Defense Acquisitions
Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force Gao ID: GAO-05-669 June 15, 2005The Army has embarked on a major transformation of its force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a $108 billion effort to provide warfighters with the vehicles, weapons, and communications needed to identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality. Establishing reliable, robust communications and networking capabilities is key to FCS's success. Each of the systems integral to the FCS communications network--the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE)--rely on significant advances in current technologies and must be fully integrated to realize FCS. Given the complexity and costs of this undertaking, GAO was asked to review each of these key development efforts to identify any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS.
Each of the programs for developing FCS's communications network is struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep technical challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently structured, the programs are at risk of not delivering intended capabilities for the first spiral of FCS, slated to start in fiscal year 2008. The JTRS Cluster 1 program--a program to develop radios for ground vehicles and helicopters--began development with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. As currently designed, the radio will only have a transmission range of only 3 kilometers--well short of the required 10 kilometers--and will not meet security requirements for operating in an open networked environment. The program's struggle to mature and integrate key technologies has contributed to significant cost and schedule growth. A recent review of the program concluded that the current program structure is not executable, and in April 2005, DOD directed the Army to stop work and notify the contractor that it was considering terminating the contract. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios--miniaturized radios, including those that soldiers carry--is even more technically challenging given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The smallest of these radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1 radios. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest have further slowed program progress. The Army is considering options for restructuring the program to meet the needs of FCS and address the technical issues encountered in the Cluster 1 program. The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-T--communications equipment that supports an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS radios--when production begins in March 2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly flawless execution and does not allow sufficient time for correcting problems. Significant interdependencies among the critical technologies further increase overall program risk. The program was directed to deliver networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs and synchronize with the restructured FCS program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to address FCS needs remains undetermined. According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE--the operating software to integrate the communications network--may not reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving and have not been translated into more detailed specifications necessary for writing SOSCOE software.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-669, Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2005:
Defense Acquisitions:
Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications
Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force:
GAO-05-669:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-669, a report to the Honorable Jerry Lewis,
Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army has embarked on a major transformation of its force. Central
to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a $108
billion effort to provide warfighters with the vehicles, weapons, and
communications needed to identify and respond to threats with speed,
precision, and lethality.
Establishing reliable, robust communications and networking
capabilities is key to FCS…s success. Each of the systems integral to
the FCS communications network”the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS),
the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and the System of
Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE)”rely on significant
advances in current technologies and must be fully integrated to
realize FCS. Given the complexity and costs of this undertaking, GAO
was asked to review each of these key development efforts to identify
any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS.
What GAO Found:
Each of the programs for developing FCS‘s communications network is
struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep
technical challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently
structured, the programs are at risk of not delivering intended
capabilities for the first spiral of FCS, slated to start in fiscal
year 2008.
The JTRS Cluster 1 program”a program to develop radios for ground
vehicles and helicopters”began development with an aggressive schedule,
immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable
requirements. As currently designed, the radio will only have a
transmission range of only 3 kilometers”well short of the required 10
kilometers”and will not meet security requirements for operating in an
open networked environment. The program‘s struggle to mature and
integrate key technologies has contributed to significant cost and
schedule growth. A recent review of the program concluded that the
current program structure is not executable, and in April 2005, DOD
directed the Army to stop work and notify the contractor that it was
considering terminating the contract.
Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios”miniaturized radios,
including those that soldiers carry”is even more technically
challenging given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The
smallest of these radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84
pounds for Cluster 1 radios. Several programmatic changes and a
contract award bid protest have further slowed program progress. The
Army is considering options for restructuring the program to meet the
needs of FCS and address the technical issues encountered in the
Cluster 1 program.
The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-
T”communications equipment that supports an expanded area of
battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS radios”when production
begins in March 2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly
flawless execution and does not allow sufficient time for correcting
problems. Significant interdependencies among the critical technologies
further increase overall program risk. The program was directed to
deliver networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-
term warfighting needs and synchronize with the restructured FCS
program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner
to address FCS needs remains undetermined.
According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE”the
operating software to integrate the communications network”may not
reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program
milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving
and have not been translated into more detailed specifications
necessary for writing SOSCOE software.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations aimed at reducing development risks so
that FCS is provided with enabling communications and networking
capabilities. If FCS proceeds without these capabilities, critical
aspects of the FCS network will remain undemonstrated. In commenting on
this report, the Department of Defense indicated it has begun taking
actions to address our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-669.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202)
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge,
Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems:
Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5
Progress:
Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and
Schedule Growth:
SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and Evolving
Requirements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities Compared
with Current Capabilities:
Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored
Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 Radios:
Figures:
Figure 1: FCS Network Components:
Figure 2: FCS Spirals' Timeline:
Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 1
Development:
Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power Compared with
Helicopter Requirements:
Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 5
Development:
Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies:
Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T Development:
Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development
from August 2003 to January 2005:
Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform
Development from August 2003 to January 2005:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FCS: Future Combat Systems:
GHz: gigahertz:
JNTC-S: Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral:
JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System:
MHz: megahertz:
SOSCOE: System of Systems Common Operating Environment:
WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 15, 2005:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
To counter the complex set of battlefield threats that have emerged
since the Cold War, the Army has embarked on a major transformation of
its force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems
(FCS) program, a large and difficult effort to develop a suite of new
manned and unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions
linked by a new information network, with a total cost of at least $108
billion. FCS will depend on this network to provide Army warfighters
and commanders with the high-quality data and real-time communications
needed to identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and
lethality. Indeed, the network's performance is what makes the FCS
concept work--superior information enables the FCS vehicles to be
lethal and survivable despite weighing a fraction of what today's
vehicles weigh. Continuously providing the quality and volume of
information necessary for the force to operate seamlessly together
places significant demands on the network components. The components
must generate high power, work at long range, and be reliable while
conforming to the tight physical constraints of the small FCS systems.
Four key systems are integral to the FCS communications network:
* Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, which is developing
radios for ground vehicles and helicopters;
* JTRS Cluster 5, which is developing small radios, including those
that soldiers carry;
* Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), which is developing
a high-capacity communications network for higher-level command units;
and:
* System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), which is
being developed as part of the FCS program and is the operating
software that integrates the communications network.
If JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE do not work as intended, battlefield
information will not be sufficient for FCS units to operate
effectively. JTRS Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 radios and new advanced
networking waveforms[Footnote 1] are expected to provide the warfighter
with a high-capacity, high-speed information link to access maps and
other visual data, communicate on-the-move via voice and video with
other units and levels of command, and obtain data directly from
battlefield sensors. WIN-T is expected to provide military commanders
access to intelligence, logistics, and other data critical to making
battlefield decisions and supporting battlefield operations.
Collectively, JTRS and WIN-T are estimated to cost over $34 billion to
develop and produce, above the $108 billion cost of FCS. SOSCOE is the
interface that allows all the systems to communicate with one another.
The Army plans to begin fielding the full set of FCS systems to brigade-
size units in 2014. However, the Army also plans to field FCS
capabilities to the current force incrementally through spirals. The
first FCS spiral is scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe and
emphasizes enhanced communications and network capabilities.
Because JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE all rely on significant advances in
current technologies and capabilities and must be fully integrated to
realize FCS, there are substantial risks to this effort. Given the
complexity of this undertaking and the size of the investment, you
asked us to review each of these key development efforts to identify
any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS's
communications and networking capabilities.
We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. To
assess the development risks of each system, we obtained and reviewed
relevant documents, including program acquisition reports, technology
readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans, cost performance
reports, and other information. We also met with various program and
agency officials and obtained in-depth briefings on the system
development efforts. More details about our scope and methodology are
in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The JTRS Cluster 1 program began development several years ago with an
aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly
defined and stable requirements. Since then, the program has continued
to struggle to mature and integrate key technologies and has been
forced to make major design changes. For example, the Cluster 1 design
does not generate sufficient power or meet size and weight constraints.
Consequently, the radio's projected range is only 3 kilometers--well
short of the 10 kilometer range required. In addition, the radio design
is not sufficient to meet security requirements for operating in an
open networked environment. These factors have contributed to
significant cost and schedule problems that led the Army in December
2004 to propose restructuring the program by adding $458 million and 24
months to the development effort. However, recently the Department of
Defense (DOD) directed that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped
while an assessment is conducted to determine the future of the
program. In addition, the Army is concerned about the contractor's
ability to develop the radios and notified the contractor that it was
considering a contract termination. At this point it is not clear what
the outcome will be and what impact this will have on the future of the
program. Consequently, it is unlikely the Cluster 1 radios will be
available for the start of the first spiral of the FCS network, slated
for fiscal year 2008. This is especially critical for FCS, as Cluster 1
is to provide what has been called the backbone of the FCS network--a
Wideband Networking Waveform that will serve as the main conduit of
information to and from Army tactical units.
