Military Personnel
Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces Gao ID: GAO-05-419T March 16, 2005To meet its human capital needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) must convince several hundred thousand people to join the military each year while, at the same time, retain thousands of personnel to sustain its active duty, reserve, and National Guard forces. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has launched three major military operations requiring significant military personnel--Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The high pace of military operations combined with the level of casualties in Iraq and other factors, such as lengthy overseas deployments, have raised concerns about DOD's ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel who possess the skills and experience needed. This testimony presents GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the extent to which the active duty, reserve, and Guard components have met their overall recruiting and retention goals, (2) the degree to which the components have met their recruiting and retention goals for selected hard-to-fill critical occupations, and (3) steps the components have taken to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. This testimony focuses on enlisted personnel. In continuing its work, GAO will assess the reliability of DOD-provided data and plans to issue a report on these issues this fall.
DOD's 10 military components generally met their overall recruitment and retention goals for each of the past 5 fiscal years (FY), but some of the components experienced difficulties in meeting their overall goals in early FY 2005. However, it should be noted that several components introduced a "stop loss" policy shortly after September 11, 2001. The "stop loss" policy requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation date, which may reduce the number of personnel the components must recruit. During FY 2000-2004, each of the active components met or exceeded their overall recruiting goals. However, for January 2005, the Marine Corps missed its overall active duty recruiting goal by 84 recruits and narrowly missed its goal again for February 2005. The Army also missed its overall recruiting goal for February 2005 by almost 2,000 recruits. This is significant, given that the Army has also already called up members from the Individual Ready Reserve and moved new recruits from its delayed entry program into basic training earlier than scheduled. Four of the six reserve components mostly met their overall recruiting goals for FYs 2000 through 2004, but many experienced difficulties in early FY 2005. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly challenged, since fewer active Army soldiers leaving active duty are joining the reserves. In terms of retention, the active components generally met their overall retention goals for the past 5 FYs. The Army, for example, met or exceeded overall retention goals from FY 2000 through FY 2004. The Army and the Air Force, however, missed retention goals in the first quarter of FY 2005. Overall recruitment and retention data do not provide a complete representation of military occupations that are either over- or under-staffed. For example, GAO's analysis of early FY 2005 data shows that 63 percent of the Army's active component specialties are overfilled and 32 percent are underfilled. Also, several hundred hard-to-fill occupations exist within the 10 DOD components. GAO identified 73 occupations that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. GAO's analysis also shows that 7 of the Army's current occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout) and 6 of the Air Force's current occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist) are on both their "hard-to-recruit" and "hard-to-retain" lists. DOD's components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. For example, DOD has expanded eligibility for selective reenlistment bonuses and has also begun offering reenlistment bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces personnel with 19 or more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. The Army increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hard-to-fill military occupations to as much as $20,000. The Army also increased its maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000. In addition, the Army plans to add 965 recruiters in FY 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 recruiters by FY 2007.
GAO-05-419T, Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST Wednesday, March 16,
2005:
Military Personnel:
Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the
U.S. Armed Forces:
Statement for the Record by Derek B. Stewart:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-419T]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-419T, a testimony to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
To meet its human capital needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) must
convince several hundred thousand people to join the military each year
while, at the same time, retain thousands of personnel to sustain its
active duty, reserve, and National Guard forces. Since September 11,
2001, DOD has launched three major military operations requiring
significant military personnel”Operation Noble Eagle, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The high pace of
military operations combined with the level of casualties in Iraq and
other factors, such as lengthy overseas deployments, have raised
concerns about DOD‘s ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers
of personnel who possess the skills and experience needed.
This testimony presents GAO‘s preliminary findings on (1) the extent to
which the active duty, reserve, and Guard components have met their
overall recruiting and retention goals, (2) the degree to which the
components have met their recruiting and retention goals for selected
hard-to-fill critical occupations, and (3) steps the components have
taken to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. This testimony
focuses on enlisted personnel. In continuing its work, GAO will assess
the reliability of DOD-provided data and plans to issue a report on
these issues this fall.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s 10 military components generally met their overall recruitment
and retention goals for each of the past 5 fiscal years (FY), but some
of the components experienced difficulties in meeting their overall
goals in early FY 2005. However, it should be noted that several
components introduced a ’stop loss“ policy shortly after September 11,
2001. The ’stop loss“ policy requires some servicemembers to remain in
the military beyond their contract separation date, which may reduce
the number of personnel the components must recruit. During FY 2000-
2004, each of the active components met or exceeded their overall
recruiting goals. However, for January 2005, the Marine Corps missed
its overall active duty recruiting goal by 84 recruits and narrowly
missed its goal again for February 2005. The Army also missed its
overall recruiting goal for February 2005 by almost 2,000 recruits.
This is significant, given that the Army has also already called up
members from the Individual Ready Reserve and moved new recruits from
its delayed entry program into basic training earlier than scheduled.
Four of the six reserve components mostly met their overall recruiting
goals for FYs 2000 through 2004, but many experienced difficulties in
early FY 2005. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be
particularly challenged, since fewer active Army soldiers leaving
active duty are joining the reserves. In terms of retention, the active
components generally met their overall retention goals for the past 5
FYs. The Army, for example, met or exceeded overall retention goals
from FY 2000 through FY 2004. The Army and the Air Force, however,
missed retention goals in the first quarter of FY 2005.
