Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments Gao ID: GAO-06-49 December 13, 2005Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) consist of an unmanned aircraft; sensor, communications, or weapons, carried on board the aircraft, collectively referred to as payloads; and ground controls. UAS have been used successfully in recent operations, and are in increasingly high demand by U.S. forces. To meet the demand, the Department of Defense (DOD) is increasing its investment in and reliance on UAS, and often deploying them while still in development. GAO has previously found that DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAS risked interoperability problems which could undermine joint operations. GAO was asked to review (1) UAS performance in recent joint operations and (2) the soundness of DOD's approach to evaluating joint UAS operational performance.
DOD has achieved certain operational successes using UAS, including identifying time-critical targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, and striking enemy positions to defeat opposing forces. Some missions effectively supported joint operations, and in other cases, the missions were service-specific. DOD has encountered challenges which have hampered joint operations at times. First, some UAS cannot easily transmit and receive data with other communication systems because they are not interoperable. Although DOD guidance requires interoperability, detailed standards for interoperability have not been developed; DOD has relied on existing, more general standards; and the services developed differing systems. For now, U.S. forces have developed technical patches permitting transmission but slowing data flow, potentially hampering time-critical targeting. Second, some sensor payloads cannot be interchangeably used on different UAS because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard. Some UAS missions may have to be delayed if compatible unmanned aircraft and payloads are not available. Based on its experience with UAS in Persian Gulf operations, U.S. Central Command believes communications interoperability and payload commonality problems occur because the services' UAS development programs have been service-specific and insufficiently attentive to joint needs. Lastly, the electromagnetic spectrum needed to control the flight of certain unmanned aircraft and to transmit data is constrained and no standard requiring the capability to change frequencies had been adopted because the problem was not foreseen. Thus, some systems cannot change to avoid congestion and consequently some missions have been delayed, potentially undermining time-critical targeting. In addition to the joint operational challenges, inclement weather can also hamper UAS operations. Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded in inclement weather than manned aircraft and DOD had not decided whether to require all-weather capability. While DOD has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address bandwidth and weather constraints, little progress has been made. Until DOD adopts and enforces interoperability and other standards, these challenges will likely remain and become more widespread as new UAS are developed and fielded. DOD's approach to evaluating UAS joint operational performance has been unsound because it was not systematic or routine. DOD has deployed UAS before developing a joint operations performance measurement system, even though results-oriented performance measures can be used to monitor progress toward agency goals. DOD has generally relied on after-action and maintenance reports which have useful but not necessarily joint performance information. DOD has also relied on short-duration study teams for some performance information but had not established ongoing or routine reporting systems. Thus, while continuing to invest in UAS, DOD has incomplete performance information on joint operations on which to base acquisition or modification decisions. In May 2005, U.S. Strategic Command began developing joint performance measures.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-49, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments
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Report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
December 2005:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote Interoperability and Improve
Performance Assessments:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49]
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-49, a report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air
and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) consist of an unmanned aircraft;
sensor, communications, or weapons, carried on board the aircraft,
collectively referred to as payloads; and ground controls. UAS have
been used successfully in recent operations, and are in increasingly
high demand by U.S. forces. To meet the demand, the Department of
Defense (DOD) is increasing its investment in and reliance on UAS, and
often deploying them while still in development. GAO has previously
found that DOD‘s approach to developing and fielding UAS risked
interoperability problems which could undermine joint operations. GAO
was asked to review (1) UAS performance in recent joint operations and
(2) the soundness of DOD‘s approach to evaluating joint UAS operational
performance.
What GAO Found:
DOD has achieved certain operational successes using UAS, including
identifying time-critical targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, and striking
enemy positions to defeat opposing forces. Some missions effectively
supported joint operations, and in other cases, the missions were
service-specific. DOD has encountered challenges which have hampered
joint operations at times. First, some UAS cannot easily transmit and
receive data with other communication systems because they are not
interoperable. Although DOD guidance requires interoperability,
detailed standards for interoperability have not been developed; DOD
has relied on existing, more general standards; and the services
developed differing systems. For now, U.S. forces have developed
technical patches permitting transmission but slowing data flow,
potentially hampering time-critical targeting. Second, some sensor
payloads cannot be interchangeably used on different UAS because DOD
has not adopted a payload commonality standard. Some UAS missions may
have to be delayed if compatible unmanned aircraft and payloads are not
available. Based on its experience with UAS in Persian Gulf operations,
U.S. Central Command believes communications interoperability and
payload commonality problems occur because the services‘ UAS
development programs have been service-specific and insufficiently
attentive to joint needs. Lastly, the electromagnetic spectrum needed
to control the flight of certain unmanned aircraft and to transmit data
is constrained and no standard requiring the capability to change
frequencies had been adopted because the problem was not foreseen.
Thus, some systems cannot change to avoid congestion and consequently
some missions have been delayed, potentially undermining time-critical
targeting. In addition to the joint operational challenges, inclement
weather can also hamper UAS operations. Unmanned aircraft are more
likely to be grounded in inclement weather than manned aircraft and DOD
had not decided whether to require all-weather capability. While DOD
has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and address
bandwidth and weather constraints, little progress has been made. Until
DOD adopts and enforces interoperability and other standards, these
challenges will likely remain and become more widespread as new UAS are
developed and fielded.
DOD‘s approach to evaluating UAS joint operational performance has been
unsound because it was not systematic or routine. DOD has deployed UAS
before developing a joint operations performance measurement system,
even though results-oriented performance measures can be used to
monitor progress toward agency goals. DOD has generally relied on after-
action and maintenance reports which have useful but not necessarily
joint performance information. DOD has also relied on short-duration
study teams for some performance information but had not established
ongoing or routine reporting systems. Thus, while continuing to invest
in UAS, DOD has incomplete performance information on joint operations
on which to base acquisition or modification decisions. In May 2005,
U.S. Strategic Command began developing joint performance measures.
What GAO Recommends:
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop and apply
appropriate joint operating standards, and include specific performance
indicators and baselines for analysis and systematic information
reporting and analysis procedures in the new performance measurement
system under development.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD fully or partially
concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-49.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup, at (202)
512-9619, or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
UAS Have Achieved Certain Mission Successes but DOD Faces Emerging
Interoperability and Other Challenges on Joint Operations:
DOD's Approach to Evaluating Joint UAS Performance on Operational
Deployments Has Been Unsound:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Bands in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Used by 12 Types of
Unmanned Aircraft and Sensor Payloads:
Figure:
Figure 1: Predator Unmanned Aircraft with Sensor:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
UAS: unmanned aircraft systems:
Letter December 13, 2005:
The Honorable Curt Weldon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Neil Abercrombie:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)[Footnote 1] consist of unmanned
aircraft; sensors, weapons, and communications equipment carried on
board the aircraft, known as "payloads"; and ground control stations
that control the flight of the aircraft and receive information
collected and transmitted by the payloads. UAS have been used
successfully in recent military operations on intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; and offensive strike missions. Due to
the successes, U.S. forces are increasingly demanding that more UAS be
supplied to them, prompting the Department of Defense (DOD) to try and
rapidly develop and field these emerging technologies. Moreover, to
meet the demand, DOD has substantially increased its investment in
these systems from about $363 million in fiscal year 2001 to about $2.2
billion in fiscal year 2005, not including supplemental appropriations.
