Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Improved Stategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges Gao ID: GAO-05-395T March 9, 2005The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s, and as the Department of Defense (DOD) transforms its military operations, UAVs are becoming increasingly vital. Today's testimony identifies (1) GAO's preliminary observations on operational successes and emerging challenges from ongoing GAO work reviewing UAV current operations, (2) the extent to which DOD has developed a strategic plan and oversight body to manage its investment in UAVs, and (3) lessons from GAO's prior work that can be used to promote the efficient development, fielding, and operational use of UAVs.
Current UAV operations have achieved mission successes, but some challenges are emerging. Among the successes, the Predator UAV has performed traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and less traditional close air support and armed strike missions. In addition, certain small UAVs have enabled troops to accomplish their missions at greater distances from enemy positions. Nonetheless, UAV operations have been hampered by certain emerging challenges. For example, some UAVs are not fully interoperable with others, with manned aircraft systems, or even with conventional forces. Certain UAVs are unable to operate in sandstorms or other poor weather conditions, thus forfeiting some of the advantages otherwise available from the sensor payloads. And UAVs increasingly compete for limited bandwidth. DOD still lacks a viable strategic plan and oversight body to guide UAV development efforts and related investment decisions. DOD has set up a Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV development and fielding, but the task force has only limited authority and cannot enforce program direction. DOD's UAV Roadmap contains some elements of a strategic plan, but it does not describe the interrelationship of service roadmaps to the DOD Roadmap or clearly identify funding priorities. Thus, DOD may not be well positioned to make sound program decisions or establish funding priorities, nor will Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. Such a plan would also help DOD minimize the types of challenges that are emerging. DOD has not consistently implemented best practices in developing and fielding UAVs. GAO has found that programs have succeeded when DOD has used innovative development processes, relied on evolutionary technology development, ensured high-level management attention, and constrained resources and relied on achievable technologies. Development has been hampered when DOD has insisted on requirements that outstripped technology, rushed into production before completing testing, used overly ambitious schedules, or engaged in concurrent testing and production.
GAO-05-395T, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Stategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST Wednesday, March 9,
2005:
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging
Challenges:
Statement of Sharon Pickup,
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Michael J. Sullivan,
Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-395T]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-395T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) has been under
development for defense applications since the 1980s, and as the
Department of Defense (DOD) transforms its military operations, UAVs
are becoming increasingly vital. Today‘s testimony identifies (1) GAO‘s
preliminary observations on operational successes and emerging
challenges from ongoing GAO work reviewing UAV current operations, (2)
the extent to which DOD has developed a strategic plan and oversight
body to manage its investment in UAVs, and (3) lessons from GAO‘s prior
work that can be used to promote the efficient development, fielding,
and operational use of UAVs.
What GAO Found:
Current UAV operations have achieved mission successes, but some
challenges are emerging. Among the successes, the Predator UAV has
performed traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions and less traditional close air support and armed strike
missions. In addition, certain small UAVs have enabled troops to
accomplish their missions at greater distances from enemy positions.
Nonetheless, UAV operations have been hampered by certain emerging
challenges. For example, some UAVs are not fully interoperable with
others, with manned aircraft systems, or even with conventional forces.
Certain UAVs are unable to operate in sandstorms or other poor weather
conditions, thus forfeiting some of the advantages otherwise available
from the sensor payloads. And UAVs increasingly compete for limited
bandwidth.
DOD still lacks a viable strategic plan and oversight body to guide UAV
development efforts and related investment decisions. DOD has set up a
Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV development and fielding,
but the task force has only limited authority and cannot enforce
program direction. DOD‘s UAV Roadmap contains some elements of a
strategic plan, but it does not describe the interrelationship of
service roadmaps to the DOD Roadmap or clearly identify funding
priorities. Thus, DOD may not be well positioned to make sound program
decisions or establish funding priorities, nor will Congress have all
the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. Such a plan
would also help DOD minimize the types of challenges that are emerging.
