Military Personnel
A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long-term Guard and Reserve Force Availability Gao ID: GAO-05-285T February 2, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) has six reserve components: the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. DOD's use of Reserve and National Guard forces increased dramatically following the events of September 11, 2001, and on January 19, 2005, more than 192,000 National Guard and Reserve component members were mobilized. About 85 percent of these personnel were members of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve. Furthermore, the availability of reserve component forces will continue to play an important role in the success of DOD's future missions, and DOD has projected that over the next 3 to 5 years, it will continuously have more than 100,000 reserve component members mobilized. Since September, 2001, GAO has issued a number of reports that have dealt with issues related to the increased use of Reserve and National Guard forces. For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the results of its work on the extent to which DOD has the strategic framework and policies necessary to maximize reserve component force availability for a long-term Global War on Terrorism.
DOD does not have a strategic framework with human capital goals concerning the availability of its reserve component forces. The manner in which DOD implements its mobilization authorities affects the number of reserve component members available. The partial mobilization authority limits involuntary mobilizations to not more than 1 million reserve component members at any one time, for not more than 24 consecutive months, during a time of national emergency. Under DOD's current implementation of the authority, members can be involuntarily mobilized more than once, but involuntary mobilizations are limited to a cumulative total of 24 months. Given this implementation, DOD could eventually run out of forces. During GAO's 2004 review, DOD was facing shortages of some reserve component personnel, and officials considered changing their implementation of the partial mobilization authority to expand the pool of available personnel. Under the proposed implementation, DOD could have mobilized personnel for less than 24 consecutive months, sent them home for a period, and remobilized them, repeating this cycle indefinitely and providing an essentially unlimited flow of forces. After GAO's review was done, DOD said it would retain its current implementation that limits mobilizations to a cumulative total of 24 months. However, DOD did not clarify how it planned to meet its longer-term requirements for the Global War on Terrorism as additional forces reach the 24-month mobilization point. By June 2004, 30,000 reserve component members had already been mobilized for 24 months. DOD's policies also affect the availability of reserve component members. Many of the policies that affect reserve component availability were focused on the services' short-term requirements or the needs of individual service members rather than on long-term requirements and predictability. For example, DOD implemented stop-loss policies, which are short-term measures that increase force availability by retaining active or reserve component members on active duty beyond the end of their obligated service. Because DOD's various policies were not developed within the context of an overall strategic framework, they underwent numerous changes as DOD strove to meet current requirements, and they did not work together to meet the department's long-term Global War on Terrorism requirements. These policy changes created uncertainties for reserve component members concerning the likelihood of their mobilization, the length of service commitments and overseas rotations, and the types of missions they will have to perform. The uncertainties may affect future retention and recruiting efforts, and indications show that some parts of the force may already be stressed.
GAO-05-285T, Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long-term Guard and Reserve Force Availability
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Not to Be Released Before 2:30 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, February 2, 2005:
Military Personnel:
A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Address Long-term Guard and Reserve
Force Availability:
Statement for the Record by Derek B. Stewart, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management:
GAO-05-285T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-285T, a statement for the record submitted to the
Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has six reserve components: the Army
Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air
National Guard, the Naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. DOD‘s
use of Reserve and National Guard forces increased dramatically
following the events of September 11, 2001, and on January 19, 2005,
more than 192,000 National Guard and Reserve component members were
mobilized. About 85 percent of these personnel were members of the Army
National Guard or the Army Reserve. Furthermore, the availability of
reserve component forces will continue to play an important role in the
success of DOD‘s future missions, and DOD has projected that over the
next 3 to 5 years, it will continuously have more than 100,000 reserve
component members mobilized.
Since September, 2001, GAO has issued a number of reports that have
dealt with issues related to the increased use of Reserve and National
Guard forces. For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the results of
its work on the extent to which DOD has the strategic framework and
policies necessary to maximize reserve component force availability for
a long-term Global War on Terrorism.
What GAO Found:
DOD does not have a strategic framework with human capital goals
concerning the availability of its reserve component forces. The manner
in which DOD implements its mobilization authorities affects the number
of reserve component members available. The partial mobilization
authority limits involuntary mobilizations to not more than 1 million
reserve component members at any one time, for not more than 24
consecutive months, during a time of national emergency. Under DOD‘s
current implementation of the authority, members can be involuntarily
mobilized more than once, but involuntary mobilizations are limited to
a cumulative total of 24 months. Given this implementation, DOD could
eventually run out of forces. During GAO‘s 2004 review, DOD was facing
shortages of some reserve component personnel, and officials considered
changing their implementation of the partial mobilization authority to
expand the pool of available personnel. Under the proposed
implementation, DOD could have mobilized personnel for less than 24
consecutive months, sent them home for a period, and remobilized them,
repeating this cycle indefinitely and providing an essentially
unlimited flow of forces. After GAO‘s review was done, DOD said it
would retain its current implementation that limits mobilizations to a
cumulative total of 24 months. However, DOD did not clarify how it
planned to meet its longer-term requirements for the Global War on
Terrorism as additional forces reach the 24-month mobilization point.
