Rebuilding Iraq
Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police Gao ID: GAO-05-431T March 14, 2005Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military and police forces capable of maintaining security. To support this effort, the United States provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-04 to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the president requested a supplemental appropriation with an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi military and police forces. GAO provides preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces; (2) the data on the status of forces, and (3) challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments of Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other statements for the record from officials such as the Secretary of Defense. In addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training facility in Jordan.
The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently maintain security. U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of March 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and about 62,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor. The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity, and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force has faced four key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment. The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.
GAO-05-431T, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 12:00 p.m. EST:
Monday, March 14, 2005:
Testimony:
Before the Committee on Government Reform; Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; House of
Representatives:
Rebuilding Iraq:
Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security
Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police:
Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and
Trade:
GAO-05-431T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-431T, a testimony before the Committee on
Government Reform; Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations; House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the
multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military and
police forces capable of maintaining security. To support this effort,
the United States provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-04 to develop
Iraq‘s security capability. In February 2005, the president requested a
supplemental appropriation with an additional $5.7 billion to
accelerate the development of Iraqi military and police forces.
GAO provides preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for
transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police
forces; (2) the data on the status of forces, and (3) challenges that
the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security
missions to these forces.
To prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status
updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments of
Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other statements for
the record from officials such as the Secretary of Defense. In
addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training facility in Jordan.
What GAO Found:
The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a
strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military
and police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its
forces based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and
developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently
maintain security.
U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to
which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of late
February 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police
forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military
forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and
equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable
because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and
accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data
does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments of
State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi
security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles,
communications equipment, and body armor.
The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it
difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From
that time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number,
complexity, and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force
has faced four key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi
forces: (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force
structure; (2) developing a system for measuring the readiness and
capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and leadership
throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a police
force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment.
The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges,
such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US
forces within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a
more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department
of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down
U.S. forces from Iraq.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202)
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges in transferring
security responsibilities from the multinational force to the Iraqi
military and police forces. In April 2005, we will issue a classified
report to the Congress that provides additional analysis on this
subject.
The former Iraqi regime fell in April 2003, and the United Nations
recognized an interim administration--the Coalition Provisional
Authority. On May 23, 2003, the Authority dissolved the military and
paramilitary organizations of the former Iraqi regime and announced
plans to create a new national self-defense capability for Iraq. In
June 2004, the Authority transferred sovereignty to an interim
government. At the time of Iraq's January 2005 elections, more than
159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition forces were operating
throughout Iraq.
As of March 2005, the United States has made available about $5.8
billion to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the
President requested a supplemental appropriation for Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other purposes that included an additional $5.7 billion to
accelerate the development of Iraqi security forces.
Today, I will provide preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for
transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police
forces, (2) data on the status of Iraqi forces, and (3) challenges the
Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security
missions to these forces.
This statement only includes unclassified information. (See appendix I
for details on our scope and methodology.) We conducted work for this
statement in February and March 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Since fall 2003, MNF-I has developed and refined a plan to transfer
security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police
forces.[Footnote 1] The plan's objective was to allow a gradual
drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the
neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with the development of
Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. In summer 2004, MNF-I
developed and began implementing a comprehensive campaign plan with
this transition concept. The campaign plan is classified. As of March
2005, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, stated that Iraqi security
forces were growing in capability but were not ready to take on the
insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-
I.
U.S. government data do not provide reliable information on the status
of Iraqi military and police forces. The goal of the multinational
force is to train and equip about 271,000 Iraqi security forces by July
2006. As of late February 2005, the State Department reported that
about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and
almost 60,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have
been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police
is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive
consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the
country. The data also include police absent from duty. Further, State
no longer reports on the extent to which Iraqi security forces have
their required weapons, vehicles, communication equipment, and body
armor.
The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it
difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces.
According to Department of Defense officials and documents, the
insurgency has grown in intensity and sophistication. Attacks against
the coalition and its Iraqi forces have increased in number over time,
with the highest peaks of attacks occurring in August and November 2004
and in January 2005. At the same time, MNF-I faces four challenges in
building an Iraqi security force capable of combating the insurgency.
First, the Iraqi force structure for the military and police is
changing with the creation of new units by MNF-I and the Iraqi
ministries. This makes it difficult to provide effective support--the
training, equipment, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. Second, MNF-I is
still developing a system to assess the readiness of Iraqi military and
police forces so they can identify weaknesses and provide them with
effective support. Third, developing strong Iraqi leadership and
ensuring the loyalty of all personnel throughout the chain of command
has proven difficult. Fourth, MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries find it
difficult to train a national police force that abides by the rule of
law while operating in a hostile environment.
