Defense Acquisitions
Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004 Gao ID: GAO-05-243 March 31, 2005Since 1985, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested $85 billion in ballistic missile defense programs, with $66.5 billion more anticipated over the next 7 years through 2011. As a major result of this investment, the Department is on the verge of activating our nation's first missile defense system for protecting the United States from intercontinental ballistic missile attacks out of Northeast Asia. This initial capability--referred to as Limited Defensive Operations (LDO)--is the first step of a national priority to develop, field, and evolve over time an overarching ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). To fulfill a congressional mandate, GAO assessed how well the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) met its cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals during fiscal year 2004. GAO assessed the program last year and will continue to provide assessments of MDA progress through 2006.
By the end of fiscal year 2004, MDA carried out activities needed to field an initial missile defense capability, as planned. These included delivery and emplacement of Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors; upgrades of ground-based radars; enhancements to Aegis Navy ships for improved surveillance and tracking; development of command and control software for system operation; and tests to verify that components of this initial capability can communicate as part of an integrated whole. However, the performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified, because a number of flight tests slipped into fiscal year 2005 and MDA has not successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally-representative hardware and software. Additionally, based on our analysis of prime contractor cost and schedule performance, the development of BMDS elements cost approximately $370 million more than planned during fiscal year 2004. To cover much of this cost overrun, MDA deferred work planned for fiscal year 2004, redirected funds earmarked for other programs, and requested additional funds in its fiscal year 2005 budget to cover the cost of deferred work. In the future, MDA will likely face increased funding risks. MDA plans to request about $10 billion annually from DOD for BMDS development, procurement, and sustainment. However, DOD's acquisition programs are likely to be competing for a decreasing share of the total federal budget and MDA's programs are competing against hundreds of other DOD programs. Also, MDA continues to budget for unanticipated cost growth. For example, the Airborne Laser program plans to spend an additional $1.5 billion to develop and demonstrate a prototype aircraft. Furthermore, procurement and sustainment will demand increased funding as more missile defense components are fielded over time. MDA policy defines a block as an integrated set of capabilities fielded during the 2-year block cycle, but we observed that MDA's fielding goals do not consistently match its cost goals. For example, Block 2004 funds are used to procure 32 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense missiles, but of these missiles, 11 will be delivered in 2004-2005 and the remaining missiles will be delivered during 2006-2007. MDA officials intend to clarify the block policy in the near future to better align the cost and fielding goals.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-243, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-243
entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense
Program in 2004' which was released on March 31, 2005.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2005:
Defense Acquisitions:
Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004:
GAO-05-243:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-243, a report to Congressional Committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 1985, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested $85 billion in
ballistic missile defense programs, with $66.5 billion more anticipated
over the next 7 years through 2011. As a major result of this
investment, the Department is on the verge of activating our nation‘s
first missile defense system for protecting the United States from
intercontinental ballistic missile attacks out of Northeast Asia. This
initial capability”referred to as Limited Defensive Operations (LDO)”is
the first step of a national priority to develop, field, and evolve
over time an overarching ballistic missile defense system (BMDS).
To fulfill a congressional mandate, GAO assessed how well the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) met its cost, schedule, testing, and performance
goals during fiscal year 2004. GAO assessed the program last year and
will continue to provide assessments of MDA progress through 2006.
What GAO Found:
By the end of fiscal year 2004, MDA carried out activities needed to
field an initial missile defense capability, as planned. These included
delivery and emplacement of Ground-based Midcourse Defense
interceptors; upgrades of ground-based radars; enhancements to Aegis
Navy ships for improved surveillance and tracking; development of
command and control software for system operation; and tests to verify
that components of this initial capability can communicate as part of
an integrated whole. However, the performance of the system remains
uncertain and unverified, because a number of flight tests slipped into
fiscal year 2005 and MDA has not successfully conducted an end-to-end
flight test using operationally-representative hardware and software.
Additionally, based on our analysis of prime contractor cost and
schedule performance, the development of BMDS elements cost
approximately $370 million more than planned during fiscal year 2004.
To cover much of this cost overrun, MDA deferred work planned for
fiscal year 2004, redirected funds earmarked for other programs, and
requested additional funds in its fiscal year 2005 budget to cover the
cost of deferred work.
In the future, MDA will likely face increased funding risks. MDA plans
to request about $10 billion annually from DOD for BMDS development,
procurement, and sustainment. However, DOD‘s acquisition programs are
likely to be competing for a decreasing share of the total federal
budget and MDA‘s programs are competing against hundreds of other DOD
programs. Also, MDA continues to budget for unanticipated cost growth.
For example, the Airborne Laser program plans to spend an additional
$1.5 billion to develop and demonstrate a prototype aircraft.
Furthermore, procurement and sustainment will demand increased funding
as more missile defense components are fielded over time.
MDA policy defines a block as an integrated set of capabilities fielded
during the 2-year block cycle, but we observed that MDA‘s fielding
goals do not consistently match its cost goals. For example, Block 2004
funds are used to procure 32 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense missiles,
but of these missiles, 11 will be delivered in 2004-2005 and the
remaining missiles will be delivered during 2006-2007. MDA officials
intend to clarify the block policy in the near future to better align
the cost and fielding goals.
Elements of Ballistic Missile Defense System
First fielded block:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense;
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications;
Ground-based Midcourse Defense;
Patriot.
Future blocks:
Airborne Laser;
Kinetic Energy Interceptors;
Space Tracking and Surveillance System;
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
What GAO Recommends:
To help decision makers in Congress and DOD better understand the
relationship between requested funding and delivered capabilities, GAO
recommends that MDA clarify and modify, as needed, its block policy to
ensure its cost and fielding goals are consistently aligned. DOD
concurred with our recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-243.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robert E. Levin at (202)
512-4841 or levinr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities in Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Testing in Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of System Performance in Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of System Cost in Fiscal Year 2004:
Funding Risks Expected to Increase for Ballistic Missile Defense
Program:
MDA Is Not Consistently Matching Cost and Fielding Goals:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: Summary:
Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix III: Summary:
Appendix III: Airborne Laser:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix IV: Summary:
Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix V: Summary:
Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix VI: Summary:
Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix VII: Summary:
Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix VIII: Summary:
Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense:
Element Description:
History:
Developmental Phases:
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
Assessment of Element Performance:
Assessment of Element Cost:
Appendix IX: Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs:
Background:
Combined Aggregate Program:
Patriot/MEADS CAP Funding:
Appendix X: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: BMDS Elements:
Table 2: MDA Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Goals:
Table 3: Progress toward Achieving LDO:
Table 4: Progress toward Achieving Block 2004 Fielded Configuration
Goals:
Table 5: Status of Element Testing--Planned and Achieved:
Table 6: Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance in Fiscal Year
2004:
Table 7: Status of Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-
-Fielding Activities:
Table 8: Aegis Ship Availability for the BMD Mission (Block 2004):
Table 9: SM-3 Missile Deliveries:
Table 10: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Flight
Test and LRS&T Activities:
Table 11: Planned Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2005 Accomplishments--Remaining
Block 2004 Flight Tests:
Table 12: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Design
Reviews:
Table 13: Aegis BMD Cost:
Table 14: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--BC/FC
Segment:
Table 15: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Laser
Segment:
Table 16: ABL Cost:
Table 17: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Accomplishments--Software Development
and Testing:
Table 18: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Making System
Operational:
Table 19: C2BMC Cost:
Table 20: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Component Development:
Table 21: Status of Major GMD Flight Tests (Fiscal Year 2004):
Table 22: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Fielding Initial Capability:
Table 23: GMD Cost:
Table 24: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Contract Award and Planning:
Table 25: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Design Activities:
Table 26: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Key
Test Activities:
Table 27: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Risk
Reduction Activities:
Table 28: KEI High-Risk Areas:
Table 29: KEI Cost:
Table 30: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Space Segment:
Table 31: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Ground Segment:
Table 32: STSS Cost:
Table 33: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Design Activities:
Table 34: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Build Activities:
Table 35: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Integration and Test Activities:
Table 36: Planned THAAD Flight Testing:
Table 37: THAAD Cost:
Table 38: Patriot/MEADS CAP Planned Costs:
Figures:
Figure 1: Phases of a Ballistic Missile's Trajectory:
Figure 2: Breakout of MDA Budget:
Figure 3: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
Figure 4: ABL Block 2004 Prime Contract:
Figure 5: ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
Figure 6: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
Figure 7: Components of the GMD Element:
Figure 8: GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
Figure 9: STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
Figure 10: THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
Abbreviations:
ABL: Airborne Laser Aegis:
BMD: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
AI&T: Assembly, Integration, and Testing:
BC/FC: Beam Control/Fire Control:
BILL: Beacon Illuminator Laser:
BMC2: Battle Management, Command and Control:
BMC4I: Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computer,
and Intelligence:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
BV: Booster Validation:
C2BMC: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications:
CAP: Combined Aggregate Program:
COIL: Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser:
CONOPS: Concept of Operations:
CONUS: Continental United States:
CTF: Control Test Flight:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT&E: Director, Operational Test and Evaluation:
EVM: Earned Value Management:
FM: Flight Mission:
FT: Flight Test:
FY: fiscal year:
GMD: Ground-based Midcourse Defense:
IBR: Integrated Baseline Review:
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile:
IFICS: In-Flight Interceptor Communications System:
IFT: Integrated Flight Test:
IGT: Integrated Ground Test:
IT: Integrated Test:
KEI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors:
LDO: Limited Defensive Operations:
LRS&T: Long-Range Surveillance and Tracking:
MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile:
MSE: Missile Segment Enhancement:
NFIRE: Near Field Infrared Experiment:
O&S: Operations and Support:
OSC: Orbital Sciences Corporation:
OTA: Other Transaction Agreement:
PAC-3: Patriot Advanced Capability-3:
PMRF: Pacific Missile Range Facility:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation:
SBIRS: Space-Based Infrared System:
SBX: Sea-Based X-band Radar:
SCF: Seeker Characterization Flight:
SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System:
SICO: System Integration and Checkout:
SIL: System Integration Laboratory:
SM: Standard Missile:
SRBM: Short Range Ballistic Missile:
SRR: System Requirements Review:
STSS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
TILL: Target Illuminator Laser:
THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense:
UEWR: Upgraded Early Warning Radar:
USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:
USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:
USSTRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command:
VAFB: Vandenberg Air Force Base:
WSMR: White Sands Missile Range:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 31, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
Our nation's first missile defense system for protecting the United
States from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks is
expected to be activated for defensive operations in the coming months.
This initial capability is the culmination of efforts on the part of
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and other Department of Defense (DOD)
components in response to the President's December 2002 directive to
begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities to meet
the near-term ballistic missile threat to our nation. It also
represents a major result of the $85 billion invested in ballistic
missile defense programs since fiscal year 1985. DOD's investment in
missile defense continues, as indicated by proposed budgets for the
next few years. The Department estimates MDA will need $66.5 billion
between fiscal years 2005 and 2011 to continue work in this area, with
fiscal year 2005 appropriations of $8.8 billion accounting for 13
percent of DOD's total research and development budget.[Footnote 1]
The initial capability, which DOD refers to as Limited Defensive
Operations (LDO), is the first step of a national priority to develop,
field, and evolve over time an overarching Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). While DOD envisions a BMDS capable of protecting the
United States, deployed forces, friends, and allies from ballistic
missile attacks of all ranges, the LDO capability is primarily designed
to provide some protection of the United States against long-range
ballistic missile attacks out of Northeast Asia.
In developing the BMDS, MDA is attempting to follow an evolutionary
acquisition strategy in which the development and fielding of
capabilities is pursued in 2-year blocks. The configuration of a given
block builds on the work completed in previous blocks. Block 2004,
being deployed during the calendar years 2004-2005, is the first
biennial increment of the BMDS to provide an integrated set of
capabilities. LDO represents an interim capability on the path to full
Block 2004 fielding.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 directed
DOD to establish schedule, testing, performance, and cost goals for its
ballistic missile defense programs.[Footnote 2] As established by DOD,
the goals highlight, by block, overall cost, schedule, and performance
objectives for BMDS development and specify the quantities and
locations of specific BMDS components[Footnote 3] planned for
operational use. The act also directed us to assess, at the conclusion
of each of fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the extent to which MDA achieved
the goals it established. We delivered an assessment covering fiscal
year 2003 to Congress in April 2004.[Footnote 4]
Congress has since continued to require our assessment through fiscal
year 2006.[Footnote 5] To fulfill this mandate, we examined the
progress that MDA made in fiscal year 2004 toward its stated goals. For
example, many activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various
element programs pertain to the completion of the LDO capability, which
is an integral part of the Block 2004 goals. While conducting this
review, we identified issues associated with MDA's ability to fund
future development and fielding of its missile defense capabilities and
with MDA's application of the block approach. Our report includes these
observations.
The accomplishment of MDA program goals is ultimately achieved through
the efforts of individual BMDS elements, such as Ground-based Midcourse
Defense and Airborne Laser. Therefore, we based our assessment on the
progress made in fiscal year 2004 by those elements that are under the
management of MDA and that are being developed as part of a block
capability. The elements we reviewed accounted for 72 percent of MDA's
fiscal year 2004 research and development budget. Details of our scope
and methodology can be found in appendix X.
Results in Brief:
By the end of fiscal year 2004, MDA carried out activities needed to
field an initial missile defense capability, as planned. This included
delivery and emplacement of Ground-based Midcourse Defense
interceptors; upgrades of ground-based radars; enhancements to Aegis
Navy ships for improved surveillance and tracking; development of
command and control software for system operation; and tests to verify
that components of this initial capability can communicate as part of
an integrated whole. However, the performance of the system remains
uncertain and unverified, because MDA has not successfully completed a
flight test using operationally-representative hardware and software.
Additionally, the development of system elements cost approximately
$370 million more than planned during fiscal year 2004. To cover much
of this cost overrun, MDA deferred work planned for fiscal year 2004,
redirected funds earmarked for other programs, and requested additional
funds in its fiscal year 2005 budget to cover the cost of deferred
work.
Two issues have relevance for decision makers in Congress and DOD when
considering future budget decisions for the missile defense program.
First, although MDA has received nearly all funding requested in the
past few years, the agency is expected to face increased funding risks-
-arising from sources both outside and within DOD--in the years ahead.
MDA plans to request, on average, about $10 billion in research and
development funding per year over the 2006-2011 time period to support
continued development, procurement, and sustainment of hardware and
software that MDA is fielding.[Footnote 6] However, DOD's acquisition
programs are likely to be competing for a decreasing share of the total
federal budget that is allocated to discretionary (non-mandatory)
spending. Also, within DOD, MDA's programs are competing against
hundreds of technology development and acquisition programs for DOD's
research and development budget--$70 billion in fiscal year 2005--and
cost growth of existing weapon programs[Footnote 7] puts even more
pressure on MDA's share of research and development dollars.
Additionally, funding risks can be expected from cost growth of ongoing
MDA programs. For example, as part of the restructuring of MDA's
Airborne Laser program, the cost to accomplish the objective of
developing and demonstrating a prototype aircraft increased by $1.5
billion. Finally, procurement and sustainment will demand increasing
levels of MDA's funding as more components are fielded over time.
Second, we observed that MDA's cost goal for a given block--which, by
definition, is MDA's budget for all developmental and fielding
activities associated with the block--is not aligned with the block's
fielding goals. According to MDA policy, for example, interceptors
identified with the Block 2004 fielding goals and fielded during
calendar years 2004-2005 should be funded as part of the Block 2004
cost goal. However, we found that MDA has not been consistently
matching a block's cost and fielding goals. For example, Block 2004
funds are used to procure 32 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense missiles,
but of these missiles, 11 will be delivered in 2004-2005 and the
remaining missiles will be delivered during 2006-2007. Also, counter to
the definition of a block as an integrated set of capabilities fielded
during the 2-year block window, the Airborne Laser program will not
field any capabilities during Block 2004 although Block 2004 funds are
used in the program's development.
We are recommending that MDA clarify its block policy to ensure that a
block's cost and fielding goals are consistently aligned. DOD concurred
with our recommendation.
Background:
Ballistic missile defense is a challenging mission for DOD, requiring a
unique combination of defensive components--space-based sensors,
surveillance and tracking radars, advanced interceptors, command and
control, and reliable communications--working together as an integrated
system. A typical scenario to engage an ICBM is expected to unfold as
follows:
* Overhead satellites detect a missile launch and alert the command
authority of a possible attack.
* Upon receiving the alert, the BMDS directs its land-and sea-based
radars to track the missile complex and (if so designed) to identify
the warhead from decoys and associated objects.
* Based on accurate track data, an interceptor--consisting of a "kill
vehicle" mounted atop a booster--is launched. The interceptor boosts
itself toward the predicted intercept point and releases its kill
vehicle to engage the threat.
* The kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors and divert thrusters to
acquire, identify, and steer itself into the warhead. With a combined
closing speed on the order of 10 kilometers per second (22,000 miles
per hour), the warhead is destroyed through a "hit-to-kill" collision
with the kill vehicle.
To meet this challenge, DOD intends to develop and field a ballistic
missile defense system capable of defeating ballistic missiles during
all phases of flight (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Phases of a Ballistic Missile's Trajectory:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Under the evolutionary, capabilities-based acquisition strategy being
pursued by DOD, the BMDS has no fixed design or final architecture, and
there are no firm requirements. According to DOD, this approach gives
MDA increased flexibility to develop a system that can more readily
respond to a changing threat and more easily insert new technologies
for enhancing system performance.
The missile defense capability of Block 2004 is primarily one for
defending the United States against ICBM attacks from Northeast Asia
and the Middle East. It is built around the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) element, augmented by shipboard Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (Aegis BMD) radars, and integrated by the Command, Control,
Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) element. The Block 2004
BMDS also includes the Army's Patriot element for point defense of
deployed U.S. forces against short-and medium-range ballistic missiles.
The Block 2006 program builds directly upon Block 2004. It continues
element development and funds the next increment of fielding that adds
interceptors, new radars, and enhanced battle management capabilities.
MDA is also carrying out an extensive research and development effort
to expand its current operational capability into future blocks. During
fiscal year 2004, MDA funded the development of four other major BMDS
elements--Airborne Laser (ABL), Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI),
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)--in addition to those elements comprising
the Block 2004 defensive capability. MDA intends to integrate these
elements, when ready, into future BMDS blocks. Table 1 provides a brief
description of these elements, and more information about them is
provided in appendixes II through VIII of this report.[Footnote 8]
Table 1: BMDS Elements:
Element: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense;
Missile defense role: Aegis BMD is a ship-based system designed to
destroy short-and medium-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse
phase of flight. Its mission is two-fold: to protect deployed U.S.
forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missile attacks, and to
serve as a forward-deployed BMDS sensor, especially in support of the
GMD mission. MDA has plans to deliver up to 66 Aegis BMD missiles--the
Standard Missile 3--and 18 ships by the end of fiscal year 2009.
Element: Airborne Laser;
Missile defense role: ABL is an air-based system designed to destroy
all classes of ballistic missiles during the boost phase of flight. ABL
employs a high-energy chemical laser to rupture a missile's motor
casing, causing the missile to lose thrust or flight control. MDA plans
to demonstrate proof of concept in a system demonstration no earlier
than 2008. The availability of a militarily useful capability is
contingent on the success of the demonstration.
Element: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications;
Missile defense role: C2BMC is the integrating and controlling element
of the BMDS. Although it is part of the Block 2004 defensive
capability, its role during this period is limited to mission planning
and situational awareness--monitoring system status and missile
trajectories.
Element: Ground-based Midcourse Defense;
Missile defense role: GMD is a ground-based system designed to destroy
ICBMs during the midcourse phase of flight. Its mission is to protect
the U.S. homeland against ballistic missile attacks from Northeast Asia
and the Middle East. GMD is part of the Block 2004 defensive capability
and has plans to field 18 interceptors by 2005. MDA plans to field 20
additional interceptors in Alaska by 2010.
Element: Kinetic Energy Interceptors;
Missile defense role: KEI is a land-based element designed to destroy
ICBMs during the boost and ascent phases of flight. MDA expects to
demonstrate a defensive capability through flight testing during Block
2012 and expand this capability to sea basing in subsequent blocks.
Element: Space Tracking and Surveillance System;
Missile defense role: The Block 2006 STSS element consists of a
constellation of two demonstration satellites. MDA intends to use these
satellites for testing missile warning and tracking capabilities. Any
real operational capability of next-generation satellites, however,
will not be available until the next decade.
Element: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense;
Missile defense role: THAAD is a ground-based element designed to
destroy short-and medium-range ballistic missiles during the late-
midcourse and terminal phases of flight. Its mission is to defend
deployed U.S. forces and population centers. MDA plans to field a Block
2006/2008 unit consisting of 24 missiles in 2009.
[End of table]
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
As part of MDA's planning process, MDA defines overarching program
goals for the development and fielding of BMDS block configurations.
The goals describe the composition of a block (components and elements
under development and planned for fielding), provide the costs and
schedules associated with element development and fielding, and
summarize performance capabilities at the component and system
levels.[Footnote 9] A block's cost goal is the portion of MDA's budget
dedicated to development and fielding activities associated with the
block.
MDA has established Block 2004 and 2006 "Development Goals" for the
continued development and testing of six BMDS elements--ABL, Aegis BMD,
C2BMC, GMD, STSS, and THAAD--and stand-alone components such as forward-
deployed radars.[Footnote 10] These goals identify the developmental
areas MDA is funding as part of the Block 2004 and 2006 programs. The
associated cost goals, which are the planned budgets for these
activities, are approximately $5.7 billion and $12.2 billion for Block
2004 and 2006, respectively.
MDA also established a complementary set of goals--referred to as
"Fielded Configuration" Goals[Footnote 11]--in response to the
President's December 2002 direction to begin fielding a limited
ballistic missile defense capability. The fielding goals build directly
upon the Development Goals but aim to deliver an operational missile
defense capability during a given block's time frame. For example,
Block 2004 goals identify the components of the BMDS available for
defensive operations by the end of December 2005. MDA states that the
cost goals associated with the Block 2004 and 2006 fieldings are $1.7
billion and $3.8 billion, respectively. Therefore, the total cost goals
for Block 2004 and 2006 are $7.4 billion and $16.0 billion,
respectively.
Figure 2 depicts MDA's total budget between fiscal years 2005 and 2011
broken out by block.[Footnote 12] As illustrated, funding for a given
block spans more than the 2-year period. For example, MDA estimates it
will need about $12.0 billion to fund Block 2008 activities over the
next 7 years through 2011.
Figure 2: Breakout of MDA Budget:
[See PDF for image]
Note: MDA's total budget for a given fiscal year is represented by the
expenditures for all block activities plus mission area investments.
For example, MDA's fiscal year 2005 budget of $8.806 billion is
comprised of $1.605 billion for mission area investments, $2.854
billion for Block 2004 activities, $3.216 billion for Block 2006
activities, $817 million for Block 2008 activities, $48 million for
Block 2010 activities, and $267 million for Block 2012 activities.
[End of figure]
Many activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various element
programs pertain to the completion of the LDO capability--the initial
capability fielded by MDA. Although LDO is not formally listed by MDA
as a Block 2004 goal, it does include the delivery of a capability on
the path to meeting the fielding goals. Table 2 summarizes MDA's
fielding goals.
Table 2: MDA Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Goals:
BMDS element: GMD;
Functionality: Defend the U.S. homeland against ICBM attacks;
LDO (Sept. 30, 2004):
* 5 Interceptors;
* Upgraded Cobra Dane radar;
* 1 Upgraded early warning radar (Beale);
* Fire control nodes;
Block 2004 (Dec. 31, 2005):
* 20 Interceptors;
* Upgraded Cobra Dane radar;
* 2 Upgraded early warning radars (Beale, Fylingdales);
* Sea-based X-band radar;
* Fire control nodes.
BMDS element: Aegis BMD;
Functionality: Sea-based engagement capability against short-and medium-
range ballistic missiles; early tracking of ICBMs as a BMDS sensor;
LDO (Sept. 30, 2004):
* 3 Aegis destroyers (long-range surveillance and tracking only);
Block 2004 (Dec. 31, 2005):
* Up to 9 missiles;
* 10 Aegis destroyers (long-range surveillance & tracking only);
* 3 Aegis cruisers (engagement).
BMDS element: C2BMC;
Functionality: Integrating element of the BMDS; situational awareness;
mission planning;
LDO (Sept. 30, 2004):
* Software Build 4.3;
* Suites (command centers) and supporting hardware at various
locations;
Block 2004 (Dec. 31, 2005):
* Software Build 4.5;
* Suites (command centers) and supporting hardware at various
locations.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
Note: Performance goals are not presented in this report because they
are classified.
[End of table]
Assessment of Scheduled Activities in Fiscal Year 2004:
The GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC programs completed scheduled activities
in fiscal year 2004 necessary to support the fielding of LDO, an
integral part of Block 2004. Most notably, the GMD program completed
construction activities at GMD sites, delivered and emplaced five GMD
interceptors in their silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and completed the
upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar. The Aegis BMD program upgraded three
destroyers for the long-range surveillance and tracking mission that
supports homeland defense against ICBMs. In addition, the C2BMC program
completed software development, activated control centers, and worked
to integrate elements of the system.
These programs also continued developmental and fielding activities in
early fiscal year 2005 to enhance LDO so that the full Block 2004
capability could be realized by the end of calendar year 2005. For
example, the GMD program delivered a sixth interceptor at Fort Greely
in October and two interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
December, completed the upgrade of the Beale early warning radar, and
initiated the upgrade of the Fylingdales early warning radar. In
addition, the Aegis BMD program completed the assembly of five missiles
and continued with software development in the upgrade of its cruisers
and destroyers. Similarly, the C2BMC program continued with software
development and testing leading to the final Block 2004 version.
Progress made toward achieving program goals relative to the fielding
of the LDO and Block 2004 capabilities is summarized in tables 3 and 4,
respectively. Detailed evaluations of activities completed in fiscal
year 2004 by all BMDS elements are given in appendices II through VIII
of this report.
Table 3: Progress toward Achieving LDO:
BMDS element: GMD;
Functionality: Defend the U.S. homeland against ICBM attacks from
Northeast Asia;
LDO (Sept. 30, 2004):
* 5 Interceptors;
* Upgraded Cobra Dane radar;
* 1 Upgraded early warning radar (Beale);
* Fire control nodes;
Progress assessment: The GMD program emplaced 5 interceptors at Fort
Greely, Alaska, by September 2004. Many site preparation activities,
including the construction of facilities and interceptor silos at Fort
Greely to prepare the system for LDO, were completed; The GMD program
completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island, Alaska.
The upgrades, which consist of hardware and software improvements,
enable the radar to more accurately track launched missiles for the
planning of intercept engagements; The upgrade of the early warning
radar at Beale Air Force Base, California, was completed in December
2004. Although radar hardware installation is complete, final software
installation and testing are ongoing with completion expected in the
middle of fiscal year 2005.
BMDS element: Aegis BMD;
Functionality: Early tracking of ICBMs as a BMDS sensor;
LDO (Sept. 30, 2004):
* 3 Aegis destroyers (long-range surveillance and tracking only);
Progress assessment: Aegis BMD will be used as a forward-deployed
sensor to provide surveillance and early tracking of long-range
ballistic missiles to support the GMD mission. This is being
accomplished through the improvement of Aegis BMD software and
hardware. The Aegis BMD program office completed the upgrade of 2
destroyers for this role in September 2004; a third destroyer became
available in October 2004. All 3 destroyers are available for
operations.
BMDS element: C2BMC;
Functionality: Integrating element of the BMDS; situational awareness;
mission planning;
LDO (Sept. 30, 2004):
* Software Build 4.3;
* Suites (command centers) and supporting hardware at various
locations;
Progress assessment: The C2BMC program office completed activities
needed to ready the C2BMC element for LDO. Of significance, the LDO
"build" of C2BMC, known as spiral 4.3, was delivered and C2BMC suites
activated. The program also carried out a number of activities enabling
BMDS integration and warfighter training.
[End of table]
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
Table 4: Progress toward Achieving Block 2004 Fielded Configuration
Goals\:
BMDS element: GMD;
Functionality: Defend the U.S. homeland against ICBM attacks from
Northeast Asia and the Middle East;
Block 2004 (Dec. 31, 2005):
* 20 Interceptors;
* Upgraded Cobra Dane radar;
* 2 Upgraded early warning radars (Beale, Fylingdales);
* Sea-based X-band radar;
* Fire control nodes;
Progress assessment: The GMD program continued to add interceptors to
its inventory. As of December 2004, 6 interceptors are in silos at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The GMD
program aims to increase its inventory of interceptors for the Block
2004 defensive capability to 20 by December 2005. However, MDA
designated 2 interceptors as test assets. Therefore, the Block 2004 GMD
inventory will consist of 18 interceptors; The GMD program began
upgrading the early warning radar at Fylingdales Airbase in England.