Overall recruitment and retention data do not provide a complete
representation of military occupations that are either over- or under-
staffed. For example, GAO‘s analysis of early FY 2005 data shows that
63 percent of the Army‘s active component specialties are overfilled
and 32 percent are underfilled. Also, several hundred hard-to-fill
occupations exist within the 10 DOD components. GAO identified 73
occupations that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill
occupations. GAO‘s analysis also shows that 7 of the Army‘s current
occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout) and 6 of the Air Force‘s
current occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist) are on both
their ’hard-to-recruit“ and ’hard-to-retain“ lists.
DOD‘s components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their
recruiting and retention efforts. For example, DOD has expanded
eligibility for selective reenlistment bonuses and has also begun
offering reenlistment bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special
operation forces personnel with 19 or more years of experience who
reenlist for an additional 6 years. The Army increased the amount of
cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hard-to-fill military
occupations to as much as $20,000. The Army also increased its maximum
college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000. In addition, the Army
plans to add 965 recruiters in FY 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to
add 425 recruiters by FY 2007.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-419T.
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Derek Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or
stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our
preliminary observations on recruitment and retention issues within the
active and reserve components.[Footnote 1] To meet its human capital
needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) must convince several hundred
thousand people to join the military each year, the majority of whom
are recent high school graduates. Last fiscal year alone, DOD had goals
to recruit more than 180,000 personnel into its active duty forces and
more than 120,000 personnel into its reserve components. Moreover, DOD
must retain tens of thousands of personnel each year to sustain its
active duty, reserve, and Guard forces. As you know, this Subcommittee
and others have raised concerns about DOD's ability to recruit and
retain sufficient numbers of personnel who possess required skills and
experience.
My statement, which focuses only on enlisted personnel, will address
our preliminary findings with respect to (1) the extent to which the
active duty, reserve, and National Guard components have met their
overall recruiting and retention goals; (2) the degree to which the
components have met their recruiting and retention goals for selected,
hard-to-fill critical occupations; and (3) steps the components have
taken to enhance their recruitment and retention efforts. Mr. Chairman,
we expect to complete our evaluation of the services' recruitment and
retention efforts by August and issue our report this fall. Findings
presented here are preliminary, and we will assess the reliability of
data provided to us by DOD as we complete our evaluation. The work done
in preparation for this hearing was conducted from February to March
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Summary:
Our preliminary examination of DOD data indicate that DOD's active and
reserve components generally met their overall recruitment goals from
fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004; but, some of the components
experienced difficulties in meeting their recruiting goals in early
2005. However, it should be noted that the "stop loss" policy
implemented by several components shortly after September 11, 2001
might have facilitated some components in meeting their overall
recruiting goals for fiscal year 2002 and beyond. The "stop loss"
policy requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond
the expiration of their contracts or retirement dates, which may reduce
the number of new people the components must recruit to meet their
endstrength goals. In fiscal year 2004, the Army, Navy, and Air Force
each exceeded their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for active duty
personnel by 1 percent, while the Marine Corps met its goal. However,
the Marine Corps missed its enlisted aggregate active duty recruiting
goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 2.6 percent, for January
2005 and narrowly missed its goal again for February 2005. The Army
also missed its February recruiting goal of 7,050 new active duty
recruits by 1,936 people, or 27.5 percent. This is significant, given
that the Army has also called members of the Individual Ready Reserve
into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its delayed entry
program into basic training ahead of schedule. Regarding the reserve
components, four of the six components generally met their enlisted
aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, but like
the active Army and Marine Corps, most of these components also
experienced difficulties in meeting their early fiscal year 2005
recruiting goals. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will
be particularly challenged, given that more active Army soldiers are
staying in the active force, and of those leaving, fewer are joining
the reserve components. Moreover, all of the active components
generally met their aggregate retention goals for the past 5 fiscal
years. The Army and the Air Force, however, missed some aggregate
retention goals in the first quarter of 2005. For example, the Army
missed its reenlistment goal for servicemembers completing their first
term by 6 percent. The Air Force achieved a reenlistment rate of 50
percent compared with its goal of 75 percent for servicemembers
completing their second term.
Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not
provide a complete representation of military occupations that are
either over-or under-staffed. Our analysis of early fiscal year 2005
data show, for example, that 63 percent of the Army's active component
occupations (i.e., specialties) are overfilled, and 32 percent are
underfilled. Also, 20 percent of the Marine Corps' active component
occupations are overfilled and 15 percent are underfilled. In the Navy,
32 of its active component occupations are over-filled and 55
occupations are under-filled. Based on the data we have received to
date, hundreds of hard-to-fill occupations exist within the 10 DOD
components. Moreover, on the basis of our analysis to date, we have
identified 73 occupations, in 7 of the 10 components, that have been
consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. Our analysis also
shows that 7 of the Army's occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry
scout) and 6 of the Air Force's occupations (e.g., combat control and
linguist) are on their "hard-to-recruit" and "hard-to-retain" lists.
