Defense Acquisitions
Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships Gao ID: GAO-05-255 March 1, 2005To conduct operations in littorals--shallow coastal waters--the Navy plans to build a new class of surface warship: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). LCS is being designed to accomplish its missions through systems operating at a distance from the ship, such as helicopters and unmanned vehicles, and that will be contained in interchangeable mission packages. The Navy is using an accelerated approach to buy the LCS, building the ships in "flights." Flight 0, consisting of four ships, will provide limited capability and test the LCS concept. The schedule allows 12 months between the delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and the start of detailed design and construction for Flight 1 ships. Estimated procurement cost of the Flight 0 ships is $1.5 billion. The Congress directed GAO to review the LCS program. This report assesses the analytical basis of LCS requirements; the Navy's progress in defining the concept of operations; the technical maturity of the mission packages; and the basis of recurring costs for LCS.
The formal analysis of requirements for U.S. littoral combat operations--conducted after the Navy established the LCS program--examined a number of options, such as the extent to which existing fleet assets or joint capabilities could be used. While the Navy concluded that the LCS remained the best option, it focused on LCS requirements for combating small boats. The Navy did not conduct an analysis of the impact of larger surface threats LCS may face. Such threats may increase the risk to LCS operations when no other nearby U.S. forces are available to help. The Navy has developed both a broad concept and more detailed plans on how the LCS will be employed. It has also identified a number of challenges that could put the LCS concept at risk, such as manning, logistics, and communications. For example, reduced manning--a key goal of the LCS program--may not be achievable because maintaining and operating the ship's mission packages, such as the MH-60 helicopter, may require more sailors than the current design allows. Further, the Navy has not yet incorporated the numbers of helicopters that will be needed to fulfill LCS's concept of operation into its force structure and procurement plans. If the Navy's efforts to meet these challenges are not successful, the Navy may not have sufficient time to experiment with the Flight 0 ships and integrate lessons learned into planning and designing for follow-on ships. While the Navy designed the first LCS to rely on proven technologies and systems, a number of technologies to be used in LCS's mission packages have yet to be sufficiently matured--that is, they have not been demonstrated in an operational environment--increasing the risk of cost and schedule increases if the technologies do not work as intended. Technologies must also be demonstrated for systems on the LCS seaframe. Other factors may affect the availability of mature technologies and subsystems, such as making the modifications necessary for adaptation to the LCS and transitioning projects from the laboratory to production. Collectively, these technology issues pose an additional challenge to the Navy's ability to sufficiently experiment with Flight 0 ships in time to inform the design efforts for follow-on ships. Procurement costs for the Flight 0 ships remain uncertain. The basis for the seaframe cost target--$220 million--appears to be more defined than for the mission packages, as the Navy has performed various cost analyses that consider the challenges in detailed design and construction. The Navy seeks to meet the cost target by trading between capability and cost. Cost data for the Flight 0 mission packages are not as firm in part because of the uncertainties associated with immature technologies.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-255, Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2005:
Defense Acquisitions:
Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate Capability of First
Littoral Combat Ships:
GAO-05-255:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-255, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
To conduct operations in littorals”shallow coastal waters”the Navy
plans to build a new class of surface warship: the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS). LCS is being designed to accomplish its missions through systems
operating at a distance from the ship, such as helicopters and unmanned
vehicles, and that will be contained in interchangeable mission
packages. The Navy is using an accelerated approach to buy the LCS,
building the ships in ’flights.“ Flight 0, consisting of four ships,
will provide limited capability and test the LCS concept. The schedule
allows 12 months between the delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and
the start of detailed design and construction for Flight 1 ships.
Estimated procurement cost of the Flight 0 ships is $1.5 billion.
The Congress directed GAO to review the LCS program. This report
assesses the analytical basis of LCS requirements; the Navy‘s progress
in defining the concept of operations; the technical maturity of the
mission packages; and the basis of recurring costs for LCS.
What GAO Found:
The formal analysis of requirements for U.S. littoral combat
operations”conducted after the Navy established the LCS
program”examined a number of options, such as the extent to which
existing fleet assets or joint capabilities could be used. While the
Navy concluded that the LCS remained the best option, it focused on LCS
requirements for combating small boats. The Navy did not conduct an
analysis of the impact of larger surface threats LCS may face. Such
threats may increase the risk to LCS operations when no other nearby
U.S. forces are available to help.
The Navy has developed both a broad concept and more detailed plans on
how the LCS will be employed. It has also identified a number of
challenges that could put the LCS concept at risk, such as manning,
logistics, and communications. For example, reduced manning”a key goal
of the LCS program”may not be achievable because maintaining and
operating the ship‘s mission packages, such as the MH-60 helicopter,
may require more sailors than the current design allows. Further, the
Navy has not yet incorporated the numbers of helicopters that will be
needed to fulfill LCS‘ s concept of operation into its force structure
and procurement plans. If the Navy‘s efforts to meet these challenges
are not successful, the Navy may not have sufficient time to experiment
with the Flight 0 ships and integrate lessons learned into planning and
designing for follow-on ships.
While the Navy designed the first LCS to rely on proven technologies
and systems, a number of technologies to be used in LCS‘s mission
packages have yet to be sufficiently matured”that is, they have not
been demonstrated in an operational environment”increasing the risk of
cost and schedule increases if the technologies do not work as
intended. Technologies must also be demonstrated for systems on the LCS
seaframe. Other factors may affect the availability of mature
technologies and subsystems, such as making the modifications necessary
for adaptation to the LCS and transitioning projects from the
laboratory to production. Collectively, these technology issues pose an
additional challenge to the Navy‘s ability to sufficiently experiment
with Flight 0 ships in time to inform the design efforts for follow-on
ships.
Procurement costs for the Flight 0 ships remain uncertain. The basis
for the seaframe cost target”$220 million”appears to be more defined
than for the mission packages, as the Navy has performed various cost
analyses that consider the challenges in detailed design and
construction. The Navy seeks to meet the cost target by trading between
capability and cost. Cost data for the Flight 0 mission packages are
not as firm in part because of the uncertainties associated with
immature technologies.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Navy analyze the effect of larger surface
threats on LCS operations, incorporate the impact of LCS into
helicopter force structure, and sufficiently experiment with Flight 0
ships before selecting a Flight 1 design. The Department of Defense
partially concurred with GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-255.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Francis at (202)
512-2811 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Navy Conducted Detailed Analysis of LCS Requirements, but Surface
Threat Risk Is Unclear:
A Detailed Concept of Operations Has Been Developed for LCS but Faces a
Number of Challenges in Implementation:
Immaturity in Mission Package Technologies Could Decrease the
Experimental and Operational Utility of Flight 0 Ships:
Procurement Cost Estimates Are Uncertain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Review:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Littoral Combat Ship Missions:
Table 2: Navy's Comparison of Materiel and Nonmateriel Solutions for
Mitigating Gaps in the Littorals:
Table 3: Examples of Mission Warfare Tasks and Related Capability Gaps
in the Littorals:
Table 4: Challenges for LCS and Examples of Navy Mitigation Efforts:
Table 5: Mine Warfare Mission Package Status:
Table 6: Antisubmarine Warfare Mission Package Status:
Table 7: Surface Warfare Mission Package Status:
Table 8: Current Estimated Costs for Flight 0 Mission Packages:
Table 9: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions:
Figures:
Figure 1: Flight 0 LCS Designs:
Figure 2: LCS Acquisition Timeline:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
LCS: Littoral Combat Ship:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 1, 2005:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Navy has begun to build a new class of surface warship--the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)--to address the challenges of operating U.S.
military forces in the shallow waters close to shore, known as the
littorals. The three principal threats it is expected to address are
from mines, small surface boat attacks, and submarines. The LCS differs
from existing types of Navy surface warships in two critical ways.
First, it will accomplish its mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare
missions primarily through the use of helicopters, unmanned vehicles
and other systems that operate at a distance from the ship itself.
Second, the systems used to conduct each main or focused mission will
be contained in mission packages; for example, one mission package will
consist of the systems needed for detecting, engaging, and neutralizing
mines. The mission packages will be interchangeable, so that the LCS
can be rapidly reconfigured for different missions. Similar to the
concept for an aircraft airframe that can change missions depending on
the systems carried, the Navy refers to the LCS hull as a seaframe. The
concept of mission packages and the ability to shift among the three
focused missions of the ship concentrates each LCS on a single focused
mission at a time as opposed to larger multimission surface ships, such
as the Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers and Ticonderoga guided
missile cruisers. However, the Navy envisions that, like other surface
ships, the LCS will be capable of conducting certain core missions and
functions, such as self defense, regardless of the mission package on
board.
The Navy seeks to rapidly build and deploy LCS and has developed an
accelerated acquisition schedule that includes delivery of four ships,
two each of different designs, between fiscal years 2007 and 2009 with
delivery of follow-on ships of a single design beginning in fiscal year
2010. The Congress recently inserted a year into the schedule between
the construction of the first and second ship of each design, which may
affect the schedule for all subsequent ships. The Navy is developing
LCS using an evolutionary acquisition approach. Capabilities are
delivered by "flight" with the first four ships referred to as Flight 0
and the next increment of capability as Flight 1. Flight 0 will provide
an initial limited capability and platforms to experiment with the
critical mission technologies and test the overall concept. Flight 1
will provide greater capability and serve as the basis for learning
lessons that will be incorporated into additional follow-on ships. The
Navy has not decided how many total ships it will build, though
currently it estimates that between 50 and 60 ships may be built. The
Navy's cost target for each of the four Flight 0 ships is approximately
$370 million. This includes $220 million for the seaframe and
approximately $150 million for mission packages (the cost of six
packages averaged over four ships).
The Senate report[Footnote 1] accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004[Footnote 2] and the House of
Representatives report[Footnote 3] accompanying the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005[Footnote 4]
directed that we assess four key areas of the LCS program. Accordingly,
this report assesses (1) the analytical basis of LCS requirements; (2)
the Navy's progress in defining the concept of operations; (3) the
technical maturity of the mission package systems; and (4) the basis of
recurring costs for the seaframe and mission packages.
