Defense Acquisitions
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs Gao ID: GAO-05-301 March 31, 2005The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat various threats to U.S. security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from those investments. DOD can help resolve these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing new weapons. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practice. It can also highlight those programs that employ practices worthy of emulation by other programs. GAO plans to update and issue this report annually.
GAO assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800 billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency's Airborne Laser to the Army's Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. GAO's assessments are anchored in a knowledge-based approach to product development that reflects best practices of successful programs. This approach centers on attaining high levels of knowledge in three elements of a new product or weapon--technology, design, and production--at key consecutive junctures in development. If a program is not attaining these levels of knowledge, it incurs increased risk of technical problems, with significant potential cost and schedule growth implications. If a program is falling short in one element, like technology maturity, it is harder to attain the requisite amount of knowledge to prudently proceed in succeeding elements. The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more and taking longer to develop than planned. Most of the programs proceeded with less knowledge at critical junctures than suggested by best practices, although some programs came close to meeting best practice standards. For example, technology and design for the F/A-22 matured late in the program contributing to large cost growth and schedule delays. The JASSM program, in contrast, has achieved a high level of knowledge at critical junctures while experiencing minimal cost increases or schedule delays. Managing these levels of knowledge takes on additional significance as DOD's share of the discretionary budget faces increasing pressure from the growth in mandatory spending and the demands of ongoing military operations. For these reasons, if DOD approves programs with low levels of knowledge and accepts the attendant likely adverse cost and schedule consequences, it will probably get fewer quantities for the same investment or face difficult choices on which investments it cannot afford to pursue.
GAO-05-301, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs
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Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2005:
Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs:
GAO-05-301:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-301, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to
enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major
investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat
various threats to U.S. security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately
develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition
remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO‘s reviews over the past 30
years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as
cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In
addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the
need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs
and to obtain the most from those investments. DOD can help resolve
these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing
new weapons.
This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an
independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs
that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program‘s
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practice. It
can also highlight those programs that employ practices worthy of
emulation by other programs. GAO plans to update and issue this report
annually.
What GAO Found:
GAO assessed 54 programs, which represent an investment of over $800
billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency‘s Airborne Laser to
the Army‘s Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. GAO‘s assessments
are anchored in a knowledge-based approach to product development that
reflects best practices of successful programs. This approach centers
on attaining high levels of knowledge in three elements of a new
product or weapon–technology, design, and production–at key consecutive
junctures in development. If a program is not attaining these levels of
knowledge, it incurs increased risk of technical problems, with
significant potential cost and schedule growth implications (see
figure). If a program is falling short in one element, like technology
maturity, it is harder to attain the requisite amount of knowledge to
prudently proceed in succeeding elements.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more and taking
longer to develop than planned. Most of the programs proceeded with
less knowledge at critical junctures than suggested by best practices,
although some programs came close to meeting best practice standards.
For example, technology and design for the F/A-22 matured late in the
program contributing to large cost growth and schedule delays. The
JASSM program, in contrast, has achieved a high level of knowledge at
critical junctures while experiencing minimal cost increases or
schedule delays.
Managing these levels of knowledge takes on additional significance as
DOD‘s share of the discretionary budget faces increasing pressure from
the growth in mandatory spending and the demands of ongoing military
operations. For these reasons, if DOD approves programs with low levels
of knowledge and accepts the attendant likely adverse cost and schedule
consequences, it will probably get fewer quantities for the same
investment or face difficult choices on which investments it cannot
afford to pursue.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-301.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Foreword:
Letter:
A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments:
Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop:
A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes:
Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical
Junctures:
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Airborne Laser (ABL):
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF):
Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA):
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS):
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS):
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS):
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System
(ATIRCM/CMWS):
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC):
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F):
Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM):
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21:
DD(X) Destroyer:
E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A):
E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE):
EA-18G:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-Atlas V, Delta IV:
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM):
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
F/A-22 Raptor:
Future Combat Systems (FCS):
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS:
Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR):
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
Joint Common Missile (JCM):
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW):
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1:
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5:
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS):
Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
Land Warrior:
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS):
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA):
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
MQ-9 Predator B:
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB):
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Tactical Tomahawk Missile:
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T):
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope of Our Review:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power:
Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems:
Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and
2005 Assessment:
Figures:
Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding--Major Defense Acquisition
Programs:
Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key
Junctures:
Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key
Junctures:
Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
Abbreviations:
ACTS: AEHF Comsec/Transec System:
BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance:
BTERM: Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle:
FY: fiscal year:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit:
GPS: Global Positioning System:
HEO: highly elliptical orbit:
HLV: heavy lift vehicle:
IMIS: Integrated Maintenance Information System:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance:
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition:
JSSEO: Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems Engineering
Organization:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
NA: not applicable:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
OT&E: Operational Test and Evaluation:
PDR: Preliminary Design Review:
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation:
SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System:
SM-3: Standard Missile 3:
TBD: to be determined:
TF/TA: Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
UHF: ultra high frequency:
U.S.C.: United States Code:
USMC: United States Marine Corps:
March 31, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
Fiscal realities demand that the Department of Defense (DOD) get better
outcomes from its weapon system investments. Federal discretionary
spending, along with other federal policies and programs, will face
serious budget pressures in the coming years. While providing for the
common defense is in the Constitution, defense spending is considered
"discretionary" from a budget sense. Furthermore, investments in new
capabilities such as weapon systems are more discretionary than other
aspects of defense spending, such as personnel costs and the costs of
supporting and maintaining current force operations. As a result, it is
imperative that DOD's limited resources be allocated to the most
appropriate weapon system investments based on current and reasonably
expected threats and that the investments yield the results promised
(such as performance, cost, and timing) within the constraints imposed
by those resources.
We have assessed weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area since 1990.
Although U.S. weapons are the best in the world, the programs to
acquire them often take significantly longer and cost significantly
more money than promised and often deliver fewer quantities and other
capabilities than planned. It is not unusual for estimates of time and
money to be off by 20 to 50 percent. When costs and schedules increase,
quantities are cut, and the value for the warfighter--as well as the
value of the investment dollar--is reduced. In these times of
asymmetric threats and netcentricity, individual weapon system
investments are getting larger and more complex. Just 4 years ago, the
top five weapon systems cost about $281 billion; today, in the same
base year dollars, the top five weapon systems cost about $521 billion.
If these megasystems are managed with traditional margins of error, the
financial consequences can be dire, especially in light of a
constrained discretionary budget.
Our work on the development of successful commercial and defense
products has shown that it is possible to get better outcomes from
investments if decisions are based on high levels of knowledge. Defense
acquisition policies support such an approach to managing weapon system
programs. However, actual practice is not yet consistently following
written policy. As this annual assessment of major weapon acquisitions
shows, most programs are proceeding with inadequate levels of
knowledge, with attendant increased risks for traditional rates of cost
growth, along with schedule delays and performance shortfalls. On the
other hand, this assessment also includes programs that are proceeding
with high levels of knowledge, showing that practice can follow policy.
This is our third annual assessment of weapon system programs. The
experiences catalogued in this report provide insights on how programs
can be better positioned to succeed. To the extent that programs are
not so positioned, the report can be used by decision makers to take
actions to reduce risks by building higher levels of knowledge.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
Letter March 31, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to
enhance warfighting capabilities. Primary among these efforts are the
investments being made to develop improved weapon systems with
technological superiority and enhanced lethality to combat threats to
U.S. security. Investment in programs such as the Army's Future Combat
Systems and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, the Missile
Defense Agency's suite of land, sea, air, and space systems, the Navy's
advanced ships such as the DD(X) Destroyer, and the Air Force's space
systems such as the Transformational Satellite Communications System
are likely to dominate the budget and doctrinal debate well into the
next decade. Many of these embody the dual challenge of employing
complex technology with a rapid pace of development. Fiscal realities,
coupled with the larger scope of key acquisitions, reduce the ability
of budgets to accommodate typical margins for error in terms of cost
increases and schedule delays. Identifying risks early and addressing
them before they become problems can lessen cost increases and schedule
delays and thus enable budgets to buy what was planned.
In this report, we assess 54 programs that represent an investment of
approximately $800 billion.[Footnote 1] Our objective is to provide
decision makers with independent, knowledge-based assessments of
individual systems' attained knowledge and potential risks.
A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments:
DOD has entered a period of high investment. A significant portion of
this investment is for the acquisition of weapon systems that offer
technologically advanced capabilities. The investment in the research,
development, and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to
rise from $144 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $185 billion in fiscal
year 2009. Major Defense Acquisition Programs make up about 45 percent,
or $65 billion, as shown in figure 1, of the fiscal year 2005
investment request.[Footnote 2] DOD's total planned investment in these
programs is approximately $1.3 trillion, with about $812 billion of
that investment yet to be made.
Figure 1: RDT&E and Procurement Funding--Major Defense Acquisition
Programs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
There are several challenges to getting the most from that investment.
First, because DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the
largest discretionary items in the federal budget, DOD's budget faces
growing pressures from increases in mandatory federal
spending.[Footnote 3] According to the Congressional Budget Office,
federal deficits are expected to average $250 billion through fiscal
year 2009 and new budgetary demands stemming from demographic trends
lie beyond that time frame. In calendar year 2004, discretionary
spending accounted for about 39 percent of the federal budget, and
current projections show that because of increases in mandatory
spending, discretionary spending is likely to decrease to 33 percent of
the federal budget by fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 4] It will be
difficult for DOD to increase its budget share to cover cost increases
in weapon programs in that environment.
Second, DOD faces competing demands within its own budget, such as from
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September 2001, DOD has
needed $158 billion in supplemental appropriations to support the
global war on terrorism.[Footnote 5] The budget implications of these
operations further increase the demand made of the defense dollar and
therefore the investment in new weapon programs. For example, current
military operations are causing faster wear on existing weapons, which
will need refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned. These needs
will compete with the investment in new weapon programs.
Third, DOD programs typically take longer to develop and cost more to
buy than planned, placing additional demands on available funding.
These programs increasingly compete for resources and are sometimes
forced to make trade-offs in quantities, resulting in a reduction of
buying power. As a result, funds are not available for other competing
needs and programs yield fewer quantities for the same, if not higher,
cost. Table 1 illustrates seven programs with the greatest reduction of
buying power. Some of these programs experienced higher costs for the
same initial quantity.
Table 1: Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
If DOD cannot deliver its major new programs within estimated costs,
difficult choices have to be made regarding which investments to pursue
and which to discontinue.
Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to Develop:
The majority of programs in our assessment are costing more and taking
longer to develop than estimated. As shown in table 2, total RDT&E
costs for 26 common set[Footnote 6] weapon programs increased by nearly
$42.7 billion, or 42 percent, over the original business case (the
first full estimate). The same programs have also experienced an
increase in the time needed to develop capabilities with a weighted-
average schedule increase of nearly 20 percent.[Footnote 7]
Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems:
Billions of constant 2005 dollars.
Total cost;
First full estimate: $479.6;
Latest estimate: $548.9;
Percent change: 14.5%.
RDT&E cost;
First full estimate: $102.0;
Latest estimate: $144.7;
Percent change: 41.9%.
Weighted-average acquisition cycle time[A];
First full estimate: 146.6 months;
Latest estimate: 175.3 months;
Percent change: 19.6%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for
the 26 programs based on total program costs at the first full and
latest estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 94.9
months for the first full estimate and 114.7 months for the latest
estimate, resulting in a 20.8 percent change.
[End of table]
Quantities for 10 of the common set programs have been reduced since
their first estimate.[Footnote 8] In addition, the weighted-average
program acquisition unit cost of 25 of the 26 programs increased by
roughly 50 percent.[Footnote 9]
During the last year, cost and schedule estimates for the same 26
programs have increased noticeably since our last assessment, as shown
in table 3.
Table 3: Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs: 2004 Assessment and
2005 Assessment:
Billions of constant 2005 dollars.
Total cost;
2004 assessment: $480.3;
2005 assessment: $548.9;
Percent change: 14.3%.
RDT&E cost;
2004 assessment: $127.3;
2005 assessment: $144.7;
Percent change: 13.7%.
Weighted-average acquisition cycle time[A];
2004 assessment: 166.1 months;
2005 assessment: 175.3 months;
Percent change: 5.5%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for
the 26 programs based on total program cost estimates for the 2004
assessment and the 2005 assessment. The simple average for these two
estimates was 110.7 months for the 2004 assessment and 114.7 months for
the 2005 assessment, resulting in a 3.6 percent change.
[B] These estimates also include the Land Warrior program. Although
this program was not included in the 2004 assessment, the program is
included in the common set because data were available from the
December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report for inclusion in this
estimate.
[End of table]
Some of DOD's largest programs have driven these increases. For
example, research and development costs for the Army's Future Combat
Systems, a $108 billion investment, increased by approximately 51
percent over the past year while in the midst of a major restructuring
of the program. Likewise, the Joint Strike Fighter, a $199 billion
investment, has reported a research and development cost increase of
over 19 percent in the past year.
A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes:
Over the last several years we have undertaken a body of work that
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon
lessons learned from best system development practices. We found that
successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that
their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their
production processes are in control. Separating technology development
from product development is important to this effort. Successful
programs make a science and technology organization, rather than the
program or product development manager, responsible for maturing
technologies. Such steps can help to reduce costs and deliver a product
on time and within budget. DOD's current acquisition guidance embraces
the use of evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition practices proven
to be more effective and efficient in developing new products. By fully
implementing these practices, DOD can better leverage its investments
by shortening the time it takes to develop capabilities with more
predictable costs and schedules, thereby maintaining its buying power.
Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge was
achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these
junctures as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated
indicators are defined as follows:
* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This level of knowledge
occurs when a sound business case is made for the product--that is, a
match is made between the customer's requirements and the product
developer's available resources in terms of knowledge, time, and money.
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment.
* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This level of knowledge
occurs when a program determines that a product's design is stable--
that is, it will meet customer requirements and cost and schedule
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-
level critical design review, usually held midway through development.
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable.
* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This level of
knowledge is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the product
can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best
practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in
statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and
capable of consistently producing parts within the product's quality
tolerances and standards--at the start of production.
The attainment of each successive knowledge point builds on the
preceding one. While the knowledge itself builds continuously without
clear lines of demarcation, the attainment of knowledge points is
sequential. In other words, production maturity cannot be attained if
the design is not stable, and design stability cannot be attained if
the critical technologies are not mature.
Seeking to improve acquisition outcomes, DOD revised its acquisition
policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based, evolutionary
framework. The policy adopts lessons learned from successful commercial
companies. For example, the policy attempts to separate technology
development from product development and requires the demonstration of
technologies to high readiness levels. The policy also allows managers
to develop a product in increments rather than trying to incorporate
all of the desired capabilities in the first version that comes off the
production line.
Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical
Junctures:
Most of the programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels of
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product
knowledge later in development than specified in DOD policy, which
resulted in cost increases and schedule delays.
Development Start:
Our work shows that the demonstration of technology maturity by the
start of system development is the key measure for achievement of
knowledge point 1. A program that proceeds into product development
without demonstrating mature technologies does so with increased risk
of cost growth and schedule delays throughout the life of the program.
Only 15 percent of the programs we assessed began development having
demonstrated all of their technologies mature, as illustrated in figure
2.
Figure 2: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key
Junctures:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
More often than not, programs sought to mature technologies well into
system development when they should have focused on maturing system
design and preparing for production. The programs that started
development with mature technologies experienced lower development and
unit cost increases than those programs that started development with
immature technologies. For example, RDT&E costs for the programs that
started development with mature technology increased by an average of 9
percent over the first full estimate, whereas the development costs for
the programs that started development with immature technologies
increased an average of 41 percent over the first full estimate.
Likewise, program acquisition unit costs for the programs with mature
technology increased by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that
started development with immature technologies experienced an average
program acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 21 percent over the
first full estimate.[Footnote 10] Finally, the programs with mature
technology experienced an average schedule delay of 7 months--a 9
percent increase--whereas the schedule for the programs that started
development with immature technology increased an average of 13 months-
a 13 percent increase.
Design Review:
As illustrated in figure 3, 42 percent of the programs that held a
design review achieved design stability at that key juncture.
Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key
Junctures:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
With the exception of the Navy's V-22, which has experienced
significant design changes since development start in 1986, these
programs have experienced a 6 percent increase in development costs and
an average schedule increase of 11 months since the first full
estimate.[Footnote 11] Those programs that did not achieve design
stability have experienced a combined development cost increase of 46
percent and an average schedule increase of 29 months since the first
full estimate.[Footnote 12]
Design stability cannot be attained if key technologies are not mature.
Ten programs held design review without demonstrating mature critical
technologies.[Footnote 13] Out of the 10 programs, 7 had experienced a
cost increase, schedule delay, or both.[Footnote 14] The unit cost of 5
of these programs increased by at least 10 percent.[Footnote 15] In
contrast, 3 programs entered product development with mature
technologies. These three programs kept program unit cost increases to
a minimum, with costs either falling or increasing by single
digits.[Footnote 16]
Nine programs are scheduled to hold their system design review in the
next year.[Footnote 17] Only two of those programs, the B-2 Radar
Modernization and the Excalibur program, expect their technologies to
be mature at the time of their design reviews. The remaining seven
programs project that their technologies will not attain maturity until
after their critical design reviews.
Production Start:
To determine if a product's design is reliable and producible,
successful programs use statistical process control to bring
manufacturing processes under control so they are repeatable,
sustainable, and consistently producing parts within quality standards.
The collection of process control data prior to a production decision
can enable a smooth transition from product development to the
production phase. Of the 19 programs in production or approaching a
production decision in the next year, only 2 collected or plan to
collect statistical process control data to measure the maturity of
production processes.[Footnote 18] While the absence of the data does
not mean that production processes were immature, it does prevent an
assessment against an objective standard.
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
We assess each program in 2 pages and depict the extent of knowledge in
a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of
the first page. As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange),
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. In some
cases, we obtained projections from the program office of future
knowledge attainment. These projections are depicted as dashed bars.
The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line,
the more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks
are discovered and resolved.
Figure 4: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared
with Best Practices:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design
review as some technologies were still not mature and only a small
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases.
We conducted our review from July 2004 through March 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II
contains detailed information on our methodology.
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Our assessments of the 54 weapon systems follow.
[End of section]
Airborne Laser (ABL):
MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their
flight. Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL
employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a
target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy
missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute
engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under
development and expected to lead to an initial capability in a future
block.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N. Mex.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $2,386.9 million;
Funding, FY05-FY09: Procurement: $0.0 million;
Funding, FY05-FY09: Total funding: $2,386.9 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2003: $5,515.8;
Latest 07/2004: $5,055.3;
Percent change: -8.4%.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2003: $0.0;
Latest 07/2004: $0.0;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2003: $5,515.8;
Latest 07/2004: $5,055.3;
Percent change: -8.4%.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: TBD.
Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be
determined.
[End of table]
Although program officials expected ABL to provide an initial
capability during Block 2006, this event has been delayed and only one
of its seven critical technologies is fully mature. During Block 2004,
the program continues work on a prototype that is expected to provide
the basic design for a future operational capability. Program officials
expect to demonstrate the other six technologies during a prototype
flight test that will assess ABL's lethality. Difficulty in integrating
prototype components could delay this effort from 2005 to 2008. MDA has
released about 94 percent of the engineering drawings for the
prototype's design, which will be the basis for an initial operational
capability during a future block if the test is successful. However,
additional drawings may be needed if the design is enhanced or if
problems encountered during flight testing force design changes.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ABL Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing the high-power
beam--is fully mature. The program office assessed three technologies-
-the six-module laser, missile tracking, and atmospheric compensation-
-as nearly mature. The remaining three technologies--transmissive
optics, optical coatings, and jitter control--are the least mature.
According to program officials, all of these technologies are needed to
provide the system with an initial operational capability.
While the program office has assessed the six-module laser as being
close to reaching full maturity, the power generated by grouping six
laser modules together must be demonstrated before full maturity can be
reasonably assessed. The recent demonstration of the simultaneous
firing of all six laser modules reduces risk in this area. Additional
testing, planned over the next 6 months, must still be completed to
demonstrate the full power and duration of the laser segment prior to
installation on the aircraft.
The transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter control are the
least mature critical technologies and consist of prototypes that have
only been tested in the laboratory or demonstrated through analysis and
simulation. The program plans to demonstrate all technologies in an
operational environment during a flight test of the system prototype,
referred to as lethal demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot
down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges with integrating the
laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents could delay this test
into 2008, but the final schedule is to be determined. Upon successful
completion of this test, MDA expects to develop a second aircraft that
will provide an initial operational capability.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability because ABL's initial
capability will not be fully developed until the second aircraft--what
is expected to provide an initial capability--is well underway. While
the program has released 10,280 of the 10,910 engineering drawings for
the prototype, it is unclear whether the design of the prototype
aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator of design stability for
the second aircraft. More drawings may be needed if the design is
enhanced or if problems encountered during flight testing force design
changes.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity of ABL because MDA has not
made a production decision. The program is producing a limited quantity
of hardware for the system's prototype. Program officials explained
that they continue to experience problems maintaining a stable
manufacturing base for prototype subcomponents.
Other Program Issues:
Technological challenges caused the prime contract to approach its cost
ceiling during fiscal year 2004. In early April 2004, MDA directed the
ABL program to restructure the contract, increase its cost ceiling, and
refocus the contractor's efforts on making technical progress. As a
result, the cost ceiling was increased by $1.5 billion and the period
of performance was extended to 2008 from 2005. The contract is
currently valued at approximately $3.6 billion.
The focus of current work is on two near-term events. The first event
was the six-module laser test in a ground test facility that the
program completed in November 2004. The second event was the initial
Beam Control/Fire Control flight test, which occurred in December 2004.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA maintained that the
current design is stable despite the assessed technology maturity.
Officials told us that because the ABL operational environment is
impractical to duplicate on the ground, the technology maturity
assessment will understate actual maturity until after 100 percent of
the drawings are released. While the officials expect changes to future
blocks as part of capability-based spiral acquisition, they believe the
basic design will directly migrate to subsequent blocks.
[End of section]
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD):
MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed
U.S. forces and critical assets from short-and medium-range ballistic
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit-
to-kill interceptors, and command and control systems. It will also be
used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed only Block 2004 of the
element's interceptor--the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3).
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon (SM-3);
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $4,005.3 million;
Funding, FY05-FY09: Procurement: $0.0 million;
Funding, FY05-FY09: Total funding: $4,005.3 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/2003: $7,071.6;
Latest 07/2004: $7,878.9;
Percent change: 11.4%.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/2003: $0.0;
Latest 07/2004: $0.0;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 11/2003: $7,071.6;
Latest 07/2004: $7,878.9;
Percent change: 11.4%.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
As of 11/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: 65.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: TBD.
Table reflects total Aegis BMD program costs for all blocks--not only
for Block 2004 SM-3--from program inception in fiscal years 1996
through 2009. Procurement cost has yet to be determined.
[End of table]
According to program officials, the first increment of SM-3 missiles
being fielded during 2004-2005 has mature technologies and a stable
design. However, the program has been struggling with the technology
that maneuvers the missile's kinetic warhead (kill vehicle) to its
target. Partial functionality of this "divert" technology was
successful in 4 flight tests, but full functionality has only been
demonstrated in ground tests--it failed during a June 2003 flight test.
Design modifications were identified but will not be implemented in the
first 8 missiles being fielded. Program officials noted that even with
a reduced capability, these missiles provide a credible defense. All
drawings for the first increment of missiles have been released to
manufacturing. The program is not collecting statistical data on its
production process but is using other means to gauge production
readiness.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Aegis BMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials estimate that all three technologies critical to the
SM-3 are mature. These technologies--the third stage rocket motor, the
infrared seeker of the kinetic warhead, and the Solid Divert and
Attitude Control System (SDACS) of the kinetic warhead--were all tested
in flight. While the first two technologies were fully demonstrated in
flight tests, the SDACS, which generates divert pulses to steer the
kinetic warhead, was only partially demonstrated. As noted previously,
full "divert" technology succeeded in ground testing but partially
failed during a June 2003 flight test. According to program officials,
the test failure was likely caused by a defective subcomponent within
the SDACS, a problem that should be corrected through specific design
modifications. Program officials note that only partial functionality
of the SDACS is required for Block 2004, which was successfully
demonstrated in flight tests. Although the kinetic warhead of these
interceptors will have reduced divert capability, they provide a
credible defense against a large population of the threat and can be
retrofitted upon the completion of design updates and testing.
Design Stability:
Program officials reported that the design for the first eight
interceptors being fielded during Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent
of its drawings released to manufacturing. The program plans to
implement design changes in subsequent configurations of the SM-3
(delivered during 2006-2007) to resolve the SDACS failure witnessed in
the June 2003 flight test.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the production maturity of the missiles being
procured for Block 2004. Program officials stated that given the low
quantity of missiles being produced, statistical process control data
on the production process would have no significance. The Aegis BMD
program is using other means to assess progress in production and
manufacturing--such as integrated product teams, risk reviews, and SM-3
metrics--as part of its overall development of the SM-3.
Other Program Issues:
The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis-
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is working to
upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tracking of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because this function is new to
the element--allowed only after the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty--the program office faced a tight schedule to
fully develop and test this added functionality, which it completed in
September 2004 with the deployment of the first destroyer for this
mission.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that Aegis BMD progress remains on track. For example, the program
deployed the first operational destroyers (for the long-range
surveillance and tracking mission) to the Sea of Japan, delivered 5
missiles in November, and successfully ground tested the redesigned
SDACS. It noted, however, that our review focused on the SM-3, a junior
portion of the overall cost and development of the Aegis BMD system.
In addition, the program office reiterated that SDACS technology was
successful in four of five Aegis BMD flight tests. The current SDACS
configuration is fully capable of defeating the Block 2004 threat set,
and a design update is in progress to complete the final increment of
capability. As an application of capabilities-based acquisition, the
warfighter is provided a significant capability years earlier (albeit
using partial SDACS functionality) instead of waiting for a perfect
design.
[End of section]
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF):
The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing
Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant,
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international
partnership program that includes Canada, United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,819.5 million;
Procurement: $501.6 million;
Total funding: $2,321.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2001: $4,222.8;
Latest 12/2003: $4,502.2;
Percent change: 6.6%.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2001: $1,249.0;
Latest 12/2003: $501.6;
Percent change: -59.8%.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2001: $5,471.8;
Latest 12/2003: $5,003.7;
Percent change: -8.6%.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2001: $1,094.362;
Latest 12/2003: $1,667.910;
Percent change: 52.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2001: 5;
Latest 12/2003: 3;
Percent change: -40.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2001: 111;
Latest 12/2003: 118;
Percent change: 6.3%.
[End of table]
According to the program office, the AEHF program's technologies are
mature and the design is stable. However, the high risk strategy of
concurrently developing two critical path items has led to further
schedule delays and cost increases. The program is relying on the
concurrent development of the AEHF Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) suite
of cryptological equipment, which limits access to authorized users,
and terminals used for satellite command and control. Both of these
items are being developed outside the program office. Delivery delays
of the ACTS and command and control terminals resulted in an additional
12-month launch delay and an estimated 20 percent cost increase,
incurring a Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C. 2433) at the 15 percent
threshold.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AEHF Program:
Technology Maturity:
All of the 14 critical technologies are mature, according to the
program office. In addition, all 19 of the application-specific
integrated circuits critical to functioning of the communications
payload have been flight qualified through demonstration and testing.
Design Stability:
AEHF's design is now stable since more than 97 percent of the design
drawings have been released. While the program completed its system
level critical design review in April 2004 with only about two-thirds
of the drawings released, the AEHF contractor has since resolved all
outstanding issues from that review.
Production maturity could not be assessed as the program office does
not collect statistical process control data. In June 2004, the formal
decision was made to acquire the third and final satellite.
Other Program Issues:
The concurrent development of two critical path items--the ACTS and the
command and control terminals--has led to further schedule delays and
cost growth. The ACTS is a suite of cryptological equipment installed
in both the satellite and the terminals to limit access to authorized
users and is being developed and produced by the National Security
Agency. The ACTS has already experienced significant cost growth and
schedule delays due to production problems and changing security
requirements. In September 2003, ACTS delivery delays and development
problems led the program office to delay the launch of the first two
satellites by 4 months. The second critical path item--the command post
terminals--is developed and funded by another Air Force program office.
These terminals must be in place and tested prior to the first launch
or there will be a day-for-day slip in the satellite launch schedule.
The concurrent development of the AEHF satellites, terminals, and the
ACTS has led to further delays and cost increases. Delayed delivery of
the ACTS had resulted in an additional 12-month delay. Launches for the
three AEHF satellites are now scheduled for April 2008, April 2009, and
April 2010. The launch delays along with added payload component
testing and replacement of critical electronic parts are expected to
increase the overall program cost by about 20 percent. In December
2004, the Air Force notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach at the
15 percent threshold.
In December 2002, satellites four and five were deleted from the AEHF
program because the new Transformational Satellite Communications
System (TSAT), assessed elsewhere in this report, is to replace these
satellites if they are sufficiently developed. The Air Force scheduled
an interim review point in November 2004 to determine whether to buy
additional AEHF satellites or rely on TSAT. However, in light of the 12-
month program slip, the decision was delayed until November 2005.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA):
The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and
above aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas, Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $165.3 million;
Procurement: $1,814.7 million;
Total funding: $1,980.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 395.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2001: $526.8;
Latest 12/2004: $599.1;
Percent change: 13.7%.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2001: $1,690.2;
Latest 12/2004: $2,029.2;
Percent change: 20.1%.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2001: $2,217.0;
Latest 12/2004: $2,628.3;
Percent change: 18.6%.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2001: $5.342;
Latest 12/2004: $6.333;
Percent change: 18.6%.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2001: 415;
Latest 12/2004: 415;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2001: 69;
Latest 12/2004: 68;
Percent change: -1.4%.
Procurement funding for the radar is included in the funding for the
F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft programs.
[End of table]
The AESA radar's critical technologies were not mature at the start of
system development or at the design review, but they now appear to be
mature. The design also appears stable. However, radar development is
continuing during production. The program is tracking a number of risks
with the technical performance of the radar. If problems are
discovered, they could require design changes while the radar is in
production. For example, the software schedule leaves little room for
error or rework, and development of the radar simulation model puts
training at risk. In addition, there are some production risks that
could affect the quality of the initial radars and the aircraft
delivery schedule. Antitamper protection for the radar is currently in
design. The AESA program also has interdependencies with other programs
that could make the radar vulnerable to delays in their progress.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AESA Program:
Technology Maturity:
The latest technology readiness assessment for the radar determined
that the four critical technologies were mature. To further ensure
technology maturity, a mini-technology assessment is planned prior to
the full-rate production decision. By then, the technologies should
have been demonstrated in their final form and under expected
conditions.
Design Stability:
As of July 2004, all engineering drawings for the radar and its
subsystems had been released. At the design review in 2001, 59 percent
had been released. Development of the radar has continued during
production. The program office has identified some development risks
that could result in design changes. According to a program office risk
assessment, the top current challenge involves the software. The lack
of timely software delivery puts the program at significant risk, and
could also require radar hardware rework due to delays in the flight
test program. Another risk is that the radar simulation model
integrated into the F/A-18 training simulator may not accurately
represent the operation and performance of the radar, which could
result in some training that is unrealistic. Further, the number of
flight tests that can be conducted may not be adequate to mature radar
software. Other current risks include whether the radar: will be able
to track sufficient targets simultaneously; radiation emissions will
interfere with F/A-18E/F weapon systems; and will have the capability
to detect tail aspect targets at low altitude. Mitigation plans are in
place to address all design risks.
