Military Training
Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training Gao ID: GAO-05-548 June 21, 2005U.S. forces are conducting more complex operations, requiring increased interoperability between the military commands, services, and other organizations. Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance calls for transforming military training by increasing the jointness in training. The overall intent of DOD's Training Transformation Program is to assure commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not experiencing joint operations for the first time. Therefore, the program's strategic goals focus on providing joint training that meets commanders' needs and links to readiness assessments. Given the significant investment planned in the program and the impact it will have on the military, this report provides a program overview, including (1) DOD's overall management approach and status of key initiatives, and (2) some significant management challenges that have emerged early in the program's implementation.
Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and unit training focused on combatant commanders' needs and linked to readiness assessments. Thus far, the department has established program accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management and oversight roles and responsibilities. DOD has also established three training transformation initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs for joint operations and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. The initiatives are being developed incrementally, wherein each initiative matures through the "build a little, test a little" philosophy. DOD plans to complete its first program assessment later this year. One significant challenge that has emerged early and will require continued focus is establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders via comprehensive communication and coordination to gain their full participation and buy-in to achieve training transformation goals. DOD has taken positive steps to communicate and coordinate with these stakeholders, which include DOD's combatant commanders, services, and training commands, as well as representatives from the Federal departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national security interagency community. However, GAO found an inconsistent understanding among some DOD stakeholders of the strategic vision and rationale behind the implementation and development pace of the initiatives. DOD has not assessed its communication and coordination efforts to determine why some stakeholders may not fully understand the overall vision. Similarly, DOD officials have been proactive in engaging external stakeholders in identifying potential joint training opportunities. However, DOD's outreach to the senior-level leadership of external organizations has been limited to date, thus risking their full commitment to future planning and implementation of joint training. Anothersignificant challenge that has emerged early and will require continued focus is developing joint training requirements--and the specific training tasks that support the requirements--that meet combatant command mission needs. Rather than identifying joint training tasks through DOD's established process called the "Joint Training System" that is used to translate combatant command needs into training requirements, the department is developing some joint tasks through a working group process that does not ensure widespread participation by the combatant commands' and services' representatives. As a result, the department risks developing joint training requirements that combatant commands and services may not fully support. Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the Training Transformation Program at risk.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-548, Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2005:
Military Training:
Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training:
GAO-05-548:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-548, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. forces are conducting more complex operations, requiring increased
interoperability between the military commands, services, and other
organizations. Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance calls for
transforming military training by increasing the jointness in training.
The overall intent of DOD‘s Training Transformation Program is to
assure commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not
experiencing joint operations for the first time. Therefore, the
program‘s strategic goals focus on providing joint training that meets
commanders‘ needs and links to readiness assessments. Given the
significant investment planned in the program and the impact it will
have on the military, this report provides a program overview,
including (1) DOD‘s overall management approach and status of key
initiatives, and (2) some significant management challenges that have
emerged early in the program‘s implementation.
What GAO Found:
Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training
Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has
established a robust network of training capabilities that are
integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint
individual and unit training focused on combatant commanders‘ needs and
linked to readiness assessments. Thus far, the department has
established program accountability and authority by assigning senior
leadership management and oversight roles and responsibilities. DOD has
also established three training transformation initiatives designed to
prepare individuals, units, and staffs for joint operations and to
provide enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. The
initiatives are being developed incrementally, wherein each initiative
matures through the ’build a little, test a little“ philosophy. DOD
plans to complete its first program assessment later this year.
Two significant challenges that have emerged early and will require
continued focus include:
* (1) Establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders via
comprehensive communication and coordination to gain their full
participation and buy-in to achieve training transformation goals. DOD
has taken positive steps to communicate and coordinate with these
stakeholders, which include DOD‘s combatant commanders, services, and
training commands, as well as representatives from the Federal
departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national
security interagency community. However, GAO found an inconsistent
understanding among some DOD stakeholders of the strategic vision and
rationale behind the implementation and development pace of the
initiatives. DOD has not assessed its communication and coordination
efforts to determine why some stakeholders may not fully understand the
overall vision. Similarly, DOD officials have been proactive in
engaging external stakeholders in identifying potential joint training
opportunities. However, DOD‘s outreach to the senior-level leadership
of external organizations has been limited to date, thus risking their
full commitment to future planning and implementation of joint training.
* (2) Developing joint training requirements”and the specific training
tasks that support the requirements”that meet combatant command mission
needs. Rather than identifying joint training tasks through DOD‘s
established process called the ’Joint Training System“ that is used to
translate combatant command needs into training requirements, the
department is developing some joint tasks through a working group
process that does not ensure widespread participation by the combatant
commands‘ and services‘ representatives. As a result, the department
risks developing joint training requirements that combatant commands
and services may not fully support.
Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for
eroding support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the
goals of the Training Transformation Program at risk.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD assess its efforts to communicate and
coordinate with stakeholders, and elevate outreach efforts to include
the senior leadership of non-DOD organizations. GAO also recommends
that DOD use its established Joint Training System process to determine
all joint training requirements. In written comments, DOD generally
agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-548.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program
Accountability, but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full Operational
Capability:
DOD's Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant Management
Challenges at This Time:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Planned Fiscal Year 2005 Expenditures, by Training
Transformation Initiative:
Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: Government Accountability Office:
JKDDC: Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability:
JAEC: Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability:
JNTC: Joint National Training Capability:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 21, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
As recently demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces are
conducting significantly more complex operations, requiring increased
interoperability between and among the military services, combatant
commands, and other Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD
organizations. In the past, military services experienced some joint
operations training during joint exercises, but most service training
focused on individual service competencies with limited joint context.
To successfully conduct today's joint missions, DOD's planning guidance
calls for transforming military training to better enable joint force
operations by increasing the level of joint context in military
training. The overall intent of the department's Training
Transformation Program is to assure combatant commanders that forces
deployed to their theater are not experiencing joint operations for the
first time. The strategic goals of training transformation are to
provide joint training that is (1) focused on combatant commanders'
operational requirements, and (2) linked to readiness assessments
through a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated
throughout the department.