To assess the four key areas of the LCS program, we held discussions
and reviewed documents at a number of Navy offices, including the
program offices for LCS and its supporting mission package systems,
Navy headquarters, the Naval War College, and Navy Warfare Development
Command. We identified and analyzed key Navy documents, including those
related to capability gaps; requirements; concepts; acquisition
planning; consideration of critical doctrinal, logistical, and
operational considerations;[Footnote 5] technology assessment and
maturity plans; and cost analyses. Our analyses of technology maturity
and costs focused on Flight 0. Details of the costs and technologies
for the seaframe are sensitive, due to the ongoing competition. We
therefore do not discuss these at length. Further details on our scope
and methodology are in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Though the Navy conducted a formal requirements process and an analysis
of other potential solutions, it did so after concluding that the LCS
concept was the best option to address challenges of operating U.S.
forces in the littorals. Normally, a major acquisition program should
include an examination of basic requirements and an analysis of
potential solutions before a new system is decided upon. Based on
Department of Defense (DOD) reviews of the Navy's analysis and the
requirements of revised acquisition guidance, the Navy eventually
examined a number of alternative solutions to address littoral
capability gaps, such as the extent to which existing fleet assets or
joint capabilities could be used. The Navy still concluded that the LCS
concept was the best option. However, the Navy's analysis of one area
of littoral operations--the surface threats facing U.S. forces in
littoral waters--did not include consideration of the potential impact
of all threats the LCS is likely to face. For example, while the
requirements for LCS are focused on combating small boats, the LCS
could face threats larger than small boats in littoral waters,
including missile-armed warships. Though LCS is to rely on support from
other nearby U.S. forces, the Navy also intends for LCS to operate
independently of those forces. The Navy has not analyzed the risks such
threats could pose to LCS operations and survivability.
The Navy has developed a broad concept of operations that addresses the
key operations of the ship and continues to develop more detailed
planning on how the LCS and its mission systems will be used. The Navy
has also identified challenges in such areas as manning; logistics;
command control, communications, computers, and intelligence; and force
structure that are critical and may increase risk to the success of the
concept. The Flight 0 ships will be the primary means for determining
whether these challenges can be met. While the Navy is working to meet
these challenges, to the extent they are not met, the Flight 0 ships
could provide less capability than planned and less experimentation to
inform the design of the Flight 1 ships. For example, reduced manning
is one of the key goals of the LCS program. If the Navy discovers that
it needs more sailors to operate the ship's critical mission package
systems than the Flight 0 design can accommodate, significant changes
may have to be made in the Flight 1 requirements. The MH-60 helicopter,
which will operate from LCS and is critical to all its missions,
embodies a number of these challenges. The number of personnel required
to operate and maintain the helicopter may be greater than the Flight 0
design can accommodate. Further, the Navy's current force structure and
procurement plans do not include the numbers of helicopters that will
be needed to fulfill LCS's concept of operation.
A number of the technologies chosen for the LCS mission packages are
not yet mature, meaning that they have not been demonstrated in an
operational environment, which is a best practice for major acquisition
programs. Immature technologies increase the risk that some systems
will not perform as expected and may require additional time and
funding to develop. The impact of delayed technology is less capability
for the Flight 0 ships and less information for the Flight 1 ship
design. Other issues beyond technology maturity could prevent some
technologies from being available in time for the first ship. For
example, some technologies considered mature may require alterations to
operate from LCS. Some of the technologies still in development face
challenges transitioning into production, while other mature
technologies may not be available for LCS. Challenges also remain for
technologies included on the LCS seaframe, including those for
communications, software, launch and recovery, and command and control
of off-board systems.
The cost to procure the first flight of LCS remains uncertain, with
seaframe costs more defined than the mission package costs. The basis
of the procurement costs for the LCS seaframe appears to be more
defined since the Navy has performed a series of cost analyses to
anticipate the challenges in detailed design and construction. The Navy
seeks to stabilize seaframe costs by establishing a $220 million cost
target and is working to meet this target by trading between capability
and cost while assuring that seaframe performance meets threshold
requirements. As many of the technologies for the mission packages
remain immature, cost data for procurement of these technologies are
not as firm. Other mission package costs, such as procurement costs for
MH-60 helicopters, are not covered by LCS program cost analyses. In
addition to issues with procurement costs, development costs for the
LCS could expand if more time and effort is needed to mature the
technologies in the mission packages and the seaframe.
We are making three recommendations to help the Navy assess and
mitigate operational, force structure, and technology risks associated
with LCS. We are recommending that (1) the Navy analyze the effect and
mitigate any risks associated with a larger surface threat on LCS
operations and the impact on other naval forces in support of those
operations; (2) the Navy incorporate into its continuing efforts
consideration of the impact of LCS operations on helicopter force
structure and procurement plans as well as efforts to address the
manning, technology, and logistics impacts of helicopter operations
from LCS; and (3) the Navy revise its acquisition strategy to ensure
that it has sufficiently experimented with Flight 0 ships and mission
packages before selecting the design for Flight 1. In comments on a
draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations
and described steps it will take to implement them.
Background:
According to Navy guidance, the Navy is required to project power from
the sea and maintain assured access in the littoral regions, which for
naval vessels refers specifically to the transition between open ocean
to more constrictive shallower waters close to shore--the littorals.
"Anti-access" threats from mines, submarines, and surface forces
threaten the Navy's ability to assure access to the littorals. The LCS
is being developed to address these missions. The LCS design concept
consists of two distinct parts, the ship itself and the mission package
it carries and deploys. For LCS, the ship is referred to as the
"seaframe" and consists of the hull, command and control systems,
launch and recovery systems, and certain core systems like the radar
and gun. A core crew will be responsible for the seaframe's basic
functions. Operating with these systems alone offers some capability to
perform general or inherent missions, such as support of special
operations forces or maritime intercept operations. The LCS's focused
missions are mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare.
The majority of the capabilities for these missions will come from
mission packages. These packages are intended to be modular in that
they will be interchangeable on the seaframe. Each mission package
consists of systems made up of manned and unmanned vehicles and the
subsystems these vehicles use in their missions. Additional crew will
be needed to operate these systems. Each mission package is envisioned
as being self contained and interchangeable, allowing tailoring of LCS
to meet specific threats. Table 1 shows examples of LCS's focused and
inherent missions.
Table 1: Examples of Littoral Combat Ship Missions:
Focused missions: Littoral mine warfare;
Examples of tasks:
* Detect, avoid, and/or neutralize mines;
* Clear transit lanes;
* Establish and maintain mine cleared areas.
Focused missions: Littoral antisubmarine warfare;
Examples of tasks:
* Detect all threat submarines in a given littoral area;
* Protect forces in transit;
* Establish antisubmarine barriers.
Focused missions: Littoral surface warfare;
Examples of tasks:
* Detect, track, and engage small boat threats in a given littoral
area;
* Escort ships through choke points;
* Protect joint operating areas.
Inherent Missions: Battle space awareness;
Examples of tasks:
* Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Inherent Missions: Joint littoral mobility;
Examples of tasks:
* Provide transport for personnel, supplies and equipment within the
littoral operating area.
Inherent Missions: Special operations forces support;
Examples of tasks:
* Provide rapid movement of small groups of special operations forces
personnel;
* Support hostage rescue operations;
* Support noncombatant evacuation operations;
* Support and conduct combat search and rescue.
Inherent Missions: Maritime interdiction/interception;
Examples of tasks:
* Provide staging area for boarding teams;
* Employ and support MH-60 helicopters for maritime interdiction
operations;
* Conduct maritime law enforcement operations, including
counternarcotic operations, with law enforcement detachment.
Inherent Missions: Homeland defense;
Examples of tasks:
* Perform maritime interdiction/interception operations in support of
homeland defense;
* Provide emergency, humanitarian and disaster assistance;
* Conduct marine environmental protection;
* Perform naval diplomatic presence.
Inherent Missions: Antiterrorism/force protection;
Examples of tasks:
* Perform maritime interdiction/interception operations in support of
force protection operations;
* Provide port protection for U.S. and friendly forces and protection
against attack in areas of restricted maneuverability.
Source: GAO from U.S. Navy sources.
[End of table]
Navy Plans an Aggressive Schedule for LCS:
The Navy characterizes the schedule for acquisition and deployment of
LCS as aggressive. To meet this schedule, the Navy is pursuing an
evolutionary acquisition strategy. Rather than initially delivering a
full capability, the program is structured to deliver incremental
capabilities to the warfighter. To support this, LCS acquisition is
broken into "flights" for the seaframe and "spirals" for mission
packages in order to develop improvements while fielding technologies
as they become available. The initial flight of ships, referred to as
Flight 0, will serve two main purposes: provide a limited operational
capability and provide input to the Flight 1 design through
experimentation with operations and mission packages. Flight 1 will
provide more complete capabilities but is not intended to serve as the
sole design for the more than 50 LCS the Navy plans to ultimately buy.
Further flights will likely round out these numbers. Flight 0 will
consist of four ships of two different designs and will be procured in
parallel with the first increment of mission packages--Spiral Alpha.
Flight 0 ships are currently being designed, and construction on the
first ship will begin in 2005. Due to the accelerated schedule, Spiral
Alpha will consist primarily of existing technologies and systems.
Spiral Bravo mission packages will be improvements upon these systems
and are intended to be introduced with the Flight 1 ships. Figure 1
shows the two designs chosen by the Navy for Flight 0, one by Lockheed
Martin and one by General Dynamics.
Figure 1: Flight 0 LCS Designs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Navy and Lockheed Martin signed a contract for detailed design and
construction of the first Flight 0 ship in December 2004, and the ship
builder is expected to deliver the ship to the Navy in fiscal year
2007. The Navy will then begin testing and experimenting with the ship,
using the first mission package--mine warfare. A date for any
deployment with the fleet has not been determined. Detailed design and
construction for the first General Dynamics design ship is scheduled to
begin in fiscal year 2006 and delivery is scheduled for fiscal year
2008. The delivery of the first antisubmarine and surface warfare
mission packages are aligned with the delivery of the second Flight 0
ship. Figure 2 shows the Navy's current acquisition timeline for Flight
0, Flight 1, and their mission packages.