MNF-I is aware of these challenges and is working to address them. For
example, MNF-I is developing a system to measure the readiness of the
Iraqi military and police and is moving to expand a system of embedded
U.S. trainers to help develop strong Iraqi leadership.
Background:
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, was
the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States and
the United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of
Iraq. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the
former regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new
Iraqi security forces, including the police and new Iraqi army. Over
time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for
recruiting and training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their
areas of responsibility.[Footnote 2] On June 28, 2004, the CPA
transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government, the CPA
officially dissolved, and Iraq's transitional period began. Under
Iraq's transitional law,[Footnote 3] the transitional period covers the
interim government phase and the transitional government period, which
is scheduled to end by December 31, 2005.[Footnote 4]
The multinational force (MNF-I) has the authority to take all necessary
measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this
process, working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach
agreement on security and policy issues. A May 2004 national security
presidential directive required the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to
direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi
security forces. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq,
which operates under MNF-I, now leads coalition efforts to train,
equip, and organize Iraqi security forces.
MNF-I Plan for Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces:
In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan
for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The four
phases were (1) mutual support, where the multinational force
establishes conditions for transferring security responsibilities to
Iraqi forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a
local area assume responsibility for security; (3) transition to
regional control, where Iraqi forces are responsible for larger
regions; and (4) transition to strategic over watch, where Iraqi forces
on a national level are capable of maintaining a secure environment
against internal and external threats, with broad monitoring from the
multinational force. The plan's objective was to allow a gradual
drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the
neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with the development of
Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.[Footnote 5]
Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted
to quickly shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not
succeed in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered
about 203,000, including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities
protection officers,[Footnote 6] and about 38,000 in the civilian
defense corps. Police and military units performed poorly during an
escalation of insurgent attacks against the coalition in April 2004.
According to a July 2004 executive branch report to Congress, many
Iraqi security forces around the country collapsed during this
uprising. Some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces. Other
units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and in some cases
assisted the insurgency.
A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security
forces. MNF-I identified problems in training and equipping them as
among the reasons for their poor performance. Training of police and
some defense forces was not uniform and varied widely across Iraq. MNF-
I's commanders had the leeway to institute their own versions of the
transitional police curriculum, and the training for some defense
forces did not prepare them to fight against well-armed insurgents.
Further, according to the CPA Director of Police, when Iraqi police
voluntarily returned to duty in May 2003, CPA initially provided
limited training and did not thoroughly vet the personnel to get them
on the streets quickly. Many police who were hired remain untrained and
unvetted, according to Department of Defense (DOD) officials.
MNF-I completed a campaign plan[Footnote 7] during summer 2004 that
elaborated and refined the original strategy for transferring security
responsibilities to Iraqi forces at the local, regional, and then
national levels. Further details on this campaign plan are classified.
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability but
were not yet ready to take on the insurgency without the presence,
help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I. He cited a mixed performance
record for the Iraqi security forces during the previous 11 months. The
commander further testified that focused training and mentoring of
Iraqi Intervention Forces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and
National Guard forces contributed to successful coalition operations in
places such as Najaf and Kufa during August 2004 and Fallujah during
November 2004, and during the January 2005 elections. On the other
hand, he also cited instances of poor performance by the police in
western Baghdad from August through October 2004 and Mosul during
November 2004.
Data on Iraqi Security Forces Has Limitations:
U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the
status of Iraqi military and police forces. According to a March 2005
State Department report, as of February 28, 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense had 59,695 operational troops, or roughly two thirds of the
total required. The Ministry of Interior had 82,072 trained and
equipped officers on duty, or almost half of the total required. Table
1 shows status of Iraqi forces under the Ministries of Defense and
Interior.
Table 1: Status of Iraqi Security Forces as Reported by the Department
of State:
Ministry: Defense;
Component: Iraq Army;
* Regular Army;
* National Guard;
* Intervention Force;
* Special Operations;
Required[A]: 94,656;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 58,992;
Percentage of Required: 62%.
Component: Air Force;
Required[A]: 453;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 186;
Percentage of Required: 41%.
Component: Navy;
Required[A]: 582;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 517;
Percentage of Required: 89%.