The JTRS Cluster 5 program has also experienced technical challenges
and program changes that have impeded progress. Meeting requirements
for JTRS Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than for Cluster 1,
given Cluster 5 radios' smaller size, weight, and power needs. For
example, the smallest of these radios, which weigh only about 1 pound
each, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1, are not going to be able
to provide the power and cooling needed for the Wideband Networking
Waveform. In addition, the program will require a new networking
waveform, the Soldier Radio Waveform. Several programmatic changes and
a contract award bid protest have also slowed progress of the Cluster 5
program. Furthermore, in light of unresolved technical issues with the
Cluster 1 program, DOD has initiated an assessment to restructure the
Cluster 5 program. Consequently, Cluster 5 small form radios needed for
the first spiral of FCS may not be available in time. The Army is
seeking ways to accelerate program deliveries.
The WIN-T program also began with an aggressive schedule and immature
technologies. None of the critical technologies will be fully mature at
the time production begins in March 2006. The tightly compressed
schedule assumes nearly flawless execution and may not allow sufficient
time for correcting problems. In addition, significant
interdependencies among critical technologies further increase overall
program risk. Any delay in maturing an individual technology may hinder
the program's ability to achieve its performance objectives--
specifically, on-the-move communications. Other critical program
issues, such as deciding on a suitable airborne platform to achieve on-
the-move communications, remain unresolved. More recently, the program
shifted its focus to deliver networking and communications capabilities
sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs while continuing to support
the restructured FCS program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-
T capabilities sooner to address FCS needs remains undetermined.
SOSCOE faces the dual challenge of a software development that is high-
risk and evolving requirements. According to Army program officials,
SOSCOE software may not reach the necessary technical maturity level
required to meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS
requirements are still evolving and have not been translated into more
detailed specifications necessary for writing SOSCOE software. As a
result, it is unclear whether SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to
support the first spiral of FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008.
Given the criticality of these four systems to the performance of the
FCS network, this report makes recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense aimed at reducing their development risks so that they provide
the first spiral of FCS with enabling communications and networking
capabilities. In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD generally
concurred with our findings and recommendations. As part of its
comments, DOD provided some information on actions it has begun to take
to address each of our recommendations. While these actions should help
strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain
concerned that a demonstration of FCS's communications and networking
capabilities will not be known for some time. Until these capabilities
are demonstrated, investment in FCS platforms and systems carries
substantial risk.
Background:
Over the last decade, the Army has begun to transform its warfighting
capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of
potential threats. According to Army officials, the transformation is
the most comprehensive change in the Army in over a century, and will
affect all aspects of its organizations, training, doctrine,
leadership, and strategic plans as well as its acquisitions. Through
this transformation, the Army expects to establish a force that
provides both the lethality and survivability of today's heavily
armored units and the deployability and responsiveness of today's
lighter combat units. As envisioned, the future force will operate very
differently than forces have in the past. It will function in smaller,
more agile and deployable modular brigade combat teams (composed of
roughly 3,000 to 4,000 personnel) that can react quickly to changing
missions and circumstances. To be effective, force components--
soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors--must be "net-centric," that
is, closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together.
The transformation involves two major, interrelated acquisitions: (1)
development of new advanced communications and networking systems--
computers, software, and a wireless tactical internet--to acquire,
exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace and
(2) development of a new generation of battlefield vehicles, weapons,
and sensors. The Army has taken initial steps toward transformation
through its Digitization and Stryker programs. Under the Digitization
program, the Army installed computers, software, and interfaces to
communications systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and
other vehicles in selected units that enable both in-theater and higher
commands to share battlefield data with lower-level units. The Stryker
program introduced a new family of vehicles expected to make units more
lethal, mobile, and survivable than today's light forces. In addition,
the Army has initiated a major restructuring of its force into modular
brigade combat teams--brigade-sized units that will have a common
organizational design.
FCS is the culminating stage in the Army's ongoing transformation to a
lighter, more agile and capable force. It is a large and complex
development effort to provide a networked family of weapons and other
systems for the future force. Establishing reliable, robust
communications and networking capabilities is essential to FCS. Without
these capabilities, the lighter, more decentralized units would be
vulnerable to enemy attack.
Currently, the armed forces have limited communications and networking
capabilities on the battlefield, making it necessary to patch together
or reroute information through multiple radio, data terminal, and
network systems to get critical information to the warfighter and
commanders. Current "dial-up speed" data rates further delay forces'
ability to identify, assess, and respond to time-critical targets.
FCS's networked on-the-move communications for voice, data, video, and
imagery are expected to be a revolutionary improvement over current
communications capabilities (see table 1).
Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities Compared
with Current Capabilities:
Capability: Interoperability;
Current: Numerous unique systems, noninteroperable;
Future force: Small number of systems, interoperable.
Capability: Mobility;
Current: Point-to-point, with limited mobility;
Future force: Mobile and integrated network operations.
Capability: Data rate;
Current: Low data rate--mostly voice;
Future force: High data rate--voice, data, video, imagery that can
communicate simultaneously.
Capability: Range;
Current: Mostly line-of-sight, limiting performance in urban settings,
mountainous terrain, and other complex environments;
Future force: Expanded to include beyond line-of-sight.
Capability: Links;
Current: Single network thread to fixed/relocatable operations centers;
Future force: Network integrated warfighting platforms with mobile
operations centers and seamless connectivity from foxhole to the
Pentagon.
Capability: Speed;
Current: Dial-up speed;
Future force: Broadband speed.
Capability: Security;
Current: Susceptible to interception and detection by adversaries;
Future force: Multiple levels of security with reduced probability of
interception and detection.
Capability: Efficiency;
Current: Circuit-switched, spectrum inefficient;
Future force: Packet-switched, spectrum efficient.
Capability: Flexibility;
Current: Defense unique/proprietary technology--inflexible;
Future force: Open-systems architecture-- drawing on universal Internet-
Protocol-based commercial technology, flexible, standards-based.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The FCS communications and networking capabilities are being designed
around five components:
* Platforms and sensors: Under FCS, the Army is developing new
warfighting systems, including manned and unmanned aerial and ground
vehicles that will provide and use intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information.
* Applications: Software applications will support battlefield command
functions, including command and control, logistics support, training,
and modeling and simulation.
* Network services: SOSCOE will be the network-centric operating
system, or middleware, that enables the integration of separate FCS
communications software packages, independent of their location and the
technology used to develop them. The Army likens the SOSCOE
architecture to Microsoft Windows, but many times larger. SOSCOE
represents about 10 percent of the more than 30 million lines of FCS
software code.
* Transport systems: Transport systems--primarily JTRS and WIN-T--will
provide wireless communication capabilities to transport information
within the FCS network and the broader DOD-wide network.
* Standards: Standards implement DOD-wide policies and doctrine
developed by offices such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Networks and Information Integration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Two critical objectives of these standards are net-centric operations
and inter-service interoperability.
Figure 1 shows a representation of the five FCS network components.
Figure 1: FCS Network Components:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS is a software-reprogrammable radio that is intended to operate
with many different legacy radio systems and provide the warfighter
with additional communications and networking capabilities--including
seamless interoperability and increased data throughput--to
simultaneously access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice
and video with other units and levels of command, and obtain
information directly from battlefield sensors. A key component of JTRS
is developing waveforms to operate with legacy radios as well as new
waveforms to provide advanced networking capabilities, such as the
Wideband Networking Waveform. The Wideband Networking Waveform
represents a new, critical capability for DOD. The development of the
Wideband Networking Waveform is intended to address many of the current
limitations associated with DOD tactical wireless networking, including
line-of-sight limitations that cause many network partitions, unique
network monitoring systems, and predefined security enclaves that
require hardware for each security level. The waveform is expected to
provide data rates of 5 megabits per second or more--hundreds of times
faster than existing communications systems--and facilitate the routing
of large amounts of information among users anywhere in the
battlespace.
DOD has structured the JTRS development effort into several programs
clustered by requirements. The JTRS Cluster 1 program is developing
radios for ground vehicles and helicopters to equip the current force
as well as FCS. The program is expected to cost $15.6 billion to
develop and acquire over 100,000 Cluster 1 radios. The JTRS Cluster 5
program is developing handheld and manpack radios for soldiers as well
as several smaller varieties of radios for use in weight-and power-
constrained platforms--such as Unattended Ground Sensors and
Intelligent Munitions Systems. The program is expected to cost $8.5
billion to develop and acquire over 300,000 Cluster 5 radios.
