at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia.
Lack of Consensus on Joint Training Requirements Stalls Strategy:
The services have identified their respective facility needs to support
urban operations training. However, the Joint Forces Command has not
been able to finalize a draft joint urban operations training strategy
because command officials and service representatives have not been
able to agree upon joint urban operations training requirements.
Specifically, there is a lack of agreement on the need for joint urban
operations training events that place significant numbers of troops
from different services together in urban settings. As Joint Forces
Command officials continue to develop the draft strategy, they have
pledged to continue working with the services and combatant commands to
develop the joint urban operations training requirements through the
working group process. To date, Joint Forces Command has provided only
a very broad, overarching statement of the tasks that are unique to or
significantly challenged by urban environments, with a focus on
conducting joint urban operations at the operational level.
Representatives from the Army and Marine Corps in attendance at the
second session of the joint urban operations training strategy working
group in August 2005 repeatedly emphasized the need for more
specifically defined training requirements for joint urban operations
before they could evaluate the draft joint urban operations training
strategy and assess their services' commitment to it. Given the key
role the services and combatant commands play in training forces--both
troops on the ground and staff personnel--consensus on joint urban
operations training requirements is necessary for the implementation of
a joint urban operations training strategy.
Because of the lack of consensus in the draft joint urban operations
training strategy and related requirements, DOD has not yet developed
joint training requirements to use as a baseline against which to
measure capabilities within and across the services. As a result, DOD
officials told us they will not be able to deliver the requirements
baseline to the Congress by the November 1, 2005, deadline. DOD
officials stated that, instead, they plan to provide a set of questions
for the Congress to use as interim criteria in considering service
funding requests for urban operations training facilities. These
questions are intended to assist the Congress in evaluating the
potential for joint usage of proposed facilities. Until Joint Forces
Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations
training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor
the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility
and training plans, and related funding requests.
Despite DOD's Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train
Together for Joint Urban Operations:
Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for
joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently
exist for joint urban operations training that places troops from
different services on the ground working under a joint headquarters.
Various factors account for the lack of joint urban operations
training, such as the services' focus on training service-specific
skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban
operations training, specific joint urban operations training
requirements, and a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban
operations training at service-owned facilities. Without a training
strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD
cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or
that DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training
facilities.
Few Urban Operations Training Opportunities Exist that Meet DOD's
Definition of Joint Training:
DOD's Joint Training Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3500.01B, defines a joint exercise as a joint military
maneuver, simulated wartime operation, or other Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff/combatant commander-designated event involving
planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation in which forces of two
or more services interact as joint forces and/or joint staffs and the
event is conducted based on approved joint doctrine that prepares joint
forces or staffs to respond to operational requirements established by
the combatant commander. Although there is often some level of
jointness incorporated into Marine Corps and Army urban operations
training events, these efforts fall short of DOD's definition of a
joint training event because they do not include a joint headquarters
and focus on service, rather than joint, training objectives. Marine
Corps officials said that the Marine Corps includes some joint
scenarios in its events and incorporates to some extent other service
participation in performing certain specialty roles, such as air-ground
coordination. The Army simulates some of the joint aspects of a
battlefield in its training as well, such as the joint command and
control structures troops are expected to encounter in theater, and it
incorporates special operations forces when possible. According to
Joint Forces Command officials, the Joint Operations Center at Joint
Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia, and the Joint Multinational
Training Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany,[Footnote 6] are used to
provide some officers with the type of joint staff officer training
called for in the draft strategy. We observed the Joint Operations
Center, which is used to provide officers with command and control
training, at the Joint Multinational Training Center. Officers we spoke
with stated that this was a great addition that increased the level of
joint urban operations training.
Although the services are taking these actions to increase jointness,
training exercises are still primarily focused on service-derived,
rather than joint, training objectives and for the most part do not
include a joint headquarters to command the exercise. For example, an
Air Force representative who was involved in supporting the Army's Air
Warrior II training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, which was
designed to prepare troops for urban operations before they deployed,
stated that the value of the training was limited for the Air Force
because the training was designed around the accomplishment of Army
training objectives. Additionally, an Air Force representative in
Germany experienced similar difficulties in getting Air Force training
objectives added to Army exercises. Furthermore, the troops and
training personnel we interviewed, many of whom had recent operational
experience in ongoing operations, emphasized the importance of training
jointly for urban operations in order to maximize familiarity with the
services' respective ways of operating and overall interoperability.
Several Factors Contribute to the Lack of Joint Urban Operations
Training:
One important factor contributing to the lack of joint urban operations
training is the services' focus on service-specific skills training.