The overall objective of this report is to provide an overview of DOD's
Training Transformation Program and its implementation challenges,
especially given DOD's plans for significant investments in the program
and the impact that training transformation will have on the combatant
commands and the services. Specifically, we (1) determined DOD's
overall management approach and status in implementing the Training
Transformation Program, and (2) identified some significant management
challenges that have emerged early in the program's implementation. We
prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General,
and are addressing this report to you because of your committee's
oversight in this area.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed key
departmentwide documents--including the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's 2004 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan--to
identify milestones for each of three training transformation
initiatives. Additionally, we met with key officials in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, as well as officials from
the combatant commands and service organizations that are affected by
the Training Transformation Program's implementation. We performed our
work from June 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Further information on our scope and
methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD's efforts to implement the Training Transformation Program have
focused on establishing program plans and accountability, but much
remains to be done to achieve full operational capability. While still
in the program's early implementation stages, DOD expects, by 2009, to
have established a robust network of training capabilities that are
integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint training
focused on the combatant commanders' needs and linked to readiness
assessments. DOD has taken steps to establish program accountability
and authority by designating an executive agent to carry out specific
responsibilities and functions. DOD's approach to transforming training
focuses on three initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units,
and staffs for the new strategic environment, and to provide enabling
tools and processes to carry out missions. These three training
transformation initiatives are being developed incrementally, wherein
each initiative matures through the "build a little, test a little"
philosophy. The most advanced of these initiatives is focused on
providing enhanced collective joint training for units or other
military and defense organizations. Of the department's planned $1.76
billion investment in training transformation for fiscal years 2003-11,
$1.48 billion has been allocated to this initiative. A second
initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember joint
training while a third initiative, which has only recently begun, is
focused on continually monitoring program results and identifying
improvements in joint training. While a management structure for each
training transformation initiative has been identified and officials
have begun taking steps towards their respective initiative goals, a
great deal remains to be done to achieve overall program goals.
Two significant challenges that have emerged early in DOD's Training
Transformation Program include (1) establishing effective partnerships
with program stakeholders through comprehensive communication and
coordination and (2) developing joint training requirements that meet
combatant commanders' needs. Establishing effective partnerships with
DOD's combatant commanders, services, and other federal organizations
is important given their key roles in planning, funding, and
participating in training events. Department officials have taken some
positive steps to communicate with DOD stakeholders and address this
challenge; however, we found an inconsistent understanding among some
stakeholders of the strategic vision and the rationale behind the
implementation and development pace of the initiatives. In addition,
efforts to collaborate with the senior leadership of non-DOD
organizations and obtain their full commitment to training
transformation have been limited to date. Without stakeholders' full
understanding and participation, DOD risks not being able to fully
achieve its program goals. Furthermore, DOD is developing some joint
training requirements--and the specific training tasks that support the
requirements--through a working group process and not through the
existing Joint Training System, DOD's established, authoritative
process that translates commanders' needs into training requirements.
For example, the working group identified 43 tactical tasks,[Footnote
1] about half of which did not originate through the Joint Training
System. Many stakeholders we spoke with expressed reservations about
the validity of some of the tasks developed in this manner. As a
result, the department's approach risks developing joint training
requirements that combatant commands and services may not fully
support.
To improve comprehensive communication and coordination, we are
recommending that DOD assess the effectiveness of its efforts in this
regard to facilitate stakeholders' full understanding of the Training
Transformation Program's goals and initiatives. We are also
recommending that, as DOD continues its outreach efforts to non-DOD
organizations, it extend these efforts to include the senior leadership
of these non-DOD organizations. To mitigate the risk of establishing
joint training requirements that may not be fully supported by the
combatant commands and services, we are recommending that DOD use the
Joint Training System to establish all the training requirements at the
joint tactical level, which would promote widespread participation and
better opportunities for stakeholders' acceptance of the requirements.
DOD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and is planning actions
to implement our recommendations.
Background:
Service military training has historically focused on individual
service competencies, with less emphasis on joint operations involving
joint commands, other services, and emerging operations with other
governmental and nongovernmental agencies and international partners.
While this has allowed the services to meet their core training
responsibilities, it has also contributed to forces entering combat
without having had previous experience or training in joint operations.
For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, many forces had to be given
some level of basic joint operations training after they had already
entered the Iraqi theater of war, because they were experiencing joint
operations for the first time. In a changing security environment,
joint operations are becoming more important given the complex nature
of military operations. Specifically, this importance is being driven
by the combatant commands' need to combine the capabilities of multiple
services to address the global threat as well as the growing
interdependence of capabilities among the services.
Under Title 10, both combatant commanders and the military services are
given the authority to determine training requirements, plan training
exercises, and execute training activities. Specifically, combatant
commanders oversee all aspects of military operations, joint training,
and logistics using the forces assigned to them,[Footnote 2] while the
military service secretaries are generally responsible for recruiting,
organizing, supplying, equipping, and training their service
personnel.[Footnote 3] Furthermore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff are responsible for formulating joint
training policy and doctrine.[Footnote 4] The Joint Forces Command is
DOD's lead in providing joint warfighting capability through joint
training.
The idea to transform training in the department initially surfaced in
2001, when the department, in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review,[Footnote 5] recognized that training was a key to dealing with
a continuously changing environment, and emphasized a need to enhance
jointness and capitalize on technology advances. Defense guidance
issued shortly thereafter directed the Under Secretary of Defense,
Personnel and Readiness, to work with the services, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commander of the U.S. Joint
Forces Command to develop a plan for transforming military training
that would better enable joint force operations. The department's
vision for the Training Transformation Program is to provide "dynamic,
capabilities-based training for DOD in support of national security
requirements across the full spectrum of service, joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational operations,"[Footnote 6] and is
built upon a foundation of three capabilities.
According to the 2004 Training Transformation Implementation Plan,
these three capabilities, or initiatives, are designed to prepare
individuals, units, and staffs for the new strategic environment, and
to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. Through
these three capabilities, combatant commanders are expected to receive
better-prepared forces that align with their joint operational needs.
* The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is expected to prepare
forces by providing units and command staffs with an integrated live,
virtual, and constructive training environment.[Footnote 7] This
capability would add enhanced service and combatant command training
that emphasizes jointness and enables global training and mission
rehearsal in support of combatant command operations.
* The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC)
is intended to prepare future decision makers and leaders to better
understand joint operations and the common operational picture, as well
as respond innovatively to adversaries. Program officials believe this
capability will enhance existing joint individual education with newly
developed courses and make these courses readily accessible through an
expanded knowledge distribution network.
* The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC) is expected to
assist leaders in assessing the value of transformational training
initiatives on individuals, organizations, and processes, and link the
impact of the Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders'
readiness requirements. This capability is also supposed to provide the
processes and tools to continuously improve joint training.
DOD's Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program
Accountability, but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full Operational
Capability:
Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training
Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has
established a robust network of training capabilities that are
integrated throughout the department to provide enhanced joint
individual and collective training focused on the combatant commanders'
needs and linked to readiness assessments. Through its 2003 Training
Transformation Implementation Plan, the department established program
accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management
and oversight roles and responsibilities. While each program initiative
has focused on developing a management structure, defining joint
training requirements, and developing mechanisms and networks to
deliver enhanced joint training, all three still have a great deal
remaining to be accomplished to meet program goals.