Facility modifications are on track to be completed by the first
quarter of fiscal year 2006; The GMD program office completed a variety
of activities in the development of the sea-based X-band radar but
assesses its planned completion by the first quarter of fiscal year
2006 as high risk.
BMDS element: Aegis BMD;
Functionality: Sea-based engagement capability against short-and medium-
range ballistic missiles; early tracking of ICBMs as a BMDS sensor;
Block 2004 (Dec. 31, 2005):
* Up to 9 missiles;
* 10 Aegis destroyers (long-range surveillance & tracking only);
* 3 Aegis cruisers (engagement);
Progress assessment: As of December 2004, the Aegis BMD program
completed assembly of 5 missiles, which are available for fielding.
Program officials stated that the program expects to have available a
slightly smaller inventory of missiles by December 2005 than was
originally planned; The Aegis BMD program aims to increase to 10 by
December 2005 the number of upgraded destroyers providing surveillance
and early tracking of long-range ballistic missiles in support of the
GMD mission. As of January 2005, 5 had been upgraded; The Aegis BMD
program is also upgrading Aegis cruisers for the element's engagement
role; that is, to defend against short-and medium-range ballistic
missiles. This requires physical modification to the ships as well as
software upgrades for the engagement role. As of December 2004, 1
cruiser--a ship dedicated to testing--has been upgraded. The program
expects to complete the upgrade of 1 additional cruiser (rather than 2)
by December 2005.
BMDS element: C2BMC;
Functionality: Integrating element of the BMDS; situational awareness;
mission planning;
Block 2004 (Dec. 31, 2005):
* Software Build 4.5;
* Suites (command centers) and supporting hardware at various
locations;
Progress assessment: The C2BMC program office continued with activities
needed to ready the C2BMC element for the full Block 2004 capability.
In particular, development of the interim build, spiral 4.4, was
completed in November 2004. The program office anticipates that
development of the final Block 2004 build, spiral 4.5, will be
completed in March 2005, after which testing will begin.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
DOD did not activate the LDO capability MDA developed and fielded.
Although the LDO capability was expected to be placed on alert by the
end of September 2004, officials from the office of the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) told us that September 30, 2004,
was a planning date rather than a "hard date." The officials indicated
that the system had not been put on alert for the following reasons:
* Shakedown. Since October 2004, the system has been undergoing a
"shakedown"--a necessary transition phase between development and
operations. During this time, the system is exercised as though an
attack is under way. It enables the warfighter to become familiar with
the system and, importantly, to plan for unexpected failures.
* Training. While initial training of operators has been completed,
more is needed. For weapon systems in general, the warfighter does not
have a military capability without trained operators, and training
cannot begin until a weapon system is delivered (or at least far along
in development).
* Policy. USSTRATCOM must receive an Execution Order from the Secretary
of Defense before the LDO capability is declared operational. This
order, which would reflect DOD policy, is to include a clear
identification of command and control relationships. USSTRATCOM plans
to advise the Secretary of Defense on the military utility of the
system and could advise against declaring the system operational if,
for example, more testing were needed to increase the command's
confidence in the system's effectiveness. Also, the concept of
operations (CONOPS) was not finalized, and issues such as the
integration of defensive and offensive operations still had to be
worked out.
USSTRATCOM officials further explained that the declaration of LDO may
or may not mean the system is "on alert" for defensive operations--LDO
operation is more complicated than "being on" or "being off" alert. For
example, the system could be in "developmental mode" when operated by
MDA for testing but capable of being transitioned to an "operational
mode" for defensive operations given sufficient time.[Footnote 13] As
of March 2005, DOD had not announced a specific date for activating the
initial missile defense capability.
Assessment of Testing in Fiscal Year 2004:
MDA completed a number of ground tests and exercises in fiscal year
2004, but key flight tests using LDO-configured components were
delayed. For example, MDA verified integration and connectivity between
its GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC elements, and the warfighter participated
in several missile defense exercises (wargames) as part of their
training to understand and operate the system. However, the GMD program
office conducted two booster tests (non-intercept attempts) in fiscal
year 2004 even though six flight tests were planned. As a result, GMD
interceptors were emplaced in silos before flight testing was completed
to verify that LDO hardware and software could function in an
operational environment.
Significant Testing Was Completed:
A summary of significant testing completed during fiscal year 2004 by
each of the respective element programs is presented in table 5. More
thorough discussions of element testing are given in appendices II
through VIII of this report.
Table 5: Status of Element Testing--Planned and Achieved:
Element: Aegis BMD;
Key testing accomplished: The Aegis BMD program conducted Flight
Mission 6 (FM-6) in December 2003, during which an SM-3 missile
successfully intercepted a short-range ballistic missile target. In
addition, the Aegis BMD element participated in non-intercept test
events to assess the element's long-range tracking and surveillance
(LRS&T) function--that is, using its shipboard SPY-1 radar to track
long-range ballistic missiles--and to verify connectivity with the
BMDS, that is, pass track data to the C2BMC and GMD elements; The
program also conducted a series of ground tests focused on validating
design updates to its Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS)-
-a collection of solid-fuel thrusters used to steer the kinetic warhead
(kill vehicle) into its designated target. In response to a flight test
failure in 2003, the program modified the design of this subcomponent
to improve its performance and reliability during high-energy pulse
operation.
Element: ABL;
Key testing accomplished: The ABL program demonstrated "First Light"--
the combined operation of individual laser modules to generate a single
laser beam--in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 (Nov. 2004).
Although the achievement of "First Light" is a key milestone for the
program, it was not intended to be an operational demonstration of a
high-power laser, that is, at full power and for the length of time
needed to shoot down a boosting missile. Rather, the laser's operation
for a fraction of a second demonstrated successful integration of
subsystems; The ABL program also completed "First Flight" in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 (Dec. 2004). Also a key milestone for the
program, "First Flight" demonstrated the flight worthiness of the
demonstrator aircraft with its newly installed laser beam control
system.
Element: C2BMC;
Key testing accomplished: The C2BMC program conducted system-level
testing of its LDO software, spiral 4.3, during fiscal year 2004 and
into fiscal year 2005. Spiral 4.3 was tested in a number of venues,
including Pacific Explorer III,[A] Glory Trip 185,b a GMD-focused
System Integration and Checkout,c and wargames that enabled the
warfighter to exercise the C2BMC in a simulated operational
environment.
Element: GMD;
Key testing accomplished: During fiscal year 2004, the GMD program
conducted two non-intercept flight tests--one for each of its Lockheed
and Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) boosters. Booster objectives
were achieved in both flight tests, however, the mock kill vehicle
failed to deploy from the Lockheed booster. The Lockheed booster test
was conducted 11 months late because of problems with a propellant
vendor. The OSC booster test was conducted 6 months late; GMD conducted
a series of integrated ground tests in fiscal year 2004. These tests
employed actual GMD-component processors integrated together in a
hardware-in-the-loop facility that emulated GMD operation in a
simulated environment. They also included warfighter participation to
aid in the development of operational concepts; Finally, the GMD
program performed a series of System Integration and Checkouts[C] of
its fielded components. While these checkouts did not assess element
performance, they demonstrated connectivity, functionality, and
integration as part of final preparations for defensive operations.
Element: KEI;
Key testing accomplished: The KEI program initiated element development
in December 2003 when MDA selected Northrop Grumman as the prime
contractor. At this early stage of development, no significant testing
has been conducted by the program office; Because of the need to
restructure the prime contract in response to reduced funding, KEI's
first integrated flight test is planned for no earlier than 2010,
depending on the outcome of the program's re-planning.
Element: STSS;
Key testing accomplished: MDA is currently working on the first
increment of STSS, which is focused on the preparation and launch of
two demonstration satellites partially built under the former Space
Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch these satellites
in 2007. At that time, testing will be conducted to assess how well the
satellites perform surveillance and tracking functions.
Element: THAAD;
Key testing accomplished: The THAAD flight-test program consists of 15
flight-test events divided among Blocks 2006 and 2008. Because of
delays in booster deliveries arising from the need for a new propellant
vendor, the first set of flight tests have been delayed 3-5 months. The
element's first test, a control test flight of the missile (non-
intercept attempt), is planned to be conducted in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2005, a two-quarter slip. The element's first intercept
attempt, Flight Test 4, is scheduled to be conducted during the second
quarter of fiscal year 2006, a two-quarter slip.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] Pacific Explorer exercises are field exercises to demonstrate BMDS
connectivity. An Aegis destroyer participates by tracking an actual
missile (or a simulated target) and passes track data to the C2BMC.
[B] Glory Trips are live flight tests during which a Minuteman III
missile is launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base as part of Follow-on
Test and Evaluation.
[C] System Integration and Checkouts are conducted by the GMD program
to verify connectivity, functionality, and integration of system
components. They are not used to assess system performance.
[End of table]
Delays and Cancellations of GMD Flight Tests Slow Attainment of
Knowledge:
The GMD program conducts integrated flight tests (IFT) to realistically
demonstrate element operation using actual hardware and software. MDA
planned to conduct several flight tests during fiscal year 2004 to gain
knowledge about the element's effectiveness and operation under real-
world conditions. However, only two of six flight tests scheduled to
occur in fiscal year 2004 were conducted. As noted in table 5, these
were non-intercept tests of the Lockheed and OSC boosters. A second
Lockheed booster test (IFT-13A) was deferred indefinitely; two
intercept attempts utilizing LDO-configured hardware and software (IFT-
14 and -15) were either delayed or cancelled; and, IFT-13C, the first
flight test in 2 years with the potential for an intercept,[Footnote
14] was delayed 9 months. When IFT-13C was conducted in December 2004,
the interceptor failed to launch, which precluded the fulfillment of
key test objectives associated with the LDO-configured interceptor.
IFT-13C was of particular significance because it was to have
demonstrated operational aspects of the LDO capability for the first
time in a flight test environment. For example:
* IFT-13C was the first flight test to utilize LDO hardware and
software. Previous intercept attempts employed a surrogate booster and
an earlier configuration of the kill vehicle. In particular, IFT-13C
was to have launched a GMD interceptor comprised of the operational
kill vehicle mated to an OSC booster.
* IFT-13C offered the opportunity to exercise Aegis BMD tracking and
connectivity in a manner consistent with an actual defensive mission,
that is, to demonstrate Aegis BMD's ability to serve as a fire-control
radar[Footnote 15] for ICBM engagements. However, because weather
exceeded peacetime operational safety limits, Navy commanders withdrew
Aegis BMD participation from IFT-13C; the program office concurred with
the decision.
The delay of IFT-13C by 9 months demonstrates that MDA is responsibly
following an event-driven test program, that is, conducting tests only
when ready. IFT-13C was delayed more than once to correct technical
problems with the interceptor and to upgrade the test interceptor to a
configuration that matches the ones deployed. However, the event-driven
approach was not carried over into fielding. Eight GMD interceptors
were in their silos by the end of December 2004 before flight testing
was completed to verify that LDO hardware and software could function
in an operational environment. If future flight testing identifies
problems with the interceptor, MDA could incur added costs to recall
and update fielded assets.
Aegis BMD Conducted Limited Testing of Its Long-Range Surveillance and
Tracking Capability:
In anticipation of fielding for LDO, the Aegis BMD flight test program
focused on long-range surveillance and tracking--that is, to operate
the element as a forward-deployed BMDS sensor--in support of the GMD
mission. To this end, by October 2004, the Aegis BMD program completed
software development and upgraded three Aegis destroyers for this role;
they are available for operations. However, the surveillance and
tracking function has only been partially demonstrated. For example:
* Aegis BMD participated in Glory Trip 185, during which an Aegis
destroyer successfully tracked a Minuteman III ICBM launched from
Vandenberg Air Force Base. However, the test did not exercise Aegis BMD
tracking and connectivity in a manner needed for an actual defensive
mission, that is, as an integral part of the system during which the
destroyer acts as a fire control radar. In addition, the software
tested was not the version installed on fielded destroyers.
* During the Pacific Explorer II field exercise, a destroyer in the Sea
of Japan successfully passed track data of a simulated target, thereby
demonstrating connectivity with the BMDS. In Pacific Explorer III, an
Aegis destroyer planned to track an actual missile and pass track data
to the BMDS. Although the destroyer tracked the live target missile, a
malfunction with the target limited the amount of data collected by the
Aegis destroyer. Specifically, the target ended its flight before Aegis
BMD could send the GMD element all of the information needed for
engaging the target.
* Finally, delays in the GMD flight test program precluded Aegis BMD
from participating in two planned integrated flight tests, IFT-13C and
IFT-14, during fiscal year 2004. Without these tests, MDA has not
verified that the element's long-range surveillance and tracking
capability will perform as desired in an actual defensive mission.
MDA Mandated to Conduct Operationally Realistic Testing:
The 2005 Defense Authorization Act, section 234, directed DOD to
conduct an operationally realistic test of the BMDS by October 1, 2005,
and required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),[Footnote 16] to
prescribe appropriate test objectives. Such a test is expected to
exercise the LDO and Block 2004 configuration in a more realistic
manner. Officials from the office of DOT&E told us that the test would
be derived from an existing flight test with objectives focused more on
operational than developmental aspects.
DOT&E recently approved the operational test portion of MDA's
Integrated Master Test Plan. The Integrated Master Test Plan
establishes the framework for BMDS ground and flight testing through
Block 2006. It is an overarching document that defines the test plans
for the BMDS and its elements, identifies operational test objectives
to support continuous characterization of demonstrated operational
capability, and identifies associated test resources.
Assessment of System Performance in Fiscal Year 2004:
MDA has conducted various ground and flight tests that provide some
degree of confidence that the LDO capability--consisting of the GMD
element, Aegis BMD destroyers for surveillance and tracking, and C2BMC
for command and control--will operate as intended. In addition, MDA
predicts that the LDO capability, although limited in inventory, will
be effective[Footnote 17] in providing some protection of the United
States against ICBM attacks from Northeast Asia. However, the agency
has not verified that the LDO capability can operate as an integrated
system without range-test limitations and artificialities (for example,
using surrogate components to emulate missile defense functions), and
operational testers within DOD state that there is not enough data to
accurately characterize system performance.
Assessment of LDO Effectiveness Subject to Interpretation:
MDA and DOT&E differ on derived estimates of LDO effectiveness. Both
offices employed similar methodologies--that is, they identified
critical functions needed to carryout a BMD engagement, estimated the
probability of success for each function, and combined results into a
"probability chain" to calculate a total probability of success for a
given scenario. However, the assessments made by MDA and DOT&E differ
in that they are based on different types and sources of information.
MDA's assessment is based on the output from BMDS-level simulations
using data derived from a variety of sources, including design
specifications and output from high-fidelity simulations of various
components (such as radars and interceptors). By employing digital
simulations, estimates of system effectiveness are obtained over a wide
range of conditions, scenarios, and system architectures. These
simulations are anchored by data collected during flight testing so
that their underlying models are reflective of real-world operation.
DOT&E generated its estimates of system effectiveness by also
approximating each factor of the "probability chain," but it relied on
historical data and results from recent ground and flight tests. Based
on this methodology, DOT&E concluded that there is not enough test data
to accurately characterize system effectiveness--that is, the estimates
are too uncertain to make definitive conclusions. In commenting on
MDA's methodology, DOT&E officials made the following points:
* MDA's computer-based assessments are appropriate for a developmental
program, but there could be difficulty in interpreting results for
operational considerations.
* A noteworthy limitation of MDA's assessment is the lack of system-
level performance data. Although its models provide a good
representation of the system being built, fundamentally they are not
predictive of actual system performance.
The uncertainty in LDO effectiveness has a direct impact on how the
warfighter operates the system. As noted by officials from USSTRATCOM,
the uncertainty limits the warfighter's ability to formulate tactics
and procedures in operating the system, especially with limited
inventory.
In addition, knowledge of component performance can play a useful role
in fielding decisions by assisting decision makers in determining
whether the capability available at the time warrants the cost of
fielding, operating, and sustaining the system, or whether additional
investment and development to enhance the capability are needed.
Integrated Operation of LDO Capability Remains Unverified:
MDA has conducted a variety of tests that provide some degree of
confidence that the LDO capability will operate as intended. For
example, since 1999, the GMD program has conducted eight flight tests
(intercept attempts)[Footnote 18] that emulated system operation
against ICBM attacks. In addition, based on MDA documentation, the
various functions of the BMD engagement--such as launch detection,
tracking, interceptor launch, and intercept--have been demonstrated in
a variety of venues, including simulations, ground tests, and flight
tests. Technical indicators monitored by GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC show
that the elements' various components are on track to function as
expected during a BMD engagement. For example, the Aegis BMD program
projects that the Aegis SPY-1 radar is able to deliver adequate
performance in support of the GMD mission. Furthermore, based on past
flight tests, MDA states that discrimination performance of the GMD
kill vehicle is adequate to meet system-level objectives relative to
the Block 2004 threat.
However, collectively, these accomplishments do not verify integrated
system operation of the LDO capability because of inherent limitations
and artificialities. An end-to-end test of system operation--beginning
with launch detection and ending with intercept confirmation--should
incorporate operational test objectives such as test realism, lack of
scripting, and the utilization of production-representative hardware.
Although MDA has progressed in demonstrating such objectives in a
ground-test setting, they have yet to be demonstrated in end-to-end
flight tests. As we reported in February 2004,[Footnote 19] GMD flight
tests to date have demonstrated basic functionality of a representative
missile defense system using surrogate and prototype components. In
addition, they have shown success in intercepting a mock reentry
vehicle in a developmental test environment. However, as developmental
tests, they were scripted, did not use production-representative
hardware and software, and required the placement of a C-band
transponder[Footnote 20] on the target reentry vehicle. The transponder
was essential for the execution of the flight tests--no ground radar of
sufficient accuracy for guiding the interceptor to the intercept point
was available.
Although MDA has conducted many tests to exercise separate functions of
the BMD mission, component-level testing in preparation for LDO has
been incomplete. For example, MDA conducted wargames that enabled the
warfighter to exercise the C2BMC in a simulated operational environment
to gain insight in and provide feedback on C2BMC capabilities. Also,
GMD radars and Aegis BMD destroyers took advantage of other DOD
missions[Footnote 21] that enabled these elements to exercise radar and
battle management operations. However, some components have not been
fully tested:
* The Cobra Dane radar is located at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya,
Alaska, at the western end of the Aleutian chain. Its close proximity
to Russia allows it to perform its primary mission of collecting data
on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched into the
Kamchatka impact area. In fiscal year 2004, the GMD program completed
hardware installation and software upgrades to the Cobra Dane radar. To
test these upgrades, Cobra Dane tracked a foreign missile launch and
participated in an integrated ground test. However, the upgraded Cobra
Dane radar has not participated in a flight test event as the primary
fire control radar--a role it would need to fill in the event of a real
threat. MDA may conduct a test during the third quarter of fiscal year
2005 using a long-range air-launched target to demonstrate the upgraded
Cobra Dane under more operationally realistic conditions.
* Aegis destroyers upgraded for the long-range surveillance and
tracking capability have not been exercised in a manner consistent with
an actual defensive mission. That is, the Aegis BMD element has not
provided track data of a target, in real time, for use in planning a
BMD mission against a target ICBM. Aegis BMD will first participate in
a GMD flight test in this role in fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 22]
Despite this concern, DOT&E officials believe that Aegis BMD can
adequately perform its detection and tracking functions.
Assessment of System Cost in Fiscal Year 2004:
We used contractor Cost Performance Reports in combination with Earned
Value Management (EVM)[Footnote 23] analysis to assess progress made by
the various element prime contractors toward MDA's cost and schedule
goals during fiscal year 2004. The government routinely uses such
reports to independently evaluate these aspects of the prime
contractors' performance. Generally, the reports detail deviations in
cost and schedule relative to expectations established under the
contract. Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive
variances are generally associated with the accomplishment of
activities under cost or ahead of schedule, while negative variances
are often associated with the accomplishment of activities over cost or
behind schedule. Cost Performance Reports provide program mangers and
others with information on a contractor's ability to perform work
within estimated cost and schedule. When reports show that the
contractor is encountering problems that cause cost growth, program
officials can then take actions to prevent further growth.
We assessed MDA fiscal year 2004 cost performance by reviewing the cost
performance of each system element, which, in turn, is based on the
cost performance of its element prime contractor. We used this
methodology because a large percentage of MDA's budget is allocated to
prime contractors that develop the various BMDS elements. As summarized
in table 6, prime contractors responsible for developing three of the
seven BMDS elements we reviewed--C2BMC, KEI, and THAAD--completed their
fiscal year 2004 work at or near budgeted costs. Activities cost more
than budgeted for the ABL, GMD, and the STSS elements by $114 million,
$220 million, and $35 million, respectively. Also, our analysis of cost
and schedule performance for the entire Aegis BMD element could not be
conducted, because Cost Performance Reports for the Standard Missile 3
contract were not issued until September 2004. Our detailed findings
are presented in appendices II through VIII of this report.
Table 6: Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance in Fiscal Year
2004:
Dollars in millions.
BMDS element: ABL;
Cost variance: ($114.4);
Schedule variance[A]: ($47.6);
Percent of contract completed: N/A[B];
Comments: Variances reflect cumulative prime contractor cost and
schedule performance for the first half of fiscal year 2004--October
2003 through March 2004. Program officials indicated that hardware
delivery delays, design problems, and integration issues were the
primary drivers of the cost variances. After this time, the program was
restructured and the prime contract rebaselined. Program officials
directed the contractor to suspend normal contractor performance
reporting between April and July 2004, during which the contractor
expended $129 million. During this time, the contractor provided
forecasts of expenditures to the program. The contractor resumed normal
cost performance reporting in August 2004. As of September 2004, the
contractor was performing work under budget but slightly behind
schedule; As part of the restructuring, the prime contract's cost
increased by $1.5 billion and its term extended over 3 years to
accomplish the objective of developing a prototype aircraft. In total,
ABL prime contract costs have increased from $1.0 billion at the time
of contract award in 1996 to $3.6 billion in 2004.
BMDS element: Aegis BMD;
Cost variance: $3.5;
Schedule variance[A]: ($2.0);
Percent of contract completed: 43%;
Comments: The Aegis BMD element has two prime contracts: the Aegis
Weapon System contract, consisting of software and hardware upgrades of
existing Navy cruisers and destroyers to make them BMD capable; and the
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) contract for the development of the element's
missile. Both were awarded in the second half of 2003. Variances shown
are of the Aegis Weapon System contract only, which shows that the
contractor completed fiscal year 2004 work under budget. The contractor
who develops the SM-3 missile began reporting cost and schedule
performance in the last month of fiscal year 2004; therefore, this
contractor's cost and schedule performance for the year is not
reported.
BMDS element: C2BMC[C];
Cost variance: ($3.6);
Schedule variance[A]: ($5.7);
Percent of contract completed: 100% (Part 2); 31% (Part 3);
Comments: Overall, the prime contractor is under budget. But when
considering performance in fiscal year 2004 alone, the contractor
performed work slightly over budget and behind schedule. The declining
performance is largely attributed to issues pertaining to algorithm
development and site integration.
BMDS element: GMD;
Cost variance: ($219.6);
Schedule variance[A]: ($59.9);
Percent of contract completed: 69%;
Comments: Developmental issues with the GMD interceptor--booster and
kill vehicle--remain the leading cause of negative cost and schedule
variances. In fiscal year 2004, interceptor-related work cost $204
million more than budgeted, of which the kill vehicle accounted for 40
percent of the variance. Flight test delays also contributed to
unfavorable cost and schedule performance.
BMDS element: KEI;
Cost variance: $0.04;
Schedule variance[A]: ($1.6);
Percent of contract completed: 1%;
Comments: The KEI prime contractor performed work in fiscal year 2004
near its budgeted costs. Program officials indicated that the slightly
unfavorable schedule variance was the result of the contractor delaying
activities so that it could conduct trade studies on new requirements
imposed by MDA; Because of plans to restructure the KEI program--to
defer the land-based capability from Block 2010 to Block 2012--the long-
term performance measurement baseline[D] is no longer relevant. In
August 2004, the program suspended contractor cost and schedule
performance reporting until a reliable baseline to reflect the full
extent of the program's restructure became available. The contractor is
reporting actual costs until program restructure efforts are complete.
BMDS element: STSS;
Cost variance: ($34.6);
Schedule variance[A]: ($20.7)[E];
Percent of contract completed: 29%;
Comments: Prime contract cost and schedule performance eroded
throughout fiscal year 2004. The erosion in cost performance was
largely attributed to cost overruns by a subcontractor who had a number
of quality and systems-engineering problems. Delays in software and
hardware deliveries were the major causes for the unfavorable schedule
variance. Despite these issues, the program office maintains that the
prime contractor is expected to complete the contract early and with
minimal cost overruns.
BMDS element: THAAD;
Cost variance: $0.7;
Schedule variance[A]: $8.1;
Percent of contract completed: 61%;
Comments: Overall, the prime contractor is under budget and ahead of
schedule. However, the contractor's favorable cost and schedule
performance eroded somewhat during the second half of fiscal year 2004.
The declining performance was largely driven by issues in missile
development. Specifically, two explosions at a subcontractor's
propellant mixing facility resulted in the need to find a new vendor.
Sources: Contractors (data); GAO (analysis).
Note: Negative variances are shown with parentheses around the dollar
amounts.
[A] Schedule variance represents the value of planned work by which the
prime contractor is behind schedule.
[B] As of March 2004, the program completed 88 percent of the contract
under the former contract structure. However, because the prime
contract was extended over 3 years, this figure is no longer accurate.
[C] C2BMC development is being carried out through a contractual
vehicle known as an Other Transaction Agreement, which functions much
like a prime contract. Values reflect the combined variances incurred
during fiscal year 2004 by parts 2 and 3 of the C2BMC contract.
[D] A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work
tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each
work task, schedules the work tasks in accordance with established
targets, and allocates budget to the scheduled work.
[E] The contractor implemented a performance measurement baseline that
reflects a 6-month accelerated schedule. This means the contractor
might be performing work on schedule, allowing it to complete all the
work by the end of the contract, but schedule performance data would
show otherwise.
[End of table]
Negative Cost Variances Incurred by ABL, GMD, and STSS Prime
Contractors:
ABL incurred a negative cost variance of $114 million during the first
half of fiscal year 2004, before the program was restructured to make
its cost and schedule targets more realistic. This variance stemmed
primarily from two sources. First, the program encountered
unanticipated complexity in manufacturing and in integrating advanced
optics and laser components for the prototype system. Second, the push
to rapidly develop the prototype aircraft caused the program to limit
testing of subcomponents, which, in turn, generated rework and modified
requirements. To address the negative variance for ABL, program
officials told us that they redirected funds originally earmarked for
other program efforts.
GMD incurred a negative cost variance of $220 million. The contractor
originally underestimated the cost of readying the element for LDO and
experienced unexpected problems requiring some rework of its kill
vehicle. Additionally, in response to explosions at a subcontractor's
propellant mixing facility, the program incurred cost to transition
operations to a new vendor. To address its negative cost variance for
GMD, MDA deferred some work planned for completion in fiscal year 2004
into fiscal year 2005, and, to cover these increased costs, requested
and received additional money in its fiscal year 2005 budget. MDA also
directed other programs within the agency, such as Test and Evaluation,
to pick up GMD's portion of the cost of work tasks that benefited both
programs. Employing established EVM analysis techniques, we estimate
that the GMD contract--which ends in September 2007--will overrun its
budget by between $593 million and $950 million at its completion
assuming no corrective actions are taken.
The negative STSS cost variance was largely attributed to a
subcontractor who had a number of quality and systems-engineering
problems in developing the payload--sensors and supporting subsystems-
-onboard the two STSS demonstration satellites. The program office
maintains that there is enough management reserve to cover the overrun
at the end of the contract, assuming that the reserve is not used for
other purposes before then.
Lack of Cost Performance Data for ABL, Aegis BMD, and KEI Elements
Prevented Full Assessment:
ABL program officials' insight of their prime contractor's cost and
schedule performance between April and July 2004 was somewhat limited.
During this time, program officials directed the contractor to suspend
normal cost performance reporting while they restructured the ABL prime
contract to make its target cost and schedule more realistic. In lieu
of providing normal Cost Performance Reports, the contractor provided
the program office with monthly forecast expenditure plans, detailed
work activities, and the number of staff needed to complete planned
tasks. The program office relied on these metrics to determine the
program's status and to provide insight into the contractor's cost and
schedule performance. In the 5 months since cost reporting resumed, the
cost and schedule variance has been relatively stable.