By June 2004, 30,000 reserve component members had already been
mobilized for 24 months.
DOD‘s policies also affect the availability of reserve component
members. Many of the policies that affect reserve component
availability were focused on the services‘ short-term requirements or
the needs of individual service members rather than on long-term
requirements and predictability. For example, DOD implemented stop-loss
policies, which are short-term measures that increase force
availability by retaining active or reserve component members on active
duty beyond the end of their obligated service. Because DOD‘s various
policies were not developed within the context of an overall strategic
framework, they underwent numerous changes as DOD strove to meet
current requirements, and they did not work together to meet the
department‘s long-term Global War on Terrorism requirements. These
policy changes created uncertainties for reserve component members
concerning the likelihood of their mobilization, the length of service
commitments and overseas rotations, and the types of missions they will
have to perform. The uncertainties may affect future retention and
recruiting efforts, and indications show that some parts of the force
may already be stressed. GAO recommended that DOD develop a strategic
framework with human capital goals and then link its policies within
the context of the strategic framework. DOD generally agreed with the
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-285T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for your
hearing on the adequacy of Army forces.
The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global commitments
without sizable participation from among its current 1.2 million
National Guard and Reserve members. Since September 11, 2001, more than
363,000 of these reserve component[Footnote 1] members have been
involuntarily called to active duty. On January 19, 2005, more than
192,000 National Guard and Reserve component members remained
mobilized, about 85 percent of them from the Army National Guard or the
Army Reserve.
Reserve component members have been deployed around the world; some
help to maintain peace and security at home, while others serve on the
front lines in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. Since the pace of
reserve operations is expected to remain high due to the Global War on
Terrorism stretching indefinitely into the future, it is critical that
the services maximize the availability of their reserve component
forces. Recruiting and retention success are important factors in
maintaining the availability of the force, and DOD has recognized that
predictability is one of the keys to the retention of a quality force.
Since September 2001, GAO has issued a number of reports that have
dealt with issues related to the increased use of Reserve and National
Guard forces. This testimony is drawn largely from our September 2004
report dealing with mobilization and demobilization issues,[Footnote 2]
and it also draws on our August 2003 report on mobilization
issues,[Footnote 3] and our November 2004 report on the National
Guard.[Footnote 4] For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the
results of its work on the extent to which DOD has the strategic
framework and policies necessary to maximize reserve component force
availability for a long-term Global War on Terrorism.
In addressing our objective for this body of work, we reviewed policies
from the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in
light of the various mobilization authorities that are available to DOD
and planned deployment rotations. We also visited sites where the
services conduct mobilization and demobilization processing and
interviewed responsible officials at those sites. Although we visited
sites for all the services, we focused our review primarily on the
Army's mobilization and demobilization processes, since more personnel
from the Army have been and are expected to be mobilized than from all
the other services combined. We analyzed personnel data obtained during
the site visits and held meetings with military and civilian officials
from OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service headquarters, reserve
component headquarters, and support agencies. Based on our review of
the databases we used, we determined that the DOD-provided data were
reliable for the purposes of our work. We conducted our reviews in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Let
me now turn to the specific issues associated with reserve component
force availability.
Summary:
DOD does not have the strategic framework and associated policies
necessary to maximize reserve component force availability for a
long-term Global War on Terrorism. The manner in which DOD implements
its mobilization authorities affects the number of reserve component
members available. The partial mobilization authority limits
involuntary mobilizations to not more than 1 million reserve component
members at any one time, for not more than 24 consecutive months,
during a time of national emergency. Under DOD's current implementation
of the authority, reserve component members can be involuntarily
mobilized more than once, but involuntary mobilizations are limited to
a cumulative total of 24 months. Given this implementation that
restricts the time personnel can be mobilized, DOD could eventually run
out of forces. During our 2004 review of mobilization and
demobilization issues, DOD was facing critical shortages of some
reserve component personnel, and officials considered changing their
implementation of the partial mobilization authority to expand the pool
of available personnel. Under the proposed implementation, DOD could
have mobilized its reserve component personnel for less than
24 consecutive months, sent them home for an unspecified period, and
then remobilized them, repeating this cycle indefinitely and providing
an essentially unlimited flow of forces. After our review was
completed, DOD said it would continue its implementation of the partial
mobilization authority that limits mobilizations to a cumulative total
of 24 months. However, DOD did not clarify how it planned to meet its
longer-term requirements for the Global War on Terrorism as successive
groups of reserve component personnel reach the 24-month mobilization
point. By June 2004, 30,000 reserve component members had already been
mobilized for 24 months.