DOD Has Established Training Transformation Program Accountability and
Authorities:
In early 2003, DOD issued its first Training Transformation
Implementation Plan, which established the basic management approach
for implementing the Training Transformation Program. As part of this
approach, the department has taken action to establish program
accountability and authority.
The department designated the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness with overall responsibility for
implementing the Training Transformation Program. Furthermore, the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness has been given
executive agent responsibility for training transformation planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution progress. To carry out their
responsibilities, these offices use three standing working groups, as
follows:
* The Executive Steering Group is made up of senior executive-level
officials--including four star general officers/flag officers and
equivalent senior executive service civilians --and is headed by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In addition to
high-level program execution oversight, this group, according to
program officials, makes department-level policy decisions and deals
with unresolved issues as it pertains to training transformation.
* Subordinate to this executive group, the Senior Advisory Group is led
by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and consists of
senior-level officials, including three star general officers/flag
officers and equivalent senior executive service civilians. This group,
according to program officials, has directive authority and is
responsible for overseeing the execution and updates to the Training
Transformation Implementation Plan, and the timely allocation,
transfer, and execution of the program's resources.
* The Joint Integrated Process Team, being subordinate to the above two
groups, serves as the primary collaborative working forum that provides
input to the oversight groups and responds to their guidance. Led by
the Director of Readiness and Training Plans and Policy, this team
consists of senior analysts, planners, and action officers from staffs,
agencies, and commands contributing to the department's Training
Transformation Program.
Each of these groups has representatives from the services, the Joint
Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, and a
wide cross-section of department-level offices, such as the Offices of
Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.
DOD is employing an incremental approach to developing and implementing
the Training Transformation Program, designed to reduce development
cycle time and increase the speed at which advanced capabilities are
delivered. According to a DOD official, DOD's approach to developing
and implementing the training transformation initiatives follows a
"build a little, test a little" philosophy that is unlike a more
traditional development approach, where initiatives within a program
are developed sequentially with planning, development, implementation,
and assessment phases. Under this development approach, some elements
of the three training transformation initiatives--the JNTC, the JKDDC,
and the JAEC--are developed concurrently, while other elements are
sequentially developed. The department's expectation is that the three
initiatives will work together to successively build a training
environment that meets combatant command needs in three phases. Phase 1
(2005) focuses on providing combatant commanders with a steady flow of
joint-trained individuals, units, and staff. Phase 2 (2007) places an
emphasis on supporting an innovative training environment for new joint
operational capabilities based on combatant commanders' demands. Phase
3 (2009) will transition joint training into a real-time mission
planning and rehearsal environment.
Reflective of the iterative implementation approach described above,
DOD's framework for assessing Training Transformation Program
performance will likewise follow the three phases of the program's
development. Performance metrics are being continuously developed
during each of these phases to mirror the actual development and
evolution of each initiative's capabilities. Similarly, formal program
assessments using these metrics to measure training transformation's
impact on joint force readiness and guide subsequent investments in
training transformation capabilities will begin in 2005, at the end of
Phase 1, and occur every 2 years thereafter.
The management of each of the three training transformation initiatives
is carried out largely by joint management offices within each
initiative's sponsoring organization. For example, the JNTC joint
management office is in the Joint Training Directorate of the Joint
Forces Command. These offices serve as the primary focal points for
planning, program preparation, and execution of all resources and
events associated with their respective training transformation
capability. The joint management office directors, having the
responsibility to implement their respective initiative, report
directly to the organization sponsoring their initiative. Each of the
joint management offices also reports to the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Readiness through the Joint Integrated Process Team. The
offices are organized functionally to align with their primary goals
and objectives.
Status and Funding of Training Transformation Initiatives Vary:
The implementation status of each of DOD's three initiatives--the JNTC,
the JKDDC, and the JAEC--varies, as program managers are intentionally
staggering the rollout of the initiatives in accordance with the
incremental development approach aimed at reducing development cycle
time and increasing the speed at which advanced capabilities are
delivered. The current and planned funding of these initiatives also
reflects this development plan.
Overall, the three initiatives are designed to prepare individuals,
units, and staffs for a new strategic environment that requires
services and combatant commands to work together, and to provide
enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. These initiatives
to transform military training are expected to result in a robust
network of training capabilities integrated throughout DOD that
provides enhanced joint individual and collective training focused on
the combatant commanders' needs and is linked to readiness assessments.
Program managers designated the JNTC initiative as the leading effort
to transform military training, and thus its progress is further
advanced than the other two initiatives. However, officials responsible
for both the JKDDC and JAEC have established a management structure and
initiated a number of efforts to meet program goals.
The Joint National Training Capability:
The JNTC initiative is focused on providing enhanced collective joint
training for units or other military and defense organizations. During
the 2002-03 time frame, a joint management office for the JNTC
initiative within Joint Forces Command was established and resourced.
Early JNTC efforts have been targeted at identifying and analyzing
combatant commanders' joint training requirements for an enhanced joint
training environment that will cut horizontally--to improve
interoperability among services--and vertically--to improve joint
planning and execution of training--across various components and
command levels. This effort includes, but is not limited to, analyzing
combatant commands' mission-essential tasks; identifying joint training
requirements evolving from operational and prior training experiences;
analyzing joint training required at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of operations; and setting the framework for
accrediting and certifying future joint training programs and
facilities.
Additionally, a considerable portion of the JNTC organization has been
focused on identifying, defining, and developing the facilities and
technologies necessary to develop a global joint training network that
can deliver live, virtual, and constructive joint training capabilities
to the services, combatant commanders, and interagency and
multinational partners. In keeping with training transformation's
approach to introduce capabilities more rapidly, JNTC managers working
with the services during 2004 provided an early demonstration of the
ability to enhance four existing exercises with live, virtual, and
constructive capabilities by integrating these capabilities to improve
joint horizontal and vertical training. In October 2004, the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness, who has been given executive
oversight responsibility for the Training Transformation Program,
deemed the JNTC initiative to be operationally capable--indicating that
the initial infrastructure of networked sites and systems needed to
enhance the joint context of training exercises was in place. During
fiscal year 2005, JNTC managers plan to incorporate this demonstrated
capability in 14 additional service or combatant command exercises.
Additionally, JNTC managers expect to continue their efforts to enhance
DOD's capability, increasing the level of jointness in military
training by involving joint commands, other services, and federal
agencies involved in current military operations. Among these efforts,
JNTC managers would like to complete development of a permanent network
of communications, instrumentation, and supporting infrastructure to
support joint military training. JNTC managers plan to create a Web-
based capability to deliver joint operational planning and mission
rehearsal training. They also plan to have the capability to conduct
overseas/multinational training events by fiscal year 2007.