Component: Sub-total;
Required[A]: 95,691;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 59,695[C];
Percentage of Required: 62%.
Ministry: Interior;
Component: Iraqi Police Service;
Required[A]: 135,000;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 55,274;
Percentage of Required: 39.
Component: Highway Patrol;
Required[A]: 6,300.
Component: Other forces;
* Civil Intervention;
* Special Police;
* Emergency Response;
* Border Enforcement;
* Dignitary Protection;
Required[A]: 34,050;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 26,798;
Percentage of Required: 79%.
Component: Sub-total;
Required[A]: 175,350;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 82,072[D];
Percentage of Required: 47%.
Total;
Required[A]: 271,041;
Operational/Trained and Equipped[B]: 141,761;
Percentage of Required: 52%.
Source: State Department reports.
[A] Required numbers are from 1/19/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report.
[B] The term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The
term "trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces.
Numbers are from 3/2/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report.
[C] Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of
Defense numbers.
[D] Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior
numbers.
[End of table]
MNF-I's goal is to train and equip a total of about 271,000 Iraqi
security forces by July 2006. However, the numbers of security forces,
as reported in table 1, are limited in providing accurate and complete
information on the status of Iraqi forces. Specifically:
* The reported number of security forces overstates the number actually
serving. Ministry of Interior reports, for example, include police who
are absent without leave in its totals. Ministry of Defense reports
exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. According to DOD
officials, the number of absentees is probably in the tens of
thousands.
* The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable. According to a
senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not know
how many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the
Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting
from police stations across Iraq.
* The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional
information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have
their necessary equipment. As recently as September 2004, State issued
unclassified reports with detailed information on the number of
weapons, vehicles, communication equipment, and body amour required by
each security force compared to the amount received. State had also
provided weekly unclassified updates on the number of personnel trained
in each unit.
In addition, the total number of Iraqi security forces includes forces
with varying missions and training levels. Not all units are designed
to be capable of fighting the insurgency. For example, the police
service, which numbers about 55,000 of Iraq's 141,000 personnel who
have received training, has a civilian law enforcement function. As of
mid-December 2004, paramilitary training for a high-threat hostile
environment was not part of the curriculum for new recruits. The
missions of other units, such as the Ministry of Defense's commando
battalion and the Ministry of Interior's Emergency Response Unit, focus
on combating terrorism. Required training for both forces includes
counterterrorism. Table 2 provides information on the types of military
and police units, their missions, and their training.
Table 2: Missions and Training of Iraqi Security Forces:
Ministry: Defense;
Unit: Iraqi Army: * Regular Army;
Mission: Defend Iraq against external threats; When directed, assist in
providing defense against internal threats;
Training: Eight weeks of basic training. Before deployment units
receive follow-on operational training.
Unit: Iraqi Army: * National Guard;
Mission: Conduct stability operations to support internal security.
Conduct constabulary duties in support of internal security;
Training: Abbreviated 3-week basic training. Follow-on training similar
to that given the regular army.
Unit: Iraqi Army: * Intervention Force;
Mission: Conduct operations to defeat anti- Iraqi forces, with primary
focus on urban areas. Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable
environment;
Training: Four weeks of cadre training (for officers and
noncommissioned officers);
13 weeks basic and urban operations training.
Unit: Iraqi Army: * Commando Battalion;
Mission: Support the Iraqi Counter- Terrorist Force. Similar in
organization, training, and mission to the U.S. Army Ranger Battalion;
Training: Regular army basic training. Instruction includes counter
terrorism and unconventional warfare.
Unit: Iraqi Army: * Counter-Terrorist Task Force;
Mission: Direct action counter- terrorism similar mission, and training
to U.S. Special Forces with counter-terrorist function;
Training: Regular Army basic training; specialized 13-week course.
Unit: Air Force;
Mission: Provide aerial reconnaissance and rotary and fixed-wing
transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities;
Training: Training consists of 1 to 4 month familiarization
instruction.
Unit: Navy;
Mission: Conduct security operations on Iraqi territorial waters,
including gas and oil platforms, and, in conjunction with Department of
Border Enforcement, conduct police operations on Iraq's coastline and
territorial waters to counter piracy, smuggling, and other unlawful
actions;
Training: Regular Army basic training;
follow- on training for land-and sea-based troops, advanced seamanship
training.
Ministry: Interior;
Unit: Police;
Mission: Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security;
Training: New officers: 8-week academy training. Serving officers: 3-
week course.