The two services that perform the bulk of urban operations training,
the Army and Marine Corps, are proactively working to ensure that their
troops are trained in the individual skills needed for operations in
urban terrain. Soldiers and Marines are exposed to individual urban
tasks in their basic training and specialty schools. The Army and
Marine Corps primarily concentrate their urban operations training on
enhancing the capabilities of individual soldiers and small units--
primarily squads, platoons, and companies. As noted in our June 2005
report,[Footnote 7] historically, service training has focused on
individual service competencies or mission-essential tasks, with less
emphasis on joint operations. While this has allowed the services to
meet their core training responsibilities, it has also contributed to
the problem of forces often entering combat without prior experience or
training in joint urban operations.
Second, in the absence of a joint urban operations training strategy,
there is currently no specific requirement for the services to train
jointly for urban operations. While it is not urban-specific, the DOD
Directive 1322.18, which advocates joint training, states: "To the
maximum extent possible, the DOD components shall conduct joint
training in accredited events at certified facilities, and shall
synchronize schedules to integrate training events." However, the
directive does not define what is meant by "to the maximum extent
possible" and therefore provides the services much leeway in how much
they participate in joint training. Absent a directive requiring the
services to train for joint urban operations tasks at a specified level
and specific joint urban operations training requirements, the services
are likely to continue to focus their training on service-specific
skills and tasks for which they are held accountable. As discussed
earlier, Joint Forces Command expects the joint urban operations
training strategy it is developing to include such requirements.
Lastly, the services own the facilities used to conduct urban
operations training and are currently using them primarily for service-
specific training requirements. While the services agree that joint
urban operations training is needed, there is no formal mechanism in
place to ensure that joint training requirements are incorporated into
the different services' training schedules. Urban training that
involves placing two or more battalions together is usually reserved
for the combat training centers and these training centers are limited
in throughput capacity. For example, the Joint Readiness Training
Center normally sponsors 10 training rotations per year and is limited
in its ability to expand the amount of rotations it can host per year
to increase joint usage. Even though Joint Forces Command is the
executive agent for joint urban operations, it does not have the
authority to direct the services or combatant commands to modify their
training plans to accommodate joint urban operations training. It is
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness that
has overall authority over DOD training policies. Table 1 lists those
facilities that can currently support large joint urban operations
training exercises and staff officer training.
Table 1: Current Training Facilities that Can Support Joint Urban
Operations Training:
Facility: Joint Readiness Training Center;
Location: Fort Polk, Louisiana;
Facilitates joint urban operations training for troops (battalions from
different services): Yes;
Facilitates urban operations training for officers on joint staffs:
Yes.
Facility: Twenty-Nine Palms;
Location: Twenty-Nine Palms, California;
Facilitates joint urban operations training for troops (battalions from
different services): Yes;
Facilitates urban operations training for officers on joint staffs:
Yes.
Facility: National Training Center;
Location: Fort Irwin, California;
Facilitates joint urban operations training for troops (battalions from
different services): Yes;
Facilitates urban operations training for officers on joint staffs:
Yes.
Facility: Joint Multinational Training Center;
Location: Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels, Germany;
Facilitates joint urban operations training for troops (battalions from
different services): Yes;
Facilitates urban operations training for officers on joint staffs:
Yes.
Facility: Joint Warfighting Center;
Location: Suffolk, Virginia;
Facilitates joint urban operations training for troops (battalions from
different services): No;
Facilitates urban operations training for officers on joint staffs:
Yes.
Facility: Sites with ability to link into Joint Training and
Experimentation Network;
Location: Various service installations;
Facilitates joint urban operations training for troops (battalions from
different services): No;
Facilitates urban operations training for officers on joint staffs:
Yes.
Source: Joint Forces Command.
Note: We are using the definition of Joint Training from DOD's joint
training policy--the training event includes two or more forces and/or
joint staffs, is conducted according to joint doctrine, and is run by a
joint headquarters.
[End of table]
In a June 2002 report,[Footnote 8] we recommended that DOD create a
database that identifies all ranges available to the department and
what they offer, regardless of service ownership, so that commanders
can schedule the best available resources to provide required training.
Without a mechanism to schedule joint urban operations training at each
other's facilities, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations
training will occur or that DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban
operations training facilities.
While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training
Personnel Suggested Further Training Enhancements:
While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we
interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals
is to train as it expects to fight. The services have been using both
formal and informal means to collect and disseminate lessons learned
from ongoing operations to be incorporated into their training events.