Additionally, they plan to continue developing training requirements
that support joint training at all levels, and accrediting joint
training programs and certifying training facilities. The certification
of DOD's training facilities relies on their ability to meet joint
training needs. Although DOD's JNTC initiative is designed to enhance
communication and infrastructure to better simulate a joint
environment, the services continue to face challenges in maintaining
training facilities to meet their own service-specific training
requirements. GAO has just recently completed a review looking at the
current condition of DOD's military training facilities.[Footnote 8]
The report concluded that current training range facilities are
deteriorating and compromise the realism essential to effective
training.
The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability:
The JKDDC initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember
joint training. Efforts under the JKDDC initiative have been focused on
organizing a management structure, initiating a process for identifying
joint individual training requirements, and establishing an
organizational and technical framework for developing and distributing
courses to address these requirements. In late 2003, a joint management
office within the Joint Staff's Office of the Director for Operational
Plans and Joint Force Development was established to manage the JKDDC
initiative and oversee the development of joint individual education
and training. Also, in October 2003, the JKDDC Working Group was
established to begin identifying and prioritizing joint individual
education and training requirements. During fiscal year 2004, the JKDDC
Working Group identified 38 combatant command requirements for joint
individual courseware. A key milestone for the JKDDC initiative--
identifying the technologies and infrastructure needed to achieve an
interim course materials distribution capability--was reached in
January 2005. As of January 2005, the JKDDC initiative has developed
and distributed two joint individual courses to satisfy some of the
combatant commanders' initial requirements. Another 17 courses are
under development.
JKDDC managers plan to continue identifying and developing joint
individual education requirements and associated courseware. They also
plan to develop a long-term joint individual training continuum and a
global distribution capability for joint education and training that
include multinational and international partners. A pilot global
distribution capability demonstration is planned for fiscal year 2006,
with a mature joint individual training continuum expected in late
2009.
The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability:
The JAEC initiative is focused on continually monitoring program
results and identifying improvements in joint training. The JAEC joint
management office was established during fiscal year 2004 under the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. Most of the early
efforts conducted under this initiative have been focused on planning,
assessing, and developing tools and techniques that can be embedded in
the other training transformation initiatives in order to provide a
robust joint assessment and enabling capability. This effort has
resulted in the establishment of preliminary training transformation
performance assessment metrics in early 2005. The first of three formal
periodic program assessments will occur from April to October 2005 and
refinements to the metrics will continue to be made as this process
progresses. Additionally, the JAEC joint management office is
developing a process that would uniformly track joint training,
education, and experience, and ensure this information can be linked to
readiness assessments by 2006. Within this initiative, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff has the lead for evaluating enhancements to DOD's Joint
Training System[Footnote 9] to make it more user friendly and adaptable
to evolving operational concepts and to complete these enhancements by
2009.
Funding of Initiatives Reflects Incremental Rollout Plans:
Current and future funding also reflect the incremental development
approach DOD is using to implement the program. The JNTC initiative,
the leading effort for transforming military training, accounts for
$1.48 billion, or 84 percent, of the total $1.76 billion budgeted for
fiscal years 2003 through 2011. Efforts related to the JKDDC and JAEC
(the trailing initiatives) are collectively budgeted for $284.9
million. For the first time, in fiscal year 2005, all three training
transformation initiatives prepared program execution plans reflecting
what they expected to spend during that fiscal year, as shown in table
1.
Table 1: Planned Fiscal Year 2005 Expenditures, by Training
Transformation Initiative:
Dollars in millions:
Initiative: JNTC;
Planned fiscal year 2005 expenditures: $188.0.
Initiative: JKDDC;
Planned fiscal year 2005 expenditures: $13.1.
Initiative: JAEC;
Planned fiscal year 2005 expenditures: $12.3.
Total;
Planned fiscal year 2005 expenditures: $213.4.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
Resources to manage the Training Transformation Program come from three
primary sources: (1) funding provided directly to and controlled by the
services for service-specific program activities related to the JNTC
initiative; (2) funding provided directly to the Joint Forces Command,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff for their
own training transformation activities; and (3) funding provided
directly to the Joint Forces Command for distribution to the services
for service-specific JNTC program activities. By providing the Joint
Forces Command with this funding, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense has given the command the flexibility to annually fund service
activities deemed critical to the Training Transformation Program,
because they contribute to meeting the goals and objectives identified
in the Training Transformation Implementation Plan.
DOD's Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant Management
Challenges at This Time:
DOD's Training Transformation Program will likely face some significant
management challenges throughout its implementation. Two significant
challenges that have emerged early and will require continued focus are
(1) establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders, such
as the services and combatant commands, through comprehensive
communication and coordination; and (2) developing joint training
requirements that meet combatant commands' mission needs. Both these
challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support
among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the
Training Transformation Program at risk.
Establishing Effective Partnerships with Stakeholders Is a Significant
Management Challenge:
Establishing effective partnerships through comprehensive communication
and coordination is a significant management challenge and is a key to
obtaining full buy-in and commitment of internal and external program
stakeholders. These include DOD's combatant commanders, services, and
training commands, as well as representatives from the federal
departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national
security interagency community. Commitment from the combatant commands
and services is critical in achieving the training transformation goals
because they play a key role in planning and funding training events.
The same commitment is necessary from non-DOD stakeholders given the
changing nature of our military operations, which require more
intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational partners than ever
before.
Attributes inherent to transformational programs--such as program
complexity and the need for stakeholders to make cultural adaptations-
-along with DOD's limited authority to influence external stakeholders,
make communication and coordination especially difficult. Recognizing
the challenge these elements pose, DOD has taken some positive steps to
communicate and coordinate with training transformation internal and
external stakeholders. However, we found that an inconsistent
understanding of the Training Transformation Program remains among some
internal stakeholders. Additionally, the department's efforts to engage
senior leaders in non-DOD organizations to establish joint training
requirements to collectively respond to the nation's security
challenges across the full spectrum of interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational operations have been limited. These operations may
include, but are not limited to, global war, humanitarian assistance,
and disaster relief.
Program Attributes Make Communication and Coordination Challenging:
DOD officials agree that there are several attributes in managing the
Training Transformation Program that make communication and
coordination with stakeholders a challenge. Officials acknowledge that
their use of a rapid, incremental approach to developing and
implementing the program adds a degree of complexity over traditional
approaches. Moreover, DOD's decentralized management of the three
program initiatives and dependencies on integration of separately led
combatant command and service training initiatives introduce additional
complexity. Further, encouraging stakeholders to make the cultural
changes inherent to the successful implementation of governmental and
defense transformational programs, such as the Training Transformation
Program, generally also requires focused management attention to
communication and coordination. The Training Transformation Program's
call for communication and coordination beyond DOD entities may pose an
additional challenge, because of DOD's lack of direct authority over
non-DOD partner organizations.