Figure 2: LCS Acquisition Timeline:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Based on congressional action for fiscal year 2005, ship 3 will
start construction in fiscal year 2007.
[End of figure]
The development of Flight 1 will proceed concurrently with the design
and construction of Flight 0. In early fiscal year 2006 the Navy will
begin consideration of several preliminary designs for Flight 1. The
Navy will choose designs for further development in fiscal year 2007.
Selection of a design[Footnote 6] to start construction of the first
Flight 1 ship will be in early fiscal year 2008. Flight 1 and future
follow-on designs will be the basis for the LCS class of ships, which
the Navy currently estimates could number between 50 and 60. Under the
current acquisition strategy, detailed design and construction of the
first Flight 1 ship will begin about 12 months after delivery of the
first Flight 0 ship. The last two Flight 0 ships will not be available
before detailed design and construction of Flight 1 begins. The second
Flight 0 ship and the first mission packages for antisubmarine and
surface warfare will be delivered just as detailed design and
construction of Flight 1 is set to begin. Delivery of the first mission
packages in Spiral Bravo will be aligned with delivery of the first
Flight 1 ship.
Navy Conducted Detailed Analysis of LCS Requirements, but Surface
Threat Risk Is Unclear:
Recognizing that it lacks a number of key warfighting capabilities to
operate in the littorals, the Navy began to develop the concept of LCS
as a potential weapon system before it had completed formal
requirements. Normally, a major acquisition program should include an
examination of basic requirements and an analysis of potential
solutions before a new system is decided upon.[Footnote 7] The Navy
eventually conducted a requirements development process and analyzed a
number of alternative solutions to a new ship but concluded that the
LCS remained the best option. However, the Navy's analysis of one area
of littoral operations--the surface threats facing U.S. forces in
littoral waters--did not include consideration of the potential impact
of all threats the LCS is likely to face.
Navy Began to Develop LCS before Fully Examining Alternatives:
The Navy has known about the capability gaps in the littorals for some
time, particularly threats from mines and submarines in shallow waters.
As we previously reported, the Navy has acknowledged that it lacks a
number of key warfighting capabilities it needs for operations in the
littoral environs.[Footnote 8] For example, it does not have a means
for effectively breaching enemy sea mines in the surf zone or detecting
and neutralizing enemy submarines in shallow water. The Navy has had
programs under way to improve its capabilities in each of these areas
for many years, such as systems designed to provide the fleet with mine
detection and limited clearing capabilities, but progress has been
slow. Additionally, the Navy has identified the threat of small boats,
such as the kind that attacked the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, as a potential
hindrance to operations in the littorals. The Navy has decided that the
LCS is to accomplish these three critical littoral missions.
After recognizing the need to address known capability gaps in the
littorals, the Navy conducted a series of wargames to test new concepts
for surface combatant ships. One such concept, a very small surface
combatant ship called Streetfighter, was incorporated into the Global
1999 war game. The concept was envisaged as a small, fast, stealthy,
and reconfigurable ship, which included many characteristics similar to
LCS. The Navy's war-fighting assessment processes confirmed gaps in
capabilities for mine warfare, shallow water antisubmarine warfare, and
surface warfare against small boats. In July 2001, the Global 2001 war
game further examined the concepts and potential benefits of
modularity--such as using mission packages--and use of unmanned
vehicles for littoral missions. As a result of the wargames the Navy
continued the process of analyzing a variety of new surface combatant
ship concepts to address the threats in the littorals.
In 2002, the Navy established an LCS program office as it began to
further identify concepts and characteristics for a new surface
combatant ship. In December 2001, the Naval War College was asked to
develop and define characteristics that would be desirable in a
littoral combat ship. The college used a series of workshops that
included operational and technical experts from throughout the Navy to
compare three types and sizes of surface combatant ships and describe
desirable characteristics that such a ship should have. The experts
examined such characteristics as speed, range, manning, and the ability
to operate helicopters and unmanned vehicles. The workshop participants
also concluded that a potential littoral ship should:
* be capable of networking with other platforms and sensors,
* be useful across the spectrum of conflict,
* be able to contribute to sustained forward naval presence,
* be capable of operating manned vertical lift aircraft,
* be capable of operating with optimized manning,
* have an open architecture and modularity,
* be capable of operating manned and unmanned vehicles, and:
* have organic self defense capabilities.
The results of the Naval War College study, which was completed in July
2002, were used as a baseline for further developing the concepts for
LCS.
At this point the Navy's analysis was focused on a single solution to
address littoral capability gaps--a new warship along the lines of LCS.
Between April 2002 and January 2004, the Navy conducted an analysis of
multiple concepts to further define the concept that would address gaps
in the littorals. The analysis began by examining five different ship
concepts for LCS (later focusing on three concepts for another stage)
and provided the Navy with insight into the trade-offs between features
such as size, speed, endurance, and self defense needs. The analysis
was performed by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division,
and drew upon expertise throughout the Navy.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff were
concerned that the Navy's focus on a single solution did not adequately
consider other ways to address littoral capability gaps. Based on these
concerns, in early 2004, the Navy was required to more fully consider
other potential solutions. The publication of new guidance on joint
capabilities development in June 2003,[Footnote 9] also led the Navy to
expand its analysis beyond the single solution of the proposed new ship
to include other potential solutions to littoral challenges.
As part of its resulting analysis, the Navy defined littoral capability
gaps, developed requirements to address those gaps, and identified and
examined 11 nonmateriel and 3 materiel solutions across the joint
forces that could be used to mitigate gaps in the littorals.
Nonmateriel solutions refer to the use of different operational
concepts or methods to meet requirements without buying new assets such
as additional ships; materiel solutions are those which involve
developing equipment or systems, such as ships and aircraft. The
solutions were analyzed to determine the feasibility and risk in
mitigating the gaps. The Navy's assessment of feasibility centered on
the extent to which each solution addressed the mine, antisubmarine,
and surface capability gaps. The Navy's assessment of risk centered on
the impacts of each solution on (1) the success of potential operations
in the littorals, (2) the sensitivity of diplomatic considerations,
such as the military support of other nations, and (3) the financial
considerations involved in choosing that solution.
Two additional materiel solutions, that centered on maritime patrol
aircraft and modified DDG-51 destroyers, were added to the Navy's
analysis as a result of input from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Program Analysis and Evaluation office and the Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics office. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Staff also provided specific questions to the Navy for
further clarification of the Navy's ongoing analysis. With these
additions, the Program Analysis and Evaluation office approved the
Navy's completed analysis as satisfactory to meet the requirements of a
full analysis of alternatives for the LCS program. Table 2 shows the
materiel and nonmateriel solutions presented in the Navy's requirements
analysis and the results of the Navy's analysis of operational
feasibility, as well as operational, diplomatic, and financial risk.
Table 2: Navy's Comparison of Materiel and Nonmateriel Solutions for
Mitigating Gaps in the Littorals:
Materiel solutions: New class of ships tailored to address maritime
access tasks mission needs (LCS);
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine, surface, and mine warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Negligible operational risk; Negligible
diplomatic risk; Negligible financial risk.
Materiel solutions: Additional current and programmed forces--includes
mine countermeasures assets;
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine, surface, and mine warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Negligible operational risk; Negligible
diplomatic risk; Significant financial risk.
Materiel solutions: System upgrades to existing platforms, and
additional platforms if necessary. Supplements ships with unmanned
vehicles and mission packages;
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine, surface, and mine warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Negligible operational risk; Negligible
diplomatic risk; Significant financial risk.
Materiel solutions: Nonsurface combatant solution with emphasis on
maritime patrol aircraft;
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine, surface, and mine warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Some operational risk; Some diplomatic risk;
Negligible financial risk.
Materiel solutions: DDG-51 destroyer hull with three mission packages
for mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare;
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine, surface, and mine warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Some operational risk; Negligible diplomatic
risk; Some financial risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Use existing force structure; (Combination of
assets from carrier and expeditionary strike groups);
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine, surface, and mine warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Some operational risk; Negligible financial
risk; Negligible diplomatic risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Use existing force structure; (independent
submarines);
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine mitigation; partial mine
warfare mitigation; little to no surface warfare mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Some operational risk; Negligible financial
risk; Negligible diplomatic risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Use existing force structure; (maritime patrol
aircraft and helicopters);
Gap mitigation: Significant antisubmarine and surface warfare
mitigation; partial mine warfare;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Some financial risk; Some diplomatic risk; Some
operational risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Use existing force structure; (Land based
tactical aviation for surface warfare);
Gap mitigation: Little to no antisubmarine and mine warfare mitigation;
partial surface warfare;
Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant diplomatic risk; Some operational
risk; Some financial risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Use existing force structure; (Long range
bombers);
Gap mitigation: Little to no antisubmarine, mine, and surface warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Some financial
risk; Some diplomatic risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Use existing force structure; (Theater-national
overhead systems);
Gap mitigation: Little to no antisubmarine, mine, and surface warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Negligible
diplomatic risk; Negligible financial risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Assign mission to nonmilitary force;
Gap mitigation: Little to no antisubmarine and mine warfare mitigation;
partial surface warfare mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Some financial
risk; Some diplomatic risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Not entering contested littorals;
Gap mitigation: Little to no antisubmarine, mine, and surface warfare
mitigation; Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Significant
diplomatic risk; Some financial risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Preemptive actions to eliminate threat;
Gap mitigation: Partial antisubmarine, mine, and surface warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Significant
diplomatic risk; Negligible financial risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Assign tasks to coalition partners;
Gap mitigation: Partial antisubmarine, mine, and surface warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Partially feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Significant
diplomatic risk; Some financial risk.
