Military Transformation
Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach Gao ID: GAO-05-540 June 30, 2005In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its definition and conceptual framework for its strategic capabilities to include not only the nuclear capabilities of the old Triad that consisted of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also the capabilities of offensive conventional strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage future spending for the New Triad.
Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans to spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next few years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to make informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD has identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not identified all associated spending. GAO's notional analysis of New Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall spending could be significantly greater than DOD's limited analyses have identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a "virtual major force program," could help DOD address these obstacles and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad. DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to identify the projected resource requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term capital investment planning is an important tool to help organizations establish priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to implement the vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and missile defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-540, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
June 2005:
Military Transformation:
Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and
Develop a Long-term Investment Approach:
GAO-05-540:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-540, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense
(DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its definition and
conceptual framework for its strategic capabilities to include not only
the nuclear capabilities of the old Triad that consisted of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and strategic bombers, but also the capabilities of offensive
conventional strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a
revitalized defense infrastructure (see figure).
GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) identified
the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long term investment approach to
identify and manage future spending for the New Triad.
What GAO Found:
Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during
the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not
developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans
to spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next
few years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help
inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and
to make informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD
has identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not
identified all associated spending. GAO‘s notional analysis of New
Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall
spending could be significantly greater than DOD‘s limited analyses
have identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully
identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad
scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a
’virtual major force program,“ could help DOD address these obstacles
and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better
visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad.
DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New
Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-
term investment approach to identify the projected resource
requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad
capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term
capital investment planning is an important tool to help organizations
establish priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face
significant affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the
mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to implement the
vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to
reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and missile
defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some near-
term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a
comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan.
Transformation of U.S. Strategic Capabilities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD take actions designed to provide greater
visibility of the projected spending and future investments for DOD‘s
efforts to create the New Triad and acquire future capabilities.
Although GAO requested them, DOD did not provide comments by the time
the final report went to print.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-540.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP:
DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment Approach
for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: U.S. Strategic Command Missions:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected
Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities:
Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New Triad
Program Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2004-2009:
Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions:
Table 4: GAO's Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program
Elements:
Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force Program
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: The New Triad:
Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements Identified
in DOD and GAO Analyses:
Figure 3: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Primary Appropriation
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009:
Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD Organizations,
Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FYDP: Future Years Defense Program:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
Letter June 30, 2005:
The Honorable Terry Everett:
Chairman:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Ranking Member:
Strategic Forces Subcommittee:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,[Footnote 1] the Department
of Defense (DOD) presented a conceptual framework for transforming U.S.
strategic capabilities.[Footnote 2] The review proposed that the United
States move away from depending heavily on nuclear weapons and instead
bring together the capabilities of nuclear and conventional offensive
strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense
infrastructure, to create a New Triad to achieve the desired strategic
effects. Enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence
capabilities would also support the New Triad. The review stated that
the synergism achieved through the integration of nuclear and
conventional offensive strike and defensive capabilities would provide
the President and Secretary of Defense with a broad array of military
options to better address the spectrum of potential opponents and
contingencies that may arise in the coming decades.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review also concluded that new defense
initiatives and investments would be required to transform U.S.
strategic capabilities and realize the full potential of the New Triad.
The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a DOD centralized report
consisting of thousands of program elements[Footnote 3] that provides
information on DOD's current and planned out year budget requests, is
one of DOD's principal tools to manage the spending for its
transformation of strategic capabilities. The FYDP provides visibility
over DOD's projected spending and helps inform DOD and Congress about
resource data relating to identifying priorities and trade-offs.
DOD is transforming its strategic capabilities at a time when it is
also faced with fiscal challenges brought about by ongoing military
operations and other major initiatives to transform the way it prepares
to fight and win wars. In our February 2005 report entitled 21st
Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of Government, we concluded
that the magnitude of funding and potential for current investments and
operations to turn into long-term financial commitments are prompting
real questions about the affordability and sustainability of the rate
of growth in defense spending.[Footnote 4] We also observed that the
role, size, and structure of forces and capabilities comprising the
strategic triad are key issues that may need to be assessed in view of
the new security and fiscal environment.
At your request, we reviewed the progress made by DOD in determining
and allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in
the future. Specifically, you asked us to determine the extent to which
DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its
FYDP and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and
manage future investments needed to achieve the synergistic
capabilities envisioned for the New Triad.