We could not fully assess cost performance for the Aegis BMD program in
fiscal year 2004. The prime contractor developing the SM-3 missile did
not generate Cost Performance Reports until September 2004, even though
the prime contract was awarded in August 2003. Program officials told
us that, instead, they monitored contractor performance through monthly
management and business meetings where cost performance, milestones,
and future performance were reviewed. Program officials indicated that
the delay in issuing Cost Performance Reports stemmed from the late
establishment of the contract's performance management baseline. It was
established 7 months after contract award because of the need for the
program office to react to funding issues. In addition, the program
suspended contractor cost and schedule performance reporting until
after the Aegis BMD program office completed an integrated baseline
review[Footnote 24] 5 months later.
KEI program officials also had reduced insight into its prime
contractor's work efforts for a portion of fiscal year 2004. After
contract award in December 2003, the prime contractor began submitting
Cost Performance Reports in May 2004. Program officials suspended cost
performance reporting after August 2004 because of the need to
restructure the prime contract in response to reduced funding. Program
officials told us that the contractor will resume reporting in 2005
after a reliable baseline that reflects the full extent of the
program's restructure is available.
Funding Risks Expected to Increase for Ballistic Missile Defense
Program:
A number of factors portend an increasing level of funding risk for the
ballistic missile defense program in the years ahead. Based on DOD's
Future Years Defense Plan for fiscal years 2006-2011, MDA plans to
request, on average, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E) funding of about $10 billion annually. This funding supports
continued development, procurement, and sustainment of hardware and
software that MDA is fielding.[Footnote 25] However, sources outside
and within DOD are expected to put pressure on MDA's share of research
and development dollars.
One factor for the increasing pressure is that DOD's acquisition
programs such as ballistic missile defense are likely to be competing
for a decreasing share of the federal budget. These programs are
categorized as "discretionary spending" as opposed to "mandatory
spending," such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. In fiscal
year 2004, discretionary spending accounted for about 39 percent of the
federal budget. The Congressional Budget Office projects that
discretionary spending is likely to decrease to 36 percent of the
federal budget by fiscal year 2009 and to 32 percent in by fiscal year
2014.[Footnote 26]
A second factor is competing demands for funding within DOD. For
example, although missile defense is seen as a national priority and
has been funded nearly at requested levels in the past few years, MDA
is facing budget cuts. Indeed, DOD's Program Budget Direction of
December 2004 called for MDA to plan for a $5 billion reduction in
funding over fiscal years 2006-2011. In addition, MDA is receiving
about 13 percent of the $70 billion RDT&E budget in fiscal year 2005
but must continue to compete with hundreds of existing and planned
technology development and acquisition programs for RDT&E funding. Cost
growth of existing weapon programs puts additional pressure on MDA's
share. We found, for example, that RDT&E cost estimates grew $6.7
billion for the Joint Strike Fighter in calendar year 2003 and $9.2
billion for the Future Combat System in fiscal year 2004.
The third factor comes from within MDA itself. The agency continues to
respond to cost growth of ongoing programs to enhance the components
and elements of the BMDS. As noted above, ABL, GMD, and STSS incurred a
collective negative cost variance of approximately $370 million in
fiscal year 2004 and, as we reported last year, MDA elements incurred a
collective negative cost variance of about $380 million in fiscal year
2003.[Footnote 27] Unless MDA can mitigate these cost variances,
significant cost overruns could occur on these contracts in the future.
Estimating cost and schedule targets of new and complex technologies
can be difficult and, as demonstrated, are often underestimated.
Furthermore, hardware made available for operational purposes is not
being fully tested before being fielded. If the need arises to correct
problems identified in subsequent testing, removing and recalling this
hardware could prove costly.
A fourth factor for the increasing pressure on MDA's RDT&E budget is
that MDA is starting to field components of the BMDS, whose production,
operation, and sustainment are also funded by RDT&E dollars. A flat
RDT&E budget combined with growing fielding costs would result in a
decrease in investment in research and development--MDA's primary
mission. According to program documentation, MDA's budget for its
fielding activities between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 includes an
average of $1.76 billion per year for procuring BMDS assets and an
additional $400 million per year for sustaining the fielded capability.
However, the fielding costs can be expected to increase in the years to
come as more components of GMD, Aegis BMD, and THAAD are integrated
into the BMDS.
Operations and support (O&S) costs of fielded systems are generally
significant and can be expected to be substantial for operational
capabilities of the BMDS. In our 2003 report on total-ownership (life-
cycle) cost,[Footnote 28] we found that the cost to develop and procure
a weapon system usually represents about 28 percent of the weapon
system's life-cycle cost; O&S costs typically account for the remaining
72 percent of a weapon's systems total life-cycle cost. The only BMDS
element thus far with a life-cycle cost estimate, the Army's Patriot-
MEADS missile defense program, has comparable life-cycle cost
percentages. According to the Army's Lower-Tier Project Office, the
Patriot-MEADS development cost accounts for 6.4 percent, procurement
accounts for 21.2 percent, and O&S costs account for 72.4 percent of
the total life-cycle cost of $151 billion.
DOD officials cautioned us that estimating life-cycle costs of missile
defense capabilities involves considerable uncertainty. For example,
O&S costs depend on the state of readiness of the fielded system, which
is difficult to predict. In addition, historical data of component
reliability in the field and the cost to repair operational missile
defense assets are essentially nonexistent. Furthermore, life-cycle
cost estimates of standard DOD weapon systems assume O&S costs apply
for long periods of time, on the order of 20 years. Components of the
BMDS, however, might be in the field for shorter durations. Finally,
our previous work[Footnote 29] recognized that life-cycle cost
estimates for revolutionary systems such as the ABL program, which
utilize new technologies in unproven applications, are unknown. When
fielded, operation and support efforts for ABL could be substantial
because ABL will require unique support for its laser and beam-control
components and ground infrastructure for chemical storage, mixing, and
handling.[Footnote 30]
MDA Is Not Consistently Matching Cost and Fielding Goals:
In assessing the extent MDA achieved its stated goals in fiscal year
2004, we observed that MDA's cost goal for a given block is not
consistently aligned with that block's fielding goals. According to MDA
policy, for example, interceptors identified with the Block 2004
fielding goals and fielded during calendar years 2004-2005 should be
funded as part of the Block 2004 cost goal. As originally designed, the
block approach would provide MDA with the flexibility to deliver a
basic capability initially and enhance it during subsequent blocks to
respond to the changing threat and to insert new technologies for
enhanced performance. The block approach also would provide for
accountability, because MDA would identify for decision makers the
promised capabilities to be delivered by the end of each block for a
specified investment of funds.
In the following instances, however, we found that MDA has not been
consistently matching a block's cost and fielding goals thereby
obscuring the relationship between requested funding and delivered
capabilities:
* Funds accounted for in the Block 2004 cost goal are being used to
procure 32 Aegis BMD SM-3 missiles. Of these missiles, 11 will be
delivered in 2004-2005, and the remaining missiles will be delivered
during 2006-2007. Similarly, funds accounted for in the Block 2006 cost
goal are being used to procure 40 missiles. Of these missiles, 7 will
be delivered in 2006-2007, and the remaining delivered during 2008-
2009.
* The THAAD program is funding a "fire unit" as part of its Block 2006
program. Operated by the Army, it will consist of a radar, a battle
management unit, 3 launchers, 24 missiles, and equipment for support,
maintenance and training. Even though MDA refers to this fire unit as a
Block 2006 fielding, it will not be delivered until 2009 (i.e., during
Block 2008).[Footnote 31]
In addition, counter to the definition of a block as an integrated set
of capabilities fielded during the 2-year block window, the Airborne
Laser program will not field any capabilities during Block 2004
although Block 2004 funds are used in the program's development.
Rather, the ABL program is focused on developing a prototype aircraft
for use in a lethality demonstration--a flight test in which the ABL
aircraft will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile.
However, ABL's funding is broken out by block--2004, 2006, and 2008--
even though the program is developing a single configuration of the
element that will not be integrated into the BMDS earlier than Block
2008.
Conclusion:
MDA delivered much of what it planned in fiscal year 2004, and DOD is
on the verge of standing up an initial capability against long-range
ballistic missiles launched from Northeast Asia. Despite this success,
the performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified because
of recurrent test delays and failures. Also, Ground-based Midcourse
Defense developmental costs continue to increase and the Airborne Laser
program was restructured when it became clear that much more time and
money would be needed to develop and demonstrate a prototype aircraft.
Looking to the future, decision makers in Congress and DOD face billion
dollar investment decisions in allocating funds both within MDA's RDT&E
activities and between MDA and other DOD programs. In exercising their
funding and oversight responsibilities, these decision makers would
benefit from a consistent implementation of a block policy for which
delivered capability is aligned with tax dollars received.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To assist decision makers in Congress and DOD in exercising their
oversight of MDA's acquisition plans and in evaluating MDA's budget
requests, we recommend that the Director, MDA, clarify and modify, as
needed, its block policy to ensure that a block's cost and fielding
goals are consistently aligned.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD's comments on our draft report are reprinted in appendix I. DOD
concurred with our recommendation. Acknowledging our observations, the
Department noted that the policy for ballistic missile defense block
definitions should provide for consistent accounting of the various
features of each block. MDA is taking steps to clarify and modify the
block definitions for that purpose.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and to
the Director, MDA. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix XI.
Signed by:
Robert E. Levin:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
Mr. Robert E. Levin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
MAR 09 2005:
Dear Mr Levin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Status
of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004," dated February 3, 2005,
(GAO Code 120360/GAO-05-243). Our official comment is enclosed.
Technical comments to this report were provided separately.
Additionally, the Department is conducting a security review of the
draft report and will forward the results of the review as soon as it
is completed.
My point of contact for this effort is COL Dan Hughes, (703) 695-7329,
daniel.hughes@osd.mil. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the
draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO FINAL REPORT -DATED March, 2005 GAO CODE 120360/GAO-05-243:
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in
2004":
RECOMMENDATION 1: To assist decision makers in the Congress and DOD in
exercising their oversight of MDA's acquisition plans and in evaluating
MDA's budget requests, we recommend that the Director, MDA, clarify and
modify, as needed, its block policy to ensure that a block's cost and
fielding goals are consistently aligned. (P. 32/GAO Final Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur -The Department agrees that the policy for
ballistic missile defense block definitions should provide for
consistent accounting of the various features of each block. MDA is
taking steps to clarify and modify the block definitions for that
purpose.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) element is designed to
protect U.S deployed forces, friends, and allies from short-and medium-
range ballistic missile attacks. Additionally, its shipboard radar can
serve as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and early tracking
of long-range ballistic missiles in support of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission. To provide these capabilities, the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is upgrading existing Aegis Navy ships for
the BMD mission. MDA completed an initial surveillance and tracking
capability in fiscal year 2004 and plans to field an initial intercept
capability in April 2005.
DOD‘s planned investment in the Aegis BMD program from program
inception in 1996 through 2011 is approximately $10 billion. DOD
expended $3.67 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2004, Congress
appropriated $1.14 billion for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting
about $5.22 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for Aegis BMD
development, procurement, and operations.
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
The Aegis BMD program completed work planned for fiscal year 2004
generally on schedule and is largely on track to upgrade system
software and expand missile inventory for an enhanced capability by the
end of December 2005 (Block 2004). However, Aegis destroyers upgraded
for the long-range surveillance and tracking (LRS&T) mission had
limited opportunities to be exercised in a manner consistent with an
actual defensive mission.
Schedule: In fiscal year 2004 and early 2005, the Aegis BMD program
completed the upgrade of three Aegis destroyers for the LRS&T
mission”all are available for operations. In addition, the program
delivered five missiles, known as the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2005 for the element‘s Block 2004
engagement capability. Because of funding constraints and ship
availability, missile deliveries and ship upgrades were delayed. In
particular, the program expects to have available a slightly smaller
inventory of SM-3 missiles by December 2005 than was originally
planned. Also, the program expected to upgrade three cruisers by the
end of Block 2004, but only two will be completed by this time.
Testing: Aegis BMD flight testing conducted in fiscal year 2004 focused
on the LRS&T mission, including the element‘s connectivity with the
BMDS. Because there were limited opportunities to track actual targets
using the fielded version of the LRS&T system, this capability was only
partially demonstrated prior to the destroyers‘ fielding. The Aegis BMD
program also conducted one successful intercept attempt against a short-
range ballistic missile target during fiscal year 2004. Finally, design
changes to the missile‘s divert system underwent ground testing and are
planned to be tested in flight in fiscal year 2005.
Performance: The Aegis BMD program has demonstrated the capability to
intercept a non-separating target through its successes in five of six
flight tests. The root cause of a failure in the missile‘s divert
system during the one unsuccessful attempt is understood, and design
changes are expected to be tested in flight in fiscal year 2005.
Although the program has exercised the element‘s LRS&T capability in a
small number of flight-test events, it has not yet used the fielded
version of the system software to provide real-time track data of a
target for use in planning a BMD mission, as it would need to do in an
actual defensive operation.
Cost: We could not fully assess cost performance for the Aegis BMD
program in fiscal year 2004 based on an analysis of prime contractor
Cost Performance Reports. We found that the contractor responsible for
upgrading existing Aegis ships for the BMD mission completed fiscal
year 2004 work $3.5 million under budget but was unable to complete
$2.0 million worth of work. However, we were unable to assess cost and
schedule performance of the prime contractor who develops the SM-3
missile because Cost Performance Reports were not available during
fiscal year 2004.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
Element Description:
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) element is a sea-based
missile defense system being developed to protect deployed U.S. forces,
allies, and friends from short-and medium-range ballistic missile
attacks. It will also be used as a forward-deployed Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) sensor, employing its shipboard SPY-1 radar, to
perform surveillance and tracking of long-range ballistic missiles in
support of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission.
The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis-
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the missile
defense mission in addition to their current role of protecting U.S.
Navy ships from air, surface, and subsurface threats. The program is
also developing the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)--the system's interceptor
missile, which is designed to destroy enemy warheads through hit-to-
kill collisions above the atmosphere. The SM-3 is comprised of a kill
vehicle[Footnote 32] mounted atop a 3-stage booster.
History:
In 1996, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Navy Theater
Wide program, the predecessor to Aegis BMD. The Navy Theater Wide
system was to be a ship-based missile defense system capable of
destroying short-range ballistic missiles above the atmosphere. At the
time, plans called for deploying the first increment of the Navy
Theater Wide system in 2010 and a final increment with an improved kill
vehicle at a later, undefined date.
Developmental Phases:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) currently manages and funds the Aegis
BMD program, although the U.S. Navy has a role in its development and
management. Accordingly, the Aegis BMD element is being developed under
MDA's acquisition approach, which delivers system capabilities in 2-
year block increments. The first increment of the Aegis BMD element,
Block 2004, is expected to deliver a limited operational capability in
the 2004-2005 time frame. It provides for surveillance and tracking of
long-range ballistic missiles and an intercept capability (engagement
role) against shorter-range ballistic missiles. The Block 2004
capability is being rolled out in three phases:
* Initial fielding of the surveillance and tracking capability. By
October 2004, the program office upgraded three Aegis destroyers with
the ability to perform the long-range surveillance and tracking (LRS&T)
function as a BMDS sensor in support of the GMD mission. All three
destroyers are available for operations. This capability is the
element's contribution to MDA's fielding of Limited Defensive
Operations (LDO), MDA's first increment of fielded capability.
* Initial fielding of an intercept capability. By April 2005, MDA plans
to have available two cruisers, along with a combined inventory of
approximately five SM-3 missiles. The cruisers are expected to be
capable of performing its two BMD missions, LRS&T and the engagement of
short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. This configuration could be
deployed operationally if so directed in an emergency.
* Completion of the Block 2004 element. The program expects to increase
the number of Aegis destroyers capable of providing LRS&T from 3 to 10
by the end of December 2005.[Footnote 33] In addition, the program
plans to deliver eight SM-3 missiles available to be deployed on
upgraded cruisers available for the engagement role.[Footnote 34]
Future block configurations of the Aegis BMD element build upon the
Block 2004 capability. In Block 2006, MDA plans to add the capability
to defeat intermediate-range ballistic missiles with limited
countermeasures and to increase Aegis BMD's role as a remote sensor by
upgrading radar capabilities. The Aegis BMD Block 2008 configuration
will incorporate upgrades to the SPY-1 radar to improve the radar's
discrimination capability and to enhance the element's command and
control component so that the element can engage multiple threats
simultaneously. Finally, the Aegis BMD Block 2010 and 2012
configurations are expected to incorporate missile enhancements,
improve discrimination capability against advanced countermeasures, and
improve planning and coordination as part of the BMDS.
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
The Aegis BMD program establishes annual element-level goals by
outlining specific activities the program plans to complete during a
given fiscal year. In fiscal year 2004, the program focused largely on
delivering the LRS&T capability for LDO and continuing with activities
leading to the full Block 2004 capability. These activities can be
grouped into three categories: fielding, testing, and design reviews.
* Fielding. The Aegis BMD program planned to install the initial
version of the operational computer program and make associated
hardware upgrades on three Aegis destroyers enabling them to perform
the LRS&T mission. In addition, the program planned to continue its
activities leading to the initial delivery of SM-3 missiles during
fiscal year 2005.
* Testing. The Aegis BMD program office planned to conduct an intercept
attempt against a short-range ballistic missile--Flight Mission 6 (FM-
6)--and to participate in other events that exercise the system's LRS&T
functionality and connectivity with the BMDS.
* Design reviews. The program planned to conduct design reviews of the
final Block 2004 Aegis Weapon System software, the final Block 2004
missile configuration, and the SM-3 missile's shipboard launch system.
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
In fiscal year 2004, the Aegis BMD program completed the upgrade of
three Aegis destroyers[Footnote 35] for the LRS&T mission. In addition,
the program was completing the final assembly of the first five SM-3
missiles for the Block 2004 engagement capability, which were delivered
in early fiscal year 2005. The program is largely on track to upgrade
software, expand missile inventory, and conduct flight tests to deliver
an enhanced capability for Block 2004 by the end of December 2005.
However, funding modifications and ship availability delayed final
missile deliveries and ship upgrades. In particular, although the
program expected to field nine SM-3 missiles by the end of Block 2004,
only eight will be delivered by this time. Also, the program expected
to upgrade three cruisers by the end of Block 2004, but only two will
be completed by this time. Specific progress made in fiscal year 2004
relative to fielding, testing, and design is given in the narrative
below and summarized in tables 7 to 12.
Fielding Activities:
The Aegis BMD program has plans to eventually upgrade 18 Aegis-equipped
Navy ships (15 destroyers and 3 cruisers) with enhanced planning,
surveillance, tracking, and engagement functions to make them capable
of performing the BMD mission. These upgrades will improve the
capability of the element's SPY-1 radar to discriminate a missile's
warhead from decoys, enable tracking of long-range ballistic missiles
as a BMDS sensor, plan engagements, and launch SM-3 missiles to engage
ballistic missiles. To achieve this enhanced functionality, the Aegis
BMD program office is upgrading the Aegis Weapon System on designated
ships through a series of software builds and hardware upgrades,
referred to as BMD 3.0E, BMD 3.0, and BMD 3.1.
Each BMD upgrade will increase the element's capability. The Aegis BMD
program has successfully installed BMD 3.0E in three destroyers, which
enables the ships to carry out long-range surveillance and tracking.
However, the ships are not yet capable of launching missiles to engage
ballistic missiles. Rather, the next software build, BMD 3.0, will be
needed to provide the preliminary engagement capability for Aegis
cruisers. It is expected to be approved for use in April 2005 and could
be deployed operationally if so directed in an emergency. The third
version of the BMD upgrade--BMD 3.1--will eventually enable the
destroyers to also launch missiles, but because other hardware upgrades
are needed, only Aegis cruisers will be equipped to do so by the end of
Block 2004. BMD 3.1 is the last weapon system upgrade planned for the
Block 2004 time frame. Table 7 summarizes the principal software
development and installation activities completed in fiscal year 2004.
Table 7: Status of Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments-
-Fielding Activities:
Activity: Complete and deliver long-range surveillance and tracking
(LRS&T) software BMD 3.0E;
Description/Progress assessment: The program completed BMD 3.0E
development for the initial fielding of the LRS&T capability.
Activity: Install LRS&T BMD 3.0E on three Aegis destroyers;
Description/Progress assessment: The program installed BMD 3.0E on two
Aegis destroyers by September 30, 2004, and on a third Aegis destroyer
in October 2004.
Activity: Begin training Aegis destroyer crews for the LRS&T mission;
Description/Progress assessment: Crew training was completed on
schedule, which included tactical operations and team certification,
personnel standards, and BMD 3.0E familiarization.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
As software builds and hardware upgrades are completed and installed,
Navy cruisers and destroyers will become available to perform their
expected missions. Table 8 summarizes the availability of Aegis ships
for the BMD mission in the Block 2004 time frame. Although MDA program
goals specified that three cruisers would be available by the end of
Block 2004 (December 2005), only two are expected to be upgraded by
this time; the third is expected to be upgraded in early 2006,
depending on ship availability.
Table 8: Aegis Ship Availability for the BMD Mission (Block 2004):
Ship function: Destroyers; Capable of only LRS&T. Engagement capability
will be added starting in 2006;
September 2004: 3[B];
December 2004: 5[B];
April 2005: 9;
December 2005: 10[ C].
Ship function: Cruisers[A]; Capable of surveillance, tracking, and
engagement;
September 2004: 0;
December 2004: 1;
April 2005: 2;
December 2005: 2.
Ship function: Total destroyers and cruisers available for BMD mission;
September 2004: 3;
December 2004: 6;
April 2005: 11;
December 2005: 12.
Source: MDA.
[A] The total number of Aegis cruisers includes one being used as a
test ship, which was scheduled to begin installation of BMD 3.0 in
December 2004.
[B] The third LRS&T ship was completed in October 2004, and the fifth
was completed in January 2005.
[C] 15 LRS&T "equipment sets" will be available at this time, but
installations may not be completed owing to the ships' operational
schedules. The remaining five upgrades are planned for the Block 2006
time frame.
[End of table]
In fiscal year 2004, the Aegis BMD program office continued to procure
SM-3 missiles for delivery in the 2004-2005 time frame. In particular,
11 "Block I" SM-3 missiles are expected to be delivered by the end of
calendar year 2005, some of which will be used in flight testing. Table
9 summarizes the status of SM-3 deliveries through December 2005.
Table 9: SM-3 Missile Deliveries:
SM-3 deliveries;
Sept. 2004 -Dec. 2004: 5;
Dec. 2004 -Apr. 2005: 1;
Apr. 2005 -Dec. 2005: 5;
Total (Dec. 2005): 11.
Source: MDA.
[End of table]
Prior to September 2004, three SM-3 missiles of an earlier
configuration were delivered and subsequently used in flight missions
(intercept attempts), FM-4, FM-5, and FM-6. "Block I" SM-3 missiles,
which are being fielded during 2004-2005, are an operational
configuration that evolved from this earlier design. Fiscal year 2004
funding modifications impacted SM-3 missile integration and delivery;
consequently, the Aegis BMD program expects to have available a
slightly smaller inventory of SM-3 missiles by December 2005 than was
originally planned.
Testing Activities:
The Aegis BMD program conducts both ground and flight tests to
demonstrate and validate element performance. Ground tests serve to
reduce risk and, in some cases, are conducted under conditions that are
difficult to replicate in flight. Flight tests verify the element's
ability to engage ballistic missile targets using actual equipment,
computer programs, and an operational ship with a Navy crew.
Ground Testing:
Ground tests completed during fiscal year 2004 included those focused
on a subcomponent of the missile's divert system--the Solid Divert and
Attitude Control System (SDACS). This subcomponent is a collection of
solid-fuel thrusters used to steer the kill vehicle into its designated
target. When an updated SDACS design proved successful in earlier
ground tests, the program flight-tested it during Flight Mission 5 (FM-
5) in June 2003. However, during this test, the subassemblies
supporting the energetic pulse-mode failed, causing the kill vehicle to
be less maneuverable and miss its target. Program officials stated that
the failure likely stemmed from a "diverter ball" in the SDACS, which
acts as a valve to control pulses that allow the missile to maneuver
quickly. The exercising of the high-energy pulse mode of the SDACS
increased internal operating pressures, and, under the thermal stress,
the protective coating of the diverter ball cracked, disabling normal
SDACS operation. The root cause of this failure has been traced to a
material failure under intense temperature and pressure.
In response to this failure, during fiscal year 2004, the program
modified the SDACS design to improve its switching performance and
reliability during high-energy pulse operation. A series of ground
tests and engineering analysis is ongoing to validate the design
updates. Following completion of ground tests and analysis, future
flight tests are planned to demonstrate operation of the SDACS using
its high-energy pulse mode.
Flight Testing:
Since 1999, there have been six intercept attempts using variants of
the SM-3 missile. In five of the six, the SM-3 successfully intercepted
targets. In fiscal year 2004, the program conducted one of these
successful intercept attempts--FM-6.[Footnote 36] Additionally, the
Aegis BMD element participated in other non-intercept test events to
assess the Aegis destroyer's ability to track targets of opportunity
and pass data to the BMDS. Because of the technical issues associated
with the SDACS reliability that arose in FM-5, the program office
delayed FM-6 from September 2003 to December 2003 and did not exercise
the SDACS high-energy pulse mode as originally planned.
After the FM-6 flight mission in December 2003, Aegis BMD flight
testing conducted in fiscal year 2004 focused on the LRS&T mission
although there were limited opportunities to track actual targets using
the fielded version of the LRS&T software, BMD 3.0E. For example,
delays in the GMD flight test program prevented Aegis BMD from
participating in two integrated flight tests, IFT-13C and IFT-14,
during fiscal year 2004. In addition, the Aegis BMD program
participated in Glory Trip 185, during which an Aegis destroyer
successfully tracked a Minuteman III ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air
Force Base. However, it exercised an earlier version of the LRS&T
software, rather than BMD 3.0E, which is installed on fielded
destroyers. Finally, in Pacific Explorer III, an Aegis destroyer
planned to track an actual missile and pass track data to the BMDS.
Although the destroyer tracked the live target missile, a malfunction
with the target limited the amount of data collected by the Aegis
destroyer. Specifically, the target ended its flight before Aegis BMD
could send the GMD element enough information needed for engaging the
target.
Although there were limited opportunities to track actual targets,
Aegis BMD participated in other tests that verified connectivity with
the BMDS. For example, in Pacific Explorer II, Glory Trip 185, Pacific
Explorer III, and Pacific Explorer IV (conducted in fiscal year 2005),
simulated or real ballistic missile target track data was successfully
transmitted to the BMDS.
Table 10 summarizes the flight test and LRS&T activities completed in
fiscal year 2004 by the Aegis BMD program.
Table 10: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Flight
Test and LRS&T Activities:
Activity: Flight Mission 6 (FM-6);
Occurred: Dec. 2003;
Description/Progress assessment: An SM-3 missile successfully
intercepted a short range ballistic missile (SRBM) target (SDACS used
in sustain-mode only).
Activity: Participate in GMD integrated flight tests as a surveillance
and tracking sensor;
Planned: Throughout FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: GMD flight tests were deferred until
fiscal year 2005. IFT-13C was conducted in December 2004 and would have
offered Aegis BMD the opportunity to exercise its LRS&T role. However,
because of rough seas caused by severe weather that exceeded safety
limits, the element did not participate. IFT-14 was conducted in
February 2005, but this test failed to execute fully because the
interceptor did not launch from its silo.
Activity: Pacific Explorer II;
Occurred: Mar. 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: An Aegis destroyer in the Sea of Japan
and an Aegis destroyer in Hawaii established full satellite
communication connectivity with the BMDS across the Pacific Ocean to
multiple land-based participants in Hawaii and the Continental United
States. Although no actual target was launched, the ship successfully
passed track data of a simulated target to exercise system
connectivity.
Activity: Glory Trip 185;
Occurred: June 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: Aegis BMD successfully exercised its
role as a forward-deployed sensor. During this test, an Aegis destroyer
detected and tracked a Minuteman III ICBM launched from Vandenberg Air
Force Base and provided track and covariance data to GMD. However, the
test did not exercise Aegis BMD tracking and connectivity in a manner
consistent with an actual defensive mission; that is, as an integral
part of the system during which the destroyer acts as a fire control
radar. In addition, the Aegis destroyer was not upgraded with the
newer, LDO version of the long-range surveillance and tracking
software.
Activity: Pacific Explorer III;
Occurred: July 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: This event provided exposure and
training to the crew of an Aegis BMD destroyer. Although the destroyer
tracked the live target missile, a malfunction with the target limited
the amount of data collected by the Aegis destroyer--the target's
flight was terminated early.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
In fiscal year 2005, the program office scheduled three more Block 2004
flight tests, all of which are planned as intercept attempts. These
tests aim to progressively demonstrate the element's capability against
short-and medium-range unitary and separating targets, as well as
demonstrate that Aegis BMD can support the BMDS as a forward-deployed
sensor. FM-7 was the first flight test to use BMD 3.0 and the Block I
SM-3 missile, which is the configuration of the first set of SM-3
missiles that will be made available for fielding. Table 11 provides a
summary of the Block 2004 flight tests the program expects to conduct
through fiscal year 2005.