Nonmateriel solutions: Tolerate capability gaps; (Accept risk);
Gap mitigation: Little to no antisubmarine, mine, and surface warfare
mitigation;
Overall feasibility: Not feasible;
Navy‘s risk assessment: Significant operational risk; Significant
diplomatic risk; Negligible financial risk.
Source: Navy analysis.
[End of table]
Based on its analysis, the Navy concluded that the materiel and
nonmateriel solutions they examined would not provide better
operational and cost effective solutions than the proposed LCS to
perform the littoral missions. A number of factors were analyzed,
including the feasibility of using other surface and non-surface force
solutions and the risk associated with those options. Four nonmateriel
solutions were considered to be partially feasible for mitigating the
gaps in the littorals, while seven other solutions were considered not
to be feasible. Partially feasible nonmateriel solutions included the
use of maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and a mix of air and sea
assets from carrier and expeditionary strike groups. The most feasible
solution considered using a combination of existing forces from carrier
and expeditionary strike groups. However, the Navy determined that
during a major combat operation, this solution would not be feasible
because other mission objectives focused on directing operations onto
shore would take a higher priority. Some of the materiel solutions
included expanding existing forces, upgrading existing forces, or
procuring a new class of platforms tailored for focused missions.
Using a number of studies of threats and analyses of potential military
operations in the littoral regions, the Navy developed requirements for
the LCS that addressed the identified capability gaps and likely
threats in the littorals. This analysis supported revised DOD and Joint
Chiefs of Staff requirements for shipbuilding acquisition programs. The
Navy identified capability gaps in the littorals by measuring the
ability of the current and programmed joint forces to accomplish a
number of tasks across a range of operating conditions and standards.
The Navy concluded that based on completing the tasks in the littorals
under the established measures of effectiveness, it lacked sufficient
assets and technology to fully mitigate the gaps. For example, under
mine warfare the task for clearing routes for transit lanes covering a
specific area within a 7 day period creates a capability gap because
the Navy concluded that its force structure lacked the number of assets
(mine countermeasures ships, destroyers with remote mine-hunting
systems, and the appropriate mine countermeasures helicopters) to fully
mitigate the gap in the littorals under the operational timeline of
seven days. Table 3 shows examples of tasks for each focused mission,
the measures of effectiveness, and the capability gap that exists under
the current and programmed force structure.
Table 3: Examples of Mission Warfare Tasks and Related Capability Gaps
in the Littorals:
Mission task: Mine Warfare: Establish and maintain mine-cleared areas;
Criteria to measure success: Clearing transit lanes within 7 days;
Capability gaps identified with current and programmed force structure:
Inadequate number of mine countermeasures assets in the force to clear
transit lanes within seven days.
Mission task: Antisubmarine warfare: Protect joint operating areas;
Criteria to measure success: Detecting submarines at 90 percent success
rate;
Capability gaps identified with current and programmed force structure:
Inadequate number of assets and technology to detect submarines in
shallow water at 90 percent success rate.
Mission task: Surface warfare: Escort through choke points;
Criteria to measure success: Neutralizing large sets of small boats in
a single raid;
Capability gaps identified with current and programmed force structure:
Gaps exist in coverage areas in defeating 50 or more small boats, due
to shortfall in the numbers of assets. Surface combatant ships and
helicopters only provide self defense protection.
Mission task: Protect port;
Criteria to measure success: Neutralizing small sets of small boats in
a single raid;
Capability gaps identified with current and programmed force structure:
Inadequate number of surface combatant assets and technology exists for
defeating small boat raid in port operating area. Helicopters provide
self defense capability only in port operating area.
Source: GAO from Navy sources.
[End of table]
LCS Requirements Analysis Did Not Cover Some Threats LCS May Face:
We analyzed the requirements the Navy developed to address littoral
capability gaps and used to support the LCS program, tracking each
requirement in the mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare areas back
to the capability gaps and threats identified by the Navy in their
requirements development process. We found no inconsistencies in the
specific requirements for LCS illustrated in the documents required as
part of the joint capabilities integration and development system.
However, the requirements the Navy arrived at for LCS's surface warfare
capabilities were focused on small boats, and this did not include an
analysis of the impact of larger surface threats in the littorals. The
Navy focused the surface threat on swarms of small boats, characterized
as Boston Whalers, capable of operating at high speeds and employing
shoulder mounted or crew served weapons, such as light machine guns.
These boats can conduct surprise, simultaneous, short range attacks
from or near shorelines. The Navy measured its current and programmed
capabilities against defeating swarms of small boats in high numbers.
For example, to determine the capability gaps and measures of
effectiveness for escorting ships through choke points, the Navy
measured its force structure against defeating large numbers of small
boats. However, larger threats, such as missile-armed patrol boats and
frigates, are also identified in the Navy's LCS concept of operations
and threat studies as threats that LCS may face in the littorals. Such
vessels may be armed with medium caliber guns, torpedoes, and antiship
missiles. These threats could present additional risk to LCS operations.
Some DOD and Navy officials have raised concerns about the extent to
which the LCS may face larger threats than it is capable of defending
against. Navy officials agreed that the surface threat was focused
exclusively on swarms of small boats and told us that LCS is not
intended to combat larger threats. The Navy found no capability gap
with respect to the larger surface threat, because there is sufficient
capability in the existing fleet to counter the threat. Further, Navy
officials stated that if a larger surface threat were encountered, LCS
would be able to call upon the assistance of other U.S. forces in the
area, such as tactical aviation or larger surface warships. In a major
combat operation, LCS squadrons would be able to draw upon assistance
of those nearby Navy or joint forces in the face of a larger surface
threat in the area. However, according to the LCS concept of
operations, in addition to operating with other U.S forces on a regular
basis, LCS is intended to operate independently of those forces,
depending on the type of mission and circumstance. When operating
independently, such as during routine deployments to littoral waters,
LCS may not be able to call upon assistance from larger U.S. forces.
This may impede LCS operations, such as forcing the LCS to withdraw
from an operating area, a situation contrary to the Navy's goals. Since
the Navy did not analyze the impact of larger surface threats on LCS
operations, the extent of the risk and the impact on U.S. operations is
not known.
A Detailed Concept of Operations Has Been Developed for LCS but Faces a
Number of Challenges in Implementation:
Although there are no formal criteria for developing a concept of
operations, the Navy has developed both a broad concept and more
detailed plans as to how the LCS and its mission systems will be used
to meet requirements. The concept of operations also includes several
challenges that, if not met, may increase the risk in actual LCS
operations. However, the Navy has not yet fully considered the LCS
concept of operations in the force structure and procurement plans for
the MH-60 helicopter, which is critical to all LCS missions. The Navy
has recognized these risks and is attempting to address them. However,
if these efforts are not successful within the time constraints of the
schedule, the Flight 0 ships may not provide the planned capability or
the level of experimentation needed to inform the Flight 1 design.
The Navy has developed a broad concept of operations document for LCS.
Though there are no formal guidelines that describe how the concept of
operations should be written or the level of detail it should contain,
it is a high level requirements document that describes how the user
(in this case, the Navy) will use the weapon system to address mission
needs. The concept of operations can also be used as guidance in
developing testable system and software requirements specifications. In
particular, the LCS concept of operations describes how the ship will
contribute to U.S. Joint Force operations in countering threats in the
littorals. These include mine warfare (detecting and neutralizing
mines), antisubmarine warfare (detecting and engaging hostile
submarines), and surface warfare (detect, track, and engage surface
threats). In addition to these focused missions, the LCS concept of
operations discusses how the LCS can perform inherent missions, such as
support for special operations forces, maritime interception operations
and supporting homeland defense related missions. For example, the LCS
concept of operations for maritime interception operations envisages
use of the ship's core crew, and any additional personnel in case of
operations in higher threat areas, to provide boat crews and boarding
teams to board suspect vessels as well as using an embarked helicopter
for assistance. The concept of operations is directed at Flight 0 but
also provides a vision for follow-on ships. The document has also been
used to build consensus among warfighters, the acquisition community,
and the various industry teams involved in building LCS as to how the
ship is intended to be used.
The development process for the LCS concept of operations began with
the Navy Warfare Development Command in late 2002 when it created the
first version of the Concept. The document described the projected
threat context, capabilities, and operational employment of LCS to help
industry with their designs. The Command based this version of the
concept of operations on their experience with various pre-LCS studies
and war games that employed fast, small ships with modular payloads.
The Navy subsequently updated and expanded the concept of operations
with new information that related to critical areas that impact, and
are impacted by, LCS operations, including doctrine, training, and
personnel. The Navy approved the LCS concept of operations in December
2004.
The Navy is also continuing to refine concepts for how LCS and its
mission systems will be used to address anti-access threats. These
efforts include a Concept of Employment, which describes the way
mission package systems are intended to be used to meet warfare
requirements, and an analysis of performance data for individual
systems in order to inform experiments on the actual operation of LCS
mission systems. In addition, the Navy will incorporate lessons learned
from Flight 0 operations into future versions of the LCS concept of
operations.
We compared the LCS concept of operations to the approved requirements
for the ship and the capability gaps identified by the Navy and found
that each of the capability gaps and LCS mission requirements were
addressed in the concept of operations. For example, the requirements
to address the mine warfare capability gap call for mines to be
detected, identified, and neutralized. The concept of operations
discusses how the LCS will address these requirements by using a
combination of helicopters and unmanned vehicles to detect and identify
mines, and either a helicopter or an explosive ordinance disposal
detachment with unmanned underwater vehicles to neutralize mines.
The LCS concept of operations includes several operational and
logistical challenges that may increase the operational risk for LCS.
One challenge is to reduce the numbers of sailors required to operate
the ship's critical mission systems. This challenge is exacerbated by
the limited space on the ship. If this cannot be achieved, the Navy may
have to make significant changes to the design or capability of follow-
on ships. Another challenge is the logistics support required to meet
the Navy's goal of changing LCS mission packages within 4 days of
arriving at an appropriate facility. A number of factors frame this
challenge, including where packages are to be stored, how they are to
be transported, and the proximity of LCS operating areas to ports
required to swap mission packages. Any of these factors could increase
the time required for a change in LCS mission packages once the
decision has been made to do so. Other challenges include training;
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence;
survivability; and the impact on the Navy's force structure.