The WIN-T program is developing communications equipment that supports
an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS
radios to connect warfighters and command centers, including joint,
allied, and coalition forces, providing commanders with access to on-
the-move communications--that is, continuously updated, real-time
multimedia information from dispersed locations throughout the theater.
It will replace existing communications networks that have limited
capacity to support on-the-move communications. Leveraging advanced
commercial technologies that enable mobile communications, the WIN-T
system includes data routing and switching hardware, computers, video
and teleconferencing equipment, high-capacity line-of-sight radios and
satellite terminals--all of which make up a tactical operation center's
communications element. WIN-T is being developed in three blocks, with
each block adding capabilities. Based on current plans, Block 1 is
projected to cost approximately $10 billion; Blocks 2 and 3 have yet to
be funded.
The SOSCOE software will reside within each FCS platform's integrated
computer system and provide a number of services for the users of the
integrated computer system. These services include interoperability
services, information assurance services, and communications services.
SOSCOE will enable integrated management of the network and will allow
systems within the network to access sources of information. The Army
estimates that SOSCOE software development will be completed in 2011.
The Army plans to field the SOSCOE software in increments to align with
the overall FCS software builds and planned FCS spirals.
When FCS began system development in May 2003, the JTRS and WIN-T
programs were under way with schedules that aligned with FCS planned
fielding. However, the Army restructured the FCS program in July 2004
to address development risks. The restructuring added 4 years to
develop the platform systems and established an evaluation unit to
demonstrate FCS capabilities. Even though the restructuring provided
additional time to the program, it also emphasized developing FCS
capabilities in spirals and accelerating the development of the network
into the current force. The Army now plans to test and field its FCS
capabilities incrementally between 2008 and 2014 through four spirals.
A 2-year period of testing will precede the actual fielding of
capabilities in each spiral. The Army has defined the initial spiral of
FCS around the capabilities needed by the current force, to include the
main components of the communications network--JTRS Cluster 1 and 5
radios and the wideband waveforms, some form of WIN-T communications
capability, and SOSCOE. The capabilities for the other FCS spirals will
be defined over time. Figure 2 shows the FCS spirals' timeline.
Figure 2: FCS Spirals' Timeline:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge,
Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems:
The JTRS Cluster 1 program began system development and demonstration
in 2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack
of clearly defined and stable requirements. These factors have
contributed to significant cost and schedule problems that the program
has not recovered from. The program has not been able to mature the
technologies needed to produce radios that generate sufficient power as
well as meet platform size and weight constraints and has been forced
to make design changes to accommodate evolving security requirements.
Because of cost, schedule, and performance problems, in December 2004,
the Army proposed restructuring the program by adding $458 million and
24 months to the development schedule. However, recently DOD directed
that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped while an assessment is
completed to determine the future of the program. In addition, because
of increased concern about the contractor's ability to develop the
radios, the Army notified the contractor that it was considering
contract termination. At this point it is not clear what the outcome
will be and what impact this will have on the future of the program. As
a result, it is unlikely JTRS Cluster 1 radios will be available for
the first FCS network spiral, slated to begin in fiscal year 2008. FCS
and other users dependent on Cluster 1 radios, such as Army
helicopters, will have to rely on legacy radios to fill the gap.
Accelerated Schedule Incompatible with System Immaturity:
Prior to the start of system development in 2002, the JTRS Cluster 1
schedule was accelerated 27 months to meet the Army's plan to modernize
its helicopters with various technological upgrades including advanced
communications. Cluster 1 proceeded into the system development and
demonstration phase with none of the program's 20 critical technologies
sufficiently matured and with requirements not clearly defined--
contrary to best practices and DOD guidance.[Footnote 2] Although many
of the technologies had been used in other radio applications,
significant technical advances were nonetheless required for developing
key components of the radio. The program's acquisition strategy, for
example, highlighted technology risks associated with the following
requirements:
* Wideband Networking Waveform: As the core of the JTRS networking
capability, the Wideband Networking Waveform is to operate across a
wide range of radio frequency spectrum, 2 megahertz (MHz) to 2
gigahertz (GHz), and provide increased routing and networking
capabilities. The Wideband Networking Waveform must also be compliant
with the Software Communications Architecture, which demands a modular
approach to waveform design, imposing much greater processing and
memory requirements. This is especially critical for FCS, as the
waveform is to provide what has been called the backbone or main
conduit of the FCS network.
* Security: The JTRS radio set is intended to operate applications at
multiple levels of security. For it to do so, developers not only have
to be concerned with traditional radio security issues but also must be
prepared to implement the features required for network and computer
security. This will require development of new technologies, obtaining
certification through a rigorous process by the National Security
Agency, and accommodating an expected growth in security requirements.
* Interference mitigation: Prior to JTRS, tactical radios were largely
designed for single channel and single band operations. Because JTRS
radio sets will operate multiple channels---as many as eight channels-
--simultaneously within the same radio set, developers must ensure that
communications over one channel do not interfere with communications
over another, because such interference would degrade the quality of
service and limit the radio's high data rate capability.
The accelerated acquisition strategy compressed the development cycle
and allowed little time for testing prior to key development decisions.
For example, the schedule called for making the initial production
decision for selected platforms immediately following an early
operational assessment of a partially functioning prototype of the JTRS
radio in surrogate vehicles (see fig. 3). This is in contrast to the
knowledge-based approach captured in best practices, which advocates
making production decisions based on an assessment of production-
representative prototypes in a realistic environment. Historically,
programs that must define requirements, develop technology, and design
products concurrently have experienced cost increases and schedule
delays. While the Army recognized the risk of moving forward with
immature technologies, it expected that emerging technologies in radio
software technology would enable it to develop the critical
technologies and integrate them into the product quickly.
Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 1
Development:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite the Army's expectations to leverage current and emerging radio
technologies, the critical technologies for the JTRS Cluster 1 radio
have generally not matured. The program is also struggling to derive
detailed specifications for Cluster 1 requirements. Despite the lack of
mature technologies and detailed specifications, the Army held the
program's critical design review--the point at which design stability
is to be achieved and demonstrated--in December 2003. However, with the
requirements still evolving, the program expects to make several costly
hardware and software design modifications. For example:
* The current processing and memory capacity of the Network INFOSEC
Unit, which contains the operating software, is insufficient to support
full systems operation, including waveform processing, enhanced
security, and power management. The program plans to double the Network
INFOSEC Unit's capacity from 256 megabytes of memory to 512 megabytes,
which will require changes to the hardware design.
* The National Security Agency has recently determined that the current
design is not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an
open networked environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS
radios will be used by allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army
to release specific source code of the software architecture to these
forces. To address the release, the National Security Agency has
required changes to the security architecture. While the program has
not finalized or funded the changes, the current plan is to separate
the networking and radio functions into two separate processors.
Size, Weight, and Power Requirements for Key Platform Users Have
Presented a Significant Challenge for Cluster 1:
A key technical challenge in developing the Cluster 1 radio is meeting
the size, weight, and power requirements for ground vehicles and
helicopters. To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband
Networking Waveform, including transmission range, the Cluster 1 radio
requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which add
to the size, weight, and power consumption of the radio. The added size
and weight are the result of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the
radio are not overheated by the electricity needed to power the
additional memory and processing. Thus far, the program has not been
able to develop radios that meet size, weight, and power requirements,
and the current projected transmission range is only 3 kilometers--well
short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband Networking
Waveform. As a consequence, more unmanned aerial vehicles may be needed
to relay information. Intended ground vehicle users have accepted a
deviation in the design--to have some of the radio's hardware mounted
separately outside the vehicle--with the expectation that the
contractor will develop a better solution later on. However, deviations
were not accepted for the helicopters because it would necessitate
major design changes to the aircraft and adversely affect the aircraft
modernization schedules. Unlike ground vehicles, aviation platforms are
limited in their ability to compromise on size, weight, and power
issues because of the difficulty in maintaining equilibrium while
airborne. The Cluster 1 radio's size, weight, and peak power
consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80
percent (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power Compared with
Helicopter Requirements:
[See PDF for image]--graphic text:
Bar graph with six items.
JTRS size;
Performance requirements for aviation: 3,379 cubic inches;
Size, weight, power (September 2004): 5,826 cubic inches.
