Military Training
Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges Gao ID: GAO-05-534 June 10, 2005Military training ranges are important national assets and play a critical role in preparing military forces for their wartime mission. The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported for years that it faces increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic training at its ranges due to various constraints. While encroachment issues have had high visibility within DOD and the Congress, much less attention has been given to the overall conditions of training ranges, which can also have an adverse impact on training activities. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority, discusses (1) the condition of military training ranges and their impact on training activities, and (2) what factors are affecting DOD's progress in improving training range conditions.
GAO's visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD's own assessments show that ranges are deteriorating and lack modernization. This adversely affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of military personnel. To ensure readiness, servicemembers must have access to capable ranges--a key DOD transformation goal--that enables them to develop and maintain skills for wartime missions. However, GAO observed various degraded conditions at each training range visited, such as malfunctioning communication systems, impassable tank trails, overgrown areas, and outdated training areas and targets. Whenever possible, the services work around these conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of training, but officials have expressed concern that workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the realism essential to effective training. Without adequate ranges, DOD compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal and assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for missions and subjected to hazards. DOD's progress in improving training range conditions has been limited and is partially attributable to a lack of a comprehensive approach to ensure that ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces for warfare. First, while the services have individually taken a varying number of key management improvement actions, such as developing range sustainment policies, these actions lack consistency across DOD or focus primarily on encroachment without including commensurate efforts on other issues, such as maintenance and modernization. Second, even though the services cannot precisely identify the funding required and used for their ranges, identified range requirements have historically been inadequately funded, as evidenced by conditions GAO saw, and inadequately addressed. Service officials identified a variety of factors that have exacerbated funding limitations, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding decisions. Third, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either recommended or required specific actions, DOD has not fully implemented such actions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-534, Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges
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Report to the Secretary of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2005:
Military Training:
Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of
Military Training Ranges:
GAO-05-534:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-534, a report to the Secretary of Defense:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Military training ranges are important national assets and play a
critical role in preparing military forces for their wartime mission.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported for years that it faces
increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic training at its
ranges due to various constraints. While encroachment issues have had
high visibility within DOD and the Congress, much less attention has
been given to the overall conditions of training ranges, which can also
have an adverse impact on training activities.
This report, prepared under the Comptroller General‘s authority,
discusses (1) the condition of military training ranges and their
impact on training activities, and (2) what factors are affecting DOD‘s
progress in improving training range conditions.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD‘s own assessments
show that ranges are deteriorating and lack modernization. This
adversely affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of
military personnel. To ensure readiness, servicemembers must have
access to capable ranges”a key DOD transformation goal”that enables
them to develop and maintain skills for wartime missions. However, GAO
observed various degraded conditions at each training range visited,
such as malfunctioning communication systems, impassable tank trails,
overgrown areas, and outdated training areas and targets. Whenever
possible, the services work around these conditions by modifying the
timing, tempo, or location of training, but officials have expressed
concern that workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly
and that they compromise the realism essential to effective training.
Without adequate ranges, DOD compromises the opportunity to achieve its
transformation goal and assumes the risk that its forces will be less
prepared for missions and subjected to hazards.
DOD‘s progress in improving training range conditions has been limited
and is partially attributable to a lack of a comprehensive approach to
ensure that ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing
its forces for warfare. First, while the services have individually
taken a varying number of key management improvement actions, such as
developing range sustainment policies, these actions lack consistency
across DOD or focus primarily on encroachment without including
commensurate efforts on other issues, such as maintenance and
modernization. Second, even though the services cannot precisely
identify the funding required and used for their ranges, identified
range requirements have historically been inadequately funded, as
evidenced by conditions GAO saw, and inadequately addressed. Service
officials identified a variety of factors that have exacerbated funding
limitations, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding
decisions. Third, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either
recommended or required specific actions, DOD has not fully implemented
such actions.
GAO‘s Analysis of DOD‘s Management Actions for Improving Training Range
Conditions:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD take various actions designed to improve
training range conditions, including the implementation of a
comprehensive approach to managing its ranges in order to accomplish
its transformation goals and ensure the long-term viability of its
ranges. DOD agreed with the recommendations, stating the department and
military services are or will be taking steps to implement them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-534.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202)
512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Degraded Conditions at Military Training Ranges Adversely Affect
Training Activities:
Various Factors Affect DOD's Progress in Improving Training Range
Conditions:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Key Management Elements of a Comprehensive Approach for
Managing Training Ranges:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Identified Condition Deficiencies at Training Ranges We
Visited:
Figures:
Figure 1: Deteriorated Training Areas at Fort Hood:
Figure 2: Tank Stuck in Mud at Fort Stewart Due to Lack of Hardened
Crossing:
Figure 3: Degraded Conditions at the Southern California Offshore Range:
Figure 4: Comparison of a Degraded Camp Lejeune Training Area with a
Better Maintained and Modernized Area at Fort Bragg:
Figure 5: GAO's Analysis of DOD's Management Actions for Improving
Training Range Conditions:
Figure 6: Mock Airfield at the Fallon Range Training Complex:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MOUT: Military Operations on Urban Terrain:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 10, 2005:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld:
The Secretary of Defense:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The success of our military forces in combat is directly linked to the
effectiveness of their training beforehand. A fundamental military
readiness principle is that the military must train as it intends to
fight, and military training ranges provide the primary means to
accomplish this principle.[Footnote 1] However, Department of Defense
(DOD) officials have reported for years that they face increasing
difficulties in carrying out realistic training at their ranges due to
a variety of constraints, such as those resulting from
encroachment.[Footnote 2] While encroachment issues have had high
visibility within the department and the Congress, much less attention
has been given to other training range constraints, such as those
resulting from inadequate maintenance and modernization, which also has
an adverse impact on training activities. DOD's 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report states that one of the basic tenets needed to
meet its training transformation goal is to reverse the erosion of
DOD's training range infrastructure and ensure that ranges are
sustainable, capable, and available. Because of the criticality of
sustainable and capable training ranges to meeting the training needs
of its military forces, it is imperative that the department addresses
the full range of constraints that impact its training ranges.
This report, with its focus on military training range
conditions,[Footnote 3] is one in a series of our reports in recent
years that have addressed risks associated with the department's
support infrastructure management. We initially identified DOD support
infrastructure as a high-risk area in the federal government in 1997
and, in our latest high-risk series report,[Footnote 4] we pointed out
that we continue to believe that it remains a high-risk area. Our
reports on overall infrastructure conditions have frequently cited the
underfunding of maintenance and repairs, resulting in deteriorating
facilities. For the most part, our prior training range reports have
focused on encroachment rather than issues such as appropriate range
maintenance or modernization. A common theme in these reports has been
the need for more comprehensive planning to include, for example,
clearly establishing goals and milestones for tracking progress in
addressing issues, identifying the funding needed to accomplish tasks,
and assigning responsibility for managing and coordinating departmental
efforts.
In view of the department's responsibilities to ensure the long-term
viability and utility of its training ranges as critical national
assets to meet the defense mission, we undertook this review to more
closely examine training range conditions related to the maintenance
and modernization of its ranges. We performed our work on the basis of
the authority of the Comptroller General to evaluate U.S. governmental
programs and are reporting the results to you because of your overall
responsibilities as Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 5] This report
discusses (1) the current conditions of military training ranges and
their impact on training activities and (2) what factors are affecting
DOD's progress in improving training range conditions.
In performing our work, we collected and analyzed training range-
related information from officials within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations
Command, and the headquarters and selected major commands of the
military services. We also visited eight active component training
ranges located in the continental United States between June and
October 2004 to observe training range conditions and discuss training
impacts and actions taken to improve range conditions.[Footnote 6]
These ranges were selected by identifying the major training ranges for
each service and seeking input from service range officials as to which
ranges could best address our audit objectives. We also reviewed
relevant DOD studies and audit reports addressing military training
range condition and funding issues. From our review of these data and
discussions with DOD officials, we believe that the data presented are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our
work from August 2003 through March 2005 in completing this report as
well as fulfilling congressionally mandated reporting requirements
dealing with training range issues.[Footnote 7] This work was completed
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Our visits to eight major training ranges between June and October
2004, along with DOD's own assessment, show that military training
ranges are in varying degrees of degradation or lack necessary upgrades
to meet current training needs, a condition that, in turn, adversely
affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of the military
personnel using them. Whenever possible, servicemembers work around the
degraded conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of the
training, but defense officials have expressed concern that these
workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that
they compromise the realism essential to effective training. To ensure
military readiness, servicemembers must have access to sustainable and
capable training ranges--a key transformation goal--that enable them to
develop and maintain their skills for wartime missions. However, we
observed degraded conditions and limitations at each of the ranges we
visited. Collectively, these conditions included malfunctioning
communication systems, impassable tank trails and roads that jeopardize
safety,[Footnote 8] training areas that were overgrown, inadequate
number of automated targets, and outdated training areas and targets.
At Fort Hood, erosion of the tank trails was such that tanks and other
vehicles could not safely maneuver from one training area to another.
DOD studies have recognized that training ranges are deteriorating. The
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for example, stated that an
aging training range infrastructure has suffered from underlying
neglect and is in need of sustainment efforts and recapitalization.
[Footnote 9] Similarly, a number of service studies have reported
degraded conditions. For example, a recent Navy study on the Southern
California Offshore Range pointed out that, while 90 percent of the
minimum antisubmarine warfare training requirements were being met,
current range resources did not provide optimal training for over 60
percent of the skills needed for a wartime environment.[Footnote 10]
Without adequately maintained and modernized ranges, the department not
only compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal of
sustainable and capable training ranges but also assumes the risk that
its forces will be less prepared for its missions and subjected to
safety hazards.