DOD's policies also affect the availability of reserve component
members. Many of the policies that affect reserve component
availability were focused on the services' short-term requirements and
the needs of individual members, rather than on long-term requirements
and predictability. For example, DOD has sometimes implemented
stop-loss policies, which are short-term measures that increase force
availability by retaining active or reserve component members on active
duty beyond the end of their obligated service. Overall, DOD's policies
concerning the use of its reserve component forces reflect the past use
of the reserve components as a later-deploying reserve force rather
than current usage as a force to support continued overseas
deployments. Because DOD's policies concerning the use of its reserve
components were not developed within the context of an overall
strategic framework with human capital goals concerning the
availability of reserve forces, the policies did not work in
conjunction with each other to meet the department's long-term Global
War on Terrorism requirements. As a result, the policies underwent
numerous changes as DOD strove to increase the availability of the
reserve components to meet current requirements. These policy changes
created uncertainties concerning unit cohesion, the likelihood of
reserve component member mobilizations, length of service commitments
and overseas rotations, the types of missions members would be asked to
perform, and the availability of needed equipment. It remains to be
seen how these uncertainties will affect recruiting, retention, and the
long-term availability of the reserve components, but there are already
indications that some portions of the force are being stressed. For
example, the Army National Guard achieved only 87 percent of its
recruiting goals in both fiscal years 2003 and 2004, and in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 it achieved only 80 percent of its goal.
In our previously published reports, we made several recommendations
aimed at increasing the long-term availability of reserve component
forces. In particular, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic
framework that sets human capital goals concerning the availability of
its reserve force to meet the longer-term requirements of the Global
War on Terrorism, and we recommended that DOD identify policies that
should be linked within the context of the strategic framework. DOD
generally agreed with our recommendations concerning long-term
availability of reserve component forces.
Background:
Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and
equipment, activating or federalizing units and members of the National
Guard and Reserves for active duty, and bringing the armed forces to a
state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It is a complex
undertaking that requires constant and precise coordination between a
number of commands and officials. Mobilization usually begins when the
President invokes a mobilization authority and ends with the voluntary
or involuntary mobilization of an individual Reserve or National Guard
member. Demobilization[Footnote 5] is the process necessary to release
from active duty units and members of the National Guard and Reserve
components who were ordered to active duty under various legislative
authorities. Mobilization and demobilization times can vary from a
matter of hours to months, depending on a number of factors. For
example, many air reserve component units are required to be available
to mobilize within 72 hours, while Army National Guard brigades may
require months of training as part of their mobilizations. Reserve
component members' usage of accrued leave can greatly affect
demobilization times. Actual demobilization processing typically takes
a matter of days once the member arrives back in the United States.
However, since members earn 30 days of leave each year, they could have
up to 60 days of leave available to them at the end of a 2-year
mobilization.
Reserve Components and Categories:
DOD has six reserve components: the Army Reserve, the Army National
Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval
Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. Reserve forces can be divided
into three major categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve,
and the Retired Reserve. The Total Reserve had approximately
1.2 million National Guard and Reserve members at the end of fiscal
year 2004. However, only the 1.1 million members of the Ready Reserve
were subject to involuntary mobilization under the partial mobilization
declared by President Bush on September 14, 2001. Within the Ready
Reserve, there are three subcategories: the Selected Reserve, the
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard.
Members of all three subcategories are subject to mobilization under a
partial mobilization.
* At the end of fiscal year 2004, DOD had 859,406 Selected Reserve
members. The Selected Reserve's members included individual
mobilization augmentees--individuals who train regularly, for pay, with
active component units--as well as members who participate in regular
training as members of National Guard or Reserve units.
* At the end of fiscal year 2004, DOD had 284,201 IRR members. During a
partial mobilization, these individuals--who were previously trained
during periods of active duty service--can be mobilized to fill
requirements. Each year, the services transfer thousands of personnel
who have completed the active duty or Selected Reserve portions of
their military contracts, but who have not reached the end of their
military service obligations, to the IRR.[Footnote 6] However, IRR
members do not participate in any regularly scheduled training, and
they are not paid for their membership in the IRR.[Footnote 7]
* At the end of fiscal year 2004, the Inactive National Guard had 1,428
Army National Guard members. This subcategory contains individuals who
are temporarily unable to participate in regular training but who wish
to remain attached to their National Guard unit.
Mobilization Authorities:
Most reservists who were called to active duty for other than normal
training after September 11, 2001, were mobilized under one of the
three legislative authorities listed in table 1.
Table 1: Authorities Used to Mobilize Reservists after September 11,
2001:
Title 10 U.S.C.: § 12304 (Presidential reserve call-up authority);
Type of mobilization: Involuntary;
Number of Ready Reservists that can be mobilized at any one time:
200,000[A];
Length of mobilization: Not more than 270 days for any operational
mission.
Title 10 U.S.C.: § 12302 (Partial mobilization authority);
Type of mobilization: Involuntary;
Number of Ready Reservists that can be mobilized at any one time:
1,000,000;
Length of mobilization: Not more than 24 consecutive months.
Title 10 U.S.C.: § 12301 (d);
Type of mobilization: Voluntary;
Number of Ready Reservists that can be mobilized at any one time:
Unlimited;
Length of mobilization: Unlimited.
Source: GAO.