JTRS weight;
Performance requirements for aviation: 115 pounds;
Size, weight, power (September 2004): 207 pounds.
JTRS peak power consumption;
Performance requirements for aviation: 1,364 watts;
Size, weight, power (September 2004): 2,444 watts.
Source: Department of Defense.
[End of figure]
To meet the JTRS size, weight, and power requirements and realize the
full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, significant
technology advances in power amplification and cooling are essential.
The Army has initiated science and technology development efforts to
address these issues, but it will take time to evolve the technologies
to an acceptable level of maturity. In addition to conducting other
research, the Army is evaluating technologies associated with a
communications and navigation system that was being developed as part
of the Comanche helicopter program. The Army approved further
development of this system and plans to integrate it into the JTRS
system and conduct a demonstration of its capabilities later this year.
However, the Army will not be able to deliver Cluster 1 radios to
support the helicopter fielding schedules and will have to purchase
legacy radios instead.
The FCS program is exploring solutions to meet a key transportability
requirement that FCS vehicles must be limited to 19 tons in order to be
airlifted by a C-130 transport aircraft. To meet this transportability
requirement, the program recently proposed significant size and weight
reductions for vehicle components, including communications equipment.
While Cluster 1 currently has no size, weight, and power requirements
for the systems to be fielded in FCS, the JTRS radios may require
further redesign to meet FCS's aggressive weight requirements. Such a
reduction would likely have a significant impact on the design of JTRS
radios for the FCS vehicles.
Cluster 1 Has Experienced Significant Cost and Schedule Growth:
Since the program entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor
has overrun cost estimates by $93 million--nearly 28 percent above what
was planned (see app. II). Although the program attempted to stabilize
costs by adding approximately $200 million to the contract in January
2004, costs continued to grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the
contractor has increasingly fallen behind schedule and has had to
devote more resources than originally planned. In January 2005, the
prime contractor estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio
and waveform development would be $531 million more than what was
originally budgeted, reaching about $898 million at completion.
However, according to program officials, since contract award, the
prime contractor has not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost
management techniques, and it is difficult to estimate with any
confidence what the overall program is likely to cost. Key issues
driving the cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated with
developing the hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other
software. As a result, the unit costs for early prototypes have
increased from the prime contractor's original proposal. According to
one DOD official, until the requirements' specifications are
stabilized, cost and schedule problems are likely to continue. For
example, according to the Defense Contract Management Agency, meeting
the design changes for security requirements is expected to cost an
estimated $80 million.
Future of Cluster 1 is Uncertain:
In light of the technical problems and cost growth, the Army in
December 2004 delayed the initial production decision, which was
scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2005, and proposed to
add $458 million and 24 months to the program. Before carrying out this
restructure, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army
in January 2005 to stop work on portions of the Cluster 1 development
and focus on preparing for an early operational assessment of the
radio, which was intended to test the basic functionality of pre-
engineering development models of the radio.[Footnote 3] In April 2005,
however, the Army suspended the operational assessment and notified the
contractor that it was considering contract termination. This action
was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the Cluster 1
program conducted by a newly established JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office, which concluded that the current program structure is not
executable and the contractor's ability to develop the radio is
questionable.
At this point it is not clear whether the contract will be terminated
and what impact a termination would have on the future of the program.
The Joint Program Executive Office is expected to complete its
assessment of the program, and a Defense Acquisition Board review will
be held at the end of fiscal year 2005 to determine the future of the
program. Program officials anticipate a new program acquisition
strategy will evolve, with greater emphasis on developing the radio in
blocks. If development resumes, it is anticipated that there will be
start-up delays--3 to 12 months, according to agency officials--
associated with restaffing the contractor's development team and
bringing the team up the learning curve.
Adding to the program's uncertainty is the impact of pending
requirements on program cost and schedule. According to agency
officials, the program will likely be tasked with new requirements from
key stakeholders. For example:
* To meet FCS requirements for accessing intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance data on the battlefield, FCS will need a new network
data link operating in the radio frequency range above 2 GHz. According
to the Army, developing the new network data link is expected to cost
approximately $170 million. Furthermore, additional costs are likely
because the new network data link may require changes to the already
challenging JTRS Cluster 1 radio design--which operates over a large 2
MHz to 2 GHz range--to operate at an even higher frequency. An analysis
of alternatives is currently under way to determine how best to meet
this requirement. According to FCS officials, a decision on the new
network data link is needed by the end of the year to keep the FCS
program on track.
* To comply with the standards of the Global Information Grid, DOD has
directed all systems to transition to the use of Internet Protocol
Version 6 in the future. Cluster 1, which has been designed with
Version 4, not only will need to upgrade but will need additional
hardware and software to ensure Version 4 and Version 6 systems can
interoperate. Reconciling security requirements for Version 6 is also
expected to be a challenge.
Given the many program uncertainties, it is unlikely that JTRS radios
will be available to support intended users: the first increment of the
FCS network slated for fiscal year 2008, Stryker Brigade Combat Team
ground vehicles, and helicopters. The Army plans to purchase legacy
radios, which have limited capabilities, for the Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams and helicopters. According to Army officials, FCS is planning to
experiment with early prototypes of JTRS radios and the Wideband
Networking Waveform, but they will not know when the fully capable
Cluster 1 radios would be available until after the program is
restructured at the end of fiscal year 2005. In addition, because of
ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has
purchased a large number of legacy radios over the past few years. The
fielding of so many new radios to the current force may call into
question the affordability of replacing them prematurely with JTRS
sets. The Army is assessing JTRS fielding plans in light of the
additional investments in legacy radios and JTRS Cluster 1 cost,
schedule, and technical problems.
Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5
Progress:
As with the Cluster 1 program, radio size, weight, power, and data-
processing requirements have presented significant technical challenges
for the JTRS Cluster 5 program, which is developing a series of radios
much smaller than those for the Cluster 1 program. Several programmatic
changes and a contract award bid protest have contributed to
disruptions in the progress of the Cluster 5 program. As a result, the
Cluster 5 program is no longer synchronized with the FCS program. The
Army is currently assessing the feasibility of accelerating the
development of selected small form Cluster 5 radios. However, in light
of the unresolved technical issues with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS
Joint Program Executive Office has initiated an assessment to
restructure the Cluster 5 program into increments. In the event that
Cluster 5 radios are not available, the Army plans to use surrogate
radios for the initial spiral of FCS. In addition, users depending on
the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army's Land Warrior program, have
decided to move forward with surrogate radios.
Technical Challenges Have Impeded Cluster 5 Program Progress:
Meeting requirements for Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than
for Cluster 1 because of their smaller size, weight, power, and large
data-processing requirements. For example, a one-channel handheld
version of the Cluster 5 radios has a maximum weight specification of 2
pounds and a volume of 40 cubic inches (see table 2). A two-channel
manpack radio has weight and volume of 9 pounds and 400 cubic inches,
respectively. A one-channel small form radio weighs about 1 pound and
occupies 40 cubic inches. In comparison, a Cluster 1 two-channel radio
weighs 84 pounds and occupies 1,732 cubic inches. Despite their extreme
size and weight limitations, Cluster 5 radios are still required to
store multiple waveforms. For instance, manpack radios will be required
to store at least 10 waveforms, handheld sets 6 waveforms, and the
small form sets 2 waveforms.
Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored
Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 Radios:
Cluster: Cluster 5;
Radio type: two-channel manpack;
Size in cubic inches: 400;
Weight in pounds: 9;
Number of stored waveforms: 10;
Power in watts: 20.
Cluster: Cluster 5;
Radio type: one-channel handheld;
Size in cubic inches: 40;
Weight in pounds: 2;
Number of stored waveforms: 6;
Power in watts: 5.
Cluster: Cluster 5;
Radio type: one-channel small form;
Size in cubic inches: 40;
Weight in pounds: 1.2;
Number of stored waveforms: 2;
Power in watts: N/A.
Cluster: Cluster 1;
Radio type: two-channel;
Size in cubic inches: 1,732;
Weight in pounds: 84;
Number of stored waveforms: 10;
Power in watts: 838.
Source: Army documents.
Note: N/A = not available.
[End of table]
The Cluster 5 program began system development and demonstration with
immature technologies, especially those related to the handheld and
smaller variants because of the limited size, weight, and power
allowances (see fig. 5). According to the Army, the requirements for
two-channel small form radios--wideband radio frequency capabilities up
to 2500 MHz, thermal management and packaging, and complex security
architecture--all introduce unique technological challenges. Cluster 5
program officials had expected to leverage technology from the Cluster
1 program. However, the Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as
anticipated. Program officials stated that backup technology will be
identified as a part of a risk mitigation plan.
Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 5
Development:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies as
follows:
* Microelectronics: Microelectronics addresses the processes for
producing and packaging the electronic circuits and systems that make
up the Cluster 5 radios. Miniaturization technology and
microelectronics components are critical to the feasibility of Cluster
5 radios because of their extremely small size.
* Environmental protection: Environmental protection describes the
technologies, tools, or design considerations necessary to protect the
radios from potentially harsh effects of the operational environment,
including, for example, lightning, short-duration force impacts, or
radioactive contaminants.
* Power management: One of the greatest challenges in designing and
implementing the Cluster 5 radios is the management and conservation of
the limited amount of available battery power. Power management refers
to the set of technologies that facilitate a reduction in energy
consumption or an increase in battery capacity with the goal of
obtaining longer operating time and a reduced battery size and weight.
* Multichannel architecture: Multichannel JTRS radios are required to
provide multiple, independent channels to simultaneously transmit and
receive information using different waveforms. The compact size of the
Cluster 5 radios and requirement for simultaneous multichannel
operation present a co-site interference mitigation challenge.
* Antennas: Cluster 5 JTRS radios are required to transmit and receive
multiple waveforms over the large frequency range 2 MHz to 2.5 GHz and
are further required to transmit and receive two separate waveforms
simultaneously with a maximum of three antennas. The requirements
impose unique technical challenges for both antenna and radio designs.
* Security: Cluster 5 security framework must support Multiple Single
Levels of Security to allow the processing of information with
different classifications and categories. It also must support an over-
the-air download capability of waveforms, which will entail large
software files. It has yet to be demonstrated in a relevant
environment.
The Cluster 5 radios are required to store and operate the Wideband
Networking Waveform. This will provide high data rates and networking
capabilities for mobile forces. The full Wideband Networking Waveform
requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which may
not be available for the Cluster 5 radios. According to the program
office, the principal challenge in operating the Wideband Networking
Waveform on Cluster 5 radios stems from the significantly smaller size,
weight, and power requirements when compared with those for Cluster 1,
as well as safety and heat considerations for the soldier. Because of
the difficulties in overcoming these challenges, the Cluster 5 program
is seeking to ease the waveform's requirements and reduce the power
demands of the software.
The Cluster 5 program is also developing another new, wideband waveform
called the Soldier Radio Waveform. Although less powerful than the
Wideband Networking Waveform, it is expected to provide the needed
network services for battery-powered radios with limited power and
antenna size such as the handheld and the small form varieties. Cluster
5 radios with the Soldier Radio Waveform will enable squad-level
communications and interoperability with other radios and work on a
network based on the Wideband Networking Waveform. The Soldier Radio
Waveform is expected to be available in 2008. However, the development
of this waveform is being managed as a science and technology effort by
the Army's Communications-Electronics Research Development and
Engineering Center until it is matured and can be transitioned into the
JTRS program. To support the first FCS spiral in the 2008-2010
timeframe, the Army has acknowledged that it may have to use an early
version of the Soldier Radio Waveform and a surrogate radio to operate
the waveform. Compounding the challenges in developing the waveform is
the Army's assessment that developing the Soldier Radio Waveform's
network manager is high risk and has yet to be funded.[Footnote 4]
Without the network manager functionality, the Soldier Radio Waveform
will not be able to interface with the Wideband Networking Waveform.
A number of JTRS Cluster 5 technologies are interdependent (see fig. 6)
that, in our opinion, can exacerbate the technical and program risks of
moving forward with immature technologies. For example, power
management is dependent upon microelectronics, multichannel
architecture, antennas, and security. A lag in the development of any
of these technologies could result in a lag in the development of power
management.
Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Because of the criticality of the size, weight, and power challenge
faced by all variants of the JTRS radios, the program office is
pursuing various solutions to the problem. The program, for example,
hopes to benefit from the Army's science and technology research on
developing wideband power amplifiers and advanced passive cooling
technology.
Cluster 5 Schedule No Longer Synchronized with FCS Schedule:
Several programmatic changes have significantly affected the Cluster 5
schedule, and the program has focused on delivering manpack radios for
the near term and handheld and small form radios later. However, the
availability of small form JTRS radios is of greater importance to FCS
because they are needed for the planned fielding of three core systems
in FCS spiral 1. The Army has concluded that the small form radios may
not be able to meet the FCS schedule and may need to use surrogate
radios to support the first FCS spiral.
In May 2003, the responsibility for developing the JTRS handheld and
manpack radios was shifted from the Special Operations Command to the
Army because of difficulties in resolving differences over requirements
and funding among the services. At the same time, the Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics noted
that the Cluster 5 capabilities would have to be delivered in at least
two spirals and set an expectation that the Army would deliver
prototype handheld and manpack radios in the third quarter of fiscal
year 2005 and low rate initial production would begin by the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2006.
In May 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the Cluster 5
program for the system development and demonstration phase of
acquisition. The Army Acquisition Executive moved the Cluster 5
handheld radios to spiral 2, and it delayed the delivery of the spiral
1 prototype manpack radios to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005
and the low-rate initial production manpack radios to the first quarter
of fiscal year 2007. The Army awarded the Cluster 5 contract in the
middle of July 2004, but had to issue a stop-work order to the
contractor by the end of July because of the filing of a bid protest by
the losing contractor. The bid protest was not upheld, but the program
was delayed another 3 months while the protest was decided.
In authorizing the May 2004 Cluster 5 program's entry into the system
development and demonstration phase, the Army Acquisition Executive
noted the criticality of the JTRS Cluster 5 radio and directed that a
review be conducted to assess the plans for the spiral 2 portion of the
program. At a minimum, the review was to assess development schedule
synchronization, technical performance expectations, integration and
performance risks, waveform development, maturity, baseline, and
program affordability. The review was scheduled for the spring of 2005.
However, because of the ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems
with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has
begun a broader assessment of the Cluster 5 program. On the basis of
the initial findings of the assessment, development work on the Cluster
5 spiral 1 radios has been suspended because the office determined that
key waveforms being developed as part of the Cluster 1 program would
not be delivered to Cluster 5 when needed. According to the JTRS Joint
Program Executive Office, a restructuring of Cluster 5 spiral 1 and 2
is being developed, and it will identify more well defined and
executable increments.
While the Cluster 5 manpack and handheld radios are important
deliverables, of greater urgency for the first spiral of FCS is the
availability of the small form Cluster 5 radios. These radios will be
embedded in a variety of sensors and weapons systems. In fact, three
FCS core systems--Unattended Ground Sensors, Intelligent Munitions
Systems, and the Non Line of Sight Launch System--need Cluster 5 small
form radios to support their planned inclusion in the first FCS spiral
scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe. The Army has concluded that the
schedule for the small form radios is not synchronized with the FCS
schedule and has asked the contractor for a plan to accelerate
deliveries. The Army has acknowledged that it may have to use surrogate
radios, which have limited capabilities, if the Cluster 5 small form
radios are not available to support the initial fielding of the three
FCS core systems. In addition, other users depending on the Cluster 5
radios, such as the Army's Land Warrior program, have decided to move
forward with surrogate radios.
Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and
Schedule Growth:
The WIN-T program entered the system development and demonstration
phase with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies close to full
maturity. None of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the
time production begins in March 2006. Because there are significant
interdependencies among critical technologies, any delay in maturing an
individual technology further increases overall program risk. WIN-T has
gone through a number of program changes, including shifts in the
program's focus. In the fall of 2004, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense approved the Army's proposal to combine the work of two
contractors to facilitate early delivery of WIN-T capabilities to the
warfighter while continuing to focus on the restructured FCS program. A
decision has recently been made not to accelerate the program or
develop capabilities sooner. It remains unclear what WIN-T capabilities
will be provided to the first FCS spiral. The changes, along with
existing technical challenges, put the program at risk of cost and
schedule overruns and failure to achieve performance objectives.
Uncertainties about Technology Development Persist:
During WIN-T's 32-month systems development and demonstration schedule,
the program must mature 9 of its 12 critical technologies. Although
risk mitigation plans were developed in mid-2003 for the 9 immature
technologies, a program review sponsored by the Army in July 2004
concluded that the plans lacked sufficient detail. Eight backup
technologies have been identified, but they are less robust and only 3
are close to full maturity. Relying on these substitutes may degrade
network performance resulting in reduced operational capability.