In March 2004, we reported that DOD's approach to planning for
developing and fielding UAS did not provide reasonable assurance that
its investment strategy will facilitate their efficient integration
into the force structure.[Footnote 2] We also reported that DOD's
approach increased the risk of future interoperability problems, which
could undermine joint operations, and would likely be insufficient to
prevent duplication of effort from one service-specific program to
another. As a result, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan
for these systems' development and fielding and assign the UAS Planning
Task Force or other appropriate entity within DOD with sufficient
authority to enforce program direction specified in the plan. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a strategic plan
and nonconcurred with the recommendation to place an entity in charge.
DOD's rationale for nonconcurring was that the Undersecretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and by extension its
UAS Planning Task Force had sufficient authority to develop and enforce
interoperability and other standards, and that the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System process promoted joint war fighting
and thus would avoid interoperability problems.[Footnote 3] In
addition, DOD has issued guidance requiring interoperable
communications capabilities in DOD weapons and other systems.
As requested, we reviewed (1) the operational performance of UAS in
recent joint operations and (2) the soundness of DOD's approach to
evaluating joint UAS operational performance. To evaluate the
operational performance of UAS in recent operations, we examined DOD or
service regulations, directives, instructions, after-action reports,
performance evaluations, and other documents. We also met with key DOD
and service officials to discuss current UAS operational status, future
plans, initiatives to address emerging challenges, and related issues.
To review DOD's approach to evaluating joint UAS performance, we
obtained relevant DOD directives, instructions, and other documents,
and met with DOD and service officials to identify the performance
measurement systems in place and operating. We determined that the data
on the numbers and types of missions performed by UAS were sufficiently
reliable for this review. We performed our work from July 2004 to
October 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS but
communications and payload interoperability, electromagnetic spectrum,
and inclement weather challenges have all emerged to hamper recent
joint operations or prevent timely UAS employment. On the one hand,
U.S. forces have used unmanned aircraft and sensor and weapons payloads
to locate and engage targets in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2002 on both
joint and service-specific missions.[Footnote 4] For example, the Air
Force used its Global Hawk unmanned aircraft to locate 55 percent of
time-critical targets to suppress enemy air defenses in Iraq in 2003
and the Predator unmanned aircraft on over 5,800 sorties or about
80,000 hours of flight on intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance,
and armed strike missions from 2002 to 2005 in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
addition, in 2004, an Army force used its Hunter unmanned aircraft to
locate certain antiaircraft artillery; the Air Force sent an armed
Predator unmanned aircraft to engage the antiaircraft artillery; and
the Army sent the Hunter back for battle damage assessment. On the
other hand, interoperability problems have emerged despite the DOD
guidance requiring interoperability and the 2002 edition of DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027[Footnote 5] identifying
interoperability as a key goal. Specifically, some sensor or
communications payloads and ground stations cannot easily exchange
data, sometimes even within a single service, because they were not
designed to interoperable communication standards. Moreover, the 2002
Roadmap specifies some communications standards, but the 2005 edition
of the Roadmap acknowledges that the detailed standards for
interoperability have not been developed. To use noninteroperable
sensors or communications payloads and ground stations, U.S. forces
have relied on technical patches to link them. However, the technical
patch process can delay receipt of the information by forces needing
it, potentially preventing time-critical targeting.
In addition, U.S. forces have also encountered another interoperability
problem: they are unable to interchangeably use some payloads from one
type of unmanned aircraft on another, a capability commonly called
"payload commonality." DOD has at least six different types of sensor
payloads, each able to collect different types of information. However,
some cannot be used interchangeably on differing unmanned aircraft
because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality standard to make them
modular and thus permit attachment to most unmanned aircraft. As a
result, commanders may have to delay missions if the appropriate sensor
is available but no unmanned aircraft are able to carry it.
Interoperability and payload commonality problems have arisen because
the services' UAS development programs have been service-specific and
insufficiently attentive to joint operational needs, according to U.S.
Central Command. In addition to interoperability and payload
commonality problems, certain electromagnetic spectrum frequencies are
congested by the large number of UAS and other weapons or
communications systems using the same frequency simultaneously. While
some unmanned aircraft, sensor or communications payloads, and ground
stations can change to different, less congested, frequencies, DOD had
not required that the capability be included on UAS as of the time of
our review, and most were consequently built without the ability to
change. Thus, commanders have had to delay certain missions until
frequency congestion cleared and DOD acknowledges that missions could
eventually be delayed or cancelled if the problem worsens.
Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded in inclement weather
than manned aircraft due in part to their lighter weight. DOD has
neither required all-weather capability nor evaluated the performance
trade-off that may arise from developing it even though it established
all-weather capability as a goal in the 2002 Roadmap. DOD acknowledges
that it (1) did not foresee the rapid technology development
experienced with unmanned aircraft, sensor or communications payloads,
and ground stations; (2) has provided unmanned aircraft and payloads
rapidly to deployed forces to meet forces' demands for them; and (3)
has not always adopted standards that might have prevented or mitigated
some of these problems. While DOD also acknowledged the need to improve
UAS interoperability and address bandwidth and weather constraints that
undermine unmanned aircraft operations, little progress has been made.
Until DOD and the services take steps to ensure that interoperable
communications and payloads, electromagnetic spectrum reprogramming,
and all-weather flying standards are developed and enforced for UAS,
these problems are likely to continue and become more widespread as DOD
continues to deploy these systems to meet forces' demands for them.
DOD's approach to evaluating UAS joint operational performance has been
unsound because it is not systematically focused on joint operations
and is not routine. While results-oriented performance measures can be
used to monitor progress toward agency goals, DOD has not developed
adequate indicators of performance on joint operations or baselines
against which to measure performance for developmental systems that are
being used. In the meantime, DOD and the services have generally relied
on available information including after-action and maintenance
reports. Nonetheless, such information is not necessarily targeted to
UAS and does not necessarily include reporting on key indicators to
measure performance on joint operations, since the indicators have not
been identified, and does not include baselines against which to apply
the indicators to permit insight into performance. DOD has acknowledged
that it tried to meet combat forces' increasing demands for UAS and
consequently deployed the systems as quickly as possibly but without
first developing the performance indicators and baselines. DOD had
begun to develop performance measures by the time of our review.
Performance reporting has also not been routine. Instead, DOD and the
services have relied on short-duration study teams rather than ongoing
processes for obtaining performance information on joint operations.
While these teams have produced some useful information, the approach
does not routinely provide information that would permit systematic
performance assessments since the teams are not permanently established
and did not employ consistent study parameters. DOD has acknowledged
the need for systematic joint performance reporting and in May 2005
tasked U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for developing appropriate
performance measures and reporting systems. Until DOD develops a
systematic approach to UAS performance measurement and reporting on
joint operations, it will have incomplete information on which to base
acquisition or system modification decisions.
To address the emerging challenges that have hampered joint operations
or prevented effective employment of UAS, we are making recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense to develop or adjust communications
interoperability, payload commonality, and electromagnetic spectrum
reprogramming standards; ensure that the new performance measurement
system includes indicators that can be used to assess progress in
overcoming communications interoperability, payload commonality, and
electromagnetic spectrum challenges; and also ensure that the new
performance measurement system includes other appropriate performance
indicators for collection, baselines against which to apply the
indicators, and a systematic means to collect joint operations
performance information and report it to organizations that develop and
field UAS. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
or fully concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it had
initiated actions to address them. DOD's comments and our evaluations
of them are provided later in this report.