Based on this feedback, during the site visits we made, we observed
that the services have made many improvements in their urban operations
training such as: expanding and upgrading their urban training
structures, using role players to a greater extent to simulate the
presence of urban populations, building convoy operations training
courses, and training troops in techniques to counter emerging enemy
tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. Our
discussions held with troops and training personnel revealed additional
items that they believed could further enhance training to better
reflect current operating conditions such as the need for additional
live-fire capability, adding larger numbers of role players and
providing more cultural awareness training to adequately prepare troops
for the required interaction with a large civilian populace once in
theater, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans
additional improvements to current training, until it develops a
strategy and specific facility and training requirements as discussed
previously, it will lack a solid basis to guide its improvement
efforts.
The Services Use Both Formal and Informal Means to Collect and
Disseminate Lessons Learned from Ongoing Operations:
The Army and Marine Corps utilize both formal and informal means for
capturing and disseminating lessons learned. According to service
officials, to obtain information from ongoing operations, they send
subject matter experts into theater with deploying units and capture
lessons learned from troops returning from recent ongoing operations.
Both services maintain databases, which are used to disseminate lessons
learned information within and among the services. These databases
include numerous lessons learned related to ongoing urban operations.
For example, the Marine Corps database contains lessons learned on
urban operations including basic Arabic language training, information
on convoy operations tactics, and search techniques. Additionally,
Joint Forces Command also sends subject matter experts into theater and
its Joint Center for Operational Analysis maintains a database of
lessons learned and helps facilitate the sharing of joint lessons among
the services. Both the Army and Marine Corps formally disseminated the
information collected through publications such as handbooks,
newsletters, and official Web sites. For example, the Army's Center for
Lessons Learned issued a tactical convoy operations handbook that was
also used by the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command,
according to Army Center for Lessons Learned officials. Another formal
method the Army uses to disseminate information is the "smart card,"
which is a compact card that easily fits in a soldier's pocket, thus
providing quick access to information. The Army recently issued a smart
card that served as a guide for knowledge about Iraqi culture.
The services also utilize informal mechanisms for capturing and
disseminating lessons learned. Officials we spoke with from the Army's
Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany indicated that they rely
more heavily on informal mechanisms, such as electronic messages from
troops in the field and the "right seat/left seat" transition program.
Under this program, incoming commanders learn the latest urban tactics
by shadowing outbound individuals conducting urban operations. For
example, incoming company commanders shadow outgoing commanders to
learn about the intricacies of the local operating area and what
practices have proved useful in conducting missions. Further, training
center officials and troops we talked with indicated that they shared
information on ongoing operations via available DOD databases.
Integration of Lessons Learned Is Improving Urban Operations Training:
The Army and the Marine Corps have recently made significant
improvements in urban operations training curriculum and facilities
based on lessons learned from ongoing operations and training events.
Specifically, these services have adjusted their training curriculum to
place greater emphasis on urban operations. While the Marine Corps
introduced its revised combined arms exercise and security and
stabilization operations training in 2003, it was not mandatory
predeployment training until the summer of 2005, according to Marine
Corps officials. The Army recently incorporated urban operations tasks
into its Advanced Individual Training Program to ensure that soldiers
receive predeployment training on warrior tasks and battle drills
regardless of their occupational specialties, according to officials
from the Army's Collective Training Directorate. Further, in June 2004,
the Army issued guidance stating that it intends to provide all
deploying brigade and battalion commanders and staff training on urban
stability and support operations through its Battle Command Training
Program.
At training sites in Germany we visited, we found that Army trainers
incorporated real-time scenarios from ongoing operations in their
exercises to provide troops with training that realistically reflects
the urban environment. For example, they incorporated Iraqi elections
into the mission rehearsal exercise in July 2005 in anticipation of the
conditions they would face once deployed. Other examples of curriculum
changes that services had made to provide troops with more of the
skills necessary to effectively face urban challenges included:
* developing mobile training teams that deploy to training sites to
provide instruction to Marines on the handling of detainees at
detention operations;
* placing more emphasis on search procedures related to dwellings,
caves, and vehicles to locate insurgents or weapons;
* delivering training on how to respond to improvised explosive device
incidents;[Footnote 9] and:
* training troops on how to conduct convoy operations.
During our visits to training sites, we also observed that the
facilities used for urban operations training had been expanded and
upgraded to more closely reflect urban conditions troops can expect to
face in current operations. For example, we observed small towns that
had been enhanced to replicate urban terrain by including mosques, open
markets, and flat-roofed dwellings. Figure 2 depicts Marines practicing
raid procedures on flat-top roofs to simulate the type of buildings
they would encounter in current urban operational environments.