Table 11: Planned Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2005 Accomplishments--Remaining
Block 2004 Flight Tests:
Activity: FTM 04-1 (FM-7);
Date: Feb 24, 2005;
Description: FM-7 was successfully conducted. An SM-3 missile
intercepted an SRBM target (SDACS used in sustain-mode only).
Activity: FTM 04-2 (FM-8);
Date: 3Q FY2005[A];
Description: FM-8 is an intercept attempt against a separating, medium-
range ballistic missile (MRBM) target. The target will fly a trajectory
more distant from the Aegis cruiser than in previous tests. Pending the
results of ground testing, the SDACS will be tested in high-energy
pulse mode.
Activity: FTM 04-3 (FM-9);
Date: 4Q FY2005;
Description: FM-9 is an intercept attempt against a separating, MRBM
target. The target will include additional decoys and clutter. The
SDACS could be tested in high-energy pulse mode.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] We use the notation "3Q FY2005" to mean the third quarter of fiscal
year 2005 and an identical format for other time periods.
[End of table]
Design Reviews:
The Aegis BMD program scheduled four component-level design reviews in
fiscal year 2004 to evaluate the design maturity of the Aegis Weapon
System software, launch system, and upgraded SM-3 missile, known as
"Block IA." The program successfully completed three of these design
reviews but delayed the fourth until early 2005. Table 12 summarizes
the principal activities related to each review.
Table 12: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Design
Reviews:
Activity: Aegis BMD 3.1 System Design Disclosure;
Completed Jan. 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: The system design disclosure for the
final version of Block 2004 software, BMD 3.1, was successfully
completed. This review evaluated the performance of BMD 3.1 for the
LRS&T mission as well as engagement scenarios with both sustain-mode
and pulse-mode SDACS.
Activity: Vertical Launch System Phase I Critical Design Review;
Completed Feb. 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: The critical design review of the
vertical launch system phase I was successfully completed. The review
examined the expected performance of the Vertical Launch System
associated with BMD 3.0.
Activity: Vertical Launch System Phase II Preliminary Design Review;
Completed June 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: The preliminary design review of the
vertical launch system phase II was successfully completed. This review
presented requirements (design specifications) and early designs for
the Vertical Launch System associated with BMD 3.1.
Activity: SM-3 Block IA Critical Design Review;
Completed Oct. 2004;
Description/Progress assessment: The initial critical design review of
the SM-3 Block IA--the upgraded configuration of the Block I missile--
was successfully completed and gave the program permission to begin
missile assembly and testing. This review examined the maturity of the
design and expected performance of the Block IA SM-3 missile
configuration. A "close out" critical design review is planned to be
conducted in April 2005.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Assessment of Element Performance:
We identified areas for which the Aegis BMD program has not fully
demonstrated element performance and reliability. First, the program
has demonstrated its intercept capability under limited conditions;
second, the program has not successfully demonstrated, in a flight
test, SDACS operation using its high-energy pulse mode; and third, the
program has only exercised the element's LRS&T capability in a small
number of flight-test events.
The Aegis BMD program demonstrated the capability to intercept a non-
separating target through its successes in FM-2, FM-3, FM-4, FM-6, and
FM-7. Although these tests were scripted, they are noteworthy, given
the difficulty of "hit-to-kill" intercepts. Officials with the office
of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), pointed out that
the Aegis BMD program has conducted the most operationally realistic
testing of all BMDS elements, especially because they utilize an
operational U.S. Navy cruiser. They recognize, however, that the
targets in FM-2 and FM-3 flew trajectories that facilitated radar
detection and tracking. More realistic engagement scenarios will be
tested in Block 2006, for example, tests with multiple simultaneous
engagements.
As we reported last year,[Footnote 37] the Aegis BMD program faced
challenges with ensuring the reliability of SDACS operation; the issue
continues to be relevant. The root causes of the SDACS failure in FM-5
are understood and the program is implementing four design changes to
correct the problem. After completing ground tests to verify these
changes, the program plans to flight test the modified multi-pulse
SDACS no earlier than FM-8, scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal
year 2005. Even if the design changes prove to resolve the SDACS issue,
program officials do not expect to implement any design changes in the
first 11 Block 2004 missiles being delivered. Program officials believe
that these missiles provide a credible defense against a large
population of the threat even with reduced divert capability.
The program has exercised the element's LRS&T capability in a limited
number of flight-test events, as noted above. Nonetheless, the Aegis
BMD program predicts that the Aegis SPY-1 radar is able to deliver
adequate performance in support of the BMD mission, and DOT&E officials
believe that Aegis BMD can adequately perform its detection and
tracking functions. Although the Aegis destroyers have been upgraded
for the LRS&T capability, they have not been exercised in a manner
consistent with an actual defensive mission. That is, the Aegis BMD
element has not provided track data of a target, in real time, to plan
a BMD mission and launch GMD interceptors.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the Aegis BMD program from program
inception in 1996 through 2011 is approximately $10 billion. As broken
out in table 13, DOD expended $3.67 billion between fiscal years 1996
and 2004,[Footnote 38] Congress appropriated $1.14 billion for fiscal
year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $5.22 billion between fiscal
years 2006 and 2011 for Aegis BMD development, procurement, and
operations. Budgeted activities in the "cooperative work" column
include SM-3 component development between the United States and Japan.
Table 13: Aegis BMD Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 1996[A] -FY 2003;
Other: $$2,985;
Block 2004: $$$0;
Block 2006: $$0;
Block 2008: $$0;
Block 2010: $$0;
Cooperative work: $0;
Total: $2,985.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $606;
Block 2006: $24;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Cooperative work: $51.8;
Total: $682.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $943;
Block 2006: $122;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Cooperative work: $71.3;
Total: $1,136.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $101;
Block 2006: $575;
Block 2008: $135;
Block 2010: $0;
Cooperative work: $24.8;
Total: $836.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $15;
Block 2006: $547;
Block 2008: $354;
Block 2010: $0;
Cooperative work: $52.8;
Total: $969.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $69;
Block 2008: $637;
Block 2010: $20;
Cooperative work: $112.5;
Total: $838.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $15;
Block 2008: $546;
Block 2010: $185;
Cooperative work: $131.5;
Total: $878.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $205;
Block 2010: $576;
Cooperative work: $129.5;
Total: $911.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $44;
Block 2010: $644;
Cooperative work: $100.0;
Total: $788.
FY 1996 -FY 2011;
Other: $$2,985;
Block 2004: $$1,665;
Block 2006: $$1,352;
Block 2008: $$1,921;
Block 2010: $$1,425;
Cooperative work: $$674;
Total: $10,022.
Source: MDA.
Notes: Aegis BMD budget as of February 2005. Numbers may not add due to
rounding.
[A] Program inception (FY 1996).
[End of table]
Contract Activities:
In the second half of 2003, two new prime contracts for the Aegis BMD
element were awarded, one for the Aegis Weapon System and one for the
SM-3 missile. Aegis Weapon System efforts, previously part of five Navy
contracts, were merged into one contract, which was awarded to Lockheed
Martin in October 2003. This contract covers Block 2004 activities,
including upgrades to BMD software, upgrades to the SM-3 missile launch
system, and planning activities for future blocks. The two previous
Navy SM-3 contracts were merged into a new contract, which was awarded
to Raytheon in August 2003. It covers development and delivery of SM-3
missiles and related engineering efforts.
Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance:
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate a prime contractor's cost and schedule
performance. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
generally associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost
or ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated
with the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.
We used the Cost Performance Reports to evaluate the cost and schedule
performance of the Aegis Weapon System prime contractor but had
insufficient data to assess the performance of the SM-3 contractor. Our
analysis of the Aegis Weapon System found that the prime contractor
performed at or near budgeted cost and schedule during fiscal year
2004. Specifically, since contract inception in October 2003 through
September 2004, the prime contractor was $3.5 million under budget.
However, it was unable to complete $2 million of work because of
fluctuations in ship and testing schedules (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Aegis BMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Defense Contract Management Agency is concerned with the delay that
occurred in the implementation of the SM-3 contract's performance
measurement baseline,[Footnote 39] which reflects the schedule and
budget for all work tasks that must be performed to meet contract
objectives. Although the contract was awarded to the prime contractor,
Raytheon, in August 2003, the contract's baseline was not reviewed at
an Integrated Baseline Review (IBR)[Footnote 40] until almost a year
after contract award. Program officials indicated that the delay
stemmed from the late establishment of the contract's performance
management baseline, which was established 7 months after contract
award because of the need for the program office to react to funding
issues. Raytheon was allowed to postpone issuing Cost Performance
Reports until after the Aegis BMD program office held an IBR 5 months
after establishment of the baseline.
Until the completion of the Raytheon IBR, program officials monitored
contractor performance through monthly management and business meetings
where cost and performance data, milestones, and projections of future
performance were reviewed. The program office stated that these monthly
meetings provided sufficient data to monitor contractor performance.
Nonetheless, without these reports, it is difficult for the program
office (and other independent agencies) to monitor cost and schedule
performance of the contract's various components and, therefore, to
identify areas in need of corrective action. Additionally, although we
are aware of past problems with SDACS performance on the SM-3 contract,
we did not have any data to evaluate its impact on the contract's cost
and schedule.
[End of section]
Appendix III Summary:
Airborne Laser:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency:
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Airborne Laser (ABL) is being developed to shoot down enemy
missiles during the boost phase of flight. Integrated onboard a Boeing
747 aircraft, ABL is designed to use a high-energy chemical laser to
rupture the enemy missile‘s fuel or oxidizer tanks, causing the missile
to lose thrust or flight control. As part of its development effort,
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans to demonstrate the feasibility
of using the prototype ABL aircraft to shoot down a short-range
ballistic missile. This event is referred to as the lethal
demonstration.
DOD‘s planned investment in the ABL program from program inception in
1996 through 2011 is about $7.3 billion. DOD expended $2.52 billion
between fiscal years 1996 and 2004, Congress appropriated $458 million
for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $4.32 billion between
fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for ABL research and development.
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
During fiscal year 2004, MDA restructured the ABL program to focus on
near-term milestones and to improve confidence in longer-term schedule
and cost projections. The restructuring placed the near-term focus on
two events: (1) the combined operation of individual laser modules to
generate a single laser beam, known as ’First Light,“ and (2) a flight
test of the prototype aircraft with an installed laser beam control
system, known as ’First Flight.“ In light of the program‘s restructure,
ABL completed most of its planned fiscal year 2004 activities on
schedule. However, total contract costs through calendar year 2008
increased by approximately $1.5 billion, and the program‘s schedule was
extended over 3 years.
Schedule: The program completed on schedule most of its fiscal year
2004 activities associated with the preparation for ’First Light“ and
’First Flight.“ However, as a result of the recent program
restructuring, the demonstration to shoot down a short-range ballistic
missile”the focus of the program”was delayed from 2005 and is now
scheduled to occur no earlier than 2008.
Testing: Both ’First Light“ and ’First Flight“ were achieved in early
fiscal year 2005. Although the achievement of ’First Light“ is a key
milestone for the program, it was not intended as an operational
demonstration of a high-power laser, that is, at full power and for the
length of time needed to shoot down a boosting missile. Rather, the
laser‘s operation for a fraction of a second demonstrates successful
integration of subsystems. ’First Flight“ is also a key milestone for
the program. It is the first of a series of flights to demonstrate the
completion of design, safety, and verification activities that are
necessary to assure flight worthiness of the aircraft with the laser
beam control system installed.
Performance: At this stage of ABL development”before the laser has been
operated at full power or critical technologies have been demonstrated
in flight tests”any assessment of effectiveness is questionable.
Nonetheless, the program office monitors performance indicators to
assess the element‘s readiness for successfully completing the
lethality demonstration. One indicator in particular”atmospheric
compensation, the process whereby a system of deformable mirrors and
electronics is used to minimize the degradation of the laser beam as it
travels through the atmosphere”is not meeting its performance
objectives. Program officials told us that a recovery plan for this
indicator is in place.
Cost: ABL program costs continue to grow. During the first half of
fiscal year 2004, prior to the restructuring of the program, the ABL
prime contractor incurred a negative cost variance of $114 million and
could not complete $47 million of planned work. MDA‘s restructuring of
the ABL program increased program cost by about $1.5 billion”the prime
contract is currently valued at approximately $3.6 billion, more than
three times its original value of $1.02 billion”although overall
program objectives did not change.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Airborne Laser:
Element Description:
The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a missile defense system designed to shoot
down enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight, the period after
launch during which the missile's rocket motors are thrusting. By
engaging ballistic missiles during the boost phase, ABL destroys enemy
missiles early in their trajectory before warheads and countermeasures
can be released. ABL plans to use a high-energy chemical laser to
defeat enemy missiles by rupturing a missile's fuel or oxidizer tanks,
causing the missile to lose thrust or flight control. ABL's objective
is to prevent the delivery of the missile's warhead to its intended
target.
ABL was initially conceived as a theater system to defeat short-and
medium-range ballistic missiles. However, its role has been expanded to
include the full range of ballistic missile threats, including
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).[Footnote 41] In addition,
ABL could be used as a forward-deployed Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) sensor to provide launch point, impact point, and
trajectory data of enemy missiles in support of engagements by other
system elements.
The ABL element consists of the following three major components
integrated onboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft. In addition,
the element includes ground support infrastructure for storing, mixing,
and handling the chemicals used in the laser.
* High-energy chemical oxygen-iodine laser (COIL). The laser, which
generates energy through chemical reactions, consists of six laser
modules linked together to produce megawatt levels of power. Because
the laser beam travels at the speed of light, ABL is expected to
destroy missiles quickly, giving it a significant advantage over
conventional boost-phase interceptors.
* Beam control/fire control (BC/FC). The BC/FC component's primary
mission is to maintain the beam's quality as it travels through the
aircraft and atmosphere. Through tracking and stabilization, the BC/FC
ensures that the laser's energy is focused on a targeted spot of the
enemy missile.
* Battle management/command and control (BMC2). The BMC2 component
plans and executes the element's defensive engagements. It is being
designed to work autonomously using its own sensors for launch
detection, but it could also receive early warning data from other
external sensors.
History:
In 1996, the Air Force initiated the ABL program to develop a defensive
system that could destroy enemy missiles from a distance of several
hundred kilometers. Developmental testing of the first prototype
aircraft was originally planned to conclude in 2002 with an attempt to
shoot down a short-range ballistic missile target.
In 2002, management authority and funding responsibility transferred
from the Air Force to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In accordance
with MDA planning, the ABL program restructured its acquisition
strategy to conform to an evolutionary, capabilities-based approach.
Developmental Phases:
The ABL program is focused on developing a prototype aircraft for use
in a lethality demonstration--a flight test in which the ABL aircraft
will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile. If this
test is successful, MDA believes it will prove out the concept of using
directed energy for missile defense. Although ABL's funding is broken
out by block--2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010--the program is developing a
single configuration of the element leading to the lethality
demonstration, which will occur no earlier than 2008. A specific date
for the demonstration has not been scheduled and depends on the success
of ground testing. Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to when ABL
will provide an initial operational capability. MDA plans to provide
this capability through the development of a second aircraft, but the
purchase of this aircraft is contingent upon the successful test of the
prototype aircraft.
In January 2004, MDA restructured the ABL program to focus on near-term
milestones and to improve confidence in longer-term schedule and cost
projections. The near-term focus of the program was shifted toward two
events: (1) the achievement of a key laser demonstration known as
"First Light"--the first demonstration of the integration of six
individual laser modules to produce a single beam of laser energy--and
(2) the initial flight test of the prototype aircraft with the BC/FC
installed, which is referred to as "First Flight."[Footnote 42] Key
provisions of the restructure call for the program office to complete
the following activities during the next few years:
* Ground test and flight test the BC/FC segment independent of high-
energy laser testing activities. BC/FC testing would utilize a low-
power, substitute laser in place of the high-energy laser, as needed.
* Ground test the high-energy laser independent of BC/FC testing
activities.
* Integrate and ground test the complete ABL weapon system (i.e.,
combined laser, BC/FC, and battle management segments).
* Flight test the ABL weapon system, culminating in a lethality
demonstration against a boosting missile.
The lethal demonstration has been delayed by about 6 years. This event
was originally scheduled to occur in 2002 and, as we reported last
year,[Footnote 43] was later rescheduled to be conducted in early 2005.
However, as a result of the January 2004 restructuring of the program,
the event is now scheduled to occur no earlier than 2008.
In its report accompanying the 2005 Defense Authorization Act, the
House Armed Services Committee noted its approval of the restructured
program. However, the Committee also recognized that the future of the
ABL program depended upon successful completion of "First Light" and
"First Flight." The Committee stated that these milestones must be
completed in order for the Committee to further support the program
after fiscal year 2005.
Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments:
The program planned to complete several activities during fiscal year
2004 commensurate with the program's restructuring. As noted above, the
program shifted its near-term focus toward key demonstrations within
the BC/FC and laser segments. The following activities were identified
as the key milestones for the fiscal year.
* BC/FC Segment. Complete ground integration and testing of the BC/FC
segment and begin integration of beam control segment into the ABL
prototype aircraft in preparation for "First Flight."
* Laser Segment. Complete integration of the six laser modules in the
System Integration Laboratory (SIL)--a ground-test facility located at
Edwards Air Force Base, California--in preparation for "First Light."
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
In fiscal year 2004, the program completed most of its planned
activities on schedule. Tables 14 and 15 summarize the progress made
toward completing BC/FC and laser activities in fiscal year 2004.
Table 14: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--BC/FC
Segment:
Activity: Complete ground integration and testing of the BC/FC;
Description/Progress assessment: In September 2004, the program
completed this activity, which is comprised of a BC/FC ground test and
a test of the aircraft's flight turret. These tests were conducted in
an effort to demonstrate the functionality of the full-up BC/FC and
turret segments with flight hardware.
Activity: Begin integration of BC/FC segment into the ABL aircraft;
Description/Progress assessment: In October 2004, the last major BC/FC
component--the flight turret--was installed on the aircraft at Edwards
Air Force Base in preparation for "First Flight."
Activity: Aircraft Readiness for Flight;
Description/Progress assessment: In November 2004, the program verified
the air-worthiness of the ABL with the BC/FC and BMC4I components
installed.
Activity: Conduct "First Flight";
Description/Progress assessment: "First Flight" was conducted in
December 2004, the first of 22 planned flight tests with the BC/FC
segment. The flight test was originally planned for 2-½ hours but was
terminated early due to erroneous instrument readings. These readings
were corrected and a full duration flight was achieved the following
week. One of its objectives was to demonstrate that all necessary
design, safety, and verification activities to assure flight worthiness
had been completed. "First Flight" also began the process of expanding
the aircraft flight envelope--types and combinations of flight
conditions--in which the ABL can operate. Finally, "First Flight" was
designed to measure the environment of the BC/FC system while the
aircraft is in flight.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Table 15: Status of ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Laser
Segment:
Activity: Complete integration of the 6 laser modules in the SIL;
Description/Progress assessment: The integration of individual modules
in preparation for "First Light" was completed successfully. The
completion of this activity enabled testing of the six integrated
modules in the ground-test facility.
Activity: Achieve "First Light" in the SIL;
Description/Progress assessment: "First Light" was successfully
conducted in fiscal year 2005 (November 2004); "First Light" refers to
the ABL ground-test event during which individual laser modules are
successfully integrated and operated to generate a single laser beam.
Activity: Continue large optics fabrication and optical coating
efforts;
Description/Progress assessment: Efforts to complete studies of
technologies are ongoing; Long-lead optics production is ongoing and
improvements to the production process are being studied.
Activity: Continue jitter reduction and illuminator improvement;
Description/Progress assessment: Efforts to upgrade hardware to reduce
jitter--vibrations onboard the ABL aircraft that degrades the focus of
the high-energy laser beam--are still ongoing; Use of advanced cooling
methods to improve the power, efficiency, beam quality, and start-up
time of the illuminator laser are also still ongoing.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Demonstration of "First Light"
The demonstration of "First Light"--to prove that individual laser
modules can be successfully integrated and operated to generate a
single laser beam--was achieved on November 10, 2004, at the SIL ground
facility. In general, "First Light" is an important milestone for any
laser system because it demonstrates the ability to get all major laser
subsystems to work together.
Although the achievement of "First Light" is a key milestone for the
program, it was not intended as an operational demonstration of a high-
power laser, that is, at full power and for the length of time needed
to shoot down a boosting missile. Rather, the laser's operation for a
fraction of a second demonstrates successful integration of subsystems.
"First Light" demonstrated that the six modules are aligned optically
and the flow system is functioning, but program officials noted that
the operation of the laser was too short to make meaningful predictions
of power and beam quality.[Footnote 44] The program plans to conduct a
series of tests that will gradually increase the length and power of
the laser operation until full power lasing objectives are achieved.
Demonstration of "First Flight"
The achievement of "First Flight"--the first of 22 planned tests--is
also a key milestone for the program. This flight test was conducted on
December 3, 2004, and served as the functional check of the aircraft
with its newly installed laser beam control system. This event is
critical because:
* It demonstrates that all necessary design, safety, and verification
activities to assure flight worthiness have been completed.
* It begins the process of expanding the aircraft flight envelope--
types and combinations of flight conditions--in which the ABL can
operate.
* It offers the program the opportunity to collect data on the effects
of the environment on the BC/FC system while the aircraft is in flight.
The data gathered during this test will be used to address jitter
issues.
Although "First Flight" was conducted, the program was unable to
achieve all of its intended test objectives. The test was originally
planned for 2-½ hours but was terminated early due to some erroneous
instrumentation readings. Program officials made several attempts to
resolve the readings in flight but were unsuccessful and the aircraft
was landed early. However, the instrumentation anomalies were all fixed
and the program conducted a second flight test on December 9, 2004,
which lasted the intended duration of 2-½ hours. The primary objective
of the second test was the same as that for "First Flight"--to perform
all necessary in-flight functional checks to ensure flight worthiness
of the aircraft. The flight test was completed and all remaining test
points not completed during "First Flight" were completed successfully.
Assessment of Element Performance:
The program office monitors performance indicators to determine the
program's readiness for successfully completing the lethality
demonstration in 2008. Based on its assessment, 11 of 15 of these
indicators point to some risk in achieving this goal. For example, one
indicator--atmospheric compensation[Footnote 45]--is not meeting its
performance objectives. Program officials identified a shortfall in the
bandwidth of the adaptive optics control system--the system of
deformable mirrors and electronics that focus the laser beam on the
target--as the primary cause of this deficiency. Program officials told
us that a recovery plan for this indicator is already in place and that
the contractor is in the process of fixing the shortfall.
Another important indicator pertaining to the technology of controlling
and stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration unique to
the aircraft does not degrade aimpoint--a phenomenon referred to as
"jitter"--was identified as a risk item by the program office early on
and continues to be a program risk. Jitter control is crucial to the
operation of the laser because the laser beam must be stable enough to
impart sufficient energy on a fixed spot of the missile target to
rupture its fuel or oxidizer tank. Because jitter is among the least
mature of ABL's critical technologies, the program office is conducting
ground tests and, in the future, flight tests to learn more about
jitter control.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the ABL program from program inception in
1996 through 2011 is approximately $7.3 billion. As broken out in table
16, DOD expended $2.52 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2004,
Congress appropriated $458 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is
budgeting about $4.32 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for
ABL research and development.
Table 16: ABL Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 1996[A] -FY 2003;
Other: $$2,058;
Block 2004: $$0;
Block 2006: $$0;
Block 2008: $$0;
Block 2010: $$0;
Total: $2,058.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $459;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $459.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $458;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $458.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $465;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $465.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $630;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $630.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $601;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $601.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $669;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $669.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $792;
Total: $792.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $1,163;
Total: $1,163.
FY 1996 -FY 2011;
Other: $$2,058;
Block 2004: $$917;
Block 2006: $$1,095;
Block 2008: $$1,270;
Block 2010: $$1,955;
Total: $7,295.
Source: MDA.
Note: ABL budget as of February 2005.
[A] Program inception (FY 1996).
[End of table]
ABL was funded as an Air Force program from 1996 through 2001 and
during that time a little over $1 billion was spent. After the program
was transferred to MDA in fiscal year 2002, MDA expended approximately
$1 billion in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 on ABL development.
Major Contracting Activity in Fiscal Year 2004:
The cost of the ABL program continues to grow. In May 2004, we reported
that the prime contractor's costs for developing ABL had nearly doubled
from the Air Force's original estimate.[Footnote 46] In addition, the
program incurred cost overruns. In fiscal year 2003 alone, the
contractor overran its budget by $242 million, which resulted primarily
from integration and testing issues.
The program office recognized that the contractor's unfavorable cost
and schedule performance would eventually cause the contract to reach
its ceiling price by May 2004. Consequently, MDA considered three
alternatives to the contract: (1) continue to work toward the planned
schedule, (2) develop a new schedule that scaled back planned
activities, or (3) discontinue the contract. Agency officials decided
to continue with the existing contract and refocus the program on near-
term technical progress. In an effort to continue with the current
contract, program officials reevaluated the program schedule and
extended the contract period of performance, established a new estimate
to complete the contract, and increased the contract cost ceiling by
about $1.5 billion. Prior to the recent program restructure, the Block
2004 prime contract was valued at approximately $2.1 billion and was
scheduled to end six months after the lethality demonstration in June
2005. However, as a result of the recent program changes, the lethality
demonstration is now expected to occur no earlier than 2008 and the
contract's period of performance was extended through December 2008.
The prime contract to conduct the lethality demonstration is currently
valued at approximately $3.6 billion--more than three times its
original value of $1.02 billion. Figure 4 summarizes the major activity
for the program's prime contract since inception.
Figure 4: ABL Block 2004 Prime Contract:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost
and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
generally associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost
or ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated
with the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.
Our analysis of prime contractor Cost Performance Reports indicates
that ABL cost and schedule performance declined during the first half
of fiscal year 2004 even though the program implemented a new
performance measurement baseline[Footnote 47] at the beginning of the
fiscal year. As illustrated in figure 5, the program incurred a
negative cost variance of $114 million and a negative schedule variance
of $47 million during the first 6 months of fiscal year 2004. Program
officials indicated that delays in hardware delivery, design problems,
and integration issues were the primary drivers of cost growth.
Figure 5: ABL Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Insufficient data is available to perform earned value management
analysis beyond March 2004. Contractor performance reporting was
suspended from April 2004 through July 2004 because the program was re-
planning its efforts and implementing a new performance measurement
baseline.
[End of figure]
Between April and July 2004, while the contractor was re-planning its
work effort, the program was unable to fully evaluate the contractor's
progress against its cost and schedule objectives. During this time,
program officials directed the contractor to suspend normal cost
performance reporting and redirected resources to complete the re-
planning effort. Since the contractor was not required to provide
program officials with full Cost Performance Reports, the program was
unable to perform meaningful Earned Value Management (EVM)
analysis.[Footnote 48] However, in the absence of these reports,
program officials took steps to ensure that some insight into the
contractor's progress was maintained throughout the re-planning effort.
For example, the program measured schedule progress by comparing actual
progress against the completion of detailed activities associated with
"First Light" and "First Flight" and gauged the contractor's cost
performance by comparing contractor forecasted expenditures to the
actual costs of the work performed.
The contractor resumed normal cost performance reporting in August
2004. As of September 2004, the contractor was performing work under
budget but slightly behind schedule--the program had a positive cost
variance of $6.6 million and a negative schedule variance of $1.6
million. According to Cost Performance Reports, the program experienced
delays associated with the integration and checkout of the turret
assembly--a subcomponent of the BC/FC system--which caused schedule
slips through the end of the fiscal year. The late delivery of laser
spare material and assembly parts caused additional schedule delays for
the program.
Award Fee Plan Unchanged:
Although the program was restructured in spring 2004 and the ABL prime
contract modified to extend the contract period and increase its value,
the associated award fee plan was not adjusted. Therefore, the
contractor currently has no opportunity to earn any fee for successful
demonstration, since the current award fee plan was tied to a
successful completion of shoot down by December 2004.
[End of section]
Appendix IV Summary:
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
element is the integrating and controlling element of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS). It is designed to link all system
elements, manage real-time battle information for the warfighter, and
coordinate element operation to counter ballistic missile attacks in
all phases of flight.
The C2BMC element is being developed under MDA‘s evolutionary
acquisition approach, which delivers system capabilities in 2-year
blocks beginning with Block 2004. Within each block, C2BMC software is
developed incrementally through a series of software builds known as
’spirals.“ The principal function of the Block 2004 C2BMC element is to
provide situational awareness, that is, to monitor the operational
status of each BMDS component and to display threat information such as
missile trajectories and impact points. It also performs deliberate
planning activities for developing battle plans and other operational
concepts.