The two versions of the MH-60 helicopter[Footnote 10] intended for use
with LCS embody a number of these challenges. The helicopter is vital
to each of the LCS's focused missions as well as some of the ship's
inherent missions, such as maritime intercept operations. In order to
operate a helicopter from LCS, a detachment of flight and maintenance
personnel are required. The Navy's current helicopter detachments on
surface warships each number at least 20 people. When combined with the
ship's core mission crew, this number could exceed the capacity of LCS
to house crews, thereby limiting the ability of LCS to operate other
mission package systems and reducing the ship's operational
effectiveness.
Additionally, the Navy's plans for buying and fielding MH-60s do not
yet include the quantities needed for the numbers of follow-on LCS
ships the Navy intends to buy. Since the helicopter is critical for
LCS's concept of operations, the ship's operations will be
significantly limited if the helicopters are not bought and made
available. To do this, the Navy needs to plan for the numbers of
helicopters needed, modify its procurement plans, obtain the funds,
build the helicopters, deliver them, conduct operational evaluations,
and train the crews.
The Navy recognizes these risk areas and has mitigation efforts
underway in each area. For example, in the risk area of manning
reduction, the Navy is using the "Sea Warrior" program to cross train
sailors so that they are more able to multitask and perform a wider set
of duties. The Navy is also conducting additional analysis to validate
the maximum number of crewmembers needed and will make changes to crew
accommodations if necessary. Further, the Navy is analyzing ways to
reduce the size of helicopter detachments and is currently reevaluating
its helicopter force structure and procurement plans to provide the MH-
60s needed for LCS. In addition, the Navy has established an LCS risk
management board to track and manage each of the risk areas as well as
monitor the effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts. Table 4 lists the
challenges for LCS and examples of Navy mitigation efforts.
Table 4: Challenges for LCS and Examples of Navy Mitigation Efforts:
Challenge: Manning;
Description: Crew size of core crew and for mission packages could
overcome capabilities of the ships as built;
Examples of Navy mitigation efforts:
* Top-down manning requirements analysis;
* Early involvement with human systems integration and manning
communities;
* Industry integration response;
* Navywide effort to analyze and change how sailors are trained in
order to allow fewer sailors to monitor and maintain a greater number
of the ship's systems.
Challenge: Training;
Description: Need for innovative methods to cross- train personnel in
order to achieve reduced manning levels;
Examples of Navy mitigation efforts:
* 13 Sailors identified and detailed to report to the LCS unit in
Norfolk in January. The Naval Personnel Development Command will work
with these sailors to mature and develop the "Revolution in Navy
Training" approach for developing hybrid sailors;
* Combined Navy-Industry team has developed a breakdown of specific
skill sets (knowledge, skills, and abilities);
* Training will occur at contractors' facilities for the Seaframe and
mission packages. This will include hands on training and simulations
in the intended environment.
Challenge: Sustainability/Logistics;
Description: Infrastructure needed to sustain LCS while deployed,
including storing and swapping mission packages;
maintaining mission technologies while deployed;
and viability of long-term unmanned vehicle operation;
Examples of Navy mitigation efforts:
* Navy is working with both seaframe contractors to classify personnel
requirements in performing integrated logistics support tasks in final
design;
* Realigning current funding to support required integrated logistics
support tasking and making this risk an award fee issue.
Challenge: Command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence;
Description: General bandwidth, communication of data from unmanned
vehicles to ship, and data links/communications with other fleet assets
in support of LCS;
Examples of Navy mitigation efforts:
* Develop prototype mine, antisubmarine, and surface warfare mission
planning applications;
* Utilize unmanned vehicle control residual capability from technology
demonstration;
* LCS command and control iterative process team has been working
directly with the two seaframe industry teams to insure that the
seaframes include sufficient core communications systems/equipment to
operate the Flight 0 mission packages.
Challenge: Survivability;
Description: Ability of LCS to operate in hostile littoral
environments, including structural and operational aspects;
Examples of Navy mitigation efforts:
* LCS seaframe and mission packages teams are working to established
Navy survivability requirements.
Challenge: Force structure;
Description: Integration of elements critical to LCS operations (e.g.,
adequate numbers of appropriate helicopters in the fleet);
Examples of Navy mitigation efforts:
* The Navy has conducted numerous force structure studies including the
Analysis of Multiple Concepts and Navy headquarters ongoing force
structure assessments.
Source: GAO from U.S. Navy sources.
[End of table]
None of these challenges are insurmountable, given enough time and
other resources to address them. However, if the Navy is unsuccessful
in mitigating the risk areas by the time the first Flight 0 ships are
delivered, LCS may be unable to meet even the limited mission
capability planned for Flight 0. The Navy plans for a period of about
12 months between the time of delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and
the start of construction for the first Flight 1 ship, provided the
first Flight 0 ship is available on time. Further, only one mission
package (mine warfare) will be available for testing and
experimentation during that time. The last two Flight 0 ships will not
be available before detailed design and construction of Flight 1
begins. The second Flight 0 ship and the first mission packages for
antisubmarine and surface warfare will be delivered just before
detailed design and construction of Flight 1 begins. Delays caused by
any of the risk areas discussed above might further reduce the already
limited time to adequately experiment with one Flight 0 ship in order
to integrate lessons learned into planning and designing for Flight 1.
Immaturity in Mission Package Technologies Could Decrease the
Experimental and Operational Utility of Flight 0 Ships:
A number of the technologies chosen for the LCS mission packages are
not mature, increasing the risk that the first ships will be of limited
utility and not allow sufficient time for experimentation to influence
design for follow-on ships. Our work has shown that when key
technologies are immature at the start of development, programs are at
higher risk of being unable to deliver on schedule and within estimated
costs.[Footnote 11] The remaining technologies are mature although some
may require alterations to operate from LCS. Other issues beyond
technology maturity could prevent some systems from being available in
time for the first ship. Some technologies still in development face
challenges going to production, while other mature technologies may not
be available for LCS due to other Navy priorities. Challenges remain
for technologies included on the LCS seaframe, including those for
communications, software, launch and recovery, and command and control
of off-board systems. As a result, the first Flight 0 ships may not be
able to provide even the limited amount of mission capability envisaged
for them. These factors could also impair the Navy's ability to
experiment with the Flight 0 ships and adequately gather and
incorporate lessons learned into the designs for the Flight 1 ships.
In order to perform its focused missions of finding and neutralizing
mines, submarines, and small boats in the littorals, LCS will deploy
mission packages consisting of helicopters and unmanned vehicles with a
variety of sensors and weapons. Each of the interchangeable mission
packages is tailored to a specific mission and is optimized for
operations in the littorals. By using a mix of manned and unmanned
vehicles, program officials hope to increase the areas covered and
decrease the time required by existing systems. The use of multiple
mission packages is to be enabled by the design of the ship itself
which will use a number of common connections or interfaces that will
work regardless of the individual technologies or systems used in the
mission packages.
In order to speed the development of the first LCS, the Navy planned
for the mission packages to comprise technologies that are either
already demonstrated in an operational environment and used by the
Navy, and therefore fully mature, or very close to the end of the
development cycle and near full maturity. However, in some cases the
program office chose technologies that have not completed testing and
are not considered mature. Some of these technologies will be delivered
to LCS as prototypes or engineering development models and may not be
fully mature. The program office has used an informed process in
choosing which technologies to pursue for Flight 0, tracking the
maturity of technologies and the plans for further development. Those
technologies selected by the program that lack maturity are being
monitored and decisions about their inclusion are made based on results
of further testing. Once initial choices were made, the Navy used an
independent panel of experts, consisting of Navy and industry
technology experts, to reassess the maturity of technologies and the
efforts needed for risk reduction. The assessment paid particular
attention to technologies at low levels of readiness, such as the Non-
Line-Of-Sight missile launching system (also referred to as NetFires)
and the environment in which the technologies are to be used.
The first mission package to be developed will focus on mine warfare
and will align with the delivery of the first ship in January 2007. The
systems within this mission package contain both mature and immature
technologies, although some mature technologies, like the remote mine-
hunting vehicle, may need modifications to operate from LCS. Table 5
shows the maturity and availability of mission package technologies for
mine warfare, based on the Navy's current assessment. The first mission
package is intended to be delivered with the first Flight 0 ship in
fiscal year 2007.
Table 5: Mine Warfare Mission Package Status:
Mission: Vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle & Coastal battlefield
reconnaissance analysis system;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2007: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission: Remote mine-hunting vehicle & AQS-20A sonar;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Yes;
Issues: May require alterations.
Mission: Battlefield preparation autonomous underwater vehicle;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Yes;
Issues: Has performance problems.
Mission: Sculpin undersea autonomous vehicle;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Yes;
Issues: N/A.
Mission: MH-60s helicopter;
Role: [Empty];
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Schedule risk.
Mission:
* AQS-20A sonar;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission:
* Airborne laser mine detection system;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter. Only system for detecting floating mines
in shallow water.
Mission:
* Rapid airborne mine clearance system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission:
* Organic airborne surface influence sweep system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission:
* Airborne mine neutralization system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission: Unmanned surface vehicle & influence sweep system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2007: Unknown;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission: Navy mine clearance team;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2007: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Source: GAO from U.S. Navy sources.
[End of table]
A number of critical mine warfare systems are not mature or will not be
ready due to the unavailability or immaturity of subsystems. This could
have a negative effect on LCS as the loss of certain technologies leads
to a decrease in capabilities. The MH-60S helicopter is a key system
for mine warfare employing technologies for both the detection and the
neutralization of mines in shallow water. While the helicopter has
proven its ability to detect mines, two of the technologies for
neutralization lack maturity. Testing on neutralization technologies
continues but is not expected to complete until after delivery of the
first ship, limiting the ability of LCS to destroy sea based mines. One
system which could fill the gap in this area, the unmanned surface
vehicle, also lacks maturity in key systems and ultimately may not be
available.