Unit: Highway Patrol;
Mission: Provide law enforcement, internal security, and convoy
security along Iraq's highways;
Training: N/A.
Other forces:
Unit: * Civil Intervention Force;
Mission: Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police
capability to counter large-scale disobedience and insurgents;
Training: N/A.
Unit: * Special Police Commando;
Mission: Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter
insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior;
Training: N/A.
Unit: * Emergency Response Unit;
Mission: Provide a special operations police capability in support of
the Iraqi Police Service;
Training: Standard regular police training; 8-week specialized training
focusing on terrorist incidents, high-risk searches, and weapons of
mass destruction.
Unit: * Department of Border Enforcement;
Mission: Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control
the movement of persons and goods;
Training: 4-week academy training.
Unit: * Bureau of Dignitary Protection;
Mission: Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site
security for Iraqi key political leaders;
Training: N/A.
Source: MNF-I documents and DOD testimonies before Congress.
Note: N/A = Not available from an unclassified source.
[End of table]
Challenges to Transferring Security Missions to Iraqi Control:
The multinational force's security transition plan depends on
neutralizing the insurgent threat and increasing Iraqi security
capability. The insurgent threat has increased since June 2003, as
insurgent attacks have grown in number, sophistication, and complexity.
At the same time, MNF-I and the Iraqi government confront difficulties
to building Iraqi security forces that are capable of effectively
combating the insurgency. These include programming effective support
for a changing force structure, assessing progress in developing
capable forces without a system for measuring their readiness,
developing leadership and loyalty throughout the Iraqi chain of
command, and developing police who abide by the rule of law in a
hostile environment.
The Insurgency Has Intensified:
According to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq--
particularly the Sunni insurgency--has grown in number, complexity, and
intensity over the past 18 months. On February 3, 2005, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
the insurgency in Iraq had built up slowly during the first year, then
became very intense from summer 2004 through January 2005. Figure 1
provides Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing these trends in
enemy initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and
infrastructure. Overall attacks peaked in August 2004 due to a rise in
violence in Sunni-dominated regions and an uprising by the Mahdi Army,
a Shi'a insurgent group led by radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Although the November 2004 and January 2005 numbers were slightly lower
than those for August, it is significant that almost all of the attacks
in these 2 months took place in Sunni-majority areas, whereas the
August attacks took place countrywide. MNF-I is the primary target of
the attacks, but the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians and
security forces increased significantly during January 2005. On March
1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee
that more Iraqi security forces than Americans have died in action
against insurgents since June 2004.
Figure 1: Violent Incidents Against the Coalition and Its Partners, by
Month, June 2003 Through February 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[A] According to DIA officals, June 2003 data are incomplete.
[End of figure]
Insurgents have demonstrated their ability to increase attacks around
key events, according to the DIA Director's February 2005 statement
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For example,
attacks spiked in April and May 2004, the months before the transfer of
power to the Iraqi interim government; in November 2004 due to a rise
in violence in Sunni-dominated areas during Ramadan and MNF-I's
operation against insurgents in Fallujah; and in January 2005 before
the Iraqi elections. The DIA Director testified that attacks on Iraq's
election day reached about 300, double the previous 1 day high of about
150 during last year's Ramadan. About 80 percent of all attacks
occurred in Sunni-dominated central Iraq, with the Kurdish north and
Shia south remaining relatively calm.
In February and March 2004, the DIA Director and CENTCOM Commander
presented their views of the nature of the insurgency to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services
Committee, respectively. According to these officials, the core of the
insurgency consists of Sunni Arabs, dominated by Ba'athist and former
regime elements. Shi'a militant groups, such as those associated with
the radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, remain a threat to the
political process. Following the latest round of fighting last August
and September, DIA concluded that al-Sadr's forces were re-arming, re-
organizing, and training, with al-Sadr keeping his options open to
employ his forces. Jihadists have been responsible for many high-
profile attacks that have a disproportionate impact, although their
activity accounts for only a fraction of the overall violence. Foreign
fighters comprise a small component of the insurgency and a very small
percentage of all detainees. DIA believes that insurgents' infiltration
and subversion of emerging government institutions, security, and
intelligence services will be a major problem for the new government.