[A] Under this authority, DOD can mobilize members of the Selected
Reserve and certain IRR members but is limited to not more than 200,000
members at any one time, of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of
the IRR.
[End of table]
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national
emergency existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center
in New York City, New York, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and
he invoked 10 U.S.C. § 12302, which is commonly referred to as the
"partial mobilization authority." On September 20, 2001, DOD issued
mobilization guidance that, among a host of other things, directed the
services as a matter of policy to specify in initial orders to Ready
Reserve members that the period of active duty service under
10 U.S.C. § 12302 would not exceed 12 months. However, the guidance
allowed the service secretaries to extend orders for an additional 12
months or to remobilize reserve component members under the partial
mobilization authority as long as an individual member's cumulative
service did not exceed 24 months under 10 U.S.C. § 12302. The guidance
further specified that "No member of the Ready Reserve called to
involuntary active duty under 10 U.S.C. 12302 in support of the
effective conduct of operations in response to the World Trade Center
and Pentagon attacks, shall serve on active duty in excess of 24 months
under that authority, including travel time to return the member to the
residence from which he or she left when called to active duty and use
of accrued leave." The guidance also allowed the services to retain
members on active duty after they had served 24 or fewer months under
10 U.S.C. § 12302 with the member's consent if additional orders were
authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d).[Footnote 8]
Mobilization and Demobilization Roles and Responsibilities:
Combatant commanders are principally responsible for the preparation
and implementation of operation plans that specify the necessary level
of mobilization of reserve component forces. The military services are
the primary executors of mobilization. At the direction of the
Secretary of Defense, the services prepare detailed mobilization plans
to support the operation plans and provide forces and logistical
support to the combatant commanders.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, who reports to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, is to
provide policy, programs, and guidance for the mobilization and
demobilization of the reserve components. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, after coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, the secretaries of the military
departments, and the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands, is
to advise the Secretary of Defense on the need to augment the active
forces with members of the reserve components. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff also has responsibility for recommending the
period of service for units and members of the reserve components
ordered to active duty. The service secretaries are to prepare plans
for mobilization and demobilization and to periodically review and test
the plans to ensure the services' capabilities to mobilize reserve
forces and to assimilate them effectively into the active forces.
Service Usage of the Reserve Component since September 11, 2001:
Figure 1 shows reserve component usage on a per capita basis since
fiscal year 1989 and demonstrates the dramatic increase in usage that
occurred after September 11, 2001. It shows that the ongoing usage--
which includes support for operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom,
and Iraqi Freedom--exceeds the usage rates during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War in both length and magnitude.[Footnote 9]
Figure 1: Average Days of Duty Performed by DOD's Reserve Component
Forces, Fiscal Years 1989-2003:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Duty days in figure 1 include training days as well as support
for operational missions.
[End of figure]
While reserve component usage increased significantly after
September 11, 2001, an equally important shift occurred at the end of
2002. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Air Force
initially used the partial mobilization authority more than the other
services. However, service usage shifted in 2002, and by the end of
that year, the Army had more reserve component members mobilized than
all the other services combined. Since that time, usage of the Army's
reserve component members has continued to dominate DOD's figures. On
January 19, 2005, more than 192,000 National Guard and Reserve members
were mobilized. About 85 percent of these mobilized personnel were
members of the Army National Guard or Army Reserve.
Under the current partial mobilization authority, DOD increased not
only the numbers of reserve component members that it mobilized, but
also the length of the members' mobilizations. The average mobilization
for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991 was
156 days. However, on March 31, 2004, the average mobilization for the
three ongoing operations had increased to 342 days, and that figure was
expected to continue to rise.
Availability of Reserve Components Is Greatly Influenced
by Mobilization Authorities and Personnel Policies:
DOD does not have the strategic framework and associated policies
necessary to maximize reserve component force availability for a
long-term Global War on Terrorism. The availability of reserve
component forces to meet future requirements is greatly influenced by
DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority and by the
department's personnel policies. Furthermore, many of DOD's policies
that affect mobilized reserve component personnel were implemented in a
piecemeal manner, and were focused on the short-term needs of the
services and reserve component members rather than on long-term
requirements and predictability. The availability of reserve component
forces will continue to play an important role in the success of DOD's
missions because requirements that increased significantly after
September 11, 2001, are expected to remain high for the foreseeable
future. As a result, there are early indicators that DOD may have
trouble meeting predictable troop deployment and recruiting goals for
some reserve components and occupational specialties.
DOD's Recent Use of Mobilization Authorities:
On September 14, 2002, DOD broke with its previous pattern of
addressing mobilization requirements with a presidential reserve call-
up before moving to a partial mobilization. By 2004 DOD was facing
reserve component personnel shortages and considered a change in its
implementation of the partial mobilization authority. The manner in
which DOD implements the mobilization authorities currently available
can result in either an essentially unlimited supply of forces or
running out of forces available for deployment, at least in the short
term.