DOD has not consistently implemented best practices in developing and
fielding UAVs. GAO has found that programs have succeeded when DOD has
used innovative development processes, relied on evolutionary
technology development, ensured high-level management attention, and
constrained resources and relied on achievable technologies.
Development has been hampered when DOD has insisted on requirements
that outstripped technology, rushed into production before completing
testing, used overly ambitious schedules, or engaged in concurrent
testing and production.
Global Hawk UAV:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Air Force.
[End of figure]
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-395T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov, or Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915
or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of
Defense's (DOD) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). As you know, we
appeared before you last year to discuss management issues that we
identified in our work on research, development, and fielding of the
latest generation of UAVs. At that time, we emphasized the need for DOD
to develop a strategic plan to guide UAV development and fielding and
an oversight body to implement such a plan. We also pointed out some of
the factors that led to success in UAV acquisition programs and those
that hampered acquisition efforts, emphasizing that strong leadership
is needed to ensure that the most cost-effective solutions are adopted.
As you know, the current generation of UAVs has been under development
for defense applications since the 1980s, and as DOD transforms the way
in which it conducts military operations, UAVs are becoming
increasingly vital. Since we appeared before you last year, we have
seen continued growth in the funding for UAVs and an acceleration of
the trend of employing UAVs in military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the types and quantities of UAV systems
currently in operation, under development, or planned for future
development are steadily growing.
Today, you asked us to discuss our preliminary observations on the work
we are currently conducting for this Subcommittee on the performance of
UAVs in current operations, and DOD's progress in improving strategic
and acquisition planning. Specifically, we will highlight (1)
operational successes and emerging challenges that U.S. forces are
experiencing with UAVs in the field, (2) lack of progress in
establishing a viable strategic plan and oversight body to guide joint
and service-specific UAV development efforts and related investment
decisions, and (3) lessons learned from our prior reviews that can be
instructive for the efficient development and fielding of UAVs.
The information we will discuss on emerging challenges is based on our
preliminary work for the Subcommittee. We will be continuing our work
after this hearing, including meeting with officials from U.S. Central
Command and previously deployed units to discuss their actual
operational experiences with UAVs and lessons learned. We plan to issue
a report based on this work to you later this year.
To address our objectives, we conducted preliminary interviews with or
reviewed documents from the Joint UAV Planning Task Force, Joint Forces
Command, the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps, and
other organizations; updated our previously issued report on UAV force
structure planning, development, and fielding; and updated our prior
body of work on UAV development and acquisition.
We conducted our work from July 2004 to February 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Current UAV operations have achieved certain mission successes but
challenges are emerging. UAVs have been used to support tactical,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, as well as
strike missions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, Global Hawk was
used to identify 55 percent of the time-sensitive targets[Footnote 1]
to defeat enemy air defenses in the Iraqi theater in March and April
2003. In addition, the Predator UAV has been used in Iraq and
Afghanistan to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
as well as highly successful lethal strike missions using Hellfire
missiles. According to the Commander of U.S. Central Command, demand
for UAVs is insatiable.[Footnote 2] Nonetheless, based on our
preliminary discussions with DOD and the services, it is becoming
apparent that DOD faces some emerging challenges affecting its ability
to maximize the use of UAVs to enhance operations and effectively
promote force transformation. Specifically, interoperability remains a
challenge. For example, some UAVs are not fully interoperable with one
another and, in some instances, ground forces have not been linked to
or able to use data generated by other services' UAVs. Also, the
ability of UAVs to operate in poor weather conditions is limited and
the availability of bandwidth[Footnote 3] needed to support UAV
operations is constrained.
While DOD continues to request funds for UAVs and the services continue
to plan, develop, and field UAV systems, it still has not developed a
strategic plan to guide investment decisions or established an office
with sufficient authority to implement such a plan. Last year, we
reported that DOD had established a Joint UAV Planning Task Force (Task
Force) within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics), and that the Task Force had issued the UAV
Roadmap 2002-2027 in December 2002 covering UAV development from 2002
through 2027.[Footnote 4] However, we noted that DOD did not have a
viable strategic plan to guide the development and fielding of UAVs.