Contrary to best practices under knowledge-based development, the
program will continue technology development concurrently with the
product development and demonstration phase (see fig.7). The tightly
compressed schedule also assumes nearly flawless execution and may not
allow sufficient time for correcting problems. For example, the
combined testing to demonstrate system performance and operational
functionality is slated to occur just 1 month after critical design
review. With immature technologies, it will be difficult, at best, to
demonstrate the system's design stability and determine whether the
system can be produced affordably and work reliably. In fact, WIN-T
program officials may be unable to conclude a reliable operational
capability of on-the-move communications until the system is
demonstrated in an operational environment early in fiscal year 2009--
long after production begins.
Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T Development:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The significant interdependencies among WIN-T's critical technologies
exacerbate the technical and program risks of moving forward with
immature technologies. For example, the on-the-move satellite
communications technologies rely on wideband waveforms, antennas, and
other technologies to achieve their performance objectives. Therefore,
a lag in the development of any of these technologies may result in a
lag in the overall development of mobile communications technologies--
a critical component of the operational concept for WIN-T.
Dependence on External Programs May Hinder the System's Performance:
Not only is the program faced with technical challenges, but its
dependence on other programs puts the WIN-T program at risk. WIN-T's
ability to significantly improve upon current communications
capabilities relies on demonstrating integrated network operations and
the ability to work on the move. The WIN-T system depends on other
programs to provide needed capabilities. Although separate from the WIN-
T program, changes or delays in these external programs may impair WIN-
T's ability to perform.
For WIN-T, unmanned aerial vehicles are fundamental to the program as
they route information and extend transmission range that ground
systems are constrained by--preserving network reliability,
connectivity, and mobile throughput. Citing their capacity to fly at
high altitudes, program officials have identified two platforms to
support WIN-T, the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
or the High Altitude Airship. However, one is not adequately funded for
a dedicated communications capability, and the other is still in the
concept development phase. Therefore, a study is under way to assess
the consequence of not having unmanned aerial vehicles and its
resulting effect on the network. It is unclear whether the issue will
be resolved in time for the upcoming development test/operational test
event. The program plans to use a surrogate plane, but it is unknown
whether this will adequately assess network reliability and critical on-
the-move communications.
Central to the WIN-T operational effectiveness is the development of a
software-programmable radio and wideband waveforms. Together, the radio
and waveforms are expected to allow warfighters to receive large
volumes of data while moving around the battlefield at increasing
speeds. However, given the uncertainty of whether a JTRS radio would be
available to support WIN-T, the program plans to develop its own high-
capacity radio, operating above the 2 GHz radio frequency range. To
meet FCS requirements, the WIN-T radio is expected to run above 2 GHz
with two new waveforms--a net-centric waveform and a high-capacity
waveform--and the existing Global Broadcast Service waveform. In
particular, these waveforms enable distribution of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance data to provide a more detailed
picture of the battlefield. To address the need for waveforms operating
above 2 GHz, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is conducting an
assessment to identify solutions. However, the results of the study may
not be available by the critical design review.
Program Has Undergone Several Strategy Changes:
Since the WIN-T program was conceived nearly 5 years ago, the program
strategy has shifted several times. Originally, the program focused on
designing a network that would meet current force needs. In 2002, the
program was realigned to focus on a network that would support future
force needs. Two contractors were to work independently on designing
the future force network architecture, and the program office would
select the better of the two. The contractors were given significant
flexibility in designing the network architecture and developing system
performance specifications. Two years later, with the global war on
terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, WIN-T was
directed to focus on developing and fielding network capabilities to
meet both current and future force needs. To expedite completion of the
architecture's design, the Army eliminated competition between the two
contractors in September 2004. Army officials believe that the combined
team provides a stronger technical solution by taking the best elements
of each contractor's proposed architecture and maintains some
competition because over 50 percent of the work will still be competed
among sub-contractors. In fact, the contractors working together
completed the network architecture by January 2005--a year earlier than
previously planned. According to Army officials, the early completion
of the network architecture allows other Army programs, particularly
FCS, to stabilize their network designs earlier than planned.
In conjunction with the WIN-T program's shift in focus to address both
current and future force needs, the Army fielded a separate program, in
2004, a beyond-line-of-sight communications network to units deployed
in Iraq: the Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S).
Although an improvement over past capabilities, JNTC-S is stationary -
-units must come to a standstill and set up their satellite equipment
to communicate. In contrast, WIN-T is expected to maintain satellite
connection--regardless of distance, weather conditions, or terrain---
while units are in motion. Currently, the Army is assessing how best to
transition JNTC-S to WIN-T. In addition, the Army is assessing whether
the WIN-T program can be modified to address the restructured FCS plan
to field communications and networking capabilities in spirals. Army
officials concede that, based on available technologies and resources,
WIN-T block 1 performance requirements may need to be scaled back to
meet the FCS spiral 1 time frame. For example, the data rate
requirements for block 1 WIN-T--which calls for an unprecedented data
throughput rate of 256 kilobits per second while units are moving at 25
miles per hour--may need to be reduced. Although the Army has decided
not to accelerate development of WIN-T, it is unclear when plans to
migrate from the JNTC-S program and address FCS needs will be
completed.
SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and Evolving
Requirements:
The Army assesses SOSCOE as high-risk. SOSCOE software may not reach
the necessary technical maturity level required to meet FCS milestones.
In addition, FCS system-level requirements are still being defined,
which could affect the SOSCOE design. Consequently, it is unclear
whether SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to support the initial
fielding of FCS beginning in fiscal year 2008.
SOSCOE Software Availability and Maturity are High-Risk:
Because SOSCOE software will tie together FCS systems, support battle
command applications, and enable interoperability with current and
future forces, it is the fundamental building block upon which a
substantial portion of FCS will be built. Thus, delays in SOSCOE
software development could affect FCS' ability to meet production and
fielding milestones. Since the start of system development, the Army
has assessed SOSCOE software availability and maturity as high-risk.
According to program officials, SOSCOE development does not require
"cutting edge" software technology. However, there are some aspects of
particular service families that are more challenging than others and
result in an overall SOSCOE development effort that varies in
complexity. The key to SOSCOE development is the "threading model,"
which is intended to allow an interface between different subsystem
operating systems. The high risk is derived from the fact that SOSCOE
may not reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet
program milestones.
The SOSCOE risk mitigation strategy is to develop and deliver the
software in increments to provide the functionality required by SOSCOE
users when they need it. Specifically, the SOSCOE software is scheduled
for delivery in a series of seven software builds between the end of
2005 and 2011. FCS functionality will increase with each successive
software build. The Army will need about one-half of the SOSCOE
software in time for the fielding of the initial FCS capability in
fiscal year 2008. If the software risks materialize, the SOSCOE build
plan may have to be modified, deferring some functionality to later
software builds.
FCS Program Requirements Are Still Evolving:
Higher-level FCS specifications are still evolving nearly 2 years after
the program started development. As in most engineering efforts, FCS
requirements are first defined at a general or high level. Once these
are defined, more detailed specifications that flow down to the
subsystem level are derived. It is the specifications that provide the
details necessary to design subsystems like SOSCOE. In the case of FCS,
very few specifications have flowed to SOSCOE, as higher-level
specifications are still being defined. The lack of specific
requirements flow-down could affect the SOSCOE software build needed to
support the first FCS spiral.
In addition, program officials are concerned that SOSCOE will have
difficulty meeting emerging requirements without significant cost and
schedule impacts. Costs are likely to grow as SOSCOE is reworked to
meet new requirements, or applications software is reworked to
accommodate the limitations of SOSCOE. Further, if design assumptions
underlying SOCOE during the spiral 1 and 2 builds are wrong, because of
incomplete technical information, requirements for future software
builds might not be met or the software could require extensive rework,
resulting in cost and schedule problems.
FCS Restructuring Reduced SOSCOE Development Concurrency:
As part of the original FCS schedule, a DOD-level Network Maturity
Milestone Decision was scheduled for 2008 to assess demonstrated
communications and networked functions. The demonstration was to verify
the performance of FCS software, including SOSCOE. The purpose of the
demonstration would have been to provide confidence that all networked
operations software would meet initial operational capability
objectives and to use the results of the milestone decision to initiate
long-lead production for the network equipment. However, the
restructuring of the overall FCS program allowed the reduction of the
high concurrency in the SOSCOE development and fielding schedule. The
development schedule has now been extended to 2011. The DOD-level
assessment of demonstrated network capabilities will be deferred until
the formal FCS production milestone decision in 2012.
