Tactical Aircraft
Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-05-304 March 15, 2005The Air Force is preparing a modernization plan that expands the capabilities of the F/A-22, which was first designed to serve as an air-to-air fighter aircraft with very limited ability to strike targets on the ground. The Air Force now intends to transform it by adding robust air-to-ground capabilities to attack enemy ground threats and by adding onboard intelligence data gathering capabilities. After the recent budget cut, DOD estimates F/A-22 cost at $63.8 billion for 178 aircraft. It has been in development for more than 19 years, a decade longer than originally envisioned. In the face of significant cost and schedule overruns, Congress mandates that GAO annually assess the F/A-22 program. In this report, GAO addresses (1) the Air Force's business case for the F/A-22 modernization plan and (2) the recently completed initial operational test and evaluation.
The Air Force has yet to produce a business case for the next-generation F/A-22. Much has changed in the years since the F/A-22 program began nearly 2 decades ago--adversarial threats against U.S. aircraft have evolved, and a plan to modernize the F/A-22 significantly different than the original aircraft is in progress. A DOD cost estimate in 2003 projected the Air Force's modernization plan to cost $11.7 billion through 2018. A December 2004 budget decision reduced procurement funding and quantities but did not cut funding for modernization. The decision to terminate procurement after fiscal year 2008 places the current modernization plan in doubt as key ground attack and intelligence-gathering enhancements had been slated for aircraft now eliminated from the program. Without a new business case for adding a more robust ground attack capability and for new intelligence missions, the Air Force may be at a disadvantage when the time comes to justify the modernization plan in the face of future budget constraints. DOD is set to conduct the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review to weigh the merits of transformational priorities and investments to determine if the best choices are being made to meet military needs within available funding levels. This may further influence an F/A-22 business case. The F/A-22 program recently underwent initial operational testing, but testing did not include the air-to-ground missions that the Air Force envisions for the aircraft. The Air Force does not expect to conduct testing of these capabilities until after a decision is made to enter full-rate production. Although a final test report was not available for our review, Air Force officials told us that the F/A-22 was extremely effective in performing its air-to-air missions. Evaluation results of capabilities needed to sustain combat operations and maintain aircraft were not as favorable. Additional testing will be required to assess corrective actions for deficiencies identified and to evaluate new ground attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities added by the modernization program.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-304, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2005:
Tactical Aircraft:
Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities and
Increased Capabilities:
GAO-05-304:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-304, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Air Force is preparing a modernization plan that expands the
capabilities of the F/A-22, which was first designed to serve as an air-
to-air fighter aircraft with very limited ability to strike targets on
the ground. The Air Force now intends to transform it by adding robust
air-to-ground capabilities to attack enemy ground threats and by adding
onboard intelligence data gathering capabilities. After the recent
budget cut, DOD estimates F/A-22 cost at $63.8 billion for 178
aircraft. It has been in development for more than 19 years, a decade
longer than originally envisioned.
In the face of significant cost and schedule overruns, Congress
mandates that GAO annually assess the F/A-22 program. In this report,
GAO addresses (1) the Air Force‘s business case for the F/A-22
modernization plan and (2) the recently completed initial operational
test and evaluation.
What GAO Found:
The Air Force has yet to produce a business case for the next-
generation F/A-22. Much has changed in the years since the F/A-22
program began nearly 2 decades ago”adversarial threats against U.S.
aircraft have evolved, and a plan to modernize the F/A-22 significantly
different than the original aircraft is in progress. A DOD cost
estimate in 2003 projected the Air Force‘s modernization plan to cost
$11.7 billion through 2018. A December 2004 budget decision reduced
procurement funding and quantities but did not cut funding for
modernization. The decision to terminate procurement after fiscal year
2008 places the current modernization plan in doubt as key ground
attack and intelligence-gathering enhancements had been slated for
aircraft now eliminated from the program. Without a new business case
for adding a more robust ground attack capability and for new
intelligence missions, the Air Force may be at a disadvantage when the
time comes to justify the modernization plan in the face of future
budget constraints. The following table shows the current plan for
integrating new capabilities:
Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program:
Examples of capabilities to be added:
2007: Air-to-air plus limited air-to-ground: Improved capability to
launch Joint Direct Attack Munition at faster speeds; upgrade air-to-
air capabilities.
2011: Air-to-ground: Add improved radar to seek and destroy advanced
surface-to-air missile systems; integrate additional air-to-ground
weapons.
2013: Additional air-to-ground: Increase capability to suppress or
destroy full range of air defenses and improve speed and accuracy of
targeting.
2015: Enhanced intelligence data gathering: Add integrated
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense (data); GAO
(analysis and presentation).
[End of table]
DOD is set to conduct the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review to weigh the
merits of transformational priorities and investments to determine if
the best choices are being made to meet military needs within available
funding levels. This may further influence an F/A-22 business case.