Production Maturity:
During 4 low-rate production runs, 84 radars are planned--20 percent of
the 415 radars to be procured. The program is currently in the second
production run. Most radars are planned to be installed in F/A-18E/Fs
on the aircraft production line. However, 135 radars will have to be
retrofitted into already produced F/A-18E/Fs--a more costly process
upfront, that, according to the Navy, is expected to save money on
support costs later. We could not assess production maturity because
statistical process control data are not being collected. Officials
said they are comfortable with manufacturing processes based on audits
and inspections conducted at some key manufacturers. Nonetheless, radar
production currently faces a number of risks. The radar contractor may
have difficulty transitioning from development to production due to
production risks, which could cause some late aircraft deliveries.
Other risks include reliability problems with one of the radar's
critical technologies may not allow initial radars to meet a
specification and qualification tests may not be complete in time,
resulting in delivering radar hardware that is not fully qualified.
Moreover, full-rate production costs could increase significantly if
the projected payoff from cost reduction initiatives is not fully
realized. However, program officials expect significant savings from
the cost reduction initiatives.
Other Program Issues:
The program office is closely tracking interdependencies that could
place the radar at risk. Successful development of other Navy programs
is required for the radar to meet key performance parameters. Also, the
radar program is being developed, in part, with funding from
contractors. Changes in the flow of this funding would affect the AESA
program, but program officials stated that almost all of the contractor
funding has been provided.
In 1999, DOD directed the services to implement antitamper protection
to guard against exploitation of critical U.S. technologies. This
protection was not one of the radar's original requirements. While
officials said there is a requirement for this protection to have no
effect on radar performance, operational tests of antitamper models are
not planned until after operational tests of radars without this
protection, which may identify problems that require design changes to
the protection package.
The program's strategy for a depot has changed. Plans have been
canceled to stand up a Navy depot maintenance facility for the radar in
2010 at North Island, California. Instead, Raytheon will conduct depot
maintenance at its facility in El Segundo, California, at substantial
cost savings, according to program officials.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS):
The Navy's AMNS is designed to relocate, identify, and neutralize
bottom or moored sea mines. AMNS consists of an operating console and a
launch and handling system containing up to four neutralizers. When
deployed, the MH-60S helicopter hovers near the target mine and lowers
AMNS via a tow cable into the water. A neutralizer, controlled through
fiber-optic cable, exits the launch and handling system and uses sonar
to find the mine and fires a lethal charge, destroying the mine and the
neutralizer.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon IDS;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $31.7 million;
Procurement: $109.3 million;
Total funding: $154.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 58.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2003: $53.1;
Latest 08/2004: $66.7;
Percent change: 25.6%.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2003: $82.5;
Latest 08/2004: $109.3;
Percent change: 32.4%.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2003: $148.7;
Latest 08/2004: $189.1;
Percent change: 27.2%.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2003: $3.164;
Latest 08/2004: $3.100;
Percent change: -2.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2003: 47;
Latest 08/2004: 61;
Percent change: 29.8%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2003: 50;
Latest 08/2004: 50;
Percent change: 0.0%.
The procurement quantity of 58 units includes the acquisition of 58
launch and handling systems and 580 neutralizers.
[End of table]
The AMNS program began system development with none of its four
critical technologies mature. While progress has been made since then,
program officials do not expect to achieve technology maturity until
developmental tests are conducted in mid-2005. The AMNS program's
design is stable, with approximately 90 percent of the drawings
complete. However, since the AMNS technologies are not expected to
demonstrate maturity until developmental testing is conducted, the
program runs the risk that problems identified during that testing will
require drawings to be modified. To maintain an initial operational
capability of June 2007, the program office requested a $13 million
increase in research and development funds in order to support
alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support delayed
testing on the MH-60S helicopter.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AMNS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The AMNS launch and handling system, the deployment subassembly, the
warhead assembly, and the neutralizer are not fully mature. The
neutralizer, which was demonstrated in a relevant environment, is
approaching full maturity. The program office describes the neutralizer
as a nondevelopmental item because it is already operational. However,
it needs to undergo safety and performance improvements before it will
be ready for AMNS. The other three technologies have not been
integrated or demonstrated outside of a laboratory environment, but
program officials have stated that no technology hurdles remain, merely
engineering challenges. Program officials expect all four technologies
to demonstrate maturity during developmental testing that is scheduled
to take place between May and October 2005.
Among risks identified by program officials are concerns that the
neutralizer will not launch properly in an environment of strong water
currents. The program office is attempting to mitigate this risk by
establishing plans and funding for testing the neutralizer in strong
water currents, including flume tank testing. Additionally, program
officials noted concerns about the survivability of the launch and
handling system in an underwater explosives environment. The program
office plans for this risk to be mitigated through an analysis of
launch and handling system internal parts and an analysis to prove that
the launch and handling system can tolerate environments of up to 50G
levels.
Design Stability:
Approximately 90 percent of the AMNS drawings are currently releasable.
Moreover, the program office projects all drawings to be releasable to
manufacturing at the completion of the design readiness review in March
2005. According to program officials, top level assembly drawings will
be considered at the design readiness review. Detailed designs of AMNS
components were validated through 17 interim design reviews held by the
program office.
Because the AMNS technologies are not expected to demonstrate maturity
until developmental testing is conducted in mid-2005, the program runs
the risk that any problems identified during testing would require
drawings to be modified.
Other Program Issues:
The program office has requested an approximately $13 million increase
in research and development funds for the fiscal year 2006 budget.
According to program officials, this increase is required to support
alternate testing on the MH-53E helicopter and to support a 16-month
delay in completion of testing on the MH-60S helicopter. The MH-60S
helicopter will not be available to support the current AMNS
development and test schedule. Without alternate testing on the MH-53E
helicopter, the program will not be able to make a low-rate initial
production decision in February 2006 or, more importantly, maintain an
initial operational capability of June 2007. For the MH-60S helicopter,
development testing is not scheduled to start until 6 months after a
low-rate initial production decision has been made.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
program quantity increased from 47 to 61 as a result of a change in
Navy strategy to deploy the system from Littoral Combat Ships rather
than aircraft carriers. Regarding technology maturity, it noted that
currently the program's critical technologies, for example the warhead
assembly, are slightly more mature than indicated in the assessment. In
addition to performing an analysis to prove that the launch and
handling system can tolerate high-pressure underwater environments, the
Navy intends to conduct Underwater Explosive Testing as further risk
mitigation.
Regarding other program issues, the Navy stated that while alternate
platform testing on the MH-53E helicopter would enable the program to
meet its low-rate initial production decision and initial operational
capability targets, alternate platform testing is pending approval by
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition). It also indicated that constraints in the availability of
MH-60S test assets have the potential to delay the program's schedule
and increase its cost beyond the projections presented in the
assessment.
[End of section]
Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS):
The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system will add a new
laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and is
expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the Hellfire
missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the
new seeker.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $23.2 million;
Procurement: $1,531.4 million;
Total funding: $1,710.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 89,539.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2002: $117.4;
Latest 03/2004: $91.8;
Percent change: -21.8%.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2002: $1,546.9;
Latest 03/2004: $1,531.4;
Percent change: -1.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2002: $1,820.0;
Latest 03/2004: $1,778.9;
Percent change: -2.3%.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2002: $0.020;
Latest 03/2004: $0.020;
Percent change: -2.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2002: 89,420;
Latest 03/2004: 89,539;
Percent change: 0.1%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2002: 60;
Latest 03/2004: 69;
Percent change: 15.0%.
[End of table]
The APKWS entered system development and held its design review before
demonstrating that its critical guidance technology was fully mature.
While the system's design was otherwise stable at the time of the March
2004 design review, initial system-level testing identified problems
with the design. Program plans call for a production decision in
September 2005 and low-rate production contract award in December 2005.
We were unable to assess the program's production maturity because
program officials do not expect to begin collecting statistical data on
their key manufacturing processes until the start of production.
Remaining efforts include completing developmental and operational
testing. If subsequent testing identifies further problems with the
design, additional costs of redesign and modification of drawings late
in development could be incurred.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
APKWS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The APKWS program has not demonstrated full maturity of its only
critical technology--laser guidance. Although a prototype guidance
system was successfully demonstrated under the Low Cost Precision Kill
Advanced Technology Demonstration, the current design for the guidance
system includes numerous hardware changes to improve system cost,
performance, and producibility. The new guidance system will not be
fully integrated and tested from an aircraft until winter 2005. Program
officials noted that although the prototype system design exists,
reverting to it would increase cost and degrade the system's
performance and producibility.
Design Stability:
Program officials released 100 percent of the drawings after a system-
level design review in March 2004. Recently completed testing, however,
uncovered the need for design changes. The APKWS, to date, has
completed two test flights. The first test flight went as planned. The
second flight test missile, however, experienced a mechanical failure
of the wing lock mechanism, causing the test missile to veer off
target. The program office identified a design solution, and flight
testing resumed in September 2004.
Production Maturity:
Program officials expect that there will be nine key processes
associated with manufacturing the APKWS. The program plans to collect
statistical data on these processes when production begins in fiscal
year 2006.
Other Program Issues:
According to program officials, the Army cut APKWS research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding by 22.1 percent due
to other funding priorities. These officials noted that this reduction
affects planned improvements to the warhead, fuze, seeker, and
propulsion subsystems. Furthermore, the program has experienced a 15.3
percent growth in acquisition cycle time as the result of slower
initial production of the system than originally planned.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with
this assessment.
[End of section]
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS):
The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered, dry interior
minisubmarine developed for clandestine insertion and extraction of
Navy SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to its deployment area by
a specially configured SSN-688 class submarine. It is intended to
provide increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, and endurance
over current submersibles. The 65-foot long, 8-foot diameter ASDS is
operated by a two-person crew and equipped with a lock out/lock in
chamber to allow divers to exit and reenter the vehicle.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $8.5 million;
Procurement: $1,218.0 million;
Total funding: $1,259.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 5.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/1994: $141.8;
Latest 10/2004: $465.1;
Percent change: 228.0%.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/1994: $125.7;
Latest 10/2004: $1,347.5;
Percent change: 972.1%.
Total program cost;
As of 09/1994: $281.7;
Latest 10/2004: $1,876.6;
Percent change: 566.1%.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/1994: $93.913;
Latest 10/2004: $312.759;
Percent change: 233.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 09/1994: 3;
Latest 10/2004: 6;
Percent change: 100.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/1994: NA;
Latest 10/2004: TBD.
[End of table]
One of ASDS's three critical technologies--the lithium ion battery--has
not reached maturity, and the first boat has required some design
changes. The production decision has been delayed from June 2004 until
December 2005 to allow time to produce and test a new battery and
develop and test other vehicle design changes. The Navy selected a
design for the lithium ion battery and, in May 2004, it awarded a
contract to develop a full shipset unit for ASDS. Battery production
will take about 1 year, and at-sea demonstration is expected in fiscal
year 2005. Concurrent with battery replacement, other vehicle
improvements are being developed and tested and design problems are
being addressed. Acoustic signature issues are being addressed;
however, this requirement does not have to be met until delivery of the
second ASDS boat.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ASDS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Of the three critical technologies identified by the ASDS program
office, one--the lithium ion battery--has not reached maturity.
However, it is expected to be mature before the December 2005
production decision for additional boats.
Acoustic, or noise level, problems are being addressed; however, the
first boat is not quiet enough to meet acoustic stealth requirements.
In earlier tests, the ASDS propeller was the source of the most
significant noise, and a new composite propeller was installed before
operational test and evaluation in 2003. Although program officials
believe it meets requirements, precise acoustic measurements have not
been made and are not scheduled to be done before the production
decision. Other acoustic issues will be addressed on a time-phased
basis because the acoustic requirement has been deferred until delivery
of the second boat.
Design Stability:
Although all engineering drawings for ASDS have been released to
manufacturing, ASDS design changes have been required based on
additional improvements, test results, and other issues since ASDS
reached initial operational capability in November 2003. An assessment
of ASDS survivability design features is also underway; however, the
Vulnerability Assessment Report will not be completed until April 2005.
An updated ASDS operational requirements document was approved in June
2004. The number of key performance parameters (those elements that are
so significant that a failure to meet them could call into question a
system's ability to perform missions) were reduced from 16 to 8, and
they include one new requirement (operational availability). Other
requirements are categorized as system critical requirements.
Until all requirements are addressed, technical problems are solved,
and testing is completed, we believe ASDS's final design will remain
uncertain and may have cost and schedule implications.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy completed an independent cost estimate, including life-cycle
costs, in March 2004. However, data were not released, and the
estimates are now out-of-date because they do not reflect the impact of
the 2-year delay in production of the second boat. According to the
June 2004 Selected Acquisition Report, the U.S. Special Operations
Command was preparing a new proposed program plan to account for the
delay in the production decision and updated cost information was
expected to be reported in the December 2004 report. However, according
to the Navy's January 2005 update, the revised program plan and updated
cost estimate will be developed, reviewed, and approved as part of the
production decision, which has been delayed until December 2005. Since
the program's first cost estimate was originally approved in 1994,
research and development costs have more than tripled.
The Navy plans to conduct follow-on testing to verify that deficiencies
and vulnerabilities identified during the May 2003 operational
evaluation are corrected. However, not all results will be known before
the scheduled production decision.
Agency Comments:
The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System:
The Army's and the Special Operations Command's ATIRCM/CMWS is a
component of the integrated infrared countermeasures suite planned to
defend U.S. aircraft from advanced infrared guided missiles. The system
will be employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. The system
includes an active infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a
countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables,
such as flares, chaff, and smoke.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $54.6 million;
Procurement: $2,097.1 million;
Total funding: $2,151.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,583.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/1996: $576.0;
Latest 12/2003: $608.5;
Percent change: 5.6%.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/1996: $2,355.8;
Latest 12/2003: $2,260.3;
Percent change: -4.1%.
Total program cost;
As of 03/1996: $2,931.8;
Latest 12/2003: $2,868.9;
Percent change: -2.1%.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/1996: $0.948;
Latest 12/2003: $1.075;
Percent change: 13.5%.
Total quantities;
As of 03/1996: 3,094;
Latest 12/2003: 2,668;
Percent change: -13.8%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/1996: Classified;
Latest 12/2003: Classified;
Percent change: Classified.
[End of table]
The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with
technologies mature and designs stable. Currently, the program's
production processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion
of the program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet
urgent deployment requirements. However, full-rate production for both
components was delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past
several years, the program has had to overcome cost and schedule
problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge: key technologies were
demonstrated late in development and only a small number of design
drawings were completed by design review. At the low-rate production
decision point, the Army developed a new cost estimate reducing program
procurement cost substantially.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ATIRCM/CMWS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The ATIRCM/CMWS's five critical technologies are mature. However, they
did not mature until after the design review in February 1997. Most of
the early technology development effort was focused on the application
to rotary wing aircraft. When system development began in 1995, the
requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force fixed wing
aircraft. This change caused problems that largely contributed to cost
increases of more than 150 percent to the development contract. The
Navy and the Air Force subsequently dropped out of the program,
rendering the extra effort needless, but the Navy and the Army are
currently pursuing future joint production planning.
Design Stability:
The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings
complete. This was primarily due to the expanded requirements. It was
not until 2 years after the design review that 90 percent of the
drawings were released and the design was considered stable. This
resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional testing, and
a 3-year schedule delay. The system design was successfully
demonstrated through engineering and manufacturing development and
transitioned to production.
Production Maturity:
The production maturity could not be assessed based on the information
provided by the program office. According to program officials, the
ATIRCM/CMWS program has 16 key manufacturing processes in various
phases of control. They stated that ATIRCM statistical process controls
are in development, control plans are being enhanced and as the program
continues in production and data are gathered, lessons learned will be
included in the processes. The Army entered limited CMWS production in
February 2002 to meet an urgent need of the U.S. Special Operations
Command. Subsequently, full-rate production was delayed for both
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems that will
be used for initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were
delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production decision for the
complete system is now scheduled for 2006.
Other Program Issues:
The Army procured an initial 32 systems in fiscal year 2002 for use on
the U.S. Special Operations Command's CH-47 helicopters. The Army plans
to procure a total of 99 systems to outfit special operations aircraft
between fiscal year 2003 and 2009. Currently, program officials are
working to integrate CMWS on 16 additional platform types and models,
which will result in an increase in quantity and funding. The CMWS low-
rate initial production quantity increased by 141 systems to a total of
200. The Army procured all 200 of these systems, and deliveries are on
schedule.
At the low-rate production decision point, the Army developed a new
cost estimate for the program that featured a variety of different
program assumptions. For example, program officials deleted 17 years of
Contractor Logistics Support, reducing potential duplication, and
deleted 29 training systems. As a result, program officials report that
procurement cost was reduced by 17 percent.
Agency Comments:
The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, the
Army commented that in January 2004, it directed the acceleration of
CMWS for deployment on Operation Iraqi Freedom aircraft. Initial
operational tests and evaluation will be completed during fiscal year
2005 for CMWS and in fiscal year 2006 for ATIRCM.
[End of section]
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP):
The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with
federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a band where the
B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified radar system is
being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of
stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery
capabilities.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $693.7 million;
Procurement: $510.6 million;
Total funding: $1,204.3 million;
Procurement quantity: 21.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 08/2004: $892.9.
Procurement cost;
Latest 08/2004: $510.5.
Total program cost;
Latest 08/2004: $1,403.5.
Program unit cost;
Latest 08/2004: $66.832.
Total quantities;
Latest 08/2004: 21.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 08/2004: 63.
[End of table]
The B-2 RMP entered system development in August 2004 with two critical
technologies mature and two approaching maturity. All critical
technologies are planned to be mature by the June 2005 design review.
The program has released 71 percent of its design drawings and plans to
have 85 to 95 percent released by the June 2005 design review. Program
officials indicated that production maturity metrics will be formulated
during development and that these metrics may or may not include
manufacturing process control data. The program plans to build six
radar units during development for pilot training with the B-2
operational wing prior to the planned completion of flight testing.
Even though these units are necessary, building them early in
development adds to the risk of later design changes because most of
the radar flight-test activity will not occur until after these units
are built.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
B-2 RMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The B-2 RMP entered development in August 2004 with two of four
critical technologies mature and two others approaching maturity. Last
year the program reported having two critical technologies, but a
formal technology readiness assessment conducted in February 2004
concluded that two additional technologies should be considered
critical. The additional two technologies, the receiver/exciter for the
electronic driver cards and aspects of the antenna designed to help
keep the B-2's radar signature low, are not considered fully mature but
are approaching maturity. There are no backup technologies for two
technologies approaching maturity, but both completed their design
phases in April 2004 and the program office estimates that both will be
fully mature by the final design review in June 2005.
Design Stability:
The program has completed and released 71 percent of its engineering
drawings to manufacturing. The program office has scheduled the design
readiness review for June 2005 and plans to have 85 to 95 percent of
its drawings released by that time. The program, however, does not use
the release of design drawings as a measure of design maturity but
instead uses the successful completion of design events, such as
subsystem design reviews, as its primary measure of design maturity.
Production Maturity:
Production maturity metrics are planned to be formulated during
development. These metrics, which may or may not include manufacturing
process control data, are planned to be used as measures of progress
toward production maturity during a production readiness review prior
to the start of production in February 2007. The program is also
involved in a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the
transmit/receive modules can be built to specifications.
Other Program Issues:
The program plans to build six radar units during development and later
modify these units for placement on operational B-2 aircraft. The Air
Force needs these radar units available when the current B-2 radar
frequency becomes unavailable, in order to continue air crew training
and proficiency operations. Even though these units are necessary,
building them early in development adds risk because most of the radar
flight-test activity will not occur until after these units are built.
Agency Comments:
The Air Force concurred with this assessment. It commented that the
program recognizes a level of risk associated with building the six
development units prior to formal testing in order to satisfy a
critical schedule constraint. It stated that, as a result, the program
office has placed a heavy emphasis on risk reduction and that the
program is progressing well thus far in system development. It further
commented that it is important to note that these six development units
are also planned to be used for collection of field level reliability
and maintainability data. It also noted that the program has
successfully completed its proof-of-manufacturing effort for the
transmit/receive modules, has now delivered over 600 modules, and has
completed and released approximately 70 percent of its engineering
drawings.
[End of section]
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):
The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and
avionics for 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It
consolidates and installs the mandated DOD Navigation/Safety
modifications, the Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130
broad area review requirements. It also incorporates other reliability,
maintainability, and sustainability upgrades and provides increased
situational awareness capabilities and reduces susceptibility of
Special Operations aircraft to detection/interception.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $815.0 million;
Procurement: $2,936.1 million;
Total funding: $3,751.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 479.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2001: $666.0;
Latest 12/2003: $1,234.7;
Percent change: 85.4%.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2001: $2,883.3;
Latest 12/2003: $2,936.1;
Percent change: 1.8%.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2001: $3,549.3;
Latest 12/2003: $4,170.9;
Percent change: 17.5%.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2001: $6.839;
Latest 12/2003: $8.512;
Percent change: 24.5%.
Total quantities;
As of 07/2001: 519;
Latest 12/2003: 490;
Percent change: -5.6%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2001: TBD;
Latest 12/2003: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
The C-130 AMP is using primarily commercial and modified off-the-shelf
technologies, and it entered system development with all but one of its
six critical technologies mature. The remaining technology is nearing
full maturity; however, there is concern that it may not meet current
performance requirements. Program officials reached agreement with the
user to field a lesser set of requirements equivalent to the current
capability in fiscal year 2008. Program officials plan to release 90
percent of engineering drawings by the design review and have made
progress toward that goal. Currently, 48 percent of the engineering
drawings are releasable compared to 14 percent a year ago.
Additionally, the program office recently modified the contract to
accelerate the installation on Special Operations aircraft by 1 year,
placing additional pressure on the already compressed schedule.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
C-130 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
Five of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature, as
the program is primarily utilizing proven commercial and modified off-
the-shelf technology for all AMP capabilities. The remaining critical
technology, the Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA)
capability, was demonstrated through the Air Force Research Lab's Quiet
Knight advanced technology demonstration program and is nearing full
maturity. There is a risk, however, that the TF/TA technology may not
meet a key requirement to operate at 250 feet. Program officials worked
with the user to agree on initially fielding TF/TA capability between
250 and 1,000 feet, which is the current capability of the technology.
Program officials plan to determine through analysis the residual
capability of the TF/TA technology to fly lower. However, if such
capability cannot be achieved, redesign may be necessary or the user
will have to accept current capability.
Design Stability:
The program office has made progress toward meeting its goal of
releasing 90 percent of the design drawings by design readiness review,
scheduled for August 2005. This will be 9 months sooner than
anticipated last year, due to the acceleration of key program dates to
meet Special Operations Command requirements. Currently, 48 percent of
the design drawings are complete and could be released to
manufacturing. Program officials stated they are committed to meeting
the required 90 percent drawing release by design review.
The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals
due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130
aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system.
Special Operations C-130 aircraft will be outfitted first, and future
spirals are planned for these aircraft because they require additional,
and unique, defensive systems integration and enhanced situational
awareness.
Other Program Issues:
Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130
AMP's development program, which resulted in a rescheduling of program
milestones and rebaselining of the program. The design review, low-rate
initial production, and production readiness decisions were all
delayed. While program officials stated that the delay in schedule
would provide more time to resolve issues with the TF/TA technology and
software, the delay in fielding was not acceptable to the Special
Operations Command. They added funding to mature the TF/TA technology
through a series of flight demonstrations prior to the formal
developmental test and evaluation period. The system integration
schedule was compressed by 9 months by accelerating installation of
core and mission-unique capabilities on Special Operations aircraft;
however, this allows less time to reduce manufacturing risks and
further compresses an already optimistic time line.
The program is also at risk if less software is reused than originally
estimated, which may cause an increase in development costs and delay
the program's schedule. Software integration remains a risk due to its
complexity, number of suppliers, potential for developmental growth,
certification of a secure operating system, and software safety
standards. The program office is working to mitigate these risks
through modeling and simulation, utilizing the systems integration
laboratory built by the contractor, and through flight demonstrations.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
program officials worked with the user to agree on initially fielding
TF/TA capability between 250 and 1,000 feet and that an analysis will
be accomplished to determine residual TF/TA technology capability to
fly lower. The Air Force also commented that funding reductions in
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the C-130 AMP development program.
It further stated that a delay in fielding MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft
until fiscal year 2010 was unacceptable to the Special Operations
Command, which added funding to mature TF/TA technology through flight
demonstrations prior to a formal developmental test and evaluation
period. The Air Force also commented that the special operations
warfighter needs are driving an aggressive schedule.
[End of section]
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP):
The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment,
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We
assessed the C-5 AMP.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $10.8 million;
Procurement: $204.2 million;
Total funding: $215.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 27.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/1998: $344.6;
Latest 02/2004: $372.2;
Percent change: 8.0%.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/1998: $602.8;
Latest 02/2004: $407.1;
Percent change: -32.5%.
Total program cost;
As of 11/1998: $947.4;
Latest 02/2004: $779.3;
Percent change: -17.7%.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/1998: $7.519;
Latest 02/2004: $14.169;
Percent change: 88.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 11/1998: 126;
Latest 02/2004: 55;
Percent change: -56.3%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/1998: 83;
Latest 02/2004: 83;
Percent change: 0.0%.
[End of table]
The program office considers the C-5 AMP's critical technologies and
design to be mature as they are relying on commercial-off-the-shelf
technologies that are installed in other commercial and military
aircraft. The C-5 AMP plans to complete developmental test and
evaluation in December 2004, a 2 month slip from last year. The main
challenge to the program is the development and integration of
software--to which this schedule delay has been attributed. The Air
Force plans to modify 55 of the 112 C-5 aircraft. The Air Force is also
seeking funding to modify the remaining 57 C-5s, however, that decision
will not be made until the Air Force determines the correct mix of C-5
and C-17 aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift needs. If the Air Force
decides to use the C-17s, it may not upgrade some, or all, of the
remaining 57 C-5s.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
C-5 AMP Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the
program used commercial technologies that are considered mature.
Program officials stated that those technologies are in use on other
aircraft and that they have not significantly changed in form, fit, or
function. For example, the new computer processors are being used in
the Boeing 777, 717, other commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy
reconnaissance aircraft.
Design Stability:
The design appears stable as the contractor has released 100 percent of
the drawings for the AMP. In addition, seven major subsystem-level
design reviews were completed, and integration activities are currently
ongoing. Demonstration of these integration activities is scheduled
during development test and evaluation, which started in December 2002
and should be completed in December 2004.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity because most components are
readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf items. This equipment is
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the
C-5 AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and
equipment, such as the embedded global positioning system, the inertial
navigation system, and the multifunction control and display units. To
ensure production maturity, the program office is collecting data
regarding modification kit availability and the installation schedules.
Other Program Issues:
Program officials indicated the greatest risk to the AMP is software
development and integration. Several new software programs must be
developed and integrated with several other commercial off-the-shelf
software packages. According to officials, the 2 month slip in
development test and evaluation can be attributed to software
development delays as well as overall systems integration (hardware and
software) delays. More specifically, program officials stated that the
two primary causes for delays were (1) the unavailability of systems
integration facilities, including equipment, simulation software, and
engineering simulator, and (2) less robust than expected integration
test scripts and computer software configuration item designs. Program
officials stated that they have applied lessons learned from the AMP
experience to the RERP program. The C-5 RERP is assessed elsewhere in
this report.
The overall quantity of the C-5 fleet has been reduced from 126 to 112
due to the retirement of 14 aircraft. The C-5 aircraft must undergo the
AMP modifications prior to the RERP modifications. However, only 55
aircraft have been approved for the AMP upgrades, while 112 are
awaiting the RERP upgrades. The Air Force needs to determine how many
of the remaining 57 C-5s will receive the AMP upgrades. That decision
will not be made until it determines the correct mix of C-5 and C-17
aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift needs. According to program
officials, the Air Force is currently performing mobility studies that
will be used to make a mobility mix decision. Until it is decided
whether to use C-17s to replace some, or all, of the earlier 57 C-5s,
the number of aircraft to undergo the AMP and RERP modernization will
remain uncertain.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated
that the unit cost comparison between the November 1998 and the latest
AMP position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth. The
November 1998 position represents the original 126-aircraft program.
The program has since been restructured to a 55-aircraft program.
According to the Air Force, such a change would increase unit costs by
a large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost
basis, to procure for a greater number of aircraft than it would be to
procure for fewer aircraft.
GAO Comments:
While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline
since the November 1998 decision to begin development, the comparison
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes,
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's
history.
[End of section]
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability of the aircraft through the
replacement of engines and modifications to subsystems such as the
electrical, fuel, hydraulic and flight controls systems, while the C-5
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the
avionics. These upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and
reduce ownership costs. We assessed the C-5 RERP.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $908.2 million;
Procurement: $7,565.1 million;
Total funding: $8,476.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 109.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/2001: $1,505.3;
Latest 02/2004: $1,537.4;
Percent change: 2.1%.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/2001: $7,858.0;
Latest 02/2004: $7,565.1;
Percent change: -3.7%.
Total program cost;
As of 11/2001: $9,366.5;
Latest 02/2004: $9,105.9;
Percent change: -2.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/2001: $74.338;
Latest 02/2004: $81.302;
Percent change: 9.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 11/2001: 126;
Latest 02/2004: 112;
Percent change: -11.1%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/2001: 100;
Latest 02/2004: 116;
Percent change: 16.0%.
[End of table]
The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-the-shelf components
that require little or no modification.The program ensured that the
technology was mature and that the design was stable at critical points
in development, closely tracking best practice standards. The program
is currently in system development and plans to enter low-rate
production in March 2007. The major challenge to the program is
software development and integration. Also, the program is dependent on
the number of aircraft approved to undergo the C-5 AMP modernization
program. Until additional aircraft are approved for the AMP, it is
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
C-5 RERP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines
account for 64 percent of the expected improvement in mission
capability rate for the aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet
engines currently being used on numerous aircraft. According to the Air
Force technology assessment, these engines have over 70 million flying
hours of use.
Design Stability:
The C-5 RERP's design is stable. As of November 2003, 98 percent of the
design drawings were complete. In addition, the seven major subsystem-
level design reviews were completed before the December 2003 system-
level design review.
According to program officials, the greatest risk to the RERP is
software development and integration activities. Several new software
programs must be developed, and these programs as well as other
commercial off-the-shelf software packages must be integrated. The
program has experienced software problems in the past and has taken
actions to improve software activities. The program is taking advantage
of AMP-developed products and lessons learned in the RERP to reduce the
risk of schedule slips associated with software development and
integration. For example, according to program officials, the baseline
software and systems integration facilities that were developed for the
AMP will not have to be completely redeveloped for RERP activities.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air
Force is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that
production maturity would be at a high level because the engines have
been commercially available for many years.
Other Program Issues:
The C-5 RERP is dependent on the C-5 AMP (assessed elsewhere in this
report), as the aircraft has to undergo avionics modernization prior to
other enhancements. Over the past year, software development resources
that were planned for the RERP were shifted to the AMP to ensure
completion of its software activities. According to program officials,
while shifting of resources currently has not caused a significant
schedule slip to the RERP, they do acknowledge that it will have a
greater impact on the RERP if the AMP continues to slip and resources
originally planned for use on the RERP are retained to complete the AMP
work.