DOD's components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their
recruiting and retention efforts. DOD, for example, can now offer
selective reenlistment bonuses to personnel who reenlist while serving
in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait, whether or not they serve in a
critical occupation. In addition, DOD recently began to offer
reenlistment bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces
personnel with 19 or more years of experience who reenlist for an
additional 6 years. Individual components have also implemented
changes. The Army, for example, increased the amount of cash bonuses it
offers to new recruits in hard-to-fill military occupations to as much
as $20,000. In addition, the Army increased its maximum college
scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000, and the Army National Guard
doubled the amount it will provide to repay a recruit's student loan to
$20,000. Regarding the services' nonfinancial efforts, the Army and
Marine Corps are increasing their recruiting forces. The Army plans to
add 965 recruiters to its current recruiter force of 5,065 recruiters
in fiscal year 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 recruiters
to its current recruiter force of 2,600 recruiters by fiscal year 2007.
Our fall 2005 report will contain more discussion of these and other
DOD efforts to enhance recruitment and retention.
Background:
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
DOD has launched three major military operations requiring significant
military personnel: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military
operations related to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom,
which includes ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain
other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing
military operations in Iraq. These military operations have greatly
increased the services' operations and personnel tempo of the military
services, and especially those of the Army and Marine Corps, which have
provided the bulk of the military personnel burden associated with
operations in Iraq. Additionally, a significant number of military
personnel have been killed or wounded in Iraq. Many congressional and
military observers have expressed concern that the current operations
tempo, combined with the level of casualties in Iraq, might lead to
lower recruiting and retention rates, thereby raising questions about
DOD's ability to sustain long-term force requirements. In addition,
there are growing concerns that a number of stress factors, such as
back-to-back and/or lengthy overseas deployments and heavier reliance
on the reserve components in the Army and Marine Corps, may
significantly hinder DOD's overall ability to effectively recruit and
retain forces.
According to DOD officals, recruiting is the military services' ability
to bring new members into the military to carry out mission essential
tasks in the near term and to begin creating a sufficient pool of entry-
level personnel to develop into future mid-level and upper-level
military leaders. To accomplish this task, active, reserve, and Guard
components set goals for accessions, or new recruits, who will enter
basic training each year. To assist in recruiting, the military
services advertise on television, on radio, and in print and
participate in promotional activities, such as sports car racing
events. In response to some of the services missing their overall
recruiting goals in the late 1990s, DOD increased its advertising,
number of recruiters, and financial incentives. Our September 2003
report[Footnote 2] assessed DOD's recruiting advertising programs, and
concluded that DOD did not have clear program objectives and adequate
outcome measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its advertising. We
recommended, and DOD agreed, that measurable advertising objectives
should be established and outcome measures should be developed to
evaluate advertising programs' performance.
The term retention used by DOD refers to the military services' ability
to keep personnel with the necessary skills and experience.
Servicemembers have the opportunity to either leave the military or
reenlist when their contracts expire. A common retention concern is
that too few people with the needed skills and experience will stay in
the military, thereby creating a shortage of experienced personnel,
decreased military efficiency, and lower job satisfaction. Although the
services have each created their own unique means of tracking
retention, they all measure retention in a career path at key points
that are delineated by various combinations of years of service and
number of enlistments. The Army and Marine Corps set numerical
retention goals; the Air Force and Navy state their retention goals in
terms of percentages of those able to reenlist.
Military Components Generally Met Overall Recruiting and Retention
Goals for the Past 5 Fiscal Years (2000-2004), but Some Components Have
Missed Early 2005 Goals:
The military components generally met their overall recruiting and
retention goals over the past 5 fiscal years. However, some are
beginning to experience difficulties in meeting their overall
recruiting and retention goals for fiscal year 2005.
Most Overall Recruitment Goals Were Met for Past 5 Years, but Army and
Marine Corps Experienced Recruiting Shortages Early This Year:
According to DOD data, the active and reserve components generally met
their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 to
2004. However, it should be noted that the "stop loss" policy
implemented by several components shortly after September 11, 2001,
might have facilitated these components in meeting their overall
recruiting goals for fiscal year 2002 and beyond. A "stop loss" policy
requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their
contract separation or retirement date. Keeping servicemembers on
active duty longer can reduce the number of new people the services
need to recruit to maintain endstrength. For example, the Army, which
has implemented some form of "stop loss" since December 4, 2001, has
required several thousand servicemembers to remain on active duty
beyond their contractual separation or retirement date. The recruiting
data presented in table 1 show that in fiscal year 2004, the Army,
Navy, and Air Force actually exceeded their goals with a 101 percent
rate.
Table 1: Total Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals and
Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004:
Army;
Fiscal year: 2000;
Goal: 80,000;
Actual: 80,113;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Goal: 75,800;
Actual: 75,855;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Goal: 79,500;
Actual: 79,585;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Goal: 73,800;
Actual: 74,132;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Goal: 77,000;
Actual: 77,586;
Percent of Goal Met: 101%.
Navy;
Fiscal year: 2000;
Goal: 55,000;
Actual: 55,147;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Goal: 53,520;
Actual: 53,690;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Goal: 46,150;
Actual: 46,155;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Goal: 41,065;
Actual: 41,076;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Goal: 39,620;
Actual: 39,871;
Percent of Goal Met: 101%.