The complexity of the Training Transformation Program heightens the
communication and coordination challenge. The department's choice to
employ a rapid, incremental development approach provides management
with a process to review, assess, adjust, and redirect actions that
collectively transform training, and, according to DOD officials, is a
contributing factor to the complexity of the program. Some DOD
officials we spoke with referred to the development approach as a
"state of constant change." Furthermore, in an effort to meet the
Training Transformation Program's goals, DOD has assigned separate
organizations--the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Readiness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Forces Command--to
oversee development of each initiative. In addition, the ability to
leverage evolving and developing technologies to deliver an integrated
live, virtual, and constructive joint training environment requires the
successful integration of separately led combatant command and service
training initiatives. For example, the Pacific Command and its Navy
component, according to command officials, are developing their own
discrete training capabilities that are expected to eventually link to
and enhance the JNTC. Achieving JNTC goals relies upon existing
training events, led and funded by combatant commands and services. The
successful linkage of these efforts will depend on continued
comprehensive communication and coordination.
We have previously reported that transformational programs across
government require particular attention to managing cultural
change.[Footnote 10] Within the Training Transformation Program, we
believe there are two areas where communication and coordination will
play an important role towards achieving cultural adaptation. First,
the training developed under the program is expected to respond to
combatant commanders' capabilities-based requirements, moving away from
mission-based requirements that are based on specific threats. A
capabilities-based approach focuses on identifying the capabilities
that U.S. forces will need to deter and defeat any potential
adversaries, being able to respond decisively anywhere and anytime to
any type of challenge. Second, training developed under the program
will be "joint" in nature and will reflect the growing need for
different services and commands to work together to achieve common
goals. DOD acknowledges, in its Training Transformation Implementation
Plan, that it has to balance the priority to provide the services with
more joint training at the individual and service levels against the
services' priorities to train to their service-specific core
competencies. The program also emphasizes training across interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational operations, which creates
additional cultural challenges for program stakeholders.
DOD Proactive in Efforts to Communicate and Coordinate with Internal
Stakeholders, but Inconsistent Understanding Continues:
DOD recognizes that program complexity and adaptation to cultural
change are inherent to training transformation, and DOD has taken some
positive steps to communicate and coordinate with internal
stakeholders, as illustrated by the following actions:
* According to DOD officials, at program inception, DOD designated a
single integrating authority under the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness with oversight responsibility to
coordinate strategy within and among the training transformation
initiatives, as well as into other DOD transformational efforts to
achieve the desired integration.
* DOD prepares and presents the Training Transformation Program
strategic plan, implementation plan, and road map at regularly
scheduled working-level meetings, with the intent to update
stakeholders and generate discussion. In addition, the department
created an interactive program Web site containing a repository of
these documents, which allows stakeholders to comment on materials
directly.
* Under the leadership of the Joint Staff, the Joint Lessons Learned
Program expanded the existing lessons learned concept by establishing
joint lessons-learned specialists' positions at all combatant commands
and services.[Footnote 11] The physical presence of these program
specialists serves to increase the understanding of the Training
Transformation Program, as well as improve the collection, analysis,
and feedback processes for lessons learned.
* DOD has begun an outreach campaign with the aim of better
facilitating the collection of training requirements from combatant
commands and services. A Joint Forces Command official, acknowledging a
need for better marketing of the JNTC, has visited with some
stakeholders such as the European and Pacific combatant commands.
Representatives under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, with the intent of outreach and communicating
joint integration and development issues, also visited every combatant
command this past year, and intend to continue this practice on a
periodic basis.
Despite DOD's efforts to communicate and coordinate with training
transformation internal stakeholders, during our interviews with
services headquarters and command staffs we found an inconsistent
understanding among some program stakeholders regarding the strategic
vision and the rationale behind the implementation and development
timing of different components of the program. For example,
representatives from three of the command staffs we visited viewed the
JNTC as Joint Forces Command's attempt to impose additional
requirements on existing service and combatant command exercises rather
than providing enabling capabilities to enhance existing training
exercises. Also, general consensus among all stakeholders attending the
Joint Integrated Process Team meeting in December of 2004 was that they
did not fully understand the Training Transformation Program's
accreditation and certification processes--which are designed to ensure
the joint content of military training programs and the adequacy of
supporting facilities--because of the complexity of the processes as
well as the lack of clear definitions during its initial
implementation. In addition, stakeholders from a service headquarters
and a command staff that we spoke with described the JKDDC as an
initiative limited to the development of joint training courses. It
appears that these stakeholders did not have a full understanding of
the larger strategic vision of the initiative to leverage evolving
technologies that will provide or distribute education and training
needed anytime and anywhere, across the full spectrum of forces. Also,
some stakeholders from two service headquarters and a command staff
expressed a lack of understanding of the program managers' decision to
iteratively develop the JAEC, as they develop metrics and perform
assessments of the JNTC and JKDDC. In particular, some of the
stakeholders associated with the JNTC and JKDDC initiatives expressed
discomfort about being measured against specified outcomes when they
were not initially provided with standards to measure results. We found
this overall lack of understanding evident mostly at the service level,
among representatives of headquarters and command staffs.
Our discussion with training transformation officials indicated that
they were not specifically aware of this level of inconsistent
understanding of training transformation's concepts and initiatives.
However, they did indicate that the program's complexity and
development approach could easily lead to inconsistent understanding
among stakeholders. We found that they had not assessed the extent to
which their communication and coordination efforts have impacted
stakeholders' comprehension of the overall concept and vision of the
Training Transformation Program. This lack of understanding risks not
obtaining stakeholders' buy-in and commitment needed to fully implement
the goals of the program.
DOD Is Communicating and Coordinating with External Stakeholders, but
Efforts to Engage Senior Non-DOD Leaders Have Been Limited to Date:
While DOD has been proactive in engaging interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners in identifying common
areas for potential joint training opportunities, their outreach has
not yet been elevated to senior-level leadership to ensure their full
cooperation. Some DOD missions--strategic defense, homeland defense,
and civil support--have already been identified as potential areas
where DOD could consider future training opportunities with the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the
Department of Energy. Within the Training Transformation Program, the
Training Transformation Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational
Mission Essential Tasks effort was launched to develop capabilities and
tasks for conducting broader, more inclusive joint operations, such as
reestablishing order and promoting stability in other nations with
multinational partners.Starting in early 2005, the department began
engaging members of the external stakeholder community in
collaboratively identifying tasks for conducting broader, more
inclusive joint operations with interagency community partners. These
efforts are mostly focused on building a task force and determining
what is required for communication, cooperation, coordination,
collaboration, and interoperability among the interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational partners at this time.