Background:
DOD defines UAS as a powered aircraft that does not carry a human
operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic forces
to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be
expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.
Generally, UAS consist of the aircraft; a flight control station;
information and retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes,
wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. UAS
carry a payload including sensors for intelligence, surveillance, or
reconnaissance to provide real-time intelligence to battlefield
commanders. When used on an intelligence, surveillance, or
reconnaissance mission, generally, the aircraft carries a sensor
payload capable of detecting heat, movement, or taking photographs or
video of ground-based targets. This information is then transmitted to
ground stations or satellites via a communications payload for
retransmission to forces needing the information to support operations.
Unmanned aircraft can also be armed for offensive strike missions and
be used to attack ground-based targets. UAS require adequate intra-or
intertheater communications capabilities using the electromagnetic
spectrum to permit operators to control certain aircraft, and also
permit communications equipment to transmit the information obtained by
the sensor payload to ground commanders or other users.
Effective joint operations are critical because combatant commanders
operate in a joint environment by applying military force appropriate
for their operational circumstance using the unique capabilities of
each of the services. In a changing security environment, joint
operations are becoming more important given the complex nature of
military operations. This importance is being driven by the combatant
commands' need to combine the capabilities of multiple services to
address the global threat, as well as the growing interdependence of
capabilities among the services. Moreover, effective joint operations
permit combatant commanders to leverage the capabilities associated
with each service to accomplish operational missions. As with manned
aircraft, UAS provide another capability that can be applied by
combatant commanders in joint operations.
Evolution of UAS Development and Use:
Initially, UAS were seen as complementary systems that augmented
existing war fighting capabilities. However, UAS are also evolving into
more significant roles, for which they can provide primary capability.
For example, the Global Hawk UAS may eventually replace the U-2
reconnaissance aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Aerial System may
eventually perform electronic warfare missions currently performed by
the EA-6 Prowler aircraft as well as offensive deep strike missions.
Moreover, UAS are figuring prominently in plans to transform the
military into a more strategically responsive force and are expected to
be an integral part of this information-based force. For example, the
Army is developing the Future Combat System and a new generation of
unmanned aircraft and other systems to enable information to flow
freely across the battlefield.
Since 2001, DOD has significantly increased its planned expenditure for
UAS and associated systems, and, more recently, the systems have
continued to be heavily used in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, over 10
different types of UAS have been used in Afghanistan and Iraq.
According to the UAS Planning Task Force, as of August 2005, DOD had
approximately 1,500 unmanned aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
addition, the budget request for UAS grew significantly between fiscal
years 2001 and 2005, from about $363 million to about $2.2 billion, and
further growth is likely. These figures do not include any supplemental
appropriations.
Fewer than half of the UAS in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of our
report had reached full-rate production or initial operating
capability. They were still considered developmental, and consequently
were covered by DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System
and DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, both issued in May 2003.[Footnote 6] The directive mandates
that systems, units, and forces shall be able to provide and accept
data, information, materiel, and services to and from other systems,
units, and forces, and shall effectively interoperate with other U.S.
forces, among other things. The instruction implements the directive
and is intended to provide DOD officials with a framework for
identifying mission needs and technology to meet the needs, as the
basis for weapons system acquisitions. Finally, the 2002 Roadmap
emphasizes the need for interoperable unmanned aircraft and payloads by
identifying a number of existing standards that are to be complied with
in systems' development in such areas as common data links,
interoperable data links for video systems, and electromagnetic
spectrum frequencies that should be used for data transmission under a
variety of circumstances.[Footnote 7]
Prior GAO Reviews of DOD's Planning for Developing and Fielding UAS:
In March 2004, we reported that DOD's approach to planning for
developing and fielding UAS does not provide reasonable assurance that
its investment will facilitate efficient integration into the force
structure and avoid interoperability problems, although DOD had taken
some steps to improve UAS program management. For example, in 2001, DOD
established the Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Planning Task Force (now
known as the UAS Planning Task Force) in the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). To
communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAS, the Task Force
published the 2002 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Roadmap, which described
current programs, identified potential missions, and provided guidance
on emerging technologies. While the Roadmap demonstrated some elements
of a strategic plan, neither it nor other key documents represented a
comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and DOD
agencies develop systems that complement each other, perform all
required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force
served in an advisory capacity to the Undersecretary, but had little
authority to enforce program direction. For their part, service
officials told us that they developed service-specific planning
documents to meet their own needs and operational concepts without
considering those of other services or the Roadmap. In consequence, we
concluded that without a strategic plan and an oversight body with
sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD risked
interoperability problems, which could undermine joint operations.
Thus, in our 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish a strategic
plan and assign an office authority and responsibility to enforce
program direction communicated in the plan to promote joint operations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to establish a
strategic plan and nonconcurred with our recommendation to assign an
office with authority and responsibility to enforce program direction.
DOD asserted that the Undersecretary had sufficient authority to
integrate UAS into joint operations and that the Task Force had been
established to promote payload commonality, develop and enforce
interface standards, and ensure multiservice coordination. Moreover,
DOD indicated that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process focuses on developing integrated joint warfighting
capabilities and thus would avoid interoperability problems that we
believed were likely.
UAS Have Achieved Certain Mission Successes but DOD Faces Emerging
Interoperability and Other Challenges on Joint Operations:
DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS including
collecting intelligence with unmanned aircraft sensor payloads and
conducting offensive strike missions with weapons payloads in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, U.S. forces employing UAS have
encountered certain communications and payload interoperability
problems (called payload commonality problems), electromagnetic
spectrum constraints, and inclement weather groundings of unmanned
aircraft during recent operations. While DOD has acknowledged the need
to improve UAS interoperability and address bandwidth and weather
constraints that undermine unmanned aircraft operations, little
progress has been made.
UAS Have Played an Integral Role in Mission Accomplishments:
DOD has achieved certain operational successes from its use of a
variety of unmanned aircraft and their sensor, communications, and
armaments payloads. In operations in Iraq or Afghanistan since 2002,
U.S. forces have used UAS in integral roles on intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike joint or service-
specific missions. For example:
* The Air Force used its Predator unmanned aircraft with sensor or
armaments payloads on over 5,800 sorties or totaling more than 80,000
hours of flight on a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; close air support; armed strike; and other missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 through 2005.[Footnote 8] For example,
the Predator's sensor and communications payloads have provided video
images to ground forces to support their operations or to strike enemy
targets with Hellfire missiles.
* Certain Air Force units used the Global Hawk unmanned aircraft's
sensor payloads to identify 55 percent of the time-critical targets to
defeat enemy air defenses in Iraq in March and April 2003. To enhance
joint operations, the Air Force developed procedures and tactics to
allow the Global Hawk's sensor payloads to provide more direct support
to ground force missions.
* In 2004, an Army force used its Hunter unmanned aircraft and sensor
payload to locate an enemy antiaircraft artillery weapon that had been
firing at coalition force aircraft. Then the Air Force sent a Predator
armed with a Hellfire missile to attack the enemy weapon. Within
minutes of the Predator strike, the Army unit sent its Hunter back to
transmit information needed for battle damage assessment.
* In 2004, an Army force operating an I-Gnat unmanned aircraft in Iraq
detected a potential ambush of Marine Corps forces and the Army unit
used information from the I-Gnat's sensor payload to successfully
adjust mortar fire onto the enemy position.