Due to the retirement of 14 aircraft, the quantity of C-5 RERP aircraft
was reduced from 126 to 112. Although the RERP program has been
authorized for 112 aircraft, the avionics modernization has only been
authorized for 55 aircraft. Therefore, until the Air Force decides on
how many C-5 aircraft will undergo avionics modernization, it is
uncertain how many aircraft will undergo the RERP. That decision is
contingent upon the results of ongoing mobility studies that are
examining the appropriate mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft for DOD's
overall airlift needs.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated
that the unit cost comparison between the November 2001 and the latest
RERP position does not accurately portray the program's cost growth.
The November 2001 position represents the original 126-aircraft
program. The program has since been restructured to a 112-aircraft
program. It further stated that such a change would increase unit costs
by a large amount because it would be less expensive, on a unit cost
basis, to procure for a greater number of aircraft than it would be to
procure for fewer aircraft.
GAO Comments:
While the program has established a new cost and performance baseline
since the November 2001 decision to begin development, the comparison
presented provides an accurate picture of change since that major
decision. Although DOD may update its baseline for management purposes,
our goal is to provide an aggregate or overall picture of the program's
history.
[End of section]
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC):
The Navy's CEC is designed to connect radar systems to enhance
detection and engagement of air targets. Ships and planes equipped with
their version of CEC hardware and software will share real-time data to
create composite radar tracks--allowing the battle group to see the
same radar picture. A CEC-equipped ship can then detect and engage
targets its radar cannot see. We assessed the current shipboard and
airborne versions of the CEC.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Systems Corporation;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $405.3 million;
Procurement: $1,180.1 million;
Total funding: $1,585.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 181.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/1995: $1,172.4;
Latest 06/2004: $2,524.6;
Percent change: 115.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/1995: $1,308.8;
Latest 06/2004: $2,171.6;
Percent change: 65.9%.
Total program cost;
As of 05/1995: $2,528.0;
Latest 06/2004: $4,696.2;
Percent change: 85.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/1995: $13.814;
Latest 06/2004: $16.594;
Percent change: 20.1%.
Total quantities;
As of 05/1995: 183;
Latest 06/2004: 283;
Percent change: 54.6%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/1995: 16;
Latest 06/2004: 16;
Percent change: 0.0%.
[End of table]
The CEC's production maturity could not be assessed because the
government does not collect the necessary data on the commercially
available portions of the ship-based and airborne versions of the CEC.
However, program and contractor officials consider the production
processes capable of producing a quality product on time and within
cost. The technologies and design of both the ship-based and airborne
versions of the CEC are fully mature. In April 2002, the shipboard
version was approved for full-rate production. The airborne version
remains in low-rate production and may proceed to full-rate production
pending a full-rate production decision anticipated in September 2005.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CEC Program:
Technology Maturity:
All six of the CEC's critical technologies are mature. While the
shipboard and airborne versions have different hardware, they share the
same critical technologies.
Design Stability:
The CEC's basic design appears stable, as all of the drawings needed to
build the shipboard and airborne versions have been released to
manufacturing. Additional drawings for each version continue to be
released to incorporate advances in commercially available
technologies, which comprise approximately 60 percent of CEC hardware.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity as data were not available.
According to program officials, CEC production is mature and
noncommercial portions do not involve critical manufacturing processes.
Officials indicated that they do not have insight into whether the
manufacturing processes for the commercial portions are critical and
are under statistical control. However, program officials are confident
that a quality product can be delivered on time and within cost given
contractor past performance.
The program office plans to seek full-rate production approval for the
airborne version in September 2005. During operational testing, the
airborne version was determined to be operationally effective but not
operationally suitable. According to the program office, it is
implementing corrections that will be verified in time to support the
full-rate production decision.
Other Program Issues:
In November 2003, the Navy announced plans to improve CEC
interoperability by pursuing open architecture and functionality
changes with the Joint Single Integrated Air Picture Systems
Engineering Organization (JSSEO). The CEC Program Office discontinued
planning for a Block 2 development effort and began working with JSSEO
to jointly engineer sensor measurement and radar tracking management
solutions that will be available to all services to ensure optimum
interoperability across the battlespace. The joint track management
software being developed is intended to interface with CEC software to
improve data sharing throughout different computing environments and to
facilitate component upgrades without redesigning the entire system.
CEC officials consider the joint track management software a technical
risk since JSSEO is using a relatively new approach for combat system
software development. The officials also consider it a schedule risk
that could impact timely delivery of Navy platforms, including the
DD(X) and the Littoral Combat Ship, which are to be equipped with CEC.
To mitigate risks, the CEC program manager is closely monitoring joint
track manager progress to determine whether the software can be
incorporated into the CEC on schedule. If JSSEO does not deliver an
acceptable product by September 2005, the Navy plans to continue using
current CEC software and explore alternatives.
With discontinuation of a Block 2 effort, the program also initiated a
preplanned product improvement effort for CEC hardware. This effort
takes advantage of advances in technology to reduce size, weight, and
cost without adding new critical technologies. Improved hardware will
operate with current CEC software and joint track manager software,
once ready. The program began testing of the improved hardware in
August 2004 and plans to obtain Office of the Secretary of Defense
approval for incorporating improvements by October 2005. The program is
also developing a miniterminal land version for the Marine Corps.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it
generally concurred with our assessment but provided clarifying
comments. Regarding the schedule risk associated with joint track
management, the Navy stated that it, along with the other services, is
working with JSSEO to reach agreement on a joint architecture for track
management, combat identification, and tactical data link integration.
It explained that the joint architectural agreement will allow
appropriate existing solutions to be integrated into the joint track
manager and will be extensible to multiple networks and different
communication devices. The Navy stated that this will reduce the risk
of providing joint track management capability in fiscal year 2008.
[End of section]
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F):
The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide
transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment,
personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to
operate in both day and night. The program is to enhance performance
and extend the useful life of the CH-47. This effort includes
installing a digitized cockpit, rebuilding the airframe, and reducing
aircraft vibration.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Helicopters;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million;
Procurement: $5,499.9 million;
Total funding: $5,499.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 314.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/1998: $149.4;
Latest 12/2003: $172.3;
Percent change: 15.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/1998: $2,615.9;
Latest 12/2003: $6,221.3;
Percent change: 137.8%.
Total program cost;
As of 05/1998: $2,765.3;
Latest 12/2003: $6,393.6;
Percent change: 131.2%.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/1998: $9.157;
Latest 12/2003: $18.860;
Percent change: 106.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 05/1998: 302;
Latest 12/2003: 339;
Percent change: 12.3%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/1998: 82;
Latest 12/2003: 113;
Percent change: 37.8%.
[End of table]
CH-47F production maturity could not be assessed as the program is not
collecting statistical process control data on key manufacturing
processes. Program officials believe that CH-47F production is low risk
because no new technology is being inserted into the aircraft, two
prototypes have been produced, and the production process was
demonstrated during the delivery of one low-rate initial production
aircraft. The CH-47F technologies appear mature and the design stable,
with 100 percent of the engineering drawings released for
manufacturing. The Army has regained 6 months of a schedule delay
anticipated when it was directed to produce additional MH-47s for
special operations.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CH-47F Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess technology maturity or determine the number of
critical technologies in detail. The CH-47F is a modification of the
existing CH-47D helicopter. Program officials believe that all critical
technologies are mature and have been demonstrated prior to integration
into the CH-47F development program.
Design Stability:
The Army completed the CH-47F engineering development and manufacturing
phase, with 100 percent of the drawings released to manufacturing.
However, at the design review, only 37 percent of the system's
engineering drawings were complete. Since that time, the number of
drawings completed increased substantially. The majority of the new
drawings were instituted to correct wire routing and installation on
the aircraft; changes the program office believed could not be
determined until after the first prototype was delivered.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the CH-47F program does
not collect statistical process control data on its production of
helicopters. The program office relies on inspections as its means to
ensure acceptable production results.
According to the program office, the CH-47 production is low risk
because two prototypes have been produced during development and the
Army recently took delivery of its first low-rate initial production
aircraft. Further, the program reported that during low-rate
production, it made significant advances in the development and
refinement of the system that are designed to increase production
efficiencies. Advances include the implementation of the automated
management execution system and the introduction of laser tracking to
identify key mounting points. These enhancements are geared toward
improving the manufacturing learning curve. However, the program office
acknowledges that the program will lose some of the learning benefits
during the anticipated break in production of the CH-47F in favor of
producing more MG-47s during the next lot of production.
Other Program Issues:
In 2002, DOD directed the Army to produce 16 MH-47G aircraft for the
Special Operations Command before the start of the Army's low-rate
production for the CH-47F helicopters and to deliver those aircraft as
soon as possible. The Army initially estimated that this transfer of 16
aircraft for special operations would result in a 15-month delay in its
first unit equipped date for the CH-47F. However, according to the
program office, scheduling issues between the Army and the Special
Operations Command have been resolved. The Army now estimates that the
15-month schedule slip has been reduced by about 6 months. The program
office reported that the CH-47F and MH-47G program strategy has been
approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive.
Further, the Army has recently approved the production of additional CH-
47F aircraft in the most recent Program Objective Memorandum
submission. Additionally, the Army included in this submission an
escalation of 19 CH-47F aircraft that had previously been scheduled at
the end of the program. These quantity changes resulted from the recent
Army Aviation Transformation Group's recommendations.
Agency Comments:
The Army concurred with this assessment and provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. Additionally, it
commented that the full-rate production decision was approved on
November 22, 2004, by the Army Acquisition Executive. Further, the
program was rebaselined to include a revised Acquisition Objective of
510 aircraft. Details of this rebaselined program will be outlined in
the December 2004 Selected Acquisition Report.
[End of section]
Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM):
The Army's CKEM is a hypervelocity missile designed to provide superior
lethality against current tanks, bunkers, buildings, and future
advanced threat armor. It is designed to provide a high rate of fire
and a high probability of kill beyond the range of tank guns, and at
half the size and weight of current kinetic energy missiles. The CKEM
is a potential candidate for use on the current Stryker Brigade and
Future Combat System vehicles. The Army is currently developing the
CKEM in an Advanced Technology Demonstration program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin-Missiles and Fire Control;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $63.6 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $63.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 07/2004: $229.2.
Procurement cost;
Latest 07/2004: $0.0%.
Total program cost;
Latest 07/2004: $229.2.
Program unit cost;
Latest 07/2004: NA.
Total quantities;
Latest 07/2004: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 07/2004: TBD.
Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be
determined.
[End of table]
Program officials believe the CKEM technologies will be mature when the
program enters system development. The Army is using an advanced
technology demonstration to develop the CKEM technologies to satisfy
future Army missile requirements. The technologies have already been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. Work remains to reduce the
technologies to the right size and show they can withstand the high g-
force environment. Funding inconsistencies and increased costs have
hampered technology development efforts and increased program risk.
Program officials expect at least one design change iteration once the
CKEM enters system development, which could happen in 2006 after full-
scale weapon system flight testing.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CKEM Program:
Technology Maturity:
Although none of its critical technologies are fully mature, the CKEM
is over a year from entering system development and all four
technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Program
officials believe all CKEM critical technologies will be fully mature
when the program proceeds with system development. The missile's four
critical technologies are a solid rocket motor, an attitude control
system, penetrator/lethality mechanisms, and guidance systems. CKEM
engineers are pioneering many of the system's technologies to satisfy
future missile requirements, which include reduced infrared signatures,
longer ranges, nondetonable propellants, and smaller size and weight.
Existing missile guidance and control components will not satisfy the
size and weight requirements and will not withstand the g-forces
potentially exerted by the CKEM. As a result, CKEM developers are
working to miniaturize existing components and improve tolerances for
use under greater velocities. The program completed testing of smaller
guidance and control prototypes in a high g-force environment.
Engineers are also designing a motor with an increased burn rate,
advanced materials, and innovative structural designs. They
successfully tested a new solid-fuel rocket motor, and they plan to
begin controlled flight testing in April 2005. They also demonstrated
the missile's lethality against a tank target with advanced armor.
However, system officials said that additional technology funding is
needed to fully develop component technologies and produce a missile
that will meet the size and performance goals.
Program officials believe they can mature technologies to the point
that only a single design iteration will be needed to satisfy Army
objective requirements during system development. They noted that the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology instructed them to forego involvement in the development of
fire control systems and instead focus solely on missile development.
This could result in integration problems that would require future
design changes.
Other Program Issues:
Program officials believe that inconsistent funding has hampered
development efforts. Over the last 3 years, the budget has been reduced
over $21 million. Those reductions were offset by reprogramming $17
million back into the program. Initially, competitive contracts were
awarded to two prime contractors. Citing funding discontinuity and
higher-than-expected contractor proposals, program officials did not
exercise an option for the second contractor's continued involvement.
They also cited funding as the reason the Army suspended international
cooperative agreements for assistance in developing associated
technologies.
The Army has not included a CKEM system development program in its
future funding plans. Nonetheless, program officials hope to have the
system ready to transition to system development in late 2006. CKEM
technologies can also be used to improve existing kinetic energy
missiles, namely the Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank missile.
Agency Comments:
The Army concurred with our assessment.
[End of section]
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21:
The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion,
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability.
These technologies will allow for increased sortie rates and decreased
manning rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the technologies
were intended for the second ship in the class, but they were
accelerated into the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring of the
program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,630.8 million;
Procurement: $24,760.5 million;
Total funding: $27,391.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 3.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 04/2004: $4,125.7.
Procurement cost;
Latest 04/2004: $26,430.2.
Total program cost;
Latest 04/2004: $30,555.9.
Program unit cost;
Latest 04/2004: $10,185.315.
Total quantities;
Latest 04/2004: 3.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 04/2004: 183.
[End of table]
The CVN-21 entered system development in April 2004 with very few of
its critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part to DOD's
decision to accelerate the installation of a number of technologies
from the second ship to the first. The accelerated technologies are at
much lower levels of maturity. Program officials state that the
extended construction and design period that ends in 2014 allows
further time for technology development. Program officials have
established a risk reduction strategy that includes decision points for
each technology's inclusion based on a demonstrated maturity level.
These points coincide with key design milestones and include
consideration of the fallback use of mature technologies for all but
two technologies. The program office has stated that those two
technologies are already mature and operational.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
CVN-21 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials reported that 3 of the 14 critical technologies were
mature at development start and that 4 more were approaching maturity.
An additional 7 were at much lower levels of readiness. The Navy
expects that 10 of the 14 technologies will be mature or close to
mature by the design review in fiscal year 2006.
Some of the CVN-21 critical technologies are being developed by other
programs, not by the CVN-21 program. As a result, events in those
programs could affect the CVN-21 development time line. Those
technologies are the Volume Search Radar, Multi-Function Radar,
Advanced Arresting Gear, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile and Joint
Precision Approach and Landing System. CVN-21 program officials
reported that they are working closely with all critical technology
leads in those offices to ensure that their time lines are integrated
with the needs of the CVN-21 program. In case those technologies do not
mature in time for insertion into the carrier, the CVN-21 program has
identified existing or fully mature alternate systems as backup
technologies.
Since entering development, the program office has added 9 1,100-ton
air conditioning plants as a critical technology, and has added them to
the baseline design for the ship. The plants are not near maturity. The
Navy added the plants because the CVN 21's requirements for chilled
water are significantly higher than existing aircraft carriers. The
Navy considers this a low-risk development effort since they are using
a proven commercial design with upgrades to meet military shock,
vibration, and noise requirements.
Two of the four remaining technologies that are not mature, the Omni-
Directional Vehicle and Automated Weapons and Materials Movement
Technologies, are primarily mobile vehicles that can be accommodated
late in the design and construction schedule because they are not
installed as part of the ship. In addition, the Advanced Arresting Gear
is not near maturity, but according to program officials, it does not
pose a significant risk to the program because it is located high in
the ship and as such will be integrated in the latter stages of
construction.
Program officials stated that it is not possible to mature some systems
to the best practices standard this early in development. One such
system is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a replacement for
the current steam catapult system used to launch aircraft off carriers.
This system has been in development since the late 1990s, but due to
the size and complexity of the system, a prototype of it cannot be
tested aboard a surrogate ship.
Other Program Issues:
Program cost estimates increased by more than $18 billion over the
amount reported last year as a result of the development start
decision, which added a second follow-on ship to the program, for a
total production run of three ships. Previous estimates were based on a
single follow-on ship and were not fully developed estimates for the
entire program. In addition, the cost estimates at development start
more accurately reflect potential inflation incurred by the shipbuilder
during design and construction of the ship.
Agency Comments:
The Navy generally concurred with this assessment and reiterated that
the time frames for design and construction of an aircraft carrier
allow for evolving technologies to be brought to the ship later in the
construction cycle. It stated that if a certain technology does not
mature in time for ship construction, the technology will be replaced
by a fall back technology that may not meet projected capability, but
it will at least be equal to current capability.
[End of section]
DD(X) Destroyer:
The Navy's DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to
provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. The
program is currently in the system design phase, and the Navy plans to
authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship in March
2005. The Navy plans to demonstrate the ship's critical technologies by
building and testing 10 developmental subsystems, referred to as
engineering development models.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $6.467.9 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $6.467.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 01/1998: $1,956.5;
Latest 08/2004: $10,120.9;
Percent change: 417.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 01/1998: $0.0;
Latest 08/2004: $0.0;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 01/1998: $1,956.5;
Latest 08/2004: $10,120.9;
Percent change: 417.3%.
Program unit cost;
As of 01/1998: NA;
Latest 08/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
As of 01/1998: 0;
Latest 08/2004: 1.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/1998: 128;
Latest 08/2004: 180;
Percent change: 40.6%.
[End of table]
Costs increased due to changes in cost estimating, additional
technology development, and a program restructuring, and include
procurement of the lead ship in research and development.
None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10 engineering
development models were mature at the start of development, and none
are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize
detailed design and construction of the lead ship. Current plans call
for demonstrating 3 of the 10 subsystems by the end of the program's
design review in August 2005 and an additional 3 in September 2005.
Backups are available for only 2 of the 10 developmental subsystems. As
most of the testing of the engineering development models will take
place in the months immediately before and after the design review, it
is not likely that design stability will be achieved by the time of
that review.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DD(X) Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the DD(X) technologies were mature at the start of development,
and none are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to
authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship. By the end
of the design review in August 2005, only three subsystems are expected
to complete testing: the autonomic fire suppression system, the hull
form, and the infrared mock-ups. The integrated power system,
peripheral vertical launch system, and total ship computing environment
are expected to complete testing in September 2005. The dual band radar
and integrated deckhouse are to complete testing well after the design
review. The advanced gun system and undersea warfare system will not be
tested as fully integrated systems until after installation on the
first ship.
The current plans for the integrated undersea warfare system include
testing the functionality of components, such as the ability of one of
two sonar arrays to detect mines, but not demonstrating the system as a
whole.
Component testing of the advanced gun system is ongoing and has
resulted in changes to some components. The weight of the gun system
increased as a result of an effort to improve producibility and cost
efficiency. Land-based testing of the gun system is planned for the
summer of 2005, and flight tests for the munition are to be completed
in September 2005. The two technologies will not be tested together
until after ship installation.
The dual band radar is not scheduled to complete testing until fiscal
year 2008, well after the design review. Program officials have made
some assumptions about where in the deckhouse it will be placed. If its
weight increases or other technical factors cause it to be relocated, a
redesign effort may be needed. In addition, recent component testing
and design reviews of portions of the radar have revealed shortfalls in
performance.
The integrated power system recently completed a change in design,
which helps mitigate previously experienced weight issues. These design
changes will not be tested until after design review. In addition,
technical issues with components of the Permanent Magnet Motor have
arisen that could affect schedule and cost. Plans for the integrated
power system do include the use of a fallback technology, but would
require trade-offs in requirements.
Design Stability:
Most of the testing of the engineering development models will take
place around the time of design review. Even if tests are successful,
they will not be completed in time to achieve design stability.
Problems found in testing could result in changes in the design, delays
in product delivery, and increases in cost. Detailed knowledge about
subsystems and their component technologies is necessary for developing
the system design. If this information is not available and assumptions
about operating characteristics have to be made, redesign may be
necessary when reliable information is available.
Agency Comments:
The Navy acknowledges the aggressive DD(X) schedule but maintains that
the ability to deliver revolutionary capabilities to the fleet with
reduced crew necessitates some element of risk. Congress has expressed
support for the Navy's approach, stating in the report accompanying the
fiscal year 2005 national defense authorization act "the conferees
believe that taking such risks is warranted to ensure that the DD(X)
technologies are not obsolete, and that the Navy has taken adequate
steps to mitigate the risks before ship construction begins."
The Navy disagrees with the assessment that the DD(X) will not achieve
design stability prior to design review. It stated that the ship design
is stable and reflects release of the final baseline leading to design
review. It also stated that the results from continued engineering
development model testing will be incorporated in the design and that
permission to begin design review will be based on meeting specific
entrance criteria that measure the availability of the appropriate data
on technologies.
GAO Comments:
Design stability requires detailed knowledge of the form, fit, and
function of all technologies as well as the integration of individual,
fully matured subsystems. As testing for DD(X) technologies continues
beyond the dates scheduled for design review, this knowledge may not be
achieved when required.
[End of section]
E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A):
The Air Force's E-10A program is being designed to exploit emerging
radar sensor technologies for airborne surface surveillance and focused
air surveillance for cruise missile defense. It will consist of an
active electronically scanned array radar; a modified Boeing 767
commercial airframe; and a battle management, command and control
computer mission subsystem. Development of the radar has already begun;
and while funding of the first airframe has begun, the overall program
has not yet entered development. We assessed the entire system.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $2,083.8 million;
Procurement: $1,171.3 million;
Total funding: $3,255.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 3.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 01/2005: $3,986.5.
Procurement cost;
Latest 01/2005: $3,394.9.
Total program cost;
Latest 01/2005: $7,381.4.
Program unit cost;
Latest 01/2005: $1,054.486.
Total quantities;
Latest 01/2005: 7.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 01/2005: TBD.
Total program cost is not available. Baseline cost information is
through fiscal year 2013. Research and development includes Global Hawk
radar development costs.
[End of table]
We have not assessed the technology maturity of the overall E-10A
program because program officials have not yet completed their
identification and assessment of the system's critical technologies.
However, they assessed the radar's critical technologies in October
2003, prior to the radar's Milestone B decision. At that time,
officials determined that six of the radar's nine critical technologies
were mature. The remaining three radar technologies are not expected to
reach full maturity until the first E-10A flight in 2010. Development
challenges for the overall E-10A program include the integration of the
radar, airframe, and battle management subsystems and the software
development for the battle management subsystem.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
E-10A Program:
Technology Maturity:
Because program officials have not yet completed their identification
and assessment of the program's critical technologies, we were unable
to assess the technological maturity of the overall E-10A system.
Program officials are preparing a technology development strategy as
well as a technology readiness assessment in support of the upcoming
development decision for the overall weapon system.
Program officials have identified and assessed the critical
technologies associated with the radar subsystem. They determined that
six of the nine critical technologies were mature. The remaining three
radar technologies are not expected to reach full maturity until the
first E-10A flight in 2010. Tests on a smaller prototype have
demonstrated the functional capabilities of the radar, but are not
representative of the E-10A radar's form or fit. The final form of the
radar will be significantly larger and will not be integrated on the
airframe until flight testing in 2010.
Design Stability:
We could not assess design stability for the E-10A as the overall
system has not yet entered system development. As a result, the total
number of drawings has not yet been determined. However, a final design
review of the radar subsystem was conducted in June 2004. Program
officials stated that over 90 percent of the expected drawings for the
radar had been released at that point. They do not expect the number of
radar drawings to change significantly because key subsystems for the
radar are already being produced for other weapon systems.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal years 2003 and 2005, the E-10A's proposed budget was reduced
by Congress. Both budget cuts resulted in a restructuring of the
program. As part of the last restructuring, program officials requested
that the system development milestone decision be accelerated from July
to April 2005. However, in a recent budget decision, DOD reduced the
program's fiscal year 2006 and 2007 budget request by a total of $600
million. If this reduction is sustained, the E-10A program will have to
undergo yet another restructuring.
According to program officials, the software development for the battle
management command and control subsystem is the most critical program
risk. This subsystem will provide the machine-to-machine communications
capability needed to operate with prospective and legacy command and
control systems. The development of the battle management subsystem has
lagged behind the radar and airframe; the Air Force just awarded a
development contract for the subsystem in September 2004.
The 767 airframe is a commercial derivative that will be modified to
meet the E-10A's military requirements. In addition, the integration of
the large scale radar and the battle management subsystem may
necessitate additional modifications. The Air Force has only contracted
for one aircraft, which will be used as a testbed. As a result of the
budget cuts, the delivery of this aircraft has slipped about 1 year.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
the E-10A program has been restructured to accommodate both an Office
of the Secretary of Defense directed development decision delay and
congressional budget cuts. It further noted that the restructuring has
been accomplished with minimal impact to ongoing design activities and
has retained the radar/E-10A synchronization necessary to deliver an E-
10A weapon system that is responsive to warfighter requirements. The
Air Force also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE):
The Navy's E-2 AHE is an all-weather, twin engine, carrier-based,
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2 AHE is
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,805.9 million;
Procurement: $9,510.0 million;
Total funding: $12,315.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 69.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2003: $3,299.1;
Latest 12/2003: $3,336.1;
Percent change: 1.1%.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2003: $9,371.9;
Latest 12/2003: $9,510.0;
Percent change: 1.5%.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2003: $12,671.0;
Latest 12/2003: $12,846.1;
Percent change: 1.4%.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2003: $168.947;
Latest 12/2003: $171.281;
Percent change: 1.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2003: 75;
Latest 12/2003: 75;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2003: 95;
Latest 12/2003: 94;
Percent change: -1.1%.
[End of table]
The E-2 AHE program entered system development in June 2003 without
demonstrating that its four critical technologies had reached full
maturity. Since that time, one of the program's four critical
technologies has reached full maturity. Program officials do not expect
to achieve maturity on the remaining three critical technologies until
after the design review. While more mature backup technologies exist
for the three critical technologies, use of the backup technologies
would result in degraded system performance or reduced ability to
accommodate future system growth. The program office has made progress
on completing design drawings and plans to have the majority of
drawings completed by the time of design review in November 2005.
However, until the technologies are mature, the potential for design
changes remains.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
E-2 AHE Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the E-2 AHE's four critical technologies (the space time
adaptive processing algorithms and associated processor) is mature. The
program expects the remaining technologies (the rotodome antenna, a
silicon carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to support UHF
radio operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for the antenna)
to be fully mature after the November 2005 design review but before the
start of production in March 2009.
More mature backup technologies exist for the three technologies (the
rotodome antenna, the silicon carbide-based transistor, and the
multichannel rotary coupler) and were flown on a larger test platform
in 2002 and 2003. However, use of the backup technologies would result
in degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future
system growth due to size and weight constraints. The next AHE
technology readiness assessment is to be performed prior to the
production decision for the system in fiscal year 2008, and the program
office anticipates that the critical technologies will be mature at
that time.
Design Stability:
The program had completed almost 35 percent of its engineering drawings
at the time of our review. Program officials project that they will
have 81 percent of the drawings completed by the time of design review
in November 2005, and 100 percent completed by the planned start of
production in March 2009. However, the technology maturation process
may lead to more design changes.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
AHE program successfully executed Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in
October 2004. The program office also completed PDRs for each of the
AHE subsystems, to include critical technologies, and documented
appropriate risks. The Navy noted that all program risks and associated
mitigation plans, including those for critical technologies, were
reviewed for PDR. According to the Navy, critical technologies do not
currently represent a high risk to the AHE program. Navy officials
stated that the program is on schedule and meeting cost and performance
objectives.
Flight tests of the critical technologies are planned during system
design and development. The Navy noted that flight tests will
inherently increase the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of the
critical technologies. These TRLs will be formally assessed before the
production decision in fiscal year 2009.
[End of section]
EA-18G:
The Navy's EA-18G is an electronic attack aircraft designed to jam
enemy radar and communications and conduct electronic warfare as part
of a battle group. The program was approved as a replacement for the EA-
6B aircraft, and it will integrate its electronic warfare technology
and components into the F/A-18F platform. Because of the heavy use of
the aging EA-6B aircraft, a large number are being retired due to wear.
To prevent a gap in electronic warfighting capabilities, DOD intends to
begin fielding the EA-18G in 2009.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,428.5 million;
Procurement: $6,182.6 million;
Total funding: $7,611.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 90.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/2003: $1,653.3;
Latest 12/2003: $1,644.9;
Percent change: -0.5%.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/2003: $6,108.7;
Latest 12/2003: $6,182.6;
Percent change: 1.2%.
Total program cost;
As of 11/2003: $7,762.0;
Latest 12/2003: $7,827.5;
Percent change: 0.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/2003: $86.244;
Latest 12/2003: $86.972;
Percent change: 0.8%.
Total quantities;
As of 11/2003: 90;
Latest 12/2003: 90;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/2003: 70;
Latest 12/2003: 69;
Percent change: -1.4%.
[End of table]
The EA-18G entered system development without demonstrating that its
five critical technologies had reached full maturity. Three
technologies were very close to maturity, and two technologies have not
been demonstrated in the form they will exist on the aircraft. While
the EA-18G's critical technologies are similar to mature technologies
on the EA-6B and the F/A-18F, integrating them into the EA-18G will
involve form and fit challenges. The EA-18G will rely on planned
capability upgrades developed for the EA-6B, which could increase
program risk. In addition to these challenges, the program also faces
risks with software integration. The program office could not project
the number of releasable drawings until the design review in April
2005.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
EA-18G Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the EA-18G's five critical technologies are fully mature. While
they are similar to the mature technologies found on the EA-6B and the
F/A-18F, integrating those technologies on the EA-18G will involve form
and fit challenges. Three of the critical technologies, the ALQ-99
pods, the F/A-18F platform, and the tactical terminal system, are
approaching full maturity. The remaining two technologies, the receiver
system and the communications countermeasures set, are not mature.
The Navy is funding a study to develop a new tactical terminal system,
which it hopes to incorporate into the EA-18G to help reduce weight,
conserve power, and reduce cooling requirements. According to the
program office, similar systems are already in use in DOD. For example,
the Special Operations Forces are using a system the size of a credit
card, significantly lighter than the current 50-pound system. If the
new system is not developed in time for the start of aircraft
production, the program plans to use a modified version of the tactical
terminal system currently in use on the EA-6B.
Raytheon Systems is developing the communications countermeasures set
for the EA-18G, which will be based on a similar system currently used
on the C-130J aircraft. Raytheon is expected to begin delivery of the
system in January 2005.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of the EA-18G as the number of
releasable drawings is not yet available. The EA-18G Program Office
does not expect to have an estimate of the number of design drawings
until the design review, currently planned for April 2005. By not
having sufficient design drawing information, the program places itself
at increased cost and schedule risk.
Other Program Issues:
The EA-18G Program Office plans to build one-third of its aircraft
during low-rate initial production due to the need to begin replacing
retiring EA-6Bs by 2009. Any problems identified in testing during
production could result in costly modifications to the already produced
aircraft. The program office has indicated it may proceed into
production even if minor known deficiencies exist.
Because the EA-18G is using the same airframe as the F/A-18F, the
program office is conducting a study to determine what impact the
increased vibration of the EA-18G will have on the life span of the
airframe. The program office also plans to certify the aircraft to land
aboard ship at 47,000 pounds, which is 3,000 pounds heavier than the
similar F/A-18F aircraft.
The F/A-18E/F aircraft has experienced problems with "wing buffet,"
which can affect performance. The F/A-18F Program Office has made
design changes, which it expects will resolve the issue.