The most recent Training Transformation Interagency Intergovernmental
Multinational Mission Essential Tasks conference, in February 2005,
consisted of more than 150 operators, planners, strategists, and policy
developers from 40 organizations, including different non-DOD agencies
and departments across the U.S. government, as well as from the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International
Committee of the Red Cross. While the effort has significant upper-
level support within DOD, the level of effort to gain support and
participation among the external stakeholders' senior-level management
has been limited. Some DOD officials we spoke with acknowledged that,
as the effort moves forward into planning and implementation, it will
require increasing levels of participation from non-DOD stakeholders.
They also believe that, without equally significant support from upper-
level leadership among those agencies and organizations that DOD has no
direct authority over, DOD may face challenges in maintaining a
collaborative environment and successfully achieving future planning
and implementation outcomes for training with those partners. The
extent to which the leadership at non-DOD partner organizations is
committed to defense training transformation is unknown, because of
DOD's limited efforts to engage these individuals to date. DOD
officials acknowledge the importance of reaching out to the leadership
of external organizations and recognize that their efforts in this
regard have been very limited to date.
Developing Joint Training Requirements That Meet Combatant Commands'
Needs Is a Significant Challenge:
Joint Forces Command's new process for developing tactical-level joint
training requirements--and the specific training tasks that support the
requirements--does not ensure that these tasks necessarily reflect
combatant command needs nor does it ensure buy-in from internal
stakeholders--combatant commanders, services, and training commands. In
the past, joint training tasks were primarily focused at the command
level[Footnote 12] and were identified through DOD's authoritative
process that built requirements by translating combatant commander
inputs into training requirements. Training transformation has expanded
joint training requirements to include those at the tactical level in
addition to joint command-level training. The current process Joint
Forces Command is using to develop these joint tactical-level tasks
does not build these requirements starting with the combatant commands'
analysis of training needs. Rather, the requirements are based on Joint
Forces Command's analysis of perceived training deficiencies. In
addition, Joint Forces Command's process for identifying and validating
these tasks does not ensure widespread participation among the
combatant commands and service representatives. Some internal
stakeholders have expressed reservations about the validity of some
recently developed joint tasks, because the tasks did not evolve
through the established Joint Training System process in which they
originated as combatant command requirements. Thus, DOD risks
developing training requirements that may not be accepted as valid or
necessary to meet combatant command training needs.
Command-Level Joint Training Requirements Rely on the Joint Training
System:
Since fiscal year 1994, the Joint Training System has been DOD's
authoritative process for collaboratively gathering each combatant
command's mission analysis and translating it into command-level
training requirements that the services must include in their training
events. Historically, joint training requirements have only been
targeted to command-level training.
The command-level joint training tasks developed by the Joint Training
System are referred to as joint mission essential tasks, and are
derived from a common, universal joint task list that has been used or
suggested by the combatant commands and approved by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Training System is further supported
by the annual worldwide joint training conference, where combatant
command and service representatives discuss the list of joint mission-
essential tasks to which the services must train. This collaboration
ensures that the services understand what they must include in their
training to meet combatant command joint training requirements.
Combatant Command and Service Representatives Have Expressed
Reservations about the Validity of Some Joint Tasks:
The Training Transformation Program has brought an emphasis on joint
training at the tactical level in addition to the command-level tasks
discussed above. Training at the tactical level was typically a service
responsibility prior to training transformation. Today, however, Joint
Forces Command, as directed in the Training Transformation
Implementation Plan, develops joint tasks, which include joint tasks at
the tactical level in addition to command-level tasks.
Rather than identifying joint tactical tasks directly through the
established Joint Training System, whose outputs are approved by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forces Command relies on a
working group process to identify and validate these tasks.[Footnote
13] The identification of these joint training tasks is based primarily
on the working group's analysis of perceived training deficiencies in
combatant command and service training, rather than being based on the
combatant commands' analyses of training needs. Any working group
participant may submit a joint task to be considered for inclusion in
future joint training, but the submission must be sponsored by a voting
member. After a task is approved by the working group, it is validated
by performing the task at one or two training events and then
resubmitted to the working group for approval as a new or revised task.
Throughout the working group process, service and combatant command
representatives who participate have the opportunity to voice concerns
regarding any of the candidate joint tasks. For example, the Joint
Forces Command working group approved 43 joint tasks in October 2004
that they believe the services should include in their training to meet
combatant command training requirements. Of these joint tasks, 21 of
them (49 percent), as identified by one service command, were new
tactical-level tasks that had not been previously identified through
the existing Joint Training System, and as such have not been derived
from a combatant command's mission analysis.
Although combatant command representatives are invited to attend
working group meetings, the working group process does not ensure the
same level of widespread participation that the established Joint
Training System achieves, and Joint Forces Command risks developing
training requirements that lack widespread combatant command and
service support. Representatives from service commands and combatant
commands staff with whom we spoke expressed reservations about the
validity of tasks developed in this manner, because they did not come
from the Joint Training System, which systematically builds
requirements based on combatant commanders' needs, nor were they vetted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and
the combatant commands. Combatant commands' representatives said that
they have provided little input into the original development of the
tasks identified by the Joint Forces Command's working group to date.
Because of the process used, they questioned how many of these joint
tasks actually reflect the combatant commands' training needs.
Conclusions:
The Training Transformation Program is a multifaceted effort that
touches nearly everyone associated with the joint training community.
With complex initiatives being developed and employed at various stages
of maturity, comprehensive communication and coordination are critical
to establish effective partnerships. Until DOD assesses its approach to
communicating and coordinating training transformation initiatives and
takes additional steps to ensure full understanding among joint
training stakeholders at all levels--from combatant commands to
services, and from headquarters to training commands--DOD risks not
building the effective partnerships necessary to gain stakeholders' buy-
in and commitment to fully implement training transformation. This lack
of understanding of the complexities and potential benefits associated
with the training transformation initiatives would likely impair DOD's
efforts to enhance joint training that will enable troops to better
carry out combatant commanders' missions.
The department's transformation effort also encompasses the way
training can be integrated with all levels of government as well as
with allies and coalition partners. Enhanced coordination at
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational levels will promote
increased cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct
seamless operations. Although senior leadership support for this effort
exists within DOD, in the absence of a targeted effort to ensure
equally significant senior leadership support from non-DOD agency and
organization partners, DOD is at risk of not being able to maintain a
collaborative environment with its external stakeholders and to
implement interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational training
outcomes successfully.