* Recently, the Air Force, Army and Marine Corps forces have used their
unmanned aircraft and their sensor and communications payloads to
locate numerous targets in Iraq and Afghanistan to permit U.S. forces
to destroy the targets.
UAS Interoperability Remains a Challenge:
While achieving certain successes with the use of unmanned aircraft and
their payloads, certain interoperability challenges have also emerged
during recent operations despite certain DOD directives requiring
interoperability and the emphasis on interoperability in the 2002
Roadmap. First, DOD Directive 5000.1 specifies that systems, units, and
forces shall be able to provide and accept data and information to and
from other systems and shall effectively interoperate with other U.S.
forces. Second, the Roadmap specifies five data standards for
formatting data, a communication standard to ensure adoption of a
common data link, and a variety of file transfer, physical media, and
other standards applicable to unmanned aircraft or their sensor and
communications payloads. However, the 2005 edition of the Roadmap
indicates that the detailed standards for interoperability have not
been developed. In effect, the absence of such standards has led to the
development of UAS that are not interoperable. In operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, interoperability problems have emerged.
Specifically, during operations, DOD has learned that unmanned aircraft
sensor and communications payloads and ground stations were not
designed to common data standards and thus are not interoperable, even
within a single service in certain circumstances. For example:
* Army forces operate both the Shadow and Hunter unmanned aircraft and
associated ground stations but discovered that these systems are not
interoperable. Specifically, while the Shadow's sensor and
communications payload is able to transmit information to its own
ground station, it is unable to transmit to a Hunter ground station.
Similarly, the Hunter's sensor and communication payloads are able to
transmit to a Hunter ground station but not Shadow's. Onward
transmission to forces needing the information is equally constrained
if they do not have compatible equipment for receiving the information.
As a result, the Army has missed an opportunity to effectively leverage
the technology inherent in either system for the benefit of operational
forces that need the information. At the time of our review, the Army
had begun an initiative to make the Shadow and Hunter unmanned aircraft
ground stations compatible with either aircraft.
When communication systems are incompatible, operating forces may be
prompted to operate their own UAS, thus increasing the numbers of
systems operating in the same area. To permit the sharing of tactical
intelligence obtained by unmanned aircraft sensor payloads, the
services or combatant commands have developed certain technical patches
permitting compatibility but slowing data transmission. As we pointed
out in 2003, in some cases, DOD needs hours or days to transmit
information to multiple services.[Footnote 9] However, slow
intelligence data transmission can undermine U.S. forces' ability to
attack time-critical targets or allow the targets to escape. U.S.
Central Command acknowledges that timely data dissemination is critical
to combat operations.
Communications interoperability problems are a long-standing problem.
In 2001, we reported that each of the military services plans,
acquires, and operates systems to meet its own operational concepts but
not necessarily the requirements of joint operations in spite of the
DOD directive requiring interoperability.[Footnote 10] In our 2004
unmanned aerial vehicle report, we reported that the services engaged
in little coordination in developing their unmanned aerial vehicle
roadmaps and that they did not view the UAS Planning Task Force's 2002-
2027 Roadmap as a strategic plan or an overarching architecture for
integrating UAS into the force structure. In the absence of adequately
developed and implemented standards and in contravention of the DOD
guidance, the services have continued to develop their unmanned systems
to their own standards, but without regard to the others' standards. At
the same time, DOD continues to develop and field UAS without adjusting
the standards, likely causing the problem to become even more
widespread. Moreover, the UAS used in current operations were built
before the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System became
fully operational and thus has had little impact on the problem.
Consequently, the information collected cannot always be quickly
transmitted to users needing it, undermining joint operations and
potentially leading to future costly initiatives to modify existing
unmanned aircraft, sensors and communications payloads, and ground
stations to overcome interoperability problems.
In addition to communications interoperability problems, payload
interoperability (commonly referred to as "payload commonality")
problems also exist. DOD has developed at least six different sensor
payloads each able to collect different types of information. These
sensor payloads are attached to an unmanned aircraft and flown over
operational areas to observe activity of interest on the ground in a
target area and to transmit observations to ground or air forces or
other users as tactical intelligence. As an example, figure 1 displays
a Predator unmanned aircraft with a sensor payload attached underneath.
Figure 1: Predator Unmanned Aircraft with Sensor:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, many sensor payloads can be attached to only one type of
unmanned aircraft because DOD has not adopted a payload commonality
standard even though this problem was identified nearly 20 years ago.
As a result, commanders may have to delay missions if the appropriate
sensor is available but no unmanned aircraft is able to carry it. We
discussed this problem in 1988 when we reported that DOD had not
adequately emphasized payload commonality for unmanned aircraft and
that Congress had stressed the need for DOD to consider payload
commonality in 1985.[Footnote 11] The 2002 Roadmap acknowledged the
need for sensor payload commonality where practical, but limited
progress has been made.
In addition to the flexibility inherent in the communications
standards, according to U.S. Central Command based on its experience in
Persian Gulf operations, unmanned aircraft development has been service-
centric and lacks an overarching employment doctrine to shape
development to achieve aircraft and sensor interoperable communications
and payload commonality. Furthermore, a Joint Forces Command official
told us that combatant commanders can not take full advantage of the
dissimilar unmanned aircraft or the sensor payload data produced due to
the interoperability problems.
Congested Electromagnetic Spectrum Has Hampered UAS Operational
Effectiveness:
Unmanned aircraft and their sensor, armaments, and communications
payloads depend on reliable access to the electromagnetic
spectrum.[Footnote 12] However, the spectrum is increasingly
constrained, potentially undermining joint operations by requiring
delays in an unmanned aircraft flight or, if the problem worsens,
cancellation. Unmanned aircraft operators use the electromagnetic
spectrum to maintain contact with the aircraft to control its flight,
fire its weapons if armed, and receive information collected by the
sensor payloads. Certain spectrum frequencies are sometimes referred to
as bands and the amount of the spectrum needed to permit transmission
of information is referred to as bandwidth. DOD officials told us that
more bandwidth is needed to transmit video and other information
obtained by sensor payloads than to maintain flight control of the
aircraft. Numerous weapons also use electromagnetic spectrum and share
it with UAS but they can interfere with each other during operations if
they operate on the same frequency at the same time.
The military services have experienced bandwidth capacity constraints,
limiting both the number of UAS and other systems that can be
effectively operated simultaneously and the amount of available data
that can be transmitted from the unmanned aircraft communications
payload. For example, insufficient bandwidth limits U.S. forces'
ability to download video and radar images via satellite from more than
one aircraft at a time. As a result, data transmission and relay are
delayed, undermining U.S. forces' ability to engage time-critical
targets and possibly permitting the target to escape, unless
alternative information sources are available on a timely basis. Army
officials informed us that data link limitations are due primarily to
frequency congestion. Table 1 displays the bands used by 12 different
unmanned aircraft or models of unmanned aircraft for flight control and
sensor payload data transmission. As shown in the table, several UAS
rely on the C-band for their data transmission capability, and only 2
of the 12 UAS can be reprogrammed to another band.
Table 1: Bands in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Used by 12 Types of
Unmanned Aircraft and Sensor Payloads:
Band: C Band;
Flight control: 3;
Data transmission: 5.
Band: Ku Band;
Flight control: 3;
Data transmission: 3.
Band: C or Ku band;
Flight control: 2;
Data transmission: 2.