Marine Corps;
Fiscal year: 2000;
Goal: 32,417;
Actual: 32,440;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Goal: 31,404;
Actual: 31,429;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Goal: 32,593;
Actual: 32,767;
Percent of Goal Met: 101%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Goal: 32,501;
Actual: 32,530;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Goal: 30,608;
Actual: 30,618;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Air Force;
Fiscal year: 2000;
Goal: 34,600;
Actual: 35,217;
Percent of Goal Met: 102%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Goal: 34,600;
Actual: 35,381;
Percent of Goal Met: 102%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Goal: 37,283;
Actual: 37,967;
Percent of Goal Met: 102%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Goal: 37,000;
Actual: 37,141;
Percent of Goal Met: 100%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Goal: 34,080;
Actual: 34,361;
Percent of Goal Met: 101%.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
More recently, however, the Marine Corps and Army failed to meet
February 2005 overall recruiting goals. The Marine Corps missed its
January goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 2.6 percent, and
narrowly missed its goal again in February. This is the first time that
the Marine Corps has missed a monthly annual recruiting goal since
1995. The Army is also beginning to experience difficulties and, in
February 2005, missed its goal of 7,050 new recruits by 27.5 percent,
or 1,936 recruits. This is significant, given that the Army has also
called members of the Individual Ready Reserve[Footnote 3] into active
duty and moved thousands of recruits from its delayed entry program
into basic training ahead of schedule.[Footnote 4] Air Force and Navy
overall recruiting goals, on the other hand, do not appear to be in
jeopardy at this time, as both services intend to reduce their
endstrengths. Over the next year the Air Force plans to downsize by
about 20,000 personnel, and the Navy is looking to trim more than 7,300
sailors.
Table 2 shows that four of the six DOD reserve components generally met
their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 through
2004 but that the Army National Guard achieved only 82 percent of its
recruiting objectives in fiscal years 2003 and 87 percent 2004, and
that the Air National Guard achieved 94 percent of its recruiting
objective in fiscal year 2004.
Table 2: Total Reserve Component Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals
and Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004:
Fiscal year: 2000;
Army National Guard: Goal: 54,034;
Army National Guard: Actual: 61,260;
Army National Guard: Percent of goal met: 113;
Army Reserve: Goal: 48,461;
Army Reserve: Actual: 48,596;
Army Reserve: Percent of goal met: 100;
Navy Reserve: Goal: 18,410;
Navy Reserve: Actual: 14,911;
Navy Reserve: Percent of goal met: 81.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Army National Guard: Goal: 60,252;
Army National Guard: Actual: 61,956;
Army National Guard: Percent of goal met: 103;
Army Reserve: Goal: 34,910;
Army Reserve: Actual: 35,522;
Army Reserve: Percent of goal met: 102;
Navy Reserve: Goal: 15,250;
Navy Reserve: Actual: 15,344;
Navy Reserve: Percent of goal met: 101.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Army National Guard: Goal: 60,504;
Army National Guard: Actual: 63,251;
Army National Guard: Percent of goal met: 105;
Army Reserve: Goal: 38,251;
Army Reserve: Actual: 41,385;
Army Reserve: Percent of goal met: 108;
Navy Reserve: Goal: 15,000;
Navy Reserve: Actual: 15,355;
Navy Reserve: Percent of goal met: 102.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Army National Guard: Goal: 66,000;
Army National Guard: Actual: 54,202;
Army National Guard: Percent of goal met: 82;
Army Reserve: Goal: 40,900;
Army Reserve: Actual: 41,851;
Army Reserve: Percent of goal met: 102;
Navy Reserve: Goal: 12,000;
Navy Reserve: Actual: 12,772;
Navy Reserve: Percent of goal met: 106.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Army National Guard: Goal: 56,002;
Army National Guard: Actual: 48,793;
Army National Guard: Percent of goal met: 87;
Army Reserve: Goal: 32,275;
Army Reserve: Actual: 32,710;
Army Reserve: Percent of goal met: 101;
Navy Reserve: Goal: 10,101;
Navy Reserve: Actual: 11,246;
Navy Reserve: Percent of goal met: 111.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Marine Corps Reserve: Goal: 9,341;
Marine Corps Reserve: Actual: 9,465;
Marine Corps Reserve: Percent of goal met: 101;
Air National Guard: Goal: 10,080;
Air National Guard: Actual: 10,730;
Air National Guard: Percent of goal met: 106;
Air Force Reserve: Goal: 9,624;
Air Force Reserve: Actual: 7,740;
Air Force Reserve: Percent of goal met: 80.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Marine Corps Reserve: Goal: 8,945;
Marine Corps Reserve: Actual: 9,117;
Marine Corps Reserve: Percent of goal met: 102;
Air National Guard: Goal: 11,808;
Air National Guard: Actual: 10,258;
Air National Guard: Percent of goal met: 87;
Air Force Reserve: Goal: 8,051;
Air Force Reserve: Actual: 8,826;
Air Force Reserve: Percent of goal met: 110.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Marine Corps Reserve: Goal: 9,835;
Marine Corps Reserve: Actual: 10,090;
Marine Corps Reserve: Percent of goal met: 103;
Air National Guard: Goal: 9,570;
Air National Guard: Actual: 10,122;
Air National Guard: Percent of goal met: 106;
Air Force Reserve: Goal: 6,080;
Air Force Reserve: Actual: 6,926;
Air Force Reserve: Percent of goal met: 114.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Marine Corps Reserve: Goal: 8,173;
Marine Corps Reserve: Actual: 8,222;
Marine Corps Reserve: Percent of goal met: 101;
Air National Guard: Goal: 5,712;
Air National Guard: Actual: 8,471;
Air National Guard: Percent of goal met: 148;
Air Force Reserve: Goal: 7,512;
Air Force Reserve: Actual: 7,557;
Air Force Reserve: Percent of goal met: 101.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Marine Corps Reserve: Goal: 8,087;
Marine Corps Reserve: Actual: 8,248;
Marine Corps Reserve: Percent of goal met: 102;
Air National Guard: Goal: 8,842;
Air National Guard: Actual: 8,276;
Air National Guard: Percent of goal met: 94;
Air Force Reserve: Goal: 7,997;
Air Force Reserve: Actual: 8,904;
Air Force Reserve: Percent of goal met: 111.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
First quarter 2005 reserve and Guard recruiting data suggest that the
reserve components may experience difficulties in meeting their early
2005 overall recruiting goals. The Marine Corps Reserve, which achieved
106 percent of its overall first quarter 2005 recruiting goals, is the
only reserve component that has met or surpassed its goal so far this
year. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 87 and 80
percent of their overall recruiting goals, respectively. The Air Force
Reserve achieved 91 percent of its overall recruiting goal; the Air
National Guard, 71 percent; and the Navy Reserve, 77 percent. DOD has
noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly challenged,
since more active Army soldiers are staying in the active force, and of
those leaving, fewer are joining the reserve components.