While DOD has taken some actions designed to improve the conditions of
its training ranges, progress has been limited, due in part to the lack
of a comprehensive approach to improving them and ensuring that these
ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces
for warfare. Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include
several key elements, such as the following: well-defined policies that
address all factors impacting range sustainability; servicewide plans
that guide the timely execution of range sustainability actions; range
requirements that are geared to meet both service and joint needs;
adequate management of range funding; and a commitment to the
implementation of this approach. While OSD and the services have
individually taken a number of key actions to varying extents, such as
developing policy and establishing working groups for range
sustainment, these actions are incomplete, focusing primarily on
encroachment; fail to incorporate all relevant officials; or lack
consistency. Further, even though the services cannot identify
precisely the funding required--or allocated--to maintain and modernize
their ranges, available information indicates that identified training
range requirements have historically not been adequately funded. For
example, according to training range data from Fort Stewart, the
installation's training range accounts were funded approximately 44
percent for fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton
data indicated that the primary range accounts were funded
approximately 13 percent during fiscal years 1998 and 2002.[Footnote
11] Service officials identified a variety of factors that contributed
to or exacerbated funding limitations, such as ranges being a lower
priority in funding decisions. Additionally, although DOD policy,
reports, and plans have either recommended or required specific
actions, OSD and the services have not fully implemented such actions.
For example, although the Senior Readiness Oversight Council in 2001
required the services,[Footnote 12] working with OSD, to prepare a
prioritized list of range sustainment and upgrade programs and
estimated costs for potential inclusion in the upcoming budget, the
list was never developed or submitted for potential funding
opportunities. Defense officials could not provide us with an
explanation as to why no appropriate action was taken. Without a fully
implemented comprehensive approach, DOD will be unable to ensure that
it achieves the goals of its training transformation initiative or to
ensure the long-term viability of its training ranges. Furthermore, the
Congress will not be in a position to fulfill its oversight role.
We are making recommendations to you that are intended to improve the
conditions at military training ranges. These recommendations are
focused on the need for a more comprehensive approach for addressing
training range deficiencies to ensure that ranges are sustainable and
modernized, to provide for more realistic training, and to achieve
DOD's transformation goals. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOD agreed with our recommendations, stating the department and
military services are or will be taking steps to implement them. The
department also provided technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
DOD's ranges are used primarily to test weapon systems and train
military forces; some ranges are used for both testing and training
purposes, while others are limited to one use or the other. These
ranges represent important national assets for the development and
sustainment of U.S. military forces. This report focuses primarily on
ranges used for training purposes. DOD requires ranges for all levels
of training to include airspace for air-to-air, air-to-ground, drop
zone, and electronic combat training; live-fire ranges for artillery,
armor, small arms, and munitions training; ground maneuver ranges to
conduct realistic force-on-force and live-fire training at various unit
levels; and sea ranges to conduct surface and sub-surface maneuvers for
training. In a February 2004 report to the Congress,[Footnote 13] DOD
identified 70 major active-component training ranges in the continental
United States--the Army has 35, the Navy 13, the Marine Corps 12, and
the Air Force 10.[Footnote 14] The report also identified several
National Guard, Reserve, and smaller training ranges.
Readiness Reporting for Defense Infrastructure to Include Training
Ranges:
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of
military forces and provides oversight on training issues. The
Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for training
personnel and for maintaining their respective training ranges and
facilities. Until recent years, DOD had no readiness reporting system
in place for its defense installations and facilities, including
training ranges. In fiscal year 2000, DOD reported to the Congress for
the first time on the readiness of its defense infrastructure as an
integral element of its overall Defense Readiness Reporting System. At
the core of the system is a rating classification, typically referred
to as a "C" rating. The C-rating process is intended to provide an
overall assessment for each of nine facility classes (e.g., "operations
and training" and "community and housing") on a military installation.
Training ranges fall within the operations and training facility class.
While the services provide overall assessments by facility class, they
may not always provide detailed separate ratings for installation
assets, such as training ranges, within a class. With respect to
training ranges, the Army and Marine Corps have data that provide C-
ratings for their ranges, but the Navy and Air Force do not. The
definitions for C-ratings are as follows:
* C-1--only minor facility deficiencies with negligible impact on
capability to perform missions;
* C-2--some deficiencies with limited impact on capability to perform
missions;
* C-3--significant facility deficiencies that prevent performing some
missions; and:
* C-4--major facility deficiencies that preclude satisfactory mission
accomplishment.
Although we have previously reported concerns about the consistency and
quality of the services' approaches to completing these assessments,
their assessments nonetheless have shown a large portion of DOD
facilities across all classes of facilities, which include training
ranges, being rated either C-3 or C-4.
DOD's Training Transformation Initiative:
To effectively support the needs of combatant commanders in the new
strategic environment of the 21st century, DOD has undertaken a
transformation initiative to change the way it conducts training by
preparing military forces to learn, improvise, and adapt to constantly
changing threats as they execute military doctrine.[Footnote 15] The
joint national training capability is one of three capabilities of this
initiative and calls for the development of a live-virtual-constructive
training environment.[Footnote 16] To meet this effort, defense
planning guidance required OSD, in collaboration with the military
services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces Command, to develop a
plan to transform military training to, among other things, ensure that
training ranges and devices are modernized and sustainable. The
Training Transformation Implementation Plan, which identifies DOD's
vision, goals, and milestones, was initially issued in June 2003 and
subsequently updated in June 2004.[Footnote 17] Under the joint
national training capability, DOD recognized the need for sustainable
and modernized ranges and stated that range capabilities, such as
instrumentation for the operating platforms, and modern range
infrastructure are necessary to create the training environment,
capture realistic ground situations, assess activity and performance,
and promptly provide feedback to the training audience and serve as the
foundation for the joint national training capability.
Prior GAO Reports on Training Ranges:
In recent years, we have reviewed and reported on constraints,
particularly those related to encroachment, on military training
ranges. A brief summary on those reports follows:
* In June 2004, we reported that DOD's training range report to the
Congress, which was mandated by section 366 of the Bob Stump National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, did not provide a
comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by
limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and air space
that are available in the United States and overseas for
training.[Footnote 18] We also reported that DOD's training report did
not fully identify available training resources, specific training
capacities and capabilities, and existing training constraints; fully
assess current and future training requirements; fully evaluate the
adequacy of current resources to meet current and future training range
requirements in the United States and overseas; or include a
comprehensive plan with quantifiable goals or milestones to measure
progress, or projected funding requirements needed to implement the
plan. In response to our recommendation calling for a comprehensive
plan to fully address training constraints, DOD stated that the
services had initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it
considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that
DOD has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the
sustainability of its ranges.
* In September 2003, we reported that through increased cooperation DOD
and other federal land managers could share the responsibility for
managing endangered species on training ranges.[Footnote 19]
* In February 2003, we also reported that while the amount of money
spent on facility maintenance has increased, the amounts have not been
sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities, which include
training ranges.[Footnote 20] In addition, we also reported a lack of
consistency in the services' information on facility conditions, making
it difficult for the Congress, DOD, and the services to direct funds to
facilities where they are most needed and to accurately gauge facility
conditions.
* In April 2002, we reported that troops stationed outside of the
continental United States face a variety of training constraints that
have increased over the past decade and are likely to increase
further.[Footnote 21] In June 2002, we reported on the impact of
encroachment on military training ranges inside the United States with
similar findings to those of the April 2002 report.[Footnote 22] In
both reports, we stated that impacts on readiness were not well
documented. In addition, we testified before the Congress twice on
these issues--in May 2002 and April 2003.[Footnote 23]
See the Related GAO Products section at the end of this report for a
more comprehensive list of our products related to the issues discussed
in this report.
Degraded Conditions at Military Training Ranges Adversely Affect
Training Activities:
Our visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD's own assessments,
show that military training ranges have been generally deteriorating
over time and lack modernized capabilities. These degraded conditions
have adversely affected training, placed the services at risk of not
meeting DOD's transformation goals, and jeopardized the safety of
military personnel who use the ranges. Without adequately maintained
and modernized ranges, the department not only compromises the
opportunity to achieve its training transformation goal of sustainable
and capable training ranges but also assumes the risk that its forces
will be less prepared for its missions and subjected to safety hazards.
Deficiencies Observed at Training Ranges We Visited:
Table 1 shows the wide variety of identified degraded conditions or
lack of upgrades to meet current training needs at the ranges that we
visited. The degraded conditions comprise both (1) those physical
features of a training range that are subject to maintenance (e.g.,
tank trails and roads) over time and (2) those capabilities that are
desirable for a modernized training range (e.g., automated threat
emitters, automated targets, urban training facilities). Following the
table is a discussion of degraded conditions that we observed.
Table 1: Identified Condition Deficiencies at Training Ranges We
Visited:
Training range: Fort Hood, Tex.;
C-ratings (2004): C-2;
Identified deficiencies: Degraded tank trails and training areas;
shortages in sniper, multipurpose machine gun, and designated marksman
ranges; inadequate number of tank video feedback systems; Military
Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) training facility not conducive to
addressing current threats.
Training range: Fort Stewart, Ga.;
C-ratings (2004): C-3;
Identified deficiencies: Eroded tank trails; inadequate electrical
wiring and convoy range; MOUT training facility does not reflect
current threats; no hygiene facilities.
Training range: Southern California Offshore Range, Calif.;
C-ratings (2004): Not rated;
Identified deficiencies: Nonworking undersea communication system;
degraded roads; inadequate pier; insufficient mooring buoys and
floating docks; no instrumented shallow water training range;
insufficient and inadequate communication systems; shortage of
realistic threats and targets.