Band: Other;
Flight control: 4;
Data transmission: 2.
Band: Total;
Flight control: 12;
Data transmission: 12.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
The 2002 Roadmap established a goal of modifying the Army's Shadow UAV
to permit it to operate a common tactical data link in Ku-band and not
the more congested C-band. This goal had not been met at the time of
our review and the Shadow unmanned aircraft still operated in C-band.
Similarly, the 2002 Roadmap established a goal of moving the Air
Force's Predator unmanned aircraft video sensor payload from C-band to
Ku-band for line of sight operations. However, the goal had not been
met at the time of our report.
Moreover, the problem cannot be easily overcome without potentially
costly modifications to existing systems because DOD has not required
unmanned aircraft or sensor payloads to be reprogrammable from one band
to another and therefore has not established such standards. As a
result, most have been designed and built without the flexibility to
operate in differing frequencies or bands to avoid congested
frequencies, thus sometimes preventing timely information transmission
or delaying their flight without interfering with or experiencing
interference from other UAS or other weapons systems.
Inclement Weather Limits Some Unmanned Aircraft Operations:
Unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded by inclement weather
than manned aircraft due in part to their lighter weight. Dust storms,
strong winds, rain, or icing prevent some unmanned aircraft from
flying, thus denying U.S. forces critically needed information unless
alternative data collection or offensive strike capabilities are
available. Specifically, winds up to 80 miles per hour in Iraq and
Afghanistan have reduced the availability of most unmanned aircraft and
dust storms have undermined the use of some sensor payloads. Moreover,
the 2002 Roadmap indicates that icing has been a primary factor in two
accidents involving the Hunter unmanned aircraft and three crashes of
the Predator unmanned aircraft. The Roadmap established a goal to
incorporate all-weather capabilities into future UAS. However, little
progress has been made because DOD has not adopted standards for all-
weather capability to be considered in development, despite the
Roadmap's stating the goal. As a result, systems have been developed
without it. At the same time, according to a UAS Planning Task Force
official, developing unmanned aircraft with all-weather capabilities
may result in some degradation in performance, such as a reduced flying
range. At the time of our review, DOD had not determined whether all-
weather capability was worth the trade-off of potentially degraded
performance.
DOD Has Made Little Progress in Addressing the Challenges:
While DOD has acknowledged the need to improve UAS interoperability and
address bandwidth and weather constraints that undermine unmanned
aircraft operations, little progress has been made. On the one hand, to
begin to address the problems, DOD has taken a number of steps as
listed below:
* In August 2005, DOD issued an updated version of its roadmap,
entitled 2005 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, to guide acquisition
and interoperability. Among other things, the 2005 Roadmap establishes
the goal of enhancing joint service collaboration as a means to improve
joint operations.
* At the time of our review, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was
preparing an action plan to address a number of shortfalls including
interoperability and other problems within U.S. Central Command's area
of responsibility, although the plan was limited to just this command
and would not necessarily solve the problems that UAS might encounter
elsewhere.
* DOD plans to reemphasize the role that the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System could play in all new UAS
developments by trying to ensure that DOD develops systems to support
joint operations, achieve commonality to the extent practical, and
identify gaps in DOD's ability to carry out its warfighting missions.
* U.S. Joint Forces Command has developed certain initiatives to
improve UAS interoperability by conducting experiments to demonstrate
aircraft modifications and new concepts of operations, although such
modifications can be costly.
In addition, on June 1, 2005, DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight
Council established a new Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Center of
Excellence and a Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overarching Integrated
Process Team. The Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overarching Integrated
Process Team has subsequently been renamed the Joint Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Material Review Board. These joint forums will help the
services manage development of new UAS or modifications to existing
UAS, and they will help the services to develop new or revised concepts
of operations for more effective use. At the same time, the UAS
Planning Task Force will try to ensure that the services' UAS
acquisition programs are coordinated, and a Task Force representative
is to be a member of the Joint Overarching Integrated Process Team. DOD
views these changes as means to more effectively manage service UAS
programs. While these changes appear to be steps in the right
direction, it is too early for us to tell if they will solve the
interoperability and other problems that we identified.
Furthermore, payload commonality, interoperability of communications
and data transmission systems, and inclement weather flying
capabilities that we identified as impacting recent operations, had
been identified previously as problems already occurring or likely to
occur. First, our 1988 unmanned aerial vehicle report indicated that
DOD had not adequately emphasized payload commonality for these
aircraft. Second, our 2001 report found interoperability problems due
to the services' continued practice of acquiring systems to support
their own operations but not necessarily that of the other services.
Third, DOD's guidance requires interoperability but the detailed
standards have not been developed. Lastly, the 2002 edition of the
Roadmap identified the need to improve interoperability of
communications systems for UAS and also identified inclement weather
capability as a problem undermining UAS operations and established
goals to address it. Despite all the emphasis, problems related to
communications and payload interoperability, and all-weather capability
problems remain. DOD acknowledges that it (1) did not foresee the rapid
technological development experienced with unmanned aircraft, sensor or
communications payloads, and ground stations; (2) has provided unmanned
aircraft and payloads rapidly to deployed forces to meet forces'
demands for them; and (3) has not always adopted new or enforced
existing standards that might have prevented or mitigated some of these
problems. As a result, while DOD has issued a directive, instructions,
guidance, and roadmaps, and established at least five different
organizations to promote UAS interoperability and address other
unmanned aircraft and payload developmental needs, no organization has
or has exercised sufficient authority to enforce program direction, or
ensure that the standards and guidance are in concurrence. As a result,
the services continued to develop and field these systems without fully
complying with the interoperability requirements stated in key guidance
or addressing known payload commonality problems.
DOD's Approach to Evaluating Joint UAS Performance on Operational
Deployments Has Been Unsound:
DOD's approach to evaluating joint UAS performance on operational
deployments is unsound because it has not implemented a systematic
approach to evaluating such performance. Instead, DOD has relied on
systems for evaluating performance that are not focused on joint
operations and are nonroutine, and as a result the department has
little assurance that the information that has been collected
represents the key performance indicators needed to assess performance
on joint operations.
DOD Lacks Performance Indicators to Assess Certain Joint UAS
Performance:
DOD has not implemented a systematic approach to evaluating joint UAS
performance on operational deployments. As we previously noted in our
2004 report, the Government Performance and Results Act's strategic
planning framework specifies that results-oriented performance measures
can be used to monitor progress toward agency goals and that such
performance measurements should be developed and used to monitor
progress. At the time of our report, DOD was only beginning to decide
on key indicators of performance that would be used to assess unmanned
aircraft, payload, and ground station performance on joint operations.
To date, DOD has relied on service-specific information that addressed
certain UAS performance. For example, some forces filed after-action
reports and maintenance reports addressing UAS performance. While
producing some useful information, these reports have not necessarily
been specifically targeted to joint UAS operations, nor do they
systematically identify key indicators for collection which could be
used to develop joint operational performance baselines and permit
performance measurement against the baseline. Thus, DOD has little
assurance that the information that has been collected represents the
key performance indicators needed to assess joint operations
performance.