DOD‘s planned investment in the C2BMC program from program inception in
2002 through 2011 is approximately $2.2 billion. DOD expended $344
million between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, Congress appropriated $191
million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $1.65 billion
for C2BMC development and operations between fiscal years 2006 and 2011.
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
The C2BMC team executed the program within budget but slightly behind
schedule in fiscal year 2004. Important activities”such as the
completion of software development and testing, integration activities,
and operator training continued in fiscal year 2004 to ready the
element for Limited Defensive Operations (LDO)”were completed.
Schedule: By the end of September 2004, the C2BMC program office
completed activities needed to ready the C2BMC element for LDO. The LDO
software ’build“ (spiral 4.3) was delivered. The program office also
carried out a number of activities enabling BMDS integration and
communications. Finally, C2BMC suites at U.S. Strategic Command and
U.S. Northern Command were activated, and ’web browsers“ providing
summary screens of the unfolding battle (such as trajectories of
attacking missiles and launched interceptors) were installed at U.S.
Pacific Command and locations in the National Capital Region.
Testing: Testing to evaluate C2BMC functionality, interoperability, and
system-level integration for LDO was completed. For example, Cycle-3
testing”the third of four cycles of testing to verify that C2BMC
interfaces with each BMDS element individually”was completed in August
2004. Cycle-4 testing, which is ongoing, is the final cycle of testing
to verify system-level integration. During these tests, the C2BMC
element participates in flight tests planned and conducted by MDA.
Performance: During testing of its software, the C2BMC program
uncovered a performance issue with its ’track correlation and
association“ algorithm in scenarios involving multiple tracks. The
program monitored this issue as a high-risk item because it had the
potential to impact situational awareness. In particular, threat
information could be displayed differently at C2BMC suites and GMD fire
control nodes, possibly causing confusion within the command structure.
The problem was resolved with software fixes and the issue retired in
July 2004.
Cost: Our analysis of the prime contractor‘s Cost Performance Reports
shows that the contractor continued to carry a positive cost variance,
that is, in total it completed work under budget. However, the
contractor experienced a modest erosion in cost performance in fiscal
year 2004. In particular, it completed fiscal year 2004 activities
slightly over budget, incurring a negative cost variance of $3.6
million. The prime contractor‘s schedule performance was slightly, yet
consistently, behind schedule for most of fiscal year 2004. In total,
the contractor incurred a negative schedule variance of $5.7 million
because of unanticipated technical issues.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications:
Element Description:
The Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
element is being developed as the integrating and controlling entity of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It is designed to provide
connectivity between the various BMDS elements and to manage their
operation as part of an integrated, layered missile defense system.
C2BMC has neither a sensor nor weapon. As a software system housed in
command centers known as suites,[Footnote 49] C2BMC provides network-
centric warfare capabilities that provide the warfighter with the
capability to plan and monitor the missile defense mission. The C2BMC
element will track ballistic missile threats--utilizing all available
sensors from the various elements--and direct weapons systems to engage
the threat.
As the name indicates, the C2BMC is comprised of three major components:
* Command and control. The command and control component enables the
warfighter to monitor the operational status of each BMDS component,
display threat information, such as missile trajectory and impact
point, and control defensive actions. In other words, it provides the
situational awareness and planning tools to assist the command
structure in formulating and implementing defensive actions.
* Battle management. The battle management component formulates the
detailed instructions (task plans) for executing various missile
defense functions, such as tracking enemy missiles, discriminating the
warhead from decoys and associated objects, and directing the launch of
interceptors. Once implemented, the battle manager will direct the
operation of system elements and components, especially under evolving
battle conditions.
* Communications. Leveraging existing infrastructure, the
communications component manages the exchange and dissemination of
information necessary for carrying out the battle management and
command and control objectives.
History:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) initiated the C2BMC program in 2002 as
a new element of the BMDS. Program officials noted that initial
versions of C2BMC software are based on existing Air Force and GMD-
developed fire control (battle management) software.
Developmental Phases:
The C2BMC element is being developed under MDA's evolutionary
acquisition approach, which delivers system capabilities in 2-year
blocks, beginning with Block 2004. Within each block, C2BMC software is
developed incrementally through a series of software builds known as
"spirals." Over time, the C2BMC element will be enhanced to provide
overarching control and execution of missile defense engagements with
the aim of implementing layered defense through the collective use of
individual BMDS elements.
The principal function of the Block 2004 C2BMC element is to provide
situational awareness, that is, to monitor the operational status of
each BMDS component and to display threat information such as missile
trajectories and impact points. The program expects to develop this
capability incrementally through spirals 4.1 -4.5. The interim
delivery, spiral 4.3, is available for Limited Defensive Operations
(LDO) and is on the path to full Block 2004 functionality.
The incorporation of battle management capabilities in the C2BMC
element begins with Block 2006. In the 2006-2007 time frame, the
element is expected to track that ballistic missile threat throughout
its entire trajectory and select the appropriate elements to engage the
threat. For example, the Block 2006 C2BMC configuration would be able
to generate a single, more precise track from multiple radars and to
transmit it to the other elements. Together, this functionality enables
each element to "see farther" than it could using its own radar system.
This allows elements to launch interceptors earlier, which provides
more opportunity to engage incoming ballistic missiles.
Block 2006 is also expected to make a significant improvement over
Block 2004 with respect to BMDS communications. During this time, the
C2BMC program office will work to establish communications to all
elements of the BMDS, overcome limitations of legacy satellite
communications protocols, and establish redundant communications links
to enhance robustness. Such upgrades serve to improve operational
availability and situational awareness.
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
Planned accomplishments for the C2BMC program in fiscal year 2004
centered on completing activities to ready the element for LDO by the
end of September 2004. To achieve this goal, the C2BMC element planned
to complete the following specific activities:
* Software development. Complete the design, development, and testing
of LDO C2BMC software spirals 4.1 -4.3.
* BMDS integration and communications. Integrate the C2BMC element into
the BMDS; install and activate global communications capabilities.
* Make BMDS operational. Complete and activate C2BMC suites; train
operators.
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
By the end of September 2004, the C2BMC program office completed
activities needed to ready the C2BMC element for LDO. The LDO "build"
of C2BMC (spiral 4.3) was delivered and installed at the various
suites. The program office also carried out a number of activities
enabling BMDS integration and communications. Finally, C2BMC suites at
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) were activated, and "web browsers" providing summary
screens of the unfolding battle (such as trajectories of attacking
missiles and launched interceptors) were installed at U.S. Pacific
Command (USPACOM) and locations in the National Capital Region (such as
the White House).
Status of C2BMC Software Development:
Table 17 summarizes the principal development and testing activities
for the first three spirals of Block 2004 C2BMC element software. Most
notably, development of the LDO build, spiral 4.3, was completed in May
2004. Testing to evaluate C2BMC functionality, interoperability, and
system-level integration was also completed. For example, Cycle-3
testing--the third of four cycles of testing to verify that C2BMC
interfaces with each BMDS element individually--was completed in August
2004. Cycle-4 testing, the final cycle of testing to verify system-
level integration, is ongoing. During these tests, the C2BMC element
participates in flight tests planned and conducted by MDA.
Table 17: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Accomplishments--Software Development
and Testing:
Software build: Spiral 4.1;
Activity: Development;
Completion date: Mar. 2003;
Comments: All functional and performance testing was completed
successfully.
Software build: Spiral 4.1;
Activity: Testing;
Completion date: Oct. 2003.
Software build: Spiral 4.2;
Activity: Development;
Completion date: Sept. 2003;
Comments: Spiral 4.2 was tested in a number of venues, including
Missile Defense Integration Exercise 04a (Mar. 2004), Integrated
Missile Defense War Game 03.2 (Nov. 2003), and Pacific Explorer II
(Mar. 2004).[A,B,C].
Software build: Spiral 4.2;
Activity: Testing;
Completion date: Cycle-3: Feb. 2004.
Software build: Spiral 4.3;
Activity: Development;
Completion date: May 2004;
Comments: Spiral 4.3 is the LDO build. It was tested in Pacific
Explorer III (Jul. 2004), Glory Trip 185 (June 2004), Integrated
Missile Defense War Games 04.2 -04.4 (June -Sept 2004), System
Integration and Checkout 6A (Sept. 2004), and other tests.[B,C,D].
Software build: Spiral 4.3;
Activity: Testing;
Completion date: Cycle-3: Aug. 2004; Cycle-4: Ongoing.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] Missile Defense Integration Exercises are hardware-in-the-loop
ground tests conducted to characterize the degree of integration and
interoperability between BMDS elements.
[B] Integrated Missile Defense War Games are ground tests that enable
the warfighter to exercise the C2BMC in a simulated operational
environment. In general, the warfighter community uses them to gain
insight in, and provide feedback on, C2BMC capabilities.
[C] Pacific Explorers are field exercises to demonstrate BMDS
connectivity. An Aegis destroyer participates by tracking an actual
missile (or a simulated target) and passes track data to the C2BMC.
[D] Glory Trips are live flight tests during which a Minuteman III
missile is launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base as part of Follow-on
Test and Evaluation. C2BMC objectives are geared to evaluating the
element's interfacing with, and processing of track data from, forward-
deployed radars.
[End of table]
The program office plans to complete, by the end of calendar year 2005,
key activities pertaining to the development and testing of spirals 4.4
and 4.5--the final two builds of Block 2004 C2BMC element software. For
example, development of spiral 4.4 was completed in November 2004 and
Cycle-3 testing is expected to be completed in April 2005. In addition,
the program office expects to complete development of spiral 4.5 in
March 2005 and begin Cycle-3 testing in June 2005. Cycle-4 testing of
spiral 4.5 is scheduled to begin during the first quarter of fiscal
year 2006 with completion coinciding with the completion of Block 2004.
Status of BMDS Integration and Communications:
The C2BMC program office carried out a number of activities in fiscal
year 2004 related to C2BMC's role in BMDS integration and
communications. For example, interface specifications between C2BMC and
other elements were completed. In addition, communications software and
hardware were installed at the various C2BMC sites, including
USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM. Finally, the C2BMC element
participated in a number of MDA test events to verify system
integration.
Status of Steps Taken to Make BMDS Operational:
The C2BMC program completed a variety of activities in fiscal year 2004
to make the BMDS operational. These activities included activation of
C2BMC suites at the various command sites and the training of military
operators for conducting ballistic missile defense missions. Table 18
summarizes the program's efforts in making the system available for
LDO.
Table 18: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Making System
Operational:
Activity: Site Activation;
Description/Progress assessment: C2BMC suites at USSTRATCOM and
USNORTHCOM were fully activated to support defensive operations.
Furthermore, so-called "web browsers" that provide situational
awareness are ready to support LDO at USPACOM and three National
Capital Region sites. At all sites, hardware installation, software
installation, testing, and a readiness review were completed by Sept.
30, 2004.
Activity: Training;
Description/Progress assessment: C2BMC operator training was completed
at USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USPACOM, and three National Capital Region
sites by Sept. 30, 2004, to support LDO. The warfighter completed a
number of training courses--Joint Defense Planner Class, Situational
Awareness Class, and Flag Officer Class--at all locations and
participated in training events. Operator training continued through
the beginning of fiscal year 2005 as part of the "shakedown" process.
Source: MDA.
[End of table]
Assessment of Element Performance:
During testing of C2BMC software, the C2BMC program uncovered a
performance issue with its "track correlation and association"
algorithm in scenarios involving multiple tracks. During a portion of
fiscal year 2004, the program monitored this issue as a high-risk item
because it had the potential to impact situational awareness. In
particular, threat information could be displayed differently at C2BMC
suites and GMD fire control nodes, possibly causing confusion within
the command structure.[Footnote 50] The program implemented a
mitigation plan to resolve this issue, including the formation of a
"Blue Ribbon Panel" in June 2004 to analyze the problem. The problem
was resolved with software fixes and the issue retired in July 2004.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the C2BMC program from program inception in
2002 through 2011 is approximately $2.2 billion. As broken out in table
19, DOD expended $343 million between fiscal years 2002 and 2004,
Congress appropriated $191 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is
budgeting $1.65 billion for C2BMC development and operations between
fiscal years 2006 and 2011.
Table 19: C2BMC Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 2002[A] -FY 2003;
Other: $$179.4;
Block 2004: $$0;
Block 2006: $$0;
Block 2008: $$0;
Block 2010: $$0;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $179.4.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $92.4;
Block 2006: $52.5;
Block 2008: $0.7;
Block 2010: $0;
Core[B]: $18.3;
Total: $163.9.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $154.0;
Block 2006: $24.0;
Block 2008: $10.8;
Block 2010: $0;
Core[B]: $1.7;
Total: $190.5.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $22.5;
Block 2006: $142.2;
Block 2008: $75.9;
Block 2010: $0;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $240.6.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $16.2;
Block 2006: $153.0;
Block 2008: $100.0;
Block 2010: $11.5;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $280.7.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $23.8;
Block 2008: $197.0;
Block 2010: $60.6;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $281.4.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $16.7;
Block 2008: $166.0;
Block 2010: $104.6;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $287.3.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $65.7;
Block 2010: $217.8;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $283.5.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $56.0;
Block 2010: $223.7;
Core[B]: $0;
Total: $279.7.
FY 2002 -FY 2011;
Other: $$179.4;
Block 2004: $$285.1;
Block 2006: $$412.2;
Block 2008: $$672.1;
Block 2010: $$618.2;
Core[B]: $$20.0;
Total: $$2,187.0.
Source: MDA.
Note: C2BMC budget as of February 2005.
[A] Program inception (FY 2002).
[B] Core funding is part of Program Element 0603890C, "BMD Project."
Core activities involve the hiring of skilled individuals to aid in the
development of the C2BMC element.
[End of table]
Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance:
C2BMC development is being carried out through a contractual vehicle
known as an Other Transaction Agreement (OTA),[Footnote 51] which
functions much like a prime contract. MDA believes that an OTA allows
the C2BMC element to take advantage of more collaborative relationships
between industry, the government, Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers, and University Affiliated Research Centers. OTAs
generally are not subject to federal procurement laws and regulations.
The OTA did implement the earned value management system used to assess
the cost and schedule performance of contractors developing large
weapon systems. The C2BMC Missile Defense National Team, for which
Lockheed Martin Integrated System and Solutions serves as the industry
lead, is developing and fielding the C2BMC element of the BMDS.
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate a prime contractor's cost and schedule
performance. Generally, these reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with
the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.
During fiscal year 2004, C2BMC development was performed under two
parts of the existing OTA--Part 2, for which work was completed in
March 2004, and Part 3, for which work began in March 2004. As
illustrated in figure 6, Cost Performance Reports show that Lockheed
Martin, the industry lead for the OTA, continued to carry a positive
cost variance, that is, in total it completed work under budget.
However, Lockheed experienced a modest erosion in cost performance in
fiscal year 2004. In particular, it completed fiscal year 2004
activities slightly over budget, incurring a negative cost variance of
$3.6 million on combined Part 2 and Part 3 work efforts.
Figure 6: C2BMC Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The prime contractor's schedule performance was slightly, yet
consistently, behind schedule for most of fiscal year 2004. However,
beginning in May 2004, schedule performance sharply declined. In total,
Lockheed incurred a negative schedule variance of $5.7 million for
combined Part 2 and Part 3 work performed in fiscal year 2004.
The C2BMC program office reported the following two drivers as
contributing to fiscal year 2004 cost and schedule variances.
* Track association algorithm. As noted in the performance section, the
C2BMC program uncovered a performance issue with its "track correlation
and association" algorithm during spiral testing. Resources allocated
to spiral 4.4 development were used to address this problem, including
the convening of a Blue Ribbon panel to analyze it. In the course of
analyzing and correcting this issue, more time and money were needed
for additional testing of spiral 4.3 and associated risk reduction
efforts on developing an alternative algorithm.
* Site activation. C2BMC suites are being integrated with existing
systems at USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM. The integration
efforts, particularly those aspects pertaining to information
assurance, were considerably more difficult that anticipated. The
result was the need for more travel by the engineering team to field,
install, and troubleshoot problems at the three activation sites.
[End of section]
Appendix V Summary:
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is a missile defense
system being developed to protect the United States against limited
long-range ballistic missile attacks launched from Northeast Asia and
the Middle East. The first increment of this capability, Block 2004, is
being developed and fielded during the 2004-2005 time frame.
By the end of September 2004, the GMD program put in place the
components of a limited capability, which is known as Limited Defensive
Operations (LDO). MDA plans to augment this capability with additional
interceptors and radars by the end of calendar year 2005 to complete
the full Block 2004 increment.
DOD‘s planned investment in the GMD program from program inception in
1996 through 2011 is approximately $31.6 billion. DOD expended $15.3
billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2004, Congress appropriated $3.3
billion for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $13.0 billion
between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 for GMD development, procurement,
and operations.
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
By the end of fiscal year 2004, GMD carried out planned activities
needed to field an initial missile defense capability, including, as
summarized below, the emplacement of interceptors at Fort Greely,
Alaska. However, delays of flight tests prevented MDA from
demonstrating the operation of the integrated system in a realistic
environment before placing interceptors in silos for defensive
operations. The program also showed unfavorable trends in contractor
cost and schedule performance in fiscal year 2004.
Schedule: The GMD program completed construction of missile silos and
facilities at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California; emplaced five GMD interceptors in their silos at Fort
Greely by the end of September 2004; and completed the upgrade of the
Cobra Dane radar. MDA is on track to add additional interceptors and
radar capabilities throughout Block 2004, although there is some risk
that the sea-based X-band radar will not be completed by the first
quarter of fiscal year 2006, as planned.
Test: The GMD program office conducted two flight tests (non-intercept
booster tests) in fiscal year 2004 out of six events that were
planned”no intercept attempts were conducted. Accordingly, GMD
interceptors were fielded before flight testing was performed to verify
that LDO hardware and software could function in an operational
environment. In preparation for defensive operations, the GMD program
also completed a series of System Integration and Checkouts that
demonstrated connectivity, functionality, and integration of its
fielded components.
Performance: While ground and flight tests have demonstrated each step
of the missile defense engagement sequence”detect, track,
launch/engage, and intercept”collectively, these accomplishments do not
verify integrated operation of the GMD capability. For example, BMDS
and GMD radars have not performed their primary function as a fire
control radar in a flight test event.
Cost: Our analysis of the prime contractor‘s Cost Performance Reports
shows that the contractor overran its budgeted costs in fiscal year
2004 by $219.6 million and was unable to complete $59.9 million worth
of scheduled work. Developmental issues with the interceptor‘s booster
and kill vehicle remain the leading causes of cost overruns and
schedule slips. For example, interceptor development cost $204 million
more in fiscal year 2004 than the contractor budgeted. Flight test
delays also contributed to unfavorable cost and schedule performance.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense:
Element Description:
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is a missile defense
system designed to protect the U.S. homeland against intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM)[Footnote 52] attacks. As an integral part of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), GMD functions to destroy
long-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of flight, the
period after booster burnout when the warhead travels through space on
a predictable path.
The GMD element relies on a broad array of components, including (1)
space-and ground-based sensors to provide early warning and tracking of
missile launches; (2) ground-and sea-based radars to identify and
refine the tracks of threatening objects; (3) ground-based interceptors
to destroy enemy missiles through "hit-to-kill" impacts outside the
atmosphere; and (4) fire control and communications nodes for battle
management and execution of the GMD mission. Figure 7 illustrates GMD
components, current and planned, which are situated at several
locations within and outside of the United States.
The program office produced, emplaced, and upgraded all GMD components
needed for an initial capability by the end of September 2004 and is
working to augment this initial capability with additional interceptors
and radars by the end of calendar year 2005. This first block of
capability--Block 2004--is estimated to provide the U.S. with
protection against ICBMs launched from Northeast Asia and the Middle
East.
Figure 7: Components of the GMD Element:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
History:
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the National Missile
Defense program in 1996 to develop a missile defense system capable of
protecting the United States from ICBM attacks. The program was to be
in a position to deploy the system by 2005, if the threat warranted.
Many of the components used in the current GMD program are based
directly on the research and development conducted by the National
Missile Defense program.
In response to the President's December 2002 directive to field a
missile defense system, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) accelerated
its developmental activities to make the GMD element operational--that
is, to field a working system operated by trained warfighters. GMD
remains a capabilities-based research and development program with
enhanced capabilities delivered periodically in block upgrades.
Developmental Phases:
GMD's development and fielding are proceeding in a series of planned 2-
year blocks, which incrementally increase the element's capability by
maturing the design of element components and upgrading software. Block
2004, the first increment, is being rolled out in two major phases:
* Limited Defensive Operations (LDO). The GMD program completed an
initial capability in September 2004, which is available for limited
defensive operations. The principal components include five
interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska; GMD fire control and
communications nodes for battle management and execution at Fort Greely
and Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at
Eareckson Air Station, Alaska; and connectivity to Aegis BMD for
additional radar tracking. DOD will use this initial capability to
provide the United States with protection against a limited ballistic
missile attack launched from Northeast Asia. This capability was
expanded by the end of calendar year 2004 with the addition of three
interceptors--one at Fort Greely and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base
(VAFB), California--and an upgraded early warning radar (UEWR) at Beale
Air Force Base, California.
* Block 2004 Defensive Capability. By the end of calendar year 2005,
MDA plans to augment the LDO capability by installing 10 additional
interceptors at Fort Greely (for a total of 18 interceptors at Fort
Greely and VAFB); deploying a sea-based X-band radar; and upgrading the
early warning radar at Fylingdales, England. These enhancements are
expected to provide additional protection against ICBMs launched from
the Middle East.
Future block configurations of the GMD element build upon the Block
2004 capability. As part of its Block 2006 program, MDA expects to
field 10 additional interceptors at Fort Greely and upgrade the early
warning radar located at Thule Airbase, Greenland. MDA also plans to
conduct more realistic flight tests to demonstrate performance against
more complex missile threats and environments.
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
The GMD element plays a central role in the Block 2004 BMDS. In
general, planned accomplishments for GMD in fiscal year 2004 centered
on continuing development of element components, conducting ground and
flight testing, and fielding components for LDO. Specific planned
accomplishments include:
* Component Development. The program office planned to continue
development of all element components for LDO, Block 2004, and the
incremental improvement of block capability.
* Testing. The program planned to conduct six flight tests (three
booster tests, one "fly-by" test, and two intercept attempts), two
integrated ground tests, and System Integration and Checkouts in
preparation for LDO.
* Fielding Initial Capability. The program planned to complete
construction of facilities and the installation of five ground-based
interceptors at Fort Greely, complete upgrades of the Cobra Dane radar,
and activate its fire control and communications component.
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
MDA met its fielding goals for LDO and is on track, with some schedule
risk, to add additional interceptors and radar capabilities throughout
Block 2004. Ground tests were conducted to ensure interoperability of
element components and to verify operation and performance of component
software. However, several key flight tests needed to verify the
effectiveness of LDO hardware and software, originally scheduled for
fiscal year 2004, were delayed into fiscal year 2005.
GMD Component Development:
In fiscal year 2004, a large portion of the GMD program focused on the
development of its Block 2004 components, some of which will be fielded
as part of LDO. Summaries of progress made by the GMD program office
during fiscal year 2004 in developing its components are given in table
20.
Table 20: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Component Development:
Component: GMD Fire Control and Communications Component;
Description: The fire control component integrates and controls the
other components of the GMD element. With input from operators, the
fire control software plans engagements and directs GMD components,
such as its radars and interceptors, to carry out a mission to destroy
enemy ballistic missiles. The in-flight interceptor communications
system (IFICS), which is part of the fire control component, enables
the fire control component to communicate with the kill vehicle while
it is en route to engage a threat;
Fiscal Year 2004 progress: In fiscal year 2004, the GMD program
completed software development and testing of the LDO build. MDA also
completed construction of IFICS Data Terminals at Shemya and Fort
Greely and activated the CONUS[A] fiber optic ring, which connects all
the command, control, and communications networks of the GMD element.
Additionally, connectivity to Aegis BMD and the C2BMC were completed.
Component: Upgraded Early Warning Radars; (Beale and Fylingdales);
Description: The early warning radar is an upgraded version of existing
Ultra High Frequency surveillance radars used by the Air Force for
strategic warning and attack assessment. For Block 2004, the GMD
program is upgrading two early warning radars--one at Beale AFB and
another at Fylingdales Airbase--to enable the radars to more accurately
track enemy missiles. The upgrades include improvements to both the
hardware and software;
Fiscal Year 2004 progress: In fiscal year 2004, Beale UEWR ground
support facilities and radar hardware installation were completed.
Although radar hardware installation is complete, final software
installation and testing are ongoing with completion expected in the
middle of fiscal year 2005; MDA also began facility construction and
upgrades to the early warning radar at Fylingdales, which is on track
to be completed by the first quarter of fiscal year 2006.
Component: Upgraded Cobra Dane Radar;
Description: The Cobra Dane radar, located at Eareckson Air Station on
Shemya Island, Alaska, was primarily being used to collect data on ICBM
test launches out of Russia. Cobra Dane's surveillance mission did not
require real-time communications and data-processing capabilities;
therefore, it was upgraded to be capable of performing the missile
defense mission as part of the Block 2004 architecture. As an upgraded
radar, Cobra Dane is expected to operate much like the upgraded early
warning radar at Beale AFB. Although its hardware required minor
modifications, Cobra Dane's mission software is being revised for its
new application. The program plans to use existing software and develop
new software to integrate Cobra Dane into the GMD architecture. It is
also modifying the Cobra Dane facility to accommodate enhanced
communications functions;
Fiscal Year 2004 progress: In fiscal year 2004, the GMD program
completed hardware installation and software upgrades to the Cobra Dane
radar. The radar also tracked a foreign missile launch and participated
in an integrated ground test. While Cobra Dane met most of the data
collection objectives in these tests, the upgraded Cobra Dane radar has
not participated in a flight test event as the primary fire control
radar--a role it would need to fill in the event of a real threat. MDA
may perform a radar certification flight test using a long-range air-
launched target during the third quarter of 2005. The primary objective
of this test is to demonstrate the upgraded Cobra Dane in a more
operationally realistic environment.
Component: Sea-Based X-Band Radar;
Description: The GMD program office is managing the development of a
sea-based X-band radar (SBX) to be delivered and integrated into the
BMDS by the end of Block 2004. SBX will consist of an X-band radar--
based on the technologies of the X-band radar prototype located at
Reagan Test Site--positioned on a sea-based platform, similar to those
used for offshore oil drilling. The radar is designed to track and
discriminate enemy missiles with high accuracy and assess whether an
intercept was successful;
Fiscal Year 2004 progress: During fiscal year 2004, MDA completed most
platform modifications and assembly of the radar structure. Key
electronic components have been completed, and all software design
reviews conducted; The program office assesses the delivery of SBX by
the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 as the program's only significant
risk item. If complications occur in final integration, checkout, or
verification, delivery could be delayed; MDA plans to exercise the SBX
in flight tests beginning in fiscal year 2006.
Component: Ground-Based Interceptor;
Description: The ground-based interceptor--the weapon component of the
GMD element--consists of a kill vehicle mounted atop a three-stage
booster. The booster, which is essentially an ICBM-class missile,
delivers and deploys the kill vehicle into a trajectory to engage the
threat. Once deployed, the kill vehicle uses its onboard guidance,
navigation, and control subsystem (along with target updates from the
fire control node component) to detect, track, and steer itself into
the enemy warhead, destroying it above the atmosphere through a hit-to-
kill collision;
Fiscal Year 2004 progress: In fiscal year 2004, MDA placed the first
five interceptors into silos at Fort Greely; a sixth interceptor was
delivered in October 2004; MDA continued to work toward building and
integrating pieces of additional missiles that will be delivered
throughout 2005. For example, interceptors #7 and #8 were placed into
VAFB silos during December 2004, as scheduled.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] CONUS refers to the Continental United States, i.e., the lower 48
states.
[End of table]
In our April 2004 report on missile defense,[Footnote 53] we noted that
MDA is pursuing the development of two types of boosters for the GMD
interceptor, one referred to as the Lockheed BV+ booster and the other
known as the Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) booster. We also
described how problems with the development and delivery of Lockheed's
BV+ booster contributed to cost growth and schedule slips for the
program. For example, BV+ production was temporarily suspended because
of two separate explosions at a subcontractor's propellant-mixing
facility.
Despite these problems, MDA is dedicated to pursuing a dual-booster
strategy. However, the problems with Lockheed's booster in fiscal year
2003 had ramifications for the program's fiscal year 2004 activities.