Training range: Fallon Range Training Complex, Nev.;
C-ratings (2004): Not rated;
Identified deficiencies: Electronic warfare range lacks density and
current capabilities, and parts for current equipment are becoming
obsolete; insufficient hard targets that could take multiple hits;
insufficient time-sensitive and moving targets.
Training range: Camp Lejeune, N.C.;
C-ratings (2004): C-3;
Identified deficiencies: Overgrown vegetation; unmarked firing lanes;
insufficient automated ranges; no instrumented feedback and scoring
systems, multipurpose machine gun range, or convoy range; insufficient
grenade ranges and elevated shooting positions; MOUT training facility
is small and not conducive to addressing current threats.
Training range: Camp Pendleton, Calif.;
C-ratings (2004): C-2;
Identified deficiencies: Overgrown vegetation; range is in flood plain
and lacks emergency access; inadequate hygiene facilities; inadequate
or lacking target maintenance and storage facilities, elevated firing
points, bullet containment, and turning and moving targets;
insufficient automated targets; MOUT training facility not conducive to
addressing current threats.
Training range: Nellis Test and Training Range, Nev.;
C-ratings (2004): Not rated;
Identified deficiencies: MOUT training facility lacks appropriate
density of buildings and scoring and feedback capabilities;
insufficient surface-to-air missile threat systems and opposition
forces.
Training range: Barry M. Goldwater Range, Ariz.;
C-ratings (2004): Not rated;
Identified deficiencies: Inadequate or lacking MOUT training
facilities, remote feedback site and capability, targets and scoring
system on live-fire ranges, remote laser system, real-time or updated
imagery of range, drop zone, emergency landing training airstrip,
target identification area, and diversity of realistic targets;
electronic warfare range lacks density and current threat capabilities,
and parts for current equipment are becoming obsolete; inadequate
communication systems; obsolete and insufficient recording systems for
feedback on Army helicopters.
Source: GAO observations and analysis of DOD data.
Note: The C-rating in general represents the composite rating for all
training areas on these ranges, as the condition of individual training
areas may vary. However, because the Army considers range conditions
and property replacement values in assigning its C-ratings and some
training areas do not have replacement values, these training areas are
not factored into the overall C-rating. The Navy and Air Force do not
annually assess the condition of their ranges.
[End of table]
Fort Hood, Texas:
While the overall C-rating of the Fort Hood ranges in 2004 was C-2, 53
percent of the assessed training areas were identified by installation
officials as having significant (C-3) or major (C-4) deficiencies that
preclude satisfactory mission accomplishment. According to Army
officials, the condition of Fort Hood's training ranges is understated
because the overall C-rating does not include all assessed training
areas. In addition, training range officials identified 364 (91
percent) of the 400 miles of their tank trails, which are not rated
under training areas, as unusable or hazardous because of deteriorated
conditions (see fig. 1). As a result, units typically detoured onto
paved, public roads to travel to and from training areas causing road
damage and creating safety hazards to the public who use the roads.
Figure 1: Deteriorated Training Areas at Fort Hood:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, the urban training facilities were outdated, having been
designed for Cold War scenarios that are not applicable to current
military operations. For example, the facilities at Fort Hood resemble
European villages with narrow streets. But in current military
operations, tanks and other military vehicles patrol Middle Eastern
settings and downtown cities. Also, while entrances to these European
homes at Fort Hood are immediately off the road and easily accessible,
homes in the Middle East are generally protected by tall, gated walls
and designed around a courtyard, making soldiers more vulnerable to
enemy fire before entering a home.[Footnote 24]
Fort Stewart, Georgia:
While the overall C-rating of the Fort Stewart ranges in 2004 was C-3,
60 percent of the training areas were identified by installation
officials as having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory
mission accomplishment. In addition, range officials and units told us
that the convoy training area limits soldiers to shoot out of only one
side of a vehicle during ambush training exercises, although soldiers
stated that in actual military operations they could be attacked from
multiple directions. The range also lacks urban training facilities
that accurately reflect the needs of current military operations, such
as Middle Eastern-style building facades. A range official further
stated that most of their ranges lack running water and therefore do
not have functioning restrooms or showers, which leads to delays and
inefficient use of training time. Similar to Fort Hood, the range also
has deteriorated training areas that pose difficulties in maneuvering
vehicles during training events (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Tank Stuck in Mud at Fort Stewart Due to Lack of Hardened
Crossing:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Southern California Offshore Range, California:
There are numerous identified deficiencies at this range--a primary
site for West Coast Navy units to train before deploying--that
adversely affect the quantity and quality of training activities. Range
and submarine squadron officials told us that a major deficiency is the
malfunctioning of the undersea training area's communications system,
which effectively reduces the available training area to the southern
portion of the range (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Degraded Conditions at the Southern California Offshore
Range:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
This situation is further exacerbated because the southern portion of
the undersea training area overlaps with surface ship training areas,
and so concurrent training cannot be conducted. Range officials stated
that this and other deficiencies could also impede their ability to
meet the increased demand created by the Navy's revised ship deployment
cycle, which requires more carrier groups to be deployable at a given
time.[Footnote 25] Moreover, the range does not have an instrumented
shallow-water capability. A recent study on the range's capabilities
for antisubmarine warfare found that current range resources are
sufficient to meet 90 percent of the minimally required training tasks.
However, the study found that the range does not provide a realistic
training environment for 19 (63 percent) of 30 Navy training skills,
primarily due to the lack of a shallow-water instrumented training
range.[Footnote 26] The range also lacks adequate support capabilities,
such as piers, docks, and mooring buoys. For example, although range
officials stated that current fleet requirements necessitate a minimum
of eight mooring buoys, only two are in satisfactory condition. As a
result, these buoys are rarely available, which leads to reduced
training support and costly workarounds, such as travel to alternate
locations for the night. In addition, the lack of mooring or docking
capabilities has also resulted in damaged military property and
canceled training events. Range officials and users cited other
deficiencies, including an inadequate number and types of targets,
electronic warfare capabilities, and tracking systems for aircraft, as
well as the lack of a dependable secure high-capacity communication
system. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Navy stated that
it is currently funding efforts to establish dedicated shallow water
training ranges on both coasts. However, during our review, Navy
officials acknowledged that the west coast range will not be
established until the service addresses more restrictive environmental
requirements and other anticipated obstacles on the east coast.
Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada:
Pilots and training range officials stated that the Fallon Range
Training Complex lacks adequate systems to replicate current threats
and targets. It lacks advanced surface-to-air missile threat systems
and has an inadequate concentration of electronic warfare systems. As a
result, the quality of training is adversely affected. Furthermore,
because replacement parts for the current electronic warfare systems
are becoming obsolete, the systems are becoming difficult to maintain.
In addition, the range has an insufficient number of targets,
particularly time-sensitive and moving targets, to reflect the current
threat.
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina:
While the overall C-rating of the Camp Lejeune ranges in 2004 was C-3,
12 percent of the training areas were identified by installation
officials as having major (C-4) deficiencies that preclude satisfactory
mission accomplishment. We observed several training areas with
overgrown vegetation that obstructed the visibility of targets and
range boundary markers, thereby precluding the use of highly explosive
ammunition for safety reasons. This condition also diminished the
trainers' ability to accurately observe the Marines' shooting
proficiency. Some training areas also lack marked firing lanes, and
only 5 of the 120 live-fire training areas had automated targets,
thereby limiting the amount of training time available since Marines
must set up and take down targets as a workaround (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Comparison of a Degraded Camp Lejeune Training Area with a
Better Maintained and Modernized Area at Fort Bragg:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Similar to the conditions found at Fort Hood and Fort Stewart, the
urban training facilities were outdated and the range lacks an area to
conduct training for soldiers on convoy operations. Consequently,
soldiers either have to travel to other ranges to receive such
training, which increases training costs and the amount of time
soldiers are away from their families, or soldiers remain at their
primary ranges and may be less prepared for the conditions they will
face in combat.
Camp Pendleton, California:
While the overall C-rating of the Camp Pendleton ranges in 2004 was C-
2, 24 percent of the training areas were identified by installation
officials as having significant (C-3) deficiencies that precluded
accomplishment of some missions. Although encroachment is the primary
problem for this range, several other deficiencies also affect its
training and safety. For example, the range lacks a sufficient number
of automated targets to provide feedback for users. In addition, one of
the primary training areas is located in a dry riverbed lacking
emergency escape routes, where range officials told us one Marine had
drowned when it flooded. The training areas used by Navy special
operation units have overgrown vegetation; are inadequately constructed
to meet requirements and safety conditions; and lack target maintenance
and storage facilities, bullet containment walls, turning and moving
targets, and hygiene facilities. A lack of running water also creates a
financial burden for the range office, which, as a costly workaround,
must consequently rent temporary restroom structures. In addition,
helicopter pilots stated that the range lacks needed mountaintop
targets for them to train against threats from an elevated position.
Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada:
Although range officials stated that the Nellis Test and Training Range
is the most capable in the Air Force, we were told about and observed
several deficiencies that affect training, including an insufficient
concentration of buildings to replicate an urban environment,
inadequate scoring and feedback capabilities, and a lack of specific
urban-setting target sets. The range also lacks a sufficient number of
opposition forces for training exercises and advanced surface-to-air
missile threat systems, which adversaries currently own and operate.
Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona:
Pilots and training range officials told us that the Barry M. Goldwater
Range lacks moving targets, camouflaged or concealed targets, enemy
targets embedded within friendly forces and the civilian population,
cave entrances, time-sensitive targets, and strafing pits at specific
tactical locations, which are necessary to provide users with a more
realistic training experience. It also lacks scoring and feedback
capability in the live-fire training areas. Without a scoring system
and targets, pilots must shoot at barren mounds of dirt, which
diminishes their ability to obtain feedback on the proficiency of their
attack. The range lacks the capability to provide remote site feedback,
thus diminishing the amount of training and personal time available to
pilots who must as a workaround travel to another base to receive this
feedback. It lacks an adequate concentration of electronic warfare
systems, and the systems it has are becoming difficult to maintain as
replacement parts become obsolete. Also, its communication system is
inadequate.
Deficiencies Identified by DOD Studies:
DOD is aware of training range deficiencies, having issued a number of
studies over the past 10 years that identify these training range
deficiencies. For example, DOD's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
states that unique American training superiority is eroding from
underlying neglect and needs support in sustainment and
recapitalization, particularly as evidenced in the aging infrastructure
and instrumentation of DOD's training ranges.[Footnote 27] The Navy has
completed a number of studies over the years that identify deficiencies
at specific ranges. For example, in 1995 it issued a tactical training
range roadmap identifying deficiencies at each of its ranges. Many of
these deficiencies still exist, such as inadequacies of shallow-water
ranges and of realistic targets. In September 2001, the Navy assessed
its ranges and identified several deficiencies, including inadequate
instrumentation at some of its most critical ranges.[Footnote 28] In
September 2000, it completed a range needs assessment on 19 air-to-
ground ranges and identified degraded range conditions and a lack of
capabilities.[Footnote 29] A 2003 Air Force assessment of its training
ranges found infrastructure deficiencies at 90 percent of its ranges,
attributable to age and limited funding.[Footnote 30] The assessment
considered the deficiencies significant at 24 of its 32 training
ranges. While the Army and the Marine Corps have not issued composite
studies on the deficiencies of their ranges, they have conducted
overall annual range assessments as part of the readiness reporting
system and identified deficiencies as well. Further, the Navy and
Marine Corps have identified a number of deficiencies at their ranges
while developing local range complex management plans.
Various Factors Affect DOD's Progress in Improving Training Range
Conditions:
While OSD and the military services have undertaken a number of
management actions that could improve the conditions of their training
ranges, progress in overall improvements has been limited, due in part
to the lack of a comprehensive approach to manage their training
ranges.
Specifically, a comprehensive approach should include, at a minimum,
several key elements, such as well-defined policies that address all
factors impacting range sustainability; plans that guide the timely
execution of range sustainability actions; and range requirements that
are geared to meet both service and joint needs. Further, while the
military services lack adequate and easily accessible information that
could precisely identify training range maintenance and modernization
funding, available information indicates that identified training range
requirements have historically not been adequately funded.
Additionally, OSD and the services have not fully implemented specific
actions identified in their policy, management guidance, reports, and
plans for improving training range conditions. Without a fully
implemented comprehensive approach, OSD and the services will not be
able to ensure the long-term viability of their training ranges, nor
their ability to meet transformation goals, nor will the Congress be in
a position to fulfill its oversight role.
OSD and the Services Have Taken Limited Range Improvement Actions, but
a Comprehensive Approach Is Lacking:
OSD and the military services have collectively taken a number of steps
that are designed to improve the conditions of training ranges at the
service and local range level. For example, to varying extents, the
military services have developed policies for training range
sustainment, developed service-specific plans, established working
groups to coordinate efforts among multiple organizations, defined
range requirements, assessed conditions, developed Web-based systems to
share information within and among OSD and the services, and developed
local range management plans. While these key actions comprise elements
of a comprehensive approach to training range sustainment, they have
focused primarily on encroachment, or they have not been consistently
implemented among the services, or they have not clearly defined the
roles and responsibilities of all officials. Our analysis of the status
of OSD's and the services' management actions taken to improve range
conditions is shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: GAO's Analysis of DOD's Management Actions for Improving
Training Range Conditions:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
* Policy--While OSD promulgated a DOD range sustainment policy in 2003,
that policy primarily focuses on external encroachment factors that
impact training and does not clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of several DOD commands that either provide oversight
or are impacted by the conditions of the ranges.[Footnote 31]
Specifically, the policy does not clearly define the maintenance and
modernization responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Installations and Environment and Special Operations Command.
Consequently, these organizations lack appropriate assignment of
responsibility and accountability for the military training range
improvements they oversee or manage. According to service officials,
the Army and Marine Corps are finalizing draft revisions of their range
sustainment policy, and the Air Force only recently started revising
its policy. Navy officials stated that the service has not yet
developed a policy to implement DOD's 2003 policy or to clearly define
the roles and responsibilities of the multiple Navy organizations
responsible for maintaining and modernizing its training ranges.
* Range sustainment programs--As shown in table 2, OSD and some of the
services have initiated specific range sustainment programs to
integrate their individual components and commands.[Footnote 32] The
Army has developed such an integrated program that incorporates the
multiple facets of range sustainment, including maintenance and
modernization, and includes involvement of all responsible officials.
OSD and the Navy have established similar programs, but their programs
focus primarily on encroachment issues and not on other factors that
impact training, such as the maintenance and modernization of ranges.
The Marine Corps has taken multiple sustainment initiatives, but has
not named their efforts as a program.
* Strategic or implementation plans--Although DOD has developed
strategic plans in other areas, such as the 2004 Defense Installations
Strategic Plan and Training Transformation Strategic Plan, to guide the
services with goals and milestones, it has not developed a
comprehensive strategic plan for the long-term viability of its
military training ranges. In June 2004, we reported that DOD's training
range report to the Congress, which was mandated by section 366 of the
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, did
not, among other things, provide a comprehensive plan to address
training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military
lands, marine areas, and air space that are available in the United
States and overseas for training.[Footnote 33] In response to our
recommendation calling for a comprehensive plan to fully address
training constraints, along with quantifiable goals and milestones for
tracking planned actions and measuring progress, DOD stated that the
services had initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it
considered to be evolutionary, and disagreed with our implication that
DOD has not executed a comprehensive program to improve the
sustainability of its ranges. Defense planning guidance has mandated
DOD to develop a plan to ensure that training ranges are sustainable,
but the plan addressed only encroachment issues impacting military
training ranges. Similarly, the 2004 Defense Installations Strategic
Plan identifies and provides goals for addressing encroachment factors
impacting DOD's training ranges, but not for other issues that affect
the quality of training, such as range maintenance and
modernization.[Footnote 34] The absence of such a plan could adversely
impact DOD-wide initiatives, such as the joint national training
capability and the overseas rebasing of forces to the United States.
Furthermore, lacking a comprehensive DOD strategic plan, none of the
services has developed implementation plans of their own. The Army and
Air Force have developed documents on their sustainable range programs,
but they do not provide specific goals or milestones that the services
can use to measure their progress in meeting their vision and overall
goals for ensuring the long-term viability of their ranges. While the
Navy has taken several actions under its sustainable range program, it
still lacks a plan with specific goals, milestones, funding sources and
amounts, defined roles and responsibilities, and other critical
components of a strategic plan.
* Multilevel integrated working groups--OSD and most of the services
have developed formal sustainable range working groups at multiple
levels that are intended to address training range constraints, since
range viability is dependent on a number of fragmented organizations
within OSD and the services. For example, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense established a multilevel DOD-wide working group, which includes
representatives from the services and some of the other OSD
offices.[Footnote 35] However, the working group does not include a
representative from Special Operations Command, although they are
responsible for and impacted by the maintenance and modernization of
military training ranges. Also, both the DOD-wide and Navy headquarters-
level sustainable range working groups are primarily focused on
encroachment issues and not on other issues that impact ranges and
training, such as maintenance and modernization. For example, the
Navy's southwest regional range director stated that his primary
responsibility is encroachment and munitions cleanup, and that he has
not been assigned or been provided the resources to address the
maintenance and modernization of ranges in his region. Also, on the
basis of our discussion with officials, we noted that only the Marine
Corps' and Air Force's working groups included all relevant
organizations, such as special operations units, which have an interest
in having maintained and modernized ranges.
* Range requirements--The Navy and Marine Corps have begun to identify
or have identified specific requirements or capabilities needed for
their ranges, which could be used for budgeting purposes as well as
assessing training range deficiencies. In addition, the Navy has linked
and the Marine Corps is in the process of linking its training
requirements to these range requirements so that the services can
identify specific training standards that are impacted by the
conditions of a specific training area. However, only the Navy's draft
range requirements document links its ranges to special operations and
joint training requirements to show the potential impact on the special
operation units' or combatant commanders' needs, which is a key
objective of DOD's training transformation initiative. Also, none of
the range requirement documents identify range support facility needs,
although facility conditions directly impact the quantity and quality
of training provided and the level of safety on the ranges.
* Systematic assessment of range conditions and impacts--At the time of
our review, we found that none of the services regularly assessed the
conditions of their ranges, including whether the ranges are able to
meet the specific training requirements of the service and combatant
commanders. While the Army and Marine Corps annually assessed the
physical condition of their training ranges, the services do not assess
the capabilities of the ranges or any impacts to training. While the
Army's assessment contained clearly defined criteria, local training
range officials stated that because the criteria are revised regularly,
comparing assessments across years is impossible. In addition, the
overall assessment of Army training ranges does not accurately reflect
the condition of all training areas on the range since it does not
include the condition of a number of training areas. Also, according to
service officials, both the Army's and Marine Corps' assessments are
conducted by public works officials who do not have the background or
specific knowledge of range infrastructure, as opposed to training
range officials or training unit representatives. In addition, local
officials stated that the Marine Corps' assessment is highly subjective
and does not provide the evaluator with specific criteria. While the
Navy and Air Force do not routinely conduct annual assessments of their
training ranges, the Air Force does perform assessments from time to
time and the Navy has completed some one-time assessments on their
ranges while developing local range complex management plans. We also
found that none of the services regularly assess the impacts to
training, and none of the services have linked their funding resources
to the results of the assessments.