Although the Roadmap included some elements of a strategic plan,
including long-term goals, approaches to attaining long-term goals,
performance goals, and some performance indicators, it omitted some
critical elements. For example, the Roadmap did not include a mission
statement, description of how program evaluations were used to
establish or revise goals, discussion of the interrelationship between
service plans and programs to develop and field UAVs, or provide
adequate information on current and projected funding needs. Moreover,
even if a strategic plan existed, we reported that neither the Task
Force nor any other office has sufficient authority to implement such a
plan. We recommended that DOD establish a strategic plan and designate
the Task Force or another body to oversee implementation of the plan.
Since that time, we understand that the Task Force is updating the UAV
Roadmap and continues to act as the focal point to coordinate with the
services on UAV development. We are hopeful that the new Roadmap will
include all of the elements of a strategic plan. Without a strategic
plan to guide investment decisions, we continue to believe that DOD
will not be in the best position to validate requirements, make sound
programmatic decisions, or establish funding priorities. We also
believe that the Congress will not have all the information it needs to
evaluate DOD's funding requests. Furthermore, such a plan could help
DOD anticipate and take steps to minimize the types of challenges that
are occurring today.
Our past work in UAV development and acquisition has identified
important lessons that can be applied to the development and fielding
of UAV systems to overcome some of the emerging challenges that we have
identified. Our reviews have found that success was achieved when DOD
has used innovative development processes, relied on evolutionary
approaches to technology development, ensured high-level management
attention, and constrained resources and relied on achievable
technologies. On the other hand, development was hampered when DOD
insisted on requirements that outstripped technological capability,
rushed into production before testing was completed, implemented overly
ambitious schedules, or engaged in concurrent testing and production.
Background:
DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a
human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic
forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely
piloted;[Footnote 5] can be expendable or recoverable; and can carry a
lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial
vehicle; a flight control station; information and retrieval or
processing stations; and, sometimes, wheeled land vehicles that carry
launch and recovery platforms. In addition, UAV systems require
adequate intra-or inter-theater communications capabilities to permit
operators to maintain control of some vehicles, and to permit the UAVs'
communications equipment to transmit the information obtained by the
onboard sensors to ground commanders or other users.
UAVs provide battlefield commanders with real-time intelligence through
their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission. The
United States is also considering using UAVs to assist with border
security for homeland security or homeland defense. Important
advantages of UAVs include their ability to operate for a far longer
period than a pilot could safely operate an aircraft, and the fact that
DOD avoids putting servicemembers' lives at risk during operations.
Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented the
capabilities the warfighter already had. However, UAVs are evolving
into more significant roles, for which they can provide primary
capability. For example, the Global Hawk UAV may eventually replace the
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Aerial System may
eventually perform electronic warfare missions performed by the EA-6
Prowler aircraft today. Moreover, UAVs are figuring prominently in
plans to transform the military into a more strategically responsive
force. UAVs are expected to be an integral part of this information-
based force. For example, they may serve as relay nodes in the Army's
Future Combat System's command and control network.
Since we testified before the Subcommittee last year, DOD has increased
its planned expenditure for UAVs and associated systems, and the
systems have continued to be heavily used in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
fact, about 12 different types of UAV systems have been used in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In addition, the budget request for UAVs grew
significantly between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2005, from about
$363 million to about $2.3 billion, respectively. DOD projects that
funding needs will grow to about $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2009.
These figures do not include supplemental appropriations. DOD has
requested about another $234 million for UAVs in the fiscal year 2005
supplemental request.
DOD Has Achieved Certain Operational Successes, but Some Challenges Are
Emerging:
As we have seen in recent operations, UAVs are being used in greater
numbers and on increasingly challenging missions, and they are likely
to be called on to operate more extensively with other UAVs, manned
systems, and conventional ground and air forces. As our preliminary
discussions with DOD officials and our review of various documents
suggests, DOD has performed successful missions using a variety of
UAVs, including the Predator, Global Hawk, Pointer, and Raven. However,
some challenges are emerging, such as issues concerning
interoperability, the ability to operate in poor weather conditions,
and communications and bandwidth limitations.