Figure 2: Marines Execute a Helicopter-Borne Raid Exercise Using Flat-
top Roofs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Both services have populated these urban training facilities with role
players that portray government officials, tribal leaders, religious
leaders, and officials from interagency organizations. For example, the
Joint Multinational Training Center has increased the total number of
civilian role players to up to 600 participants, though not all are
used in each training event. Our discussions with soldiers who had
returned from operations in Iraq, however, stated that exercises need
to include a larger number of role players to more realistically
represent the urban environment. We noted that the Joint Readiness
Training Center replicates the media and incorporates nongovernmental
organizations and civilian role players in its training. Figure 3 shows
an Army exercise that incorporates civilian role players to simulate
local inhabitants in a Middle Eastern environment.
Figure 3: Army Troops Practice Communicating with Role Players as Part
of Their Training Exercise in Hohenfels, Germany:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Furthermore, we observed that the Marine Corps and Army have included
newly built live-fire or simulated convoy courses in some of their
urban operations facilities. Those with live-fire courses are
emphasizing the importance of training troops on them at night and in
adverse weather. Figure 4 shows training on a live-fire convoy
operations training course in Germany. The services are also updating
training to reflect changes to enemy tactics such as the use of
improvised explosive devices. We saw incorporation of simulated
improvised explosive devices at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and observed
the newly developed training site for explosive devices at the Joint
Multinational Training Center in Germany.
Figure 4: Army Live-Fire Convoy Training Exercise in Germany:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to recent improvements, the services are currently planning
further enhancements to existing training facilities. For instance, the
Marine Corps is requesting funds to construct a large-scale urban
training facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The new facility
will have up to 1,500 buildings, including live-fire capability, and
outlying components such as an airfield, port, and villages. According
to Marine officials, the facility will be large enough to accommodate
joint training exercises with the Army. It is also expected to provide
a venue from which to experiment, develop, and exercise
joint/interagency urban operations with the Joint National Training
Capability. The Marine Corps also plans to add a night driving course
to pre-deployment training. Additionally, the Marines plan to add shoot
houses at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and Marine Corps Base Quantico.
Likewise, the Army is in the process of improving its combat training
centers by adding more buildings and instrumentation, and its major
installations by providing shoot houses, urban assault courses, breach
facilities, and combined arms collective training facilities. Army
officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center have initiated an
effort to enhance training through the development of an Expeditionary
Instrumentation System, which is a new mobile instrumentation
capability that provides feedback to the battalion at any training site
that lacks instrumentation. According to its developers, the mobile
nature of the system will also help alleviate capacity concerns
throughout the Army, turning any location into an instrumented range.
See appendix II for a description of major ongoing and planned urban
operations training facility enhancements.
Troops and Training Personnel Identified Further Training Enhancements
That They Believe Would Better Reflect Current Operating Conditions:
One of DOD's training goals is to train as it expects to fight and
discussions held with troops and training personnel revealed additional
items that they believe could further enhance training to better
reflect current operating conditions. Personnel identified enhancements
such as the need for additional live-fire capability, adding more
civilian role players in exercises and providing additional information
gathering and cultural awareness training, and having newly fielded
equipment available to train with at the training centers.
Additional Live-Fire Training:
The troops we spoke with stated that the live-fire training they
received prior to deployment was infrequent and did not sufficiently
prepare them to use their weapons in an urban setting. Training
personnel at facilities we visited stated that the facilities' live-
fire capability is limited due to environmental issues and concerns
about safety when training in urban operations training sites with role
players. In lieu of live-fire training, urban operations facilities
have simulated shooting drills, including video and target
instrumentation, to provide the experience of live-fire urban
operations.
More Role Players and Greater Emphasis on Cultural Awareness Training:
Further, although we observed role players included in the training
exercises we visited, troops noted that more were needed and additional
cultural awareness training would be beneficial. They noted operating
in an urban environment, against an elusive enemy with the ability to
hide among the civilian population, requires troops to be able to work
more closely with local people, in many cases on an individual basis,
to conduct stability and support operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian
missions, and the gathering of information. Troops we spoke with
indicated that the number of role players included in exercises is not
sufficient to adequately prepare them for the density and level of
persistent contact that is typical of noncombatants in the urban
environment. In addition, troops and training personnel we interviewed
wanted the role players to more actively engage the troops during the
exercises to better replicate operational conditions. The troops and
trainers also indicated that more cultural awareness training, which
would include basic language training, would be helpful to establish
and maintain communication with local civilians so that they could
better interact with civilians and minimize civilian interference with
military operations. Currently, training exercises contain some level
of cultural awareness and civil affairs training by including role
players that interact with troops, and exercises that we observed
emphasized the use of translators when working with the local
population. However, access to translators in training is limited, and
officials and troops agreed that translators were not often available
for everyday interaction with civilians and so further training would
be beneficial. Both the Marine Corps and Army have taken steps to
improve this training; the Marine Corps has established an advanced
cultural awareness center and according to an Army official, the Army
continually updates its cultural awareness training to reflect
conditions in current operations.