* Web-based range information management system--DOD reports and
officials have increasingly called for a range information management
system that would allow range offices and users to share information
within and across the services. Such a Web-based system would include
best practices, lessons learned, a scheduling tool, policies, points of
contact, funding information, and range conditions and capabilities.
Local range offices have undertaken a number of initiatives to ensure
that their ranges remain viable while trying to minimize the negative
impact on training, but they often lack an effective mechanism for
sharing these initiatives with other organizations. For example, the
range officials at the Fallon Range Training Complex routinely obtained
targets and training structures at no cost from the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Service to enhance their training
capability,[Footnote 36] but other training offices we visited were
having difficulty obtaining these items or were paying for the items
they were able to obtain. For example, figure 5 shows a mock airfield
that was constructed at the Fallon Range out of materials obtained from
the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service.
Figure 6: Mock Airfield at the Fallon Range Training Complex:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Marine Corps has an active, centralized training range Web site to
provide information to units and ranges across the world, including
related service regulations, general and detailed information about
each of its ranges, and training range points of contact. The Web site
also allows units from any service to schedule their training events
remotely, and provides them with a map of each training range including
photographs and, in some instances, video footage to assist them in
scheduling and designing their training events. However, to date, the
Marine Corps has not used its Web site to exchange information, such as
lessons learned and best practices, between and among training range
offices and military units. Meanwhile, the Army has developed an
initial Web site that provides similar, but more limited, information
about its sustainable range program. The Air Force has also established
a training range Web site to share information about its training
ranges, but it has remained nonfunctional, since the service did not
enter information into the site. The Air Force's Air Combat Command is
developing a separate training range information management system.
While a cognizant command official stated that the command plans on
adding a chat room feature to exchange information, the official stated
that the system might not be Web-based, so the information would not be
available to other range offices or units within and across the
services. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the
Air National Guard is in the process of developing a Web-based range
scheduling system that could meet some of the service's needs, but
additional funding is needed to complete this effort. While Navy
reports and officials recognize the need for a servicewide training
range management system, the service has not developed such a system.
However, the Southern California Offshore Range has its own management
system that is used for scheduling, identifying specific training
requirements for each training event, documenting reasons why training
is modified or canceled, tracking training range utilization rates by
specific units, and recording maintenance issues and resolutions. In
addition, the system allows the range office to compute the costs of
training each unit using specific training requirements and warfare
areas.
* Local range complex management plans--The Navy and Marine Corps have
started to develop local range complex management plans for their
training ranges, which, among other things, provide descriptions of the
training ranges, a strategic vision for range operations, and
recommendations for environmental planning; identify and analyze
required capability shortfalls derived from fleet training needs; and
include an investment strategy to address these deficiencies. Although
most of the Navy's and Marine Corps' local range offices have started
to develop plans with investment strategies, these strategies are not
linked to any service investment strategies. Also, due to funding
expectations, current needs have been pushed out 20 years.
Consequently, today's training requirements are being met with
yesterday's ranges and tomorrow's training requirements will be met
with today's ranges. Further, six of the Marine Corps' range complex
management plans, including two of the service's most significant
training ranges, are currently unfunded. In addition, the Army and Air
Force ranges we visited have outdated plans. The Army recently started
developing standardized local range plans and the Air Force is creating
a management system to develop plans for its ranges. However, the
system is not scheduled to be operational until 2007.
While these key actions comprise elements of a comprehensive approach
to training range sustainment, they have focused primarily on
encroachment, have not been consistently implemented among the
services, or have not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of
all officials. Such an approach should include, at a minimum, several
key elements, such as an overall comprehensive strategic plan that
addresses training range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and
milestones for tracking planned actions and progress. Other key
elements include well-defined policies that address all factors
impacting range sustainability, servicewide plans that guide the timely
execution of range sustainability actions, range requirements that are
geared to meet both service and joint needs, and a commitment to the
implementation of this approach. (See app. II for a more comprehensive
list of what we consider to be key managerial elements of a
comprehensive approach).
Services Have Not Adequately Funded Training Range Maintenance and
Modernization:
Various documents and training range officials report that training
range requirements have not been adequately funded historically to meet
training standards and needs. According to service officials, a variety
of factors--such as ranges having a lower funding priority amid
competing demands--have contributed to or exacerbated funding
limitations. However, the military services lack adequate and easily
accessible information that could precisely identify the required
funding and track what is allocated to maintain and modernize its
ranges.
Available Data Reflect Funding Shortages for Range Requirements:
Available data indicate that funding for training ranges has
historically been insufficient to meet range requirements. For example,
the 2003 Special Operations Command report on training ranges states
that ranges are inadequately funded for construction, maintenance,
repairs, and upgrades.[Footnote 37] In addition, a 2001 Navy range
study states that both range operation funds and base operation funds,
which also support range sustainment, were not adequate, thus adversely
impacting utilization of the Navy's ranges.[Footnote 38] A 2004 Naval
Audit Service report also found that Navy range accounts were not being
adequately funded and thus were dependent on funds from other
accounts.[Footnote 39] Further, funding information provided by
training range officials during this review showed that funding has not
adequately met their requirements. For example, Fort Stewart training
data indicated that the installation's training range maintenance
account was funded approximately 44 percent for fiscal years 1998
through 2002. Similarly, Camp Pendleton data revealed that the overall
identified range needs were funded approximately 13 percent from fiscal
years 1998 through 2002. DOD reports and officials identified the
following as factors in the funding shortages:
* Training ranges typically have a lower funding priority than many
other installation activities. Specifically, training ranges do not
compete well for funding against other installation activities that are
more visible or related to quality-of-life issues, such as gymnasiums,
child care centers, and barracks, and consequently training funds are
often reallocated from the range to support other base operations
programs.[Footnote 40] For example, the 2003 Air Force training range
assessment stated that critically needed sustainment funds for ranges
were often diverted to fund other base requirements identified as more
pressing.[Footnote 41]
* Service officials identified a number of organizational structure
issues that exacerbate the extent to which training range requirements
are prioritized and funded. While OSD's and the services' training
range offices are located in an operations directorate, this
directorate does not prioritize or fund base programs that provide
resources for the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of DOD
infrastructure (including ranges). Recognizing this as an issue, the
Navy recently hosted a conference to address the fragmented management
for budgeting and allocating funds to ranges. During the meeting, Navy
officials agreed to 20 specific actions that could be taken to minimize
future funding issues. Also, while local range personnel are
responsible for maintaining and modernizing ranges, some of these
offices are not directly linked to the command that prioritizes
installation resources. For example, the range office at the Southern
California Offshore Range, which is an operational unit, is not
organizationally aligned with the installation management organization
that prioritizes sustainment funds for San Clemente Island. In
addition, although the majority of the Southern California Offshore
Range's exercises are fleet operations and not air operations, the
range office is aligned under a naval air command and not the fleet
command.
In addition, the relative position of training ranges in the
organizational framework affects the extent to which training range
requirements are prioritized and funded. Specifically, while some local
range offices report directly to the senior mission commander that
prioritizes funding resources, other range offices report to offices
several echelons below the commander. For example, the Air Force's Air
Warfare Center commander stated that since the range office for the
Nellis Test and Training Range is an Air Force wing, it has the same
opportunity to identify its requirements and deficiencies to him as
have the other wings at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Conversely,
although the Fallon Range Training Complex range office used to report
directly to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center commander, who sets
funding priorities and requirements, the range office has since been
aligned to a lower echelon position, thus placing the office at a less
advantageous position in having its requirements and deficiencies
identified as priorities.
* A lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities can also result
in overlooked training range requirements as well. Specifically,
several training range officials stated that the Navy's regional
installation support structure lacks clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for each of the program directors within the
structure, which results in overlooked requirements at its training
ranges. For example, because the Southern California Offshore Range is
only a portion of the San Clemente Island in the Pacific Ocean, there
are multiple officials responsible for the different operations
occurring on the island, including training ranges, port, airfield,
environmental, facilities, information technology, and safety. However,
according to training range officials, deficiencies on the island are
overlooked because the Navy has not issued guidance providing clearly
defined roles and responsibilities for each of these program directors.
Specifically, training range officials stated that they are unable to
obtain funds to maintain or modernize support facilities on the island,
such as the pier and roads, because program managers either tend to
view the entire island as a training range and therefore not their
responsibility or to view it as not one of their top priorities, since
the adverse impact on their primary missions is relatively limited.
Nevertheless, the condition of these support facilities directly
impacts range activities.