The ALQ-99 pods successfully completed shake testing, which evaluated
their ability to handle the increased vibrations of the EA-18G.
The EA-18G program may experience minor cost growth if cuts are made in
the number of EA-6Bs that are upgraded because the EA-18G program plans
to procure some of the same components as those used in the EA-6B ICAP
III upgrade. Decreased purchases by the EA-6B program would increase
unit costs of these items, thereby increasing the cost to the EA-18G.
Agency Comments:
The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-Atlas V, Delta IV:
The Air Force's EELV program acquires commercial satellite launch
services from two competitive families of launch vehicles--Atlas V and
Delta IV. The program is an industry partnership to support and sustain
assured access to space and reduce the life-cycle cost of space
launches by at least 25 percent over previous systems while meeting the
government's launch requirements. Different types of lift vehicles may
be used, depending on the particular mission. We assessed both the
Atlas V and Delta IV.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin & Boeing Launch Services;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $72.6 million;
Procurement: $23,970.9 million;
Total funding: $24,043.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 122.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1998: $1,529.2;
Latest 06/2004: $1,793.4;
Percent change: 17.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1998: $13,394.7;
Latest 06/2004: $25,952.1;
Percent change: 93.7%.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1998: $14,923.9;
Latest 06/2004: $27,745.5;
Percent change: 85.9%.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1998: $82.452;
Latest 06/2004: $201.054;
Percent change: 143.8%.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1998: 181;
Latest 06/2004: 138;
Percent change: -23.8%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1998: TBD;
Latest 06/2004: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
[End of table]
Although the EELV Program Office has access to technology, design, and
production maturity information, it has not formally contracted for
this data because it is acquiring the launch service rather than
developing the system itself. To date, seven successful EELV launches
have occurred--two government and five commercial. With a history of
launch delays, the heavy lift vehicle (HLV) had its first demonstration
flight in 2004. The EELV program's total costs have increased about 86
percent due to a decline in the commercial launch market upon which the
business case was based.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
EELV Program:
Technology Maturity:
We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air
Force has not formally contracted for information on technology
maturity from its contractors.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force
has not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this
assessment.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air
Force has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate
this assessment.
Other Program Issues:
The decline in commercial satellite launch needs in the late 1990s
resulted in program cost increases and a reduction in the anticipated
number of Atlas V and Delta IV launches. Cost increases greater than 25
percent over the program's objective triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach
(see 10 U.S.C. 2433), requiring a review by the Secretary of Defense
and a report to Congress. As provided by the law, DOD certified in
April 2004 that the program is critical to national security and its
cost estimates are reasonable. In conjunction with the certification,
the Air Force is updating the 1994 Space Launch Modernization Plan
(which examines launch alternatives), and it revised its mission model
to reflect a reduction of launch vehicles. Also, the Air Force is
reviewing contract structures that could include cost type provisions
for the follow-on procurement of EELV services.
The EELV program has continued to experience schedule changes to the
Delta IV heavy lift vehicles (HLV). The Delta IV heavy-lift
demonstration flight that was planned for July 2004 did not occur until
December 2004 and the HLV first operational flight was delayed by 6
months. According to the Air Force, these delays occurred due to a
number of factors, including other launch priorities, slips in launch
dates for the first three Delta IV missions, modifications to the HLV
launch pad, and design problems encountered during launch pad testing.
In addition, both contractors are addressing technical issues related
to meeting program requirements. The Boeing Company is addressing a
Delta IV issue related to the separation of the payload fairing device
(which encloses and protects the payload). Lockheed Martin is dealing
with an Atlas V intermediate class booster issue regarding the
excessive vibration caused by the noise generated at liftoff.
According to DOD, initiatives are in place to reduce EELV risk and
ensure access to space. The initiatives are aimed at critical rocket
components, improving the producibility of the upper stage engine,
systems engineering processes, and the availability of critical staff
and facilities. Related to these initiatives, there are three technical
issues that the Air Force is addressing. Parts of the RL-10 upper stage
engine are common to both the Delta IV and the Atlas V and an engine
flaw could potentially ground both vehicles. However, the Air Force
maintains that the RL-10 has flown successfully since the 1960s. Also,
the Atlas V continues to rely on the Russian-made RD-180 propulsion
technology (though the contractor plans to start building this
technology in the United States with a first military launch by 2012).
Additionally, until the West Coast launch pad becomes operational in
2005 in time for the first U.S. government need in 2006, the Air Force
is limited to launching the Atlas V from its East Coast launch pad.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force acknowledged
that technology, design, and production maturity data are not required
as a deliverable, and therefore it does not have the authority to
provide this information. However, daily interaction with both
contractors provides insight into the readiness of the launchers as
well as the potential for cost increases and schedule issues.
[End of section]
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
The Marine Corps' EFV (formerly called the Advanced Amphibious Assault
Vehicle) is designed to transport troops from ships offshore to their
inland destinations at higher speeds and from farther distances than
the existing Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). It is designed
to be more mobile, lethal, reliable, and effective in all weather
conditions. The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier for 17
combat equipped Marines and 3 crew and a command vehicle to manage
combat operations in the field. We assessed both variants.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Woodbridge, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $644.6 million;
Procurement: $7,355.5 million;
Total funding: $8,046.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 1,012.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2000: $1,419.0;
Latest 08/2004: $1,972.6;
Percent change: 39.0%.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2000: $6,364.0;
Latest 08/2004: $7,470.1;
Percent change: 17.4%.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2000: $7,864.7;
Latest 08/2004: $9,517.4;
Percent change: 21.0%.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2000: $7.673;
Latest 08/2004: $9.285;
Percent change: 21.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2000: 1,025;
Latest 08/2004: 1,025;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2000: 138;
Latest 08/2004: 165;
Percent change: 19.6%.
[End of table]
The EFV's technology is mature and the design is stable. However, at
the start of development, only four out of five critical technologies
were mature. The demonstration of the moving map, the last of these
technologies, has led to full technology maturation. The design was
close to meeting best practice standards at the design review,
signifying the design was relatively stable. Early development of fully
functional prototypes and other design practices have facilitated
design stability. Based on the functional prototyping, the program
expects changes to roughly 12 percent of the drawings. The
demonstration of production maturity remains a concern because the
contractor does not collect statistical process control data.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
EFV Program:
Technology Maturity:
All five of the EFV's critical technologies are mature. The moving map
navigation technology, which was not mature at the start of product
development, was recently demonstrated in an operational environment on
the full-up system prototype. The moving map technology provides
situational awareness.
Design Stability:
The program has now released all of its drawings for the troop carrier
variant. However, 12 percent require design changes to address
reliability issues. At the time of critical design review in 2001, 84
percent of the expected drawings had been released, signifying the
design was approaching stability. The program is currently seeking to
reduce the threshold for the reliability key performance parameter
based on a USMC reevaluation of concept of operations. According to
program officials, reliability is a moderate risk but may elevate to
high risk if the requirement change is not approved. Program officials
expect the EFV to meet revised reliability thresholds by initial
operational testing in November 2007.
According to the program, recent tests of an improved track and wheel
design demonstrated significant improvements in reducing vibration on
the vehicle. Program officials estimate that vibration levels have been
reduced by up to 50 percent over previous measurements. The new track
and wheel design will be incorporated on the vehicles used for the
operational assessment in March 2005.
Production Maturity:
The program expects to enter low-rate production in December 2005. It
will do so without requiring the contractor to use statistical process
controls to demonstrate that the 12 critical processes are producing
quality and reliable products. Instead, the contractor plans to have 95
percent of the production tooling and manufacturing processes in place
by low-rate production start. These processes are being utilized and
refined to build the prototype vehicles. Additionally, the program and
the contractor are in planning stages for production readiness reviews
that assess production processes, identify any additional critical
manufacturing processes, and determine the benefit of using statistical
process controls. Because the final EFV production facility is not
ready, the contractor is using the planned manufacturing processes to
build prototypes at the development facility. This will provide
verification of these manufacturing processes. However, when production
moves to the new facility, processes will need to be validated again to
ensure they work as expected.
Other Program Issues:
The program tracks a number of entrance criteria for low-rate
production and is on track to meet most of those criteria. One key
entrance criterion is an operational assessment scheduled for March
2005. The assessment will include the demonstration of a launch and
recovery from an amphibious ship; transportation of Marines on water
and on land; and negotiation of the vehicle in a 4-foot surf. Another
key entrance criterion, demonstration of system reliability, is a
moderate risk and may delay low-rate production.
Agency Comments:
The EFV Program Office was provided an opportunity to comment on a
draft of this assessment, but it did not have any comments.
[End of section]
Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM):
The Navy's ERGM is a rocket-assisted projectile that is fired from
guided missile destroyers. ERGM is one concept the Navy is considering
to meet its fire support requirement. ERGM can be guided to targets on
land at ranges of between 15 and 50 nautical miles to provide fire
support for ground troops. It is expected to offer greater range and
accuracy than the Navy's current 13 nautical mile gun range. ERGM
required modifications to the 5-inch gun, a new munitions-handling
system, and a new fire control system. We assessed the projectile.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD;
Procurement: TBD;
Total funding: TBD;
Procurement quantity: TBD.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/1997: $78.6;
Latest 08/2004: $393.6;
Percent change: 400.5%.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/1997: $310.7;
Latest 08/2004: $204.8;
Percent change: -34.1%.
Total program cost;
As of 04/1997: $389.3;
Latest 08/2004: $598.4;
Percent change: 53.7%.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/1997: $0.045;
Latest 08/2004: $0.191;
Percent change: 319.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 04/1997: 8,570;
Latest 08/2004: 3,141;
Percent change: -63.3%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/1997: 50;
Latest 08/2004: 150;
Percent change: 200.0%.
[End of table]
Latest funding and schedule data are based on the fiscal year 2005
defense budget and a notional development time frame for the extended
range munition program.
Since our last assessment, the ERGM program has not demonstrated
additional technology maturity or design stability. Due to problems
with the rocket motor and propelling charge, flight testing was halted,
and the program has been unable to demonstrate the maturity of 7 of its
20 critical technologies. The program plans to resume flight testing in
February 2005. If that test is successful, four technologies will
demonstrate maturity. The program also stated that ERGM's design
drawings will not be completed because of limited program funding.
Therefore, ERGM will not reach design maturity under Raytheon's current
contract. Finally, due to concerns about ERGM's inconsistent test
performance and projected unit cost, the Navy plans to recompete the 5-
inch guided projectile requirement and restart development by mid-
fiscal year 2006. If ERGM is not selected, it will cease to be a
program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
ERGM Program:
Technology Maturity:
Thirteen of ERGM's 20 critical technologies are mature. The program has
completed development work on six of the seven remaining technologies,
but has yet to test them in an operational environment. Program
officials currently project that four of the remaining technologies,
the tactical telemeter and the three unitary warhead-related
technologies, will be demonstrated during a February 2005 flight test.
The program's fiscal year 2005 budget request was reduced from $11.3
million to $4.5 million, and the program's funds will be exhausted in
March 2005. Unless the program receives additional funding, none of the
three remaining critical technologies--antijam electronics, safe and
arm device and fuze, and data communication interface--will achieve
maturity under the current contract since the Navy plans to recompete
the 5-inch guided projectile requirement and restart development in
early to mid-fiscal year 2006. If the ERGM concept is selected, the
program office projects that all ERGM critical technologies would be
demonstrated in an operational environment by 2008.
Design Stability:
The program has released approximately 51 percent of its 140 production
representative drawings. None of ERGM's production representative
engineering drawings were released at its May 2003 design review.
Instead, the program conducted this review with less mature drawings
and used them to validate the design of the development test rounds. In
our March 2004 report, the program office stated that it would have a
complete and updated drawing package by October 2004. However, because
of a lack of funds and the 5-inch guided projectile competition that
will end the current ERGM contract, the contractor will not complete
this drawing package. If the ERGM concept is selected, the option
exists to complete this drawing package.
Production Maturity:
Since the future of the ERGM concept will not be determined until
January 2006, it is unclear whether and when the program will proceed
to production. If the ERGM concept is chosen, the current manufacturing
plan states the contractor will identify key product characteristics
and then determine how to implement statistical process control.
Other Program Issues:
In May 2004, the Navy awarded a contract to ATK to demonstrate an
alternative precision-guided munition concept--the Ballistic Trajectory
Extended Range Munition (BTERM). BTERM will likely be one of the
concepts competing for the new development contract. In fiscal years
2004 and 2005, the Navy budgeted $35 million for the BTERM effort. The
BTERM technology demonstration includes six guided flight tests in
2005. At this point, none of the BTERM critical technologies have
reached maturity. However, according to the project office, the six
flight tests, if successful, will demonstrate most of BTERM's critical
technologies in a relevant or operational environment. Finally, the
latest ERGM program cost and schedule estimates do not reflect the
potential cost and time needed to complete the 5-inch guided projectile
development effort. The Navy is currently considering an acquisition
strategy that would start a new development program with a revised
program baseline, which could delay initial operational capability
until 2011 depending on the maturity of the concept selected. The
procurement cost of this new program will likely be much higher than is
currently reported for ERGM because the latest cost estimate for the
ERGM program is based on the procurement funding available in the
future year defense plan, not current inventory requirements.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that it
intends to issue a request for proposal in fiscal year 2005 and select
an Extended Range Munition (ERM) development contractor in fiscal year
2006. It will request that the program start the system development
phase due to the maturity of guided projectile concepts that could meet
ERM requirements. The Navy also stated that research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds in fiscal year 2006-2011 will be
used for the ERM development effort, resulting in an initial
operational capability of no later than fiscal year 2011. Depending
upon the maturity of the concept selected, development could end as
early as fiscal year 2008 with a fiscal year 2009 initial operational
capability. In this case, fiscal year 2006-2008 RDT&E funding (about
$58.4 million) would be used to complete the program and fiscal year
2009-2011 funding (about $87.3 million) would support spiral
development and/or product improvement initiatives.
[End of section]
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions. It is
intended to improve the accuracy and range of cannon artillery. Also,
the Excalibur's near vertical angle of fall is intended to reduce the
collateral damage area around the intended target, making it more
effective in urban environments than the current artillery projectiles.
The Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon requires the
Excalibur to meet its required range.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon;
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $484.5 million;
Procurement: $2,597.4 million;
Total funding: $3,081.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 61,483.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/1997: $60.3;
Latest 08/2004: $828.5;
Percent change: 1,273.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/1997: $676.7;
Latest 08/2004: $2,597.4;
Percent change: 283.8%.
Total program cost;
As of 05/1997: $737.0;
Latest 08/2004: $3,426.0;
Percent change: 364.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/1997: $0.004;
Latest 08/2004: $0.055;
Percent change: 1,405.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 05/1997: 200,000;
Latest 08/2004: 61,752;
Percent change: -69.1%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/1997: 160;
Latest 08/2004: 136;
Percent change: -15.0%.
[End of table]
The Excalibur program's critical technologies are not fully mature,
even though product development began over 7 years ago. Program
officials expect to have technology maturity by June 2005. The program
has achieved design stability. Currently, almost all of the Excalibur
drawings are completed and could be released to manufacturing. However,
the Excalibur is undergoing testing that may lead to design changes.
The program has encountered a number of challenges since development
began, including a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the
contractor's plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and
changes in program requirements. It merged with the Trajectory
Correctable Munition program in 2002.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Excalibur Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the Excalibur's three critical technologies--the guidance
control system, the airframe, or the warhead--are fully mature.
According to program officials, all three have been demonstrated in a
relevant environment, and they are expected to reach full maturity
before the design review in June 2005. The warhead was not considered a
critical technology in 1997 because the Excalibur design called for a
warhead that was under production for other munitions. At the Army's
direction, the program has undertaken development of a different
warhead that is currently undergoing testing.
Design Stability:
The most recent program restructure divided the design review into two
reviews. The first, scheduled for June 2005, freezes the first article
test design and the second, scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2006, freezes the production design. The program recently
completed an Early Fielding Technical Data Package review of the design
drawings. The review found that about 97 percent of the Excalibur
engineering drawings are complete and releasable to manufacturing. The
program office plans to have all of the drawings complete by the June
2005 design review. The Excalibur has to complete safety and other
testing before it is ready for production. This testing could lead to
design changes.
Other Program Issues:
The program has gone through many changes since the beginning of
product development in May 1997. It was almost immediately restructured
due to limited funding, and it was restructured again in 2001. The
program was again restructured and merged with a joint Swedish/U.S.
program known as the Trajectory Correctable Munition. This merger has
helped the Excalibur deal with design challenges, including issues
related to its original folding fin design. In May 2002, due to the
cancellation of the Crusader, the Army directed the restructure of the
program to include the Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon.
In December 2002, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) approved an early fielding plan for the
unitary version. The plan currently includes developing the unitary
version of the Excalibur in three spirals. In the first spiral, the
projectile would meet its requirements for accuracy in a nonjammed
environment and lethality and would be available for fielding to Joint
Lightweight 155mm cannon in September 2006. In the second spiral, the
projectile would be improved to meet its requirements for accuracy in a
jammed environment and reliability and would be available for fielding
to the Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon in September
2008. Finally, in the third spiral, the projectile would be improved to
meet its range requirement and would be available for fielding to all
systems in late fiscal year 2011.
The net effect of these changes has been to increase the program's
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities.
As a result, the program's overall costs and unit costs have
dramatically increased.
Agency Comments:
The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
F/A-22 Raptor:
The Air Force's F/A-22, originally planned to be an air superiority
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It is being
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for
long ranges. It also has integrated aviation electronics (avionics)
designed to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation
surrounding them. It is designed to replace the Air Force's F-15
aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,755.4 million;
Procurement: $25,242.2 million;
Total funding: $28,361.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 203.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/1992: $21,542.9;
Latest 12/2003: $31,726.2;
Percent change: 47.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/1992: $56,602.1;
Latest 12/2003: $40,812.9;
Percent change: -27.9%.
Total program cost;
As of 02/1992: $78,405.1;
Latest 12/2003: $73,098.5;
Percent change: -6.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/1992: $120.996;
Latest 12/2003: $262.002;
Percent change: 116.5%.
Total quantities;
As of 02/1992: 648;
Latest 12/2003: 279;
Percent change: -56.9%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/1992: 203;
Latest 12/2003: 230;
Percent change: 13.3%.
[End of table]
The F/A-22 entered production without ensuring that production
processes were in control. The Air Force expects to have about 27
percent of the aircraft on contract prior to the full-rate decision in
March 2005, yet quality issues remain. For example, the F/A-22 has not
achieved important reliability goals and some components, like the
canopies, are not lasting as long as expected. Technology and design
matured late in the program and have contributed to numerous problems.
Avionics problems were discovered late in development, which resulted
in large cost increases and caused testing delays. The potential for
further cost increases and schedule delays exists until initial
operational testing and follow-on testing are completed. Additionally,
$7 billion in cost reductions has to be achieved to keep cost growth
within the congressionally mandated production cost limitation.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
F/A-22 Raptor Program:
Technology Maturity:
The three critical F/A-22 technologies (supercruise, stealth, and
integrated avionics) appear to be mature. However, two of these
technologies, the integrated avionics and stealth, did not mature until
several years after the start of development. Integrated avionics have
been a source of major problems, delaying developmental testing and the
start of initial operational testing. Since 1997 the costs of avionics
have increased by over $801 million and problems discovered late in the
program were the major contributor. In April 2004, the Air Force began
initial operational test and evaluation after reporting that these
problems were corrected.
Design Stability:
The F/A-22 design is essentially complete, but it matured slowly,
taking over 3 years beyond the critical design review to meet best
practice standards. The late drawing release contributed to parts
shortages, work performed out of sequence, delayed flight testing and
increased costs. Design changes resulted from flight and structural
tests. For example, problems with excessive movement of the vertical
tails and overheating problems in the fuselage and engine bay required
design modifications. The Air Force completed development testing in
December 2004 and operational testing in November 2004. The Air Force
is in the process of evaluating the results of operational testing. The
results of this evaluation could result in additional design changes.
Production Maturity:
The program office stopped collecting process control information in
November 2000. The contractor estimated that nearly half of the key
processes had reached a marginal level of control, but not up to best
practice standards. The Air Force has 67 production aircraft on
contract. The Air Force relies on the contractor's quality system to
verify manufacturing and performance requirements are being met.
However, the Air Force has not demonstrated the F/A-22 can achieve its
reliability goal of 3 hours mean time between maintenance. It does not
expect to achieve this goal until 2008 when most of the aircraft will
have already been bought. Best practices call for meeting reliability
requirements before entering production. As of mid-October 2004, the
Air Force had only demonstrated about 22 percent of the reliability
required.
Other Program Issues:
The Air Force is counting on future cost reduction plans to offset
estimated cost growth and enable the program to meet the latest
production cost estimate. If these cost reduction initiatives are not
achieved as planned, production costs could increase.
The Integrated Maintenance Information System (IMIS), a paperless
computerized maintenance system, is used by the Air Force to maintain
the F/A-22. The system collects and analyzes problem data and develops
a maintenance solution. The system has not functioned properly causing
unnecessary maintenance actions. This has affected the Air Force's
ability to fly the test aircraft on schedule. The Air Force installed
new software in February 2004 to address many of the errors generated
by IMIS and uncovered additional errors. According to the Air Force,
these problems were resolved in July 2004. In November 2004, the Air
Force upgraded IMIS to a commercially supportable operating platform
and database that added new functionality such as wireless
connectivity.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. The Air
Force also stated that, in coordination with the DCMA and contractor
teammates, the program is aggressively pursuing cost reduction
initiatives to meet cost goals. It stated that these goals represent a
significant reduction in per aircraft cost and include substantial
improvements to production by the primes and subcontractors. The Air
Force disagreed, however, with the value we reported in our draft
assessment. It stated that the initiatives total $2.5 billion. The Air
Force also indicated that the reliability of the F/A-22, while
maturing, is already comparable to legacy Air Force fighter aircraft
while delivering a required combat capability that cannot be achieved
by legacy platforms.
GAO Comments:
We reviewed the Air Force's comments concerning projected production
cost reduction savings and determined that the Air Force will have to
reduce the current production estimate by approximately $7 billion to
execute the program within a congressional mandated cost cap.
[End of section]
Future Combat Systems (FCS):
The FCS, a program that will equip the Army's new transformational
modular combat brigades, consists of a family of systems composed of
advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems, unmanned ground and
air vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of-
systems architecture, the first increment of the FCS features 18 major
systems and other enabling systems along with an overarching network
for information superiority and survivability.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Hazelwood, Mo.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $16,639.9 million;
Procurement: $60,669.2 million;
Total funding: $77,924.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 15.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/2003: $18,573.6;
Latest 09/2004: $28,007.2;
Percent change: 50.8%.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/2003: $60,646.5;
Latest 09/2004: $79,960.0;
Percent change: 31.8%.
Total program cost;
As of 04/2003: $79,835.8;
Latest 09/2004: $107,967.2;
Percent change: 35.2%.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/2003: $5,322.388;
Latest 09/2004: $7,197.811;
Percent change: 35.2%.
Total quantities;
As of 04/2003: 15;
Latest 09/2004: 15;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/2003: 91;
Latest 09/2004: 139;
Percent change: 52.7%.
[End of table]
Quantities refer to complete brigade-sized Units of Action. Each
contains many FCS systems and platforms.
The FCS program began a major restructuring in July 2004, which delays
fielding 4 years, until 2014, and spirals various FCS technologies to
the current force. The restructuring increased the priority for
developing and demonstrating the FCS network. The program also
continues refining requirements. In some cases, the Army has decided to
use different technologies, which are less mature than the original
technologies. The program expects all of its 54 critical technologies
to be mature by the end of fiscal year 2008. Technology maturation will
continue throughout system development, with an associated increase in
the risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Since the FCS will
dominate Army investment accounts over the next decade, cost growth and
schedule delays could affect all Army acquisitions.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
FCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
One of the FCS program's 54 critical technologies is currently mature.
Overall, the program's current technology maturity is slightly less
than it was in May 2003 when the program began development.
The program is not appropriately applying best practices to maturing
its critical technologies. It considers technical risk acceptable as
long as it can estimate that the technologies will be demonstrated in a
relevant environment before design review. Also, it does not
consistently include form or fit in technology maturation because it
views sizing the technology as an integration risk, not a technology
risk. In addition, the program could assess a technology as mature
simply because it is part of another program. For example, it assesses
the maturity of the technologies enabling the Active Protection System
as mature, even though the Army is developing the system for a current
combat vehicle that is much larger than the FCS vehicles. The
technologies will need to be reduced in size before the system can be
incorporated into the FCS vehicles. Overall, the program must continue
to mature its technologies while developing the FCS.
In some cases, as the FCS requirements are refined, the Army has
decided to use different technologies that are less mature than the
original technologies. For example, in February 2004, the program
assessed the maturity of ground-to-air combat identification as fully
mature primarily because similar identification systems were readily
available in air defense systems. In September 2004, however, it
reduced the technology's maturity because it refined the FCS
requirements and determined that in order to provide required
interoperability with NATO systems, the program would have to use an
operating mode that required the development of a new interrogator. As
a result, it assessed the technology as very immature.
Design Stability:
The program estimates that 80 percent of its 42,750 drawings will be
released by the design review scheduled for September 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The FCS program began a major restructuring in July 2004, which delays
fielding an initial FCS capability until 2014, 48 months later than
planned. The revised strategy helps meet the needs of an Army at war by
making $9 billion available for investment in future capabilities for
the current force, which include FCS technologies that are expected to
be transitioned to the current force between 2008 and 2014. It also
increases the priority of development and demonstration of the FCS
network and system-of-systems architecture along with munitions,
sensors, and unmanned vehicles.
The concept of a modular FCS equipped brigade-sized combat unit, known
as a Unit of Action, represents a major departure in the way the Army
has conducted combat operations and is a major part of the Army's
transformation efforts. To successfully develop the FCS, the Army faces
a number of technological and programmatic challenges, including
equipping Units of Action with a common family of networked vehicles
and other systems. These vehicles and systems are expected to be a
fraction of the weight of existing heavy fighting vehicles in order to
improve transportability such as being airlifted by a C-130 transport.
Agency Comments:
The Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate. In addition, it considers technical risk acceptable as
long as it can estimate that the technologies would be demonstrated in
a relevant environment before design review. The restructured FCS
program also includes a process for periodically spiraling out
technologies to the current force as they reach acceptable levels of
maturity. Additional efforts to mature these technologies will continue
as needed under the main program. The Army believes this approach will
ensure that all technologies are proven before fielding of full FCS-
equipped Units of Action. Finally, the Army noted that, in addressing
transportability challenges, the FCS program will continue to develop
and analyze alternative technical approaches to find the design
solution that best meets the broad spectrum of user needs.
GAO Comments:
The Army is holding FCS technologies to a lower maturity standard than
best practices and DOD policy calls for. This increases the risk of
program cost growth and schedule delays.
[End of section]
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle:
The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long endurance
unmanned aerial vehicle with integrated sensors and ground stations
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
After a successful technology demonstration, the system entered
development and limited production in March 2001. Considered a
transformational system, the program was restructured twice in 2002 to
acquire 7 air vehicles similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-
4A) and 44 of a new, larger, and more capable model (the RQ-4B).
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,481.1 million;
Procurement: $2,744.5 million;
Total funding: $4,320.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 41.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 03/2001: $894.7;
Latest 09/2004: $2,528.9;
Percent change: 182.7%.
Procurement cost;
As of 03/2001: $3,709.6;
Latest 09/2004: $3,367.7;
Percent change: -9.2%.
Total program cost;
As of 03/2001: $4,631.4;
Latest 09/2004: $6,025.8;
Percent change: 30.1%.
Program unit cost;
As of 03/2001: $73.515;
Latest 09/2004: $118.152;
Percent change: 60.7%.
Total quantities;
As of 03/2001: 63;
Latest 09/2004: 51;
Percent change: -19.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 03/2001: 54;
Latest 09/2004: 57;
Percent change: 5.6%.
[End of table]
Key product knowledge on Global Hawk is now less than it was in March
2001 due to the 2002 program restructurings. Officials had planned to
first produce systems very similar to technology demonstrators and then
slowly develop and acquire more advanced systems. Technology maturity
and design stability approached best practice standards for this plan.
However, program restructurings accelerated deliveries, overlapped
development and production schedules, and added the new, larger air
vehicle with advanced sensors. These actions increased development and
program unit costs. While the platform design is fairly mature,
production of the new air vehicle began with advanced sensor
technologies still immature and operational tests not planned until
much later. Production maturity cannot be assessed using knowledge-
based criteria because statistical process control data are not used.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Global Hawk Program:
Technology Maturity:
Five of 14 critical technologies associated with the Global Hawk system
are mature, 3 technologies are approaching maturity, and 6 are less
mature. Three of the mature technologies are uniquely associated with
the RQ-4A. Two of the 11 RQ-4B's critical technologies are mature--one
more than last year. The less mature technologies include the airborne
signals intelligence payload and the multiplatform radar technology
insertion program. These desired capabilities largely drove the
decision to develop and acquire the new RQ-4B air vehicles, which can
carry 50 percent more payload than the original model, the RQ-4A.
Production of the first RQ-4B began in July 2004. Integrating and
testing these advanced sensors on the air vehicle will not be completed
until late in the program when most of the fleet will already have been
bought. There is risk that the sensor technologies and final designs
may not meet the space, weight, and power limitations of the RQ-4B,
resulting in extended development times, costly reworks, or diminished
capabilities. The airborne signals intelligence payload currently
exceeds its weight allocation, and the power requirements for the
multiplatform radar requirements near the RQ-4B's limit.
Design Stability:
The RQ-4A design is stable, and 75 percent of RQ-4B engineering
drawings were completed by the time of its design review in April 2004.
By late fiscal year 2004, over 90 percent of the engineering drawings
were completed. However, the Air Force has not built a prototype of the
RQ-4B to demonstrate a stable design and has not established a
reliability growth plan prior to initiating production--both
characteristics of best practices used to assure design maturity.
Additionally, the Air Force plans to buy almost half the fleet before
it completes initial operational test and evaluation to verify the air
vehicle design works as required. This increases the potential that
testing may identify a need to redesign and retrofit aircraft.
Production Maturity:
Although production experience and lessons learned on the RQ-4A will
benefit the RQ-4B program, the new model requires different and more
complex manufacturing processes and tooling than the original model.
Officials have not implemented, and do not plan to implement, a
comprehensive statistical process control program to demonstrate that
new manufacturing processes are in control and capable of meeting cost,
schedule, and quality targets. Officials have started to identify
critical manufacturing processes and will continue to collect
performance data such as defect and rework rates to measure product
quality. There are continuing concerns about the quality and timeliness
of several key subcontractors, which negatively affect cost and
schedule of both design and production work. We note that the
acceptance of the second production RQ-4A was delayed due to defects
and flight deficiencies.
Other Program Issues:
Restructuring the Global Hawk program has accelerated planned
deliveries of advanced capabilities and made development, test, and
production cycles highly concurrent. Cost increases, schedule slips,
and performance trade-offs have already occurred. We recently reported
that slowing down production to enable closing the gaps in product
knowledge and operationally testing the aircraft should be considered.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
our knowledge-based criteria do not effectively assess Global Hawk's
evolutionary acquisition strategy. It stated that Global Hawk's spiral
approach fosters efficiency, flexibility, and innovation and includes
the controls essential to manage program risk and achieve effective
program results. The Air Force further noted that the Global Hawk
program is managing development risks as it migrates from the RQ-4A to
the larger, multiple-intelligence RQ-4B configuration. It noted that
the RQ-4B is an evolutionary design change, built upon the successful
RQ-4A design, years of extensive testing, and over 5,000 RQ-4A flight
hours, and also stated that establishing accurate RQ-4B size, weight,
and power constraints provides accurate design requirements for
development of advanced sensors, further reducing future risk. The Air
Force further commented that by using concurrent development and
production processes, the Global Hawk program plans to achieve initial
operational capability approximately 5 years after program initiation,
fielding greater capability than initially planned.