For example, MDA planned to use BV+ boosters in alternating Block 2004
flight tests and in about half of the interceptors fielded. However,
because of BV+ development and production problems, MDA deferred BV+
participation in integrated flight tests into Block 2006, and the Block
2004 inventory of GMD interceptors will consist entirely of those
utilizing OSC boosters. MDA plans to restart the manufacturing of BV+
boosters in fiscal year 2005 and to field the first BV+ booster in
2007.
GMD Testing:
The GMD program conducts a variety of tests, the most visible being
flight test events. For example, the program conducted booster
validation (BV) flight tests to assess the operation of GMD's two
booster designs. In addition, the program conducts integrated flight
tests (IFT) to more realistically demonstrate the GMD element using
actual hardware and software. IFTs are reflective of the environment in
which the GMD element would operate for a given threat trajectory and
given set of conditions.
Although MDA hoped to gain knowledge about the element's effectiveness
by conducting several integrated flight tests throughout fiscal year
2004, only two of six scheduled tests--non-intercept tests of the
Lockheed BV+ booster and the OSC booster--were executed. Table 21
summarizes the major GMD flight tests that MDA planned to conduct in
fiscal year 2004.
Table 21: Status of Major GMD Flight Tests (Fiscal Year 2004):
Test event: BV-5[A];
Date: Original date: Feb. 20, 2003.
Actual date: Jan. 9, 2004;
Description: BV+ Booster Test.
Objectives:
* Characterize Lockheed's BV+ booster performance;
Outcome: All booster objectives were achieved. However, the mock kill
vehicle failed to deploy.
Test event: IFT-13A;
Date: Original date: May 2003.
Planned date: Deferred indefinitely;
Description: BV+ Booster Test.
Objectives:
* Characterize booster and kill vehicle environments;
* Engage simulated target as part of an integrated system;
Outcome: The program deferred this test until BV+ production resumes.
Test event: IFT-13B;
Date: Original date: July 2003.
Actual date: Jan. 26, 2004;
Description: OSC Booster Test[B].
Objectives:
* Characterize booster and kill vehicle environments;
* Engage simulated target as part of an integrated system;
Outcome: The test was a successful demonstration of the OSC booster--
all test objectives were achieved.
Test event: IFT-13C;
Date: Original date: Mar. 2004.
Actual date: Dec. 14, 2004;
Description: Non-intercept attempt (zero-offset flyby)[C] with the OSC
booster.
Configuration:
* Target launch from Kodiak;
* Interceptor launch from Reagan Test Site;
* Interceptor: LDO configuration;
Outcome: Because the interceptor failed to launch from its silo, test
objectives associated with booster and kill vehicle functioning could
not be assessed. The root cause of the test failure was attributed to a
timing problem with the interceptor's flight computer, which caused the
interceptor to abort its launch.
Test event: IFT-14;
Date: Original date: Oct. 2003.
Actual date: Feb. 14, 2005;
Description: System test (intercept attempt) with OSC booster.
Configuration:
* Target launch from Kodiak;
* Interceptor launch from Reagan Test Site;
* Interceptor: LDO configuration;
Outcome: Because the interceptor failed to launch from its silo, test
objectives associated with booster and kill vehicle functioning could
not be assessed. The reason for the launch failure is under
investigation.
Test event: FTG-04-1;
Date: Planned date: 4Q FY2005[D];
Description: System test (intercept attempt) with OSC booster.
Configuration:
* Target launch from Kodiak;
* Interceptor launch from VAFB;
* Interceptor: LDO configuration;
Outcome: TBD.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
Note: Test schedule as of October 2004.
[A] BV-5 was the last flight test to use Lockheed's BV+ booster.
[B] Orbital Sciences Corporation builds the OSC boost vehicle. MDA
accelerated the production of OSC boosters to compensate for the
undelivered BV+ boosters. All of the Block 2004 interceptors use OSC
boosters.
[C] A "zero-offset flyby" means that intercepting the target is not a
test objective. However, no action is taken to prevent an intercept.
[D] We use the notation "4Q FY2005" to mean the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2005 and an identical format for other time periods.
[End of table]
IFT-13C, which was the first flight test in 2 years with the potential
for an intercept,[Footnote 54] was delayed several times during fiscal
year 2004. Part of the delay was attributed to technical problems with
the interceptor. In addition, MDA upgraded the test interceptor to a
configuration that more closely matches the ones deployed. The test was
conducted in December 2004, but failed to execute fully because the
interceptor did not launch from its silo. IFT-13C was of particular
significance, because it was to have demonstrated operational aspects
of the LDO capability for the first time in a flight test environment.
For example, it was to have demonstrated: (1) the operation of LDO
hardware and software; (2) the operation of the kill vehicle mated with
an OSC booster; and (3) "real-time" connectivity between Aegis
destroyers and the C2BMC. IFT-14 was conducted in February 2005 as a
repeat of IFT-13C but with the added objective to achieve an intercept.
However, as in IFT-13C, it failed to execute fully because the
interceptor did not launch from its silo.
MDA relies heavily on its ground test program to characterize element
and system performance (especially under a broad set of conditions not
testable in flight), to demonstrate interoperability, and to develop
operational doctrine. MDA conducted two integrated ground tests (IGT)
in fiscal year 2004, IGT-2 and IGT-4a. These tests employed actual GMD-
component processors integrated together in a hardware-in-the-loop
facility that emulated GMD operation in a simulated environment. They
also included warfighter participation to aid in the development of
operational concepts. Although the tests demonstrated that GMD
components could work together, its utility in assessing element
performance was limited. Officials in the office of DOT&E told us that
such assessments should be anchored by flight test data so that models
and simulations accurately characterize the system. Delays in the GMD
flight test program precluded these tests from being adequately
anchored and, therefore, limited its usefulness in assessing element
performance.
The GMD program also participated in a series of System Integration and
Checkouts (SICO) of its fielded components. While these checkouts do
not assess element performance, they do demonstrate connectivity,
functionality, integration, and configuration in preparation for
defensive operations. During fiscal year 2004, MDA successfully
conducted SICOs 1, 3, 5, and 6A. SICO 3 demonstrated the integration of
non-LDO interceptor equipment at Fort Greely into the overall BMDS;
SICO 5 confirmed that the upgraded Cobra Dane radar was properly
connected to the Communications Network; and SICO 6A confirmed
integration of LDO interceptor equipment at Fort Greely into the BMDS.
Finally, SICO 6B was successfully conducted in the beginning of fiscal
year 2005 (December 2004). It demonstrated the integration of
interceptor equipment at Vandenberg into the BMDS.
Fielding Initial Capability:
The GMD program completed the development, emplacement, and/or upgrade
of element components planned for LDO, including ground-based
interceptors, the Cobra Dane radar, the Beale UEWR (in fiscal year
2005), and the GMD fire control and communications. Most notably, five
interceptors were placed in silos at Fort Greely and are available for
defensive operations. GMD also completed hardware and software upgrades
to the Cobra Dane and Beale radars, both of which met objectives in
ground tests and tracked targets of opportunity. Fire control and
communications nodes have been activated and linked to all GMD
locations. Finally, facility construction at Fort Greely and other GMD
sites was completed. Table 22 summarizes main accomplishments made in
fiscal year 2004 for each activity.
Table 22: Status of GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Fielding Initial Capability:
Activity: Ground Based Interceptor: Deliver and install 5 interceptors
at Fort Greely;
Description/Progress assessment: Five interceptors were delivered and
installed at Fort Greely by September 30, 2004. Three additional
interceptors were delivered (1 to Fort Greely; 2 to VAFB) by December
2004; MDA plans to have 18 interceptors available for defensive
operations by the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2006, two
less than the agency's Block 2004 fielding goal. Of the 20 interceptors
originally planned, two were designated as test assets.
Activity: Cobra Dane Radar: Complete upgrades, checkout, and
activation;
Description/Progress assessment: Installation and checkout of Cobra
Dane's mission equipment was completed ahead of schedule. Cobra Dane
software development was also completed. The radar successfully tracked
a foreign missile launch but has not participated in any BMDS flight
tests that demonstrate real-time tracking and communications as part of
an integrated system.
Activity: Beale UEWR: Complete upgrades, checkout, and activation;
Description/Progress assessment: All planned hardware upgrades and GMD
software for LDO were completed. The Beale UEWR is now integrated with
the BMDS. Although radar hardware installation is complete, final
software installation and testing are ongoing with completion expected
in the middle of fiscal year 2005; The upgraded radar successfully
tracked a Titan missile launched out of VAFB and several satellites but
has not participated in any MDA-dedicated tests like radar
certification flights or integrated flight tests in its upgraded
configuration. The full checkout of the upgraded software will not be
verified in a flight test until fiscal year 2005.
Activity: GMD fire control and communications: Complete installation,
checkout, and activation;
Description/Progress assessment: GMD fire control and communications
were completed on schedule to support fielding of the GMD element. The
CONUS fiber optic ring and spurs to all GMD locations were activated.
Satellite communication links were established and all IFICS Data
Terminals were completed.
Activity: Construction: Complete construction and installation at Fort
Greely and Shemya;
Description/Progress assessment: All facilities required for alert at
Fort Greely were completed, including the first missile field,
Readiness and Control Building, Mechanical Electrical Building, and the
on-site IFICS Data Terminals. The Missile Assembly Building and the
interim power plant, although not required for LDO, were also
completed.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Assessment of Element Performance:
GMD, the centerpiece of the BMDS Block 2004 defensive capability, has
demonstrated its ability to intercept target warheads in several flight
tests since 1999. Indeed, the program has achieved five successful
intercepts out of eight attempts.[Footnote 55] In addition, according
to MDA officials, ground and flight tests have demonstrated each step
of the engagement sequence--detect, track, launch/engage, and
intercept--collectively, although these accomplishments do not verify
integrated operation of the GMD capability.
Although GMD flight tests have demonstrated basic functionality of a
representative missile defense system using surrogate and prototype
components, the tests were developmental in nature and relied on
artificialities to overcome test-range limitations. For example, flight
tests required the placement of a C-band transponder and Global
Positioning System instrumentation on the target reentry vehicle. In
addition, engagement conditions were limited to low closing velocities
and short interceptor fly-out ranges. Finally, the tests were scripted
and did not use production-representative hardware and software.
In its push to field the first eight GMD interceptors by the end of
December 2004, MDA is assuming both performance and cost risk. As noted
above, the GMD program emplaced interceptors in silos before
successfully conducting a flight test utilizing components with the LDO
configuration. For example, the program did not demonstrate that the
kill vehicle could operate with the OSC booster prior to placing it in
the silo for future operational use (even though this booster puts more
stress on the kill vehicle). If future flight testing identifies
problems with fielded interceptors, the need for corrective actions
could be costly, but confidence would increase as corrections are made
and capability is understood.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the GMD program from program inception in
1996 through 2011 is approximately $31.6 billion. As broken out in
table 23, DOD expended $15.3 billion between fiscal years 1996 and
2004,[Footnote 56] Congress appropriated $3.3 billion for fiscal year
2005, and MDA is budgeting about $13.0 billion between fiscal years
2006 and 2011 for GMD development, procurement, and operations.
Table 23: GMD Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 1996[A] -FY 2003;
Other: $$12,370;
Block 2004: $$0;
Block 2006: $$0;
Block 2008: $$0;
Block 2010: $$0;
Total: $$12,370.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $1,357;
Block 2006: $1,587;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $2,944.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $2,756;
Block 2006: $563;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $3,319.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $2,224;
Block 2008: $74;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $2,298.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $2,232;
Block 2008: $281;
Block 2010: $189;
Total: $2,702.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $331;
Block 2008: $1,425;
Block 2010: $717;
Total: $2,473.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $234;
Block 2008: $1,176;
Block 2010: $655;
Total: $2,065.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $338;
Block 2010: $1,557;
Total: $1,895.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2004: $0;
Block 2006: $0;
Block 2008: $213;
Block 2010: $1,350;
Total: $1,563.
FY 1996 -FY 2011;
Other: $$12,370;
Block 2004: $$4,113;
Block 2006: $$7,171;
Block 2008: $$3,507;
Block 2010: $$4,468;
Total: $$31,629.
Source: MDA.
Note: GMD budget as of February 2005.
[A] Program inception (FY 1996).
[End of table]
Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
GMD's prime contract consumes the bulk of the program's budget. The
contract originally covered Block 2004 and Block 2006 developmental
activities, not the procurement and fielding of interceptors for the
initial defensive capability. Therefore, the program significantly
modified the contract in October 2003. The $823 million modification
directed the delivery of Block 2004 interceptors 6-20. The program is
expected to modify the contract again to procure additional
interceptors. The added cost of these interceptors is already reflected
in the planned GMD budget and MDA cost goals.
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost
and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with
the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.
The GMD program showed an unfavorable trend in contractor performance
in fiscal year 2004. According to our analysis, the contractor exceeded
its budgeted costs during fiscal year 2004 by $219.6 million, which
equates to 11.6 percent of the contract value over the fiscal year. In
addition, the contractor fell behind schedule in its work plan. In
fiscal year 2004, the contractor was unable to complete $59.9 million
of planned work. Figure 8 shows how the contractor's cumulative cost
and schedule performance declined during fiscal year 2004.
Figure 8: GMD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Our analysis shows that developmental issues with the interceptor
continue to be the leading contributor to cost overruns and schedule
slips. Interceptor-related work cost $204 million more than budgeted in
fiscal year 2004, with the kill vehicle accounting for approximately 40
percent of this overrun. Delays in flight tests IFT-13C and IFT-14 also
caused unfavorable cost and schedule variances.
Based on the contractor's cost and schedule performance in fiscal year
2004, we estimate that the current GMD contract--which ends in
September 2007--will overrun its budget by between $593 million and
$950 million. The contractor, in contrast, estimates a $200 million
overrun at contract completion. However, as of the end of fiscal year
2004, the contractor had already incurred a negative cumulative cost
variance of approximately $348 million. In order for the prime
contractor to complete the contract within the established budget, the
contractor must not incur any additional cost overruns through contract
completion and recoup at least $148 million. The Defense Contract
Management Agency believes that the prime contractor is optimistic in
projecting that it can limit further cost growth and schedule slips.
Indeed, the Defense Contract Management Agency predicts that the
contractor will continue to fall behind and be unable to recover from
past cost growth and schedule slips.
[End of section]
Appendix VI Summary:
Kinetic Energy Interceptors:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) element is a new Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) program in its early stage of development. The program is
building on existing missile defense technology to develop an
interceptor capable of destroying long-range ballistic missiles during
the boost phase of flight”the period after launch when rocket motors
are thrusting. KEI also provides the opportunity to engage an enemy
missile in the early-ascent phase, the period after booster burnout
before warheads are released. MDA expects to have available a land-
based capability in the 2012-2013 time frame.
DOD‘s planned investment in the KEI program from program inception in
2003 through 2011 is approximately $6.0 billion. DOD expended $192
million between fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress appropriated $267
million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $5.5 billion
for KEI research and development between fiscal years 2006 and 2011.
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
KEI program activities completed in fiscal year 2004 include the
selection of Northrop Grumman as prime contractor for KEI development,
associated planning activities, and experimental work geared toward
collecting data of boosting missiles. Of significance, the amount
appropriated by Congress for missile defense in fiscal years 2004 and
2005 did not include the amount of funding for KEI that was requested
in the President‘s Budget. As a result, the program delayed its land-
based capability from the originally planned Block 2008 time frame to
Block 2012.
Schedule: In December 2003, MDA awarded Northrop Grumman a $4.6 billion
prime contract to develop and test the KEI element over the next 8
years. The award follows an 8-month concept design effort between
competing contractor teams, each of which was awarded $10 million
contracts to design concepts for KEI.
Testing: In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program office continued with
activities designed to reduce technical risks in developing the KEI
interceptor. In particular, the program office is working on an
experiment to collect data on boosting missiles, known as the Near
Field Infrared Experiment. At this early stage of development, however,
no significant testing of the land-based capability has been conducted
by the program office.
Performance: Because this element is still in its infancy, data are not
yet available to make a performance assessment. However, the program
office identified areas of high risk that could have an impact on the
element‘s future performance. All risks are associated with interceptor
development”including motor development and plume-to-hardbody
handover”stemming from the demands required of the boost phase
intercept mission.
Cost: Our analysis of the prime contractor‘s cost performance report
shows that the contractor completed planned work under budget but was
slightly behind schedule in performing planned activities.
Specifically, during fiscal year 2004, the contractor could not
complete about $1.6 million worth of work. The program was unexpectedly
tasked to complete trade studies of how to incorporate new requirements
being imposed by MDA. Due to plans to restructure the KEI program, the
prime contract‘s long-term baseline is no longer relevant; a reliable
baseline will not be available until 2005.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Kinetic Energy Interceptors:
Element Description:
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) element is a missile defense
system designed to destroy ballistic missiles during the boost phase of
flight, the period after launch during which the missile's rocket
motors are thrusting. KEI is also planned to engage enemy missiles in
the early ascent-phase, the period after booster burnout before the
missile releases warheads and countermeasures. Unlike the Airborne
Laser element, which utilizes directed energy to disable boosting
missiles, the KEI element launches interceptors to engage and destroy
these threats through hit-to-kill collisions.
The KEI program is currently focused on developing a mobile, land-based
system--to be fully demonstrated by the Block 2012 time frame--to
protect the United States against long-range ballistic missile
attacks.[Footnote 57] The land-based system will be a deployable unit
consisting of a command and control/battle management unit, mobile
launchers, and interceptors. The KEI element has no sensor component,
such as radars, for detecting and tracking boosting missiles. Instead,
it will rely on Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensors, such
as space-based infrared sensors and forward-deployed radars, for such
functions.
Concurrent with KEI development, the program is proceeding with its
Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE). The experiment consists of
launching an experimental satellite in fiscal year 2006 to collect
infrared imagery of boosting intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM). The data it collects will support the program's efforts in
developing the software that operates the interceptor's kill vehicle,
in addition to enhancing plume[Footnote 58] models and boost-phase
simulations.
History:
In fiscal year 2003, MDA initiated the KEI program as part of its Boost
Defense Segment. To select a contractor and a concept for the element,
the KEI program office awarded competitive contracts to teams headed by
Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Each contractor was given the
flexibility to design a system that met only one broad requirement--
that the KEI element be capable of reliably intercepting missiles in
their boost/ascent phases. MDA did not set cost or schedule
requirements or specify how the contractors should design the system.
MDA initially requested funds for the KEI element along with other
boost-phase defense elements, such as the Airborne Laser, in its Boost
Defense Segment. However, in fiscal year 2004, MDA budgeted the KEI
program under a new area known as BMDS Interceptors.
Developmental Phases:
The KEI element is being developed under MDA's acquisition approach,
which delivers system capabilities in 2-year block increments. When the
KEI concept was first being pursued in fiscal year 2003--during which
Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin were competing for the prime
contract--the program planned on developing a mobile, land-based system
to be available in the Block 2008 time frame and expanding it to sea-
based platforms in Block 2010. However, the amount appropriated by
Congress for missile defense in fiscal year 2004 did not include the
amount of funding for KEI that was requested in the President's Budget.
As a result, the program delayed completion of its land-based
capability into Block 2010 and delayed the expansion of the sea-based
capability into Block 2012.
In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program underwent a second re-plan to
compensate for anticipated fiscal year 2005 funding cuts and the
addition of new requirements (such as nuclear hardening) imposed by
MDA. In the re-plan, the land-based capability was combined with the
sea-based capability of Block 2012, both of which utilize the same
interceptor.
The KEI program has undergone further restructuring, as reflected in
the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget submitted in February 2005.
Based on revised funding levels beyond fiscal year 2005, the program
deferred the sea-based capability into Block 2014 (2014-2015 time
frame), removed the international program, and initiated plans for a
Space Test Bed.
The program now expects to develop KEI capabilities as follows:
* Block 2012--land. MDA envisions that the first-generation land based
interceptors would be launched from trucks that can be driven up close
to the border of the threatening nation. An initial land-based
capability will be declared after the final flight test, Integrated
Test 5 (IT-5), is conducted by the end of 2013.
* Block 2014--sea. This block increment expands KEI's land-based
capabilities to include the capability to launch KEI interceptors from
sea-based platforms, such as Aegis cruisers. The sea-based capability
will use the same interceptor as the land-based capability.
* Blocks 2012/2014--space test bed. Development of the space test bed
is planned to be carried out concurrently with the development of KEI's
terrestrial (land and sea) capabilities. Consisting of a limited
constellation of space-based interceptors, the test bed is envisioned
to provide an additional layer of defense against ICBMs. MDA plans to
initiate a concept design phase in fiscal year 2008 and conduct space-
based intercept tests in the Block 2012/2014 time frame.
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
The KEI program planned to accomplish several activities during fiscal
year 2004 associated with the land-based capability, with its primary
focus being the selection of a prime contractor for KEI's developmental
phase. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, the program selected
Northrop Grumman as its prime contractor and awarded the company a
contract valued at $4.6 billion that covers a 98-month performance
period.
The program office also planned to complete design, test, and risk
reduction efforts in fiscal year 2004. However, budget reductions
forced Northrop Grumman to delay several of these planned activities
until fiscal year 2005. The program office originally told the
contractor to plan for a $90 million budget during fiscal year 2004,
but only $47 million was available. Because program funding in fiscal
year 2004 was much less than requested, several design and test
activities were postponed into fiscal year 2005. For example, the
program's System Requirements Review (SRR)--a review during which
mission objectives are documented, critical components are identified,
and program planning is established--was postponed into fiscal year
2005.
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
While the program completed a number of its planned activities,
overall, the KEI program progressed much more slowly than anticipated.
As noted above, Northrop Grumman was forced to re-plan several
scheduled activities because of reduced funding for the KEI program in
fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Progress made toward achieving scheduled
activities is summarized in tables 24 through 27.
A key program accomplishment in fiscal year 2004 was the selection of
Northrop Grumman as the KEI prime contractor. The KEI program office
employed a unique acquisition strategy in the award of the contract by
making mission assurance--the successful operation of the element to
perform its mission--the basis for the amount of the contractor's
profit from the performance of the contract. MDA built incentives into
the contract that require the prime contractor to assure mission
assurance through a disciplined execution of quality processes. For
example, the contractor earns an award fee only if flight tests are
successful, and the percentage of the award fee earned is determined by
whether the tests are conducted on schedule. The program's intention is
to maximize the contractor's incentives to develop a quality product on
schedule and at the originally proposed price.
Table 24: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Contract Award and Planning:
Activity: Award KEI Block 2010 Development and Test Contract;
Description/Progress assessment: In December 2003, Northrop Grumman was
awarded the prime contract for KEI development. The cost-plus-award-fee
contract is valued at $4.6 billion and covers a 98-month performance
period (Dec. 2003 to Jan. 2012).
Activity: Conduct Integrated Baseline Review (IBR)[A];
Description/Progress assessment: The IBR for the Development and Test
Contract was completed in March 2004. The review concluded with a
decision to re-plan work given the funding constraints and to have the
contractor address the cost of adding additional MDA-imposed
requirements, such as anti-tampering, nuclear hardening, and
insensitive munitions.[B].
Activity: Conduct Block 2010 System Requirements Review (SRR);
Description/Progress assessment: The SRR is being deferred until April
2005. At that time, program officials will set specific requirements
for the KEI element based on detailed design trades, risk reduction
tests, and performance assessments at both the element and component
level.
Activity: Conduct "Continuation Review";
Description/Progress assessment: The fiscal year 2004 Continuation
Review--a review to assess whether the program should continue--was
deferred until the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2005. The program office
reasoned that the value offered by such a review would be limited with
only eight months of performance toward a 98-month contract.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] An integrated baseline review is the program manager's review of a
contractor's performance measurement baseline. The review is conducted
by the program manager and the manager's technical staff. It verifies
the technical content of the baseline and ensures that contractor
personnel understand and have been adequately trained to collect earned
value management data. The review also verifies the accuracy of the
related budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been properly
identified, assesses the contractor's ability to implement earned value
management properly, and determines if the work identified by the
contractor meets the program's objectives.
[B] An insensitive munition is one that will not detonate under any
condition other than its intended mission to destroy a target.
[End of table]
Table 25: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Design Activities:
Activity: Develop element simulations and models;
Description/Progress assessment: The Kinetic Energy Interceptors
Simulation was delivered by Northrop Grumman to MDA in July 2004. The
simulation will be used to evaluate the end-to-end performance of the
KEI element.
Activity: Develop interface requirements between KEI and C2BMC;
Description/Progress assessment: The KEI program completed an initial
draft of the KEI-to-C2BMC Interface Control Document in June 2004.
Activity: Finalize acquisition plans for sea-based test bed platform;
Description/Progress assessment: The KEI program is investigating the
use of a CG-47 class vessel to be used as a test asset so that a better
understanding of the effects of the sea environment on KEI operation is
gained. A survey is underway to determine the condition of the vessel
and whether the vessel could accommodate a launcher.
Activity: Initiate Concept of Operations (CONOPS) development with the
warfighter;
Description/Progress assessment: The KEI program provided a draft
CONOPS to the Army community for review in May 2004. Additionally, the
program office commissioned the Navy to conduct a CONOPS study to
determine the feasibility of integrating and operating KEI from
cruisers, destroyers, and/or submarines. The Navy completed this study
in August 2004.
Activity: Initiate launcher control electronic assembly development;
Description/Progress assessment: As a result of program re-planning,
this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005.
Activity: Design and fabricate Special Test Equipment for interceptor
design verification testing;
Description/Progress assessment: As a result of program re-planning,
this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005.
Activity: Establish interceptor manufacturing process laboratory;
Description/Progress assessment: As a result of program re-planning,
this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Table 26: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Key
Test Activities:
Activity: Initiate range planning;
Description/Progress assessment: Northrop Grumman continues to work on
facilities as well as environmental and commercial support agreements
with the ranges.
Activity: Establish target requirements;
Description/Progress assessment: The KEI program office initiated a
draft Target System Requirements Document in January 2004. Working with
Northrop Grumman, KEI will deliver the final version to the MDA
Configuration Control Board following the SRR in April 2005.
Activity: Establish Developmental Master Test Plan;
Description/Progress assessment: The delay in the SRR resulted in a
delay in Developmental Master Test Plan delivery. Based on the current
schedule, the program expects to deliver the test plan in July 2005, 90
days after the SRR.
Activity: Static booster motor firing;
Description/Progress assessment: This activity, which would have been
the first firing of booster motors for the interceptor, was deferred
into fiscal year 2005.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Table 27: Status of KEI Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--Risk
Reduction Activities:
Activity: Continue collection of boost/ascent phenomenology data;
Description/Progress assessment: The KEI program received high-
resolution data sets from several Target of Opportunity data
collections during fiscal year 2004. These series of data collections
provide realistic, high-resolution data sets of plumes for a variety of
missile launches.
Activity: NFIRE activities;
Description/Progress assessment: MDA directed the program to proceed
with the experiment but remove the kill vehicle payload from the
experiment's satellite, thereby reducing funding needs for fiscal year
2005.
Activity: Liquid Divert and Attitude Control System demonstration
activities;
Description/Progress assessment: As a result of program re-planning,
this activity was deferred into fiscal year 2005.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Assessment of Element Performance:
At this early stage of element development, data are not available to
evaluate element performance through the use of technical indicators.
However, the program office identified areas of high risk[Footnote 59]
that may have an impact on the element's future performance. Table 28
summarizes these risks. All risks are associated with interceptor
operation for the boost-phase intercept mission.
Table 28: KEI High-Risk Areas:
Technology: Motor Development;
Risk/Area of concern: According to program officials, there is
significant risk in achieving the required booster thrust and burn time
performance to meet element requirements.
Technology: Plume-to-hardbody handover[A];
Risk/Area of concern: The risk pertaining to plume-to-hardbody handover
arises from a lack of phenomenology data. The program initially planned
to utilize a 1-color infrared seeker for the kill vehicle, a plan
driven by schedule constraints. However, because of program changes
resulting in more time for element development, the program is
proceeding with a 2-color seeker that enables the kill vehicle to
better differentiate between the plume and hardbody.
Technology: Thrust Vector Control;
Risk/Area of concern: The thrust vector control component of the
booster is used to steer the interceptor during its boost phase.
Program officials rated its development as a high-risk item. The risk
stems from the need for highly capable steering of the boosting
interceptor under stressing scenarios.
Technology: Predicted Impact Point/Divert Trades;
Risk/Area of concern: This risk pertains to maintaining a balanced
design trade to enable the kill vehicle to intercept the missile given
targeting uncertainty. The design trade is between (1) predicted impact
point accuracy (achieved by the KEI battle manager component) and (2)
kill-vehicle divert requirements to compensate for targeting errors.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] Plume-to-hardbody handover refers to the identification of the
actual missile from among the plume of hot exhaust gas that obscures
the body of the boosting missile.