Most Overall Retention Goals Met for Past 5 Years:
According to DOD data, the four active components generally met their
enlisted aggregate retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal
year 2004. However, as I stated in the discussion on recruiting, it
should also be noted here that the services' "stop loss" policies
implemented shortly after September 11, 2001, might have facilitated
the services in meeting their aggregate retention goals since fiscal
year 2002. In addition, the Army generally reduced its overall
retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2003.
Table 3 shows that the Army is the only active component that met all
of its retention goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. Table 3 also
shows that, in fiscal year 2004, the Navy missed its retention goal for
initial reenlistments by just less than 2 percentage points and the Air
Force missed its goal for midcareer term reenlistments by 5 percentage
points. In fact, the Air Force missed this goal in 4 of the past 5
fiscal years and missed its goal for career third term or subsequent
reenlistments in 2000 and 2001. The Navy missed its goal for
reenlistments among enlisted personnel who have served from 10 to 14
years in 2 of the past 5 fiscal years, and the Marine Corps missed its
goal for second and subsequent reenlistments in fiscal year 2003 only.
Table 3: Total Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Retention Goals and
Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004:
Service: Army;
FY 2000: Initial;
Goal: 20,000;
Actual: 21,402;
Percent of Goal Met: 107.
FY 2000: Midcareer;
Goal: 23,700;
Actual: 24,118;
Percent of Goal Met: 102.
FY 2000: Career;
Goal: 24,300;
Actual: 25,791;
Percent of Goal Met: 106.
Service: Navy;
FY 2000: Zone A;
Goal: N/A;
Actual: 29.6%;
Percent of Goal Met: N/A.
FY 2000: Zone B;
Goal: N/A;
Actual: 46.5%;
Percent of Goal Met: N/A.
FY 2000: Zone C;
Goal: N/A;
Actual: 56.6%;
Percent of Goal Met: N/A.
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2000: First term;
Goal: 5,791;
Actual: 5,846;
Percent of Goal Met: 101.
FY 2000: Subsequent;
Goal: NA;
Actual: 63.4%;
Percent of Goal Met: NA.
Service: Air Force;
FY 2000: First term;
Goal: 55%;
Actual: 53.1%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2000: Second term;
Goal: 75%;
Actual: 69.7%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2000: Career;
Goal: 95%;
Actual: 90.8%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
Service: Army;
FY 2001: Initial;
Goal: 19,750;
Actual: 20,000;
Percent of Goal Met: 101.
FY 2001: Midcareer;
Goal: 23,350;
Actual: 23,727;
Percent of Goal Met: 102.
FY 2001: Career;
Goal: 20,900;
Actual: 21,255;
Percent of Goal Met: 102.
Service: Navy;
FY 2001: Zone A;
Goal: 57%;
Actual: 56.9%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2001: Zone B;
Goal: 69%;
Actual: 68.2%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2001: Zone C;
Goal: 89%;
Actual: 85.0%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2001: First term;
Goal: 6,144;
Actual: 6,144;
Percent of Goal Met: 100.
FY 2001: Subsequent;
Goal: NA;
Actual: 5,900;
Percent of Goal Met: NA.
Service: Air Force;
FY 2001: First term;
Goal: 55%;
Actual: 56.1%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2001: Second term;
Goal: 75%;
Actual: 68.9%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2001: Career;
Goal: 95%;
Actual: 90.2%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
Service: Army;
FY 2002: Initial;
Goal: 19,100;
Actual: 19,433;
Percent of Goal Met: 102.
FY 2002: Midcareer;
Goal: 22,700;
Actual: 23,074;
Percent of Goal Met: 102.
FY 2002: Career;
Goal: 15,000;
Actual: 15,700;
Percent of Goal Met: 105.
Service: Navy;
FY 2002: Zone A;
Goal: 56%;
Actual: 58.7%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2002: Zone B;
Goal: 73%;
Actual: 74.5%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2002: Zone C;
Goal: 90%;
Actual: 87.4%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2002: First term;
Goal: 5,900;
Actual: 6,050;
Percent of Goal Met: 103.
FY 2002: Subsequent;
Goal: 5,784;
Actual: 7,258;
Percent of Goal Met: 125.