The first systems for antisubmarine and surface warfare packages of
Spiral Alpha are scheduled to be available at the time the second
Flight 0 ship is delivered in fiscal year 2008. Of these technologies,
few are currently mature. Two of the systems used for detecting
submarines, the unmanned surface vehicle and remote mine-hunting
vehicle, lack maturity in key subsystems and will be delivered to LCS
while still experimental. If these systems fail to meet requirements,
LCS may have to depend on the MH-60R helicopter to find submarines. The
MH-60R is an important system in both these missions, and while fully
mature in the antisubmarine warfare configuration, it has not yet
completed testing for surface warfare and is not expected to do so
until September 2005. The helicopter has potential capability in both
detecting and neutralizing surface targets, such as small boats, due to
the types of sensors and weapons it carries. Tables 6 and 7 show the
maturity and availability of mission package technologies for
antisubmarine and surface warfare, respectively. These packages are
scheduled to be delivered with the second Flight 0 ship in fiscal year
2008.
Table 6: Antisubmarine Warfare Mission Package Status:
Mission package systems: Unmanned surface vehicle & sensor systems;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems: Advanced deployable system;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems: Remote mine-hunting vehicle & sensor systems;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems: MH-60R helicopter;
Role: [Empty];
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Schedule risk.
Mission package systems:
* Mk 54 torpedo;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission package systems:
* Airborne low frequency sonar;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission package systems:
* Sonobuoys;
Role: Detect;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission package systems: Torpedo countermeasures on ship;
Role: Defense;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: [Empty].
Mission package systems: Vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle &
communications equipment;
Role: Communications;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Still in development.
Source: GAO from U.S. Navy sources.
[End of table]
Table 7: Surface Warfare Mission Package Status:
Mission package systems: Unmanned surface vehicle & electro-optical
infrared sensors;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems:
* 30mm gun system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems:
* NetFires Missile System;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems:
* Running gear entanglement system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems: Vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle &
electro-optical infrared sensors;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems: MH-60R helicopter & sensor systems;
Role: Detect;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Schedule risk.
Mission package systems:
* GAU 16 gun system;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission package systems:
* Hellfire;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: Yes;
Available in FY 2008: Unknown;
Issues: Linked to helicopter.
Mission package systems: NetFires missile system on ship;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Mission package systems: 30mm gun system on ship;
Role: Neutralize;
Mature: No;
Available in FY 2008: Yes;
Issues: Still in development.
Source: GAO from U.S. Navy sources.
[End of table]
In addition to challenges posed by the lack of mature technologies,
there may be other challenges in obtaining some mission package systems
in time for the first ships. The unmanned surface vehicle, a system
used in all three mission packages, is being developed through an
advanced concept technology demonstration[Footnote 12] and does not yet
have a planned production schedule. The current development program for
the unmanned surface vessel ends in fiscal year 2005 and seeks only to
prove the military utility of the vehicle. In order to procure the
systems needed for LCS, a new program will have to be established to
conclude development, finalize design and start production of vehicles.
Other technologies have planned production schedules but need to
complete significant demonstrations and tests before they are able to
deploy operationally. The vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle,
another system used in all mission packages, underwent a major
redesign, and the first deliveries to LCS will not represent a final
design. The remote mine-hunting vehicle only recently began development
as an antisubmarine warfare platform and remains in development as an
advanced concept technology demonstration. These factors could
jeopardize the dates established for the delivery of the LCS mission
packages and may ultimately affect the ability of LCS to execute many
of the missions assigned to it.
Other technologies, while mature, may not be available to LCS in time
for the ship's deployment due to other Navy priorities. For example,
the MH-60 helicopters, in both the MH-60R and MH-60S configurations,
are scheduled to complete testing in fiscal year 2007, but may not be
fully available until fiscal year 2009, assuming the Navy makes them
available for LCS, because of training requirements. This could have an
impact on LCS capabilities in all missions. The MH-60S is a key system
for mine warfare, and the lack of this helicopter results in the loss
of some capability, in terms of detecting some mines, and limitations
in the ability to neutralize others. While LCS will still be capable of
detecting and destroying mines in littorals without the helicopter, it
will do so more slowly, which minimizes operational effectiveness. If
the MH-60R is unavailable, the ability to neutralize submarines from
LCS is severely compromised as no other mission package system is
planned to provide a neutralization capacity. Older, less capable,
versions of the MH-60 helicopter can be used in this mission but
changes would be needed in the ship's communications systems. The Navy
acknowledges that no helicopters will be available for LCS operations
until fiscal year 2009 and are working to align crew training schedules
to permit operations with LCS.
Challenges also remain for systems on the LCS seaframe, including
technologies for communications, software, launch and recovery, and
command and control of off-board systems. Further tests of these
systems are expected before ship installation.[Footnote 13]
In addition to limiting the operational capability of the Flight 0
ships, technology maturity and availability issues could limit the time
available for the Navy to adequately experiment with operation of the
seaframe and mission packages and gather valuable lessons for
incorporation into Flight 1 ships. Detailed design and construction of
the first Flight 1 ship is currently scheduled to begin in fiscal year
2008. Spiral Alpha mission packages for antisubmarine warfare and
surface warfare are not scheduled for delivery to the Flight 0 ships
until fiscal year 2008, just as detailed design and construction for
Flight 1 is set to begin. If technology immaturity causes any of the
mission packages systems to slip to later delivery dates, the
opportunity to experiment and gather lessons learned from these systems
aboard the Flight 0 ships would be lost, unless the time allowed for
such experimentation is extended. If the helicopters are not available
for operations until fiscal year 2009, input on the full impact of
their operations could be lost as well.
Procurement Cost Estimates Are Uncertain:
The cost to procure the first flight of LCS ships remains uncertain,
particularly regarding the mission packages. The basis of the
procurement costs for the LCS seaframe appears to be more defined
because the Navy has conducted a series of cost analyses to investigate
the challenges in detailed design and construction. The Navy seeks to
stabilize seaframe costs by establishing a $220 million cost target and
working to meet this target by trading between capability and cost
while assuring that seaframe performance meets threshold requirements.
Nevertheless, seaframe costs could be affected by changes to ship
design and materials that might be necessary as a result of changes to
naval ship standards. As many of the systems for the mission packages
lack maturity, cost data for these technologies are not as firm. Other
mission package costs are not covered by LCS program cost analyses. For
programs like LCS, an independent cost estimate by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense normally provides additional confidence in program
cost estimates, but such an estimate will not be done on LCS until
Flight 1. In addition to issues with procurement costs, nonrecurring
development costs for the LCS could expand, as systems both in the
mission packages and the seaframe remain in development.
The Navy's procurement cost target for Flight 0 is about $1.5 billion
(fiscal year 2005 dollars). The cost target for each of the four Flight
0 ships is approximately $370 million. This includes $220 million for
the seaframe and approximately $150 million for mission packages (the
cost of six packages averaged over four ships).
The Navy currently estimates that the mission packages for Flight 0
will cost approximately $548 million, which is approximately $137
million for the six packages averaged over four ships. This is about
$13 million below the mission package target. Table 8 shows the current
cost estimates for the mission packages for Flight 0. The estimated
cost for seaframe detailed design and construction is considered
competition sensitive and is not discussed in detail in this report.
Table 8: Current Estimated Costs for Flight 0 Mission Packages:
Fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions:
Item: Vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle;
Individual cost: $37.0;
Quantity: 4;
Total cost: $148.0.
Item: Advanced deployable system[A];
Individual cost: $12.3;
Quantity: 1;
Total cost: $12.3.
Item: Mine warfare package;
Individual cost: $102.8;
Quantity: 2;
Total cost: $205.6.
Item: Antisubmarine warfare package;
Individual cost: 67.0;
Quantity: 2;
Total cost: 134.0.
Item: Surface warfare package;
Individual cost: $23.8;
Quantity: 2;
Total cost: $47.6.
Total for mission packages;
Total cost: $547.5.
Source: GAO from Navy data.
[A] The advanced deployable system is used for detection of submarines.
[End of table]
The Navy has conducted a number of cost reviews for procurement of the
LCS seaframe and mission packages to support decision making at key
points in the program. One of the most detailed of these reviews took
the form of a cost assessment used to support the program's initiation.
In this assessment the program office analyzed cost data, provided by
the contractor, to establish a preliminary cost and challenged some
assumptions behind these costs. The Cost Analysis and Improvement Group
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense also performed cost
assessments for Flight 0. More recently, a cost estimate for procuring
the seaframe and mission packages of Flight 0 was performed by the Navy
and became the official program estimate. A cost estimate differs from
an assessment in that it goes into greater depth in challenging
assumptions behind costs provided by the contractors and may use
different methodologies and assumptions to arrive at a final number. As
a result, the program estimate may differ from the price provided by
contractors and offers a more detailed cost analysis for decision
making.
The basis of the procurement costs for the LCS seaframe appears to have
become more defined over time as successive cost analyses have been
developed to anticipate the challenges in detailed design and
construction. Analyses included recommendations to add funds to
mitigate changes to seaframe design as well as firm fixed price quotes
for some materials. In addition, the Navy seeks to manage seaframe
costs by establishing a $150 to $220 million cost range, which the Navy
considers aggressive, and has been working to meet this range by
trading between capability and cost while assuring that seaframe
performance meets requirements. Any capabilities in the seaframe that
exceed the requirements established by the Navy are considered trade
space areas, in which less expensive systems may be substituted at the
cost of lower performance. Each trade is analyzed for impact to cost
and operational capability by a team of program officials and is fully
vetted through the chain of command.
One factor that increases risk to seaframe cost estimates is applying
the current changes in the naval vessel rules for design and
construction of surface ships. The unconventional hull designs and
materials used in both Flight 0 LCS designs reflect new types of ships
the Navy has not hitherto built. Changes to the rules are occurring at
the same time as development of the LCS. The process of meeting these
rules could lead to changes in the designs and materials used. Such
changes may increase uncertainty in seaframe procurement and life-cycle
costs.