The F/A-22 program recently underwent initial operational testing, but
testing did not include the air-to-ground missions that the Air Force
envisions for the aircraft. The Air Force does not expect to conduct
testing of these capabilities until after a decision is made to enter
full-rate production. Although a final test report was not available
for our review, Air Force officials told us that the F/A-22 was
extremely effective in performing its air-to-air missions. Evaluation
results of capabilities needed to sustain combat operations and
maintain aircraft were not as favorable. Additional testing will be
required to assess corrective actions for deficiencies identified and
to evaluate new ground attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities
added by the modernization program.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is reiterating and expanding upon a 2004 recommendation that DOD
complete a new and comprehensive business case that reflects the
current budget environment and justifies future investments and
specific quantities needed to meet mission requirements. DOD concurred
and expects to build a business case through such actions as the 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review and analysis required to support future
modernization efforts as a separate program.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-304.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at
(202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
F/A-22 Modernization Program Lacks Business Case and May Not Be
Executable as Planned:
Operational Testing Considered Successful by Air Force, but Ground
Attack Role Has Not Yet Been Tested:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: F/A-22 Program Cost, Quantity, and Schedule Changes:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program:
Figures:
Figure 1: Quantity and Program Acquisition Unit Cost of F/A-22s:
Abbreviations:
CAIG: Cost Analysis Improvement Group:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IOT&E: Initial Operational Test and Evaluation:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 15, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
The F/A-22 aircraft program is acquiring the Air Force's next-
generation, multi-mission fighter for about $63.8 billion. The need for
the F/A-22, its increasing costs, and the quantities required to
perform its mission have been the subject of a continuing debate within
the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress. Supporters cite its
advanced features--stealth, supercruise speed, maneuverability, and
integrated avionics--as integral to the Air Force's Global Strike
initiative[Footnote 1] and for maintaining air superiority over
potential future adversaries for years to come. Critics, however, argue
that the Soviet threat it was originally designed to counter no longer
exists and that its large budget could better be invested in enhancing
current air assets and acquiring new and more transformational
capabilities that will allow it to meet the evolving threat. The debate
continues as a December 2004 budget decision by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) reduced F/A-22 funding and the number of
aircraft to be acquired. Meanwhile, the upcoming 2005 Quadrennial
Defense Review is girding up for a review of force structure, mission
requirements, and modernization plans.
DOD has been pushing to transform its military operations and
capabilities to acquire revolutionary weapon systems and meet evolving
post-Cold War threats. Undertaking this transformational effort
requires significant funding and competes with other DOD and national
priorities. When DOD's weapon systems, such as the F/A-22, require more
time and money than originally anticipated, the extra investment needed
to solve problems takes funding away from other priorities, slows DOD's
overall modernization effort, delays capabilities for the warfighter,
and forces unplanned--and possibly unnecessary--trade-offs among DOD's
many priorities. Our past work has shown that problems, such as cost
overruns, arise when weapon programs do not have a sound business
case[Footnote 2] or capture the knowledge needed to efficiently and
effectively manage program risks. The end result is a reduction in
quantities and ultimately in DOD's overall buying power.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires
GAO to report annually on the F/A-22 development program and cost,
schedule, and performance issues.[Footnote 3] The act also requires us
to certify whether we had access to sufficient information to make
informed judgments on the matters contained in this report. This report
addresses (1) Air Force business case, plans, and funding for the F/A-
22 modernization program and (2) the recently completed initial
operational test and evaluation (IOT&E).
We performed our work from November 2004 to February 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We analyzed
modernization plans, funding, and impacts from recent budget changes.
Our observations on operational testing are limited and largely based
on summary comments and briefing materials provided by testing and
program officials. We did not review Air Force and OSD reports on
operational test results because the reports were not available to us
at the time of our review. Notwithstanding, we believe DOD officials
gave us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on
the matters in this report. Appendix I further discusses this report's
scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The F/A-22 program has changed substantially since it started in 1986,
and Air Force leaders have not developed a new business case for
investing billions more dollars to modernize the aircraft that reflects
this change. A December 2004 budget decision places much of the
modernization program in doubt and renders the current plan obsolete.
DOD cut more than $10 billion from the procurement program, ending
aircraft procurement after 2008. However, the decision did not cut
budgeted funds planned for modernizing the F/A-22. In March 2003, OSD
cost analysts had estimated the modernization may cost over $11 billion
to add more robust ground attack capabilities and much enhanced
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to give the
F/A-22 more utility and to take on new missions. Many of the advanced
ground attack and intelligence-gathering modernization efforts were
intended to be incorporated on aircraft procured after 2008, which have
now been eliminated. Further, the budget decision and DOD studies to
reappraise multi-service tactical air modernization programs and
propose alternative investments call into question the F/A-22's
expected role and contributions in combination with other DOD assets,
the numbers of aircraft needed in each of its planned configurations,
and the affordability and feasibility of modernization plans. If the
modernization plan were canceled, what is left of the F/A-22 program is
the original F-22, primarily a state-of-the-art fighter designed to
counter large numbers of advanced Soviet fighter aircraft, a threat
that never materialized. Nevertheless, the Air Force still has to
decide how best to invest the remaining billions of dollars budgeted
for the program, increasing the need for a new and executable business
case unless the modernization program is also terminated.
Reports detailing the results from IOT&E were not available for our
review, but Air Force test officials told us that testing showed the F/
A-22 was "overwhelmingly effective" as an air superiority fighter and
that its supporting systems were "potentially suitable." Some
deficiencies and lack of maturity were identified in aircraft
reliability and maintainability (including maintaining low observable
characteristics) and in the integrated diagnostic systems used to
identify and direct maintenance actions. Air Force officials believe
these deficiencies are readily correctible and should meet the needs of
the warfighter by the scheduled initial operational capability date in
December 2005. They also believe that test results support making the
full-rate production decision planned in late March 2005. Testing to
demonstrate the limited air-to-ground attack capability included in the
current design was not done during initial operational testing but is
scheduled to be done during follow-on testing planned to start in July
2005. Air-to-ground attack capabilities are increasingly emphasized by
the Air Force and future enhancements are planned for 80 percent of the
modernized F/A-22s. More robust ground attack and intelligence
gathering capabilities will be tested in the future as they are
developed.
In March 2004,[Footnote 4] GAO recommended the Secretary of Defense
complete a new business case that determines the need for the F/A-22
(air and ground missions) and the quantities required and affordable.
DOD did not prepare a new business case as recommended, stating routine
acquisition and budget processes provide elements of the business case.
We do not believe the routine processes provide sufficient analysis to
justify future investments in the new capabilities added by the
modernization program, especially given the continued uncertainties
still surrounding these program issues. Therefore, we again recommend
the Secretary of Defense direct appropriate studies and analyses be
completed in order to prepare a new business case that justifies the
new capabilities and affordable quantities. DOD concurred with the
recommendation this time and said it will provide business case
elements through the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, modernization
program documentation required by policy, and in other ways.