Recent UAV Successes in Combat Operations:
The Air Force has used Predator in a variety of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Predator is also being used for other missions, including close air
support and armed strike. For example, a Predator UAV armed with
Hellfire missiles was used to attack a target carrying suspected
terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The Air Force believes that using Predator
has enabled it to achieve time-critical targeting that might otherwise
have been impossible.
In addition, Global Hawk has also significantly improved DOD's ability
to gather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Global Hawk captures detailed images of targets and wide
swaths of terrain and then transmits those images on a nearly real-time
basis to battlefield commanders and intelligence centers. In fact,
while flying just 3 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Global Hawk
generated 55 percent of the time-critical targets against enemy air
defenses.
Lastly, small UAVs such as the Pointer and Raven have been instrumental
in enabling troops to find, locate, and destroy numerous targets. For
example, during a single mission, a team used a small UAV system to
locate a target, cover the team's movements, target the adversary, and
then conduct a bomb damage assessment to determine whether additional
strike missions were needed. Moreover, the use of small UAVs has
enabled ground forces to accomplish their missions at greater distances
from enemy positions, in effect expanding the standoff distance and
thereby reducing the risk to U.S. servicemembers on the ground.
Certain Challenges Are Emerging:
Notwithstanding these operational successes, it is becoming apparent
from our preliminary discussions with DOD officials and our review of
various documents that DOD faces some emerging challenges affecting its
ability to maximize the use of UAVs to enhance operations and
effectively promote force transformation. Such challenges relate to
interoperability, the ability of UAVs to operate in poor weather, and
the availability of communications and bandwidth.
First, while numerous UAVs have been used to conduct various missions
in recent operations, interoperability is a challenge. The services
have generally been reluctant to adopt common mission management
systems or other interoperability approaches within similar types or
classes of UAVs. As a result, it appears that some UAVs may not be
fully interoperable with other UAVs, with manned aircraft systems, or
even with conventional forces. For example, in certain instances ground
forces have not been linked to or able to utilize data generated by
other services' UAVs. Each service has tended to initiate its own
separate development program, specifically tailored to its own
requirements, rather than adopting an existing capability from another
service. DOD is aware of this problem and has taken some steps to
address it. For example, DOD is evaluating several areas, including
vehicle development, training, and data sharing, to determine if
improvements in these areas will increase UAV interoperability.
However, we have not evaluated the effectiveness of DOD's efforts at
this time.
Second, weather and environmental constraints are a key limiting factor
for UAV operations. UAVs are generally not able to operate in certain
inclement weather conditions, including sandstorms and icing
conditions. For example, dust storms have kept Marine Corps UAVs from
performing some of their missions. At the same time, certain UAV
sensors are capable of "seeing" through clouds, sandstorms, and other
inclement weather conditions by day or night. Nonetheless, this
capability may not be available because the vehicles themselves are not
always able to carry the onboard sensors during these poor weather
conditions, consequently undermining the capability made available by
UAV operations.
Third, communications represent a major challenge for UAVs. There is
widespread concern that UAVs are consuming increasingly large amounts
of communication bandwidth as DOD fields additional UAVs requiring
communications capability. Bandwidth is needed to support systems that
control the flight of UAVs, to transmit the data collected by payload
sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers. As UAVs and
other weapons systems requiring bandwidth are increasingly employed,
limits on bandwidth availability will hamper DOD's ability to obtain
the benefits from these new weapons systems if bandwidth availability
is not expanded. DOD is aware of this challenge and is exploring
possible solutions.
A Strategic Plan and Effective DOD Oversight Can Be Helpful in
Addressing the Challenges:
DOD has set up a Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV development
and fielding. The Task Force is the primary focal point, but has
limited authority to enforce program direction. The Task Force has
issued its UAV Roadmap 2002--2027 to communicate its vision and promote
interoperability. Although the Roadmap includes some elements of a
strategic plan, DOD still lacks a comprehensive plan, as well as an
office with sufficient authority to implement it. Without a strategic
plan to guide investment decisions, DOD will not be in a position to
validate requirements, make sound programmatic decisions, or establish
funding priorities nor will the Congress have all the information it
needs to evaluate DOD's funding requests. Furthermore, such a plan
would help DOD anticipate and potentially minimize the types of
challenges that are emerging today.