New Equipment Available for Training Prior to Deployment:
Troops and training personnel identified a third area for further
enhancement: the ability to train with newly fielded equipment prior to
deployment. Troops we interviewed who had returned from ongoing
operations stated that there were several pieces of equipment that they
used in theater that had not been available to train with prior to
deployment. These items had been developed to help alleviate the
difficulties of conducting urban operations by addressing the
adversaries' tactics, such as improvised explosive devices, and the
adversaries' ability to conceal themselves in an urban environment.
According to training personnel and DOD officials, limited production
quantities and the need for the items in theater to respond to rapidly
changing operational environments makes it difficult for the training
centers to initially have the items. Some examples of newly fielded
equipment that are in limited supply but DOD believes will improve
troops' ability to conduct urban operations include the following.
* Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). These
vehicles are not available at some training facilities and only the
soft-top HMMWVs were on hand for training exercises, according to
officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels and
Twenty-Nine Palms. Traveling in the up-armored HMMWVs provides greater
protection from improvised explosive devices while maintaining
transport mobility for forces, civil affairs teams, and engineers
operating in urban areas. However, Army and Marine Corps officials and
troops that we interviewed stated that the up-armored HMMWVs used in
theater were top-heavy, difficult to maneuver, and required different
tactical procedures from the soft-top HMMWVs when used in combat.
* The Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight. This gunsight is another piece
of equipment used in conducting urban operations that has been quickly
fielded into theater, but limited quantities prevented its use in
training prior to deployment. Officials stated that this item greatly
enhanced troops' ability to precisely target long-distance hostile
forces in all lighting conditions, which is critical to an urban
setting where lighting plays a key role.
* New improvised explosive device detection and disabling equipment.
These devices were not at some training facilities we visited, and some
troops noted that their absence hampered the troops' use of the items
in theater because the instructions were difficult to understand.
Officials at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Joint Multinational
Training Center, and Camp Lejeune stated that more specific training on
the use of improvised explosive device detection equipment would
facilitate its use in theater.
* Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System, also known as
Blue Force Tracker. Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking
and communication system that gives an all-weather, near real-time
picture of the battlefield. Troops we interviewed stated that they were
not exposed to Blue Force Tracker in training, although it has been
essential in conducting urban operations in Iraq because of its ability
to distinguish friendly forces from adversaries.
Officials and troops agreed that exposure to these items before
arriving in theater would have better prepared them to operate in the
urban environment. Training center and other DOD officials stated that
they would like to see a greater priority given to placing high-demand
items like the ones mentioned at the training centers to increase the
troops' level of exposure to this equipment before deployment. While
DOD plans additional improvements, until it develops a strategy and
specific facility and training requirements, it will lack a solid basis
to evaluate suggestions and make improvements and investment decisions.
Conclusions:
DOD has continually emphasized the importance of joint training,
including to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations
in urban environments. The inherent complexities of operating in urban
environments, DOD's expectation that urban environments will play a
significant role in future military operations, and that most of these
operations will be conducted jointly, coupled with the combatant
commanders' interest in ensuring U.S. forces are sufficiently prepared,
are significant incentives for Joint Forces Command and services to
develop and implement an overall joint training strategy and related
requirements. In addition, the fact that U.S. forces are currently
involved in urban operations adds a tangible sense of urgency for joint
training. Notwithstanding these incentives, current training exercises
offer few opportunities for U.S. forces to train jointly for urban
operations. An overall strategy requiring joint urban operations
training and clearly defined facility and training requirements, and a
mechanism for scheduling joint training at training facilities, would
provide a framework to assign accountability, synchronize the services'
training efforts to ensure they include joint training, and maximize
the joint usage of training facilities. In the absence of this
framework, DOD risks that the services will continue to pursue their
respective service-specific training and facility plans. Until DOD
develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and
related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress
will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility
plans, and related funding requests. To its credit, DOD and the
services have actively sought to incorporate lessons learned during
ongoing operations and made several adjustments to make the training
environment more reflective of operational conditions. To further
enhance training, the troops and training personnel we interviewed
identified several additional adjustments that they believed would
further enhance urban operations training. However, until DOD develops
a strategy and related requirements, it lacks a solid basis to evaluate
suggestions, and make improvements and investment decisions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's approach to joint urban operations training, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, Joint
Forces Command to:
* Finalize development of the joint urban operations training strategy
and related requirements including joint training tasks and standards,
level and types of joint training exercises to be conducted, and
facility needs. Once established, we envision this framework would be
used to guide the review and approval of service training and facility
plans, and to guide efforts to make additional improvements to existing
urban operations training curriculum, including evaluating any
suggestions from training and troop personnel.