Background:
The F/A-22 is the Air Force's next-generation air superiority[Footnote
5] fighter aircraft and incorporates a low observable (stealth) and
highly maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a new
engine capable of sustained supersonic flight without the use of
afterburners. It was originally designed to counter threats posed by
the Soviet Union and was intended to replace the F-15 fighter in the
air-to-air combat role. Over the years, the Air Force decided to add a
more robust air-to-ground capability not previously envisioned but now
considered necessary to increase the utility of the aircraft. In 2002,
the F-22 aircraft was redesignated the F/A-22, with the "A"
representing the expanded ground attack capabilities. Officials
initiated a modernization program to develop and integrate these new
capabilities.
The F-22 acquisition program started in 1986 with an intended
development period of 9 years and an initial operational capability in
March 1996. The Air Force's plan at that time was to procure 750
aircraft. In the years since, the original business case has been
severely weakened as threats, missions, and requirements have changed.
Further, the program milestones have slipped, the development period
lengthened to more than 19 years, development costs more than doubled,
and a modernization program was added. The initial operational
capability date is now December 2005.
Amidst concerns about escalating costs and schedule, Congress placed
cost limitations on both development and production budgets in
1997,[Footnote 6] later removing the development cost cap.[Footnote 7]
(The current production cost cap is $37.3 billion.) Concomitantly, the
planned procurement quantity has steadily decreased due to
affordability concerns and changes in missions and combat requirements.
Two major reviews of defense force structure and acquisition plans, the
1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, both
significantly reduced F/A-22 quantities. In addition, OSD's "buy to
budget" acquisition strategy, which essentially placed a ceiling on the
total program costs, has resulted in further cuts to quantity as
development cost increased. In December 2004, OSD issued Program Budget
Decision 753, which reduced F/A-22 funding by $10.5 billion and cut 96
aircraft from the planned procurement quantity. The decision ends
procurement in 2008, instead of 2011, and would reduce total
procurement quantity to 178 aircraft.[Footnote 8]
Figure 1 illustrates the downward trend in procurement quantity over
the years juxtaposed with a rise in program acquisition unit
costs,[Footnote 9] which has resulted in a significant loss in buying
power. Program acquisition unit costs have increased largely due to (1)
increased development and production costs; (2) decreased procurement
quantities; and (3) increased costs to modernize and enhance
capability. The current plan supporting the fiscal year 2006 defense
budget request submitted in February 2005 is to acquire 178 aircraft
for about $63.8 billion.[Footnote 10] Appendix II illustrates other
changes in cost, quantity, and schedule experienced by the program
since its commencement.
Figure 1: Quantity and Program Acquisition Unit Cost of F/A-22s:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Our March 2004 report[Footnote 11] discussed the significant changes in
cost, quantity, capabilities, and mission since F-22 development began
in 1986. We reported continued problems and delays in the development
and testing schedules. We recommended that DOD complete a new business
case that justifies the continued need for the F/A-22 and the
quantities needed to carry out the air-to-air versus air-to-ground
missions. The business case was to also consider alternatives within
the constraints of future defense spending. Later in
testimony,[Footnote 12] we stated that there are competing priorities
both internal and external to DOD's budget that require a sound and
sustainable business case for DOD's acquisition programs based in clear
priorities, comprehensive needs assessments, and a thorough analysis of
available resources. DOD partially concurred with our report
recommendation but did not prepare a new business case, stating that it
evaluates the F/A-22 business case elements as part of the routine
acquisition and budget processes with the results reflected in the
defense budget. We did not think these kinds of activities sufficiently
analyzed and addressed the specific business case elements--analysis of
need for original and new capabilities, assessment of alternatives,
justification of needed quantities, and evidence that planned
quantities were affordable.
F/A-22 Modernization Program Lacks Business Case and May Not Be
Executable as Planned:
The Air Force, in the face of significant changes to the F/A-22, has
not prepared a new business case to justify the resources needed to add
a much more robust ground attack capability and to assume new missions.
The requirements for the F/A-22 have changed significantly since its
original business case and the available resources are in flux--both
are key components of a business case needed to support further
investments. A December 2004 budget decision reduced procurement
funding and quantities but did not cut funding for modernization. This
has made the current modernization plan obsolete as key ground attack
and intelligence gathering enhancements had been slated for aircraft
that have now been eliminated from the F/A-22 procurement program.
While its total cost is not clear at this time and program content is
subject to change, in 2003 OSD cost analysts estimated the
modernization program would cost about $11.7 billion.
Modernization Program Makes Significant Changes to F/A-22 Requirements
without a New Business Case:
The Air Force embarked on the expensive and wide-ranging modernization
program without a new business case to support investments of billions
of dollars to develop and deliver new capabilities and missions. The
modernized F/A-22 would differ so significantly from the original
aircraft in capabilities and missions that it should have been
developed in an entirely separate acquisition program. Instead, the Air
Force opted to incorporate modernization efforts within the existing
acquisition program.[Footnote 13] A business case should match
requirements with resources--proven technologies, sufficient
engineering capabilities, time, and funding--when undertaking a new
product development. First, the user's needs must be accurately
defined, alternative approaches to satisfying these needs properly
analyzed, and quantities needed for the chosen system must be well
understood. The developed product must be producible at a cost that
matches the users' expectations and budgetary resources. Finally, the
developer must have the resources to design and deliver the product
with the features that the customer wants and to deliver it when it is
needed. If the financial, material, and intellectual resources to
develop the product are not available, a program incurs substantial
risk in moving forward.