* Various documented reports and testimonies of cognizant officials
suggest that range needs are understated to the Congress due to the
following factors: (1) installation real property inventories, which
are used to calculate the installations' sustainment funding
requirements, do not contain complete and accurate information needed
to compute requirements; (2) commands typically understate range needs
because they have come to expect lower funding amounts; and (3) ranges
may receive supplemental funding from units to help maintain
conditions. For example, the 2003 Special Operations Command training
range report found that Army installations had incorrectly categorized
their range facilities built with operations and maintenance funds as
multipurpose ranges, which are considered less costly to maintain than
those specially targeted for the command. Therefore, these
installations underbudgeted for the maintenance and repair of these
facilities. In addition, Marine Corps officials stated that they
recently updated their installation real property inventories and
discovered numerous discrepancies that had resulted in understatement
of their ranges' needs. Also, officials at Fort Hood stated that 30
percent of its tank trails are not included in its real property
records because the tank trails do not meet military construction
standards. As a result, Fort Hood is unable to obtain sufficient funds
to either sustain or improve the tank trails to an acceptable standard
and add them to the real property inventory. Further, officials stated
that commands understate range funding requirements because they have
come to expect lower funding levels. For example, officials at Fort
Hood stated that although their range modernization funding
requirements totaled at least $8 million, they had programmed and
budgeted for only $4 million. Also, the requirements and budget
documents at the Southern California Offshore Range office showed that
the range's requirements were understated by about 30 percent for
fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Consequently, range officials stated
that even if this amount were fully funded and not transferred to other
accounts, their needs would be unmet. Since the range has a management
system that captures the cost to train units on the range, the office
reported that they would have to cancel operations due to a lack of
funds in May of each year, or eliminate all command and control and
battle group exercises, including 20 already scheduled significant
training events. In addition, a 2004 Naval audit found that the regular
transfer of funds from units to training ranges resulted in understated
requirements and senior Navy management, DOD officials, and the
Congress not having important information needed to efficiently and
effectively manage and fund Navy programs identified by the Congress as
significant to readiness.[Footnote 42]
* The services do not link funding for their training ranges to range
conditions, capabilities, impacts on training, or utilization. For
example, while the number of training hours on the Southern California
Offshore Range increased by 153 percent between fiscal years 1998 and
2001, range funding data reflect that funding increased by less than 10
percent. As a result, range officials told us that the training range
requirements continued to be underfunded, conditions continued to
deteriorate, and the capabilities continued to be lacking.
* Service officials across all commands lack adequate knowledge and
training about the various resources available for range maintenance
and how modernization impacts funding levels. For example, very few of
the training range officials that we met during our review were aware
of sustainment funds that were generated by the range property in the
installation's real property inventory systems.
* The services lack clearly defined range requirements that distinguish
special operations-specific range needs and servicewide range needs,
which results in confusion between which organization is responsible
for funding range maintenance and modernization. Specifically, the 2003
Special Operations Command training range report stated that when
Special Operations Forces are the primary users of a range funded with
service dollars, disagreement sometimes arises over responsibility for
maintenance costs. Consequently, there needs to be better clarification
of what comprises Special Operations-specific facilities and what
comprises service-common facilities.
Services Lack the Capability to Accurately Capture Training Range
Requirements and Funding Levels:
We found, and DOD recognizes, that the services lack the capability to
accurately and easily capture training range funding information. DOD's
sustainable range working group officials told us that the services
were unable to easily and precisely identify their funding
requirements, funding levels, and trends in expenditures on an annual
basis. Consequently, the group developed a subcommittee in 2004 to
begin addressing this issue. Also, the 2004 Naval audit on range
operations funds found that the lack of a range management system
resulted in problems related to the visibility of the amount and use of
funds being provided.[Footnote 43] Further, while training range
officials for each of the services stated that they could identify some
training range requirements or funding amounts, none were able to
identify all of the funds that their ranges need and receive. For
example, while the Army was able to identify its range operations
requirements and funding levels, it was unable to identify its range
sustainment requirements and funding levels. Officials in these range
offices stated that they should have the ability to accurately identify
all funding provided to their ranges if they are going to be effective
program sponsors. Local training range officials were also unable to
identify all their funding requirements and levels. They noted that a
centralized system would provide a mechanism for service headquarters
officials to identify funding requirements and at the same time relieve
them of the burden of responding to constant requests for information.
OSD and the Services Have Not Fully Implemented Previously Recommended
Actions:
Although policy, management guidance, reports, and plans have either
recommended or required specific actions, OSD and the services have not
fully implemented these previously recommended actions. For example,
although DOD's sustainable range policy requires OSD to, among other
things, provide oversight of training ranges and ensure that DOD-level
programs are in place to protect the future ability of DOD components
to conduct force training, a cognizant OSD official told us that OSD
believes it should be a facilitator rather than a provider of
oversight. Without adequate oversight, DOD-level initiatives, such as
transformation efforts, could be jeopardized. In addition, OSD has not
established a means to assess the readiness benefits of range
sustainment initiatives, as required by the policy. In response to DOD
guidance stating that DOD was to reverse the erosion of its training
range infrastructure and ensure that ranges are sustainable, capable,
and available, the Senior Readiness Oversight Council required the
services, working with OSD, to prepare a prioritized list of range
sustainment and upgrade programs and estimated costs for potential
inclusion in the fiscal year 2003 budget. However, the list was never
developed and submitted for potential funding opportunities. Defense
officials could not provide us with an explanation as to why no
appropriate action was taken. In addition, the 2003 Special Operations
Command training range report identified a number of recommendations
that could improve the conditions of training ranges units within the
command use.[Footnote 44] For example, the report stated that all
special operations' components need to create master range plans that
address their current and future range issues and solutions; identify
and validate training requirements as well as facilities available and
needed; and define acceptable limits of workarounds. However, according
to a knowledgeable defense official, these recommendations have not
been implemented to date because of resource shortages. Also, in July
1995, the Navy issued a tactical training range roadmap that, among
other things, applied training requirements to training range
capabilities and identified deficiencies to produce an investment plan
for training range development. Although the plan stated that it should
be updated biannually to remain current and accurately reflect fleet
training requirements and associated instrumentation needs, the Navy
has not updated the plan since that time. Without a commitment to
implementation, it is unlikely that the OSD and the services will be
able to ensure the success of their transformation efforts and long-
term viability of their training ranges.
Conclusions:
DOD training ranges are important national assets that have not been
adequately maintained or modernized to meet today's needs. While DOD
has undertaken a number of actions in an effort to maintain and
modernize its training ranges, it lacks a comprehensive approach to
address range issues. We have previously recommended and continue to
believe that DOD needs an overall strategic plan that identifies
specific goals, actions to be taken, milestones, and a process for
measuring progress and ensuring accountability. In turn, each service
needs to develop a comprehensive implementation plan if deteriorating
conditions are to be abated and overall training capabilities improved
to meet today's and tomorrow's requirements. Similarly, OSD and the
services have issued policies, conducted studies containing
recommendations, identified range officials at various command levels,
and developed working groups. However, not all relevant officials are
included, their roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined, the
policies and recommendations have been ignored or only partially
implemented, and several of these actions focus only on external
encroachment issues. DOD needs to ensure that OSD's comprehensive
strategic plan, the services' implementation plans, DOD's training
transformation plan, DOD policies, and identified recommendations
include all relevant officials, clearly define their roles and
responsibilities, comprehensively address all sustainability issues,
including the maintenance and modernization of military training
ranges, and are fully implemented to ensure the long-term viability of
these national assets. Although military training ranges are generally
in degraded condition, which adversely affects the quantity and quality
of training and safety of the users, the military services do not
accurately and systematically assess their ranges, including whether
the ranges are able to meet the specific training requirements of the
service and combatant commanders. Without systematically assessing the
conditions of their ranges, the services cannot accurately identify the
ranges where the conditions negatively impact training and need
improvements, the best locations for training, or which training ranges
best meet the needs of DOD's training transformation plan and of
service and combatant commanders. Although local training range
officials have undertaken a number of initiatives to ensure that their
ranges remain viable while trying to minimize negative impact on
training, the services have not provided these officials or military
units with a Web-based range information management system. Without
such a system, the range offices are unable to share best practices and
lessons learned within and across the services and military units are
unable to identify which ranges best meet their needs.
Various documents and training range officials report that training
range requirements have historically not been adequately funded to meet
training standards and needs. Without appropriate attention and
adequate funding, the services will be unable to meet DOD's
transformation goals and ensure the long-term viability of their
ranges. The military services do not have the capability to accurately
and easily identify the funding amounts needed or provided for
maintaining and modernizing their ranges. Without this capability, the
military services are constrained in their ability to accurately plan,
program, and budget for the maintenance and modernization of their
training ranges; provide complete and accurate information to the
Congress for appropriation and legislative decision making; and obtain
this information without constant requests for information from
multiple officials at different commands. A variety of factors, such as
ranges having a lower priority in funding, contributes to or
exacerbates funding limitations. Without addressing these and other
factors, training range conditions will continue to degrade.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We have previously recommended that OSD develop an overall
comprehensive strategic plan for its training ranges that addresses
training range limitations, along with quantifiable goals and
milestones for tracking planned actions and progress.[Footnote 45] In
response to our recommendation, DOD stated that the services had
initiated a comprehensive planning process, which it considered to be
evolutionary, and disagreed with the implication that DOD has not
executed a comprehensive program to improve the sustainability of its
ranges. However, our work has shown that this recommendation still has
merit and should be addressed because it is fundamental to the
comprehensive approach for managing training ranges that we are
advocating.
We are making other recommendations to you as follows:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to:
* Update DOD Directive 3200.15 to broaden the focus of the policy to
clearly address all issues that affect the long-term viability of
military training ranges; and clearly define the maintenance and
modernization roles and responsibilities of all relevant DOD
components, including the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, Joint Forces Command, and Special
Operations Command.
* Broaden the charter of the DOD-wide working group, the Sustainable
Range Integrated Product Team, to address all issues that could affect
the long-term viability of military training ranges; and include all
DOD components that are impacted by range limitations.
* Update DOD's training transformation plan to address all factors that
could impact the sustainability of military training ranges and not
just external encroachment issues.
* Direct the Secretaries of the Military Services to implement a
comprehensive approach to managing their training ranges, to include:
* A servicewide sustainable range policy that implements the updated
DOD Directive 3200.15 and clearly defines the maintenance and
modernization roles and responsibilities of relevant service officials
at all levels.
* A servicewide sustainable range implementation plan that includes
goals, specific actions to be taken, milestones, funding sources, and
an investment strategy for managing their ranges.