In late October 2004, according to a CENTCOM document, MNF-I estimated
the overall size of active enemy forces at about 20,000. The estimate
consisted of about 10,000 former regime members; about 3,000 members of
al Sadr's forces;[Footnote 8] about 1,000 in the al-Zarqawi terrorist
network; and about 5,000 criminals, religious extremists, and their
supporters. In February and March 2005, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed
Services Committee that it is difficult to develop an accurate estimate
of the number of insurgents. The CENTCOM commander explained that the
number of insurgent fighters, supporters, and sympathizers can rise and
fall depending on the politics, problems, and major offensive
operations in a given area. He also acknowledged that gaps exist in the
intelligence concerning the broader insurgency, particularly in the
area of human intelligence.
The CENTCOM commander and MNF-I commanding general recently cited
Iraq's January 2005 elections as an important step toward Iraqi
sovereignty and security but cautioned against possible violence in the
future. In March 2005, the MNF-I commanding general stated that the
insurgency has sufficient ammunition, weapons, money, and people to
maintain about 50 to 60 attacks per day in the Sunni areas. The CENTCOM
Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the upcoming
processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new government
could trigger more violence, as the former regime elements in the
insurgency seek a return to power. The MNF-I commanding general stated
that a combination of political, military, economic, and communications
efforts will ultimately defeat the insurgency.
Challenges to Increasing the Capability of Iraqi Security Forces:
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to take on the
insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-
I. MNF-I has faced four key challenges in helping Iraq develop security
forces capable of combating the insurgency or conducting law
enforcement duties in a hostile environment. These key challenges are
(1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2)
determining progress in developing capable forces without a system for
measuring their readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership
throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing police
capable of democratic law enforcement in a hostile environment.
Iraqi Security Force Structure Is Constantly Changing:
The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response
to the growing insurgency. This makes it difficult to provide effective
support--the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. DOD
defines force structure as the numbers, size, and composition of units
that comprise defense forces.[Footnote 9] Some changes to the Iraqi
force structure have resulted from a Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq analysis of needed Iraqi security capabilities during
summer 2004 and reported in October 2004.[Footnote 10] The Iraqi
government has made other changes to forces under the Ministries of
Defense and Interior to allow them to better respond to the increased
threat. According to a February 2005 DOD budget document, MNF-I and the
Iraqi government plan to increase the force structure over the next
year.
According to the October report, a number of enhancements in Iraqi
force capabilities and infrastructure were critically needed to meet
the current threat environment. Based on this review, the MNF-I
Commander decided to increase the size of the Iraqi Police Service from
90,000 to 135,000 personnel; the Iraqi National Guard by 20 battalions
to 62 battalions; and the Department of Border Enforcement from 16,000
to 32,000 border officers. The review also supported in the creation of
the Civil Intervention Force, which consists of nine specialized Public
Order Battalions and two Special Police Regiments under the Ministry of
Interior. This force is designed to provide a national level, high-end,
rapid response capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and
insurgency activities.
Over the past year, the Iraqi government has created, merged, and
expanded Iraqi security forces under the Ministries of Defense and
Interior. For example, according to a DOD official, the Iraqi Army
Chief of Staff created the Iraqi Intervention Force in April 2004 in
response to the unwillingness of a regular Army battalion to fight
Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah. This intervention force will be comprised
of nine battalions and is the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi
Army. According to Iraq's national security strategy,[Footnote 11] the
Iraqi government decided to increase the Iraqi Army from 100,000
soldiers to 150,000 personnel by the end of this year and extend the
time required to complete their training from July 2005 to December
2005. The government planned to form this larger army by including the
Iraqi National Guard and accelerating the training and recruitment of
new troops. In addition, in late 2004, the Ministry of Interior added
the Mechanized Police Brigade, a paramilitary, counter-insurgency unit
that will consist of three battalions that will deploy to high-risk
areas. It also created the paramilitary, army-type Special Police
Commando brigades.
According to DOD document supporting the February 2005 supplemental
request, the Iraqi government planned to add a number of additional
military elements, primarily support units, to the force structure over
the next year. These include logistics units at the division level and
below, a mechanized division, and a brigade each for signals, military
police, engineering, and logistics.
System for Measuring Iraqi Readiness Has Not Been Developed:
MNF-I officials stated that, as of March 2005, MNF-I and the Iraqi
government do not yet have a system in place to assess the readiness of
Iraq's various security forces to accomplish their assigned missions
and tasks.[Footnote 12] However, in early 2005, the commanding general
of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq said that MNF-I
had begun work on a system to assess Iraqi capabilities. MNF-I plans to
develop a rating system along the lines of the U.S. military readiness
reporting system. According to the commanding general of the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq, this system most likely
would have Iraqi brigade commanders evaluating such things as the
training readiness of their units, their personnel field, and their
equipping levels. They also would provide a subjective judgment of the
units' readiness. The commanding general said that this rating system
would take time to implement.