The original business case for the F/A-22 was made in 1986 to support
acquiring large quantities of air superiority fighters to engage in
conventional warfare and counter Cold War-era threats. These threats
never materialized as expected. Because the program was in development
for over 19 years, tactical fighter requirements, projected threats,
and operational war plans changed. To enhance the utility of the F/A-22
for today and the future, the Air Force now plans to develop a robust
air-to-ground attack capability to allow the aircraft to engage a
greater variety of ground targets, such as surface-to-air missiles
systems, that pose a significant threat to U.S. aircraft. It also plans
to equip most of the F/A-22 fleet with improved capabilities to satisfy
expanded warfighter requirements and to take on new missions, including
intelligence data gathering and the suppression of enemy air defenses
and interdiction.
The Air Force established a time-phased modernization program to
develop and insert new capabilities required to implement the Air
Force's Global Strike concept of operations. Table 1 shows how the Air
Force intended to integrate new capabilities incrementally before the
December 2004 budget decision reduced quantities by 96 aircraft. At the
time of our review, officials were still determining the impacts of the
budget decision on the modernization program content and quantities.
Table 1: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program:
Fiscal year when enhancements are expected to be incorporated: 2007;
Capabilities increment: Global Strike Basic;
Configuration[B]: Block 20;
Quantity of F/A-22s: 56;
Examples of enhancements to be added: Improve capability to launch
Joint Direct Attack Munition at faster speeds and at longer distances;
upgrade air- to-air capabilities;
Fiscal year when enhancements are expected to be incorporated: 2011[A];
Capabilities increment: Global Strike Enhanced;
Configuration[B]: Block 30;
Quantity of F/A-22s: 91;
Examples of enhancements to be added: Enhance air-to-ground capability
by adding improved radar capabilities to seek and destroy advanced
surface-to-air missile systems; integrate additional air-to-ground
weapons;
Fiscal year when enhancements are expected to be incorporated: 2013;
Capabilities increment: Global Strike Full;
Configuration[B]: Block 40;
Quantity of F/A-22s: 128;
Examples of enhancements to be added: Increase capability to suppress
or destroy the full range of air defenses and improve speed and
accuracy of targeting;
Fiscal year when enhancements are expected to be incorporated: 2015;
Capabilities increment: Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance;
Configuration[B]: Block 40;
Quantity of F/A-22s: [C];
Examples of enhancements to be added: Add capability for full
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration for
increased target sets and lethality.
Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense.
[A] Global Strike Enhanced includes two increments of capability with
the first increment incorporated in fiscal year 2009 and the second in
2011.
[B] The Air Force plans to have three configurations (called blocks)
that include specific enhancements developed in the modernization
program.
[C] This quantity included in Global Strike Full amount. Total 128
aircraft planned for block 40.
[End of table]
Initial development work on modernization enhancements started in 2003
and is planned to extend over a 12-year period with the first set of
new capabilities inserted into the production line in fiscal year 2007.
By the end of development in 2015, the Air Force plans to have three
different configurations (or blocks) of F/A-22s, each with distinct
operational capabilities. Based on the current modernization road map,
the Global Strike Basic configuration (block 20) will include 56 F/A-
22s built primarily to perform air-to-air missions but with limited air-
to-ground capability. The Global Strike Enhanced configuration (block
30) includes 91 aircraft that will perform the bulk of air-to- ground
and electronic attack missions using advanced radars to track targets
and small diameter bombs to destroy them. Block 40 encompasses both the
Global Strike Full and Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance increments. This configuration of 128 aircraft is
expected to perform such missions as suppression of enemy air defenses
and gathering up-to-date information on potential adversaries'
locations, resources, and personnel to improve target identification
and increase kill capabilities. According to program officials, these
latter two increments are still conceptual in nature and subject to
revision.
Budget Decisions and Unstable Resources Places the F/A-22 Modernization
Program in Doubt:
The modernization program as currently planned is much in doubt because
of the recent budget cut and the likely prospects for more changes. The
instability in F/A-22 resources and upcoming DOD-wide reviews of
capabilities and requirements may result in further revisions and
cutbacks, further impacting modernization plans. Budget and
programmatic decisions also cause ripple effects on other resource
plans tied to the modernization, which may open up budgeted funds for
other uses.
In March 2003, OSD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)[Footnote
14] estimated that the Air Force would need $11.7 billion for the
planned modernization programs through fiscal year 2018. The CAIG
estimate included costs for development, procurement, and retrofit of
modernized aircraft. The Air Force's latest estimated cost for the
modernization program is about $5.4 billion through 2011. Future
modernization costs beyond 2011 have not been definitized and are
subject to change. The modernization program manager projected annual
funding of $700 million to $750 million would be needed for the
currently planned modernization program after 2011.
The December 2004 budget decision places much of the modernization
program in doubt, particularly the latter stages. OSD substantially
reduced the F/A-22 budget, which will require another strategy for the
modernization program. It reduced F/A-22 funding by $10.5 billion,
stopped procurement of aircraft after 2008, and reduced the quantity by
96 aircraft. This and other events will reduce the Air Force's expected
buy to no more than 178 aircraft. While the OSD funding decision
changed the baseline F/A-22 program, it did not change the planned
funding for the modernization program to add advanced ground attack and
intelligence gathering capabilities between 2007 and 2015. However,
many of these new and advanced capabilities had been planned for
aircraft that will not be built as the budget eliminates F/A-22
aircraft that had been planned for production after 2008. Air Force
officials told us they hope to reverse these changes, but officials
acknowledge that a major restructuring is likely if the proposed
funding cuts are sustained. If the budget cut is sustained, the
modernization program as currently planned is largely obsolete and
funding for these advanced capabilities to be incorporated after 2008
would be available for other uses. This could include up to $1.2
billion now budgeted for the start-up of the latter modernization
increments.
The Air Force's desire to upgrade the F/A-22's computer architecture
and avionics processors in order to support the block 40 expanded
capabilities[Footnote 15] may also be affected by the recent budget
cut. Program officials do not expect the new architecture to be fully
developed and ready for installation in the F/A-22 until fiscal year
2010. However, early indications show that the effort to upgrade the
computer architecture--expected to cost between $400 million and $500
million--already is experiencing schedule problems and increased risks.