DOD has used two mobilization authorities to gain involuntary access to
its reserve component forces since 1990. In 1990, the President invoked
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b, allowing DOD to mobilize Selected Reserve
members for Operation Desert Shield.[Footnote 10] The provision was
then commonly referred to as the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up
authority and is now called the Presidential Reserve Call-up
authority.[Footnote 11] This authority limits involuntary
mobilizations to not more than 200,000 reserve component members at any
one time, for not more than 270 days, for any operational mission. On
January 18, 1991, the President invoked Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673,
commonly referred to as the "partial mobilization authority," thus
providing DOD with additional authority to respond to the continued
threat posed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.[Footnote 12] The partial
mobilization authority limits involuntary mobilizations to not more
than 1 million reserve component members at any one time, for not more
than 24 consecutive months, during a time of national emergency. During
the years between Operation Desert Shield and September 11, 2001, DOD
invoked a number of separate mission-specific Presidential Reserve
Call-up authorities for operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia,
and Haiti, and the department did not seek a partial mobilization
authority for any of these operations.
After the events of September 11, 2001, the President immediately
invoked the partial mobilization authority without a prior Presidential
Reserve Call-up.[Footnote 13] Since the partial mobilization for the
Global War on Terrorism went into effect in 2001, DOD has used both the
partial mobilization authority and the Presidential Reserve Call-up
authorities to involuntarily mobilize reserve component members for
operations in the Balkans.
The manner in which DOD implements the partial mobilization authority
affects the number of reserve component forces available for
deployment. When DOD issued its initial guidance concerning the partial
mobilization authority in 2001, it limited mobilization orders to
12 months but allowed the service secretaries to extend the orders for
an additional 12 months or remobilize reserve component members, as
long as an individual member's cumulative service under the partial
mobilization authority did not exceed 24 months. Under this cumulative
implementation approach, it is possible for DOD to run out of forces
during an extended conflict, such as a long-term Global War on
Terrorism. During our 2003-2004 review of mobilization and
demobilization issues, DOD was already facing some critical personnel
shortages. At that time, to expand its pool of available personnel, DOD
was considering a policy shift that would have authorized mobilizations
under the partial mobilization authority of up to 24 consecutive months
with no limit on cumulative months. Under the considered approach, DOD
would have been able to mobilize its forces for less than 24 months,
send them home, and then remobilize them, repeating this cycle
indefinitely and providing essentially an unlimited flow of forces.
After our review was complete, DOD said it would continue its
implementation of the partial mobilization authority that limits
mobilizations to a cumulative total of 24 months. However, DOD did not
clarify how it planned to meet its longer-term requirements for the
Global War on Terrorism as successive groups of reserve component
personnel reach the 24-month mobilization point.
Many Policies Did Not Address Long-term Requirements or
Predictability:
DOD's policies related to reserve component mobilizations were not
linked within the context of a strategic framework to meet the force
availability goals, and many policies have undergone significant
changes. Overall, the policies reflected DOD's past use of the reserve
components as a strategic force, rather than DOD's current use of the
reserve component as an operational force responding to the increased
requirements of the Global War on Terrorism. Faced with some critical
personnel shortages, the policies focused on the short-term needs of
the services and reserve component members, rather than on long-term
requirements and predictability. Lacking a strategic framework
containing human capital goals concerning reserve component force
availability to guide its policies, OSD and the services made several
changes to their policies to increase the availability of the reserve
component forces. As a result of these changes, predictability declined
for reserve component members. Specifically, reserve component members
have faced uncertainties concerning the cohesion of their units, the
likelihood of their mobilizations, the length of their service
commitments, the length of their overseas rotations, the types of
missions they would be asked to perform, and the availability of their
equipment.
Volunteer and Individual Ready Reserve Policies:
The partial mobilization authority allows DOD to involuntarily mobilize
members of the Ready Reserve, including the IRR;[Footnote 14] but after
the President invoked the partial mobilization authority on September
14, 2001, DOD and service policies encouraged the use of volunteers and
generally discouraged the involuntary mobilization of IRR members. DOD
officials stated that they wanted to focus involuntary mobilizations on
the paid, rather than unpaid, members of the reserve components.
However, our prior reports documented the lack of predictability that
resulted from the volunteer and IRR policies. Our August 2003
mobilization report[Footnote 15] showed that the policies were
disruptive to the integrity of Army units because there had been a
steady flow of personnel among units. Personnel were transferred from
nonmobilizing units to mobilizing units that were short of personnel,
and when the units that had supplied the personnel were later
mobilized, they in turn were short of personnel and had to draw
personnel from still other units. From September 11, 2001 to May 15,
2004, the Army Reserve mobilized 110,000 reservists, but more than
27,000 of these reservists were transferred and mobilized with units
that they did not normally train with. In addition, our November 2004
report on the National Guard[Footnote 16] noted that between September
11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over
74,000 personnel to deploying units. The reluctance to use the IRR is
reflected in the differences in usage rates between Selected Reserve
and IRR members. About 42 percent of the personnel who were members of
Selected Reserve on November 30, 2004, had been mobilized since
September 2001, compared to about 3 percent of the IRR members. Within
the Army, use of the IRR had been less than 2 percent. Because the IRR
makes up about one-quarter of the Ready Reserve, policies that
discourage the use of the IRR will cause members of the Selected
Reserve to share greater exposure to the hazards associated with
national security and military requirements, and could cause DOD's pool
of available reserve component personnel to shrink by more than
276,000 personnel.[Footnote 17]
Stop-Loss Policies:
At various times since September 2001, all of the services have had
"stop-loss" policies in effect.[Footnote 18] These policies are short-
term measures that increase the availability of reserve component
forces while decreasing predictability for reserve component members
who are prevented from leaving the service at the end of their
enlistment periods. Stop-loss policies are often implemented to retain
personnel in critical or high-use occupational specialties.