[End of section]
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
MDA's GMD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to defend the United States against limited long-range ballistic
missile attacks. The first block consists of a collection of radars and
an interceptor--a three-stage booster and an exoatmospheric kill
vehicle (EKV)--integrated by a central control system that formulates
battle plans and directs the operation of GMD components. We assessed
all technologies critical to the Block 2004 GMD element, but only the
design and production maturity of the interceptor.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Company;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $9,687.3 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $9,687.3 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2003: $22,809.3;
Latest 08/2004: $25,719.9;
Percent change: 12.8%.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2003: $0.0;
Latest 08/2004: $0.0;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2003: $22,809.3;
Latest 08/2004: $25,719.9;
Percent change: 12.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2003: NA;
Latest 08/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2003: NA;
Latest 08/2004: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2003: NA;
Latest 08/2004: TBD.
Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be
determined.
[End of table]
Three of GMD's 10 critical technologies were fully mature, and its
design seemed stable in September 2004 when MDA placed five ground-
based interceptors in silos for the initial capability. The remaining
technologies were nearing full maturity. However, there is a risk that
design changes could occur during Block 2004 because a solution to a
technical problem in the kill vehicle has not been proved in flight
tests and additional problems could be identified during the flight
tests scheduled to occur before the end of the block. Although MDA has
not made a formal production decision, it is currently producing
hardware for operational use. We could not, however, assess the
stability of MDA's production processes as the program is not
collecting statistical data on its production processes.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials estimate that 3 of GMD's 10 critical technologies are
mature: fire control software, the EKV's infrared seeker, and the
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) booster. The remaining seven
technologies are nearing maturity. These technologies are the Lockheed
Martin BV+ booster; Sea-based X-Band radar; Cobra Dane radar; Beale
radar; EKV on-board discrimination; EKV guidance, navigation, and
control subsystem; and the in-flight interceptor communications system.
The program expected to demonstrate 3 of these technologies by the end
of fiscal year 2004, but flight test delays prevented the
demonstrations. However, program officials expect that the maturity of
all 7 technologies will be demonstrated before the end of Block 2004.
Design Stability:
The Block 2004 ground-based interceptor design is stable with 100
percent of its drawings released to manufacturing. The ongoing effort
to mature critical technologies and solve an ongoing engineering
problem, however, may lead to more design changes.
Production Maturity:
Officials have not made an official production decision, although they
are delivering interceptors for the Block 2004 emergency capability. We
could not assess the production maturity of these interceptors because
the program is not collecting statistical control data on the
production process. According to program officials, data are not
tracked because the current quantities of GMD component hardware are
small. Instead, the GMD element measures production capability and
maturity with a monthly evaluation process that assesses critical
manufacturing indicators for both readiness and execution.
To reduce program risk, MDA is following a dual booster strategy,
developing the BV+ and the OSC boosters, each of which has a different
design. Although this strategy offers two different capabilities and
has helped to mitigate production risks, MDA has experienced ongoing
problems with the BV+ booster. After an explosion at the facility that
mixes propellant for the BV+ booster motors, the facility's contractor
ceased operations. A new contract has been awarded for the production
of the BV+ 2nd and 3rd stage motors. MDA hopes to restart manufacturing
in fiscal year 2005. Therefore, all Block 2004 interceptors will use
the OSC booster.
EKV and booster delivery is on schedule for the December 2005 initial
capability. MDA delivered 5 interceptors for initial defensive
operations by September 2004, and it plans to have a total of 18 on
alert by December 2005. MDA originally planned to have 20 interceptors
by this time; however, two of these interceptors were later designated
as test assets.
Other Program Issues:
Increased cost of the EKV and the explosions at the BV+ propellant-
mixing facility were leading causes of $175 million in GMD cost growth
during fiscal year 2004. To avoid a delay in fielding the initial
defensive operation on September 30, 2004, MDA funded the cost overrun
by having other groups within MDA perform some tasks that GMD was
budgeted to complete.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA stated that a formal
production decision is not anticipated or planned in the GMD
acquisition approach. It emphasized that it is not feasible to collect
data on most GMD production processes due to the extremely low
quantities of system hardware being procured, but statistical data are
collected and available on those subsystems/parts produced in
sufficient volume. It also pointed out that ongoing efforts to mature
critical technologies and solve technical problems are an inherent part
of the capability-based acquisition/block development approach and that
design changes are to be expected as the system is evolved through
subsequent blocks. Technical comments were also provided and
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS:
GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department
of Transportation, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, United
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000,
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system
and receiver units. We focused our review on the Block IIF.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin and Boeing;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $526.5 million;
Procurement: $1,253.7 million;
Total funding: $1,780.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 10.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2002: $1,891.0;
Latest 12/2003: $2,112.0;
Percent change: 11.7%.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2002: $3,448.7;
Latest 12/2003: $3,875.5;
Percent change: 12.4%.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2002: $5,339.7;
Latest 12/2003: $5,987.5;
Percent change: 12.1%.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2002: $161.810;
Latest 12/2003: $161.826;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2002: 33;
Latest 12/2003: 37;
Percent change: 12.1%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2002: TBD;
Latest 12/2003: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
Costs and quantities include Block IIR, IIR-M, and IIF satellites, and
the Operational Control System (OCS). Lockheed Martin is the contractor
for IIR and IIR-M, Boeing is the contractor for IIF and OCS.
[End of table]
According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies are mature.
Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites have been
modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing additional
capabilities and benefits. The GPS II modernization effort required new
technology for the atomic clocks on the IIF satellites, and this
technology has been tested in space on IIR satellites. However, the
contractor was not required to provide data on design drawings and
statistical process control techniques are not being used to monitor
production. As a result, design stability and production maturity could
not be assessed.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GPS Block II Modernization Program:
Technology Maturity:
The only new critical technology on the Block IIF satellites, the space-
qualified atomic frequency standards, was tested in space on Block IIR
satellites, and it is considered mature.
Design Stability:
We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract
does not require that design drawings be delivered to DOD. However, the
program office assesses design maturity by reviewing contractor
development testing, participating in technical interchange meetings
and periodic program reviews, and conducting contractor development
process and configuration audits.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not
collect statistical process control data. However, the program office
reviews earned value management reports, integrated master schedules,
and test dates as a means of monitoring the contractors' production
efforts.
Other Program Issues:
The current Block IIF contract calls for the procurement of 12
satellites. The Air Force estimated that this number would be
sufficient for constellation sustainment until the launch of the first
GPS III satellite, scheduled for 2010. However, in fiscal year 2003,
the Air Force restructured the GPS III launch schedule and delayed the
first launch to 2012. Consequently, four additional satellites will
need to be acquired to sustain the GPS constellation due to this delay.
To build these additional satellites, several subsystems would require
parts that are no longer available and must be newly manufactured.
Additional funding has been requested for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 to
pay for the nonrecurring engineering required to manufacture these
parts for the additional Block IIF satellites.
The GPS Operational Control System consists of monitor stations that
passively track the navigation signals of all the satellites and a
master control station that updates the satellites' navigation
messages. Certain components of the control system have been delayed
because funds from this development were reallocated to complete the
Block IIF development in support of constellation sustainment.
Specifically, M-Code and Flex Power capabilities, part of the control
system, will be delayed 3 years, but according to the program office,
this will not result in underutilization of the satellites on orbit.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
the GPS constellation first achieved final operational capability of 24
healthy and operational satellites in July 1995 and since then has
consistently exceeded this requirement. It also stated that beginning
in 2000, the joint program office initiated a modernization and upgrade
program to more rapidly introduce new capabilities for the warfighter
and civil users. It further stated that, as of December 2004, the joint
program office's current estimate for launch availability of the first
modernized satellite (IIR-M) will be April 2005 and that the Block IIF
will continue the modernization program with its first satellite launch
availability in September 2006.
[End of section]
Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR):
The Marine Corps' HLR system will perform the marine expeditionary
heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and
personnel to support distributed operations deep inland from a sea-
based center of operations. The HLR program is expected to replace the
current CH-53 helicopter with a new design to improve range and
payload, survivability, reliability and maintainability, coordination
with other assets, and overall cost of ownership.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding, FY05-FY15:
R&D: $3,120.5 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,120.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 09/2004: $3,130.2.
Procurement cost;
Latest 09/2004: $0.0.
Total program cost;
Latest 09/2004: $3,130.2.
Program unit cost;
Latest 09/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
Latest 09/2004: 11.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 09/2004: 126.
Latest data include all development costs and quantities from the
program's inception through fiscal year 2015. Information on
procurement funding and quantities was not available.
[End of table]
The critical technologies for the HLR program are not expected to be
fully mature before the start of development in February 2005. An
initial readiness assessment for the program identified 10 critical
technologies. A subsequent assessment reduced that number to 3--the
main rotor blades, the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper, and the main
gearbox. Elements of the 7 eliminated technology areas, including the
engines, may still present challenges to the program. The gearbox and
the rotor blades are not expected to reach full maturity until 2011 and
2012, respectfully. Currently, an aggressive acquisition strategy is
being planned.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
HLR Program:
Technology Maturity:
The three critical technologies for the HLR program--the main rotor
blades, the main rotor viscoelastic lag damper, and the main gearbox--
are not expected to be fully mature before the start of development in
February 2005. A lag damper similar to that planned for use is
currently in operation on another program, but it must be resized for
use on the HLR and therefore will not reach full maturity until the
critical design review in 2008. The gearbox and the rotor blades
represent new technology areas that have only been demonstrated in a
low fidelity laboratory environment and are not expected to reach full
maturity until 2011 and 2012, respectively.
Other development items may present future challenges to the HLR
program. While 10 critical technologies were originally identified for
the program, an assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced those to
the 3 above. Of the 7 technologies eliminated, 2 are being developed by
the HLR program and 5 are being developed by or used on other programs
and will then have to be integrated onto the HLR platform. In either
case, this integration can represent potential risks to cost and
schedule. For example, the program is still considering five different
engine design options. While the Navy has determined that none of the
engine designs are expected to use new or novel technology or represent
a new relevant environment for use, each requires different levels of
design change, developmental risk, and qualification. For two other
technologies, less desirable backup systems will have to be used if the
technologies are not developed as planned.
Other Program Issues:
In September 2003, the Navy evaluated seven existing aircraft platforms
and determined that only the CH-53E (with substantial enhancements) was
capable of meeting requirements for performance, inventory, operational
capability dates, operating and support costs, and survivability.
Previous assessments concluded that the CH-53 airframe was experiencing
substantial fatigue due to age and lack of regular upgrades and
modifications. Program officials told us that this situation is even
worse now due to increased operational use in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
2003 analysis evaluated four alternative CH-53E designs and recommended
one of these to meet range and payload requirements and minimize
effects to service capability dates, inventory, support costs, and
risk. However, after refining operational requirements for the HLR, the
Navy selected a different alternative that offered additional
performance and reliability improvements but added additional schedule
and technical risk. To address these challenges, the Navy expects to
implement an aggressive acquisition strategy for the HLR program,
including sole-source contracting to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and
a single-step acquisition approach. The program also intends to
manufacture 50 of the 154 total helicopters (32 percent) during low-
rate initial production and concurrent with initial operational
testing. This concurrent production may help to field the systems
sooner, but it could also result in greater retrofit costs if
unexpected design changes are required.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
HLR program was developed to replace the aged CH-53E and support Marine
Corps Sea Basing and other 21st Century joint operations. It added that
the program balances operational and programmatic risks and that delays
to the current HLR planned schedule will result in significant
additional procurement and operation and support costs to support the
CH-53E legacy aircraft and Marine Corps Heavy Lift shortfalls. The Navy
noted that the Office of Naval Research endorsed the HLR program
initiation at Milestone B and that the approved HLR Technology
Readiness Assessment and maturation plan include the application of
engineering trade and risk reduction prior to program initiation at
Milestone B. It also noted critical technology item maturation events
coincide with key system development events such as critical design
review and prototype production. As the HLR program matures, risk
reduction will continue to be abetted through sustained selection of
nondevelopmental technologies, with an emphasis on employment of mature
technologies common to Marine, Navy, and DOD weapon systems.
[End of section]
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
The JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy missile system designed to
provide a new capability to attack surface targets outside of the range
of area defenses. The JASSM will be delivered by a variety of aircraft
including the F-16 C/D, the B-52H, the F/A-18E/F, the B-2, and the B-
1B. The system includes the missile, software, and software interfaces
with the host aircraft and mission planning system. We assessed all
components.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Fort Walton Beach, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $206.8 million;
Procurement: $2,355.2 million;
Total funding: $2,562.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 3,853.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 11/1998: $877.3;
Latest 12/2003: $1221.0;
Percent change: 39.2%.
Procurement cost;
As of 11/1998: $1,092.3;
Latest 12/2003: $2,547.8;
Percent change: 133.3%.
Total program cost;
As of 11/1998: $1,990.6;
Latest 12/2003: $3,768.8;
Percent change: 89.3%.
Program unit cost;
As of 11/1998: $0.806;
Latest 12/2003: $0.863;
Percent change: 7.1%.
Total quantities;
As of 11/1998: 2,469;
Latest 12/2003: 4,366;
Percent change: 76.8%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 11/1998: 75;
Latest 12/2003: 87;
Percent change: 16.0%.
[End of table]
The JASSM program entered production in December 2001 without ensuring
that production processes were in control. However, program officials
indicated that they have demonstrated the production processes by
sampling statistical data at the subsystem level and that four missiles
are selected from each production lot and tested for quality. The JASSM
program used mature technology, and the missile design was stable at
the design review. Although there were some test failures in the
developmental and operational tests run from April 2002 to September
2003, program officials incorporated fixes that subsequent tests
demonstrated to be successful. However, in recent follow-on tests, the
program continued to have test failures, and the Air Force suspended
testing until the causes of these failures can be determined.
Nevertheless, the JASSM was approved for full-rate production in July
2004.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JASSM Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JASSM program identified three critical technologies--global
positioning system antispoofing receiver module, low observable
technology, and composite materials--and stated that all three are
mature. They are new applications of existing technologies.
Design Stability:
The contractor has released 100 percent of the drawings to
manufacturing. The program office completed developmental and
operational tests and entered follow-on test and evaluation. Fourteen
developmental flight tests were performed, with three tests failing to
meet the test objectives. Program officials identified the issues
involved and incorporated fixes, which were successfully tested in
later developmental tests. Fifteen operational tests were conducted
from June 2002 to September 2003. According to the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Command, 7 of these were successful, 5
were failures, and 3 were "no test." Based on the developmental and
operational tests, the Command considered the JASSM to be capable
against the required targets but not reliable. Therefore, it rated the
missile as effective and potentially suitable and recommended approval
of full-rate production. Since that time, in follow-on test and
evaluation, the missile had three successful tests and three failures.
The Air Force halted further testing and convened a failure review
board to determine the causes for the test problems. This board was to
report its findings in October 2004.
Production Maturity:
Program officials do not collect production process control data at the
system level. However, they stated that all production processes had
been demonstrated and that statistical data are collected at the
subsystem level and are sampled as required. Program officials
indicated that the contractor has produced at the rates required for
the low-rate initial production buy of 176 missiles and that it will be
able to produce at the full-rate production level of 250 missiles per
year. Three production lots are on contract and deliveries are on
schedule. Program officials believe that none of the manufacturing
processes that affect critical system characteristics are a problem,
although there are key production processes that have cost
implications, such as bonding for the low observable materials and the
painting/coating application. The missile was approved for full-rate
production in July 2004.
Other Program Issues:
A contract for development of an extended range version of the missile
was awarded in February 2004.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that
as a result of two test failures this summer, the Air Force Program
Executive Office for Weapons convened a Reliability Enhancement Team on
August 16, 2004, to investigate ways to improve reliability of the
JASSM. It further stated that the team completed its work in October
and concluded the JASSM design was sound, concurred with the joint
program office return to test plan, and recommended award of the next
lot's production contract--awarded November 2004. Also, the team
recommended the Joint Program Office/Lockheed Martin pursue a more
focused effort on subtier supplier manufacturing process quality
controls and implement a robust test program to improve missile
reliability. The Air Force stated that the key stakeholders (Air Force,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress) concurred with the
team's recommendations and the joint program office's way ahead plan
and noted that the JASSM team continues to address near-term
reliability issues identified by the Reliability Enhancement Team.
[End of section]
Joint Common Missile (JCM):
The Joint Common Missile is a joint Army/Navy program with Marine Corps
participation and United Kingdom involvement. It is an air-launched and
potentially ground-launched missile designed to target tanks; light
armored vehicles; missile launchers; command, control, and
communications vehicles; bunkers; and buildings. It is to provide line-
of-sight and beyond line-of-sight capabilities and can be employed in a
fire-and-forget mode or a precision attack mode. The missile will
replace systems such as Hellfire and Maverick.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $875.0 million;
Procurement: $5,876.6 million;
Total funding: $6,751.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 48,613.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 06/2004: $982.2.
Procurement cost;
Latest 06/2004: $5,876.6.
Total program cost;
Latest 06/2004: $6,858.8%.
Program unit cost;
Latest 06/2004: $0.141.
Total quantities;
Latest 06/2004: 48,815.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 06/2004: 65.
[End of table]
The Joint Common Missile entered system development of the air-launched
version in April 2004, before any of its critical technologies were
fully mature. At this time, program officials do not know the number of
drawings that will be released by design review in March 2006. Program
officials currently project that the critical technologies will reach
maturity 3 months prior to design review, about half way through
product development. Until all technologies are demonstrated, the
potential for design change remains. Mature backup technologies are
available should the new technologies fail to mature; however, use of
backup technologies could degrade system performance or increase costs.
By beginning integration before these technologies have been
demonstrated, the potential for cost growth, schedule delay, or
decreased performance exists.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Joint Common Missile Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the Joint Common Missile's three critical technologies have
demonstrated full maturity according to best practices. These
technologies include a multimode seeker for increased countermeasure
resistance, boost-sustain propulsion for increased standoff range, and
a multipurpose warhead for increased lethality. Program officials noted
that many of the components of these technologies are currently in
production on other missile systems, but they have not been fully
integrated into a single missile. Maturing technologies concurrently
with product development increases the potential for cost growth and
schedule delays. According to program officials, while backup
technologies exist for each of the critical technologies, substituting
any of them would result in degraded performance or increased costs.
Design Stability:
Currently, about 16 percent of the drawings for the Joint Common
Missile have been released to manufacturing. Program officials project
that approximately 41 percent of the drawings will be released by May
2005, the end of what they term a risk mitigation phase. However,
program officials have not projected the number of drawings that will
be released by design review in March 2006. Officials project full
integration of the subsystems into the Joint Common Missile will occur
by April 2005, although the system will reach technology maturity by
December 2005, over a year and a half after the start of system
development.
Program officials stated that the program's modular design will reduce
life-cycle costs, including demilitarization, and will enable
continuous technology insertion to provide improved capability against
advancing threats.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that during the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2004, a
comprehensive Technology Maturity and Readiness Assessment, along with
a risk assessment, was performed by subject matter experts from the
Aviation and Missile Research and Engineering Center and the Army Test
and Evaluation Command and coordinated with respective offices within
the Army and the Navy. This assessment was reviewed by the Department
of the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering and concluded that the Joint Common
Missile technology was at an appropriate maturity level to support
entry into System Design and Development. Further, it is anticipated
that progress will continue. The system technologies combined with
control test vehicle firing(s) will substantiate maturity according to
best practices by April 2005.
[End of section]
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF):
The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy,
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S.
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier
suitable version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The
conventional take-off and landing version will primarily be an air-to-
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and A-10 aircraft, and will
complement the F/A-22. The short take-off and vertical landing version
will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $28,664.3 million;
Procurement: $154,854.5 million;
Total funding: $183,678.6 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,443.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2001: $33,478.4;
Latest 12/2003: $43,566.3;
Percent change: 30.1%.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2001: $148,528.2;
Latest 12/2003: $154,854.5;
Percent change: 4.3%.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2001: $183,561.2;
Latest 12/2003: $198,624.5;
Percent change: 8.2%.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2001: $64.048;
Latest 12/2003: $80.840;
Percent change: 26.2%.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2001: 2,866;
Latest 12/2003: 2,457;
Percent change: -14.3%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2001: 185;
Latest 12/2003: 196;
Percent change: 5.9.
[End of table]
The JSF entered system development in 2001 with its critical
technologies immature, and recent assessments indicate that this is
still the case. Other risks exist as well. For example, the preliminary
design review revealed a significant weight problem that led to
numerous design and requirement changes. This resulted in delays of 16-
22 months for the design reviews and increased costs. The program
expects 35 percent of its drawing packages to be completed by the
design reviews. Also, the program expects to produce a significant
number of production aircraft with little demonstrated knowledge about
performance, reliability, software maturity, and producibility. In
2004, the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost
breach largely due to design maturation efforts, schedule extensions,
and revised labor and overhead rates.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JSF Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JSF entered system development without demonstrating the maturity
of its 8 critical technologies. Data provided by the program office
indicate that the technology maturity has not significantly changed. In
2004, an independent review team examined the program and identified
several technical challenges related to the critical technologies. For
example, it found that the highly integrated subsystems still have risk
and that major challenges remain with the mission systems and software
integration. The team reported that prognostics and health management
technologies needed a focused initiative to mature them.
Design Stability:
When development began, the design was not well defined, leading to
changes in requirements and design. The preliminary design review held
in March 2003 revealed significant airframe weight problems--eventually
exceeding targets by as much as 25 percent--that affected the
aircraft's ability to meet key performance requirements. Actions to
resolve the problem have added 18 months and $4.9 billion to the
development program.
Program officials indicated that no drawings have been completed for
any production representative variant. Critical design reviews are
scheduled for the 2006 time frame, a 16-to 22-month delay. At the time
of the design reviews, the program expects to have released about 85
percent of the critical structural drawings but only 35 percent of the
total engineering drawing packages needed to build the aircraft. This
relatively low level of design knowledge will continue beyond the
production decision in 2007. At the time of that commitment, the JSF
will (1) have done limited flight testing on only one nonproduction
representative aircraft; (2) not have flight-tested an integrated
aircraft (with critical mission systems and prognostics technologies);
(3) have less than 40 percent of the software lines of code needed for
expected system functionality released. By 2013, when development is
scheduled to be complete, DOD plans to have bought around 500 low-rate
production aircraft at an estimated cost over $50 billion. This highly
concurrent strategy of producing and developing aircraft increases the
risks of cost growth and delays in delivering capability to the
warfighter.
Production Maturity:
The program office is collecting information on the JSF production
processes. The contractor is currently in the process of identifying
the key characteristics, critical manufacturing processes and capturing
some early data. At the time of the production decision, the program
will not have demonstrated that the aircraft can be produced
efficiently or with expected reliability. These uncertainties are major
contributors for DOD plans to rely on cost reimbursable type contracts
for the early production buys. Fixed price contracts, the norm for
production, are not expected until the air vehicle has a mature design,
has been demonstrated in flight tests, and is producible at established
cost targets.
Other Program Issues:
In 2004, the program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) program
unit cost breach. According to the program office, total program unit
costs have increased by 19.4 percent largely due to aircraft design
maturation efforts, schedule extensions, and revised labor and overhead
rates.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided the
following information. A 2001 DOD review concluded the JSF had
demonstrated sufficient technical maturity for entry into development.
Design reviews were completed March 2004 on all areas except the
airframe. By the airframe design review, 85 percent of the critical
structural drawings will be complete. Subsystem hardware/software
integration in the lab is ahead of schedule, occurring sooner than
legacy fighter programs. Significant progress has been made in weight
and performance issues. The short take-off and vertical landing variant
includes over 2,700 pounds of weight reductions achieved through design
optimization. More weight improvements were achieved by modest
requirement changes endorsed by the warfighters. Requirements for other
variants were not changed. Manufacture of the first test aircraft is
underway, with assembly times less than planned. Over 1,500 test hours
have been achieved on seven engines. Some replan refinements are in
work. Program concurrency reflects spiral development strategy.
[End of section]
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW):
The JSOW is a joint Air Force and Navy guided bomb to attack targets
from outside the range of most enemy air defenses. A dispenser variant
(JSOW A) carries submunitions to attack soft targets. In 2002, the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council deferred production of an
antiarmor JSOW variant (JSOW B). The unitary variant (JSOW C) uses a
seeker, autonomous targeting acquisition software, and a single warhead
to attack targets. All the variants use a common air vehicle. We
assessed the unitary variant and the common air vehicle.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million;
Procurement: $761.2 million;
Total funding: $761.2 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,861.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/1995: $334.6;
Latest 08/2004: $326.1;
Percent change: -2.5%.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/1995: $4,037.6;
Latest 08/2004: $848.1;
Percent change: -79.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 04/1995: $4,372.2;
Latest 08/2004: $1,174.2;
Percent change: -73.1%.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/1995: $0.561;
Latest 08/2004: $0.391;
Percent change: -30.2.
Total quantities;
As of 04/1995: 7,800;
Latest 08/2004: 3,000;
Percent change: -61.5%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/1995: 89;
Latest 08/2004: 117;
Percent change: 31.5%.
[End of table]
The JSOW program began low-rate production in June 2003 without knowing
whether production processes were in control. However, the contractor
has since identified seven critical production processes and has five
of the seven under statistical process control and performing at an
acceptable quality level. The contractor is working with the remaining
two processes to collect enough data to verify that the processes are
under control. Operational evaluation was completed in September 2004,
and the beyond low-rate production and live fire test reports required
to support the full-rate production decision were received in December
2004.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JSOW Unitary Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JSOW Unitary variant's technology is mature. The program office
identified the imaging infrared seeker with the autonomous acquisition
software as the only critical technology for the system. The seeker was
not mature at the start of development, but it did demonstrate maturity
in October 2001--about three-fourths through development--when it was
flown aboard an aircraft in a captive flight test. Program officials
stated that in seven developmental tests, three free-flight tests with
the seeker only and four combined seeker/warhead tests, the seeker's
performance substantially exceeded requirements. The seeker has
demonstrated greater accuracy than required during operational testing.
Design Stability:
The JSOW unitary variant's basic design is complete. At the system
design review in May 2002, the program office had completed 99 percent
of the drawings. The Navy has completed 10 developmental tests (adding
one combined seeker/warhead test in 2003) in its development program--3
sled tests with the warhead, 3 free-flights with the seeker, and 4
combined warhead/seeker tests. After some delay in beginning
operational tests due to problems with the fuze, the Navy completed
operational testing in September 2004 and reported that the fuze
reliability met requirements.
Production Maturity:
Raytheon and the Navy identified seven critical processes unique to
seeker development and collected data during low-rate production to
determine that five of the seven were in control. Raytheon is working
to collect data sufficient to characterize the remaining two processes.
The Navy reports that delivery of the seekers is ahead of schedule and
that there is low risk to meeting the quantity requirements of 17 per
month. Raytheon has maintained its on-time deliveries for the common
air vehicle for more than 33 months.
Other Program Issues:
The JSOW completed operational testing in September 2004. Preliminary
analysis of the data indicated that the missile, its seeker, and
warhead met performance requirements. The final report rated the weapon
as operationally effective but noted some deficiencies in training
affecting the rating for suitability. According to a program office
official, the issues have been resolved and the revised assessment
rates the weapon as operationally effective and suitable. Reports
detailing the analysis of the testing and the weapon's operational
suitability and effectiveness and its live fire test results were
received in December 2004.
Agency Comments:
The Navy provided technical comments to a draft of this assessment,
which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1:
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and significantly increase
communications capabilities. A joint service program office is
responsible for developing the JTRS architecture and waveforms, while
service-led program offices will develop and procure radio hardware for
platforms with similar requirements. This is an assessment of Cluster
1, led by the Army, which is developing radios for ground vehicles and
helicopters.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $475.1 million;
Procurement: $14,673.0 million;
Total funding: $15,148.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 108,685.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 06/2002: $875.9;
Latest 08/2004: $895.1;
Percent change: 2.2%.
Procurement cost;
As of 06/2002: $14,088.0;
Latest 08/2004: $14,674.9;
Percent change: 4.2%.
Total program cost;
As of 06/2002: $14,963.9;
Latest 08/2004: $15,570.0;
Percent change: 4.0%.
Program unit cost;
As of 06/2002: $0.138;
Latest 08/2004: $0.143;
Percent change: 3.5%.
Total quantities;
As of 06/2002: 108,388;
Latest 08/2004: 109,002;
Percent change: 0.6%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 06/2002: 55;
Latest 08/2004: 60;
Percent change: 9.1%.
[End of table]
The JTRS program's demonstrated knowledge continues to be difficult to
characterize. Program officials believe that the design is stable and
production processes are in control. However, design and production
knowledge are dependent on technology maturity. None of the program's
20 critical technologies are mature, and the number of drawings has
nearly tripled since last year. The program is proceeding under an
accelerated strategy that does not allow for testing the radio's full
functionality before initial low-rate production begins. Requirements
changes are being considered that could result in design changes. The
Army is proposing to restructure the program, which may add time to the
development schedule.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS Cluster 1 Program:
Technology Maturity:
While the program office has made some progress in maturing critical
technologies, none of the JTRS Cluster 1 program's 20 critical
technologies are mature. Many of these critical technologies have been
used in other radio applications but cannot be assessed as mature
because they have not been integrated into a complex radio like Cluster
1. Mature backup technologies exist for some critical technologies, but
program officials have cautioned that substituting them would
complicate integration or result in degraded performance. Program
officials pointed out several challenges in achieving technological
maturity. In particular, the program continues to reconcile size,
weight, and power requirements. Meeting the performance objectives of
the Wideband Networking Waveform is also a challenge. Program officials
expect to demonstrate maturity of all 20 critical technologies during
an early operational assessment scheduled to end in April 2005.
Design Stability:
The program reports achieving design stability for the basic Cluster 1
radio design. However, while all drawings have been released to
manufacturing, the total number of drawings has nearly tripled from
last year's assessment. Program officials primarily attribute the large
increase to additional drawings required for certain components as the
design matured and more specificity of the initial component drawings.
Furthermore, program officials report that the number of drawings is
likely to change again as a result of the upcoming operational
assessment and as they move toward production. Given that the critical
technologies have yet to mature, the significant changes to the number
of drawings raise concerns about the program's design stability.
Production Maturity:
The program reports that all production processes to be utilized in
manufacturing the JTRS radios are mature and in control. However, as
the program office expected, the number of processes has decreased from
last year's assessment. According to the program office, the number has
decreased because of design enhancements. The program office expects
the number of processes to change again as further design requirements
take place.