As a result, the 2010 insertion date may not be achievable as planned
for the F/A-22. Furthermore, DOD's proposed termination of procurement
after 2008 raises questions about the need to proceed with the planned
computer upgrade. The existing processors with some minor upgrades
would support up to 155 aircraft and most Global Strike Enhanced
capabilities.
Additionally, since our March 2004 report the program office has
identified new requirements needed to implement the modernization
program. The F/A-22 program office has concluded that the F/A-22
infrastructure, including government laboratories, such as software
avionics integration labs, flying test beds, and test ranges need to be
upgraded to ensure a successful modernization program. According to
program officials, the existing facilities have major resource/capacity
limitations and are inadequate to support needed software integration
activities and system performance and operational testing for most
planned enhancements. The program office has budgeted about $1.8
billion through fiscal year 2009 for the infrastructure upgrades,
including funds for engineering and maintenance personnel support.
According to program officials, the current infrastructure limitations
have caused some modernization efforts to be deferred to later blocks.
If modernization plans are curtailed, some infrastructure improvements
may not be needed.
Even if funding were restored to the F/A-22 program and the above-
mentioned concerns were resolved, previous funding shortfalls and
schedule slippages have already resulted in planned capabilities being
deferred to later years. For example, block 20 enhancements required to
conduct autonomous search and improve target recognition have been
deferred to block 30. Similarly, funding problems have caused the Air
Force to scale back some efforts and delay development of block 30
electronic attack and small diameter bomb enhancements. In November
2004, the Defense Contract Management Agency reported that the
contractor proposes to reduce the amount of planned tasks, defer
development of software specifications, and incrementally develop a key
communication component in order to meet an April 2005 system design
review.
DOD officials stated that they believe the budget cut has some
diseconomies that may result in procuring even fewer than 178 aircraft.
They said that stopping aircraft production early affects production
economies and efficiencies that were expected from a multiyear
procurement contract and from production line efficiencies. The
multiyear contract was to begin in fiscal year 2008, the year
procurement is now curtailed by the budget decision. Now that
opportunity is gone. Officials also said that cutting production
quantities from the final years of the program eliminate projected
savings in annual unit procurement costs. Typical of many DOD
acquisitions, Air Force program officials had projected future budgets
assuming that the marginal costs for buying F/A-22s would decrease with
each passing year of production as a result of manufacturing
efficiencies, productivity projects, and more economical buying
quantities. This means that aircraft bought late in the production
program usually cost less than those bought earlier in the program. For
example, the average unit flyaway cost[Footnote 16] paid for F/A-22s
was $212 million per aircraft bought in 2002 and $178 million in 2003.
Before the budget decision, officials had projected average unit
flyaway costs to decrease to $127 million, $111 million, and $108
million in fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. Now that the
program has been truncated after 2008, the less expensive aircraft in
2009 and beyond will not be bought and unit costs are now projected at
$135 million in 2007 and $149 million in 2008 (increase associated with
close-out of production).
OSD has directed that the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review include an
assessment of joint air dominance in future warfare and the
contributions provided by all tactical aircraft, including the F/A-22.
An announced defense goal is to redirect investment from areas of
conventional warfare, where the United States enjoys a strong combat
advantage, toward more transformational capabilities needed to counter
"irregular" threats, such as the insurgency in Iraq and ongoing war on
terror. DOD is also conducting a set of joint capability reviews to
ensure acquisition decisions are based on providing integrated
capabilities rather than focused on individual weapon systems. The
study results, although still months away, could further impact the
future of the F/A-22 program including the modernization plan. The F/A-
22 will have to compete for funding, priority, and mission assignments
with operational systems, such as the F-15 and F/A-18, and future
systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter and the Joint Unmanned Combat
Air Systems.
Air Force leadership and the Air Combat Command continue to support the
multi-mission role for the F/A-22 and do not want to reduce or
eliminate the new capabilities and missions. Therefore, if
restructuring is required, program officials are considering other
options to accommodate the program within reduced funding and fleet
size. They are considering the possibility of moving forward with
blocks 20 and 30 but curtailing block 40 because its enhancements are
slated for those aircraft that have been cut by the budget decision
(refer to table 1). Officials said that some of the enhancements
planned for block 40 could be retrofitted into the block 20 and 30
aircraft. At the time of our review, Air Force officials were
considering alternative strategies and plans for rephasing funds in
order to execute the changes in the program enumerated above. It is
paramount that these issues be settled before moving forward in the
program.
Operational Testing Considered Successful by Air Force, but Ground
Attack Role Has Not Yet Been Tested:
Reports detailing the results from IOT&E were not available for our
review, but Air Force test officials told us that testing showed the F/
A-22 was "overwhelmingly effective" as an air superiority fighter and
that its supporting systems were "potentially suitable." Some
deficiencies were noted, particularly in reliability and
maintainability, but Air Force officials believe these deficiencies can
be corrected in time to meet the warfighter's needs by the scheduled
initial operational capability date in December 2005. They also believe
test results support making the full-rate production decision. Testing
to demonstrate the limited air-to-ground attack capability was not
accomplished but is scheduled to be done as part of the follow-on
operational test planned to start in July 2005.
The F/A-22 initial operational test and evaluation was conducted by the
Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center from April through
December 2004 to support the full-rate production decision planned for
March 2005. Its operational test plan was designed to assess the F/A-
22's combat effectiveness and suitability in an operationally
representative environment. The warfighter had established five
critical operational issues for evaluation during operational testing
to demonstrate effectiveness and suitability:
* effectiveness--demonstrate operational performance to effectively
execute selected counter-air missions;
* survivability--assess ability to evade and survive against air-to-air
and surface-to-air threats;
* deployability--evaluate the timely transportability and set up of F/
A-22 personnel and equipment into a theater of operations;
* sortie generation--assess how well air crews can generate and launch
sorties, including maintenance and supply support capabilities; and:
* ground attack--demonstrate limited air-to-ground attack with the
Joint Direct Attack Munition.