The only stop-loss policy in effect when we ended our 2004 review of
mobilization and demobilization issues was an Army policy that applied
to units rather than individuals in critical occupations. Under that
policy, Army reserve component personnel were not permitted to leave
the service from the time their unit was alerted[Footnote 19] until
90 days after the date when their unit was demobilized. Because many
Army units undergo several months of training after being mobilized but
before being deployed overseas for 12 months, stop-loss periods can
reach 2 years or more.
According to Army officials, a substantial number of reserve component
members have been affected by the changing stop-loss policies. As of
June 30, 2004, the Army had over 130,000 reserve component members
mobilized and thousands more alerted or demobilized less than 90 days.
Because they have remaining service obligations, many of these reserve
component members would not have been eligible to leave the Army even
if stop-loss policies had not been in effect. However, from fiscal year
1993 through fiscal year 2001,[Footnote 20] Army National Guard annual
attrition rates exceeded 16 percent, and Army Reserve rates exceeded
25 percent. Even a 16 percent attrition rate means that 20,800 of the
mobilized 130,000 reserve component soldiers would have left their
reserve component each year. If attrition rates exceed 16 percent or
the thousands of personnel who are alerted or who have been demobilized
for less than 90 days are included, the numbers of personnel affected
by stop-loss policies would increase even more.[Footnote 21] When the
Army's stop-loss policies are eventually lifted, thousands of
servicemembers could retire or leave the service all at once, and the
Army's reserve components could be confronted with a huge increase in
recruiting requirements.
Mobilization and Rotation Policies:
Following DOD's issuance of guidance concerning the length of
mobilizations in September 2001, the services initially limited most
mobilizations to 12 months, and most services maintained their existing
operational rotation policies to provide deployments of a predictable
length that are preceded and followed by standard maintenance and
training periods. However, the Air Force and the Army later increased
the length of their rotations, and the Army increased the length of its
mobilizations as well. These increases in the length of mobilizations
and rotations increased the availability of reserve component forces,
but they decreased predictability for individual reserve component
members who were mobilized and deployed under one set of policies but
later extended as a result of the policy changes.
From September 11, 2001, to March 31, 2004, the Air National Guard
mobilized more than 31,000 personnel, and the Air Force Reserve
mobilized more than 24,000 personnel. Although most Air Force
mobilizations were for 12 months or less, more than 10,000 air reserve
component members had their mobilization orders extended to 24 months.
Most of these personnel were in security-related occupations.
Before September 2001, the Army mobilized its reserve component forces
for up to 270 days under the Presidential Reserve Call-up authority,
and it deployed these troops overseas for rotations that lasted about 6
months. When it began mobilizing forces under the partial mobilization
authority in September 2001, the Army generally mobilized troops for 12
months. However, troops that were headed for duty in the Balkans
continued to be mobilized under the Presidential Reserve Call-up
authority. The Army's initial deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan were
scheduled for 6 months, just like the overseas rotations for the
Balkans. Eventually, the Army increased the length of its rotations to
Iraq and Afghanistan to 12 months.[Footnote 22] This increased the
availability of reserve component forces, but it decreased
predictability for members who were mobilized and deployed during the
transition period when the policy changed. When overseas rotations were
extended to 12 months, mobilization periods, which must include
mobilization and demobilization processing time, training time, and
time for the reserve component members to take any leave that they
earn, required a corresponding increase in length.
Cross-Training Policies:
DOD has a number of training initiatives under way that will increase
the availability of its reserve component forces to meet immediate
needs. Servicemembers are receiving limited training--called "cross-
training"--that enables them to perform missions that are outside their
area of expertise. In the Army, field artillery and air defense
artillery units have been trained to perform some military police
duties. Air Force and Navy personnel received additional training and
are providing the Army with additional transportation assets. DOD also
has plans to permanently convert thousands of positions from low-use
career fields to stressed career fields.