Other Program Issues:
The program has a software development plan with insufficient schedule
reserve to incorporate knowledge gained from initial development
increments. It also has a compressed test and evaluation phase that
leaves little room for rework. For example, the production decision is
scheduled to occur immediately upon completion of an early operational
assessment limited to pre-engineering development models that are not
fully functional. The program office also reported an increase in
procurement costs of over $600 million primarily due to an error in
estimating manufacturing costs. The JTRS Cluster 1 information security
certification approach is also unprecedented, and the radios must go
though a certification process that is outside the program office's
control. In addition, the joint program office is exploring additional
requirements including the development of additional waveforms that
operate at above 2GHz--that may be tasked to the JTRS Cluster 1 program
and may also necessitate hardware modifications. Because of emerging
requirements and other technical challenges, the Army is considering
restructuring the program, which may add more time to the development
schedule.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
generally agreed with the information provided in this report. Program
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5:
The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and
networking capabilities. A joint service program office is developing
the architecture and waveforms, while service-led program offices are
developing radio hardware. The Army-led JTRS Cluster 5 is developing
handheld, manpack, and small embedded radios for applications such as
ground sensors. Spiral 1 will field a two-channel manpack. Spiral 2
will develop and field all versions. We assessed Spiral 2.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics Design Systems, Inc.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $426.1 million;
Procurement: $8,209.1 million;
Total funding: $8,635.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 328,514%.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 04/2004: $471.0.
Procurement cost;
Latest 04/2004: $8,209.1.
Total program cost;
Latest 04/2004: $8,680.1.
Program unit cost;
Latest 04/2004: $0.026.
Total quantities;
Latest 04/2004: 329,574.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 04/2004: 34.
[End of table]
JTRS Cluster 5 began system development with one of its six critical
technologies mature for Spiral 2. The program considers the five other
technologies low risk and anticipates increased levels of maturity,
though not full maturity, by the production decision in March 2008. We
did not assess design stability because no production representative
drawings had been released at the time of our assessment for either
Spiral 1 or Spiral 2. The total number of drawings has also not been
identified.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS Cluster 5 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies--
identical for both of the Cluster 5 spirals. Spiral 1 is based on
technologies that are either commercial-off-the-shelf or
nondevelopmental items, and is focused on a two-channel manpack with
narrowband capability operating seven of the designated JTRS waveforms.
Spiral 2 is to evolve and expand Spiral 1 two-channel manpack
capabilities as well as fully developing the one-and two-channel
handheld and small form fit variants meeting the wideband and
networking requirements.
The program office has assessed one of Cluster 5 critical technologies,
termed environmental protection, as mature for use in Spiral 2. It has
also assessed two other critical technologies, antenna and power
management, at a high level of readiness, although not fully mature.
However, the power management technology may not be as mature as
assessed given the Cluster 5 requirement to support a JTRS Wideband
Networking Waveform. This waveform is essential to providing JTRS
networking services to ensure interoperability over a wide range of
frequencies. While it is not designated a Cluster 5 critical
technology, the JTRS Operational Requirements Document designates it as
a key performance parameter. Operation of this waveform carries with it
a large power requirement. Because of that power requirement and the
technical challenges of meeting that requirement in an acceptable size
and weight, the Cluster 5 program is seeking some relief from the
waveform's requirements, and attempting to optimize the software code
to increase its power efficiency. It is also evaluating alternative
waveforms such as the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide in a power
efficient way the needed networked services for radios with limited
power and antenna size.
The remaining Cluster 5 critical technologies--antennas,
microelectronics, multichannel architecture, and security--require
additional development. According to the program office, however, all
four represent a low level of risk and are anticipated to reach
increased levels of maturity by the production decision.
Additionally, the program continues to address size, weight, and power
requirements. The Cluster 5 manpack radios to be fielded in Spiral 2
are to have a maximum weight of 9 pounds. In comparison, Spiral 1 units
weigh up to 13 pounds. With the help of the Army's Communications-
Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, the program
is pursuing power trade-offs and technical solutions to achieve the
Spiral 2 requirement.
Design Stability:
We did not assess the design stability of JTRS Cluster 5 because the
total number of drawings is not known and there are currently no
releasable drawings complete for either spiral.
Other Program Issues:
An Acquisition Decision Memorandum in May 2004 authorized the movement
of the single channel handheld radios requirement from Spiral 1 to
Spiral 2. The memorandum also expressed concern about the immaturity of
the Spiral 2 definition and required the program to update the cost and
affordability assessment during the second quarter of fiscal year 2006.
Furthermore, in recognition of the criticality of JTRS, it directed the
Cluster 5 program to conduct a review in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2005 to assess the maturity of the plans for Spiral 2. The JTRS
Cluster 5 development contract was awarded in July 2004. However,
immediately thereafter, the contractor was issued a stop-work order
because of a bid protest. Work was stopped until late October 2004,
when we denied the protest and work resumed. Impact of the stop-work
order is still being assessed by the Cluster 5 product manager.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided some technical comments and suggested a number of editorial
changes including additional clarifying information, which we
incorporated as appropriate. The program office indicated the critical
technologies will reach an acceptable level of maturity by the
production decision in 2008.
GAO Comments:
While the program office commented that the critical technologies will
reach an acceptable level of maturity by the time of the production
decision, best practices call for attaining a higher level of maturity
by the start of development.
[End of section]
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS):
The J-UCAS program is a combined effort of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force, and the Navy to
demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value of a
networked system of high performance and weaponized unmanned air
vehicles. Expected missions include the suppression of enemy air
defenses, electronic attack, precision strike, and surveillance. The
program consolidates two formerly separate service projects and is to
develop larger, more capable, and interoperable aircraft.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing/Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $3,694.1 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,694.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 09/2004: $4,042.0.
Procurement cost;
Latest 09/2004: $0.0.
Total program cost;
Latest 09/2004: $4,042.0.
Program unit cost;
Latest 09/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
Latest 09/2004: 6.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 09/2004: TBD.
Latest cost is funding through fiscal year 2009 for technology
development and prototypes. Procurement funding and quantities for
future acquisitions are not yet identified.
[End of table]
The J-UCAS program began in October 2003 with technologies that
officials project will sufficiently mature to support a possible 2010
start of operational system development. The program plans to develop
and demonstrate the next generations of the original Air Force and Navy
demonstrators that will have common performance objectives and utilize
common subsystems and technologies. The program expects to conduct an
early operational assessment starting in fiscal year 2007 and then
provide the Air Force and the Navy with several program options for
follow-on efforts. A December 2004 program budget decision would
restructure the program and reduce funding. At the time of our review,
it was not clear how these changes will impact the schedule for
achieving key product knowledge.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
J-UCAS Program:
Technology Maturity:
While none of the J-UCAS' six critical technologies are currently
mature, program officials project that they will be sufficiently ready
to support the early operational assessment scheduled to begin in
fiscal year 2007 and to provide options to the Air Force and the Navy
for follow-on efforts starting in fiscal year 2010. Program officials
identified the following critical technologies needed to produce a high
performance and networked system of low observable air vehicles capable
of operating in high-threat environments for extended periods of time:
(1) signature reduction; (2) advanced tactical targeting; (3) secure
robust communications; (4) force integration, interoperability, and
global information grid compatibility; (5) adaptive autonomous
operations; and (6) operations in aircraft carrier-controlled airspace.
These technologies are still maturing as would be expected at this
early presystem development stage. The targeting and autonomous
operations technologies are considered the most mature and carrier
operations technology the least mature.
Other Program Issues:
The previous service-specific efforts combined in the joint program had
different primary missions and operating environments. The Air Force
began developing its system to suppress and attack enemy air defenses,
while the Navy's primary interest was for a carrier-based unmanned
aerial vehicle to provide persistent armed surveillance for the battle
group. The joint program is expected to maintain a competitive
environment and continue to develop next-generation versions of both
Air Force and Navy demonstrators. Both versions will be expected to be
capable of performing all required missions of the two services. By
merging the Air Force and Navy efforts, DOD hopes for synergy and cost
savings by developing interoperable and networked systems utilizing
common operating systems, sensors, and weapons.
The program cost of over $4 billion from startup in fiscal year 2004
through fiscal year 2009 does not include the approximately $500
million spent on the two service-specific projects prior to
consolidation. The program will compete for funding with current
operational systems such as the Predator and the Global Hawk and other
unmanned and manned systems in varying stages of development, some with
similar missions. Congress reduced J-UCAS funding in fiscal year 2005
because the program had not properly coordinated with the two services
and directed that the technology demonstrators be completed in support
of Air Force and Navy requirements.
A December 2004 program budget decision by DOD restructured J-UCAS by
realigning adjusted resources to the Air Force to establish a joint
program with Navy representation. It reduced total funding by about
$1.1 billion from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011.
Emerging challenges include adaptation for carrier operations and
development of the common operating system. The projected weight for
the new models increased from earlier estimates in order to meet range,
payload, and persistence requirements. The common operating system is
expected to integrate and provide for interoperability of J-UCAS air
vehicles and is required to control groups of vehicles flying in a
coordinated manner and functioning in the absence of human inputs. The
program director said the common operating system is the most
technically challenging aspect of the entire J-UCAS program.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, DARPA stated that the J-
UCAS program, newly established when Congress considered fiscal year
2005 funding, is run under the guidance of a high-level executive
committee and jointly manned with DARPA, Air Force, and Navy personnel.
The Air Force and the Navy have fully coordinated on the demonstration
approach using the X-45C and X-47B in support of service priorities.
According to officials, the J-UCAS concept does not compete directly to
replace any specific manned or unmanned system but will augment a
transformed force structure and provide options to better address
military needs in deep, denied adversary environments. DARPA also
stated that in addition to the capabilities identified by the services
today, J-UCAS will offer insights into new warfighting concepts. It
will also preserve opportunities for competition in follow-on and
derivative programs. Finally, DARPA noted that the common operating
system, while technically challenging, encompasses essential mission
functionality and offers the greatest potential return in flexibility
and affordability.
[End of section]
Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI):
MDA's KEI element is a new missile defense system designed to destroy
long-range ballistic missiles during the boost phase of flight, the
period after launch during which the missile's rocket motors are
thrusting. KEI would also engage missiles in the early ascent-phase,
the period immediately after booster burnout. Key components include
hit-to-kill interceptors, launchers, and battle management units. We
assessed the proposed land-based KEI capability, which is planned to
become available during 2012-2013 (Block 2012).
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman;
Program office: Fair Lakes, Va.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $7,485.1 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $7,485.1 million;
Procurement quantity: NA.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/2003: $8,619.2;
Latest 07/2004: $7,771.2;
Percent change: -9.8%.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/2003: $0.0;
Latest 07/2004: $0.0;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 09/2003: $8,619.2;
Latest 07/2004: $7,771.2;
Percent change: -9.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/2003: TBD;
Latest 07/2004: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
Total quantities;
As of 09/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: 8.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/2003: NA;
Latest 07/2004: TBD.
Table reflects cost of program from inception through fiscal year 2009.
As of November 2004, planned program funding was reduced further, from
$7.8 billion to $3.6 billion.
[End of table]
All 7 KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of
maturity, ranging from proofs of concept established through analytical
or laboratory studies to new applications of existing technologies. For
example, the program is leveraging existing interceptor technologies--
infrared seeker, third stage rocket motor, and divert system--that are
currently used in other MDA programs. The program office rates the
development of 2 critical technologies as high risk. The first involves
one of the interceptor's booster motors, which demands high performance
for KEI engagements. In addition, the program office judges the
algorithm enabling the kill vehicle to identify the missile's body from
the luminous exhaust plume as a high-risk technology. MDA expects to
mature these technologies and integrate them into a land-and sea-based
capability under the prime contract awarded in December 2003.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
KEI Program:
Technology Maturity:
All 7 KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of
maturity. These technologies are part of the element's interceptor, the
weapon component of the element consisting of a kill vehicle mounted
atop a boost vehicle. Of the 7 technologies, 4 pertain to the boost
vehicle that propels the kill vehicle into space. They are its 2 types
of booster motors, attitude control system, and thrust vector control
system. The remaining 3 technologies pertain to the kill vehicle--its
infrared seeker, divert system, and plume-to-hardbody algorithms.
Although all technologies are immature, 3 of the 7 are derived from
existing components in other missile defense programs. The infrared
seeker and the third stage rocket motor come from the Aegis BMD
program, and the divert system comes from the GMD program. Backup
technologies exist for all but the infrared seeker, however, they are
at the same low level of maturity as the critical technologies.
The program office noted that KEI critical technologies are not at a
low level of maturity in and of themselves. The program's assessment--
which rated each technology as relatively immature--was made from a
systems perspective (i.e., it characterized the risk associated with
integrating and demonstrating these technologies in the KEI
environment). The 7 critical interceptor technologies will be assessed
as mature if the program successfully completes its first intercept
attempt of a boosting missile. This flight test is expected to be
conducted sometime after 2010.
Design Stability:
At this time, the KEI program office does not have an estimate for the
total number of drawings for any of its Block 2012 components
(interceptor, launcher, and battle management unit). In addition to the
number of drawings, the program plans to use other metrics to assess
design maturity. Those metrics will include design, manufacturing,
producibility, and quality measures for hardware and measures of
maturity of the system's software.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal year 2004, the KEI program underwent a program replan to
compensate for anticipated fiscal year 2005 funding cuts and the
addition of new requirements (e.g., nuclear hardening) imposed by MDA.
The original program called for a Block 2010 land-based capability to
be available by the end of 2011. In the replan, the land-based
capability was combined with the sea-based capability of Block 2012,
both of which utilize the same interceptor. The KEI program is
undergoing further restructuring. Based on comments received from the
program office (see below), anticipated funding cuts beyond fiscal year
2005 are delaying the sea-based capability into Block 2014 (2014-2015
time frame) and deferring other activities indefinitely.
Because completion of the land-based capability continues to be pushed
further in the future, the program's funding profile has changed. Under
the plan to demonstrate an initial capability in the Block 2012 time
frame, near-term funding through fiscal year 2009 was reduced by about
10 percent, with the balance shifted into later years. The latest
restructuring noted by the program office further reduced funding by
over 50 percent.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided information on the latest restructure of the KEI program. In
short, program funding through fiscal year 2009 was reduced from $7.8
billion (as listed) to $3.6 billion and, accordingly, program
activities such as development of the sea-based capability were delayed
into future blocks.
In addition, the program office indicated that "mission assurance" is
the program's number one priority. In other words, the program's
approach to element development is knowledge-driven, which places an
emphasis on upfront systems engineering and analysis and other risk
reduction activities.
[End of section]
Land Warrior:
The Army's Land Warrior system is a modular, integrated, soldier-worn
system of systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational
awareness, and survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers.
Land Warrior comprises a computer-radio, integrated helmet assembly,
weapon, software subsystem, and protective clothing. The Army
terminated Block I (Land Warrior-Initial Capability) in 2003 due to low
reliability in developmental testing and proceeded to Block II (Land
Warrior-Stryker Interoperable). We assessed Block II.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics;
Program office: Fort Belvoir, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $497.0 million;
Procurement: $8,220.1 million;
Total funding: $8,717.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 58,900.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 02/2003: $753.6;
Latest 12/2003: $977.0;
Percent change: 29.6%.
Procurement cost;
As of 02/2003: $1,762.0;
Latest 12/2003: $8,220.1;
Percent change: 366.5%.
Total program cost;
As of 02/2003: $2,515.6;
Latest 12/2003: $9,197.1;
Percent change: 265.6%.
Program unit cost;
As of 02/2003: $0.157;
Latest 12/2003: $0.156;
Percent change: -1.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 02/2003: 15,985;
Latest 12/2003: 59,038;
Percent change: 269.3%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 02/2003: 145;
Latest 12/2003: 166;
Percent change: 14.5%.
Due to a recent program restructuring, the November 2004 design review
did not occur. Future events noted above were for Block II and are no
longer valid.
[End of table]
Land Warrior entered system development in 1994 and today, two of the
system's four critical technologies are mature. The program expects one
of the remaining two--the personal area network--to be mature before
the June 2006 low-rate production decision. The other technology--radio
communications--is a risk area for the program because JTRS Cluster 5
embedded radios will not be available when needed. We could not assess
the design stability of Land Warrior because the program was unable to
supply complete design data. The program reported significant cost
growth in 2003, due to an increase in the Army's planned procurement of
Land Warrior systems and to increased Block II software and integration
costs. The Army recently restructured the program, putting Block II on
indefinite hold as the program focuses on fielding elements of the Land
Warrior system to the current force.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Land Warrior Program:
Technology Maturity:
Two of the Land Warrior system's four critical technologies (the helmet-
mounted display and power) are mature. Officials told us that despite
concerns about the ability of industry to produce the helmet-mounted
display in the quantities needed, the technology involved in the unit
(which provides data and video) has been demonstrated and is mature.
The commercial battery technology that will power Land Warrior is also
mature, though overall power management remains a challenge due to
irregularities in components' power consumption.
The other two critical technologies, the personal area network and
radio communications, are not mature. The personal area network
includes the connectors, cables, and interfaces that will link
components of the soldier-worn ensemble to one another. Although such
connections have in the past proven difficult, officials expect this
technology to reach maturity before the June 2006 low-rate production
decision. Land Warrior will eventually utilize the JTRS Cluster 5
embedded radio (assessed elsewhere in this report) when it becomes
available in fiscal year 2011. Technology for this radio is not mature.
In the interim, the Land Warrior program intends to use the Raytheon
MicroLight Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), a
single-channel, commercial-off-the-shelf radio. Program officials
characterize the MicroLight as a cost-effective, short-term solution.
Technology for the MicroLight could not be assessed as fully mature
because it has not yet been integrated into the Land Warrior ensemble.
Program officials said the MicroLight is smaller than other EPLRS
radios in use today.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of the Land Warrior system
because the program was unable to supply complete data on design
drawings. The program cited changes resulting from an impending merger
with the Army's Future Force Warrior technology integration effort as
the complicating factor.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the maturity of production processes for Land
Warrior because the program is not collecting statistical process
control data at this time. Officials told us General Dynamics has not
fully identified the key manufacturing processes, but that the company
will measure production maturity in the future.
Other Program Issues:
The Land Warrior program has experienced significant challenges and
delays in its 10-year history. The program restructured after
contractor prototypes failed basic certification tests in 1998.
Government testing in 2002 and 2003 revealed technical and reliability
problems with Block I. The program manager terminated Block I shortly
thereafter, and focused on developing Block II.
The Army recently restructured the program again, in response to
congressional direction to immediately field some Land Warrior
capabilities to the current force. The restructured program will
produce capabilities in five spirals and has placed Block II on
indefinite hold as it moves to field the Commander's Digital Assistant
and the MicroLight EPLRS radio in "Spiral 0." The Army received a
partial waiver in December 2004 to purchase a limited number of
MicroLight radios, but radio communications will remain a risk area for
the program until this issue is fully resolved. Officials said Spiral 0
is now the program's most pressing concern, and that the schedule for
future spirals is being determined at this time. In addition, the
program is planning to merge its efforts with the Army's Future Force
Warrior technology integration effort, as directed in the Conference
Report accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2005. Congress also reduced the program's fiscal year 2005
budget by $15 million due to anticipated efficiencies resulting from
this merger.
The program reported significant cost growth in 2003, due mainly to an
increase of more than 40,000 units in the Army's planned procurement of
Block II Land Warrior systems to equip a broader range of soldiers than
previously envisaged. Development costs also increased nearly 30
percent due to software development and vehicle integration
requirements for Block II.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army generally
concurred with our assessment and provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship is to be a fast, maneuverable, shallow
draft, surface combatant optimized for littoral warfare. LCS will
employ innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission packages to
counter antiaccess threats in three mission areas: mine, antisubmarine,
and surface warfare. This review focuses on the technology maturity of
the mission packages associated with the acquisition of the first group
of ships. Since competition for the remainder of the ships continues,
we assessed only the mission modules.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,092.0 million;
Procurement: $810.1 million;
Total funding: $1,902.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 05/2004: $1,187.9;
Latest 08/2004: $1,227.4;
Percent change: 3.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 05/2004: $752.6;
Latest 08/2004: $810.4;
Percent change: 7.7%.
Total program cost;
As of 05/2004: $1,940.5;
Latest 08/2004: $2,037.8;
Percent change: 5.0%.
Program unit cost;
As of 05/2004: $485.135;
Latest 08/2004: $509.446;
Percent change: 5.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 05/2004: 4;
Latest 08/2004: 4;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 05/2004: 41;
Latest 08/2004: 41;
Percent change: 0.0%.
The first and third ships will be procured using research and
development funds. Quantity shown is the number of ships procured,
seven mission packages will also be procured with funds shown.
[End of table]
The program office identified 42 critical technologies. In June 2004,
the LCS program entered system development with 14 of these 42
technologies mature. Five of the remaining 28 technologies are close to
being mature. However, none of the 28 technologies were projected to
demonstrate full maturity until after design review in November 2004.
The acquisition schedule for LCS calls for deploying several critical
technologies as prototypes or engineering development models for the
first group of ships. The technologies that have not reached maturity
affect all three of the littoral warfare missions: mine warfare,
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare. The program office
designated certain information competition sensitive. As a result, we
have depicted only the level of knowledge for the LCS mission packages.
The Navy has stated that the total program level of knowledge is
higher.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
LCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Nine of the technologies under development for LCS are used in multiple
applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are used on
different platforms or in different environments, the program office
chose to assess each use as a separate technology. This resulted in a
total of 42 critical technologies, 14 of which are currently mature.
The first set of the mine warfare mission package will align with the
delivery of the first ship in January 2007. As part of this mission,
the MH-60S helicopter is to carry subsystems for either the detection
or neutralization of mines. MH-60S and its technologies for mine
detection are currently expected to complete testing in fiscal year
2005, after first ship design review for LCS. Its mine neutralization
technologies will complete testing in fiscal year 2007, after delivery
of the first ship.
The Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is an unmanned
helicopter, and will employ the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and
Analysis System for detection of mines on the beach. By delivery to LCS
in 2006, the platform will be an engineering development model and its
payload will still be in testing. The Unmanned Surface Vehicle will be
used for all three littoral warfare missions. For mine warfare, it is
expected to deploy a mine neutralization system, but neither the
vehicle nor its payload will be fully mature by the design review.
The first spirals for antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will
align with delivery of the second ship in fiscal year 2008. MH-60R will
be used for both these missions. The helicopter and its subsystems are
fully mature in the antisubmarine warfare configuration and mostly
immature in the surface warfare configuration. It will complete testing
for both missions in September 2005.
The Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is a communications relay
station for other platforms performing antisubmarine warfare. For
surface warfare, it may use the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System
and an Electro-Optical Infrared system. Currently, none of the
technologies are fully mature and most will remain in testing by the
second ship's design review in August 2005. In its antisubmarine
warfare configuration, the Remote Minehunting Vehicle will use
subsystems that are currently immature and will be delivered to LCS as
engineering development models. As an antisubmarine warfare platform,
the Unmanned Surface Vehicle will carry detection systems that are not
yet mature. For surface warfare operations, the program will use a gun
system and a missile system. A nonlethal weapon system is also being
considered. This vehicle and its technologies are currently immature in
all of its mission configurations.
A missile and a gun system for surface warfare will also be on the ship
itself, but currently neither of these technologies is fully mature.
Design Stability:
We did not assess design stability due to the competition sensitive
nature of the ship's designs.
Other Program Issues:
While the MH-60R and MH-60S complete testing in fiscal years 2005 and
2007, respectively, they will be unavailable for deployment with LCS
until fiscal year 2009.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
primary objectives of LCS Flight 0 (the first group of LCS ships) are
the harvesting of mission systems to deliver immediate warfighting
capability in critical gaps and the design and validation of the
modular open system architecture. It also stated that the key to
attaining these objectives is the creation of a common interface that
enables the independent development of sea frames and mission packages
and that the use of this interface is critical for the development and
evaluation of sea frames and mission packages to ensure effective
interoperability. The result is a total system design that is highly
adaptable to changes over the life of the program, but isolates impact
to production schedules. The mission package technology risks described
in this report are well understood, subject to rigorous risk management
including appropriate backup technologies, and generally independent
from the successful achievement of LCS Flight 0 key performance
parameters.
[End of section]
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS):
The Army's MEADS is developing a mobile air defense system to protect
deployed maneuver forces and critical assets against short-and medium-
range theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-breathing
threats. In 2004, the Army combined management, development, and
fielding of the Patriot air defense missile system and MEADS. Although
the Army combined the programs, MEADS remains an international
development effort among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We
assessed the MEADS fire unit portion of the combined program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding, FY05-FY11:
R&D: $2,839.3 million;
Procurement: $1,216.8 million;
Total funding: $4,056.1 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 07/2004: $4,590.2.
Procurement cost;
Latest 07/2004: $12,154.7.
Total program cost;
Latest 07/2004: $16,744.8.
Program unit cost;
Latest 07/2004: $348.851.
Total quantities;
Latest 07/2004: 48.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 07/2004: 158.
The program office expects the first complete MEADS fire unit to be
available in fiscal year 2015.
[End of table]
MEADS began development start in July 2004 with two mature critical
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one
immature critical technology. Program plans call for a system design
review in 2009, but program estimates currently project that only one
of the six technologies will be more mature at that time than at
development start. The program office anticipates that all critical
technologies will be fully mature by the start of production in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2013.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
MEADS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only two of the six critical technologies--launcher electronics and PAC-
3 missile integration--were mature at development start in July 2004.
Three other critical technologies--low noise exciter that manages the
radars' frequencies, cooling system for the radars, and slip ring that
carries power and coolants to the radars--were nearing maturity. The
remaining critical technology--the transmit/receive module that
transmits/receives signals for the fire control radar--was immature.
The program office noted that four of the six critical technologies
have been demonstrated or employed. According to the office, the MEADS
launcher will employ electronics already being developed for the
Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot launcher, and
these "common launch electronics" completed design review in May 2003.
Likewise, the integration of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile
into MEADS will be similar to integrating the missile into the existing
Patriot system. Furthermore, the office indicated that a prototype of
the low noise exciter met some 90 percent of its performance
specifications during the MEADS risk reduction phase that ended in
2004. The office stated that this prototype provided the information on
exciter design necessary to take corrective actions in the MEADS
development phase. In addition, the office stated that the technology
used in the transmit/receive module has been employed in THAAD and
demonstrated that MEADS performance requirements could be met. However,
the U.S.-developed technology as demonstrated on THAAD is not
releasable to the MEADS European partners. The partners are developing
their own transmit/receive module for MEADS, but the design has
achieved only about 75-80 percent of the performance needed.
The program office projects that the transmit/receive module will
increase in maturity by the time of the system design review planned
for 2009. The program office expects that the five other critical
technologies will be at the same maturity levels as they were at
development start. The office expects all critical technologies to be
fully mature by the start of production in late 2012. There are no
backup technologies for any of the MEADS critical technologies, with
the exception of the transmit/receive module.
Design Stability:
We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of
releasable drawings and total drawings expected was not available. The
program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings
at the design review in 2009.
Other Program Issues:
The program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach. There are
three increments, with the first beginning in 2008, another in 2010,
and the final in 2013. The program office plans for each increment to
introduce new or upgraded capability into the program. The Army expects
MEADS to achieve initial operational capability in 2017 with four
units.
The contract award for the United States, Italy, and Germany to proceed
into design and development together has been delayed by about 9
months. The Army originally expected the contract award to occur in
June/July 2004, but the award did not occur. In September 2004, the
United States and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding to proceed
to design and development, and a letter contract was awarded to
initiate that phase. The contract has a 6-month period of performance,
which coincides with the March 2005 date when the Army expects Germany
to sign the memorandum.
Agency Comments:
The Army generally concurred with this assessment. It indicated that we
addressed critical technologies that were already areas of intense
management focus. Additionally, it stated that the transmit/receive
module's maturity assessment changed due to international memorandum of
understanding negotiations and U.S. National Disclosure Policy that
changed the source of the modules. The Army also noted that it still
expects all technologies to be fully mature by production and further
stated that there are risk mitigation plans for the maturing
technologies as well as alternate backup technologies now identified
for the transmit/receive module. Additionally, the Army stated that, at
the design review in 2009, the design work in the critical technologies
will be at the maturity level required to fabricate system prototypes
and thus demonstrate system capabilities.
GAO Comments:
The MEADS Program Office clarified that the transmit/receive module's
maturity had decreased and we revised our assessment accordingly.
[End of section]
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA):
The Navy's MMA is one element of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
(BAMS) family of systems, along with the BAMS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) and Aerial Common Sensor programs. The MMA is manned, and it will
sustain and improve armed maritime and littoral intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of the U.S. Navy. The
primary roles of the MMA are persistent antisubmarine and antisurface
warfare. It is the replacement for the P-3C Orion. DOD is discussing
international partner participation in the program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $6,337.9 million;
Procurement: $20,205.5 million;
Total funding: $26,662.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 108.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 06/2004: $6,513.0.
Procurement cost;
Latest 06/2004: $20,205.5.
Total program cost;
Latest 06/2004: $26,837.5.
Program unit cost;
Latest 06/2004: $233.370.
Total quantities;
Latest 06/2004: 115.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 06/2004: 160.
[End of table]
The MMA program entered development with none of its four critical
technologies mature. According to the program office, these
technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design
review and tested in an operational environment by the production
decision. The system's technology maturity will be demonstrated at
least 3 years later than recommended by best practice standards.
However, the program has identified mature backup technologies.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
MMA Program:
Technology Maturity:
None of the 4 critical technologies--integrated rotary sonobuoy
launcher, electronic support measures digital receiver, data fusion,
and acoustic algorithms--are mature. These technologies have not moved
beyond the laboratory environment. For three of the technologies, the
components have not been integrated into a prototype system. The
program expects the four technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant
environment by design review in July 2007 and tested in an operational
environment by the production decision in May 2010. The system's
technology maturity will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than
recommended by best practice standards.
The program office and the contractor developed maturation plans and
identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical
technologies. According to program officials, the MMA would lose some
capabilities but still meet its minimum system requirements if it used
these backups. For example, one of the biggest technology challenges
for the MMA identified by program officials is the electronic support
measures digital receiver. This technology exists as a prototype and
has been demonstrated in a high fidelity laboratory environment. The
program is leveraging the digital receivers currently in development on
the EA-18G program. If the EA-18G digital receiver program is
unsuccessful, the program will have to use legacy analog off-the-shelf
receivers, which would prevent them from gaining an increased
sensitivity for certain signals.
The four technologies we assessed were identified in the MMA's
technology readiness assessment. The program evaluated six other
technologies but decided they were not critical because they had
already been demonstrated in a relevant or operational environment.
Design Stability:
We did not assess design stability as the number of releasable drawings
is not yet available.
Other Program Issues:
In addition to its primary roles of antisubmarine warfare and
antisurface warfare, the MMA shares the persistent intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) role with the BAMS UAV. The BAMS
UAV program will not start development until fiscal year 2005, and if
it does not develop as expected, the MMA program is the fall back to
perform its mission. According to program officials, in order to
fulfill this mission, the Navy would have to procure 14 additional
aircraft by 2018, increasing the overall cost of the program. If the
MMA fails to develop as expected or experiences schedule slippage, the
Navy will have to rely on its aging P-3C Orion fleet, which, according
to DOD, is plagued by serious airframe life issues, poor mission
availability rates, high ownership costs, and limited system growth
capacity.
The MMA program is discussing international participation with
Australia, Canada, and Italy for the development phase of the program.
This participation could include both the MMA and BAMS UAV programs.
DOD expects to benefit from improved interoperability, strengthened
allies, and lower production costs due to increased sales. Program
officials stated that they are incorporating lessons learned from the
Joint Strike Fighter international program, particularly in managing
partner expectations regarding technology transfer.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally
concurred with our characterization of the MMA program. It stated that
the four critical technologies are tracking along their current
maturation plans and that it is confident that by design readiness
review, these technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant
environment. It noted that these four technologies are being matured
through the MMA risk management process.