The first two issues assess combat effectiveness in completing selected
counter air missions and in surviving against representative air and
ground threats. The second two issues assess suitability of F/A-22 to
support combat by transporting, deploying and sustaining forces and
equipment. These four critical operational issues were addressed in
IOT&E. The fifth critical operational issue--ground attack--was not
addressed in IOT&E and will be assessed during follow-on operational
test and evaluation, scheduled to start in July 2005. This follow-on
testing is also planned to include demonstrations of corrective actions
for some deficiencies identified during IOT&E and other testing needed
to achieve initial operational capability in December 2005. Additional
follow-on operational tests are planned in the future to test new, more
robust attack capabilities and other enhancements added by the
modernization program.
Combat effectiveness and survivability testing included extensive
flight tests to evaluate air-to-air capabilities including (1)
offensive counter-air missions against aggressor aircraft and (2)
defensive counter-air missions to accompany and protect friendly strike
and high value support aircraft from attack by aggressor aircraft.
These tests incorporated ground and air threats resident at the Air
Force's Nevada test range. Computer simulations and models were also
used to evaluate performance against future threats and in other
scenarios that cannot be replicated in open flight tests.
Test officials told us that the F/A-22 performed all the air-to-air
missions very satisfactorily, demonstrating "overwhelming
effectiveness" in their words. Officials also said that, in direct
comparability tests with the F-15C, the F/A-22 demonstrated a clear
advantage often many more times the effectiveness of the F-15C. Testing
did reveal some areas needing improvement, including avionics
reliability, defensive systems, and other corrective actions that will
need to be addressed in follow-on testing.
Test officials characterized F/A-22 suitability demonstrations for the
aircraft and support systems as "potentially suitable." The ability to
transport and deploy F/A-22 personnel and equipment was adequately
demonstrated and met the interim goal set by the warfighter regarding
the number of airlift planes needed to transport forces and support
equipment in the required amount of time.
Of the four critical operational issues assessed, sortie generation
experienced the most problems. Officials rated the sortie generation
area as unsatisfactory. Problems were noted in aircraft reliability and
maintainability, including maintenance of the aircraft's critical low
observable characteristics. Problems were also noted in the maturity of
integrated diagnostic systems, key assets expected to greatly improve
and accelerate field maintenance activities for meeting sortie rates
with constrained personnel. Officials believe these and other
deficiencies can be corrected in time to meet the warfighter's needs.
For example, officials said the mission capability rate demonstrated
during testing has continued to improve and is close to achieving the
warfighter's desired rate, not required until December 2005. However,
the testing and implementation of most corrective actions will not
occur until after the full-rate production decision.
Sortie generations and support activities also required the extensive
involvement of contractor personnel for providing technical assistance,
off-aircraft maintenance, and engineering, including trouble-shooting
and use of special test equipment. Air Force officials said that
extensive contractor involvement has long been planned for the F/A-22
system, particularly during initial fielding, and that reliance on
contractor personnel and special test equipment should somewhat lessen
as Air Force personnel gain experience.
Before full-rate production can start, the Office of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation must still review test results and
report to Congress and defense leadership.[Footnote 17] In addition,
the F/A-22 program must demonstrate it satisfies criteria established
by the Defense Acquisition Board in November 2004. Among other things,
that criteria includes delivering a fully-resourced plan for follow-on
testing to correct deficiencies identified in IOT&E, achieving design
stability of the avionics software, demonstrating mature manufacturing
processes, and validating technical order data.
Conclusions:
The Air Force, in the face of significant changes to the F/A-22, has
not prepared a new business case to justify the resources needed to add
a much more robust ground attack capability and to assume new missions.
Over the 19 years that the program has been in development, the world
threat environment has changed and the capabilities the Air Force once
needed and planned for in the F-22 may not satisfy the warfighter's
future needs. Additionally, cost growth over time and affordability
concerns have driven down planned aircraft quantities from 750 to 178
aircraft. The Air Force is now planning a modernization program that
will substantially change the role of the F/A-22. Because of budget
cuts in the program that have eliminated F/A-22 procurement after 2008
the modernization program as planned is obsolete. Even if aircraft are
restored to the procurement plan beyond 2008, this modernization is
projected to occur over a 12-year period. Based on the program's
current knowledge, there is significant risk that the planned
modernization would not move ahead and deliver capability to the
warfighter on schedule. The original plan to develop and deliver an
initial capability for the F-22 was 9 years--it has taken nearly 20
years. Our body of work in best practices tells us one thing for
certain, and that is that the chances of attaining successful outcomes
are substantially increased when a business case is made that matches
requirements and resources for developing a product. Right now both
requirements and resources for the F/A-22 program are in a state of
flux and it lacks a business case to move forward with billions of
dollars in planned investments.
Over the immediate horizon, planned studies present OSD with
opportunities to answer questions about need and affordability of the
F/A-22. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review is expected to make a
strategic assessment of available and planned tactical air capabilities
to help determine where to target resources. Likewise, an ongoing
series of joint capabilities reviews, to include the F/A-22, could help
determine where the F/A-22 now fits in the force structure. These top-
level studies would provide information needed for a specific F/A-22
business case that would place DOD leaders in a better position to
decide on remaining F/A-22 investments in concert with other tactical
aircraft and DOD needs. The F/A-22 full rate production decision is
currently planned for March 2005, before the results of these studies
are available and production is already at near full rate quantities.