To increase opportunities for joint training and maximize the joint
usage of training facilities, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Defense:
* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at
major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice
participation in urban operations training.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our first
recommendation and did not concur with the second. DOD concurred with
our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Commander, Joint Forces Command, to finalize development of the joint
urban operations training strategy and related requirements including
joint training tasks and standards, levels, and types of joint training
exercises to be conducted. DOD stated that current efforts, when
completed, will adequately address this recommendation without further
direction from the Secretary of Defense. DOD also noted its view that
we seemed to blur the distinction between what it characterized as two
separate actions--Joint Forces Command's efforts to develop a joint
training strategy for urban operations and DOD's efforts to develop
criteria for evaluating service plans to construct training facilities.
We note that efforts to develop the joint strategy have been underway
for some time and continue to believe that the lack of consensus within
DOD regarding the draft strategy may delay the completion of this
effort without further emphasis and monitoring from the Secretary of
Defense. Furthermore, we believe that the strategy and evaluation
criteria should not be viewed as separate actions, but rather must be
clearly linked. As discussed in our report, until Joint Forces Command
develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and
related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress
will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training
plans, and related funding requests.
DOD did not concur with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban
operations training at major training centers to facilitate increased
multiservice participation in urban operations training. In its
response, DOD stated that it remains strongly committed to a
decentralized training ranges and facilities management solution in
supporting the services' Title 10 responsibilities. DOD also noted the
Office of the Secretary of Defense is providing planning support,
oversight, and policy guidance to ensure all its training resources
support service, cross-service, and joint needs and goals. DOD further
stated that it is committed to maximizing system integration, sharing
of data, and facilitation of the services' scheduling processes to
better leverage all assets for the full benefit of military readiness.
However, we note that, to date, DOD has not given sufficient leadership
attention to ensuring necessary coordinated action among the services
to accomplish these goals. We believe the lack of progress is more an
issue of leadership to ensure coordinated action among the key
stakeholders than an issue of usurping the services' Title 10
responsibilities. Our report shows that the lack of a formal mechanism
for scheduling joint urban operations training at major training
centers is one of the key factors accounting for the limited number of
joint urban operations training opportunities. Our recommendation is
intended to facilitate increased multiservice participation in urban
operations training events. Without focused leadership efforts on the
part of DOD to ensure coordinated action among the services to
establish a mechanism to schedule joint training, we believe that DOD
will perpetuate the current situation in which few exercises are joint
according to its definition. Therefore, we continue to believe our
recommendation has merit.
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided
technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9619. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine DOD's overall approach to training for urban operations,
we reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies, and guidance, and other
documentation related to urban operations training. We discussed urban
operations training with a variety of officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, Joint Forces Command,
operational units of the Army and Marine Corps, training organizations,
and other related organizations. Specifically, we did the following:
* To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in
establishing a strategy for joint urban operations training, we
discussed with officials at Joint Forces Command and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense the process and associated timelines for strategy
development and approval. We attended meetings of the joint urban
operations training working group and reviewed the draft strategy as it
evolved to monitor progress towards strategy development and gaining
buy-in from the services and combatant commanders. Further, we analyzed
DOD's draft strategy and assessed to what extent it included defined
joint urban operations training requirements and identified who needed
to accomplish the requirements. Lastly, we reviewed legislation
pertaining to this issue and determined whether DOD's draft strategy
would address the congressional directive that DOD establish joint
urban operations facility requirements and a training requirements
baseline by November 1, 2005.
* To determine the extent to which current exercises provide
opportunities for joint urban operations training, we analyzed joint
and service urban operations training doctrine and policy to determine
how joint urban operations training exercises are defined, and the
level of joint training that is required by those documents. We
interviewed officials from Joint Forces Command and Office of the
Secretary of Defense to determine the number of joint urban operations
training exercises that have occurred this year. In addition, we
interviewed troops who had returned from operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq to determine how much joint urban training they receiving before
deploying and how they felt the training prepared them for conducting
urban operations they took part in. Lastly, we interviewed service
trainers and observed some exercises to determine the level of joint
urban operations training incorporated into current training events.