The department has an established, authoritative process to develop
joint training requirements in the Joint Training System, which relies
on the combatant commands to align training requirements with their
assigned missions. By not fully utilizing this system to develop the
training requirements to support the JNTC component-based, tactical-
level joint training, DOD may risk the services and combatant commands
not fully accepting these training requirements as valid. If such
requirements are not embraced as combatant command-generated training
requirements, the services and combatant commands may not completely
support the need to enhance joint training at the tactical level, thus
potentially underutilizing the capability being developed by the JNTC.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To promote effective partnerships and mitigate the risk of implementing
Training Transformation Program components that are not fully supported
by the combatant commands, services, and other federal agencies, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three
actions:
* direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to assess the effectiveness of their communication and
coordination efforts of the training transformation initiatives and
take additional steps to enhance stakeholders' understanding of the
program's goals and initiatives;
* direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-
DOD agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders' full
understanding, buy-in, and commitment; and:
* direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to
establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in
order to promote widespread participation and better opportunities for
stakeholders' acceptance of the requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third. DOD
concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to assess the effectiveness of their communication and
coordination efforts of the training transformation initiatives and
take additional steps to enhance stakeholders' understanding of the
program's goals and initiatives. DOD stated that in addition to its
continued effort to communicate and coordinate through Training
Transformation Joint Integrated Process Team, the Senior Advisory Group
and Executive Steering Group, it will be placing Joint Forces Command
personnel within key Service and Combatant Command training
organizations to improve understanding of training transformation.
Additionally, DOD stated it would evaluate the effectiveness of the
program's overall communication and coordination in its first and
subsequent assessments of the training transformation program.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior
leadership within non-DOD agencies and organizations to ensure these
stakeholders' full understanding, buy-in, and commitment. In its
response, DOD stated that an initiative led by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Policy) will address this recommendation by the
end of fiscal year 2006.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training
System to establish all training requirements at the joint tactical
level in order to promote widespread participation and better
opportunities for stakeholders' acceptance of the requirements. DOD
stated that the Joint Forces Command uses the Joint Training System to
develop its Joint Training Plan as required by DOD directive.
Nevertheless, DOD also acknowledged that GAO is correct in its
assessment that some joint training requirements may not be documented
in the Joint Training System or recognized by some users of the Joint
Training System. In this regard, they further stated that USJFCOM has
been directed to submit these training requirements that are derived
from joint tactical tasks for inclusion in the Joint Training System
and that the Joint Staff consider them in future updates.
We agree with DOD's comments concerning Joint Forces Command's role and
responsibilities in developing training requirements. However, we
continue to believe that the services' and combatant commands'
commitment and ownership of these tactical training tasks would be
enhanced if they originated from the combatant commands' annual
training needs analysis, which is an integral part of the Joint
Training System, and not just included in the system after the fact. As
stated in our report, if such requirements are not embraced as
combatant command-generated training requirements, the services and
combatant commands may not completely support the need to enhance joint
training at the tactical level, thus potentially underutilizing the
capability being developed by the joint national training capability.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4402. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Janet St. Laurent, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine DOD's overall management approach and status in
implementing the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed relevant
DOD plans, policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to
training transformation. We discussed training transformation issues
with a variety of officials at DOD, service headquarters offices,
several combatant commands, and other stakeholders that are involved
with the Training Transformation Program (see table 2). Specifically,
we did the following:
* To determine the DOD's overall management approach in implementing
the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed key documentation
related to the management responsibilities, development approach,
status of each initiative, and resource allocation among the three
initiatives.
* To determine the DOD's overall status in implementing the Training
Transformation Program, we conducted interviews with key officials
supporting each initiative.
* To better understand the roles, responsibilities, and funding
profiles within the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed and
analyzed key documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's 2004 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the
2003 JNTC Implementation Plan, the September 2004 DOD directive on
military training, and available program execution plans prepared by
the joint management offices from fiscal years 2002 through 2005.
Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Organization: Army;
Locations: Headquarters, Army Collective Training Division, Washington,
D.C;
Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.
Organization: Air Force;
Locations: Headquarters, Air Force Operational Training Division,
Washington, D.C;
Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va;
Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Tx.
Organization: Coast Guard;
Locations: Headquarters, Office of Workforce Performance, Training and
Development, Washington, D.C.
Organization: Marine Corps;
Locations: Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education Command,
Quantico, Va.
Organization: Navy;
Locations: Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet Training
Branch, Washington, D.C;
Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Education Training (N00T),
Human Performance and Acquisition Assessment Division, Arlington, VA;
Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
Organization: Special Operations;
Locations: U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
Fla.
Organization: Joint Organizations;
Locations: The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Force
Transformation, Washington, D.C;
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training Policy
and Programs, Washington, D.C. - Joint Assessment and Enabling
Capability Joint Management Office, Alexandria, Va. - Readiness
Programming and Assessment, Washington, D.C;
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. - Operational Plans and
Joint Force Development Directorate, Washington, D.C. - Joint Knowledge
Development and Distribution Capability Joint Management Office,
Alexandria, Va;
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla;
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. - Joint National Training
Capability Joint Management Office, Suffolk, Va. - Joint Training
Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, Va;
U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii - U.S. Army Pacific, Hawaii - U.S. Marine
Corps Forces Pacific, Hawaii - U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Hawaii - U.S.
Pacific Fleet, Hawaii - U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific,
Hawaii.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To identify significant management challenges that have emerged early
in the program's implementation, we again reviewed relevant DOD plans,
policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training
transformation and interviewed many of the same officials indicated in
table 2. We reviewed and analyzed some additional key documents,
including DOD's 2003 Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, the
2002 Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, the 2003
Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2004 Training Capabilities
Analysis of Alternatives Final Report, various Joint Integrated Process
Team briefs, and prior GAO reports. To better understand some of the
management challenges, we attended meetings of the JKDDC working group,
the Joint Integrated Process Team, and the Training Transformation
Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Mission Essential
Tasks Task Force. We also obtained and reviewed all the minutes from
the working groups and task force meetings that we attended.
Additionally, to assess the challenge in developing joint training
requirements that met combatant commands' mission needs, we obtained a
list of approved joint tasks developed by the Joint Forces Command
working group and solicited feedback from combatant command and service
representatives.
We performed our review from June 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
6 June 2005:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-05-548, "MILITARY
TRAINING: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint
Training," dated May 4, 2005, (GAO Code 350525).
Let me first take this opportunity to applaud the collaborative
approach utilized by the GAO Review Team. This approach contributed
greatly to the success of this review and certainly is a testament to
their professionalism.
DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Our
review found it to be well written and we concur with Recommendations
#1 and #2 and partially concur with Recommendation #3. Detailed
comments on the GAO recommendations and report are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
Readiness:
Enclosure: As Stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED May 4, 2005 GAO CODE 350525/GAO-05-548:
"MILITARY TRAINING: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to
Transform Joint Training"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
assess the effectiveness of their communication and coordination
efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take additional
steps to enhance stakeholders' understanding of the program's goals and
initiatives. (Pages 24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR. The Department will continue its proactive
Training Transformation (T2) communication, coordination, and outreach
strategies through the T2 Joint Integrated Process Team, the Senior
Advisory Group, the Executive Steering Group and Joint Staff-sponsored
Combatant Command "Hub-trip" forums. Additional actions include; in
FY06, many Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) events will
transition from centralized USJFCOM planning and execution to
decentralized planning and execution by Service and Combatant Command
nominated training programs. They will be assisted by strategically
placed USJFCOM "Support Elements" starting in FY05. The
decentralization of JNTC planning and execution and the placing of
USJFCOM personnel within key Service and Combatant Command training
organizations should contribute to improved understanding of T2, to the
include the accreditation and certification processes, among services
headquarters, command staffs and the supported training organizations.