Recommendations:
Because of evolving threats against the United States; pending changes
in U.S. defense plans; the lack of clarity regarding F/A-22 required
capabilities, quantities, and resources; the recent budget decision;
and upcoming reviews on joint air capabilities, we are reiterating and
expanding upon the recommendation in our March 2004 report for a new
and comprehensive business case to justify future investment in the F/
A-22 program. We recommend the Secretary of Defense complete a new
business case that determines the continued need for the F/A-22 and
that specifically:
(a) justifies the F/A-22's expanded air-to-ground capabilities based on
an assessment of alternatives to include both operational assets and
planned future weapon systems;
(b) justifies the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy
requirements for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions;
(c) provides evidence that the planned quantity and capabilities are
affordable within current and projected budgets and the statutory
funding limitation;
(d) addresses impacts of the recent budget decision on the need for and
cost of future developmental activities, long-term logistical support
and basing decisions, and the ability to take advantage of cost
reduction efforts, such as multiyear contracting and productivity
improvement; and:
(e) justifies the need for investments for a new computer architecture
and avionics processor, and F/A-22 infrastructure deficiencies.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation. They identified the following actions planned that
would accomplish business case elements: (1) the 2005 Quadrennial
Defense Review will address quantity of aircraft needed for air-to-air
and air-to-ground missions; (2) Defense Acquisition Board reviews of
the F/A-22 program will ensure that initial modernization efforts have
validated requirements and are tested; and (3) the plan to break out
the latter stages of modernization as a separate acquisition program
will require the Air Force to develop requirements, perform an analysis
to substantiate those requirements, and justify investments in new
capabilities.
DOD also stated its concern that by only reporting total program
acquisition unit cost (pp. 5 and 6 herein), the report does not provide
a balanced picture. They asked us to also present information
concerning the steady reduction in unit flyaway costs over the course
of the program. Flyaway costs do not include "sunk" costs and fixed
expenses for program start-up, development, test, construction, and
support but focus on the procurement costs of buying additional
systems, costs that generally decrease as a production program matures
and manufacturing efficiency improves. In response, we provided
additional information about flyway costs and potential diseconomies
from truncating the procurement program (see p. 12). We also
incorporated other technical comments from DOD where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please
contact me or Michael J. Hazard at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff
has any questions concerning this report. Other contributors to this
report were Robert Ackley, Michael W. Aiken, Lily J. Chin, Bruce D.
Fairbairn, Steven M. Hunter, and Adam Vodraska.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the Air Force's F/A-22 modernization plans and funding
requirements, we analyzed budget documents, cost reports, acquisition
plans, and project listings to identify the purpose, scope, and cost of
the modernization efforts. Officials from the Air Force and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) briefed us on program details,
specific candidate projects, and program history. We compared current
plans and project listings with previous time periods to determine
changes in modernization projects and schedules. We also compared cost
estimates prepared by the Air Force and OSD's cost analysts in order to
identify key differences in assumptions used, cost factors applied, and
time periods and to reconcile how these differences impacted final
results.
To determine the results and implications of the initial operational
test and evaluation on the F/A-22 program, we first reviewed test
plans, laws and regulations governing operational tests, and management
direction affecting the scope and schedule of testing. We then
discussed summary results and program impacts, including schedule
issues, with testing and evaluating officials from the Air Force and
OSD. We also reviewed briefing materials used by testing officials to
inform DOD management and congressional staffs on the results of
initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). However, at the time
of our review, the final reports on IOT&E results from the Air Force's
Operational Test and Evaluation Center and the OSD Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation were not issued nor were drafts made
available to us. Accordingly, our analysis of actual results and data
was somewhat constrained and our reporting limited to providing summary
level observations on test scope, results, and corrective actions
identified. Notwithstanding, DOD officials gave us access to sufficient
information to make informed judgments on the matters covered in this
report.
In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington,
D.C., including the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation, the Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Cost
Analysis Improvement Group; Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
F/A-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirkland Air Force Base, New
Mexico; and the Combined Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base,
California.. We performed our work from November 2004 through February
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: F/A-22 Program Cost, Quantity, and Schedule Changes:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
MAR 09 2005:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense's (DoD's) response to the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report, "TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Air
Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities and
Increased Capabilities," dated February 15, 2005 (GAO Code 120380/GAO-
05-304).
The draft GAO report provides one recommendation in five parts. The
Department of Defense concurs with the recommendation. A discussion of
the ways in which the Department is addressing the recommendation is
provided at Attachment 1. Additional comments and recommendations
regarding the report are provided at Attachment 2. In particular, the
Department is concerned that by only presenting total acquisition unit
cost, the report does not provide a balanced picture of the cost to
produce F/A-22 aircraft. We strongly recommend that the report also
present information depicting the steady reduction in unit-flyaway
costs over the course of the F/A-22 program.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Defense Systems:
Attachments: As stated:
"TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-
22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION: GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense complete a new
business case that determines the continued need for the F/A-22 and
that specifically:
(a) justifies the F/A-22's expanded air-to-ground capabilities based.
on an assessment of alternatives to include both operational assets and
planned future weapon systems;
(b) justifies the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy
requirements for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions;
(c) provides evidence that the planned quantity and capabilities are
affordable within current and projected budgets and the statutory
funding limitation;
(d) addresses impacts of the recent budget decision on the need for and
cost of future developmental activities, long-term logistical support
and basing decisions, and the ability to take advantage of cost
reduction efforts, such as multiyear contracting and productivity
improvement; and:
(e) justifies the need for investments for a new computer architecture
and avionics processor, and F/A-22 infrastructure deficiencies.
RESPONSE: The Department of Defense (DoD) concurs with the GAO's
recommendation. Actions are currently underway, or planned, to
accomplish those items addressed in the recommendation.