* To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated lessons learned
into its urban operations training to reflect current operational
conditions, we observed Army and Marine Corps urban operations
training, reviewed changes made to course curriculum to incorporate
real-time scenarios troops could expect to encounter in theater,
discussed with officials from the Army and Marine Corps lessons learned
offices and training centers the means of collecting and disseminating
lessons learned, and obtained documentation on changes made to training
curriculum and facilities based on these lessons. Further, we reviewed
lessons learned publications and databases to assess the type and
amount of information dealing with urban operations that are readily
available to troops. Lastly, we interviewed troops who had returned
from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many of whom were readying for
a second deployment, to assess how lessons learned were shared in
theater and the extent to which training had been updated since their
first deployment.
Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Organizations: Army;
Locations:
* Headquarters, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C;
* Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA;
* Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA;
* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS;
* Combat Training Center Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS;
* Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS;
* 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX;
* 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY;
* 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY;
* Joint Multinational Command Training Center, Grafenwoehr, Germany.
* Joint Multinational Readiness Group, Hohenfels, Germany.
Organizations: Marine Corps;
Locations:
* Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command,
Quantico, VA;
* Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA;
* Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, VA;
* Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA;
* March Air Reserve Base, CA[A];
* Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, CA.
* 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC.
Organizations: Air Force;
Locations:
* Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA.
Organizations: Joint Organizations;
Locations:
* The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Programs and Readiness;
* Joint Training and Ranges Office, Washington, D.C.
* Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA:
- Joint Urban Operations Office;
- Joint Warfighting Center, Capabilities Group;
- Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned.
Source: GAO.
[A] As of September 2005, Marine Corps training at March Air Reserve
Base was moved to Twenty-Nine Palms.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations Training
Facility Enhancements:
ARMY: Enhancement: Shoot house[A];
Description: The shoot house is a single story, multiroom building with
multiple points of entry designed for individual, squad, and platoon
live-fire training.
Enhancement: Urban assault course[A];
Description: The urban assault course is a five-station training
facility that is designed to train individuals, squads, and platoons.
It includes a two-story offense/defense building, grenadier gunnery, an
underground trainer, and two individual-through-platoon task/technique
training ranges.
Enhancement: Breach facility[A];
Description: The breach facility includes wall, door, and window breach
locations and provides training for individuals, teams, and squads in
breaching techniques and procedures.
Enhancement: Combined arms collective training facility[A];
Description: A complex of 20-26 buildings that provides combined arms
collective training for platoon and company situational exercises and
battalion task force field training exercises.
Enhancement: Instrumentation;
Description: Shoot houses and urban assault courses have limited video
capture and targetry control capability for enhanced safety monitoring
and rapid training feedback (after action reviews). Combined arms
collective training facilities have limited exterior and interior
video, targetry control, and a more comprehensive after action review
capability.
Enhancement: Additional buildings;
Description: Installations plan to add structures (shanty towns) and
debris (salvage cars) to the combined arms collective training facility
for increased realism. These are added at little or no additional cost
and require no sustainment. There is no dedicated funding for
additional buildings at this time.
Source: U.S. Army:
[A] The Army plans to have these structures at every Brigade Combat
Team home station, at the Combat Training Centers, and at installations
identified as Power Projection Platforms and Power Support Platforms as
prioritized by the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Training and
Doctrine Command.
[End of table]
Marine Corps:
Enhancement: Shoot houses;
Description: The Marine Corps is installing shoot houses to provide
Marines with training on tactics, techniques, and procedures involved
with urban shooting. The shoot houses will be installed at Camp
Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Quantico Marine Corps bases.
Enhancement: Convoy operations range;
Description: The live-fire convoy operations range is designed to
simulate and provide live-fire convoy and counter-ambush training. The
Marine Corps has installed a live-fire convoy range at Twenty-Nine
Palms and Camp Lejeune Marine Corps bases.
Enhancement: Non-live-fire urban operations training facilities;
Description: The non-live-fire urban operations training facilities are
designed to support maneuver training, basic urban skills training, and
security and stability training for battalion-sized units and below.
The Marine Corps plans to install live-fire urban operations training
facilities at Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune Marine Corps bases.
Enhancement: Live-fire urban operations training facility;
Description: The live-fire urban operations training facility is
designed to provide live-fire and maneuver training for company-sized
units and below. The Marine Corps plans to install a live-fire urban
operations training facility, consisting of 15-30 buildings, at Camp
Lejeune Marine Corps base.