Joint UAV Planning Task Force Established:
In October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) created the Joint UAV Planning Task Force as
the joint advocate for developing and fielding UAVs. The Task Force is
the focal point to coordinate UAV efforts throughout DOD, helping to
create a common vision for future UAV-related activities and establish
interoperability standards. However, while the Task Force's authority
focuses on program review and advice, it is insufficient to enforce
program direction. The Task Force Director testified in March 2003 that
the Task Force does not have program directive authority, but instead
provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) with advice and recommendations[Footnote 6]--that is, the
Task Force tries to influence service programs by proposing changes for
consideration by the Under Secretary. Last year, the Director of
Defense Systems, in the Office of the Undersecretary, testified that
the Task Force tries to guide service acquisition, planning,
prioritization, and execution of unmanned air systems.[Footnote 7]
Nonetheless, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt its
suggestions and does not have approval authority. For example,
according to DOD officials, additional progress is needed to achieve
better interoperability among the services in UAV platform and sensor
coordination.
The Roadmap Has Some Elements of a Strategic Plan:
The UAV Roadmap exhibits some elements of a strategic plan, but is not
a comprehensive plan to guide the development and fielding of UAVs that
complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and avoid
duplication. Key elements of a strategic plan would include:
* a mission statement;
* an explanation of long-term goals and objectives;
* strategies to attain long-term goals;
* an explanation of the relationship between long-term goals and
objectives and annual performance goals;
* identification of external factors that could affect accomplishment
of the goals;
* a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or
revise the goals;
* a description of the relationship between similar programs; and:
* information concerning funding needs and expenditures.
The Roadmap represents a good start on a strategic plan because it
incorporates some of the key elements. For example, the Roadmap
identifies approaches to attaining long-term goals, and it assesses, in
part, annual performance goals and performance indicators that identify
progress toward these goals. However, the Roadmap only minimally
addresses the other key elements. In particular, it does not explain
the interrelationship between service-specific efforts, identify
opportunities for joint endeavors, or address funding issues.
DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has not issued any guidance that establishes an overall strategy for
UAVs. While several high-level DOD strategic-planning documents--
including the National Military Strategy and the Strategic Planning
Guidance--provide some general encouragement to pursue transformational
technologies, these documents do not provide specific guidance on UAV
development or related force structure integration. In 2004, we
recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan or set of plans. We
understand that DOD plans to issue an updated Roadmap later this year.
We hope that the new Roadmap will include all of the elements of a
strategic plan. As we testified last year, it is important that DOD's
plan clearly identify goals, requirements, programs, funding needs,
performance measures, and the interrelationship of service-specific
programs to each other; how service-specific UAV programs promote joint
operations; and funding requirements. With such a plan, we continue to
believe that DOD will be better positioned to validate requirements,
integrate service efforts, and establish program and funding
priorities. We also believe that such a plan will assist the Congress
in evaluating DOD's funding requests for UAVs.
Our Prior Work Identifies Important Lessons for the Efficient
Development, Fielding, and Operational Use of UAVs:
Within the past year, we have reviewed four UAV programs and observed
factors that lead to successful outcomes and others that tend to
increase risk of poor outcomes. The UAV programs included in our
reviews were the Global Hawk, Predator, Shadow, and Joint Unmanned
Combat Air Systems. Table 1 displays the common factors that we
identified that lead to successful acquisition programs and those that
increase risk and limit success.
Table 1: Factors That Lead to or Limit Success:
Lead to success: Innovative process;
Limit success: Requirements that outstrip resources, including
technology.
Lead to success: Evolutionary approach; Limit success: Rush to
production.
Lead to success: Management attention; Limit success: Ambitious
schedules.