Service: Air Force;
FY 2002: First term;
Goal: 55%;
Actual: 72.1%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2002: Second term;
Goal: 75%;
Actual: 78.3%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2002: Career;
Goal: 95%;
Actual: 94.6%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
Service: Army;
FY 2003: Initial;
Goal: 19,821;
Actual: 21,838;
Percent of Goal Met: 110.
FY 2003: Midcareer;
Goal: 18,422;
Actual: 19,509;
Percent of Goal Met: 106.
FY 2003: Career;
Goal: 12,757;
Actual: 12,804;
Percent of Goal Met: 100.
Service: Navy;
FY 2003: Zone A;
Goal: 56%;
Actual: 61.8%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2003: Zone B;
Goal: 73%;
Actual: 76.7%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2003: Zone C;
Goal: 86%;
Actual: 87.9%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2003: First term;
Goal: 6,025;
Actual: 6,001;
Percent of Goal Met: 100.
FY 2003: Subsequent;
Goal: 6,172;
Actual: 5,815;
Percent of Goal Met: 94.
Service: Air Force;
FY 2003: First term;
Goal: 55%;
Actual: 60.5%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2003: Second term;
Goal: 79%;
Actual: 72.9%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2003: Career;
Goal: 95%;
Actual: 95.2%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
Service: Army;
FY 2004: Initial;
Goal: 23,000;
Actual: 24,903;
Percent of Goal Met: 108.
FY 2004: Midcareer;
Goal: 20,292;
Actual: 21,120;
Percent of Goal Met: 104.
FY 2004: Career;
Goal: 12,808;
Actual: 13,987;
Percent of Goal Met: 109.
Service: Navy;
FY 2004: Zone A;
Goal: 56%;
Actual: 54.1%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2004: Zone B;
Goal: 70%;
Actual: 70.2%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2004: Zone C;
Goal: 85%;
Actual: 86.9%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
Service: Marine Corps;
FY 2004: First term;
Goal: 5,974;
Actual: 6,011;
Percent of Goal Met: 101.
FY 2004: Subsequent;
Goal: 5,628;
Actual: 7,729;
Percent of Goal Met: 137.
Service: Air Force;
FY 2004: First term;
Goal: 55%;
Actual: 63%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
FY 2004: Second term;
Goal: 75%;
Actual: 70%;
Percent of Goal Met: Short.
FY 2004: Career;
Goal: 95%;
Actual: 97%;
Percent of Goal Met: Exceed.
Source: DOD.
Notes: Various Navy and Marine Corps retention goals for fiscal years
2000 and 2001 were not available or complete (i.e., "N/A").
The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), mid-career (second or subsequent enlistment with
less than 10 years of service), and career (second or subsequent
enlistment with 10 or more years of service).
The Navy's most important retention categories are Zone A (up to 6
years of service), Zone B (6 years of service to under 10 years of
service), and Zone C (10 years of service to under 14 years of service).
The Marine Corps tracks retention by first enlistment and second or
subsequent enlistment.
The Air Force tracks retention by first term (first enlistment,
regardless of length), second term (second enlistment), and career
(third or subsequent enlistment).
[End of table]
For the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, data show that the Army
missed its initial reenlistment goal for active duty enlisted personal
by 6 percent and its midcareer reenlistment goal by 4 percent. The Air
Force also missed two of its reenlistment goals for active duty
enlisted personnel in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005. The Air
Force achieved a reenlistment rate of 50 percent for second-term
reenlistments, compared with its goal of 75 percent, and a reenlistment
rate of 92 percent for career reenlistments, compared with its goal of
95 percent. The Air Force also established a goal for 55 percent of all
personnel eligible for a first-term reenlistment to reenlist and missed
this goal by just 1 percent.
We are continuing to collect, analyze, and assess the reliability of
retention data for both the active and reserve components, which we
will incorporate into our final report.
Aggregate Recruitment and Retention Data Do Not Identify Over-or Under-
staffing within Certain Military Occupations:
Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not
provide a complete representation of occupations that are either over-
or under-filled. For example, our analysis of fiscal year 2005 Army
data, on its 185 active component enlisted occupations, shows that 116
occupations, or 63 percent, are currently overfilled and that 60
occupations, or 32 percent, are underfilled. Also, the Marine Corps
told us that, of its 255 active component enlisted occupations, 52
occupations, or 20 percent, are overfilled and that 37 occupations, or
15 percent, are underfilled. Data provided by the Navy show that 32
enlisted occupations are overfilled and 55 occupations are under filled.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, about 30 percent of the
occupations for enlisted personnel experienced shortages and about 40
percent experienced overages, on average, from fiscal year 1999 through
fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 5] We requested the active, reserve, and
Guard components provide us with their list of hard-to-fill
occupations. On the basis of data for 7 of 10 components, we identified
several hundred occupations that have been consistently designated as
hard-to-fill because the components had not been able to successfully
recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel in these areas to
meet current or projected needs. Of these, we identified 73 occupations
as being consistently hard to fill. Table 4 shows these 73 hard-to-fill
occupations, by components.
Table 4: Hard-to-Fill Occupations:
Component: Active Duty Army;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Infantry;
* Cannon Crewmember;
* Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Crewmember;
* Field Artillery Computer System Specialist;
* Cavalry Scout;
* M1 Armor Crewmember;
* Abrams Tank Maintainer;
* Bradley Maintainer;
* Petroleum Supply Specialist;
* Food Services Specialist;
* Cryptic Linguist.