To obtain information on DOD's efforts to identify projected spending
and develop future investment strategies for the New Triad, we reviewed
documents and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps
headquarters, and the U.S. Strategic Command. We also conducted a
notional analysis to identify projected spending for the New Triad by
analyzing resource data for program elements related to the New Triad
included in the FYDP prepared to support the President's fiscal year
2005 budget submission to Congress. The results of our notional
analysis are not meant to provide a definite accounting of the
projected New Triad spending included in the FYDP but rather to
illustrate an approach that could be used to align the concepts and
capabilities of the New Triad with program elements in the
FYDP.[Footnote 5] We did not analyze resource data from the FYDP
prepared to support the President's fiscal year 2006 budget submission
because the data were not yet available during our review. In
conducting our analysis, we determined that the automated FYDP data
were sufficiently reliable for meeting our objectives. Additionally, we
compared DOD's investment planning actions for the New Triad against
the best practices identified for leading capital decision making to
determine the extent that DOD has followed these practices. We
conducted our review from December 2003 through April 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See
appendix II for a more complete description of our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
Although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has not developed a
way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad programs in its
FYDP. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming strategic
capabilities in the current fiscal environment, decision makers need to
have the best and most complete data available about the resources
being allocated to the New Triad. Although DOD has identified some
spending related to the New Triad in the FYDP, our notional analysis of
such spending included in the FYDP through 2009 indicates that overall
spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD's limited
analyses have identified. DOD has not fully identified New Triad
spending because the diversity and scope of the New Triad and ambiguity
of the concept make it difficult for DOD officials to reach agreement
on a complete list of programs, according to DOD officials.
Additionally, the current FYDP structure does not readily identify and
aggregate New Triad spending. A mechanism to aggregate FYDP spending,
known as a "virtual major force program," has been used by DOD to
identify space funding and could be beneficial in tracking New Triad
funding, according to some DOD officials including the Commander of the
U.S. Strategic Command. Without some mechanism to aggregate funding
associated with the New Triad, DOD will be limited in its ability to
guide and integrate New Triad spending.
Despite the long lead time generally needed to develop and acquire new
systems and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD
has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment
approach for acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of
its aging systems that provide New Triad capabilities. Best practices
show that long-term capital planning is needed to help organizations
define direction, establish priorities, and plan future budgets. While
DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are
incomplete because some key capabilities for the New Triad have not
been fully assessed in context of the New Triad and long-term
replacement of key platforms have not been assessed in the context of
the new security environment and DOD-wide affordability challenges.
Although DOD recognizes the need for a long-term investment approach,
it has not begun to develop one because its concepts for nonnuclear
strike and missile defense are not fully mature. However, delaying the
preparation of a long-term investment approach puts DOD at risk of not
developing an affordable strategy. Additionally, DOD and Congress will
not have sufficient information to effectively determine future
investment costs, the priorities, and trade-offs needed to sustain New
Triad implementation. While we agree that some concepts are continuing
to evolve, and that new systems are still under development, we do not
believe that these circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan
for the future of the New Triad. As new information becomes available,
we would expect to see adjustments in DOD's plans-that is the nature of
long-term planning.
We are making recommendations designed to provide greater visibility of
the projected spending and future investments for DOD's efforts to
create the New Triad and acquire future capabilities. On April 28,
2005, we provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment.
As of the time this report went to final printing, DOD had not provided
comments as requested.
Background:
In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the
range of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad,
which consisted of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also
conventional and nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive
capabilities. The review also called for revitalizing the U.S. research
and development and industrial infrastructure that would develop,
build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems and be
capable of responding in a timely manner to augment U.S. military
capabilities when necessary. According to DOD, the three legs of the
New Triad-offensive strike, active and passive defenses, and responsive
infrastructure-are intended to be supported by timely and accurate
intelligence, adaptive planning, and enhanced command and control
capabilities. Figure 1 shows the three legs of the New Triad and its
supporting elements.
Figure 1: The New Triad:
[See PDF for image]
Note: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-
launched ballistic missiles.