* Defined training range requirements and a systematic process to
annually assess the conditions of training ranges and their consequent
impact on training, including whether the ranges are able to meet the
specific training requirements of the service and combatant commanders.
* A Web-based range information management system that allows training
range officials at all levels to share information, such as range
conditions and their impact on training; funding sources, requirements
and expenditures; and local range initiatives.
* Regularly developed strategies to address the factors contributing to
funding shortages for ranges, including the reassessment of funding
priorities for maintaining and modernizing ranges relative to other
needs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Readiness agreed with our recommendations, stating the
department and military services are or will be taking steps to
implement them.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are included in this
report in appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations
to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this
report. A written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and it will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Mark A. Little,
James R. Reifsnyder, Patricia J. Nichol, Tommy Baril, Steve Boyles, and Cheryl A. Weissman were major contributors to this report.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Barry W. Holman, Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the conditions of military training ranges and their
consequent impact, we collected and analyzed training-range-related
information from officials within the headquarters and selected major
commands of the military services. We also visited eight major active
component training ranges situated at various locations in the
continental United States--Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Stewart, Georgia;
Southern California Offshore Range, California; Fallon Range Training
Complex, Nevada; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton,
California; Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada; and the Barry M.
Goldwater Range, Arizona--to observe training range conditions and
discuss consequential impacts.[Footnote 46] These ranges were selected
by identifying the major training ranges for each service and seeking
input from service range officials as to which ranges could best
address our audit objectives. During our visits we met with
installation officials, range managers, and units that use the ranges.
We also reviewed relevant DOD studies and audit reports identifying the
conditions of military training ranges.
To assess the progress the department has made in improving training
range conditions, we discussed and reviewed information relating to
training range initiatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, and the
headquarters and selected major commands of the military services. We
also examined key documents related to the funding of training ranges
including associated funding requirements and funding allocations. In
addition, we reviewed prior GAO reports and internal service audits
addressing funding issues for military facilities, including training
ranges.[Footnote 47] We also obtained and reviewed range-related
information from range officials of each of the eight installations
that we visited. Further, we toured the training areas or support
facilities at each of the ranges we visited to observe initiatives
implemented by local range offices to improve the condition or
capability of their ranges. Although we found limitations in the
availability of certain data, we believe the available data gathered
are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on our
discussions with OSD and military service officials and our review of
the prior GAO reports and internal service audits.
Organizations and Units Visited or Contacted for This Review:
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of the Director of Readiness and Training, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness:
* Office of Installations Requirements and Management, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment:
Combatant Commands:
* Chief of Staff, Joint Forces Command:
* Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Joint
Forces Command:
* Joint Training Policy and Validation Division, Special Operations
Command:
Army:
* Training Directorate, Training Simulations Division, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff:
* Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management:
* Installation Management Agency--Headquarters:
* Installation Management Agency--Southeast Region:
* Installation Management Agency--Southwest Region:
* Forces Command:
Navy:
* Navy Fleet Training Branch, Fleet Readiness Division, Fleet Readiness
and Logistics, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations:
* Operating Forces Support Division, Chief of Naval Installations:
* Live Training Ranges Office, Fleet Forces Command:
Marine Corps:
* Range and Training Area Management Division, Training and Education
Command:
Air Force:
* Office of the Director of Ranges and Airspace, Air and Space
Operations:
* Air Combat Command:
* Air Education and Training Command:
Fort Hood, Texas:
* Garrison Commander, Fort Hood:
* Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, III Corps:
* Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division:
* 8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division:
* 16th Field Artillery, 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Division:
* Headquarters Company, 1st Cavalry Division:
* 3rd Air Support Operations Group (U.S. Air Force):
* Directorate of Plans, Training and Security:
* Directorate of Public Works:
* Range Division, Directorate of Plans, Training and Security:
* Garrison Resource Management Office:
Fort Stewart, Georgia:
* Deputy Garrison Commander, Fort Stewart:
* 64th Armored Regiment, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry
Division:
* Headquarters Company, 3rd Infantry Division:
* Training Division, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization an
Security:
* Directorate of Public Works:
* Garrison Resource Management Office:
Southern California Offshore Range, California:
* Commodore, Submarine Squadron 11, Commander Submarine Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet:
* Training and Readiness Department, 3rd Fleet:
* Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific:
* Naval Special Warfare Command:
* Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility Detachment Southern
California Offshore Range:
* Commander Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light Wing, Pacific:
* Public Works Office, Naval Base Coronado:
Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada:
* Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Fallon:
* Program Manager of Ranges, Navy Region Southwest, Chief of Naval
Installations:
* N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center:
* Training Range Branch, N5 Strike Department, Naval Strike and Air
Warfare Center:
* Comptroller, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center:
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina:
* Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune:
* Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations:
* Range Development Division:
* Training Resources Management Division:
* Modeling and Simulation Division:
* School of Infantry:
* Special Operations Training Group:
* 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force:
* Weapons and Field Training Battalion:
* Office of the Comptroller, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Environment
Department:
Camp Pendleton, California:
* Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations:
* Range Operations Division:
* Training Resources Management Division:
* School of Infantry:
* 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force:
* Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force:
* Special Operations Training Group:
Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada:
* Commanding Officer, Air Warfare Center:
* 98th Range Wing, Air Warfare Center:
* 414th Combat Training Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing, Air
Warfare Center:
* 57th Operations Support Squadron, 57th Operations Group, 57th Wing,
Air Warfare Center:
Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona:
* 56th Fighter Wing:
* 944th Fighter Wing:
* 56th Fighter Wing Range Management Office:
* 56th Operations Group, 56th Fighter Wing:
* 355th Operations Group, 355th Wing:
* 162nd Fighter Wing Operations Group, Arizona Air National Guard:
* 563rd Rescue Group, Air Force Special Operations Command:
* Western Army National Guard Aviation Training Site:
We conducted our work from August 2003 through March 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Key Management Elements of a Comprehensive Approach for
Managing Training Ranges:
The flow chart below depicts what we consider to be the defense
organizational roles and responsibilities needed to implement a
comprehensive approach for managing training ranges.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
Mr. Barry W. Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Holman:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office Draft Report GAO-05-534, "MILITARY TRAINING:
Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve Conditions of
Military Training Ranges," April 29, 2005 (GAO Code 350430).
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft,
and substantially concurs with the contents of the report and
recommendations offered. In addition, the Department is providing
several technical comments for consideration.
Sincerely,
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED April 29, 2005 GAO CODE 350430/GAO-05-534:
" MILITARY TRAINING: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to
Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges:"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
update DoD Directive 3200.15 to broaden the focus of the policy to
clearly address all issues that affect the long-term viability of
military training ranges; and clearly define the maintenance and
modernization roles and responsibilities of all relevant DoD
components, including the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, Joint Forces Command, and Special
Operations Command. (Pages 37 and 38/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. In general, the Department concurs
that more fully articulating the complimentary roles and
responsibilities of primary OSD offices, the Services, and the
Combatant Commands will better address the full range of management
functions required to sustain DoD ranges. Whether DoD Directive 3200.15
should be broadened to serve as the single focus point for sustainable
range policy or if it would make more sense to address the myriad of
sustainable range issues and articulate these complimentary
responsibilities through other directives and instructions remains to
be determined. The Department intends to undertake a review of policies
to ensure the scope of issues to be addressed and the roles and
responsibilities for addressing such issues are integrated and clearly
articulated in existing, revised, or new policies.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
broaden the charter of the DoD-wide working group, the Sustainable
Range Integrated Product Team, to address all issues that could affect
the long-term viability of military training ranges; and include all
DoD components that are impacted by range limitations. (Page 38/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The Department concurs that a more
broad-based, collaborative effort among its various components and
agencies will better address the full range of sustainment issues. As
issues have arisen that go beyond the core membership of the
Sustainable Ranges Integrated Product Team (IPT) charter, various
groups and agencies have been brought in to help work these issues and
sub-groups have been formed to address specific issues. For example,
the IPT has had a long-term working relationship with the Ordnance
Environmental Executive Steering Committee and more recently is
partnering with the Defense Installation Spatial Data Infrastructure
office, and the Natural Infrastructure Capabilities Working Group (a
DoD Installations Capabilities Council group created to deal with
natural infrastructure management and encroachment prevention). In
addition, as part of the Department's response to reporting
requirements pursuant to section 366 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, a funding subgroup was formed
to develop a common construct for consistent and accurate reporting and
discussions of range funding among the Services.
Although the Sustainable Ranges IPT has addressed a spectrum of
sustainability issues, the group's focus has remained largely on
encroachment from environmental challenges and land, air and sea-space
management. Addressing internal limitations by partnering with the
facilities sustainment and modernization community makes sense. The IPT
will address whether to expand the IPT membership or simply develop
working relationships with existing groups that already have those
responsibilities.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
update DoD's training transformation plan to address all factors that
could impact the sustainability of military training ranges and not
just external encroachment issues. (Page 38/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. The Department concurs that the full
breadth of sustainable range management needs to be addressed in our
efforts to transform military training and establish a Joint National
Training Capability. As stated in the report, the Department's Training
Transformation Implementation Plan recognizes the need for sustainable
and modernized ranges and provides guidance to this end. It will be a
long-term effort, however, to successfully transform our ranges, given
the time and resources required to make substantive changes. We will
continue to work towards a more complete integration of the maintenance
and modernization factors associated with our infrastructure and the
environmental and encroachment factors of range sustainment in future
updates of the Training Transformation Implementation Plan.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Military Services to implement a
comprehensive approach to managing their training ranges to include:
(1) a Service-wide sustainable range policy that implements the updated
DoD Directive 3200.15 and clearly defines the maintenance and
modernization roles and responsibilities of relevant Service officials
at all levels; (2) a Service-wide sustainable range implementation plan
that includes goals, specific actions to be taken, milestones, funding
sources, and an investment strategy for managing their ranges; (3)
defined training range requirements and a systematic process to
annually assess the conditions of training ranges and their consequent
impact on training, including whether the ranges are able to meet the
specific training requirements of the Service and combatant commanders;
(4) a Web-based range information management system that allows
training range officials at all levels to share information, such as
range conditions and their impact on training; funding sources,
requirements and expenditures; and local range initiatives; and (5)
regularly developed strategies to address the factors contributing to
funding shortages for ranges, including the reassessment of funding
priorities for maintaining and modernizing ranges relative to other
needs. (Page 38/ GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE:
Concur with comment. DoD concurs with the GAO that a comprehensive
approach to managing training ranges is essential to successful range
sustainment. However, a truly comprehensive solution calls for a
collaborative approach, one that involves both OSD and the Services.