The costs for the first spiral of mission packages are less defined, as
many of the technologies are not mature. For example, the unmanned
surface vehicle remains in an advanced concept technology demonstration
program into fiscal year 2005. This program seeks only to prove the
military utility of the vehicle. Any cost data that emerges as a result
of tests and construction of test vehicles does not accurately
represent the final cost of the system and is thereby preliminary. The
vehicle may also use different subsystems or have different
capabilities when used on LCS. This would further change actual
procurement costs.
Additional confidence in a program's costs is usually gained through an
independent cost estimate done outside the Navy. According to a DOD
acquisition instruction, an independent cost estimate should be
completed as part of the process that normally authorizes the lead
ship, referred to as the Milestone B decision.[Footnote 14] For
programs like LCS, an independent group, like the Cost Analysis and
Improvement Group, is required to perform such an estimate. While this
group performed assessments of Flight 0 costs, it has not yet performed
a cost estimate for LCS. On the LCS program, the Flight 0 ships are
considered to be predecessors to the Milestone B decision. The
Milestone B decision will authorize the first Flight 1 ship. The Navy
considers this to be the point at which an independent estimate is
required. An independent cost estimate is thus planned for
authorization of Flight 1 in January of 2007. While DOD would not have
been prevented from conducting an independent estimate for Flight 0,
given the short time in which the Navy solicited and selected designs
for Flight 0, it is unclear whether there was enough time to do so.
Other mission package costs are not covered by LCS program cost
analyses but could have an effect on the broader Navy budget. For
example, mission package costs do not include procurement costs for the
MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters utilized in LCS operations. The Navy
estimates that the procurement cost for each MH-60R is about $36
million and the cost for each MH-60S is about $23 million. The number
of helicopters acquired by the Navy is determined by the helicopter
concept of operations, which has not yet been modified to reflect the
deployment of LCS. Given the reliance of LCS mission packages on these
platforms, costs for these systems, or number needed for operations,
could increase.
The developmental nature of the mission package technologies may affect
more than the procurement, or recurring, costs of LCS. Development and
integration of technologies on many of the mission package systems is
not complete. Testing for these systems will continue, in some cases,
up to the delivery date of the mission packages. Should these tests not
go as planned, or if more time and money is needed for integration and
demonstration, development costs could rise. Since the development of
mission package systems is only partially funded by LCS, the costs for
continued development could spread to other programs. Alternately, the
decision maybe made to reduce the quantities of certain technologies
aboard LCS, as was the case with the Advanced Deployable system. Some
seaframe technologies remain developmental as well, such as the launch
and recovery systems. Unlike the mission packages, the LCS program
office would assume any increase in development funding that occurs on
seaframe systems.
Conclusions:
The Navy has embarked on a plan to construct four Flight 0 ships,
complete development and procure multiple mission packages, experiment
with the new ships, and commit to the construction of follow-on ships
in a span of only four years. The Flight 1 and follow-on designs form
the basis of a class of ships that may eventually total more than 50.
At this point, we see three risks that could affect the success of the
program.
First, because the Navy focused the surface warfare threat and
requirements analysis exclusively on small boat swarms, the risks posed
by larger surface threats when the LCS operates independently from
nearby supporting U.S. forces have not yet been assessed.
Second is the availability of the MH-60 helicopter in light of its
criticality to all LCS missions. Experimentation with the MH-60 will
provide key information on mission performance, operations issues such
as manning, and technology maturity. Thus, it is essential that the
helicopters, equipped with the systems needed for LCS missions, be
available for testing on the Flight 0 ships. In addition, if the
quantities of MH-60s are not available for the Flight 1 ships the
Navy's ability to deploy these ships operationally as intended, would
be reduced. Making the MH-60s available requires meeting a number of
challenges, including developing requirements, force structure
planning, budgeting, delivering, and training air crews.
Third, the Navy intends to begin considering multiple designs for
Flight 1 in fiscal year 2006 and to begin detailed design and
construction of a single design in fiscal year 2008. By 2007, only one
Flight 0 ship will be delivered, and only one mission package will be
available, providing there are no delays for either ship or mission
package. While maturing technologies and evaluating potential designs
for Flight 1 while Flight 0 ships are being delivered could be
beneficial, committing to a single design for follow-on ships before
gaining the benefit of tests and experiments with the two Flight 0
designs increases the risk to the Flight 1 design. The current schedule
allows about 12 months for the Navy to conduct operational experiments
to evaluate the first Flight 0 seaframe design; the mine warfare
mission package; and the doctrinal, logistics, technology maturity and
other operational challenges the Navy has identified before committing
to production of follow-on ships. The Navy's schedule does not allow
for operational experimentation with the other three ships or the
antisubmarine or surface warfare mission packages before Flight 1 is
begun. Setbacks in any of these areas further increases the risk that
the Navy will not be able to sufficiently evaluate and experiment with
Flight 0 ships and incorporate lessons learned into the design and
construction of the Flight 1 ships.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help the Navy assess and mitigate operational, force structure, and
technology risks associated with LCS, we are making the following three
recommendations:
To determine whether surface threats larger than small boats do pose
risks to the LCS when operating independently and to mitigate any risks
the Navy subsequently identifies, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct an analysis of the
effect of a surface threat larger than small boats on LCS operations
and the impact on other naval forces in support of those operations.
To address challenges associated with integrating the MH-60 helicopter
into LCS operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
that the Navy include in its ongoing evaluation of helicopter
integration with LCS (1) evaluation of the numbers and budget impact of
helicopters required to support future LCS ships and (2) examination of
how to address manning, technology, and logistical challenges of
operating the helicopters from LCS.
To allow the Navy to take full advantage of the technical and
operational maturation of the Flight 0 ships before committing to the
much larger purchases of follow-on ships, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy
to ensure that it has sufficiently experimented with both Flight 0 ship
designs, captured lessons learned from Flight 0 operations with more
than one of the mission packages, and mitigated operational and
technology risks before selection of the design for an award of a
detailed design and construction contract for Flight 1 is authorized.
Agency Comments and Our Review:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed
with the intent of our recommendations. DOD discussed steps it is
currently taking as well as actions it plans to take to address these
recommendations.
In response to our recommendation that the Navy analyze the effect of a
larger surface threat on LCS operations, DOD indicated that, in
addition to efforts it already has underway to analyze elements of the
threats facing LCS, the Navy will assess the impact of larger surface
threats on LCS as part of the capabilities development process for
Flight 1. Using the analyses required in this process should help the
Navy clarify the extent to which a larger surface threat poses a risk
to LCS operations.
In commenting on its plans to address helicopters' needs and
challenges, DOD indicated that it is currently assessing the helicopter
force structure including both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.
While this may clarify the Navy's helicopter force structure
requirements, we continue to believe that due to the importance of
helicopters to LCS operations and the numbers of LCS the Navy plans to
acquire, the Navy should also analyze the budgetary impact of potential
helicopter force structure changes.
In response to our recommendation that the Navy revise its acquisition
strategy to ensure time to experiment with Flight 0 designs, DOD stated
that, before award of Flight 1 contracts, it will review the
acquisition strategy to ensure the strategy adequately provides for
experimentation, lessons learned, and risk mitigation. DOD stated that
it is balancing the acquisition risks with the risk of delaying closure
of warfighting gaps that LCS will fill. It also stated that mission
package systems will potentially be spiraled with a different cycle
time than the historically more stable hull and systems that comprise
the seaframe. We believe the separation of development spirals for the
mission packages and seaframe has merit. However, decisions leading to
the award of a detailed design contract for the Flight 1 seaframe must
go beyond technology risks. Because the Navy plans to begin design of
the Flight 1 seaframe with a new development effort and competition, it
is important to gain experience with the two Flight 0 seaframe designs
that are being acquired so that the benefits of this experimentation
can be realized in the design and development of a new seaframe.
Experimentation with Flight 0 in terms of basic mission performance,
swapping mission packages, actual manning demands, and operations with
multiple LCS are all factors that could have a significant effect on
the Flight 1 ship design.
DOD also noted that its plan for acquiring LCS provides for multiple
flights. Under this strategy, DOD would have more opportunities beyond
the fiscal year 2008 Flight 1 decision to upgrade mission packages and
seaframes as the 50 or so remaining ships are bought. We have made
changes in the report to reflect this strategy. However, we do not
believe it lessens the value of incorporating experience from Flight 0
operations into the design for Flight 1.
DOD's written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-2811; or Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512-6785. Key staff members that contributed to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the basis of the LCS requirements and the concept of
operations, we obtained and analyzed Navy wargames and operational
plans, requirements documents, and other sources used by the Navy to
identify capability gaps in the littoral waters. We conducted our own
analysis of all critical concept, requirements, and acquisition
documents required as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development system to determine the extent to which the Navy (1)
developed specific requirements to address capability gaps and examined
materiel and nonmateriel solutions to meet those requirements; and (2)
developed a concept of operations that addressed each of the identified
requirements as well as critical doctrinal, logistical, and operational
considerations. We compared the sources of the requirements for the
LCS, such as analyses of military operations based on specific
scenarios and threat assessments to the final validated requirements
document (Capabilities Development Document), and highlighted each
capability gap. We identified the capability gaps in the Navy's
functional analysis for each of the warfare missions--mine warfare,
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare. This included looking at
the Navy's standards that were used to measure how well the current and
programmed joint forces could mitigate the warfare threats in the
littorals during a major combat operation. We then reviewed the
materiel and nonmateriel solutions identified by the Navy that could be
used as alternative solutions for mitigating the gaps. We also
conducted a comparative analysis of the Initial Capabilities Document
with the validated requirements in the Capabilities Development
Document to highlight additional gaps. We also compared the
requirements, as developed in the CDD and the Preliminary Design
Interim Requirements Document to the LCS operating concepts and
capabilities, as developed in the Navy's two versions of the concept of
operations.