It is unclear at this time whether the system under development would
provide adequate measures for determining the capability of Iraqi
police. Because the police have a civilian law enforcement function
rather than a military or paramilitary role in combating the
insurgency, MNF-I may have to develop a separate system for determining
police readiness.
Developing an Effective Iraqi Chain of Command:
On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that the establishment of an effective Iraqi chain of command
is a critical factor in determining when Iraqi security forces will be
capable of taking the lead in fighting the counterinsurgency. The
CENTCOM Commander added that the Iraqi chain of command must be loyal
and capable, take orders from the Iraqi head of state through the
lawful chain of command, and fight to serve the Iraqi people. MNF-I
faces several challenges in helping to develop an effective chain of
command, including questionable loyalty among some Iraqi security
forces, poor leadership in Iraqi units, and the destabilizing influence
of militias outside the control of the Iraqi government.
The executive branch reported in July 2004 that some Iraqi security
forces had turned to fight with insurgents during the spring
uprising.[Footnote 13] In October 2004, in response to questions we
submitted, CENTCOM officials indicated that it is difficult to
determine with any certainty the true level of insurgent infiltration
within Iraqi security forces. Recent reports indicate that some Iraqi
security personnel continue to cooperate with insurgents. For example,
a February 2005 report cited instances of insurgent infiltration of
Iraqi police forces. Police manning a checkpoint in one area were
reporting convoy movements by mobile telephone to local terrorists.
Police in another area were infiltrated by former regime elements.
In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the
commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-
Iraq cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical
element in developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. MNF-
I officials indicated that they plan to expand the use of military
transition teams to support Iraqi units. These teams would help train
the units and headquarters and accompany them into combat. On March 1,
2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee
that there is broad, general agreement that MNF-I must do more to
train, advise, mentor, and help Iraqi security forces. CENTCOM has
requested an additional 1,487 troops to support these efforts and must
have the continued support of the new Iraqi government.
The continued existence of militias outside the control of Iraq's
central government also presents a major challenge to developing an
effective chain of command. In late May 2004, the CPA developed a
transition and reintegration strategy for disbanding or controlling
militias that existed prior to the transfer of power to the Iraqi
interim government.[Footnote 14] Detailed information on the current
status of militias in Iraq is classified. However, the CENTCOM
Commander acknowledged the continued existence of older militias and
the recent creation of new militias. He said that their presence will
ultimately be destabilizing unless they are strictly controlled, come
under government supervision, and are not allowed to operate
independently.
Developing a Police Force in a Hostile Environment:
MNF-I's efforts to develop a police force that abides by and upholds
the rule of law while operating in a hostile environment have been
difficult. U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us in mid-December 2004
that Iraqi police were trained and equipped to do community policing in
a permissive security environment. Thus, Iraqi police were not prepared
to withstand the insurgent attacks that they have faced over the past
year and a half. According to the State Department's Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 2004, more than 1,500 Iraqi police have been
killed between April 2003 and December 2004. To address this weakness,
MNF-I and the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare
some police to operate during an insurgency. In a December 2004 press
briefing, the MNF-I Commander stated that MNF-I was moving to add
paramilitary-type skills to the police training program to improve some
units' ability to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. U.S.
police trainers in Jordan told us that the curriculum was being revised
to provide police paramilitary capabilities. In addition, according to
the Iraq's national security strategy, the Iraqi government is in the
process of upgrading security measures at police stations throughout
the country.
According to State's 2004 human rights report, police have operated in
a hostile environment. Attacks by insurgents and foreign terrorists
have resulted in killings, kidnappings, violence, and torture.
Bombings, executions, killings of government officials, shootings, and
intimidation were a daily occurrence throughout all regions and sectors
of society. The report also states that members of the Ministry of
Interior's security forces committed numerous, serious human rights
abuses. For example, in early December 2004, the Basrah police reported
that the Internal Affairs Unit was involved in the killings of 10
members of the Baath Party and the killings of a mother and daughter
accused of prostitution. The report further states that, according to
Human Rights Watch, torture and ill treatment of detainees by the
police was commonplace. Additionally, the report states that corruption
continued to be a problem. The Iraq Commission for Public Integrity was
investigating cases of police abuse involving unlawful arrests,
beatings, and theft of valuables from the homes of persons detained.