Equipment Transfer Policies:
Because the combatant commander has required Army National Guard units
to have modern, capable, and compatible equipment for recent
operations, the Army National Guard adapted its units and transferred
equipment to deploying units from nondeploying units. However, this has
made equipping units for future operations more challenging. National
Guard data showed that between September 2002 and June 2004, the Army
National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to
units that were deploying in support of operations in Iraq. The
equipment included night vision goggles, machine guns, radios, chemical
monitors, and vehicles. As a result, it has become increasingly
challenging for the National Guard to ready later deploying units to
meet warfighting requirements.
Early Indications Exist That DOD May Have Trouble Meeting Its Rotation
and Recruiting Goals:
While it remains to be seen how the uncertainty resulting from changing
mobilization and personnel policies will affect recruiting, retention,
and the long-term availability of the reserve components, there are
already indications that some portions of the force are being stressed.
For example, the Army National Guard achieved only 87 percent of its
recruiting goals in both fiscal years 2003 and 2004, and in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 it achieved only 80 percent of its goal.
The Secretary of Defense established a force-planning metric to limit
involuntary mobilizations to "reasonable and sustainable rates" and has
set the metric for such mobilizations at 1 year out of every 6.
However, on the basis of current and projected usage, it appears that
DOD may face difficulties achieving its goal within the Army's reserve
components in the near term. Since February 2003, the Army has
continuously had between 20 and 29 percent of its Selected Reserve
members mobilized. To illustrate, even if the Army were to maintain the
lower 20 percent mobilization rate for Selected Reserve members, it
would need to mobilize one-fifth of its Selected Reserve members each
year.[Footnote 23] DOD is aware that certain portions of the force are
used at much higher rates than others, and it plans to address some of
the imbalances by converting thousands of positions from lower-demand
specialties into higher-demand specialties. However, these conversions
will take place over several years, and even when the positions are
converted, it may take some time to recruit and train people for the
new positions.
DOD Plans to Address Increased Personnel Requirements Are Unclear:
It is unclear how DOD plans to address its longer-term personnel
requirements for the Global War on Terrorism, given its current
implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Requirements
for reserve component forces increased dramatically after
September 11, 2001, and are expected to remain high for the foreseeable
future. In the initial months following September 11, 2001, the Air
Force used the partial mobilization authority more than the other
services, and it reached its peak with almost 38,000 reserve component
members mobilized in April 2002. However, by July 2002, Army
mobilizations surpassed those of the Air Force, and since December
2002, the Army has had more reserve component members mobilized than
all the other services combined. According to OASD/RA data, about
42 percent of DOD's Selected Reserve forces had been mobilized from
September 14, 2001, to November 30, 2004.[Footnote 24] Although many of
the members who have been called to active duty under the partial
mobilization authority have been demobilized, as of January 19, 2005,
more than 192,000 of DOD's reserve component members were still
mobilized and serving on active duty, and DOD has projected that for
the next 3 to 5 years it will have more than 100,000 reserve component
members mobilized, with most of these personnel continuing to come from
the Army National Guard or Army Reserve.
While Army forces may face the greatest levels of involuntary
mobilizations over the next few years, all the reserve components have
career fields that have been highly stressed. For example, across the
services, 82 percent of enlisted security forces have been called up
since September 11, 2001. Our September 2004 report detailed Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force career fields that have been stressed.
* In June 2004, DOD noted that about 30,000 reserve members had already
been mobilized for 24 months. Under DOD's cumulative approach, these
personnel will not be available to meet future requirements under the
current partial mobilization. The shrinking pool of available
personnel, along with the lack of a strategic plan to clarify goals
regarding the reserve component force's availability, will present the
department with additional short-and long-term challenges as it tries
to fill requirements for mobilized reserve component forces.
Conclusions:
As the Global War on Terrorism stretches into its fourth year, DOD
officials have made it clear that they do not expect the war to end
soon. Furthermore, indications exist that certain components and
occupational specialties are being stressed, and the long-term impact
of this stress on recruiting and retention is unknown. Moreover,
although DOD has a number of rebalancing efforts under way, these
efforts will take years to implement. Because this war is expected to
last a long time and requires far greater reserve component personnel
resources than any of the smaller operations of the previous two
decades, DOD can no longer afford individual policies that are
developed to maximize short-term benefits and must have an integrated
set of policies that address both the long-term requirements for
reserve component forces and individual reserve component members'
needs for predictability.
For example, service rotation policies are directly tied to other
personnel policies, such as policies concerning the use of the IRR and
the extent of cross training. Policies to fully utilize the IRR would
increase the pool of available servicemembers and would thus decrease
the length of time each member would need to be deployed, based on a
static requirement. Policies that encourage the use of cross-training
for lesser-utilized units could also increase the pool of available
servicemembers and decrease the length of rotations. Until DOD
addresses its personnel policies within the context of an overall
strategic framework, it will not have clear visibility over the forces
that are available to meet future requirements. In addition, it will be
unable to provide reserve component members with clear expectations of
their military obligations and the increased predictability that DOD
has recognized is a key factor in retaining reserve component members
who are seeking to successfully balance their military commitments with
family and civilian employment obligations.