[End of table]
In its July 2003 report on the boost-phase intercept mission,[Footnote
60] the American Physical Society indicated that "time line" is a major
challenge for boost phase defense systems. In particular, boost phase
defense against ICBMs hinges (in large part) on the length of time an
attacking missile is in boost phase and on the speed of the defending
interceptor. Accordingly, KEI program officials recognize the time
constraints of the boost phase intercept mission and the challenge in
developing quicker interceptors--as is evident by the first high-risk
item of table 28.
This same report also questions the feasibility of a land-based boost-
phase intercept concept, especially against large nations. For example,
the report states that a boost-phase intercept system employing
terrestrial-based interceptors would generally be ineffective against
ICBMs launched from the interiors of large countries--those having
dimensions greater than 1,000 kilometers. Nonetheless, the program
office contends sufficient coverage is possible given adequate numbers
and stationing of KEI units. Furthermore, sea basing, which offers more
options for boost phase defense, builds directly upon the investments
being made in the land-based capability.
Finally, a scientific study on boost phase defense commissioned by
MDA[Footnote 61] focused on selected issues of high risk. Plume-to-
hardbody handover was identified as high risk because of a lack of
plume phenomenology data available for determining the appropriate
sensor combination for the interceptor. The program office recognizes
this challenge, as noted in table 28. As a result, the KEI program is
proceeding with a 2-color seeker, better enabling the kill vehicle to
differentiate between the plume and hardbody of a missile. In addition,
the program is sponsoring NFIRE and participating in targets of
opportunity to collect data of boosting missiles.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the KEI program from program inception in
2003 through 2011 is approximately $6.0 billion. As broken out in table
29, DOD expended $192 million between fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
Congress appropriated $267 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is
budgeting about $5.5 billion for KEI research and development between
fiscal years 2006 and 2011.
Table 29: KEI Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 2003[A];
Other: $$91.5;
Block 2010: $$0;
Block 2012: $$0;
Space Test Bed: $0;
Total: $$91.5.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $100.6;
Block 2012: $0;
Space Test Bed: $0;
Total: $100.6.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $267.4;
Space Test Bed: $0;
Total: $267.4.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $218.7;
Space Test Bed: $0;
Total: $218.7.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $420.2;
Space Test Bed: $0;
Total: $420.2.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $604.6;
Space Test Bed: $45.0;
Total: $649.6.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $961.1;
Space Test Bed: $150.0;
Total: $1,111.1.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $1,189.3;
Space Test Bed: $248.0;
Total: $1,437.3.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $1,453.5;
Space Test Bed: $230.0;
Total: $1,683.5.
FY 2003-FY 2011;
Other: $$91.5;
Block 2010: $$100.6;
Block 2012: $$5,114.8;
Space Test Bed: $$673.0;
Total: $$5,978.9.
Source: MDA.
Note: KEI budget as of February 2005.
[A] Program inception (FY 2003).
[End of table]
Table 29 reflects the planned funding profile of the KEI program as
presented in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2006, which was
submitted in February 2005. When compared with the fiscal year 2005
President's Budget--submitted last year in February 2004--KEI's current
funding level is considerably less. Indeed, last year MDA budgeted
$7.87 billion for KEI program activities between fiscal years 2004 and
2009. The current budget of $2.77 billion over the same time period
represents a 65 percent reduction in program funding.
Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance:
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost
and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with
the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.
The KEI prime contractor performed work in fiscal year 2004 near its
budgeted costs. From contract inception through August 2004 (which
covers less than 1 percent of the contract), the contractor completed
work slightly under budget but was behind schedule in performing about
$1.6 million worth of planned work. Program officials indicated that
the negative schedule variance was the result of the contractor
delaying activities so that it could conduct trade studies on new
requirements imposed by MDA. For example, the contractor has been
directed to determine the cost of adding requirements for anti-
tampering, nuclear hardening, and insensitive munitions.
Because of plans to restructure the KEI program, the long-term
performance measurement baseline[Footnote 62] is no longer relevant.
Near-term work is still being performed according to plan, but the
program suspended contractor cost and schedule performance reporting
for current work efforts after August 2004. As a result, KEI program
officials had reduced insight into its prime contractor's work efforts
for a portion of fiscal year 2004. The program office told us that the
contractor will resume reporting in 2005 after a reliable baseline that
reflects the full extent of the program's restructure is available.
[End of section]
Appendix VII Summary:
Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) is being developed as
a constellation of low-orbiting satellites to detect and track enemy
missiles throughout all phases of flight. Funded and managed by the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), STSS replaces the Air Force‘s Space-Based
Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low) program. The STSS program office is
preparing to launch in 2007 two technology demonstration satellites
that were partially built under the SBIRS-Low program. MDA intends to
assess how well these satellites perform missile defense surveillance
and tracking functions and use this information to establish
capabilities and goals for next-generation STSS satellites.
DOD‘s planned investment in the STSS program from program inception in
2002 through 2011 is approximately $4.5 billion. DOD expended $819
million between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, Congress appropriated $305
million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $3.35 billion
for element development between fiscal years 2006 and 2011.
MDA‘s planned budget for the next 6 years through 2011 funds activities
associated with the assembly and launch of the two demonstrator
satellites (Block 2006), ground segment upgrades (Block 2008), and the
development of an operational constellation of satellites (Block 2012).
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
The STSS program office accomplished all but one of the principal Block
2006 activities planned for completion in fiscal year 2004 and
initiated work planned for completion in fiscal year 2005. Although the
prime contractor is working to an accelerated delivery schedule,
quality and systems-engineering problems with a subcontractor are
jeopardizing the early delivery of a satellite‘s payload.
Schedule: Program activities completed in fiscal year 2004 include the
complex tasks of systems integration, testing, and software
development. The program office completed a critical design review on
time. Hardware modifications to the satellites were completed, but a
heat problem resulting from the redesign of the electrical power
subsystem caused a delay of three months. Software development
activities were also completed, and reviews to ensure that the design
for the STSS ground system could accommodate a larger constellation of
satellites were conducted.
Testing: Functional tests on components of the second technology
demonstration satellite were completed several months late because of
minor problems with the spacecraft‘s computer processor and other
components. Planned integration tests on the track sensor were not
completed, and integration testing of an interim version of the
software that controls the sensors onboard the satellites took longer
than planned. Although final acceptance testing for the ground software
is expected to be completed 2 months late, all software development
tasks are scheduled to be completed two years before satellite launch.
Performance: Data provided by MDA indicate that two STSS performance
indicators do not meet their respective requirements”one pertaining to
the acquisition sensor and a second pertaining to the tracking sensor.
Program officials stated that degradation in performance is within
acceptable limits. The program considers the demonstration of STSS
functionality more critical than verifying the effectiveness of the
demonstrator satellites.
Cost: Our analysis of prime contractor Cost Performance Reports shows
that the contractor completed work in fiscal year 2004 over budget by
about $34.6 million. In addition, the contractor could not complete
$20.7 million of scheduled work (relative to a 6-month accelerated
schedule). Quality and systems-engineering problems with a
subcontractor contributed to the overruns in cost and schedule.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Space Tracking and Surveillance System:
Element Description:
The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) is being developed as
a space-based sensor for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
As envisioned by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the full STSS
element will be comprised of a constellation of low-orbiting
satellites[Footnote 63] designed to detect and track enemy missiles
throughout all phases of flight. Each satellite making up the program's
"space segment" includes a space vehicle and a payload of two infrared
sensors--the acquisition sensor to watch for the bright plumes (hot
exhaust gas) of boosting missiles, and the tracking sensor to follow
the missile through midcourse and reentry. The STSS element also has
supporting ground infrastructure, known as the "ground segment," which
includes a ground station and mission software to support the
processing and communication of data from the satellites to the BMDS.
MDA is currently working on the first increment of STSS, known as Block
2006, which is focused on the preparation and launch of two technology
demonstration satellites[Footnote 64] partially built under the Space
Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS-Low) program. MDA plans to launch
these satellites in 2007, in tandem, in an effort to assess how well
they perform surveillance and tracking functions. Using data collected
by the satellites, MDA will determine what capabilities are needed and
what goals should be set for the next generation of STSS satellites.
Any real operational capability, however, would not be realized until
the next decade.
History:
Initiated in 1996, SBIRS-Low was the latest in a series of Department
of Defense (DOD) satellite programs attempting to deliver an
operational capability for detecting and tracking missiles from low-
earth orbits. The program experienced cost and schedule growth and
performance shortfalls. In response, DOD cancelled the accompanying
demonstration program in 1999 and put the partially constructed
satellite equipment into storage.
In October 2000, Congress directed the Air Force to transfer the SBIRS-
Low program to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (MDA's
predecessor). When MDA inherited SBIRS-Low, the agency decided to make
use of the equipment that was partially built under the SBIRS-Low
technology demonstrator program. By completing the assembly of the two
satellites and launching them in 2007, MDA intends to use the
satellites in missile defense flight tests. At the end of 2002, the
SBIRS-Low program was renamed STSS.
Developmental Phases:
STSS's development is proceeding in a series of 2-year blocks, namely,
Blocks 2006, 2008, and beyond. As noted above, Block 2006 involves the
assembly, integration, testing, and launch of two research and
development satellites in 2007. The first satellite is expected to be
ready in September 2005 and the second in early fiscal year 2007. Block
2008 is primarily an upgrade of the Block 2006 ground stations, which
are used to collect and analyze data from the two satellites. As
technology matures and as lessons are learned from the first
satellites, more capable satellites will be designed and launched in
subsequent blocks.[Footnote 65]
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
The STSS program office intended to accomplish several activities
during fiscal year 2004 related to the preparation of the two
demonstration satellites for launch in 2007. Specifically, the program
office planned to complete the following space-and ground-segment
activities:
* Space Segment. The program planned to complete a design review to
ensure the STSS design can support the BMDS mission; complete the
reactivation of hardware components for the second satellite; modify
two satellite hardware components to enhance spacecraft performance;
continue to develop the payload software; and start the assembly,
integration, and testing of satellite components.
* Ground Segment. The program planned to complete activities to ensure
that the STSS element has a mature ground system design and to continue
with the development of software for the ground segment of the program.
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
The STSS program office completed all but one of the principal Block
2006 activities planned for fiscal year 2004, including the complex
tasks of systems integration, testing, and software development.
Moreover, the program office initiated work planned for completion in
fiscal year 2005. The contractor has been performing to an accelerated
delivery schedule, that is, attempting to complete all contracted
activities six months earlier than required by the contract. However,
according to the program office, quality and systems-engineering
problems at the payload subcontractor are jeopardizing the early
delivery. Progress made toward achieving the space-and ground-segment
activities is summarized in tables 30 and 31, respectively.
Table 30: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Space Segment:
Activity: Critical Design Review;
Actual/Planned completion date: Nov. 2003; (Completed on schedule);
Comments: The STSS program office conducted a critical design review in
the first quarter of fiscal year 2004. Sixteen issues were identified
during the review, and all were satisfied and closed out in March 2004.
According to the program office, the review was on time and the outcome
was successful.
Activity: Reactivation of Satellite #2 Hardware;
Actual/Planned completion date: Oct. 2003; (Completed 5 months late);
Comments: The second satellite has been completely reactivated, which
involved the contractor taking 58 hardware components out of storage
and running tests on them to determine if they still worked. All but
one of the components passed the appropriate functional tests.
Functional tests for the final component--the spacecraft computer
processor--are being deferred until the next higher-level of hardware
integration. During the reactivation of this hardware, the contractor
experienced minor problems with some components. Though these issues
have since been resolved, they contributed to the five-month delay in
the reactivation schedule. Overall, however, the components survived
storage rather well, according to program officials.
Activity: Hardware Modifications.
* Electrical Power Subsystem;
Actual/Planned completion date: * Sept. 2003 (Completed 3 months late);
* Sun Shield;
Actual/Planned completion date: * Sept. 2004 (Completed on schedule);
Comments: Performance modifications to the Sun Shield were completed as
planned, but modifications to the Electrical Power Subsystem were
completed three months later than expected. Although the upgrades to
the power system are to result in a 200 percent improvement in on-orbit
operation, the redesign was more complex than originally planned and
resulted in the problem of removing excess heat produced by the power
system. To resolve the heat problem, the contractor had to use $2-3
million from its management reserve to add air ducts to the spacecraft.
Activity: Payload Software.
* Build 2.
Actual/Planned completion date: * July 2004 (Completed 1 month late).
* Closed Loop Testing of Sensor Payload Software;
Actual/Planned completion date: * May 2005 (Ongoing);
Comments: Software builds for the space and ground segments are
proceeding as planned. The program office characterized software
development as being the "gem" of the program. Version 2 of the
software that controls the sensors onboard the satellite was completed
in mid-August 2004. Although the software team encountered problems
while integrating and testing this version, the problems were resolved
in time to limit the delay to one month in building the software. At
the end of fiscal year 2004, the contractor had completed about half of
Version 3 software for the payload data processor. A partial build of
this version is undergoing integration testing and is scheduled for
completion in May 2005. According to the program office, the software
is on schedule to be completed two years before the satellites are
launched.
Activity: Assembly, Integration, and Testing (AI&T).
* Track Sensor;
Actual/Planned completion date: * Aug. 2004 (Ongoing);
* Spacecraft #1;
Actual/Planned completion date: * July 2004 (Completed 1 month late).
* Payload #1;
Actual/Planned completion date: * Jan. 2005 (Ongoing);
Comments: The STSS program scheduled several assembly, integration, and
testing activities for completion in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, which
were (or expected to be) completed behind schedule. First, the program
office had planned to assemble, integrate, and test the track sensor
for the first satellite by the end of August 2004. Second, the program
office had planned to integrate and test the spacecraft for the first
payload by the end of July 2004, but did not complete the task until
mid-August 2004. The objective of the tests was to demonstrate the
electrical integration of the spacecraft. Third, the program office
planned to start integrating and testing the payload for the first STSS
space vehicle. The testing of the payload components was expected to be
completed by January 2005. However, the program office reported that
the schedule will be tight and will likely slip by a couple of months
primarily because of quality and systems engineering problems at the
payload subcontractor.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Table 31: Status of STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Ground Segment:
Activity: Mature Ground System Design; Actual/Planned completion date:
Oct. 2003; (Completed 1 month late);
Comments: Reviews were conducted to ensure that the STSS program has a
mature ground system design. Because of issues related to paperwork,
the reviews were completed about a month later than planned. The
contractor presented a detailed design for the STSS ground system at
the November 2003 critical design review, and according to the program
office, the proposed design is robust enough to accommodate a larger
STSS constellation in the future.
Activity: Develop Ground Software; Actual/Planned completion date: Dec.
2005;
Comments: The STSS ground software development was completed in
December 2005. The contractor is following a "build a little" and "test
a little" approach in order to catch defects early in the process
before they are costly to fix, according to program officials.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[End of table]
Assessment of Element Performance:
The Block 2006 STSS satellites will be used as technology demonstrators
(rather than for operational missions) and have an in-orbit life of 18-
24 months. To keep costs within budget, the program considers the
demonstration of STSS functionality more critical than the
demonstration of STSS effectiveness in performing the functions. MDA
decided to fly these demonstration satellites before developing and
producing them in larger numbers to see how components and subsystems
work together as a system in a realistic environment before a greater
investment of resources is made, thereby reducing program risk. As
noted above, each satellite contains two infrared sensors--an
acquisition sensor to detect a missile launch and a tracking sensor to
track the missile through space once it has been detected. The tracking
sensor would continue tracking the missile after the acquisition sensor
has completed its detection function. The ability of one satellite to
detect or "acquire" a missile launch and to transmit this data to its
internal tracking sensor has not yet been demonstrated in space,
although DOD has had successes in demonstrating some related on-orbit
capabilities through experimental satellites.
Even with a focus on system functionality over effectiveness, the prime
contractor continues to track 12 system level technical parameters that
are critical to the performance of the sensors onboard the Block 2006
satellites. Data provided to us by MDA indicate that 2 of the 12
indicators do not meet their respective requirements. The details on
these issues, including the impact on STSS performance, are classified.
However, shortfalls in performance involve both sensors. The ability of
the acquisition sensors to properly detect a missile launch is falling
below performance margins and the accuracy of the tracking sensor is
getting close to the margin. Program officials stated that the
degradation in acquisition sensor performance is within allowable
limits and steps are being taken to improve tracking sensor
performance.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the STSS program from program inception in
2002 through 2011 is approximately $4.5 billion.[Footnote 66] As broken
out in table 32, DOD expended $819 million between fiscal years 2002
and 2004, Congress appropriated $302 million for fiscal year 2005, and
MDA is budgeting about $3.35 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2011
for element development. MDA's planned budget for the next 6 years
through 2011 funds activities associated with the assembly and launch
of the two demonstrator satellites (Block 2006), ground segment
upgrades (Block 2008), and the development of an operational
constellation of satellites (Block 2012).
Table 32: STSS Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 2002[A] -FY 2003;
Other: $$544;
Block 2006: $$0;
Block 2008: $$0;
Block 2010: $$0;
Block 2012: $$0;
Total: $$544.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $263;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $12;
Block 2012: $0;
Total: $275.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $254;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $48;
Block 2012: $0;
Total: $302.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $231;
Block 2008: $0;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $1;
Total: $232.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $208;
Block 2008: $45;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $167;
Total: $420.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $65;
Block 2008: $29;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $440;
Total: $534.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $11;
Block 2008: $24;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $579;
Total: $614.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $8;
Block 2008: $14;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $737;
Total: $759.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2006: $7;
Block 2008: $14;
Block 2010: $0;
Block 2012: $773;
Total: $794.
FY 2002 -FY 2011;
Other: $$544;
Block 2006: $$1,046;
Block 2008: $$127;
Block 2010: $$60;
Block 2012: $$2,697;
Total: $$4,474.
Source: MDA.
Note: STSS budget as of February 2005. Numbers may not add due to
rounding.
[A] Program inception (FY 2002).
[End of table]
Prime Contractor Cost and Schedule Performance:
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate prime contractor performance relative to cost
and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with
the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule.
Figure 9 shows the STSS contractor's cost and schedule performance
during fiscal year 2004. According to Cost Performance Reports, the
work completed during this time cost more than budgeted and was behind
schedule relative to a 6-month accelerated schedule. Specifically,
during fiscal year 2004, the work cost about $34.6 million more than
expected, and the contractor could not complete approximately $20.7
million of scheduled work.
Figure 9: STSS Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The erosion of cumulative cost variance throughout fiscal year 2004 was
largely attributed to cost overruns by the payload subcontractor, whose
costs comprise about one-third of the total STSS contract. During the
past year, the subcontractor has had a number of quality and systems-
engineering problems that contributed to overruns in cost and schedule.
These problems are largely the result of unclear systems engineering
procedures and the subcontractor's lack of experience with space
hardware. In response to these problems, the prime contractor conducted
a thorough review of the subcontractor's quality assurance program for
the assembly, integration, and testing of satellite components. In
addition, the subcontractor added technicians who have more experience
working with space hardware and brought in systems engineers to work
with the technicians. Despite these issues, the program office still
expects the prime contractor to complete the contract early and with
minimal cost overruns.
The cumulative schedule variance also eroded during fiscal year 2004.
The delay in the delivery of the payload is the major driver of the
unfavorable schedule variance. In addition to these drivers,
performance upgrades to the Electrical Power Subsystem were completed
three months later than planned due to a heat-removal problem. A factor
complicating our analysis of schedule variance is that the contractor
implemented a performance measurement baseline[Footnote 67] that
reflects a six-month accelerated schedule. This means the contractor
might be performing work on a schedule that would allow it to complete
all the work by the end of the contract, but schedule performance data
would show that work was falling behind schedule.
Our assessment of fiscal year 2004 activities did not identify any
evidence that the STSS program would be unable to launch the two
demonstration satellites in 2007. Although the payload subcontractor
experienced schedule delays and cost overruns arising from quality
issues, the program office is still confident that the satellites will
be delivered early. In addition, the reactivation of components from
storage went better than anticipated and, accordingly, the program
office reduced the risk level associated with hardware and software
furnished by the government. Furthermore, the prime contractor is
making progress on the parts obsolescence issue. For example, the prime
contractor located most replacement parts and is assembling a database
to track them.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII Summary:
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
[See PDF for image]
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
[End of figure]
Program Description:
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) element is a ground-
based missile defense system designed to protect deployed military
forces and civilian population centers from short- and medium-range
ballistic missile attacks. THAAD engages ballistic missiles during the
late-midcourse and terminal phases of flight, that is, before or after
the warhead reenters the atmosphere. The THAAD program expects to field
an initial capability consisting of 24 interceptors during the 2009
time frame.
DOD‘s planned investment in the THAAD program from program inception in
1992 through 2011 is approximately $12.3 billion. DOD expended $7.2
billion between fiscal years 1992 and 2004, Congress appropriated $760
million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is budgeting about $4.3 billion
for THAAD development and procurement between fiscal years 2006 and
2011.
Fiscal Year 2004 Progress Assessment:
The bulk of fiscal year 2004 activities focused on developing and
ground-testing THAAD components in preparation for the first round of
flight tests in mid-fiscal year 2005. At the end of fiscal year 2004
with 61 percent of the THAAD prime contract completed, THAAD‘s prime
contractor was under budget and ahead of schedule. However, the
contractor‘s favorable cost and schedule performance eroded somewhat
during fiscal year 2004. Our analysis indicates that problems with
missile development were a major driver of the deteriorating
performance.
Schedule: During fiscal year 2004, the THAAD program accomplished key
activities ahead, on, or slightly behind schedule. The program
conducted the missile-component design readiness review ahead of
schedule, completed radar assembly on schedule, but was behind schedule
on missile delivery for the element‘s first flight test, Flight Test 1.
In addition, the program successfully conducted ground tests in
preparation for the initial flight test.
Testing: Two explosions in the summer of 2003 at a subcontractor‘s
propellant mixing facility impacted THAAD‘s fiscal year 2004 funding,
delayed the start of flight testing, and led to a revision of the
flight test program.
Performance: The program office told us that key indicators show that
THAAD is on track to meet operational performance goals. However, an
assessment of THAAD‘s effectiveness remains uncertain until the program
conducts flight tests with updated hardware and software. Data from
flight testing are needed to ’anchor“ simulations of THAAD‘s
performance and to more confidently predict the element‘s effectiveness.
Cost: Our analysis of prime contractor cost performance reports shows
that the contractor‘s favorable cost and schedule performance eroded
somewhat during fiscal year 2004. The declining schedule performance
was largely driven by unfavorable performance in the missile
component”caused by two separate explosions at a subcontractor‘s
propellant mixing facility”but offset by other THAAD components with
favorable performance. Overall, the prime contractor is under budget
and ahead of schedule.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense:
Element Description:
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) element[Footnote 68] is
being developed as a ground-based missile defense system to protect
forward-deployed military forces, population centers, and civilian
assets from short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD
provides the opportunity to engage ballistic missiles--outside or
inside the earth's atmosphere--not destroyed earlier in the boost or
midcourse phases of flight by other elements of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS).
A THAAD unit consists of a command, control, battle management, and
communications (C2/BMC) component for controlling and executing a
defensive mission, truck-mounted launchers, ground-based radar,
interceptor missiles, and ground support equipment. The ground-based
radar is a solid-state, phased-array, X-band radar that performs
search, track, discrimination, and other fire-control functions. The
THAAD missile is comprised of a kill vehicle mounted atop a single-
stage booster and is designed to destroy enemy warheads through hit-to-
kill collisions.
History:
The THAAD program entered the Program Definition and Risk Reduction
phase of acquisition in 1992 but was plagued by missed intercepts in
its first six attempts. As noted in our 1999 report,[Footnote 69]
THAAD's failures were caused by a combination of a compressed test
schedule and quality control problems. The Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E), reported in his Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Report
to the Congress that the sense of urgency to deploy a prototype system
resulted in an overly optimistic development schedule.
The THAAD program conducted two successful intercept attempts in 1999
after devoting substantial time to pretest activities. The program then
transitioned to the product development phase[Footnote 70] of
acquisition, in which program activities shifted from technology
development and demonstration to missile redesign and engineering. The
Department of Defense (DOD) transferred the THAAD program from the U.S.
Army to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now MDA) on October
1, 2001.
Developmental Phases:
The THAAD program is pursuing its goals within the MDA block approach,
which incrementally increases the element's capability against the
ballistic missile threat. We reported[Footnote 71] last year that
THAAD's development was structured around a Block 2004-2006-2008
program, with program funding aligned accordingly. However, with the
submission of the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget in February 2005,
MDA implemented a new BMDS baseline approach for the THAAD program.
Under this new program, THAAD development is structured around a Block
2006-2008-2010 program, with funding broken out by Block 2006/2008 and
Block 2010.
* Block 2006. Block 2006 incorporates the activities of the former
Block 2004 program. The Block 2006 THAAD program is expected to
demonstrate an engagement capability against short-and medium-range
ballistic missiles above the atmosphere.
* Block 2008. By the end of Block 2008, the THAAD element will have
completed additional flight tests (including attempts employing a salvo-
firing doctrine), demonstrated an engagement capability inside and
above the atmosphere, and be configured to accept data from other BMDS
sensors for launching its interceptor missiles. THAAD's integration
with the BMDS is expected to increase its defended area by more than a
factor of three.
The THAAD program includes a "fire unit" for delivery in fiscal year
2009. Operated by the Army, it will consist of a radar, a C2/BMC unit,
3 launchers, 24 missiles, and equipment for support, maintenance and
training. The Army has "signed on" to receive the equipment and is
planning to allocate nearly 100 soldiers for training and operations.
* Block 2010. The THAAD program plans to enhance the element's ability
to interoperate with other elements and sensors of the BMDS. By
engaging threats with external BMDS data, THAAD is expected to increase
its defended area by more than a factor of ten.
Planned Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2004:
The bulk of the fiscal year 2004 activities focused on developing and
ground-testing THAAD components in preparation for the first round of
flight tests in mid-fiscal year 2005. We grouped activities into three
categories: (1) design, (2) build, and (3) integration and test.
Progress on key activities scheduled for fiscal year 2004 is discussed
below.
Assessment of Scheduled Activities:
During fiscal year 2004, the THAAD program accomplished key activities
ahead, on, or slightly behind schedule. As examples, the program
conducted the missile-component design readiness review ahead of
schedule, completed radar assembly on schedule, but delivery of the
missile for Flight Test 1 slipped into fiscal year 2005. Specifics
regarding progress in achieving these and other key scheduled
activities are summarized below in tables 33 through 35.
Table 33: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Design Activities:
Activity: Missile-component design readiness review.
Planned: 1Q FY2004[A];
Completed: 4Q FY2003;
Description/Progress assessment: This event was accomplished ahead of
schedule. The missile component design readiness review demonstrated
that the missile-component design, including internal and external
interfaces, met all applicable design requirements with acceptable
risk.
Activity: THAAD element design readiness review.
Planned: 1Q FY2004;
Completed: 1Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: This event was accomplished on
schedule. The stakeholders agreed during the design readiness review
that they understood the THAAD system and its final integrated design,
and that the design met BMDS objectives. Stakeholders included the
THAAD Project Office, supporting contractors, representatives of the
Army Air Defense School, and MDA.
Activity: Radar block process validation.
Planned: 2Q FY2004;
Completed: 2Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: This event was accomplished on
schedule. The radar block process validation examined the contractor's
operations to determine adequacy of production planning, processes, and
controls; the existence of suitable production facilities; and the
radar's design stability.
Activity: C2/BMC block process validation.
Planned: 4Q FY2004;
Completed: Under revision;
Description/Progress assessment: The C2/BMC block process validation
was delayed to address defective government-furnished C2/BMC shelters
and was somewhat behind schedule at the end of fiscal year 2004.
Significant progress was made toward its completion, but the remaining
work is planned to carry over into fiscal year 2005. The purpose of the
validation is to assess the contractor's ability to manufacture C2/BMC
production representative hardware to support future fielding
decisions.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] We use the notation "1Q FY2004" to mean the first quarter of fiscal
year 2004 and an identical format for other time periods.
[End of table]
Table 34: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Build Activities:
Activity: Radar assembly.
Planned: 1Q FY2004;
Completed: 1Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: This event was accomplished on
schedule. The radar was assembled in the first quarter of fiscal year
2004.
Activity: Missile delivery for Flight Test 1 (FT-01).
Planned: 4Q FY2004; Scheduled: 2Q FY2005;
Description/Progress assessment: Delivery of the FT-01 missile to White
Sands Missile Range (WSMR)[A] was delayed to respond to a new program
schedule that addresses funding shortfalls and two separate explosions
at a subcontractor's propellant mixing facility. Delivery is now
scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2005.
Activity: WSMR activation.
Planned: 2Q FY2004;
Completed: 2Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: This event was accomplished on
schedule. All THAAD facilities at WSMR were activated by March 2004 and
are preparing for FT-01.
Activity: WSMR safety qualification tests.