As noted in the report, the PB06 budget deliberations require that the
2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) include an assessment of joint
air dominance in future warfare and the contributions provided by all
tactical aircraft, including the F/A-22. Accordingly, the QDR will
address the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements
for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. In support of the QDR, DoD
is performing an aircraft capabilities study. The objective of this
study is to evaluate the capabilities that planned U.S. air superiority
and strike forces will bring to bear in meeting future potential
threats, and to assess options that may be developed to reduce selected
risks. Options may include alternative force structures, aircraft and
system upgrades, and enhancements to the F/A-22's air-to-air and air-
to-ground capabilities. A product of the QDR will be an assessment of
the affordability of alternative tactical aviation force structures,
including procurement quantities and development of enhanced
capabilities.
Moreover, in its oversight of the development and acquisition of
modernization Increment 4, the Department will conduct an analysis that
is consistent with the GAO's definition of a business case, as defined
in the report. As noted in the GAO's draft report, the Acting Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) "directed
the Air Force to break out the latter stages of the modernization
efforts and manage it as a separate acquisition program." This refers
specifically to Increment 4, which the Air Force has not defined, but
which may include a new computer architecture and avionics processor.
The Air Force is required by DoD and Joint Chiefs of Staff regulations
to develop requirements and perform an analysis to substantiate those
requirements, and to justify investments in the new capabilities
proposed. The analysis must show that the concept can be developed and
produced within existing resources. The decision to proceed will also
be based on an assessment of cost, schedule and technical risk. The
risk assessment will address the adequacy of design knowledge. If the
development requires advanced technologies, those technologies must be
demonstrated to a sufficient level of maturity to permit development to
proceed with acceptable cost, schedule, and technical risk.
Although the Department has decided to manage Increments 2 and 3 as
part of the existing F/A-22 program, those spirals will be subject to
separate Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) reviews. These DAB reviews
will ensure that each capability increment has validated requirements
and is subject to operational test and evaluation.
The Department recognizes that President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2006
(PB-06) will have an impact on decisions regarding logistical support
and basing, and on the viability of cost-reduction initiatives. The Air
Force currently is evaluating these impacts. Because the PB-06 curtails
production in Fiscal Year 2008, it effectively forecloses the multi-
year procurement of F/A-22 aircraft.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-248.
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.
Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter
Programs. GAO-04-597T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2004.
Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22
Business Case. GAO-04-391. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2004.
Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can
Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-645T. Washington, D.C.: April
11, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-603T.
Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22
Production Rates While Development Risks Continue. GAO-03-431.
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003.
Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should
Be Lower to Reduce Risks. GAO-02-298. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2002.
Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs
Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.: July
16, 2001.
Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need
for Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2001.
Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.: August
15, 2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22
Total Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2000.
F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals.
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999.
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Production and RDT&E Programs. GAO/
NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999.
Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal
Year 2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1999.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113. Washington,
D.C.: March 17, 1999.
F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-55. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1999.
F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: March 25,
1998.
F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-98-67. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 1998.
Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program.
GAO/NSIAD-97-156. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 1997.
Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on
Optimistic Budget Projections. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103. Washington, D.C.:
March 5, 1997.
F-22 Restructuring. GAO/NSIAD-97-100R. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
1997.
Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22
Aircraft Should Be Reduced. GAO/NSIAD-95-59. Washington, D.C.: April
19, 1995.
Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176.
Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1994.
Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned.
GAO/NSIAD-94-118. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1994.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Global Strike is one of six complementary concepts of operations
laying out the Air Force's ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited-
duration and extended attacks against targets.
[2] The business case is defined as demonstrated evidence that (1) the
warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the chosen
concept and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within
existing resources--including design knowledge, demonstrated
technologies, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the
product.
[3] P. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217(d). The act states that
no report is required after Engineering and Manufacturing Development
under the program has been completed. If the scheduled March 2005 full-
rate production decision occurs, it means that the overall program has
officially moved beyond the development phase into large-scale
production. Accordingly, this would be the last GAO report under this
mandate.
[4] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-
22 Business Case, GAO-04-391 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2004).
[5] Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the
conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive
interference by the enemy.
[6] P. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217.
[7] P. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001), section 213.
[8] Program Budget Decision nominally reduced procurement quantity to
179 aircraft. Subsequently, the Air Force transferred one production
aircraft to be dedicated to testing, further reducing procurement
quantity to 178. It should also be noted that the recent crash of an F/
A-22 has reduced planned operational aircraft to 177.
[9] Program acquisition unit cost includes funding for development,
procurement, related military construction, and initial modernization
costs divided by total procurement quantity. It does not include later
modernization costs and certain support costs.
[10] The total amount consists of $61.3 billion currently budgeted for
the basic program and the initial stages of the modernization efforts;
$1.3 billion for future start-up costs of a separate acquisition
program for the latter stages of modernization; and $1.2 billion in
related costs to retrofit aircraft with enhanced capabilities and
activate depot maintenance activities.
[11] GAO-04-391.
[12] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter Programs, GAO-04-597T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2004).
[13] In November 2004, the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the Air Force to hold
separate milestone reviews for the latter stages of the modernization
program to be consistent with DOD acquisition policy. The Air Force now
plans to manage these efforts as a separate acquisition program while
continuing to manage the initial stages of modernization in the
existing F/A-22 program.
[14] The OSD CAIG acts as the principal advisory body to the milestone
decision authority on acquisition program costs.
[15] GAO-04-391, p. 8 through 10, discusses Air Force needs, plans, and
associated risks for a new computer architecture and avionics processor
to support the modernization program.
[16] Average unit flyaway cost includes the costs associated with
procuring one aircraft, including the airframe, engines, avionics,
other mission equipment, and certain nonrecurring production costs. It
does not include "sunk" costs, such as development and test, and other
costs to the whole system including logistical support and construction.
[17] 10 U.S.C. section 2399 provides that a major defense acquisition
program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until
initial operational test and evaluation is completed and the
congressional defense committees have received the report of testing
results from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. This
report is to contain an opinion about test adequacy and whether the
test results confirm that the system actually tested is operationally
effective and suitable for combat.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
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