In our previously published reports, we made several recommendations
aimed at increasing the long-term availability of reserve component
forces. In particular, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic
framework that sets human capital goals concerning the availability of
its reserve force to meet the longer-term requirements of the Global
War on Terrorism, and we recommended that DOD identify policies that
should be linked within the context of the strategic framework. DOD
generally agreed with our recommendations concerning long-term
availability of reserve component forces.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For answers to questions about this statement, please contact Derek B.
Stewart at (202) 512-5140 or stewartd@gao.gov or Brenda S. Farrell at
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this statement included Michael J. Ferren, Kenneth E.
Patton, and Irene A. Robertson.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD's reserve components include the collective forces of the Army
National Guard and the Air National Guard, as well as the forces from
the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the
Air Force Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve also assists DOD in meeting
its commitments. However, we do not cover the Coast Guard Reserve here
because it accounts for about 1 percent of the total reserve force and
comes under the day-to-day control of the Department of Homeland
Security rather than DOD.
[2] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve
Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).
[3] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003).
[4] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
[5] Some of the services use the terms "activation" and "deactivation"
to describe the processes for bringing reserve component members on and
off active duty, and use the terms "mobilization" and "demobilization"
to describe the broader processes that also include equipment and
facility issues. We have used the more common "mobilization" and
"demobilization" terms here even though our primary focus is on
personnel issues.
[6] While enlistment contracts can vary, a typical enlistee would incur
an 8-year military service obligation, which could consist of a 4-year
active duty obligation followed by a 4-year IRR obligation.
[7] IRR members can request to participate in annual training or other
operations, but most do not. Those who are activated are paid for their
service. Also, there are small groups of IRR members who participate in
unpaid training. The members of this last group are often in the IRR
only for short periods while they are waiting to transfer to paid
positions in the Selected Reserve. IRR members can receive retirement
credit if they meet basic eligibility criteria through voluntary
training or mobilizations.
[8] According to DOD, this policy guidance is still in effect, and the
only major change to the policy has been to allow the Army to call up
reserve component members for more than 12 months on their initial
orders. However, DOD also noted that there have been multiple other
documents published to augment the policy, provide more information, or
implement legal requirements.
[9] Noble Eagle is the name for the domestic war on terrorism. Enduring
Freedom is the name for the international war on terrorism, including
operations in Afghanistan. Iraqi Freedom is the name for operations in
and around Iraq.
[10] The provision was renumbered 12304 in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-337,
§1662(e) (2) (1994).
[11] In 1990, the authority permitted the involuntary call-up of only
members of the Selected Reserve. The statute was amended to permit the
call-up of up to 30,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve and is
consequently now referred to as the Presidential Reserve Call-up
authority. Pub. L. No. 105-85 § 511 (1997).
[12] This provision was renumbered 12302 in 1994. Pub. L. No.103-337,
§1662(e) (2) (1994).
[13] DOD has noted that under its analysis of the applicable
authorities at the time, it was not authorized to use Presidential
Reserve Call-up authority in September 2001. DOD also noted that 10
U.S.C 12304(b) has since been changed to allow for the call-up of
Reserve members in response to "—a terrorist attack or threatened
terrorist attack—."
[14] The partial mobilization authority (10 U.S.C. § 12302) states that
"To achieve fair treatment as between members in the Ready Reserve who
are being considered for recall to duty without their consent,
consideration shall be given to (1) the length and nature of previous
service, to assure such sharing of exposure to hazards as the national
security and military requirements will reasonably allow; (2) family
responsibilities; and (3) employment necessary to maintain the national
health, safety, or interest."
[15] GAO-03-921.
[16] GAO-05-21.
[17] On November 30, 2004 DOD had 285,376 IRR members but only 8,394 of
these members had been called to active duty since September 11, 2001.
If DOD policies prevent further use of the IRR then 276,982 members of
the IRR will remain unused for the current Global War on Terrorism.
[18] Stop-loss policies can affect active as well as reserve component
personnel. Our focus here is on those policies that affect reserve
component members.
[19] The Army goal is to alert units at least 30 days prior to the
units' mobilization date.
[20] Army stop-loss policies went into effect early in fiscal year
2002.
[21] During our 2004 review of mobilization and demobilization issues,
officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) estimated that recent stop-loss policies
might have prevented more than 42,000 reserve component soldiers from
leaving the service on the date when they would have been eligible if
stop-loss policies had not been in effect.
[22] The final rotation to Bosnia was increased to 9 months, and
rotations to Kosovo are scheduled to increase to 12 months in 2005.
[23] Given the fiscal year 2003 attrition rates of 17 percent for the
Army National Guard and 21 percent for the Army Reserve, it might be
possible to achieve the one in six metric if attrition is concentrated
in the population that has already been mobilized, and the Army is able
to fully utilize its entire Selected Reserve population by mobilizing
individual soldiers out of its reserve component units that have
already been mobilized.
[24] This percentage does not take into account the 285,376 personnel
who were members of the IRR on November 30, 2004. DOD has made very
limited use of the IRR.