DOD officials told us that they have tried to keep pace with operating
forces' demands for more unmanned aircraft and their payloads, and
therefore the services have deployed them while still under development
within the DOD acquisition system. These deployments have often
occurred before identification of key performance indicators that would
need to be collected to be used to evaluate performance. In effect, the
services have bought and deployed unmanned aircraft, sensor and
communications payloads, and ground stations and tried to evaluate
their effectiveness all at the same time. On the one hand, this has
permitted DOD to provide operating forces with new capabilities
represented by the aircraft and their payloads. On the other hand, it
has also resulted in DOD and the services sometimes learning of joint
performance problems based on reporting from actual operations only if
after-action reports or other reporting mentioned the problem.
Nonetheless, without appropriate performance measures and baselines
against which to assess performance on joint operations, even anecdotal
information can have limited utility because officials are less likely
to be able to assess the magnitude of the problem, or even become aware
of it if no reports identify it.
DOD has acknowledged the need to develop specific performance
indicators for unmanned aircraft and their payloads on joint operations
and had begun to develop them at the time of our report. First, the
Army recently began an initiative to develop performance indicators and
a baseline against which to assess performance. However, while this
approach may produce useful information on which to assess the
performance of Army-operated unmanned aircraft, payloads, and ground
stations, it was not designed to address joint performance. The other
three services had not started to develop specific performance
indicators and baselines for unmanned aircraft at the time of our
review. Second, in May 2005, DOD assigned U.S. Strategic Command
responsibility for the development of joint performance indicators but
the effort was just getting started at the time of our review.
DOD's UAS Joint Performance Reporting Has Not Been Routine:
In addition to anecdotal performance reporting, DOD has not established
routine performance reporting mechanisms for UAS operations but instead
has relied on sometimes short-duration study teams to gather relevant
joint operational performance information. For example, in November
2004, DOD established a group known as a "Tiger Team" to identify
opportunities for improving the joint operational effectiveness of UAS.
However, this team was established on a temporary basis and had a
limited mission to identify improvements only in the U.S. Central
Command area of responsibility. The Tiger Team did identify a number of
areas needing improvement. For example, it determined that forces in
the region need Full Motion Video capability to provide images of
actual events as they occur. The team also determined that a need
exists to address electromagnetic spectrum limitations hampering UAS
operations. However, the team identified the electromagnetic spectrum
problem only after the UAS had been deployed and U.S. forces had tried
to use them on operational missions. In addition, also in 2004, another
DOD short-duration study team evaluated the operational performance of
the Shadow unmanned aircraft. Lastly, the Army conducted a one-time
comprehensive review of the effectiveness of its UAS in theaters of
operations. While these teams developed useful performance information,
the approach does not represent a systematic or long-term means to
obtain joint UAS performance information since the teams are not
permanently established and they did not use consistent study
parameters.
Finally, even in the instances where some ongoing processes were used,
the information obtained was relevant only on a service-specific but
not a joint basis. For example, the Marine Corps uses its Operational
Advisory Group process to determine needed improvements in its UAS
operations. While this group has developed useful information that may
assist the Marine Corps in enhancing its ability to effectively use UAS
in operations, the information developed is likely to have limited
utility for joint operations.
DOD acknowledges that the speed with which unmanned aircraft, payloads,
communications, and associated technology are being developed, along
with the imperative to provide emerging technologies quickly to
operating forces, have resulted in the deployment of developmental
systems before adequate performance reporting systems have been
established. Consequently, while the systems are being successfully
used in overseas operations, DOD does not have reasonable assurance
that it is well informed on opportunities to further enhance the
ability of operational forces to take advantage of UAS capabilities.
Conclusions:
DOD has achieved certain operational successes with UAS but certain
challenges have also emerged that have hampered joint operations or
prevented effective employment of UAS. These challenges are caused by
the limited attention paid to interoperability standards for UAS and
the lack of detailed interoperability standards. Development and
implementation of appropriate interoperability, payload commonality,
and other standards help to ensure that such problems are addressed
during development and any problems are fixed prior to deployment.
Moreover, until DOD assesses the extent to which a lack of detailed
standards undermines the purpose of the broad standards by allowing
development of noninteroperable systems and enforces common standards
among the services, problems are likely to continue and possibly be
repeated and made more widespread as new unmanned aircraft, sensor and
communication payloads, ground stations, and related equipment are
developed and fielded. In addition, costly modifications might be
needed later.
The unsoundness in the approach DOD has taken to assessing joint UAS
performance in operational deployments was due to a lack of accepted
performance indicators and a routine system for collecting performance
information. Until DOD develops specific indicators of UAS joint
operational performance, establishes appropriate baselines against
which to measure performance, and communicates which indicators
operating forces should systematically collect and report to
appropriate users, DOD will lack reasonable assurance that it is
adequately informed on UAS performance on joint operations. Moreover,
DOD may also be poorly informed as to its progress in addressing
interoperability and other problems and may therefore be less likely to
avoid the same problems in future UAS development and fielding.
Lastly, in our 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish a
strategic plan and an office with sufficient authority to enforce
program direction to avoid interoperability problems and for other
purposes. In nonconcurring with our recommendation to assign an office
with sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD indicated
that the UAS Planning Task Force and Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System had sufficient authority and would address
interoperability, payload commonality, and other problems. However,
these problems persist. Consequently, we continue to believe that
sustained management attention is warranted. Without such attention,
DOD continues to risk undercutting the benefit of its continued
investment in UAS. Consequently, we continue to believe that our prior
recommendation has merit, but we are not reiterating it because DOD
indicated that it will not implement it.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To address the challenges emerging in joint operations, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the service secretaries, and other appropriate
organizations to work together to take the following four actions:
* develop or adjust communications interoperability standards and
electromagnetic frequency reprogramming capabilities standards and
ensure that they are applied to new or modified unmanned aircraft,
sensor and communications payloads, ground stations, and related
equipment;
* develop sensor and other payload commonality standards where
practical and enforce such standards when modifying existing unmanned
aircraft or payloads and developing new ones;
* develop appropriately detailed UAS interoperability standards; and:
* determine whether unmanned aircraft need all-weather flying
capabilities, identify any performance degradation associated with all-
weather flying capabilities, and obtain all-weather capabilities where
appropriate.
To improve joint operational performance reporting, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command to ensure that the performance measurement system being
developed by the command at a minimum:
* measures how effectively UAS perform their missions by identifying
quantifiable goals and comparing results with desired outcomes;
* identifies the specific performance indicator information that needs
to be collected to adequately assess joint performance;
* develops indicators that assess communications and payload
interoperability, and the extent to which electromagnetic spectrum
congestion is undermining joint operations;
* establishes baselines and applies the identified indicators against
the baselines to gauge success in joint UAS performance; and:
* develops a way to systematically collect identified performance
information and routinely reports it to organizations that develop and
field UAS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. We made five
recommendations and DOD fully or partially concurred with them. It also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated into our report as
appropriate.
First, DOD concurred with our recommendation for the appropriate DOD
organizations to work together to develop or adjust communications
interoperability standards and electromagnetic frequency reprogramming
capabilities standards and ensure that they are applied to new or
modified unmanned aircraft, sensor and communications payloads, ground
stations, and related equipment. In concurring, DOD indicated that it
recognized the utility of communications interoperability and the need
to improve this capability and will direct the services to use common
frequencies and data links to enhance communications interoperability.
Second, in partially concurring with our recommendation to develop and
enforce sensor and other payload commonality standards where practical,
DOD commented that it does not typically focus on payload
interchangeability. Instead, DOD pointed out that unmanned aircraft
payload procurement is a service responsibility and is dependent on
service mission requirements, unmanned aircraft physical design
limitations, and rapid technological evolution. Our report recognizes
that it is not practical for all unmanned aircraft sensors and payloads
to be common due to the various sizes of some aircraft and we worded
our recommendation accordingly.