Component: Army Reserve;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Heavy Construction Equipment Operator;
* Concrete and Asphalt Equipment Operator;
* Carpentry and Masonry Specialist;
* Cable Systems Installer-Maintainer;
* Military Police;
* Psychological Operations Specialist;
* Civil Affairs, General;
* Light Wheel Vehicle Maintainer;
* Chemical Operations Specialist;
* Motor Transport Operator;
* Ammunitions Specialist;
* Hospital Food Specialist;
* Automated Logistical Specialist;
* Petroleum Supply Specialist;
* Shower/Laundry and Clothing Repair Specialist;
* Water Treatment Specialist.
Component: Active Duty Air Force;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Aircraft Loadmaster;
* Airborne Mission Specialist;
* Air Traffic Control;
* Combat Control;
* Tactical Air Command and Control;
* Aerospace Control and Warning Systems;
* Intelligence;
* Imagery Analysis;
* Crypto Linguist;
* Signals Intelligence Analysis;
* Electronic Signals Intelligence Exploitation;
* Survival/Evasion/Resistance/Escape Operations;
* Pararescue;
* Interpreter/Translater;
* Electronic Computer Switching Systems.
Component: Air Force Reserve;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Aircrew Operations;
* Intelligence;
* Aircrew Protection;
* Weather;
* Manned Aerospace Maintenance;
* Logistics;
* Maintenance Management Systems;
* Transportation;
* Munitions and Weapons;
* Security Forces.
Component: Active Duty Marine Corps;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Counter Intelligence Specialist.
Component: Marine Corps Reserve;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Intelligence;
* Imagery Analysis;
* Reconnaissance;
* Civil Affairs Non Commissioned Officer;
* Ground Communications Repairer;
* Military Police;
* Air Traffic Controller;
* Airborne Radio Operator;
* Scout Sniper;
* KC-130 Crewmembers.
Component: Active Navy;
Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard
to recruit or retain:
* Aviation Structural Mechanic (Equipment);
* Aviation Structural Mechanic (Structural);
* Cryptologic Technician;
* Data Processing Technician;
* Electrician's Mate;
* Fire Control Technician;
* Machinist's Mate;
* Mineman;
* Missile Technician;
* Operations Specialist.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data:
Notes: The remaining components (Air National Guard, Army National
Guard and Navy Reserve) did not provide us with data.
Active duty Army data from 2001-2005, Army Reserve data from 2000-2009,
active duty Air Force data from 2000-2005, Air Force Reserve data is
current proposed information, Marine Corps data is 2000-2005, Navy data
is from GAO report 05-299.[Footnote 6]
[End of table]
More specifically, we asked DOD to provide us with the current hard-to-
fill occupations for active duty components, and we received data for
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps currently does not
report hard-to-fill occupation information to DOD. Table 5 shows the
extent to which these occupations were over-or under-filled as of
November 2004.
Table 5: Over-and Under-filled Hard-to-Fill Occupations As of November
2004:
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Special
Warfare Diver;
Personnel authorized: 3288;
Personnel assigned: 2187;
Difference: -1101.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Surface
Force Corpsman;
Personnel authorized: 614;
Personnel assigned: 188;
Difference: -426.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Nuclear
Missile Technician;
Personnel authorized: 10536;
Personnel assigned: 10364;
Difference: -172.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: P-3 Flight
Engineer;
Personnel authorized: 354;
Personnel assigned: 257;
Difference: -97.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Sonar
Technician (Submarine);
Personnel authorized: 1985;
Personnel assigned: 1901;
Difference: -84.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: In Flight
Aviation Technician;
Personnel authorized: 214;
Personnel assigned: 145;
Difference: -69.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Sonar
Technician (Surface);
Personnel authorized: 175;
Personnel assigned: 111;
Difference: -64.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Linguist;
Personnel authorized: 932;
Personnel assigned: 872;
Difference: -60.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Special
Operations Corpsman;
Personnel authorized: 101;
Personnel assigned: 54;
Difference: -47.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Navy: Aviation
Warfare Operator;
Personnel authorized: 225;
Personnel assigned: 215;
Difference: -10.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Crypto Linguist;
Personnel authorized: 1459;
Personnel assigned: 1916;
Difference: +457.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Explosive Ordinance Disposal;
Personnel authorized: 1006;
Personnel assigned: 1074;
Difference: +68.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE);
Personnel authorized: 404;
Personnel assigned: 408;
Difference: +4.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Airborne Crypto Linguist;
Personnel authorized: 944;
Personnel assigned: 499;
Difference: -445.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Operation Intel;
Personnel authorized: 2519;
Personnel assigned: 2293;
Difference: -226.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Network Intelligence Analysis;
Personnel authorized: 1511;
Personnel assigned: 1365;
Difference: -146.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Pararescue;
Personnel authorized: 362;
Personnel assigned: 243;
Difference: -119.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Imagery Analysis;
Personnel authorized: 1150;
Personnel assigned: 1071;
Difference: -79.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Combat Control;
Personnel authorized: 432;
Personnel assigned: 360;
Difference: -72.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Air Force:
Electrical Signals Intelligence Exploitation;
Personnel authorized: 734;
Personnel assigned: 673;
Difference: -61.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army:
Infantryman;
Personnel authorized: 39690;
Personnel assigned: 41287;
Difference: +1597.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Cavalry
Scout;
Personnel authorized: 7656;
Personnel assigned: 7889;
Difference: +233.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Motor
Transport Operator;
Personnel authorized: 11830;
Personnel assigned: 10459;
Difference: -1371.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Health
Care Specialist;
Personnel authorized: 16962;
Personnel assigned: 16472;
Difference: -490.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Fire
Support Specialist;
Personnel authorized: 4283;
Personnel assigned: 3914;
Difference: -369.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Chemical
Operation Specialist;
Personnel authorized: 6694;
Personnel assigned: 6342;
Difference: -352.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Special
Operations Medical Sergeant;
Personnel authorized: 769;
Personnel assigned: 630;
Difference: -139.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Petroleum
Supply Specialist;
Personnel authorized: 8306;
Personnel assigned: 8206;
Difference: -100.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Explosive
Ordinance Disposal;
Personnel authorized: 984;
Personnel assigned: 886;
Difference: -98.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Army: Food
Service Specialist;
Personnel authorized: 9659;
Personnel assigned: 9588;
Difference: -71.
Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component: Marine Corps:
No data available;
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data:
Note: N/A denotes not available.
[End of table]
Further analysis of the data shows that 7 of the Army's occupations
(infantry, fire support specialist, cavalry scout, chemical operations
specialist, motor transport operator, petroleum supply specialist, and
food service specialist) and 6 of the Air Force's occupations (airborne
linguist;
combat control; imagery analysis; linguist; SERE [survival, evasion,
resistance, escape operations]; pararescue, and explosive ordnance
disposal) are on both the services' "hard to recruit" and "hard to
retain" lists.
DOD's Components Are Taking Steps to Address Recruiting and Retention
Challenges:
DOD has made enhancements to existing programs and introduced new
programs in recent years to improve its ability to recruit and retain
servicemembers. These programs include increasing the eligibility for
and size of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and educational
benefits, and the number of recruiters.
DOD, for example, expanded the pool of servicemembers who are eligible
to receive a selective reenlistment bonus. Selective reenlistment
bonuses are designed to provide an incentive for an adequate number of
qualified midcareer enlisted members to reenlist in designated critical
occupations where retention levels are insufficient to sustain current
or projected levels necessary for a service to accomplish its mission.
The statutory authority for this bonus was amended in the Fiscal Year
2004 Defense Authorization Act to allow the Secretary of Defense to
waive the "critical skill" requirement for members who reenlist or
extend an enlistment while serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait in
support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 7]
In addition, in February 2005, DOD announced a new retention bonus for
Special Operations Forces personnel (Army Special Forces; Navy SEALs;
and Air Force pararescue, plus a few other specialties) who decide to
remain in the military beyond 19 years of service. The largest bonus,
$150,000, will go to senior sergeants, petty officers, and warrant
officers who sign up for an additional 6 years of service. Personnel
who sign up for shorter extensions will receive a smaller bonus;
personnel who extend for 1 additional year, for example, will receive
$8,000.
Individual components have also implemented changes. The Army, for
instance, increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new
recruits in hard-to-fill military occupations up to $20,000. In
December 2004, the National Guard announced that it is increasing its
initial enlistment bonuses from $8,000 to $10,000 for individuals
without prior service who sign up for one of the National Guard's top-
priority military occupations such as infantry, military police, and
transportation. DOD officials also said the Army and the National Guard
are increasing the amount of their college scholarship funds for new
enlistees. The Army increased the maximum college scholarship from
$50,000 to $70,000, while the Army National Guard doubled the amount it
will provide to repay a recruit's student loan to $20,000.
Finally, the Army and Marine Corps components are increasing their
recruiting forces to meet their additional recruiting challenges. The
Army plans to add 965 recruiters to its recruiter force in fiscal year
2005, for a total force of 6,030 recruiters, and the Marine Corps plans
to add 425 recruiters to its recruiter force by fiscal year 2007,
bringing its total recruiter force to 3,025 recruiters.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Derek B. Stewart at
(202) 512-5559 (e-mail address: [Hyperlink, Stewartd@gao.gov] or David
E. Moser at (202) 512-7611 (e-mail address: [Hyperlink,
Moserd@gao.gov]. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Alissa H. Czyz, Joseph J. Faley, Brian D. Pegram, and John S.
Townes.
(350662):
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD's reserve components include the collective forces of the Army
National Guard and the Air National Guard, as well as the forces from
the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the
Air Force Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve also assists DOD in meeting
its commitments. However, we do not cover the Coast Guard Reserve here
because it accounts for about 1 percent of the total reserve force and
falls under the Department of Homeland Security rather than DOD.
[2] See GAO, Military Recruiting: DOD Needs to Establish Objectives and
Measures to Better Evaluate Advertising's Effectiveness, GAO-03-1005
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).
[3] The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised principally of
individuals who (1) have had training, (2) have served previously in an
active or reserve component, and (3) have some period of their military
service obligation remaining.
[4] The delayed entry program consists of individuals who have signed a
contract to join the military at a future date.
[5] Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options (February 2005).
[6] See GAO, Financial Costs and Loss of Critical Skills Due to DOD's
Homosexual Conduct Policy Cannot Be Completely Estimated, GAO-05-299
(Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
[7] Pub. L. No. 108-136, sec. 626