To assess the Navy's progress in defining the concept of operations we
used a gap analysis, similar to the one used for the requirements, to
trace the extent to which the concept of operations were developed. GAO
compared the LCS concept of operations to the ship's requirements
(specifically the Capabilities Development Document) and the identified
capability gaps to determine if the LCS concept of operations fulfilled
the requirements. We also discussed with Navy officials the extent to
which they included doctrinal and operational challenges and the Navy's
assessment of where the risks are stemming from these challenges and
their mitigation efforts.
To assess the progress of technology development in LCS mission
packages, we reviewed the basis of the Navy's estimation of technology
readiness and plans to bring these technologies to full maturity. As a
part of this assessment we analyzed the Technology Readiness Assessment
performed by the Navy and reviewed development and testing plans
developed by the program offices. As a measure of technology maturity
we utilized Technology Readiness Levels, the same metric used by the
Navy in the Technology Readiness Assessment. The standard we used for
assessing technology maturity is the demonstration of form, fit, and
function in an operational environment. This standard is based on
defined technology readiness levels developed by the National
Aeronautic and Space Administration and adopted by DOD.[Footnote 15]
Table 9: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions:
Technology readiness level (TRL): 1. Basic principles observed and
reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 2. Technology concept and/or
application formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the
assumption. Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 3. Analytical and experimental
critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 4. Component and/or breadboard.
Validation in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system;
Examples include integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware software: Low fidelity breadboard; Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together; Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 5. Component and/or breadboard
validation in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment; Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components;
Hardware software: High fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.).
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 6. System/subsystem model or
prototype demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;
Hardware software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration environment: High fidelity lab demonstration or
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment.
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 7. System prototype demonstration in
an operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in
a test bed aircraft;
Hardware software: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 8. Actual system completed and
"flight qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development; Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware software: Flight qualified hardware;
Demonstration environment: Developmental test and evaluation in the
actual system application.
Technology readiness level (TRL): 9. Actual system "flight proven"
through successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration environment: Operational test and evaluation in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
Our analysis was supplemented by interviews with officials from the LCS
program offices and other Navy programs supporting the mission
packages. Our audit focused on technologies for Flight 0, as
technologies for Flight 1 have not been selected.
To assess the basis of LCS costs we reviewed the cost analyses prepared
by the contractors and the LCS program office. We analyzed the basis of
costs for design and construction of the seaframe as well as the
development and procurement costs of mission packages for Flight 0. Our
analysis was supplemented by interviews with the program offices and
contractors involved in LCS. Costs for operation of Flight 0 and
procurement of Flight 1 have not been estimated. Details of the costs
and technologies for the seaframe are sensitive, due to the ongoing
competition. We therefore do not discuss these at length.
To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from
Navy headquarters' surface warfare requirements office; LCS program
offices; mine warfare program office; the MH-60 program office; the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles program office; the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Dahlgren Division; the Naval Undersea Warfare Center; the Naval
War College; and the Navy Warfare Development Command. We also
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Program Analysis and Evaluation division, General Dynamics, and
Lockheed Martin.
We conducted our review from July 2004 through December 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Plans
Should Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral
Combat Ships," dated January 21, 2005 (GAO Code 120344/GAO-05-255).
The Department has reviewed the draft report and partially concurs with
the three recommendations. I am enclosing specific DoD comments that
address each of the recommendations.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JANUARY 21, 2005 GAO CODE 120344/GAO-05-255:
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: PLANS SHOULD ALLOW ENOUGH TIME TO DEMONSTRATE
CAPABILITY OF FIRST LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct an analysis of the effect
of a surface threat larger than small boats on Littoral Combat Ships
(LCS) operations and the impact on other naval forces in support of
those operations. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur.
The GAO draft report identifies the "surface threat larger than small
boats" as missile-armed patrol boats and frigates that might have
medium-caliber guns, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. The GAO draft
report states the Navy's analysis of LCS requirements does not consider
these.
The Navy either has completed or is in the process of conducting some
of the analysis the GAO recommends. Specifically, the Navy has
completed an analysis of anti-ship cruise missile threats to LCS. The
torpedo defense analysis is complete for Flight 0 and is ongoing for
Flight 1. For the remaining areas, the Navy will assess capabilities
against larger surface targets in the littoral as part of the LCS
Flight 1 Capabilities Development Document generation.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct that the Navy include in its ongoing evaluation of helicopter
integration with LCS: (1) an evaluation of the numbers and budget
impact of helicopters required to support future LCS ships, and (2) an
examination of how to address manning, technology, and logistical
challenges of operating the helicopters from LCS. (p. 36/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE:
Part 1. Partially Concur. A review of helicopter force structure is
underway, taking into account several recent changes, including the
introduction of LCS and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Part 2. Concur. Ongoing Navy studies are addressing manning,
technology, and logistical challenges of operating helicopters and
unmanned aerial vehicles from LCS. These comprehensive, integrated
supportability and engineering studies span LCS, mission module, MH-60,
and Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program activities in an
effort to define solutions that meet an optimal, total capability need
versus system-specific needs. These studies also maximize opportunities
to leverage technology development and innovative supportability
concepts introduced by other aviation-capable ship programs. The
completed study will offer manning alternatives and identify training
tracks for the aviation detachment.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy to ensure that it
has sufficiently experimented with both Flight 0 ship designs, captured
lessons learned from Flight 0 operations with more than one of the
mission packages, and mitigated operational and technology risks before
selection of the design for an award of the detailed design and
construction contract for Flight 1 is authorized. (p. 36/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur.
The Department concurs with the intent of this recommendation and will
review the acquisition strategy before award of Flight 1 contracts to
ensure that the transition from Flight 0 to Flight 1 adequately
provides for experimentation, lessons learned, and risk mitigation.
However, the LCS program entails risk by design. The Department
balances the program acquisition risks with the risk of delaying
closure of the warfighting gaps that LCS will fill. The Navy intends
for LCS Flight 0 to deliver an immediate capability to the fleet to
address critical littoral anti-access capability gaps and to provide
risk reduction for follow-on flights.
The Department previously has identified the risks discussed in this
report and actively is managing the risks and developing appropriate
mitigation plans. The inherent modularity of the LCS concept mitigates
the current schedule risks, especially for the mission packages.
Mission package systems will potentially be spiraled with a different
cycle time than the historically more stable hull, mechanical, and
electrical systems of the seaframe. The primary risks identified by GAO
reside in the mission systems. The acquisition of the seaframe has a
more manageable risk. Acquisition of new spirals for each of the
mission packages will proceed at the pace optimal to their technical
maturity to provide warfighting improvements over time.
The evolutionary development plan for LCS provides for multiple
flights. The Department does not anticipate the Flight 1 execution
decision in FY08 will be for an extended 50+ ship run as suggested in
the report, but will be limited to an optimal flight size before the
Department initiates a flight upgrade with its associated requirements
definition process and acquisition milestones. The Navy plans to
acquire 50+ LCS, but the acquisition strategy is designed to allow the
Department to buy the optimum seaframe and mission packages at every
point along the acquisition timeline. We will clarify this in the
acquisition strategy update.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-2811;
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402;
Karen S. Zuckerstein (202) 512-6785:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Richard G. Payne, Jerome A. Brown, J.
Kristopher Keener, Joseph W. Kirschbaum, James C. Lawson, Jodie M.
Sandel, Angela D. Thomas, Roderick W. Rodgers, and Bethann E. Ritter
made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] S. Rep. No. 108-46, at 179-180 (2003).
[2] Pub. L. No. 108-136 (2003).
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 108-491, at 184-185 (2004).
[4] Pub. L. No. 108-375 (2004).
[5] DOD generally refers to these considerations as doctrine,
operations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities
(DOTMLPF).
[6] The Flight 1 acquisition strategy is under review and Navy
officials indicate that no options have been excluded, including the
selection of more than one design for Flight 1.
[7] Department of Defense, Instruction No. 5000.2, Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003 and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3170.01D, Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System, March 12, 2004.
[8] GAO, Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities
Needed, GAO-01-493 (Washington, D.C.: May 2001).
[9] This is referred to as the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System, which is meant to identify joint capabilities that
allow joint forces to meet the full range of future military
challenges. The current version of this guidance is dated March 12,
2004.
[10] MH-60R and MH-60S.
[11] The standard we used for assessing technology maturity is the
demonstration of form, fit, and function in an operational environment.
This standard is based on defined technology readiness levels developed
by NASA and adopted by DOD. See GAO, Best Practices: Using A Knowledge-
Based Approach to Improve Weapon Acquisition, GAO-04-386SP (Washington,
D.C.: January 2004). A DOD acquisition instruction also states that
technology should be demonstrated, preferably in an operational
environment, to be considered mature enough for product development in
systems integration. See Department of Defense, Instruction No. 5000.2,
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, § 3.7.2.2, May 12, 2003.
Technology maturity levels are discussed further in GAO, Best
Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30,
1999).
[12] Advanced concept technology demonstrations are DOD efforts to
provide mature or maturing technology prototypes to the warfighter in
order to test concepts and applicability of the technology and evaluate
the extent to which further acquisition is needed.
[13] The exact nature of the seaframe technologies is considered
competition sensitive and is not discussed in detail in this report.
[14] Department of Defense, Instruction No. 5000.2, Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System, § 3.7.1.2, May 12, 2003. The statutory
basis for this requirement is 10 U.S.C. § 2434, which provides that the
Secretary of Defense may not approve the system development and
demonstration or the production and deployment of a major defense
acquisition program unless the Secretary considers an independent
estimate of the full lifecycle cost of the program.
[15] See GAO, Best Practices: Using A Knowledge-Based Approach to
Improve Weapon Acquisition, GAO-04-386SP (Washington, D.C.: January
2004); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapons
Programs, GAO-04-248 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004) and Best Practices:
Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System
Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); and
Department of Defense, Instruction No. 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, § 3.7.2.2, May 12, 2003; and Defense Acquisition
Guidebook, § 10.5.2, December 2004.
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