Lead to success: Simple requirements and fixed resources; Limit
success: Concurrent testing and production.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Global Hawk:
Top management attention set the stage for the early success of Global
Hawk. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) became personally involved in establishing the original plan
for development. Leadership insisted on fielding an initial capability
that could be developed within a fixed budget while providing for an
evolutionary process to add enhancements to succeeding versions. The
result was a successful advanced concept technology demonstration which
produced seven demonstrators, logged several thousand-flight hours,
passed its military usefulness assessment, and effectively supported
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In March 2001, the Air Force began a systems acquisition program that
continued the evolutionary approach with a plan to first acquire basic
systems very similar to the demonstrators (designated the RQ-4A) and
then slowly and incrementally develop and acquire systems with more
advanced sensor capabilities while using the same air vehicle. However,
DOD restructured the program twice in 2002 to more quickly develop and
field a larger air vehicle (RQ-4B) with more advanced but immature
technologies. The restructurings tripled development costs and
compressed the procurement schedule. Program funding, which previously
had been stretched relatively evenly across 20 years, was compressed
into roughly half the time, tripling Global Hawk's budgetary
requirements in some years. The development period was expanded by 5
years and production period compressed by 9 years, creating significant
concurrency between fiscal years 2004 to 2010. By adding the new larger
air vehicle with its associated new technologies and design elements,
while speeding up the acquisition schedule, the Air Force accepted
higher risks compared to the original plan which followed a more
evolutionary approach.
Because of this concurrency, the Air Force plans to invest in almost
half of the total fleet of the new larger Global Hawks before a
production model is flight-tested and operational evaluations are
completed to show that the air vehicle design works as required.
Likewise, full-rate production will begin before the airborne signals
intelligence and multiplatform radar (the two required capabilities
justifying the new, larger model) complete development and are flight-
tested to prove the integrated system will work as intended. The
primary reason for building the RQ-4B model was to integrate and carry
the advanced sensors to provide added capability to the warfighter. In
our November 2004 report, we raised concerns about the substantial
concurrency and accelerated pace for acquiring the new system. We
recommended rethinking the revised plans and limiting initial
procurement of the new model until a new business case is completed
that reduces risk and justifies further investments based on a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy. The Air Force did not agree with
us, but we note that since our report was issued, DOD officials have
criticized the Global Hawk program for cost increases and have
decreased buys in fiscal years 2006 and 2007.
Shadow:
The Army's Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program, called Shadow, had
unusual interventions by top-level individuals that early on
established resource constraints, encouraged evolutionary acquisition
strategies, and set an early fielding date. Agreements were reached to
ensure that the program followed a "no bells and whistles" approach to
development that focused on key achievable technologies and limited the
program to "must have" capabilities and restrained costs. Despite cost
increases and operational shortfalls caused largely because the program
did not allow time to develop and test the system before production
began, the Army was still able to quickly deliver a needed capability
to the warfighter that has been used during recent combat operations.
Predator:
The Air Force's Predator A (MQ-1) also had success by following an
innovative advanced concept technology demonstration approach.
Development was focused and brisk and within 18-months of start-up
prototypes were deployed in Bosnia, demonstrating its worth before
completing development and starting production. Predator As are being
used with substantial success in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.
However, the Air Force then started a highly-concurrent development and
production program in 2002 to quickly acquire substantial numbers of a
new, larger, and multirole variant, the Predator B (MQ-9).
Subsequently, Air Force headquarters revised the strategy to include
fielding an interim combat capability by fiscal year 2006 and
developing Predator B in three separate increments, thereby extending
the completion of development by 4 years. Recognizing increased risks,
the program office lowered annual buy quantities and extended
production 5 years.
Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems:
This joint effort combined previously separate efforts of the Air Force
and Navy to develop advanced unmanned systems that can attack ground
targets. The Air Force had plans to abandon its initial low-risk
approach to development that increased its requirements and accelerated
its program schedule shortly before shifting to product development.