With regard to the BAMS mission, the Navy stated that an analysis of
alternatives conducted in May 2002 concluded that 14 additional
aircraft would have to be in place by 2018 to replace the Legacy P-3
ISR requirements that were allocated to the BAMS UAV. It further stated
that since that time, a BAMS UAV Operational Requirements Document has
been approved that identified additional UAV specific missions and
requirements that were not considered in the May 2002 analysis of
alternatives. It noted that there is no current completed analysis that
encompasses how many aircraft, based on new approved BAMS UAV
operational requirements document, would be required if the BAMS UAV
does not develop as expected.
[End of section]
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is
designed to replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite
system currently in operation and provide support to worldwide,
multiservice, mobile, and fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a
network of advanced UHF satellites and multiple ground segments. We
assessed both the space and ground segments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems;
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,219.0 million;
Procurement: $2,894.0 million;
Total funding: $6,308.0 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 09/2004: $3,474.0.
Procurement cost;
Latest 09/2004: $2,894.0.
Total program cost;
Latest 09/2004: $6,579.0.
Program unit cost;
Latest 09/2004: $1,096.500.
Total quantities;
Latest 09/2004: 6.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 09/2004: 91.
[End of table]
In September 2004 the MUOS program was authorized to begin development.
The program currently has eight of nine critical technologies mature.
The remaining technology is projected to be mature by April 2007 in
time for the critical design review. The program intends to order long
lead items for the first two satellites before achieving a stable
design. This early procurement could lead to rework causing cost
increases and schedule delays if relevant designs change prior to
critical design review. In addition, the MUOS development schedule
remains compressed, posing several risks to the program.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
MUOS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development
start decision in September 2004. The remaining technology, a new
cryptographic chip, is expected to be mature by the time the program
reaches its critical design review in April 2007. A mature backup
technology exists for this chip in the event that it fails to mature in
time. However, the use of the backup technology would increase the
vulnerability to attacks on the transmissions of signals that are used
to ensure the satellites remain properly placed in their orbits around
the earth.
Design Stability and Production Maturity:
The MUOS program intends to procure long lead items for the first two
satellites before achieving a stable design. The September 2004
development start decision authorized the program to procure long lead
items for these satellites. According to the program office, ordering
of long lead items is to begin in 2005 after segment-level preliminary
design reviews, but well before critical design review in April 2007.
This early procurement could lead to rework if relevant designs change
prior to critical design review, causing program cost increases and
schedule delays. According to the program office, long lead procurement
is necessary to preserve the program schedule and delaying such
procurement until after critical design review would cause the program
schedule to slip. It also noted that the dollar amount of long lead
procurement prior to critical design review is not large, at $65.9
million.
In addition, the program office has yet to determine the total number
of design drawings needed to build the satellites. According to the
program office, the development contract requires completion of 90
percent of design drawings as a condition of conducting critical design
review.
Other Program Issues:
DOD delayed the first MUOS satellite launch as well as its initial
operational capability by 1 year to fiscal year 2010. Despite the
delays, the MUOS schedule remains compressed and poses several risks to
the program. For example, initial operational capability is to be
declared before on-orbit operational testing is to occur. Usually, the
results of such testing are used to support decisions for declaring
operational capability and identifying problems that may necessitate
design changes. Furthermore, the time period between the critical
design review and the first satellite launch is shorter for the MUOS
program, at about 2.7 years, than that of the previous UHF Follow-On
program, at about 3 years. This schedule comparison is important given
the significant leap in increased capability that MUOS is expected to
provide. While the UHF Follow-On program increased communications
capability by up to a factor of 3, the MUOS program is expected to
increase communications capability by a factor of 20. The program
office, however, considers the development of the satellite to be low
risk. In addition, program officials stated that the initial
operational capability was changed to mean initial MUOS on-orbit
capability, and initial operational capability would be declared after
on-orbit operational testing takes place.
In addition, an independent program assessment states that the program
is schedule-driven primarily because of the software development
effort. According to the program office, software development for the
MUOS ground segment represents one of the highest risks to the program
due to the size and complexity of the contractor's design. The program
office stated that the ground software segment is to be developed
incrementally to mitigate schedule risk.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
MQ-9 Predator B:
The Air Force's MQ-9 Predator B is a multirole, medium-to-high altitude
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor the MQ-1 Predator A.
The Predator B is designed to provide a ground attack capability and
will employ fused multispectral sensors to find and track small ground
mobile or fixed targets. As envisioned, each Predator B system will
consist of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite
communication suite. We assessed only the air vehicle.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated;
Program office: Dayton, Ohio:
Funding, FY05-FY09:
R&D: $136.1 million;
Procurement: $279.6 million;
Total funding: $415.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 18.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 08/2004: $173.7.
Procurement cost
Latest 08/2004: $452.3.
Total program cost
Latest 08/2004: $626.1.
Program unit cost
Latest 08/2004: $9.938.
Total quantities
Latest 08/2004: 63.
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Latest 08/2004: 70.
[End of table]
Total program cost is not available. The latest baseline cost
information is through fiscal year 2009.
The Predator B entered system development in February 2004 with three
of its four critical technologies mature. The fourth, needed for
weapons launch, has not matured as expected. The Air Force expects this
technology to be ready in August 2005--a slip of 13 months. No backup
technology is available. If this technology fails to mature, it will
prevent the Predator B from performing its primary mission to destroy
enemy targets. The program recently changed to incrementally develop
versions of the Predator B. The Air Force believes most drawings for
increment one will be complete by the 2006 critical design review. The
program has also concurrently started to produce Predator B aircraft,
and operational testing is not scheduled to be complete until 2007 when
one-third of them will be on contract. Concurrency increases the risk
of redesign and need to retrofit already acquired system.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Predator B Program:
Technology Maturity:
Three of the Predator B's four critical technologies, the synthetic
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air
vehicle, are fully mature. The avionics subsystem technology designed
to integrate and store data necessary to launch munitions is still
being evaluated in a laboratory environment. It is expected to be ready
by August 2005, a 13-month schedule slip. No backup technology is
available. If this critical technology fails to mature, it will prevent
the Predator B from performing its primary mission to destroy enemy
targets. The Air Force plans to retrofit these and other air vehicles
that are under production once this capability has been fully
demonstrated.
Design Stability:
Subsequent to Milestone B approval in February 2004, the program office
was directed by Headquarters Air Force to develop Predator B in three
increments. DOD is in the process of defining the increments. The
program office expects 94 percent of the expected increment one
drawings to be completed by the April 2006 critical design review,
which has been delayed about 7 months since our last report. Program
officials acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for
subsequent increments. Design changes and modification of drawings are
likely to occur late in development, increasing the need to retrofit
already acquired systems.
Production Maturity:
Program officials said the contractor does not plan to use statistical
process controls to ensure product quality. Instead, they plan to use
other quality control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to
track product quality. Also, initial operational testing of increment
one, which is to demonstrate a product is ready for production, is not
scheduled to be complete until September 2007. Testing for remaining
increments has not been determined.
Other Program Issues:
In February 2004, Headquarters Air Force directed the program office to
quickly field an interim combat capability to the warfighter by fiscal
year 2006. This delayed the start of the system development and
demonstration phase by 9 months to November 2004. However, the Air
Force is already concurrently on contract to produce 15 Predator Bs.
The decision to make Predator B an incremental development program has
also extended the completion of development by nearly 4 years. An
incremental approach is the preferred approach to weapon acquisitions.
However, the Air Force does not plan to have formal decisions approving
entry into development for subsequent increments as required by DOD
acquisition policy. To reduce the risks of concurrently developing and
producing Predator Bs, the program office lowered annual buy quantities
and extended production 5 years. The estimated program completion date
is now 2014.
The Air Force is still evaluating a variety of lightweight munitions
for use on the Predator B. The Air Force is also weighing the
possibility of adding new system capabilities such as launching very
small or micro unmanned aerial vehicles from the Predator B and
equipping it with air-to-air missiles.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force disagreed
with our evaluation of the Predator B development risks. It stated that
the stores management system technology is mature and that the system
is being tested. It also noted that the existing weapons release system
provides a backup capability. It also disagreed with our assessment
that the Predator B development had been extended by 4 years. It stated
that, as planned, the initial operational capability will follow the
completion of the first increment in December 2009. Future increments
are to be determined. Before starting future increments, the Air Force
stated that proper approval will be obtained from the milestone
decision authority. Also, its acquisition plan has phased production
rates to the development effort, and the increased concurrent
production before operational testing has been driven by congressional
actions.
GAO Comments:
The program planned to deliver the full capability Predator B in 2006,
but due to acquisition approach changes the full capability Predator B
is now scheduled for delivery in 2010--a 4 year extension.
[End of section]
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
NPOESS is a triagency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the
year 2020. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single
national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command,
control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and
field terminal software. We assessed all segments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology;
Program office: Silver Spring, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,027.5 million;
Procurement: $1,182.3 million;
Total funding: $4,209.8 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 08/2002: $4,562.3;
Latest 12/2003: $4,933.6;
Percent change: 8.1%.
Procurement cost;
As of 08/2002: $1,177.8;
Latest 12/2003: $1,182.3;
Percent change: 0.4%.
Total program cost;
As of 08/2002: $5,740.0;
Latest 12/2003: $6,115.9;
Percent change: 6.5%.
Program unit cost;
As of 08/2002: $956.675;
Latest 12/2003: $1,019.313;
Percent change: 6.5%.
Total quantities;
As of 08/2002: 6;
Latest 12/2003: 6;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 08/2002: 172;
Latest 12/2003: 175;
Percent change: 1.7%.
[End of table]
In August 2002, the NPOESS program committed to the development of
satellites with operational capability without having demonstrated
technology maturity or design stability. Only 1 of its 14 critical
technologies is mature. The program expects that all but 4 of these
will be mature by the design review in April 2006. The program has
released about half of its design drawings and expects to complete
about 94 percent by design review. It is not collecting statistical
process control data to assess production maturity because of the small
number of units being produced. At present, the program office
considers the three critical sensors to be key program risks because of
technical challenges. Due to a recent program restructuring, the
program office estimates that the cost of the program will increase to
$8.1 billion.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
NPOESS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Only 1 of the program's 14 critical technologies were (and currently
are) mature at the production decision in August 2002. This is less
than reported last year due to the program office's more accurate
application of the technology standards. The program projects that all
but 4 of the technologies will be mature by the design review in 2006.
The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration
satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's
Earth Observing System. This satellite, scheduled for launch in 2006,
is planned to demonstrate three critical sensors in an operational
environment. This will provide data processing centers with an early
opportunity to work with sensors, ground controls, and data processing
systems and allow for incorporating lessons learned into the
satellites. The three critical sensors are experiencing continued
technical problems and schedule delays. The program office considers
these sensors as top program risks.
Design Stability:
In August 2002, the program committed to the development of two
satellites with operational capability before achieving design
stability or production maturity. Program officials indicated that
about 50 percent of the design drawings were released to manufacturing
and expects to release about 94 percent by the design review in 2006.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because, according to the
program office, it does not collect statistical process control data
due to the small number of units to be built. However, the ground
segment contractor uses various metrics such as schedule and cost
performance indices, rework percentages, and defect containment to
ensure production is proceeding as planned. According to the program
office, monthly reviews of these metrics reveal acceptable results.
Other Program Issues:
In 2002, DOD extended the launch date of one of its legacy
meteorological satellites to 2010, delaying the need for NPOESS. DOD
and NOAA thus reduced their NPOESS funding by about $144 million
through fiscal year 2007 and the program delayed the launch of the
first satellite 7 months, to November 2009.
The recent funding reductions prompted a restructuring of the NPOESS
program. The program office estimates that the cost will increase to
$8.1 billion. This increase reflects changes to the contract and
increased program management costs. The program office reports that the
increases include costs associated with extending the development
schedule, increased sensor costs, and additional funds needed for
mitigating risks.
The program office is planning to present a new cost estimate to its
executive oversight committee in January 2005 to ensure the program is
adequately funded. Other factors could further affect the revised cost
and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor is not meeting
expected cost and schedule targets of the new baseline because of
technical issues in the development of key sensors.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the program office stated that
it lowered its technologies' maturity levels in September 2004 at our
request. Program officials also commented that since the government can
no longer afford full-up research and development satellites, few
instruments can attain technology maturity and systems cannot achieve
design stability or production maturity prior to entering full-scale
development. The program office stated that it spent 5 years in the
Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction phase driving down sensor and
system risk, thereby significantly increasing the technology and sensor
design maturity before entering the Acquisition and Operations phase in
August 2002. It also noted that the current instrument problems
highlighted above result from design/manufacturing process issues,
which are not related to the listed critical technologies.
GAO Comments:
The NPOESS program's technology maturity levels were lowered because
the program office more accurately applied the technology standards. In
addition, these standards do not require the launch into space of a
full-up research and development satellite in order to achieve full
maturity. Rather, a representative model demonstrating the full
functionality of the subsystems in a relevant environment is
sufficient.
[End of section]
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High:
The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to
provide missile warning information and to support the missile defense,
technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. It
also is intended to replace the Defense Support Program and to consist
of four satellites (plus one spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit
(GEO), two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO),
and associated fixed and mobile ground stations. We assessed the
sensors and satellites only.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,126.4 million;
Procurement: $1,421.2 million;
Total funding: $5,164.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 3.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/1996: $3,758.9;
Latest 06/2004: $7,497.4;
Percent change: 99.5%.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/1996: $0.0;
Latest 06/2004: $1,517.0.
Total program cost;
As of 10/1996: $3,948.0;
Latest 06/2004: $9,866.7;
Percent change: 149.9%.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/1996: $789.601;
Latest 06/2004: $1,973.330;
Percent change: 149.9%.
Total quantities;
As of 10/1996: 5;
Latest 06/2004: 5;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/1996: TBD;
Latest 06/2004: TBD;
Percent change: TBD.
Acquisition cycle time is now unknown because Air Force Space Command
has not defined the initial operational capability.
[End of table]
The SBIRS High program's critical technologies have demonstrated
acceptable levels of maturity after many years of difficult
development. The design is now mature since approximately 98 percent of
the expected design drawings have been released. Production maturity
could not be determined because the contractor does not collect
statistical control data. In August 2004 the contractor delivered the
first payload (the HEO 1 sensor) after a delay of 18 months. This
created additional delays and cost increases. As a result, the program
is again being replanned.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SBIRS High Program:
Technology Maturity:
The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared
sensor, thermal management, and on-board processor--are mature. Program
officials indicated that the hardware was tested in a thermal vacuum
chamber under expected flight conditions. These technologies were not
mature at the start of development.
Design Stability:
The design of SBIRS High was not stable at the critical design review
in August 2001 since only 30 percent of the expected design drawings
had been released at that time. The design is now stable with about 98
percent released.
Design stability has been an issue for SBIRS High. The first HEO sensor
was delivered in August 2004 after a delay of 18 months due to
excessive electromagnetic interference (radio waves emitted by the
sensor's electronics that interfered with the host satellite). The
program office reports that it applied the knowledge gained from the
design problems on this sensor to the second HEO sensor, which is now
due for delivery in February 2005--a 13-month delay from the
restructured schedule. Initial testing of the second sensor revealed
one electromagnetic interference issue. The program office anticipates
the approval of a waiver to this deviation.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity of SBIRS High because the
contractor does not collect statistical process control data. However,
the program office tracks and assesses production maturity through
detailed monthly manufacturing and test data and monthly updates on
flight hardware qualifications. In addition, the program office
recently assigned detailed entrance criteria to all major manufacturing
and test events. These criteria must be fully satisfied prior to
program office approval to enter the specific event. According to the
program office, this new "event-driven" philosophy will significantly
improve insight into the maturity of the production process.
Other Program Issues:
The delayed delivery of the first HEO sensor affected cost and schedule
for the remainder of the program. For example, resources needed for the
second HEO sensor and GEO satellites were instead used on the first HEO
sensor. The deliveries of the first two GEO satellites have now each
been delayed by over a year (to April 2008 and April 2009).
In May 2004, the program incurred a second Nunn-McCurdy breach (10
U.S.C. 2433), this time at the 15 percent threshold. Since program
delays and the extension of the contract through 2011 yielded a
substantial funding shortfall, Congress increased the SBIRS High fiscal
year 2005 budget by $91 million. The program office reports that future
risks are being mitigated by addressing high-risk elements earlier in
the development phase as well as earlier and more robust testing. It
also plans to convene an independent review team in early 2005 to
assess the program's progress and future risks.
Because of the lag time between the procurement of the first two GEO
satellites and the last three, the Air Force is able to consider
upgrading the on-board processors for the GEO satellites 3-5. A revised
acquisition program baseline will be submitted in March 2005 after a
decision on this upgrade is finalized and the cost impact is
determined.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that the
February 2005 delivery of the second HEO sensor is well before the need
date of mid-June 2005. It also noted that the GEO satellite's signal
processor assembly power supply and the common gyro reference
assemblies were integrated onto the payload structure (both are key
steps toward the payload's first thermal vacuum test) and that GEO
spacecraft testing has been successful in the early identification and
mitigation of hardware/software integration issues before they become
schedule critical path concerns. It also commented that the Defense
Support Program-capable Multi-Mission Mobile Processors are in test and
are on track for operational certification by December 2005 and that
initial SBIRS High support to the Missile Defense Agency mission is in
place.
[End of section]
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB):
The Air Force's SDB is a small autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground,
precision bomb able to strike fixed and stationary targets. The weapon
will be installed on the F-15E aircraft and is designed to work with
other aircraft, such as the F/A-22. Potential follow-on capabilities,
such as precision strike against moving targets, are being considered.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing;
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $128.6 million;
Procurement: $1,237.3 million;
Total funding: $1,365.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 24,000.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 10/2003: $382.7;
Latest 07/2004: $382.3;
Percent change: -0.1%.
Procurement cost;
As of 10/2003: $1,211.6;
Latest 07/2004: $1,237.3;
Percent change: 2.1%.
Total program cost;
As of 10/2003: $1,594.2;
Latest 07/2004: $1,619.5;
Percent change: 1.6%.
Program unit cost;
As of 10/2003: $0.066;
Latest 07/2004: $0.067;
Percent change: 1.6%.
Total quantities;
As of 10/2003: 24,070;
24,070;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 10/2003: 62;
Latest 07/2004: 61;
Percent change: -1.6%.
[End of table]
The six critical technologies for the SDB appear mature, and the design
is stable. The program office held the design review prior to starting
system development and, although data were not collected, the program
maintains that the contractor released over 90 percent of the
production drawings. In 2004, the program began a test program, which
combines developmental, live fire, and operational testing, in an
effort to decrease time spent in system development. Although the first
three flight tests were successful, this concurrent approach may
increase program risks. A low-rate production decision is expected to
be made in April 2005.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SDB Program:
Technology Maturity:
The program office assessed all six critical technologies for the SDB
as mature. The technologies are the airframe, the Anti-Jam Global
Positioning System, the fuze, the Inertial Navigation System, the
carriage, and warhead. Program officials stated that many of the
program's critical technologies were demonstrated in a free-flight
environment. They also stated that they have flight-tested the system
with the properly sized components.
Design Stability:
The design review was held prior to the start of system development
and, although data were not collected, the program office maintains
that Boeing released over 90 percent of the production drawings.
According to the program office, although the contractor has ultimate
responsibility for the weapon system and has given the government a 20-
year "bumper to bumper" warranty, the program office has insight into
the contractor's configuration control board process and all changes
are coordinated with the government.
The SDB program began a program of developmental, live fire, and
operational testing in 2004. This combined testing approach is designed
to eliminate or reduce redundant testing. However, this process could
expose the program to additional risk of design changes, as there may
be more concurrency between system developmental and operational tests
than there would be under a traditional test program. As of the date of
this review, 3 of 16 planned flight tests had been conducted, each
meeting its objectives. These flight tests were conducted with live
fuzes but not with live warheads. Eleven of the 16 flight tests are
planned to be conducted prior to the low-rate production decision
point.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because statistical process
control data were not available. In developing the SDB, Boeing used
many key components that are common with the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM). The SDB production line will be colocated in the same
facility used to produce the JDAM. According to program officials, the
production line layout is very similar to the processes currently used
for the JDAM. As of the date of this review, no critical manufacturing
processes that impact the critical system characteristics had been
identified. A low-rate production decision is expected to be made in
April 2005.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch
these satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the
context of the missile defense system. MDA is also studying
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $870.7 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $870.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 0.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
Latest 02/2004: $3,320.4.
Procurement cost;
Latest 02/2004: $0.0.
Total program cost;
Latest 02/2004: $3,320.4.
Program unit cost;
Latest 02/2004: TBD.
Total quantities;
Latest 02/2004: 2.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
Latest 02/2004: TBD.
Latest column includes all costs and quantities from the program's
inception through fiscal year 2009, but excludes data on the next
generation satellites.
[End of table]
Four of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature, and
the remaining technology is expected to reach maturity in March or
April 2005. The STSS design appears stable, with all drawings released
to manufacturing. However, until all STSS technologies demonstrate
maturity, the potential for design changes remains. The program is
currently in the process of conducting system level assembly,
integration, and testing activities and software development. Until
that work is complete, certain risk areas, such as payload hardware and
software integration, will remain. Additionally, a number of systemic
quality and systems engineering problems with the payload have
persisted. Despite these issues, the program office still expects early
delivery and launch of the satellites.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
STSS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Four of five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-
links, on-board processor, acquisition sensor, and track sensor--are
mature. The acquisition sensor reached maturity in October 2004 (a
month later than reported last year) when the thermal vacuum testing
was completed. The track sensor reached maturity in December 2004 when
the payload for the first satellite completed thermal vacuum testing,
which is 3 months later than reported last year. The single-stage
cryocooler will be mature when the payload for the first satellite
completes thermal vacuum testing in March or April 2005--about 15
months earlier than reported previously. Last year the program had a
sixth technology, the two-stage cryocooler, but it is no longer
considered critical and will not be used on the first increment of the
STSS program.
Design Stability:
The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design
drawings. However, until the maturity of the STSS technologies has been
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains.
Other Program Issues:
The STSS program is in the process of completing the assembly,
integration, and testing of the satellite components and software
development. Until that work is complete, certain risk areas will
remain. Some of these include complex infrared payload hardware and
software integration; completion of the ground segment and infrared
sensor software development and testing; modifications to the tracking
sensor, system integration and testing; and handling issues related to
parts obsolescence.
In addition, the payload subcontractor has had a number of systemic
quality and systems engineering problems. These problems have continued
for the last year and have contributed to some cost and schedule
overruns on the payload subcontract. The quality and engineering
problems are the result of the subcontractor's lack of experience and
systems engineering procedures that are not clearly written. In
response, the prime contractor reviewed the subcontractor's quality
program. During this time, there was a 2-month stoppage of work at the
subcontractor facility and the majority of the subcontractor's effort
was concentrated on resolving failures noted during assembly,
integration, and testing of the satellite components. When work
restarted at the facility, the subcontractor continued to encounter
difficulties in assembling the sensors and preparing the appropriate
test equipment needed for sensor-level testing. Based on these factors
and the significant remaining tasks, the prime contractor stepped up
its presence at the subcontractor's facility. In addition, the
subcontractor added technicians who have more experience working with
space hardware and brought in systems engineers to work with the
technicians.
Despite these issues, the program office still expects the prime
contractor to deliver and launch the satellites earlier than the
contract date of July 2007.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA generally concurred
with our assessment and provided technical comments, which were
incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a command and
control/battle management system. We assessed the design for the Block
2006 initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to
the Army for concurrent operation and testing in fiscal year 2009.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin;
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding, FY05-FY09: R&D: $3,461.7 million;
Procurement: $0.0 million;
Total funding: $3,461.7 million;
Procurement quantity: TBD.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 9/2003: $10,909.5;
Latest 08/2004: $11,273.3;
Percent change: 3.3%.
Procurement cost;
As of 9/2003: $0.0;
Latest 08/2004: $0.0;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 9/2003: $10,909.5;
Latest 08/2004: $11,273.3;
Percent change: 3.3%.
Program unit cost: TBD.
Total quantities: TBD.
Acquisition cycle time (months): TBD.
Latest cost includes all costs from the program's inception through
fiscal year 2009. Procurement funding and quantities have yet to be
determined.
[End of table]
Program officials assess THAAD's technologies as mature and its design
as generally stable. The technology assessments, however, are sometimes
based on tests of earlier component designs. The design of Block 2006,
which is expected to provide a limited operational capability, is a
further maturation of THAAD's Block 2004 design. While 91 percent of
the Block 2004 engineering drawings have been released, the total
number of drawings for the 2006 capability could increase if problems
are identified in flight tests scheduled to begin early next year.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
THAAD Program:
Technology Maturity:
Program officials assess all of THAAD's critical technologies as
mature. These technologies are included in four major components: the
command, control, and battle management component; the interceptor; the
launcher; and the radar.
After experiencing early test failures, program officials made changes
in the execution of the THAAD program that allowed it to make progress
in maturing critical technologies. Officials placed more emphasis on
risk reduction efforts, including adopting technology readiness levels
to assess technological maturity.
Design Stability:
THAAD's basic design is nearing completion, with approximately 91
percent of the expected engineering drawings released for the basic
design that is expected to provide the initial capability. However, the
THAAD Program Office reported a decrease in the percentage of drawings
released this year (91 percent) compared to the percentage reported
last year (100 percent). In 2003, the program reported that it had
released all of the expected 9,852 drawings. However, as the design
matured, the program office recognized that 11,221 engineering drawings
would be required and that it had released only 10,221 of those
drawings. The number of drawings increased as information was gained
from testing, the design of experimental items was completed, existing
drawings were revised, and as new subcomponents were needed to replace
obsolete ones. The program office successfully conducted a design
review in December 2003. However, if problems are identified during
flight testing, the number of drawings may increase as the design
matures during Block 2006.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because MDA does not know
when it will transition THAAD to the Army for production. The one fire
unit that will be handed off to the Army in 2009 for limited
operational use is considered to be primarily a test asset. Prior to a
production decision, the program office plans to assess production
maturity using Baseline Manufacturing Readiness Risk Assessments and
Block Process Verification Reviews for assurance of the contractor's
readiness to proceed with repeatable processes and quality.
Other Program Issues:
Although the THAAD program has implemented many procedures to reduce
program risk, it continues to encounter some problems. For example, the
program experienced a major workmanship problem in a shelter subsystem
within the command, control, and battle management component. In
addition, an explosion at the Pratt & Whitney propellant mix facility
is causing the program to seek an alternate source. The program
office's risk assessment states "source replacements have the potential
for delaying booster delivery during the flight test program and into
production."
MDA officials are examining whether one THAAD component can be deployed
early. Officials are assessing whether a THAAD-like radar can serve as
a forward-deployed radar for the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
Development, customization, and testing of the radar under another MDA
program have begun in an effort to provide this capability within the
next 2 years.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, MDA provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Tactical Tomahawk Missile:
The Navy's Tactical Tomahawk Block IV will allow ships and submarines
to attack land targets. Program officials say it incorporates new
subsystem features like an improved antijamming global positioning
system, in-flight retargeting, and transmission of imagery prior to
impact. They also said it will have greater reliability and its average
per unit cost will be $729,000 versus the $1.4 million of its
predecessor. The Block IV includes the missile, the weapon control
system, and the mission planning system. We assessed only the missile.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $0.0 million;
Procurement: $1,737.5 million;
Total funding: $1,737.5 million;
Procurement quantity: 2,055.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 09/1997: $567.0;
Latest 12/2003: $609.8;
Percent change: 7.5%.
Procurement cost;
As of 09/1997: $1,250.4;
Latest 12/2003: $2,604.1;
Percent change: 108.3%.
Total program cost;
As of 09/1997: $1,817.5;
Latest 12/2003: $3,213.8;
Percent change: 76.8%.
Program unit cost;
As of 09/1997: $1.331;
Latest 12/2003: $1.152;
Percent change: -13.5%.
Total quantities;
As of 09/1997: 1,365;
Latest 12/2003: 2,790;
Percent change: 104.4%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 09/1997: 58;
Latest 12/2003: 71;
Percent change: 22.4%.
[End of table]
The Tactical Tomahawk Block IV program entered low-rate production and
awarded its full-rate production contract without the knowledge needed
to ensure its production processes were in control but with mature
technology and design knowledge. The program received its first low-
rate production missile in May 2004. Other missiles such as those used
in operational testing, while production representative, were mostly
put together one at a time, so their manufacture was insufficient for
collecting statistical data necessary for process control. Officials
did not expect that the program would produce and test sufficient
missile quantities to have the necessary knowledge about its production
processes until sometime during March or April of 2005. Delivery of its
first full-rate production missiles in January 2006 depends on
completing substantial testing/verification.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Tomahawk Program:
Technology Maturity:
We did not assess the readiness level of the key technologies for the
Tactical Tomahawk Block IV because its subsystems were derivative from
other programs or upgrades to preexisting subsystems. Therefore,
according to program officials, the critical technologies for the
missile's key subsystems like the antijamming global positioning
system, the digital scene matching area correlator, and the cruise
engine were already mature.
Design Stability:
The design of the Tactical Tomahawk missile is complete. At the design
review in June 2000, about 47 percent of the drawings had been released
to manufacturing. By the end of technical evaluation in October 2003,
100 percent of the drawings had been released. Technical evaluation was
successfully completed, and the program entered operational evaluation
in December 2003. Operational evaluation was completed in 2004, and the
missile was judged operationally effective and suitable.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity of the Tactical Tomahawk
Block IV missile because program officials said statistical process
data needed for production maturity were not available. Although the
Block IV uses much existing technology to reduce costs, the technology
is arranged inside the missile in a new manner. The new layout makes
the production process sufficiently different enough that it requires
development of new production processes and statistical controls.
Officials said the program had not yet produced and tested sufficient
missile quantities to attain this statistical control information.
Tomahawk officials currently project the program will obtain production
maturity prior to January 2006.
The Navy's Operational Test and Evaluation Force judged the missile
operationally suitable and effective for combat operations but also
recommended review of quality assurance processes. Prior to this
recommendation, the program had engaged outside experts to conduct a
quality audit. The audit team concluded the audited facilities would
consistently supply material to meet the program's requisite product
and process capability requirements. The team also noted opportunities
for improvement in areas like statistical process control. Officials
said a follow-up Navy/Raytheon (the prime contractor) review indicated
that progress had been made in all areas identified for improvement.
They also said Raytheon had contracted for ongoing outside support for
implementation of quality initiatives.
Other Program Issues:
At the time of our review, a full-rate 5-year production contract had
been awarded, with the multiyear feature designed to provide earliest
replenishment of inventory at lowest cost. Full-rate production is
planned for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2008.
Agency Comments:
Commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. It also noted that
all Block IV production processes have been fully defined and are
maturing.
[End of section]
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT):
The Air Force's TSAT system is designed to provide survivable, jam-
resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose laser cross-links with
other air and space systems, including the planned AEHF satellite
system, reviewed elsewhere in this report. TSAT will serve as the
cornerstone of a new DOD communications infrastructure by providing
high bandwidth connectivity to the warfighter. The system consists of a
constellation of five satellites, plus a sixth satellite to ensure
mission availability. We assessed the six satellites.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon,
Booz Allen Hamilton;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $12,012.7 million;
Procurement: $3,576.1 million;
Total funding: $15,663.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 4.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 01/2004: $12,463.7;
Latest 06/2004: $12,463.7;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Procurement cost;
As of 01/2004: $3,576.1;
Latest 06/2004: $3,576.1;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total program cost;
As of 01/2004: $16,114.6;
Latest 06/2004: $16,114.6;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Program unit cost;
As of 01/2004: $2,685.771;
Latest 06/2004: $2,685.771;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Total quantities;
As of 01/2004: 6;
Latest 06/2004: 6;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 01/2004: 117;
Latest 06/2004: 122;
Percent change: 4.3%.