Conclusion:
The multinational force has been working to transfer full security
responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police.
However, the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an
intense insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a
system to measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership
and chain of command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it
difficult to uphold the rule of law in a hostile environment. MNF-I
recognizes these challenges and is moving to address them so it can
begin to reduce its presence in Iraq and draw down its troops. Of
particular note is MNF-I's effort to develop a system to assess unit
readiness and to embed MNFI-I transition teams into units to mentor
Iraqis.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202)
512-8979. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony were
Lynn Cothern, Mattias Fenton, Laura Helm, Judy McCloskey, Tet Miyabara,
Michael Rohrback, and Audrey Solis.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for
transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police
forces, 2) the data on the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the
Multi. National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security
missions to these forces. We conducted our review for this statement
during February and March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. We used only unclassified information
for this statement:
To examine the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to
Iraqi forces, we focused on the 2003 security transition concept plan.
We obtained and reviewed the transition plan and related documents and
interviewed officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority and the
Departments of State and Defense. Our work on this issue is described
in June 2004 GAO report entitled Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security,
Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R). To
update information on the transition concept, we reviewed statements
for the record from the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Commander and the MNF-I commanding general on the campaign plan and on
the capability and recent performance of Iraqi security forces. These
statements focused on Iraqi security forces' ability to perform against
the insurgency, as well as the training and mentoring of forces that
contributed to successful operations.
To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed
unclassified Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March
2005 that provided information about the number of troops by the
Ministries of Defense and Interior. We interviewed State and Department
of Defense (DOD) officials about the number of Iraqi police on duty and
the structure of the Iraqi police forces. To identify the type of
training the Iraqi security forces receive, we reviewed and organized
data and information from the Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq. We also visited the Jordan International Police Training
Center in Amman, Jordan to determine the training security forces
receive. This approach allowed us to verify that Iraqi security forces
have varying missions and training levels and not all are designed to
be capable of fighting the insurgency.
To discuss the insurgency in Iraq, we reviewed statements for the
record from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the CENTCOM Commander on the
status of the insurgency. We obtained data and reports from DIA on the
number of reported incidents from June 2003 through February 2005. We
obtained written responses from CENTCOM on the strength and composition
of the insurgency. To address the challenges to increasing the
capability of Iraqi security forces, we reviewed statements for the
record by the CENTCOM Commander, the MNF-I commanding general, and DOD
officials. We also examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy,
funding documents from the Office of Management and Budget and State
Department, and the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental Request of the
President. We obtained and reviewed further breakdowns of briefings on
the supplemental request. To identify challenges in developing the
Iraqi police force, we interviewed police trainers in Jordan and
reviewed the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 2004.
We obtained comments on a draft of this statement from State and DOD,
including CENTCOM. All generally agreed with our statement and provided
technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential
Services, and Oversight Issues, GAO-04-902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2004).
[2] The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and
Jordan academies. The Iraqi army units were trained by the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
[3] Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period, March 2004.
[4] See Iraq's Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R, May 25, 2004, for more
information on key events during Iraq's transitional period.
[5] For more information on the security transition concept, see GAO-04-
902R.
[6] The Departments of State and Defense stopped counting the
Facilities Protection Service as part of the Iraqi security force
structure in September 2004. The mission of the Facilities Protection
Service is to guard and secure individual ministry and municipal
buildings against vandalism and theft.
[7] According to DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-
02; Nov. 30, 2004), a campaign plan is a plan for a series of related
military operations to accomplish a strategic or operational objective
within a given time and space.
[8] MNF-I refers to the al-Sadr's forces as Muqtada Militia.
[9] DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
[10] Office of Management and Budget, Quarterly Update to Congress,
Section 2207 Report, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2004).
[11] Strategy for National Security and the Role of the Army and
Internal Security Forces, January 2005.
[12] DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines readiness
as the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: (1) unit
readiness, which is the ability to provide capabilities required by
combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions; this is
derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which
it was assigned; and (2) joint readiness, which is the combatant
commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and
support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.
[13] Section 2207 report.
[14] Nine militias accepted the transition plans, but others either had
not agreed or decided to continue hostile operations against the
coalition rather than take part in the transition and reintegration
process. See GAO-04-902R for more information on Iraq's militias and
earlier efforts to disband them.