Planned: 3Q FY2004;
Completed: 4Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: Although this event was completed 1
quarter behind schedule, there was no impact on FT-01's schedule.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] WSMR is a U.S. Army missile test range in New Mexico. Because of
test range limitations at WSMR, flight testing will be conducted at the
Pacific Missile Range Facility, a U.S. Navy missile test range in
Kauai, Hawaii, beginning with FTT-06-1 (formerly FT-05) in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2006.
[End of table]
Table 35: Status of THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Planned Accomplishments--
Integration and Test Activities:
Activity: Kill vehicle destruct test.
Planned: 1Q FY 2004;
Completed: 1Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: This event was accomplished on
schedule. Testing of the kill vehicle flight termination system met
objectives.
Activity: Integrate launch and test support equipment at SIL[A].
Planned: 2Q FY2004;
Completed: 3Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: Because of two separate explosions at
a subcontractor's propellant mixing facility in the summer of 2003,
this event was accomplished about one quarter behind schedule. The
launch and test support equipment completed its system checkout in June
2004. The THAAD program reports that the launch and test support
equipment is on schedule to support the revised schedule of FT-01
planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2005.
Activity: Kill vehicle qualification tests.
Planned: 4Q FY2004;
Completed: 4Q FY2004;
Description/Progress assessment: Kill vehicle qualification testing in
preparation for FT-01 was completed in September 2004.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
[A] The System Integration Lab (SIL) refers to ground facilities at
Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, California.
[End of table]
THAAD Flight Test Program Delayed 3-5 Months:
The THAAD flight-test program consists of 15 flight-test events divided
among Blocks 2006 and 2008. Two explosions in the summer of 2003 at a
subcontractor's propellant mixing facility impacted THAAD's fiscal year
2004 funding, delayed the start of flight testing, and led to revisions
of the flight test plans.
The first set of flight tests have been delayed 3-5 months. The first
flight test, referred to as a control test flight (CTF), is a missile-
only, non-intercept test that focuses on how the missile operates under
high endoatmospheric environmental conditions. The second flight test
is an integrated system test with a "virtual target" to demonstrate
system performance under conditions comparable to the next flight test
(first flight test utilizing a real target). The third flight test is a
seeker characterization flight (SCF), which ensures proper functioning
of the seeker. This SCF is also a non-intercept test, but the seeker
will demonstrate the ability to view a real target. The fourth flight
test, FT-04, is the first intercept attempt with a configuration--
target and engagement geometry--comparable to that used in flight tests
conducted during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase of
development. Table 36 summarizes the first six flight test events,
including current and prior flight test dates with their objectives.
Compared to test plans of fiscal year 2004, the THAAD program deferred
two test events. A second control test flight conducted at WSMR--
formerly FT-02--and an intercept attempt against a threat-
representative target at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)--
formerly FT-05--have been deferred to a later time.
Table 36: Planned THAAD Flight Testing:
Flight test event: FT-01 (CTF) at WSMR; Non-intercept flight test
(missile only/no target);
Date: Current: 3Q FY2005 Previously: 1Q FY2005;
Objectives:
* Validate missile performance in a high-endoatmospheric flight
environment;
* Verify missile integration with WSMR.
Flight test event: FT-02 at WSMR; Integrated system test -virtual
target. (New test);
Date: Current: 4Q FY2005 Previously: N/A;
Objectives:
* Integrated system test dry run (virtual target);
* Demonstrate missile launch and control for conditions comparable to
FT-03.
Flight test event: FT-03 (SCF) at WSMR; Non-intercept flight test;
Date: Current: 1Q FY2006.
Previously: 3Q FY2005;
Objectives:
* Characterize seeker in flight against a high-endoatmospheric unitary
target;
* Verify element integration with WSMR.
Flight test event: FT-04 at WSMR; First intercept flight test;
Date: Current: 2Q FY2006.
Previously: 4Q FY2005;
Objectives:
* Demonstrate exoatmospheric discrimination and intercept of a
separating target;
* Demonstrate lethality assessment of recovered debris.
Flight test event: FT-05 (CTF) at WSMR; Non-intercept flight test;
(Formerly FT-02);
Date: Current: 2Q FY2006.
Previously: 2Q FY2005;
Objectives:
* Characterize missile performance in a low-endoatmospheric flight
environment;
* Assesses effects of heat on seeker window;
* Tests performance in a high dynamic pressure fly-out.
Flight test event: FTT-06-1 at PMRF; Second intercept flight test.
(Formerly FT-05);
Date: Current: 4Q FY2006.
Previously: 1Q FY2006;
Objectives:
* Demonstrate exoatmospheric aimpoint selection and intercept against a
non-separating liquid-fueled target;
* Demonstrate integration with PMRF.
Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).
Note: Test schedule as of December 2004.
[End of table]
Assessment of Element Performance:
Any assessment of THAAD's effectiveness is uncertain at this time. The
program office told us that key indicators show that THAAD is on track
to meet operational performance goals. However, the THAAD program has
not conducted any recent flight tests and, as a result, performance
indicators[Footnote 72] used to gauge progress toward meeting
performance objectives are based only on engineering analysis and
ground testing. Until data collected during flight tests are used to
"anchor" simulations of THAAD operation, the program cannot be
confident that current indicators accurately predict THAAD's
performance in actual combat conditions.
Assessment of Element Cost:
DOD's planned investment in the THAAD program from program inception in
1992 through 2011 is approximately $12.3 billion. As broken out in
table 37, DOD expended $7.2 billion between fiscal years 1992 and 2004,
Congress appropriated $760 million for fiscal year 2005, and MDA is
budgeting about $4.3 billion for THAAD development and procurement
between fiscal years 2006 and 2011.
Table 37: THAAD Cost:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 1992[A] -FY 2003;
Other: $$6,500;
Block 2006/2008: $$0;
Block 2010: $$0;
Total: $$6,500.
FY 2004 (Actuals);
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $717.9;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $717.9.
FY 2005 (Appropriated);
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $759.7;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $759.7.
FY 2006;
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $1,046.1;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $1,046.1.
FY 2007;
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $931.0;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $931.0.
FY 2008;
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $779.4;
Block 2010: $0;
Total: $779.4.
FY 2009;
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $353.0;
Block 2010: $168.0;
Total: $521.0.
FY 2010;
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $0;
Block 2010: $635.1;
Total: $$635.1.
FY 2011;
Other: $0;
Block 2006/2008: $0;
Block 2010: $395.0;
Total: $$395.0.
FY 1992 -FY 2011;
Other: $$6,500;
Block 2006/2008: $$4,587.1;
Block 2010: $$1,198.1;
Total: $$12,285.2.
Source: MDA.
Note: THAAD budget as of February 2005. MDA implemented a new BMDS
baseline approach that redirected funding from Block 2004 and 2006 to
Block 2006/2008.
[A] Program inception (FY 1992).
[End of table]
Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
The government routinely uses contractor Cost Performance Reports to
independently evaluate the prime contractor's performance relative to
cost and schedule. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and
schedule relative to expectations established under the contract.
Contractors refer to deviations as "variances." Positive variances are
usually associated with the accomplishment of activities under cost or
ahead of schedule, while negative variances are often associated with
the accomplishment of activities over cost or behind schedule. At the
end of fiscal year 2004, the THAAD prime contractor was carrying a
positive cumulative cost and schedule variance of $3.9 million and
$14.7, respectively.[Footnote 73] That is, overall, the prime
contractor was under budget and ahead of schedule.
As figure 10 shows, declining cumulative schedule variance during the
latter portion of fiscal year 2004 was eroding overall performance. The
decline in the positive schedule variance was largely caused by
problems with the missile component, which were the result of two
explosions at a subcontractor's propellant mixing facility. In January
2004, these incidents and efforts to reestablish booster production
caused MDA to revise THAAD's baseline.[Footnote 74] The new baseline
recognizes the inevitable delay to initial flight testing and all
supporting tasks.[Footnote 75] It also provides a new starting point
for measuring the prime contractor's schedule performance. Therefore,
even though the prime contractor completed $8.1 million worth above
that scheduled for fiscal year 2004 (that is, incurred a positive
schedule variance of $8.1 million), the variance would have been less
favorable had the contractor not established a new baseline.
Figure 10: THAAD Fiscal Year 2004 Cost and Schedule Performance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The favorable cumulative cost variance incurred during fiscal year 2004
masks problems with the cost variance incurred by the missile
component, which was unfavorable for the year. Major factors
contributing to the missile's unfavorable cost variance include
explosions at a subcontractor's facility used to mix missile propellant
and the cost of efforts to reestablish booster production, as noted
above; delays in activating a test facility at the Air Force Research
Laboratory; and re-design efforts on a faulty valve thrust vector
assembly. Favorable cost variances in other THAAD areas, such as the
radar segment, offset the missile's unfavorable cost variance.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Information on the Army's Missile Defense Programs:
Background:
The Army is responsible for funding and managing two missile defense
programs. The programs--which ultimately will be fielded as a single
missile defense system--include the Patriot missile defense system
including its newest missile variant, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3
(PAC-3), and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), which is
currently under development. The Army intends to incrementally replace
fielded Patriot components with more-capable MEADS components as they
become available. The resulting system is expected to better protect
deployed U.S. forces and critical assets from short-and medium-range
tactical ballistic missile attacks. The Army's Lower Tier Project
Office manages Patriot and MEADS development, procurement, and
fielding.
Now operational with the U.S. Army, Patriot with its PAC-3 missiles is
the latest evolution of the Patriot air and missile defense system. The
Patriot system has four basic components: (1) ground-based radar to
detect and track targets; (2) engagement control station to provide
command, control, and communications; (3) launcher; and (4) interceptor
missiles. Compared with earlier versions of the Patriot missile, PAC-3
provides improved performance against short-and medium-range tactical
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. The PAC-3 missile is
in production and successfully achieved initial fielding[Footnote 76]
in September 2001.
MEADS is an international co-development program between the United
States, Germany, and Italy with a cost share of 58, 25, and 17 percent,
respectively. MEADS expands upon Patriot capability with four new
components: (1) a launcher; (2) battle management, command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence (BMC4I) equipment; (3) a
surveillance radar; and (4) a multi-function fire control radar. MEADS
is expected to offer significant improvements in tactical mobility and
strategic deployability over existing Patriot units. In addition, MEADS
is designed to be interoperable with other airborne and ground-based
sensors and utilize a netted architecture to provide a robust, 360-
degree defense against cruise missiles, unmanned-aerial-vehicles,
tactical air to surface missiles, rotary-wing and fixed-wing threats,
and very short and medium range theater ballistic missiles.
Combined Aggregate Program:
In 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics approved plans for combining management, development, and
fielding of the Patriot and MEADS programs.[Footnote 77] The approach
calls for incremental fielding and early insertion of MEADS components
within existing Patriot batteries rather than delivering MEADS as a
single system. The Army uses the term "Combined Aggregate Program
(CAP)" to refer to the transitional activities leading up to full
fielding of the MEADS and replacement of Patriot components. CAP also
includes an enhanced PAC-3 missile--funded 100 percent by the United
States--called the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE). The MSE missile
is intended to operate at higher altitudes and longer ranges than
existing PAC-3 missiles.
The plan calls for MEADS components to be inserted into Patriot
battalions in three time-phased increments, as follows:
* Increment one. Scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal year 2009,
increment one consists of the insertion of the MEADS BMC4I to begin
replacing the Patriot engagement control station component and
associated equipment. This increment is considered the highest
acquisition priority because it (a) integrates with existing sensors to
provide 360-degree coverage to counter cruise missiles, and (b)
supports targeting by using data from external sensors, which is
referred to as "engage on remote."
* Increment two. Scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal year 2011,
increment two consists of the insertion of the MEADS launcher to begin
replacing the Patriot launcher. This increment is expected to enhance
system mobility and be capable of firing either the existing PAC-3
missile or the new MSE missile. The MSE missile is scheduled for
initial fielding in 2011. It does not replace the PAC-3 missile but,
rather, supplements fielded inventory.
* Increment three. Scheduled for initial fielding in fiscal year 2015,
increment three consists of the insertion of the MEADS Ultra High
Frequency surveillance radar and the X-band multifunction fire control
radar to replace the Patriot C-band radars. These radars are expected
to provide (a) 360-degree coverage for defense against cruise missiles
and fire control to engage low-altitude, stressing targets; and (b)
surveillance and fire control for high-value asset defense against
short-range ballistic missiles.
The overall Patriot/MEADS CAP is scheduled for initial fielding in 2015
when increment three is available. MEADS production is scheduled to
continue through fiscal year 2028. The 2015 fielding date, approved by
the Under Secretary for Defense, represents a three-year delay from the
fielding date planned in the previous MEADS program. According to a
Lower Tier Project Office spokesperson, constraints in developmental
funding caused the delay in initial fielding of MEADS components.
Specifically, out-year Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) funding was insufficient to field MEADS in fiscal year 2012.
Patriot/MEADS CAP Funding:
The Army's Lower Tier Project Office estimates that the life-cycle cost
for the United States' portion of the Patriot/MEADS CAP program--which
includes PAC-3 and MEADS-component development, procurement, and
operations and support (O&S) costs--will be $150.6 billion through
approximately fiscal year 2048. Of this amount:
* $109 billion (72.4 percent) is for O&S.
* $31.9 billion (21.2 percent) is for procurement.
* $9.7 billion (6.4 percent) is for RDT&E.
Operations and support costs are a large proportion of the total cost
largely because of the length of time a fielded unit is supported.
Although production is scheduled to end in fiscal year 2028, these
newest units are expected to be in the field for another 20 years.
Table 38 summarizes the funding requested by the U.S. Army to fund
development and missile procurement of the Patriot/MEADS Combined
Aggregate Program over the Future Years Defense Plan (fiscal years 2006-
2011). The requested funding supports the procurement of 108 PAC-3
missiles per year.
Table 38: Patriot/MEADS CAP Planned Costs:
Dollars in millions of then-year dollars.
FY 2006;
RDT&E: $288.8;
Missile procurement: $489.7.
FY 2007;
RDT&E: $$326.4;
Missile procurement: $494.8.
FY 2008;
RDT&E: $454.5;
Missile procurement: $466.0.
FY 2009;
RDT&E: $510.7;
Missile procurement: $471.8.
FY 2010;
RDT&E: $510.4;
Missile procurement: N/A.
FY 2011;
RDT&E: $490.4;
Missile procurement: N/A.
Source: Department of the Army.
Note: Budget as of February 2005.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix X: Scope and Methodology:
The accomplishment of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) program goals is
ultimately achieved through the efforts of individual Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) elements. Therefore, we based our assessment on
the progress made in fiscal year 2004 by those seven elements that (1)
are under the management of MDA and (2) are being developed as part of
a block capability. The elements we reviewed accounted for 72 percent
of MDA's fiscal year 2004 research and development budget. We compared
each element's completed activities, test results, demonstrated
performance, and prime contractor cost and schedule performance in
fiscal year 2004 with those planned for the year. We also completed an
abbreviated evaluation of an eighth BMDS element, the U.S. Army's
Combined Aggregate Program, which consists of Patriot and the Medium
Extended Air Defense System.
Many activities completed in fiscal year 2004 by the various element
programs pertained to the completion of Limited Defensive Operations,
which is an integral part of the Block 2004 goals. To assess progress
toward schedule goals--that is, program activities including test
events scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2004--we examined each
element's prime contractor Cost Performance Reports, Defense Contract
Management Agency's analyses of these reports (if available), quarterly
reviews of element progress (known as System Element Reviews), and
other agency documents to determine whether key activities were
accomplished as planned. We also developed a data collection
instrument, which was submitted to MDA, to gather detailed information
on completed program activities, including tests, design reviews, prime
contracts, and estimates of element performance.
We assessed MDA's fiscal year 2004 cost performance by separately
reviewing the cost performance of each BMDS element's prime contractor.
We used this methodology because MDA allocates a large percentage of
its budget to fund prime contractors that develop system elements. To
make these assessments, we applied established earned value management
techniques to data captured in contractor Cost Performance Reports.
Results were presented in graphical form to determine trends. We also
used established earned value management formulas to project the likely
costs of the contracts at completion.
To assess MDA's progress toward its performance goals, we analyzed data
provided by MDA on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense, and Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications elements--the elements that comprise the Block 2004
defensive capability. We supplemented this information by holding
discussions with, and attending overview briefings presented by,
various program office officials. Furthermore, we interviewed officials
from the office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
within the Department of Defense (DOD) to learn more about their
assessment of the operational capability of the initial BMDS. Finally,
we met with officials from U.S. Strategic Command to discuss the
initial capability's military utility from the warfighter's
perspective.
During our review, we observed that MDA is expected to face increasing
funding risks--arising from sources both within and outside DOD--in the
years ahead as MDA attempts to enhance and field its missile defense
capabilities. To examine this issue further, we reviewed life-cycle
cost documentation from the U.S. Army Lower Tier Project Office, our
report on total ownership costs,[Footnote 78] a Congressional Budget
Office report,[Footnote 79] and MDA documentation on the agency's plans
for development and fielding.
We also observed inconsistencies in how MDA is implementing its block
approach. To gain insight into this issue, we examined element-level
documents and answers to a data collection instrument that we generated
to extract specific information on planned deliveries of fielded
assets. We also examined MDA's Statement of Goals, budget statements
for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and other documents provided by MDA,
such as Missile Defense Plan II.
To ensure that MDA-generated data used in our assessment are reliable,
we evaluated the agency's internal management control processes. We
discussed these processes extensively with MDA upper management. In
addition, we confirmed the accuracy of MDA-generated data with multiple
sources within MDA and, when possible, with independent experts. To
assess the validity and reliability of prime contractors' Earned Value
Management systems and reports, we analyzed audit reports prepared by
the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Finally, we assessed MDA's internal
accounting and administrative management controls by reviewing MDA's
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Report for Fiscal Years 2003 and
2004.
Our work was performed primarily at MDA headquarters in Arlington,
Virginia. At this location, we met with officials from the Kinetic
Energy Interceptors Program Office; Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Program Office; Airborne Laser Program Office; Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications Program Office; and Ground-based
Midcourse Defense Program Office. In addition, we met with officials
from the Space Tracking and Surveillance System Program Office, Los
Angeles, California; Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Project
Office, Huntsville, Alabama; and the U.S. Army Lower Tier Program
Office, Huntsville, Alabama. We also interviewed officials from the
office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington,
Virginia; U.S. Strategic Command, Omaha, Nebraska; and the Joint
Theater Air Missile Defense Organization, Arlington, Virginia.
We conducted our review from May 2004 through February 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Barbara Haynes (256) 922-7500:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Tony Beckham, Ivy Hübler,
Stan Lipscomb, LaTonya Miller, Karen Richey, Adam Vodraska, Jonathan
Watkins, and Randy Zounes (Analyst-in-Charge) made key contributions to
this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD also funds missile defense activities outside of MDA. The Army
requested approximately $4.5 billion for the development and
procurement of its Combined Aggregate Program--consisting of Patriot
and the Medium Extended Air Defense System--during fiscal years 2006
through 2011. Appendix IX provides additional information on this
program.
[2] Pub. L. No. 107-107, section 232.
[3] Functional pieces of system equipment, such as radars and
interceptors, are referred to as "components."
[4] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).
[5] Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 233.
[6] Congress authorized DOD's use of funds appropriated for MDA
research, development, test, and evaluation for the fielding of
ballistic missile defense capabilities. Pub. L. No. 108-136, section
222; Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 231.
[7] We found, for example, that research and development cost estimates
grew $6.7 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter in calendar year 2003
and $9.2 billion for the Future Combat System in fiscal year 2004.
[8] Table 1 lists those elements of the BMDS for which we completed a
detailed review of progress achieved in fiscal year 2004. Because we
were directed to assess MDA's progress in achieving its program goals
and MDA does not have funding and management responsibility for the
Patriot system, our review of this program--provided in appendix IX--is
not as detailed. Rather, we provide information on how Patriot's
eventual replacement, Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), will
be inserted into fielded Patriot units.
[9] MDA goals are formally detailed in the agency's budget estimates
and in the top-level MDA document, Statement of Goals.
[10] The KEI program is funded by the Block 2012 program and,
accordingly, is not part of the Block 2004 and 2006 goals.
[11] In budget documentation submitted in February 2004, MDA referred
to these goals as "Operational Alert Configuration" Goals. "Fielded
Configuration" is new terminology.
[12] Mission area investment noted in figure 2 represent funding of
major mission areas that contribute to the development and enhancement
of all blocks. For example, these investments fund system design and
engineering activities, testing, advanced concept development, and
other special programs.
[13] Additional details on system availability and readiness are
classified.
[14] IFT-13C was a "zero-offset flyby." Although intercepting the
target was not a test objective, no action was taken to prevent an
intercept.
[15] The fire control radar is the primary radar for providing the
necessary targeting data to the fire control node (battle management
component). In particular, data provided by the fire control radar are
used to generate an interceptor flyout solution that guides the
interceptor to the target.
[16] DOT&E is responsible for providing independent oversight of
operational test and evaluation of major defense acquisition programs
to verify their operational effectiveness and suitability for combat
use. The Director is the principal operational test and evaluation
official within DOD and advises the Secretary of Defense and Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on
operational test and evaluation. The Director also provides responsible
officials with advice on developmental testing.
[17] The term "effective" means that the BMDS can destroy an ICBM with
a high probability of success. The exact figures, which depend on
scenario, are classified.
[18] GMD's December 2004 flight test, IFT-13C, and its February 2005
flight test, IFT-14, are not counted.
[19] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed, GAO-04-254 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 26, 2004).
[20] A transponder is a receiver-transmitter that will generate a reply
signal under proper interrogation. The missile defense community also
refers to the transponder as the "C-band beacon."
[21] Most notably are Glory Trips, which are live flight tests during
which a Minuteman III missile is launched from Vandenberg Air Force
Base as part of Follow-on Test and Evaluation.
[22] With the objective of acting as the fire control radar for an ICBM
engagement, Aegis BMD planned to participate in GMD flight test IFT-14
in February 2005. The test could not be fully executed because the GMD
interceptor failed to launch.
[23] The EVM system is a management tool widely used by DOD to compare
the value of a prime contractor's work performed to the work's actual
cost. The tool measures the contractor's actual progress against its
expected progress and enables the government and contractor to estimate
the program's remaining cost.
[24] An integrated baseline review is the program manager's review of a
contractor's performance measurement baseline. The review is conducted
by the program manager and the manager's technical staff. It verifies
the technical content of the baseline and ensures that contractor
personnel understand and have been adequately trained to collect earned
value management data. The review also verifies the accuracy of the
related budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been properly
identified, assesses the contractor's ability to implement earned value
management properly, and determines if the work identified by the
contractor meets the program's objective.
[25] Congress authorized DOD's use of funds appropriated for MDA
research, development, test, and evaluation for the fielding of
ballistic missile defense capabilities. Pub. L. No. 108-136, section
222; Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 231.
[26] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An
Update (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2004).
[27] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).
[28] GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 11, 2003).
[29] GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser's Cost and
Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
[30] The ABL program manager agrees that operating costs of the ABL
element are not well defined due to its technical maturity. However, as
with the fielding of any new technology, the initial operating costs
may be substantial. As the support concept matures, the ABL program
manager expects these costs to decrease and be comparable with other
Air Force high-value assets.
[31] With the submission of the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget in
February 2005, MDA implemented a new BMDS baseline approach for the
THAAD program. The agency now refers to the fielding of the fire unit
as a Block 2006/2008 fielding.
[32] The program office refers to the kill vehicle as the "kinetic
warhead."
[33] Five additional destroyers will be upgraded during Block 2006,
bringing the total number of upgraded destroyers to 15, which was MDA's
original Block 2004 goal.
[34] MDA program goals called for the delivery of nine SM-3 missiles by
the end of calendar year 2005.
[35] The third destroyer was upgraded in October 2004.
[36] The program also conducted FM-7 in February 2005, which resulted
in a successful intercept of a short-range ballistic missile target.
[37] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).
[38] Includes funds expended to develop the Navy Theater Wide system.
[39] A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work
tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each
task, schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets,
and allocates budget to the scheduled work.
[40] An integrated baseline review is the program manager's review of a
contractor's performance measurement baseline. The review is conducted
by the program manager and the manager's technical staff. It verifies
the technical content of the baseline and ensures that contractor
personnel understand and have been adequately trained to collect earned
value management data. The review also verifies the accuracy of the
related budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been properly
identified, assesses the contractor's ability to implement earned value
management properly, and determines if the work identified by the
contractor meets the program's objectives.
[41] The terms "intercontinental ballistic missile" and "long-range
ballistic missile" are used interchangeably.
[42] "First Flight" was planned as a "passive" flight test, that is,
without the use of the Track Illuminator Laser (TILL) and the Beacon
Illuminator Laser (BILL). The TILL and BILL are part of the laser-beam
control system used to focus the laser beam on the target and to
mitigate the effects of the atmosphere on beam quality.
[43] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).
[44] The quality of a laser beam is measured by attributes such as beam
width, coherency, and sustained power.
[45] Atmospheric compensation is the process whereby the high-energy
laser beam uses a system of deformable mirrors to minimize the
degradation of the laser caused by distortions in the atmosphere.
[46] GAO, Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser's Cost and
Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
[47] A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work
tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each
task, schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets,
and allocates budget to the scheduled work.
[48] The EVM system is a management tool widely used by DOD to compare
the value of the prime contractor's work performed to the work's actual
cost. The tool measures the contractor's actual progress against its
expected progress and enables the government and contractor to estimate
the program's remaining cost.
[49] The C2BMC element also consists of supporting hardware, such as
workstations and communications equipment.
[50] Details of this issue are classified.
[51] An OTA refers to transactions other than contracts, grants, or
cooperative agreements. OTAs are entered into under the authority of 10
U.S.C. § 2371 (2000 & Supp. II 2004) for basic, applied, and advanced
research projects or under the authority of section 845 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (10 U.S.C. § 2371 note)
for prototype projects.
[52] The terms "intercontinental ballistic missile" and "long range
ballistic missile" are used interchangeably. They are, by definition,
ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (3,400
miles).
[53] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).
[54] Technically, IFT-13C was a "zero-offset flyby." Although
intercepting the target was not a test objective, no action was taken
to prevent an intercept.
[55] The December 2004 flight test, IFT-13C, and the February 2005
flight test, IFT-14, are not counted.
[56] Includes funds expended to develop the National Missile Defense
system.
[57] In our report, GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance
Testing and Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23,
2004), we stated that the land-based system would be available in the
Block 2010 time frame. Because of budget cuts and a restructuring of
the program, the land-based KEI capability will not be available until
Block 2012.
[58] The plume is the hot exhaust gas emanating from the missile during
boost phase.
[59] High risk means that the program will not meet its objectives
without priority management actions and risk reduction activities.
[60] Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost Phase
Defense Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense (July 2003).
[61] Battleson, Kirk, et al., Phase One Engineering Team, Parameters
Affecting Boost Phase Intercept System (February 2002).
[62] A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work
tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each
task, schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets,
and allocates budget to the scheduled work.
[63] The satellites are expected to orbit the earth at an altitude much
less than satellites in geo-synchronous orbit.
[64] The two technology demonstration satellites were part of the
Flight Demonstration System.
[65] Program content of Block 2010 and beyond is classified.
[66] Prior to 2002, the SBIRS-Low program invested $686 million to
develop the demonstration satellites that are now part of the STSS
program.
[67] A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work
tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each
task, schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets,
and allocates budget to the scheduled work.
[68] In early 2004, MDA changed the name of the THAAD element from
"Theater High Altitude Area Defense" to "Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense."
[69] GAO, THAAD Restructure Addresses Problems but Limits Early
Capability, GAO/NSIAD-99-142 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1999).
[70] "Product development" is referred to by DOD as the "System
Development and Demonstration" phase of acquisition and formerly as
"Engineering and Manufacturing Development."
[71] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability, GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).
[72] The THAAD program monitors numerous performance indicators as part
of its management process. For example, element effectiveness, as
measured by the probability of a successful kill, is one such
indicator.
[73] The cost and schedule variance incurred during fiscal year 2004
was $0.673 million and $8.1 million, respectively.
[74] A performance measurement baseline identifies and defines work
tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibilities for each
task, schedules the work tasks in accordance with established targets,
and allocates budget to the scheduled work.
[75] The explosions caused the program to seek an alternate source.
According to the program office's current risk assessment, "source
replacements have the potential for delaying booster delivery during
the fight test program and into production."
[76] Initial fielding, sometimes called First Unit Equipped, refers to
the date a system and support elements are issued to the designated
unit and specified training has been accomplished.
[77] Evolution from Patriot to MEADS--Acquisition Decision Memorandum,
dated August 12, 2003.
[78] GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 11, 2003).
[79] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An
Update (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2004).
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