Enhancement: Instrumentation;
Description: Adding capability at training sites to capture and record
training events and to use the data for after action reviews, enabling
the review of training events and the capture of lessons learned.
Enhancement: Additional buildings;
Description: Increasing the number of buildings at training sites to
more realistically replicate the urban environment where density of
buildings complicates military maneuver.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
DEC 01 2005:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office Draft Report, "MILITARY TRAINING: Funding Request
for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should be Based on a
Sound Strategy and Requirements," dated October 31, 2005 (GAO Code
350617/GAO-06-193).
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft. We
agree with GAO's first recommendation to complete the Joint Urban
Operations study in order to identify Joint requirements for Urban
Operations. Given Service Tide 10 responsibilities, we non-concur with
the GAO's recommendation to develop a centralized scheduling capability
for Joint Urban Operations facilities. The Department's comments to the
GAO draft recommendations are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT-DATED OCTOBER 31, 2005 GAO CODE 350617/GAO-06-193:
"MILITARY TRAINING: Funding Request for Joint Urban Operations Training
and Facilities Should Be Based on a Sound Strategy and Requirements"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct Joint Forces
Command to finalize development of the joint urban operations training
strategy and related requirements including joint training tasks and
standards, level and types of joint training exercises to be conducted,
and facility needs. (Page 27/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. Current efforts, when complete,
should adequately address this recommendation and will include facility
capacity and location, as well as training content, without further
direction from the Secretary of Defense. GAO's report seems to blur the
distinction between two separate DoD actions. The first is Joint Forces
Command's Joint Urban Operations strategy, and the second is the Office
of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) effort to establish evaluation
criteria to apply to the Services Joint Urban Operations training
facility military construction (MILCON) submissions.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at
major training centers to facilitate increased multi-service
participation in urban operations training. (Page 28/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Non-concur. DoD remains strongly committed to a
decentralized training ranges/facilities management solution in
supporting Service Title 10 responsibilities. OSD is providing planning
support, oversight and policy guidance to ensure all DoD training
resources support service, cross-service and joint needs and goals. We
are, however, committed to maximizing system integration, sharing of
data, and facilitation of the Services' scheduling processes to better
leverage all assets for the full benefit of military readiness.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Contact:
Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Assistant
Director, John Beauchamp, Jonathan Clark, Gina Ruidera, Susan Tindall,
Cheryl A. Weissman, and Tracy Whitaker made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Training: Some Improvements Have Been Made in DOD's Annual
Training Range Reporting but It Still Fails to Fully Address
Congressional Requirements.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-29R]
Washington, D.C. October 25, 2005.
Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform
Joint Training.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-548]
Washington, D.C. June 21, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and
Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-556]
Washington, D.C. June 15, 2005.
Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to
Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-534]
Washington, D.C. June 10, 2005.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to
Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat
Training Centers.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-8]
Washington, D.C. January 28, 2005.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70]
Washington, D.C. December 17, 2004.
Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness
Can Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive
Planning.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855]
Washington, D.C. August 12, 2004.
Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address
Congressional Reporting Requirements.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-608]
Washington, D.C. June 4, 2004.
Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-614]
Washington, D.C. June 11, 2002.
Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces
for Combat in Urban Areas.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI]
Washington, D.C. February 25, 2000.
Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past
Mistakes is Largely Untapped.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-95-152]
Washington, D.C. August 9, 1995.
(350617):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Testimony of Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Readiness), before the Subcommittee on Readiness and the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,
House Armed Services Committee, regarding Joint National Training
Capability (Mar. 18, 2004).
[2] This program is intended to enhance training to better enable joint
force operations in the new strategic environment, calling for dynamic,
capabilities-based training in support of national security
requirements across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
[3] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint
Urban Operations (Sept. 16, 2002).
[4] S. Rep. No. 107-151, at 427-28 (2002).
[5] S. Rep. No. 109-69, at 456 (2005).
[6] This facility was formerly known as the Combat Maneuver Training
Center.
[7] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to
Transform Joint Training, GAO-05-548, (Washington, D.C. June 21, 2005).
[8] GAO, Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614, (Washington D.C. June 11,
2002).
[9] This issue had received attention from all services and the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat task force was formed to identify
enemy tactics for explosive devices and recommend servicewide
solutions. The task force, in addition to fielding detection and
disabling equipment, also established mobile training teams to provide
training on how to respond to ever-changing enemy tactics, techniques,
and procedures related to improvised explosive devices.
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