Third, DOD fully concurred with our recommendation that the appropriate
DOD organizations work together to develop appropriately detailed UAS
interoperability standards. DOD indicated that the UAS Roadmap 2005-
2030 released in August 2005 discusses the preferred framework,
methodology, and standards for achieving UAS interoperability. DOD
outlined a number of actions that it has taken to address UAS
interoperability standards, including ratifying a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Standards Agreement aimed at achieving joint and combined
interoperability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has tasked the newly formed
Joint UAS Material Review Board and Joint UAV Center of Excellence to
provide recommendations for continuing to improve UAS interoperability.
Fourth, DOD fully concurred with our recommendation to determine
whether unmanned aircraft need all-weather flying capabilities,
identify any performance degradation associated with all-weather
capabilities, and obtain all-weather capabilities where appropriate.
DOD commented that combatant commanders should expect UAS to support
operations in diverse weather conditions. Further, DOD indicated that
as UAS capabilities improve, the weather conditions these systems will
need to operate in will also increase. However, DOD also points out
that it is not cost effective to expect all classes of unmanned
aircraft to have an all-weather capability. We agree. The intention of
our recommendation is for DOD to determine those UAS for which all-
weather capabilities are cost effective and to add such capabilities
when appropriate.
Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that U.S.
Strategic Command ensure that the performance measurement system being
developed at a minimum includes quantifiable goals, performance
baselines, systematic collection procedures, measures of communications
and payload interoperability, and performance indicators against which
to measure performance. DOD indicated that the U.S. Strategic Command
has drafted a Joint Functional Component Concept of Operations that
includes metrics to gauge the force's ability to meet intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. Moreover, DOD stated
that in conjunction with the services, intelligence community,
combatant commanders, and other DOD organizations, this action would
facilitate not only the evaluation of UAS performance but would enable
DOD to have the necessary information available to assess such factors
as UAS requirements, mission accomplishment, UAS capabilities, and
customer satisfaction. DOD also pointed out that the performance
measures are in development and will require service participation to
define the specific data and methodology which will result in useful
information. While we acknowledge that these actions should address
many of the data elements that we believe are necessary to evaluate
UAS, we continue to believe that effective communications,
interoperability, and avoidance of frequency congestion are important
contributors to the success of joint operations. Therefore, we continue
to believe that DOD should ensure that, at a minimum, the U.S.
Strategic Command includes the data elements we recommended in its
performance measurement system. In addition, we agree that other
organizations including the services, should participate in the
development of this measurement system if appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to other
interested parties upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-9619 or email at [Hyperlink, pickups@gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. The GAO contact and key
contributors are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To evaluate the operational performance of unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) in recent operations, we examined the Department of Defense (DOD)
regulations, directives, and instructions as well as service guidance
and documentation on UAS. We met with key DOD and service officials,
including those from the UAS Planning Task Force and UAS program
managers, to discuss the current status and future plans for these
systems. We reviewed the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027
because this document establishes an overall DOD management framework
for developing and employing UAS DOD-wide and the update, 2005 Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Roadmap. During discussion and visits with DOD and
service officials, we obtained and reviewed DOD and service analyses,
briefings, and summary reports describing each of the UAS used in
supporting recent combat and combat support operations. This included
obtaining detailed information on current and future UAS operational
capabilities. Additionally, we obtained information on the numbers and
types of missions performed by UAS, as well as the methods used by the
services to evaluate UAS performance in accomplishing those missions.
To assess the reliability and types of missions provided to us by DOD,
we (1) interviewed knowledgeable officials about the processes for
collecting and maintaining the data and (2) reviewed the data for
completeness and reasonableness by comparing it to other sources of
information. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this review. DOD and service officials also provided
specific examples of operational successes and emerging challenges. We
discussed actions taken and processes used by DOD and service officials
and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to
address identified challenges. We also held discussions with Joint
Staff officials to discuss their efforts to address joint UAS issues
via the Tiger Team.
The specific military activities that we visited and/or obtained
written responses to questions from include the following:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) and its Joint UAS Planning Task Force; Washington, D.C;
* Headquarters, Department of the Army; Washington, D.C;
* U.S. Army Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama;
* U.S. Marine Corps, Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia;
* U.S. Navy Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Station, Patuxent
River, Maryland;
* U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command Directorate of Requirements,
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;
* U.S Air Force, Air Force Material Command, Wright Patterson Air Force
Base Dayton, Ohio;
* U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia;
* U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida;
* U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa,
Florida;
* U.S. Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., and:
* U.S Strategic Command, Omaha, Nebraska.
We also obtained documents describing the mission and planned
operations of the new Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Center of
Excellence and Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Overarching Integrated
Process Team.
To assess the soundness of DOD's approach to evaluating UAS operational
performance, we interviewed DOD and service officials to discuss the
criteria and processes used to assess performance. We also obtained and
reviewed DOD and Army UAS Operations Assessments to identify issues and
concerns regarding performance. Additionally, we held discussions with
U.S. Strategic Command officials to obtain information on the status of
their efforts to establish measures for assessing joint UAS
performance. We also held discussions with service officials to
determine the extent to which they are required to capture information
on the use and performance of UAS in their existing lessons-learned
systems. Finally, we obtained and reviewed DOD and service specific UAS
or unmanned aerial vehicle roadmaps.
We performed our work from July 2004 to October 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
NOV 15 2005:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: DoD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments," dated
October 11, 2005 (GAO Code 350550).
The DoD concurs with the draft report's first, third, and fourth
recommendations on communications interoperability
standards/electromagnetic frequency reprogramming capabilities
standards, interoperability standards, and all-weather capabilities.
The DoD partially concurs with the second and fifth recommendations on
payloads commonality and a performance measurement system,
respectively. The rationale for the DoD's position is enclosed.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact
Dyke Weatherington, Deputy, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task
Force at 703-695-6188.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Mark D. Schaeffer:
Principal Deputy Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT-DATED OCTOBER 11, 2005 GAO CODE 350550/GAO-06-49:
"UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service
Secretaries, and other appropriate organizations to work together to
develop or adjust communications interoperability standards and
electromagnetic frequency reprogramming capabilities standards and
ensure that they are applied to new or modified unmanned aircraft,
sensor and communications payloads, ground stations, and related
equipment. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. DOD recognizes the utility of communications
interoperability and the need to improve this capability. The
Department has completed studies on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
frequency spectrum requirements and will direct the Services to operate
in common frequency spectra, and we will specify a Common Data Link
(CDL) baseline for all tactical and larger UAS in accordance with the
revised CDL specification. The direction will require industry standard
internet and Ethernet protocols as well as standard data link waveforms
which will enhance interoperability within DOD networks and systems.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service
Secretaries, and other appropriate organizations to work together to
develop sensor and other payload commonality standards where practical
and enforce such standards when modifying existing unmanned aircraft or
payloads and developing new ones. (p. 24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partial Concur. Unmanned aircraft payload procurement is
dependent upon Service mission requirements, physical design
limitations of the unmanned aircraft, and the rapid nature of
technology evolution. The Department does not typically focus on
"payload interchangeability" (e.g., the ability to swap payloads
directly from one type of unmanned aircraft to another); however where
appropriate, efficiencies and savings from developing, producing, and
sustaining "common payloads" for integration into different unmanned
aircraft types is encouraged. The Department can currently cite
examples of the same payload being used on different unmanned aircraft,
but within the same class. For example, the Army and Air Force Raven
and the Marine Corps Dragon Eye small unmanned aircraft use common
infrared (IR) and electro-optical (EO) payloads. The same multi-sensor
targeting system EO/IR payload that is integrated on the Air Force
Predator will be integrated on the Army Warrior unmanned aircraft. The
Army Shadow and the Marine Corps Pioneer also share the same EO/IR
payload. In these examples, "commonality" is achieved by the same
sensor being integrated and operated on different unmanned aircraft
types. Where practical, the Services work together to acquire common
payloads.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service
Secretaries, and other appropriate organizations to work together to
develop appropriately detailed UAS interoperability standards. (p.