Concerned about the accelerated schedule and a lack of synergy in the
separate Air Force and Navy efforts, Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials intervened to reconcile requirements and funding challenges
and to improve oversight. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
was designated to lead the joint demonstration program with Air Force
and Navy participation. Plans and strategy established a $4 billion
demonstration program that would develop larger versions of the Air
Force and Navy prototypes, leading to an operational assessment in
2007. A common operating system was to be developed and both versions
were expected to also share common subsystems and weapons. The intent
was to then offer alternatives to the services leading to possible
start-up of systems development in 2010.
Although not clear at this time, program direction and content appears
to be again changing. Congress reduced fiscal year 2005 funding,
stating that the program had not properly coordinated with the services
and that the focus should be on meeting Air Force and Navy
requirements. Recently, DOD decided to transfer leadership and funding
from the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency to the Air Force as
joint office lead with Navy participation. Transitioning will occur
this year with Air Force taking over in 2006.
There are trends that run consistently through these four programs.
That is, when DOD provides strong leadership at an appropriate
organizational level, it enables innovative, evolutionary, and
disciplined processes to work. Once leadership is removed or
diminished, all these programs have tended to lose control of
requirements and add technical and funding risk. We have also found
that after successful demonstrations to quickly field systems with
existing technologies, problems were encountered after the programs
transitioned into the system development phase of the acquisition
process. The services pushed programs into production without maturing
processes and also began to add new requirements that stretched beyond
technology and design resources. DOD officials tend to agree with the
factors that lead to success and those that lead to problems and have
made some limited progress in the last year, but we have not yet seen a
consistent and across the board application of these successful
practices.
Concluding Remarks:
We believe that a greater emphasis on strategic planning and
application of the lessons learned for development and fielding of UAVs
could be helpful in addressing the emerging challenges that we are
identifying on our current work for the Subcommittee. We will more
fully examine these emerging challenges and monitor DOD's efforts to
address the challenges, and we will report to you on this work later
this year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy
to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup
at (202) 512-9619, Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915, or Brian J.
Lepore at (202) 512-4523. Other individuals making key contributions to
this statement include Harry E. Taylor, Jr., Patricia F. Albritton,
Jeanett H. Reid, Elisha T. Matvay, Robert B. Brown, Cheryl A. Weissman,
Ron La Due Lake, Kenneth E. Patton, Lily J. Chin, Bruce D. Fairbairn,
Steven M. Hunter, Matthew B. Lea, Charlie Shivers, and Adam Vodraska.
[End of section]
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy
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[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-6] Washington,
D.C.: November 5, 2004.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Major Management Issues Facing DOD's
Development and Fielding Efforts.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-530T] Washington,
D.C.: March 17, 2004.
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Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology
Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. [Hyperlink,
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Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-598] Washington, D.C.: June
30, 2003.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow
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[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-204]
Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-78]
Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2000.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved
Project Outcomes.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-33]
Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude
Endurance Aircraft Price Goals.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-29]
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1998.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to
Justify Further Production.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-97-153]
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138] Washington, D.C.:
April 9, 1997.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy
Fleet Use.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-2]
Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short-Range System Still in
Question.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-94-65]
Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of
Short-Range System.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-92-311]
Washington, D.C.: September 4, 1992.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-91-2]
Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of
Short-Range System.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-90-234]
Washington, D.C.: September 28, 1990.
Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master
Plan.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR]
Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.
(350671):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Time-sensitive targets are targets that are expected to be
vulnerable to attack for only a short time.
[2] Testimony of General John P. Abizaid, Commander, United States
Central Command, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March
1, 2005.
[3] Bandwith refers to the available frequencies to support the flight
of UAVs, to transmit the output of on-board sensors, and to interface
with air traffic control centers.
[4] GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
17, 2004).
[5] An autonomously piloted UAV is one that is pre-programmed for its
mission before it takes off. It then flies its mission without a
ground- based pilot. A remotely piloted UAV is controlled by a pilot in
a control station on the ground during the flight.
[6] Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force, before
the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on
Armed Services, March 26, 2003.
[7] Statement of the Director, Defense Systems, Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics),
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed
Services, March 17, 2004.