We will also direct the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC)
to assess the effectiveness of our overall communication, coordination,
outreach strategies on T2 stakeholders beginning with the FY05 Block
Assessment and in following assessments planned at two year intervals.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-DoD agencies
and organizations to ensure these stakeholders' full understanding, buy-
in, and commitment. (Page 24/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR. Training Transformation Interagency
Intergovernmental Multinational Mission Essential Tasks initiative lead
by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and sponsored
by T2 is on track to address this recommendation no later than the end
of FY06.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to
establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in
order to promote widespread participation and better opportunities for
stakeholders' acceptance of the requirements. (Page 24/GAO Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: PARTIALLY CONCUR. USJFCOM is in fact utilizing the JTS
process to develop its Joint Training Plan which is applicable to its
subordinate components and commands. Additionally, DoD Directive
1322.18 provides the necessary direction on the use of the Joint
Training System. Paragraph 4.4 of this document states; "The Joint
Training System (JTS) shall be used to manage training throughout the
Department of Defense." However, at issue in Recommendation #3 is how
USJFCOM is generating training requirements within the Requirements
Phase of the JTS.
The Joint Training System (JTS) provides a common approach that helps
joint force commanders identify and evaluate their training needs, plan
and schedule training events. The JTS process consists of four phases;
the Requirements Phase, the Plans Phase, the Execution Phase and the
Assessment Phase. The documents that form the written framework of the
Joint Training System are: Joint Training Policy (CJCSI 3500.01B),
Joint Training Manual (CJCSM 3500.03A), and the Universal Joint Task
List (CJCSM 3500.04C).
USJFCOM develops its training requirements from four primary sources:
1. Training requirements and shortfalls identified by the combatant
commanders.
2. Identification of joint warfighting shortfalls (that can be
mitigated via training) through review of lessons learned reports from
the Joint Center for Operational Analysis/Lessons Learned and the five
Service lessons learned centers.
3. Joint warfighting shortfalls identified by Joint Agencies.
4. Joint warfighting shortfalls identified by the Services.
USJFCOM's requirements generation process weights heavily on Combatant
Command inputs. They are derived directly via on site visits and
training objective workshops completed by USJFCOM J7, reviews of
combatant command documents such as their Integrated Priority Lists
(IPLs) and Joint Training Plans, Joint Mission Essential Task Lists
(JMETLs), the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), and feedback
from exercises conducted by the combatant commands.
DoD Directive 1322.18 Military Training, Paragraph 5.9.3 directs
USJFCOM to "Annually collect all Combatant Commanders' Joint Mission
Essential Tasks (JMETs), including tasks for allocated and apportioned
forces. Develop a master JMETL with baseline conditions and standards
validated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Direct the
training of assigned forces to this master JMETL."
Finally, the 2004, DepSecDef approved, Training Transformation
Implementation Plan tasks the Joint Force Trainer (USJFCOM J7) to
"..identify JNTC [Joint National Training Capability] specific
combatant commander training requirements for active and Reserve
components" and to:
"..routinely integrate warfighter operational and training requirements
into the USJFCOM Training Plan development process."
However, the GAO has correctly pointed out, that the potential exists,
that some USJFCOM joint training requirements (derived from Joint
tactical level tasks developed in a collaborative working group, and
not presently documented in the Universal Joint Task List (CJCSM
3500.04C)) may not be recognized amongst the larger JTS user community.
In summary, USJFCOM is utilizing the JTS and there is clear direction
for them to direct the training of assigned forces based upon the
Combatant Commander JMETS and specific Combatant Commander training
requirements. However, for those training requirements that are based
upon Joint tactical tasks not documented in the Joint Training System's
Universal Joint Task List (CJCSM 3500.04C) we have directed USJFCOM to
submit these tasks to the Joint Staff J7 (the OPR for the UJTL). The
Joint Staff will include the proposed new tasks in future update cycles
of the UJTL in order to vet them in their coordination process, with
the objective of incorporating them within the written framework of the
JTS. USJFCOM submitted the first set of tasks to the Joint Staff on 10
May 2005.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Fred Harrison,
Marie Mak, Todd Dice, Gwyneth Blevins, Jonathan Clark, and R.K. Wild
also made major contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to
Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat
Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address
Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. Washington, D.C.:
June 4, 2004.
Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.
Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could
Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program. GAO-03-
1026. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003.
Military Training: Implementation Strategy Needed to Increase
Interagency Management for Endangered Species Affecting Training
Ranges. GAO-03-976. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2003.
Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air
Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003.
Military Training: DOD Approach to Managing Encroachment on Training
Ranges Still Evolving. GAO-03-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003.
Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's Advanced
Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393. Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2003.
Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2002.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Comprehensive Plan to Manage
Encroachment on Training Ranges. GAO-02-727T. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2002.
Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in
Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training
and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27. Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Tactical tasks refer to combat and combat support-level activities
that are normally performed by DOD service components to achieve combat
objectives.
[2] 10 U.S.C. § 164.
[3] 10 USC §§ 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b).
[4] 10 U.S.C. § 153. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CJCSI) 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the
United States.
[5] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD
effort to be conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals.
[6] DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, March 1, 2002,
p. 5.
[7] Live training refers to live simulations involving real people
operating real systems in a live environment. Virtual training involves
virtual simulations using real people operating simulated systems.
Constructive training refers to simulated people operating simulated
systems, often referred to as war games.
[8] GAO, Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed
to Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges, GAO-05-534
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
[9] Joint Training System is a framework used by the department's joint
community to identify training requirements; develop training plans;
and execute, evaluate, and assess joint training.
[10] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2003); and Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's
Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).
[11] The U.S. Coast Guard does not have a Joint Lessons Learned
Specialist but works closely with the Joint Center for Operational
Analysis and Lessons Learned to further their ability to share joint
lessons.
[12] Command-level training includes the operational and strategic
theater levels of training which are designed to provide training to
unified command and joint task force headquarters staff.
[13] The working group is chaired by Joint Forces Command and is
composed of service, combatant command, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Joint Staff, and Joint Forces
Command representatives, each of whom are invited to attend meetings
and vote on the inclusion of specific joint training tasks into
training events that meet mission requirements. Service component
representatives are encouraged to participate, but are not voting
members.
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