24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The OSD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, released in August
2005, includes an Interoperability Standards Appendix which discusses
the preferred framework and methodology for establishing
interoperability and addresses specific standards to achieve unmanned
aircraft interoperability. Standards for command and control, data
links, still imagery, motion imagery, and ground moving target
indicator formats are a few described in the annex. As identified in
the response to the GAO's first recommendation above, the Department
will direct the Services to operate in common frequency spectra and
will specify a Common Data Link (CDL) baseline for all tactical and
larger UAS in accordance with the revised CDL specification. Additional
efforts within the Department that address unmanned aircraft
interoperability standards include: Service ratification of NATO
Standards Agreement (STANAG) 4586 and a recent memo from the
Department's Chief Information Officer concerning Full Motion Video
(FMV). STANAG 4586 addresses the standard interface for unmanned
aircraft to achieve interoperability in the complex NATO combined/Joint
Services operational environment. This past May, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense directed the Department to investigate ways to improve
integration of FMV and related sensor data generated by unmanned
aircraft in support of the Global War on Terrorism. This resulted in
direction on the use of standards to increase the integration of FMV
across the Services. One example of rapid improvement in Joint Service
interoperability is the evolution of remote video terminals for direct
video reception from multiple UAS. Originally started by the Air Force
as the Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver System (ROVER), the
concept has been embraced by each of the Services. Currently, the third
version of ROVER is now in use with Air Force, Army and Marine Corps,
including 50 ROVER III ground terminals deployed with the Marines.
These enable troops on the ground to receive information directly from
airborne Predator, Shadow, Hunter, Dragon Eye, and Pioneer unmanned
aircraft. The capabilities that UAS bring to the joint fight have been
acknowledged at the most senior levels of the Department. The Vice
Chairman, JCS has tasked the newly formed Joint UAS Material Review
Board and Joint UAV Center of Excellence to provide recommendations for
continuing to improve UAS interoperability.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service
Secretaries, and other appropriate organizations to work together to
determine whether unmanned aircraft need all-weather flying
capabilities, identify any performance degradation associated with all-
weather flying capabilities, and obtain all-weather capabilities where
appropriate. (p. 25/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Combatant Commanders should expect UAS to support
operations in diverse weather conditions. As UAS capabilities improve,
the range of weather conditions these systems will need to operate in
will also increase. The Services evaluate their weather capability
requirements for each of their UAS, and develop and acquire these
capabilities where appropriate. As the GAO report points out, some
unmanned aircraft are more likely to be grounded by inclement weather
than manned aircraft, due in part to their lighter weight. It is not
cost effective, however, to expect all classes of unmanned aircraft to
have an all-weather capability. All-weather capability is generally a
function of aircraft size. Some unmanned aircraft will probably not be
able to operate in all adverse weather conditions. For example, it is
not reasonable to expect small, mini, micro unmanned aircraft to be
able to operate in adverse conditions such as high winds. Where
appropriate, the Services have implemented procedural and limited
technological solutions to help mitigate the effects of weather on some
unmanned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft, including the Global Hawk,
Predator, Fire Scout and Warrior, have requirements to be capable of
operating in some, but not all, adverse weather conditions. The
Department equips its systems with those levels of capability
determined to be most cost effective, while meeting combat capability
and readiness.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command to ensure that the
performance measurement system being developed by the command at a
minimum:
* measures how effectively UAS perform their missions by identifying
quantifiable goals and comparing results with desired outcomes;
* identifies the specific performance indicator information that needs
to be collected to adequately assess joint performance;
* develops indicators that assess communications and payload
interoperability, and the extent to which electromagnetic spectrum
congestion is undermining joint operations;
* establishes baselines and apply the identified indicators against the
baselines to gauge success in joint UAS performance; and:
* develops a way to systematically collect identified performance
information and routinely report it to organizations that develop and
field UAS. (p. 25/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partial Concur. The U.S. Strategic Command has drafted a
Joint Functional Component Concept of Operations that includes metrics
to gauge the force's ability to meet intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) requirements. This will:
* Develop criteria for assessing collection mechanisms to determine the
effectiveness of synchronization, resolution of tasking and asset
competition, and customer satisfaction.
* In coordination with the Services, Intelligence Community, Combat
Support Agencies, and Combatant Commanders (COCOM), develop, maintain,
use, and evaluate measures of effectiveness and mission metrics to
assess ISR mission objective accomplishment. Examine requirements,
plans, asset capabilities, and mission results to support this process.
* In conjunction with U.S. Joint Forces Command, develop and implement
ISR modeling and simulation methodologies. The Joint Functional
Component Command-ISR will participate in technical and operational
testing of various DOD ISR proposals and platforms to determine their
military utility.
* Implement timely planning process changes to support COCOM
requirements and, if necessary, modify ISR asset use to support new
planning guidance.
These ISR metrics are in development and will require Service
participation to define the specific data and methodology which will
result in useful information. At this time, there is not a detailed
schedule for this process. The Department will provide updates to GAO
as this activity matures.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Brian J. Lepore, Assistant
Director; Harry E. Taylor, Jr; Patricia F. Albritton; Jeanett H. Reid;
Elisha T. Matvay; Robert B. Brown; Cheryl A. Weissman; Ron La Due Lake;
and Kenneth E. Patton also made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
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(350550):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Unmanned aircraft systems were previously known as unmanned aerial
vehicles. In August 2005, the Department of Defense began using the new
term. We have adopted the new term in this report and for clarity will
use it when referring to the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task
Force, although it was actually known as the Joint Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles Planning Task Force prior to August 2005. However, we will
refer to publications by whichever term was used in their titles.
[2] GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C. Mar. 17,
2004).
[3] The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System is a
collaborative system that DOD uses to identify capability gaps and
integrated solutions to resolve these gaps.
[4] Joint missions involve UAS from more than one service, whereas
service-specific missions involve UAS from only one service.
[5] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Roadmap 2002-2027 (Washington, D.C. December 2002).
[6] DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003
and DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, May 12, 2003.
[7] In August 2005, DOD issued an updated version of the roadmap. See
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap
2005-2030 (Washington, D.C. August 2005).
[8] This is the latest information available at the time of our review.
[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability
of Systems That Process Intelligence Data, GAO-03-329 (Washington, D.C.
Mar. 31, 2003).
[10] GAO, Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time Critical Targeting, GAO-02-
204R (Washington, D.C. Nov. 30, 2001).
[11] GAO, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR (Washington, D.C. Dec. 9, 1988).
[12] The electromagnetic spectrum refers to the range of radio
frequencies used in wireless communication.
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