Conclusions:
Although DOD and the military services have produced the best armed
forces in the world, their effectiveness in carrying out military
operations has been hampered by communications and networking systems
that lack interoperability and have limited capacity to transfer
information where and when it is needed. The Army's efforts to develop
JTRS, WIN-T, and the SOSCOE as components of the network are essential
to overcoming these limitations. However, to achieve the desired
capabilities, not only must each program be successfully executed, but
because the programs are interdependent, they must be closely
synchronized. In particular, the successful fielding of FCS
capabilities is critically dependent on the outcome of the JTRS and WIN-
T programs. If they do not work as intended, there will not be
sufficient battlefield information for the future force to operate
effectively.
As currently structured, the JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE programs are at
risk of not delivering intended capabilities when needed, particularly
for the first spiral of FCS. They continue to struggle to meet an
ambitious set of user requirements, steep technical challenges, and
stringent timeframes. While the Army's restructuring of the FCS program
last year into spiral increments was a positive step, the first spiral
may not demonstrate key networking capabilities. The first spiral of
FCS should provide a meaningful demonstration of the networking
capabilities that can then serve as a basis to support further
development of the future force. In particular, demonstrating the
capability of the Wideband Networking Waveform is important, given that
the design of FCS vehicles and systems in later spirals is predicated
on this capability. It is reasonable that such a demonstration should
include JTRS with the Wideband Networking Waveform, WIN-T, and basic
capability from SOSCOE.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Since (1) an enhanced Army communications network is critical for a
successful transformation to FCS and (2) JTRS, including the advanced
wideband waveforms, WIN-T, and SOSCOE are the key pillars of the
communications network, the timing of the first FCS spiral should be
based on when the pacing capabilities to be provided by JTRS and WIN-T
will be demonstrated. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense:
* establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and
SOSCOE capabilities;
* synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS, WIN-
T, and SOSCOE; and:
* develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production
decisions.
In addition, in light of the delays in JTRS Cluster 1 and the
criticality of the Wideband Networking Waveform for FCS, we recommend
the Secretary of Defense assess whether a greater priority should be
placed on demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS
radio prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of
the Cluster 1 development program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with
our findings and three of our recommendations and partially concurred
with a fourth recommendation. (DOD's letter is reprinted in app III.)
As part of its comments, DOD provided some information on actions it
has begun to take to address each of our recommendations. While these
actions should help strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and
SOSCOE, we remain concerned that a demonstration of FCS's
communications and networking capabilities will not be known for some
time. Until these capabilities are demonstrated, investment in FCS
platforms and systems carries substantial risk. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
Regarding our first recommendation--that the Secretary of Defense
establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE
capabilities--DOD concurred, noting (1) that its newly established JTRS
Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the condition of each JTRS
product line and will make recommendations to ensure effective control
of cost, schedule, and performance and (2) that the Army is managing
risks associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense is applying the appropriate level of oversight. While the
actions being taken by DOD and the Army will help, it remains unclear
whether they will be sufficient to ensure JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE--the
critical components of the enhanced communications network--are
successfully executed. We remain concerned that the requisite knowledge
needed to effectively manage program development risks has not been
sufficiently developed. A low-risk fielding schedule for each of the
components should set the pace for the Army's transformation to FCS.
Regarding our second recommendation--that the Secretary of Defense
synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with the fielding schedules for
JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE--DOD partially concurred, but stated that "the
Army's strategy for spiraling out FCS technology is not constrained to
any one particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make
available mature and military useful system capability in increments,
leveraging opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with
current force capability." DOD further stated that "the FCS spirals
will make use of technologies as they become available or leverage the
use of surrogate applications where they apply." DOD also noted that
the Army did not define the first FCS spiral around the main components
of the communications network, but around the capabilities needed by
the current force. While we agree with DOD that mature and military
useful capabilities should be fielded as expeditiously as possible, we
believe that the first spiral should demonstrate meaningful
capabilities for FCS. In particular, we believe that the first spiral
of FCS should demonstrate critical networking capabilities, and that
its schedule be predicated on demonstrating core capabilities, such as
the JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform. Progress made on these
capabilities should guide the future investments, such as on ground
vehicles that depend on network performance. In addition, reliance on
surrogate applications has the potential to result in costly
replacement of the surrogate applications once the target applications
are fully mature.
Regarding our third recommendation--that the Secretary of Defense
develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production
decisions--DOD concurred, stating that FCS will initially field a mix
of both new and legacy communications and network capabilities, and
that iterative operational test and evaluation will be stressed to
ensure strong capability verification and validation. DOD also noted
that network maturity will be assessed at each spiral's production
decision. While it is appropriate to assess network maturity at each
spiral's production decision, to measure progress in developing the FCS
communications network, these assessments will need to culminate in a
full demonstration that the network will perform as intended before
committing to produce equipment for FCS units of action.
Finally, regarding our fourth recommendation--that the Secretary of
Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on
demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio
prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the
Cluster 1 development program--DOD concurred, noting that the newly
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is assessing the JTRS
Cluster 1 development path and that the development of the Wideband
Networking Waveform will be included in the assessment.
As agreed with your office, unless you announce its contents, we will
not distribute this report further until 30 days after the date of this
letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will
also send copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Army, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will
also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2811, or Assistant Director John Oppenheim at
(202) 512-3111. Major contributors to this report were Ridge Bowman,
Subrata Ghoshroy, Karen Sloan, Hai Tran, Paul Williams, and Candice
Wright.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Paul L. Francis, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the development risks associated with the Joint Tactical
Radio System-Tactical (JTRS) Cluster 1, JTRS Cluster 5, and WIN-T
programs, we obtained briefings on acquisition plans, analyzed
documents describing the maturity of critical technologies, and
interviewed project and product officials from the Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Program Management Office, Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey. To determine the status of JTRS waveforms, we
obtained briefings on wideband waveform development efforts and
interviewed officials from the JTRS Joint Program Office, Arlington,
Virginia. We also reviewed selected acquisition reports, technology
readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans, defense acquisition
executive summaries, and acquisition decision memorandums for
individual programs. To obtain information related to the planned use
of JTRS Cluster 1 radios in rotary wing platforms, we interviewed
officials from the Program Executive Office, Aviation, Arlington,
Virginia. To obtain information related to JTRS Cluster 1 contract
performance data, we interviewed Defense Contract Management Agency
officials in Anaheim, California, and obtained cost performance reports
and other cost analysis documentation.
To assess cost and schedule performance for JTRS Cluster 1 and waveform
development for the period between August 2003 and January 2005, we
used cost and schedule variances reported in contractor cost
performance reports. Results were presented in graphical form to
determine the period's trends. We also obtained likely cost at the
completion of the prime contract from the reports. We confirmed that
the prime contractor's earned value management system had been
validated by the Defense Contract Management Agency. The cost and
schedule results include both prime and subcontractors. The development
of the waveforms was included in our analysis of Cluster 1 because,
although the effort is managed separately under the Joint Program
Office, it is being executed under the same contract.
To determine the development risks associated with the System of
Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), we obtained briefings on
fielding plans, analyzed documents describing SOSCOE software
availability and maturity, and interviewed project officials from the
Project Manager for FCS Network Systems Integration, Fort Monmouth, New
Jersey. We also attended FCS in-process reviews and a board of
directors meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, organized by the Program
Manager, Unit of Action.
To obtain the perspective of organizations that provide policy
guidance, oversight, and technology support for the JTRS, WIN-T, and
Future Combat Systems (FCS) programs, we interviewed officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information
Integration, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the
Army's Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering
Center, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
Our review was conducted from January 2004 through May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance:
Since Cluster 1 entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor
has overrun cost estimates by almost $93 million--nearly 28 percent
above what was planned. We used contractor cost performance reports to
assess the prime contractor's progress toward meeting the Army's cost
and schedule goals during the period August 2003-January 2005. The
government routinely uses such reports to independently evaluate the
prime contractor's performance. Generally, the reports detail
deviations in cost and schedule relative to expectations established
under the contract. Deviations are referred to as variances. Positive
variances--activities costing less or completed ahead of schedule--are
considered as good news, and negative variances--activities costing
more or falling behind schedule--as bad news.
Although the program attempted to stabilize cost growth by adding
approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, the cost
variance continued to decline steadily thereafter.[Footnote 5] Key
issues driving the cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated
with developing the hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other
software. As a result, the unit costs for early prototypes have
increased from the prime contractor's original proposal. In January
2005, the prime contractor estimated that the total costs for the
Cluster 1 radio and waveform development would be $531 million more
than was originally budgeted, reaching about $898 million at completion
(see fig. 8). However, the program office noted that, since contract
award, the prime contractor has not demonstrated strong cost estimating
and cost management techniques.
Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development
from August 2003 to January 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Cluster 1 has also experienced unfavorable schedule variance. Figure 9
indicates that the contractor increasingly fell behind schedule during
the period August 2003-January 2005. If a program is not only overrun
in costs, but is also behind schedule, additional costs can be expected
because of potential schedule slippage or from acceleration of the
effort to finish on time. The schedule variance stabilized briefly
after the program rebaselined in January 2004, but then it continued to
increase again. [Footnote 6] By January 2005, the value of planned work
that the contractor was behind schedule was about $25 million. Delays
in software build completions, software/hardware integration, and the
delivery of key technologies to the waveform developers have
contributed to schedule problems.
Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform
Development from August 2003 to January 2005:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION:
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000:
JUN 9, 2005:
Mr. Paul L. Francis:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
US General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Francis,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report "Resolving Developmental Risks in
the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding
Future Force," dated May 6th, 2005 (GAO Code 120283/GAO 05-669).
The DoD has reviewed the findings of the report and appreciates the
efforts of the GAO staff to present objective viewpoints regarding Army
Networking capabilities and dependencies for the Future Combat System.
We have reviewed the draft report and with the consideration of the
enclosed comments concur with the findings and recommendations.
My point of contact for GAO Code 120283/GAO 05-669 is COL Randall
Conway, Communications Programs Directorate. He can be reached at 703-
607-0277 or via email at randall.conway@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed for:
Ronald C. Jost:
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3 Policies, Programs and
Space Programs):
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MAY 6, 2005 GAO-05-669 (GAO CODE 120283):
"DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's
Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future Force"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE
capabilities. (p. 32/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation. The newly
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the
condition of each JTRS product line and will make recommendations to
the USD (AT&L) to ensure effective control of cost, performance, and
schedule. The Department acknowledges that there are additional risks
associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE. The Army is managing that risk and
OSD is applying the appropriate level of oversight. Additionally, the
JPEO JTRS recently began discussions with the FCS program to determine
their dependencies on JTRS. These discussions will be a recurring event
to insure coordination of these key net-centric programs. Some specific
comments regarding SOSCOE, JTRS, and WIN-T follow:
RE: Establishing low-risk SOSCOE schedule:
SOSCOE has four integration phases, each supported prior to integration
by analysis, modeling and simulation, assessment and experimentation.
Each Integration Phase is comprised of an Engineering Iteration (EI),
Integration and Verification Iteration (IVI) and Spiral Out (SO). Thus,
a low risk schedule is achieved through successive integration phases.
Furthermore, Spiral Out products will be developed over a minimum of 2
engineering iterations.
RE: Establishing a low-risk JTRS schedule:
The JPEO is de-risking JTRS plans. FCS will be using pre-EDM cluster
one and cluster five radios in the first spiral out. The pre-EDM
Cluster five plan is to have the pre-EDM radios run SRW INC 1.0. The
pre-EDM and EDM units will be produced by different contractors to
reduce risk. SRW will be demonstrated this summer (2005).
RE: Establishing a low-risk WIN-T schedule:
DASD-NII in cooperation with PM WIN-T established a WIN-T IIPT with
Systems Engineering, Network, Test WIPT and other WIPTs reporting to
the IIPT. OSD-NIT will work with WIN-T to assure design and schedule
integrity as well as execution of appropriate risk management
processes.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS, WIN-
T, and SOSCOE. (p. 32/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The Army's
strategy for spiraling-out FCS technology is not constrained to any one
particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make available
mature and military useful system capability in increments, leveraging
opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with current force
capability. Program synchronization efforts are an ongoing process that
will ensure that FCS spirals are effectively supported by the minimum
essential functionality of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE. The FCS spirals
will make use of technologies as they become available or leverage the
use of surrogate applications where they apply. The FCS Network IIPT
and WIPT will continue to review FCS progress and establish a Milestone
C for every FCS Spin out and FCS end-state. Program synchronization
will also be examined by the DASD NII led acquisition WIN-T IIPT.
Further, OASD NH and Army G6 led task force will be established to
assure synchronization of FCS and WIN-T and their interoperability with
complementary programs.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production. (p.
33/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation. In recognition that
FCS will initially field a mix of both new and legacy communications
and network capabilities, DoD will stress iterative operational test
and evaluation that ensures strong capability verification and
validation. Also, NH plans to convene an FCS Network WIPT in addition
to a Net Centric Review in conjunction with each Milestone C decision
to assess network maturity. System and user test results will be
evaluated at each Milestone C decision for each FCS spiral.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
assess whether a greater priority should be placed on demonstrating the
Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio prototype over other
Cluster I capabilities in the remainder of the Cluster 1 development
program. (p. 33/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with the recommendation. The newly
established JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is assessing the JTRS
Cluster 1 development path and will recommend to the USD (AT&L) a re-
prioritization of development efforts to maximize resource investments
and satisfy user needs. Development of the Wideband Networking Waveform
will be included in the assessment. The JPEO also agrees that force
transformation is directly related to providing IP mobile adhoc
networking to the warfighters. This will include working with the
requirements community to develop common approaches across all domains.
TECHNNICAL COMMENTS:
Page 10, last paragraph: "The Army has defined the initial spiral of
FCS around the main components of the communications network,.."
DOD RESPONSE: The Army defined the initial spiral of FCS around the
capabilities needed by the current force, to include the requirement to
satisfy U.S. Landmine Policy.
Page 26, paragraph 2: "Recently, the Army directed the program to
determine whether capabilities can be developed sooner to address the
needs of the current force and the restructured FCS program. A plan for
how to do this remains undetermined."
DOD RESPONSE: This is no longer an accurate statement. The decision has
been made not to accelerate the program.
Page 28 and 29, 3rd and 1st paragraphs: "However, given the uncertainty
of whether a JTRS radio would be available to support WIN-T, the
program plans to develop its own high capacity radio, operating above
the 2GHz radio frequency range. To meet FCS requirements, the WIN-T
radio is expected to run above 2GHz with two waveforms-one both net
centric and high capacity and the other the existing Global Broadcast
Service waveform. ....to address the need for waveforms operating above
2 GHz, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is conducting an
assessment to identify solutions. However, the results of the study may
not be available by the critical design review."
DOD RESPONSE: There are two waveforms that WIN-T is developing to
support the Communications on the Move (COTM) requirement. The first
waveform is called the Net-Centric Waveform and is Ka/Ku SATCOM based.
The other waveform is called the High Capacity Networking Waveform and
is line-of-sight based. Additionally, WIN-T will use the GBS broadcast
receive only waveform.
Page 29, paragraph 2: "to expedite completion of the architecture's
design, the Army eliminated competition between the two contractors in
September 2004. ... On the other hand, without competition, the
government has less assurance that cost and schedule risks will be
sufficiently controlled."
DOD RESPONSE: Competition was not entirely eliminated. Over 50% of work
share is still competed among sub-contractors.
FOOTNOTES
[1] A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the
frequency, modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system.
In general usage, the term waveform refers to a known set of
characteristics, for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, UHF),
modulation techniques (FM, AM), message standards, and transmission
systems. In JTRS usage, the term waveform is used to describe the
entire set of radio functions that occur from the user input to the RF
output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is implemented as a reusable,
portable, executable software application that is independent of the
JTRS operating system, middleware, and hardware.
[2] To help avoid cost and schedule overruns, best practices and DOD
guidance call for achieving a high level of technological maturity
before allowing new technologies into product development.
[3] The early operational assessment was originally scheduled for
August 2004 but was rescheduled for December 2004 as a result of the
Over Target Baseline in January 2004. Because of further technical
challenges, the assessment was postponed to April 2005.
[4] Network management is execution of a set of functions required for
controlling, planning, allocating, deploying, coordinating, and
monitoring the resources of a telecommunications network.
[5] The program attempted to stabilize the contractor cost variance by
initiating an over-the-target baseline (OTB) in January 2004. An OTB is
a reprogramming effort or "recovery plan" that adds budget to a
contract for either future work or in-process work when the original
objectives cannot be met. The primary purpose of an OTB is to improve
managerial control over the execution of the remaining work in a
project. A project manager may conclude that the baseline is no longer
adequate to provide valid performance measurement information relative
to the remaining work and therefore consider initiating an OTB.
[6] The OTB added 4 months to the acquisition schedule.
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