In 2004 we reported a total quantity of 10 satellites, including 4
replenishment satellites. The approved quantity is currently 6
satellites.
[End of table]
TSAT entered the risk reduction and design development phase in January
2004 with only one of its seven critical technologies mature. The
program expects to demonstrate technology maturity but not design
stability or production maturity before awarding a contract to acquire
operational satellites in 2006.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
TSAT Program:
Technology Maturity:
The TSAT program is in the risk reduction and design development phase,
with only one of its seven critical technologies mature. The program is
being developed in two increments--six of the technologies are
associated with the first increment and all seven are associated with
the second increment.
Of the six technologies associated with the first increment, only one
technology--the packet processing payloads--is mature. The other five-
-communication-on-the-move nulling antenna, dynamic bandwidth and
resource allocation technologies, protected bandwidth efficient
modulation waveforms, information assurance, and single access laser
communications--are scheduled to reach maturity in early 2006, about 2
years after the start of development. The single access laser
communications has no backup technology, and according to program
officials, any delay in maturing this technology will cause the
expected first satellite launch date to slip beyond 2012.
The seventh critical technology, the multiaccess laser communications,
is part of the second increment. It will not reach maturity until the
production decision for the last four operational satellites in 2008,
about 4 years after the planned start of development.
Other Program Issues:
Unlike current communications satellites, TSAT will be equipped with
laser-optical payloads for high-capacity links to other air and space
platforms. AEHF will depend on the first TSAT satellite, now scheduled
for launch by the end of 2012, to provide full global coverage. Because
military users are concerned with the aggressive acquisition strategy,
the Air Force scheduled an interim review point for November 2004 to
determine whether the technology development had progressed
sufficiently to meet the required launch date and decided to continue
with both AEHF and TSAT development. A second interim review point is
scheduled for November 2005, at which point the Air Force must decide
on alternatives, one of which is to buy an additional AEHF satellite.
Air Force officials are in the process of defining the evaluation
criteria they intend to use to assess TSAT's progress or identify
alternatives.
TSAT is currently being rebaselined as a result of a congressional
reduction totaling $300 million in research and development funding for
fiscal year 2005. The defense authorization conference report indicated
that funding was reduced because of continuing concerns related to the
risk of the current acquisition approach.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that,
based on commercial and DOD best practices, all TSAT technologies meet,
or exceed, the level of maturity appropriate for the current risk
reduction and design development phase and that this phase provides the
data (technology readiness and design maturity) necessary for a
production contract award. It also commented that all key technologies
are on schedule to achieve maturity 10 months prior to Preliminary
Design Review and that, to further reduce risk, TSAT has backup
technologies in all areas in the event that a technology is not ready.
It noted that the backup technologies would still provide a large
increase in warfighter capability and allow for technologies to be used
on later TSAT satellites. It also noted that to be effective, risk
reduction and preliminary design must be done concurrently and
iteratively. If not, the program risks maturing technology that does
not support the system design, resulting in scrap and rework. It
believes that this strategy delivers the greatest warfighter capability
at minimum risk and cost.
GAO Comments:
Our prior work has shown that technologies should demonstrate a high
level of maturity before starting development to reduce the risk of
cost, schedule, and performance problems. Although the program started
development a year ago, we found that several critical technologies had
demonstrated very low levels of maturity involving analytical studies
and the demonstration of nonscale individual components in a laboratory
environment.
[End of section]
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft:
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft
being developed by the Navy for Joint Service application. It is
designed to meet the amphibious/vertical assault needs of the Marine
Corps, the strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special operations
needs of the Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The MV-
22 version will replace the CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters of the Marine
Corps. We assessed the MV-22 Block A, which has been undergoing changes
to make it safe and operational.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO;
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $654.3 million;
Procurement: $27,314.7 million;
Total funding: $27,997.9 million;
Procurement quantity: 386.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 04/1986: $3,647.9;
Latest 12/2003: $10,723.7;
Percent change: 194.0%.
Procurement cost;
As of 04/1986: $30,591.3;
Latest 12/2003: $35,518.0;
Percent change: 16.1%.
Total program cost;
As of 04/1986: $34,442.5;
Latest 12/2003: $46,293.8;
Percent change: 34.4%.
Program unit cost;
As of 04/1986: $37.724;
Latest 12/2003: $101.078;
Percent change: 167.9%.
Total quantities;
As of 04/1986: 913;
Latest 12/2003: 458;
Percent change: -49.8%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 04/1986: 117;
Latest 12/2003: 288;
Percent change: 146.2%.
[End of table]
MV-22 Block A technologies are mature and the design is considered
stable. Problems identified during recent tests are expected to be
resolved prior to the next operational test, according to program
officials. Some redesign efforts have been identified as candidates for
preplanned product improvements. Parts issues and delayed reporting of
test results could delay the operational performance certification
needed to increase production in fiscal year 2006. Decisions on whether
to lift current flight restrictions, prior to the completion of
operational evaluation, will be made on a case-by-case basis. Recent
tests found interoperability and human factors as high-risk issues that
may impact this evaluation. Also, the contractors were asked to propose
cost reduction initiatives targeted at reducing aircraft unit cost to
$58 million by fiscal year 2010.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
V-22 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Although we did not assess the MV-22's technology maturity, the program
office states that based on DOD criteria, the Block A technologies are
mature. During recently completed limited operational tests, technology
maturity was assessed in a range of environmental conditions. Program
officials state that problems were identified and corrective plans
implemented to insure a successful operational test and evaluation
assessment.
Design Stability:
Design for Block A is considered stable. However, additional changes to
later blocks of the aircraft have been identified. These changes
include redesign of the forward cabin; redesign of the rear cabin
seating, which is considered inadequate for combat equipped troops;
redesign of a extendable tube for fuel jettison operations; and
enhancements to improve wheel brake control and effectiveness.
Production Maturity:
Process management is becoming more robust at the final assembly site
on each major fixture assembly using Six Sigma. Program officials point
to the delivery of aircraft as an indication of manufacturing maturity.
An independent review assessed a V-22 parts problem at one of the
contractors' plants that could affect its ability to support full-rate
production and concluded that in the near term they believe the current
parts shortage could be addressed with heroics. However, the team and
program officials are concerned with the institutionalization of long-
term process improvements and recommended development of a plan that
addresses both short-term part shortages and implementation of a full-
rate production plan.
The Navy plans to increase annual production of the aircraft starting
in fiscal year 2006, provided the Secretary of Defense certifies to
Congress that the program successfully completed operational testing by
demonstrating several capabilities related to V-22 safety,
effectiveness, maintainability, and reliability (Section 123, Pub. Law
107-107, Dec. 28, 2001) through operational test. The certification
would allow the program to increase annual production above the current
minimum sustaining rate. Program officials are concerned that the
certification cannot be done before completion of the fiscal year 2006
budget process and, as a result, the request to increase production may
not be granted.
Other Program Issues:
The V-22 is currently being tested with operating limits, such as
defensive combat maneuver capability. Decisions on whether to relax or
remove specific restrictions will be made on a case-by-case basis prior
to the completion of operational evaluation in June 2005. The decisions
on these restrictions will impact the result of the upcoming
operational assessment. A recently completed limited assessment
concluded that out of 16 critical operational issues, 2 were at high
risk and 6 at medium risk of not achieving a satisfactory resolution
during upcoming operational testing. The high-risk issues are
interoperability and human factors. The medium-risk issues are
reliability, availability, logistics support, compatibility,
documentation, and diagnostics. Recently, the program requested that
the contractor submit a proposal for combining cost reduction
initiatives to reduce the aircraft unit price to a target price of $58
million in fiscal year 2010.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the V-
22 Joint Program Office continues to execute a disciplined, event-
driven test and program schedule. It noted that since returning to
flight in 2003, the V-22 has flown over 4,000 hours, both in
development and operational tests. It also stated that the Block A V-22
has demonstrated reliability and maintainability on par with fleet
aircraft and that multiship sorties and operations have been
demonstrated for nearly all missions. It further commented that the
range and speed capability of the V-22 has spawned new tactics and
realized logistics efficiencies that will reduce time, resources and
save lives.
The Navy also stated that it remains committed to fielding a V-22
weapon system when it is tested and ready and noted that a talented
team of government and industry professionals champions the
transformational capability that the V-22 brings and is committed to
its success. It further stated that the test and training programs will
continue to ensure operators and maintainers are ready and capable from
day one to ensure the warfighter has the best equipment with the best
information.
[End of section]
Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS):
WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the
next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Systems;
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $61.8 million;
Procurement: $660.9 million;
Total funding: $722.7 million;
Procurement quantity: 2.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 12/2000: $183.7;
Latest 12/2003: $228.2;
Percent change: 24.2%.
Procurement cost;
As of 12/2000: $840.6;
Latest 12/2003: $1,293.1;
Percent change: 53.8%.
Total program cost;
As of 12/2000: $1,024.2;
Latest 12/2003: $1,521.3;
Percent change: 48.5%.
Program unit cost;
As of 12/2000: $341.412;
Latest 12/2003: $304.262;
Percent change: -10.9%.
Total quantities;
As of 12/2000: 3;
Latest 12/2003: 5;
Percent change: 66.7%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 12/2000: 50;
Latest 12/2003: 75;
Percent change: 50.0%.
[End of table]
The WGS program's technology, design, and production are now mature.
Manufacturing problems did contribute to a delay in the launch of the
first WGS satellite by almost 2 years. The program office is increasing
its oversight of the contractor to help rectify these issues and
believes the problems have been resolved. A decision to procure the
fourth and fifth satellites is expected to add millions of dollars to
the program's cost, but the program office will not know the cost of
these satellites until it receives a proposal from the contractor.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
WGS Program:
Technology Maturity:
WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital
channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program
officials, both technologies were mature when the program entered
production in November 2000.
Design Stability:
The WGS design is essentially complete, as the program office has
released over 97 percent of the expected drawings to manufacturing.
Last year we reported that the contractor had problems integrating the
antenna into the satellite because experience the contractor expected
to gain on commercial satellite orders did not materialize. The
integration problems have since been resolved, and testing of the
antenna engineering models demonstrated that the design worked as
required.
Production Maturity:
Due to the commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract, the
program office does not have access to production process control data.
Despite not being able to access these data to determine production
maturity, unit level manufacturing for WGS is essentially complete, as
all units have been manufactured and delivered for the first satellite.
The contractor continues to experience difficulties in manufacturing
one of the components of the phased array antenna, making the antenna
production the top risk to the program. Approximately 254 of these
antenna components were being built when thin cracks in the copper
striplines were noticed during inspection. An early analysis showed
that poor handling procedures of inexperienced personnel contributed to
the cracks, and a screening test revealed that inconsistencies in the
thickness of the copper trace used to build the striplines were also to
blame. The contractor replaced all the flawed striplines with properly
manufactured parts and implemented additional process controls. In
resolving these production issues, program officials stated that they
inspected the manufacturing facilities, reviewed test plans and
procedures, started screening parts, and now hold monthly program
reviews with the contractor. Manufacturing problems with the phased
array antenna contributed to delaying the launch of the first WGS
satellite by almost 2 years. As a result of the delay, the Air Force
revised its acquisition strategy program baseline, which was approved
in February 2004.
Other Program Issues:
In December 2002, DOD directed the addition of WGS satellites four and
five, with launch dates of fiscal years 2009 and 2010, respectively.
Therefore, the current contract options must be extended and
renegotiated to cover the cost of the likely 2-to 3-year production gap
between satellites three and four. The cost estimate for the additional
satellites has grown because of a greater than anticipated effect of
parts obsolescence and loss of manufacturing knowledge to be gained
during the production of the first three satellites. In addition, the
production costs of the first three satellites have been higher than
expected. The procurement of satellites four and five is expected to
add millions of dollars to the cost of the WGS program, but the exact
amount will not be known until the program office receives a proposal
from the contractor. Negotiation for the two satellites is to begin in
the second half of fiscal year 2006.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that even though manufacturing process information is unavailable, it
believes the production knowledge of WGS is mature based upon
similarities to the contractor's commercial communications satellites.
In addition, the delays experienced in the delivery of the first
satellite were primarily due to inadequate adherence to manufacturing
and quality assurance standards at subcontractor facilities rather than
production knowledge immaturity.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T):
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless
video, data, imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate
simultaneously at various levels of security. The network is to have
the ability to be initialized and modified based upon unit task
organization. It is to connect Army units with higher levels of command
and provide Army's tactical portion of the Global Information Grid. WIN-
T is being fielded in blocks. We assessed the first block.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics Government Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $586.8 million;
Procurement: $9,634.7 million;
Total funding: $10,221.4 million;
Procurement quantity: 1.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2005 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost;
As of 07/2003: $730.3;
Latest 12/2003: $730.3;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Procurement cost;
As of 07/2003: $9,392.7;
Latest 12/2003: $9,634.7;
Percent change: 2.6%.
Total program cost;
As of 07/2003: $10,123.0;
Latest 12/2003: $10,365.0;
Percent change: 2.4%.
Program unit cost;
As of 07/2003: $10,123.037;
Latest 12/2003: $10,365.008;
Percent change: 2.4%.
Total quantities;
As of 07/2003: 1;
Latest 12/2003: 1;
Percent change: 0.0%.
Acquisition cycle time (months);
As of 07/2003: 78;
Latest 12/2003: 78;
Percent change: 0.0%.
[End of table]
WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
close to full maturity. None of the technologies will be fully mature
at the time production begins in March 2006. Eight have backup
technologies available, but only three of these are fully mature, and
use of backup technologies would degrade system overall robustness and
capabilities. Due to significant interdependencies among critical
technologies, and the fact that some determine network functionality,
it may not be possible to demonstrate that those technologies are fully
mature until after production begins. Design stability could not be
assessed because the program office does not track the number of
releasable drawings. WIN-T is primarily an information technology
system integration effort rather than a manufacturing effort.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
WIN-T Program:
Technology Maturity:
WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies
close to reaching full maturity. While program officials do not expect
these technologies to reach full maturity until the network is built
and can be demonstrated in an operational environment, they do expect
the technologies to have been demonstrated in a simulated operational
environment by the time the critical design review is held in September
2005. An independent Army technology readiness assessment determined
that WIN-T would enter system development prior to full definition of
the first block's design and specific technology-based components,
systems, or subsystems. WIN-T will include technologies such as mobile
and static communications nodes, network operations and support
centers, transmission relays, joint gateway nodes, points of presence
for future force and command elements, vehicular wireless packages,
airborne wireless communication packages, and personal communications
devices.
Design Stability:
Design stability could not be assessed because the program office does
not plan to track the number of releasable drawings as a design metric.
According to the program, WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but
primarily an information technology system integration effort.
Consequently, the government does not obtain releasable design drawings
for many of WIN-T's components, particularly commercial components. The
WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based specifications and
open systems design, and it is to conform to DOD's Joint Technical
Architecture.
Other Program Issues:
Among other issues, the program will need to pay close attention to the
interdependent nature of the WIN-T, FCS, and JTRS programs, the
interrelationship between WIN-T and FCS and Global Information Grid
requirements, the scalability of WIN-T, the challenge of linking all
the nodes and networks of the Army's system-of-systems, and the
coordination of unmanned relay programs with FCS. The program will also
have to track external factors that will impact WIN-T such as the DOD
Net-Centric Data Strategy. WIN-T deployment will be essential for FCS
deployment and as each system evolves, integration demonstrations will
need to be performed to ensure WIN-T and FCS interoperability.
In addition, a major revision to the WIN-T acquisition strategy is
underway. WIN-T was originally envisioned to support the Army's Future
Force. However, the global war on terrorism and the lessons learned
from recent military operations have shifted the Army's focus toward
providing WIN-T capabilities sooner. To accomplish this, DOD, in
September, approved a decision to combine the competing contractor
teams for WIN-T's system design and development. The two originally
competing contractors are now teaming to establish a single
architecture for WIN-T that, according to the revised acquisition
strategy, will leverage each contractor's proposed architecture to
provide the Army with a superior technical solution for WIN-T.
Establishing the single WIN-T architecture a year earlier than
originally planned is expected to allow other Army programs to begin to
follow that architecture for near-term force procurements and build on
that architecture for the Future Force.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army noted that, as a
result of merging the two competing prime contractors under a new
acquisition strategy, the "best of breed" critical technologies will be
used in the updated WIN-T architecture. This new strategy is also
expected to increase the range of available technical products and
developing technologies, thereby lowering the risk of maturing critical
technologies for production and fielding. The Army also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but it
did provide technical comments. These comments, along with agency
comments received on the individual assessments, were included as
appropriate. (See app. I for a copy of DOD's response.)
Scope of Our Review:
For the 54 programs, each assessment provides the historical and
current program status and offers the opportunity to take early
corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge
diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also
identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by
other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of
knowledge, it has less risk--but not zero risk--of future problems.
Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and
best practices, it indicates an increased risk--not a guarantee--of
future problems. The real value of the assessments is recognizing gaps
early, which provides opportunities for constructive intervention--such
as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and additional
funding--before cost and schedule consequences mount.
We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors,
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3)
congressional interest. The majority of the 54 programs covered in this
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. (See app. II for details of the
scope and methodology.)
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202)
512-4841 or Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Katherine V. Schinasi:
Managing Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
MAR 07 2005:
Mr. Paul Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, dated
February 11, 2005 (GAO Code 120350/GAO-05-301). We have enclosed
technical comments to ensure accuracy. These comments should be
reflected in the final report and in the individual program summaries.
My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, (703) 692-9556, or e-mail:
skip.hawthorne@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Deidre A. Lee:
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:
Enclosure:
As stated:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly.
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable
for our engagement purposes, after reviewing DOD's management controls
for assessing data reliability.
Macro Analysis:
Data for major defense acquisition program research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funding in figure 1 were
obtained from DOD's selected acquisition reports or from data obtained
directly from the program offices and then aggregated across programs
between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2009. Data used to assess the
fiscal year 2005 RDT&E and procurement funding plan were drawn from the
2003 selected acquisition reports or obtained directly from the program
office. For the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs for which a
baseline was not available, we used the latest available cost
information.
To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the
programs included in our assessment, it was necessary to identify those
programs with all of the requisite data available. Of the 54 programs
in our assessment, 26 programs constituted the common set of programs
where data were available for cost, schedule, and quantity at the first
full estimate, generally milestone B, and the latest estimate. Data
utilized in this analysis were drawn from information contained in
selected acquisition reports or data provided by program offices as of
January 14, 2005. We summed the costs associated with RDT&E and total
costs consisting of research, development testing and evaluation,
procurement, military construction, and acquisition operation and
maintenance. The data were also used for a comparison between the 2004
assessment period and the 2005 assessment period. The schedule
assessment is based on the change in the average acquisition cycle
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the
achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent fielding
date.
The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program
acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by
taking the total cost estimate for each of the 26 programs and dividing
it by the aggregate total cost of all 26 programs in the common set.
The resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the
simple percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain
the weighted unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this
weighted cost change for all programs was calculated to get the
weighted unit cost change for the common set as a whole. To assess the
weighted-average acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the
weight calculation by the acquisition cycle time estimate for each
corresponding program. A simple average was then taken to calculate the
change between the first full estimate and the latest estimate, and
between the 2004 assessment period and the 2005 assessment period. We
believe these calculations best represent the overall progress of
programs by placing them within the context of the common set's
aggregate cost.
To assess the number of programs with technology maturity and design
stability at each critical juncture, we identified programs that had
actually proceeded through the start of development and the system
design review and obtained their assessed maturity. This information
was drawn from data provided by the program office as of January 14,
2005. For more information, see the product knowledge assessment
section in this appendix.
System Profile Assessment:
In the past 4 years, DOD revised its policies governing weapon system
acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major acquisition
events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent across
the 54 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key
program events. In the individual program assessments, program start
refers to the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program
start as milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and
technology development phase. Similarly, development start refers to
the commitment to system development that coincides with either
milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's system development and
demonstration phase. The production decision generally refers to the
decision to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with
low-rate initial production. Initial capability refers to the initial
operational capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or
required asset availability. For the MDA programs that do not follow
the standard DOD acquisition model, but instead develop systems in
incremental capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology
development efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block
assessed.
The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal
2005 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on information
from selected acquisition reports or on data from the program office.
In some instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this
by the term "to be determined" (TBD), or not applicable, annotated
(NA). The "Latest" program costs used in cost comparisons are the
latest estimates provided by the individual programs. The quantities
listed only refer to procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in
particular, produce a large percentage of their total operational units
as development quantities, which are not included in the quantity
figure.
To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we
reviewed DOD's selected acquisition reports or obtained data directly
from the program offices. In general, we compared the latest available
selected acquisition report information with a baseline for each
program. For systems that have started system development--those that
are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the latest available selected
acquisition report to the development estimate from the first selected
acquisition report issued after the program was approved to enter
development. For systems that have not yet started system development,
we compared the latest available data to the planning estimate issued
after milestone I or A. For systems not included in selected
acquisition reports, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and
current data from the individual program offices. For MDA systems for
which a baseline was not available we compared the latest available
cost information to the amount reported last year.
All cost information is presented in base year 2005 dollars, unless
otherwise noted, using Office of the Secretary of Defense approved
deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have depicted only
the programs' main elements of acquisition cost--research and
development and procurement; however, the total program costs also
include military construction and acquisition operation and maintenance
costs. Because of rounding and these additional costs, in some
situations the total cost may not match the exact sum of the research
and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs are
calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total quantities
planned. These costs are often referred to as program acquisition unit
costs. In some instances, the data were not applicable, and we annotate
this by using the term "NA." In other instances, the current absence of
data on procurement funding and quantities precludes calculation of a
meaningful program acquisition unit cost and we annotate this by using
the term "TBD." The quantities listed refer to total quantities,
including both procurement and development quantities.
The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as
the number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or
A, and the achievement of initial operational capability or an
equivalent fielding date. In some instances, the data were not yet
available, and we annotate this by using the term TBD, or was
classified.
The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such
detailed distinctions.
Product Knowledge Assessment:
To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each 2-
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews.
To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed
technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force Science and
Technology research organizations use them to determine when
technologies are ready to be handed off from science and technology
managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels are
measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully
integrated into a completed product. (See appendix III for the
definitions of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work
has shown that a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a
technology in an operational environment--is the level of technology
maturity that constitutes a low risk for starting a product development
program. In our assessment, the technologies that have reached
technology readiness level 7, a prototype demonstrated in an
operational environment, are considered mature and those that have
reached technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a
relevant environment, are assessed as attaining 50 percent of the
desired level of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved
technology readiness level 6 are assessed as fully mature due to the
difficulty of demonstrating maturity in an operational environment--
space.
In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system
at key decision points after the passage of many years.
To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases
where information existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build to"
drawings.
To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of
statistical process control where information existed that raised
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were
unavailable.
Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller
treatment of risk elements.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties;
Hardware Software: None (Paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware Software: None (Paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration Environment: None.
Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology.
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity"
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad
hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware Software: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration Environment: Lab.
Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly.
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory
integration of components;
Hardware Software: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.)
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment;
Hardware Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment.
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an
operational environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a
test bed aircraft;
Hardware Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate
full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if
it meets design specifications;
Hardware Software: Flight qualified hardware;
Demonstration Environment: DT&E in the actual system application.
Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the
system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware Software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration Environment: OT&E in operational mission conditions.
[End of table]
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of section]
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841:
Acknowledgments:
David B. Best, Alan R. Frazier, and Bruce H. Thomas made key
contributions to this report. Other key contributors included Robert L.
Ackley, D. Catherine Baltzell, Maricela Cherveny, Tana M. Davis, Thomas
J. Denomme, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J. Hand,
Michael J. Hazard, Barbara H. Haynes, Leslie M. Hickey, John E.
Oppenheim, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Nancy Rothlisberger, Rae Ann H.
Sapp, James L. Morrison, Wendy P. Smythe, Sharon E. Sweeney, Robert S.
Swierczek, and Karen S. Zuckerstein. The following staff were
responsible for individual programs:
System: Airborne Laser (ABL);
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller.
System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD);
Primary Staff: Randolph S. Zounes.
System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF);
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry/Lisa P. Gardner.
System: Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA);
Primary Staff: Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W. Clark.
System: Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS);
Primary Staff: Ian A. Ferguson/Brendan S. Culley/Angela D. Thomas.
System: Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS);
Primary Staff: John S. Warren/Thomas L. Gordon/Michele R. Williamson.
System: Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS);
Primary Staff: Mary K. Quinlan.
System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning
System (ATIRCM/CMWS);
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins/Danny G. Owens.
System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP);
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Arthur L. Cobb.
System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/Christopher A. Deperro.
System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP);
Primary Staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Sameena N. Ismailjee.
System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP);
Primary Staff: Sameena N. Ismailjee/Cheryl K. Andrew.
System: Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC);
Primary Staff: Johana R. Ayers/W. William Russell.
System: CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F);
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe/Leon S. Gill.
System: Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM);
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN-21);
Primary Staff: Brendan S. Culley/Trevor J. Thomson.
System: DD(X) Destroyer;
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Angela D. Thomas.
System: E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (E-10A);
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp/David R. Schilling.
System: E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE);
Primary Staff: Gary L. Middleton/Bruce H. Thomas.
System: EA-18G (EA-18G);
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Miller/Brian T. Mullins.
System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV);
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant/Maricela Cherveny.
System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Ronald E. Schwenn.
System: Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM);
Primary Staff: Shelby S. Oakley/Ronald E. Schwenn/Margaret B. McDavid.
System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Primary Staff: Lawrence D. Gaston/John P. Swain.
System: F/A-22 Raptor;
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Arthur L. Cobb.
System: Future Combat Systems (FCS);
Primary Staff: John P. Swain/Lawrence D. Gaston/Marcus C. Ferguson.
System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle;
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Steven M. Hunter.
System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD);
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler.
System: Global Positioning System II (GPS II);
Primary Staff: Jean N. Harker/Michael L. Gorin.
System: Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR);
Primary Staff: Brian T. Mullins/Wesley A. Johnson.
System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM);
Primary Staff: Beverly A. Breen/Carrie R. Wilson.
System: Joint Common Missile;
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens/Jonathan E. Watkins.
System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);
Primary Staff: Matthew B. Lea/David R. Schilling.
System: Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW);
Primary Staff: Carol T. Mebane/Bradley J. Trainor.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1;
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/James P. Tallon.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5;
Primary Staff: Subrata Ghoshroy/Paul G. Williams.
System: Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS);
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Matthew T. Drerup.
System: Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI);
Primary Staff: Randolph S. Zounes.
System: Land Warrior;
Primary Staff: Joel C. Christenson/Candice N. Wright.
System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Angela D. Thomas.
System: Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS);
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis.
System: Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA);
Primary Staff: Matthew F. Ebert/Ronald E. Schwenn/Heather L. Barker.
System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi/Tony A. Beckham.
System: MQ-9 Predator B;
Primary Staff: Steven M. Hunter/Travis J. Masters.
System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS);
Primary Staff: Suzanne S. Olivieri/Carol R. Cha/James P. Tallon.
System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High);
Primary Staff: Nancy Rothlisberger/Maricela Cherveny.
System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB);
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson/Beverly A. Breen.
System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS);
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty/Tony A. Beckham.
System: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);
Primary Staff: William S. Lipscomb.
System: Tactical Tomahawk Missile;
Primary Staff: Bradley J. Trainor/Carol T. Mebane.
System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT);
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr./Travis J. Masters.
System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22);
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden.
System: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS);
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham/Richard Y. Horiuchi.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T);
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Ridge C. Bowman.
[End of table]
Source: GAO.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-393] GAO-04-393. Washington,
D.C.: March 1, 2004.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,
but More Controls Are Needed. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-53] GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2003.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-57] GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-701] GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best
Practices. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-469T]
GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288] GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-199] GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2000.
Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon
System Decisions. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-
NSIAD-00-137] GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000.
Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Program
Implement Best Practices. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-206] GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, D.C.: August
16, 1999.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-162] GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-99-
116] GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.
Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123] GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-56] GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.: February
24, 1998.
Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD's Earned Value
Management Process. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-108] GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.: May 5,
1997.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-162] GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August
26, 1996.
(120350):
FOOTNOTES
[1] This estimate includes total research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E); procurement; military construction; and acquisition
operation and maintenance appropriations to develop the weapon systems.
[2] Major Defense Acquisition Programs are programs identified by DOD
as programs that require eventual RDT&E expenditures of more than $365
million or $2.19 billion in procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant
dollars.
[3] Mandatory spending is controlled by laws other than appropriation
acts. Discretionary spending is provided in appropriations acts.
[4] Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015. (Washington, D.C.: January 2005.)
[5] Estimate as of May 2004. Another supplemental was expected in
January 2005 to cover costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[6] The common set refers to the 26 weapon system programs that we were
able to assess since development began and between annual assessment
periods. The 26 programs are AESA, AEHF, APKWS, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, CH-
47F, CEC, E-2 AHE, EA-18G, Excalibur, EFV, ERGM, F/A-22, FCS, Global
Hawk, JASSM, JSOW, JSF, JTRS Cluster 1, Land Warrior, NPOESS, Tomahawk,
SDB, V-22, WIN-T, and WGS. We limited this analysis to these 26
programs because all data including cost, schedule, cycle time, and
quantities were available for comparison between program estimates.
[7] A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value.
[8] The 10 programs are AEHF, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, Excalibur, ERGM, F/A-
22, Global Hawk, JSF, JSOW, and V-22.
[9] This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and
does not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost
growth. The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 25
programs is 40 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur,
is 52 percent.
[10] These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple
average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 0.68 percent for
the programs that started development with mature technologies and 25
percent for the programs that started development with immature
technologies.
[11] This estimate does not include cost and schedule data for three
programs: the V-22, Aegis BMD, and STSS. Aegis BMD and STSS were not
included in the cost and schedule estimates because they are missile
defense elements that do not provide baseline cost and schedule
estimates against which to measure progress.
[12] The cost and schedule estimates do not include the THAAD system or
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system because they are missile
defense elements that do not provide baseline estimates against which
to measure progress. The schedule estimate does not include the
ATIRCM/CMWS because a key date is classified.
[13] The 10 programs are AESA, Aegis BMD, APKWS, ATIRCM/CMWS, EFV,
ERGM, F/A-22, GMD, JTRS 1, and STSS. The F/A-22 held its design review
in 1995 and while we did not formally assess the technology maturity at
that point, the F/A-22 technologies and design matured late in the
program (e.g. the F/A-22 program had released 21 percent of drawings at
design review).
[14] This estimate does not include the missile defense elements (Aegis
BMD, GMD, and STSS) because they do not provide baseline estimates
against which to measure progress.
[15] The five programs are AESA, ATIRCM/CMWS, EFV, ERGM, and F/A-22.
[16] The three programs are the C-5 RERP, JASSM, and the Tactical
Tomahawk. C-5 RERP and JASSM were assessed to have design stability at
design review. C-5 RERP had a program unit cost increase of 8.2
percent; JASSM had a program unit cost of increase of 7.1 percent; and
Tactical Tomahawk had a decrease of program unit cost of-13.5 percent.
[17] The nine programs are AMNS, B-2 RMP, C-130 AMP, CVN-21, DD(X), E-2
AHE, EA-18G, Excalibur, and WIN-T.
[18] The two programs are APKWS and ASDS.
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