The Sustainable Ranges Integrated Product Team, established by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense on December 4, 2001, provides this
collaborative forum ("...form an Integrated Product Team (IPT) to act
as the DoD coordinating body for all issues of encroachment on our
ranges, operating areas, and other locations where we train or test and
evaluate new weapons and sensors."). The IPT has had notable success so
far in establishing top-level sustainable ranges policy (3200.15, as
well as updates to other range guidance). OSD has issued programmatic
guidance to the Services on range sustainment, to include modernization
aspects as well as counter-encroachment. The IPT has a standing
subgroup that tracks Service programming for range sustainment and is
developing a framework that provides increased visibility into year-to-
year funding. The IPT has initiated a comprehensive review of range
information systems and needs across all the Services. And for the past
two years, the IPT has led a collaborative effort to report our
comprehensive range program progress to Congress (the "Section 366
Report").
Based on the agreements and understandings reached in the IPT, and
founded upon DoD-level policy and other direction, each Service must
develop detailed programs for range sustainment and implement them
accordingly. This entails the development and implementation of Service-
level policies and plans, to include a process for evaluating and
addressing range requirements, managing range funding, and effectively
managing range information. While all four Services are in some stage
of development on such a comprehensive Service program, not all are
fully formed or well described at this stage. The IPT will undertake a
detailed review of each Service range sustainment program over the
coming year, to include each of the five areas mentioned by the GAO's
recommendation 4. We already have a programmatic review of Service
range sustainment programs planned for the August timeframe, and will
widen this review in order to capture more fully the GAO's concerns.
Based on the results of this review, the need for additional guidance,
whether from the IPT or the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will be
assessed and appropriate actions taken.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address
Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. Washington, D.C.:
June 4, 2004.
DOD Operational Ranges: More Reliable Cleanup Cost Estimates and a
Proactive Approach to Identifying Contamination Are Needed. GAO- 04-
601. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Military Munitions: DOD Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Approach for
Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites. GAO-04-147. Washington, D.C.: December
19, 2003.
Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase
Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training
Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management
Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and
Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on Training
Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic
Planning Needed to Improve Condition of Military Facilities. GAO-03-
274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.
Defense Infrastructure: Most Recruit Training Barracks Have Significant
Deficiencies. GAO-02-786. Washington D.C.: June 13, 2002.
Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2002.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2002.
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in
Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Defense Budget: Analysis of Real Property Maintenance and Base
Operations Fund Movements. GAO/NSIAD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: February
29, 2000.
Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces
for Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 2000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] We use the term "training ranges" to collectively refer to airspace
used to conduct training, live-fire and nonlive-fire and impact areas,
ground maneuver areas, sea ranges (above or below the surface), and
other operating areas.
[2] DOD defines "encroachment" as the cumulative result of any and all
outside influences that inhibit normal training and testing. DOD
initially identified the following eight encroachment factors:
endangered species and critical habitat, unexploded ordinance and
munitions constituents, competition for frequency spectrum, protected
marine resources, competition for airspace, air pollution, noise
pollution, and urban growth around installations. Some of the emerging
factors to be worked in the future are space, overseas ranges, water
use, resource extraction, and civilian access.
[3] In this report we use the term "condition" to refer collectively to
the physical features of DOD's training ranges that rely on routine
maintenance (e.g., roads and tank trails) as well as range capabilities
to provide for modernized and realistic training environments (e.g.,
automated threat emitters, automated targets, and urban training
facilities).
[4] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[5] 31 U.S.C. § 7 17(b)(1).
[6] Range locations included training areas at Fort Hood, Texas; Fort
Stewart, Georgia; the Southern California Offshore Range, California;
Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;
Camp Pendleton, California; Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada; and
the Barry M. Goldwater Range, Arizona.
[7] Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 required OSD to report to the Congress in 2004 on a
comprehensive plan to address training range constraints with annual
updates through 2007 and for GAO to evaluate each of these reports. See
GAO, Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully
Address Congressional Reporting Requirements, GAO-04-608 (Washington,
D.C.: June 4, 2004). We expect to complete a separate assessment of
DOD's 2005 update after it is submitted to the Congress.
[8] Tank trails are unpaved roads that allow units to travel to and
from their motor pools to training areas safely and reduce negative
impacts to the environment.
[9] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2001).
[10] CNA, Assessing Training Range Capabilities: Application of a Range
Resource Approach to SoCal ASW Training (Alexandria, Va.: November
2004).
[11] For the purpose of this report, Fort Stewart's and Camp
Pendleton's funding information include operations and maintenance
funds, and do not include military construction funding. Fort Stewart's
range account also does not include facility sustainment funds.
[12] The Senior Readiness Oversight Council advises the Secretary of
Defense on matters pertaining to DOD readiness, oversees readiness-
related activities, provides recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense on readiness policy matters, and provides reports on current
and projected readiness issues.
[13] Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel
and Readiness, Implementation of the Department of Defense Training
Range Comprehensive Plan (Washington, D.C.: February 2004).
[14] In this report, we refer to major training ranges as those that
the services either identified as "primary" training ranges or those
ranges used by major service combat commands, such as the Army's Forces
Command.
[15] We are completing a separate report that provides an overview of
the training transformation program and the challenges the department
faces in its implementation.
[16] A live-virtual-constructive training environment is one that
integrates training ranges with simulators to support joint training
objectives at single or multiple locations.
[17] Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan
(Washington, D.C.: June 2004).
[18] GAO, Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not
Fully Address Congressional Reporting Requirements, GAO-04-608
(Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004).
[19] GAO, Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase
Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training
Ranges, GAO-03-976 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2003).
[20] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and
Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military
Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2003).
[21] GAO, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
30, 2002).
[22] GAO, Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614 (Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2002).
[23] GAO, Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on
Training Ranges Still Evolving, GAO-03-621T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2,
2003); and Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-727T (Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2002).
[24] We are completing a separate review of DOD's strategy for training
forces to conduct urban operations, the incorporation of current
operations lessons learned into recent training, and the challenges
faced in implementing this training.
[25] We are performing a separate review of the Navy Fleet Response
Plan, which assesses, among other things, the geographic combatant
commanders' ability to meet their warfighting objectives.
[26] CAB D0010901.A2.
[27] Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
[28] Department of the Navy, Fleet Ranges to Readiness Study
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2001) (Unpublished).
[29] Department of the Navy, Department of Navy Range Needs Assessment:
Air-to-Ground Ranges (Washington, D.C., September 2000).
[30] U.S. Air Combat Command, Combat Air Forces: Training Ranges and
Air Space Mission Support Plan FY 2003 (Langley Air Force Base, Va.:
October 2003).
[31] Department of Defense Directive, Sustainment of Ranges and
Operating Areas (OPAREAs), 3200.15 (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).
[32] In this report, we refer to a sustainable range program
generically as a collective effort that integrates the initiatives
designed to ensure the long-term viability of military training ranges.
Such a program should address the maintenance, modernization,
environment, and encroachment issues related to the ranges.
[33] GAO-04-608.
[34] Department of Defense, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, 2004 Defense Installations Strategic
Plan (Washington, D.C.: September 2004).
[35] In December 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
formation of the Defense Readiness and Range Initiative Integrated
Product Team to act as DOD's coordinating body to address encroachment.
The team consists of an overarching integrated product team and a
working integrated product team. The overarching team is primarily
responsible for strategic planning, while the working team is the staff-
level working body that supports the overarching team.
[36] The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service manages the DOD
surplus property sales program and disposes of excess property received
from the military services.
[37] U.S. Special Operations Command, Tiger Team Report: Global Special
Operations Forces Range Study (MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: Jan. 27,
2003).
[38] Fleet Ranges to Readiness Study.
[39] Naval Audit Service, Navy Range Operations Support Funding, N2004-
0061 (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2004).
[40] Our recently completed review of the management and funding of
base operations and facilities support illustrates how funds designated
for one activity are redesignated for other activities and the
potential adverse effects on operations and training.
[41] Combat Air Forces: Training Ranges and Air Space Mission Support
Plan FY 2003.
[42] N2004-0061.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Tiger Team Report: Global Special Operations Forces Range Study.
[45] GAO-04-608.
[46] While we did not specifically include National Guard, Reserve, and
smaller training ranges in the scope of this review, based on
discussions with DOD officials and reviews of relevant studies and
audit reports many of the conditions and issues discussed in this
report apply to them as well.
[47] GAO, Military Infrastructure: Real Property Management Needs
Improvement, GAO/NSIAD-99-100 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 1999); and
Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic
Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities, GAO-
03-274 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.19, 2003); U.S. Army Audit Agency, Range
Sustainment, A-2003-0434-IME (Alexandria, Va.: Sept. 9, 2003); and
Naval Audit Service, Navy F/A-18 Combat Aviation Training, N2003-0039
(Washington D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003).
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