[End of figure]
DOD concluded in the 2001 review that while nuclear weapons will
continue to play a critical role in defending the United States, the
combination of capabilities included in the New Triad would increase
the military options available to the President and Secretary of
Defense and allow for the development of responsive, adaptive, and
interoperable joint forces that could be employed in a wider range of
contingencies. DOD's review indicated that the additional capabilities
provided by the New Triad would partially mitigate the effects of any
reductions in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads that are planned through 2012.[Footnote 6] Table 1 shows the
weapons systems and capabilities that make up the New Triad.
Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities:
Leg: Offensive strategic strike;
Element: Nuclear strike;
Weapon system or capability:
* Intercontinental ballistic missiles;
* Submarine- launched ballistic missiles;
* Strategic bombers;
* Nuclear-armed sea- launched cruise missiles (held in reserve).
Element: Nonnuclear strike;
Weapon system or capability:
* Advanced conventional weapon systems;
* Offensive information operations;
* Special operations forces.
Leg: Defenses;
Element: Active defense;
Weapon system or capability:
* Ballistic missile defenses;
* Air defenses.
Element: Passive defense;
Weapon system or capability: Measures that:
* Reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal, redundancy,
deception, concealment, and hardening;
* Warn of imminent attack;
* Support consequence management activities.
Leg: Responsive infrastructure;
Element: Research and development and industrial infrastructure;
Weapon system or capability:
* Research facilities;
* Manufacturing capacity;
* Skilled personnel.
Element: Elements that support the New Triad:
* Adaptive planning;
* Enhanced command and control;
* Timely and accurate intelligence.
Source: Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, 2002,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense.
[End of table]
In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD indicates that new initiatives
and investments would be required to achieve a mix of new or improved
capabilities that compose the offensive, defensive, and responsive
infrastructure legs and supporting command and control, intelligence,
and adaptive planning elements of the New Triad. In particular, the
review found that major investment initiatives would be needed in the
areas of advanced nonnuclear strike, missile defenses, command and
control, and intelligence. DOD also plans to improve existing New Triad-
related capabilities by modernizing existing weapon systems and
enhancing the tools used to build and execute strike plans to provide
more flexibility in adapting or developing military options during
crises. An Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics official in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that DOD intends to
partially address near-term affordability issues for the New Triad by
enhancing capability characteristics of current weapon systems, such as
range, and leveraging capabilities already in development. In March
2003, DOD published a Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan that
is intended to identify initiatives for developing the New Triad and
institutionalizing the Nuclear Posture Review.[Footnote 7] DOD plans to
implement the New Triad concept and many of the capabilities identified
by the Nuclear Posture Review by 2012. However, DOD states that further
investments are likely to be needed beyond that time frame as existing
nuclear platforms age, such as the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile system,[Footnote 8] and follow-on nuclear weapon
systems are proposed.
The Nuclear Posture Review also states that DOD should conduct periodic
assessments to determine its progress in developing and integrating
capabilities for the New Triad. Specifically, these strategic
capability assessments are to review the (1) progress to date in
reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons, (2) state of the security environment, and (3) progress made
in the development of the New Triad. An assessment team, which included
representatives from DOD and the Department of Energy, completed its
first Nuclear Posture Review strategic capability assessment and
associated report in April 2005. An Office of the Secretary of Defense
official told us that DOD plans to update its first assessment in the
fall of 2005 to support the department's conduct of the Quadrennial
Defense Review. DOD intends to conduct subsequent assessments about
every 2 years through 2012.
Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services,
combatant commands, and defense agencies, and the Department of Energy,
have responsibilities for implementing various aspects of the New
Triad. These responsibilities are broadly defined in relevant New Triad
implementation and guidance documents. Within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, two organizations have key responsibilities for
overseeing and managing the New Triad implementation efforts:
* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
responsible for developing the policy and guidance to implement the
2001 Nuclear Posture Review and for establishing an organizational
framework for coordinating New Triad initiatives within DOD.
* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for the
development and deployment of New Triad capabilities.
The U.S. Strategic Command also has a significant role in implementing
the New Triad and supporting its missions. In addition to its
responsibilities for strategic nuclear deterrence and military space
operations missions, the command was assigned several new missions
related to the New Triad in January 2003. These missions are: global
strike; integrated missile defense; DOD information operations; and
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. In January 2005, the Secretary of
Defense also assigned the command responsibility for the mission of
combating weapons of mass destruction. Appendix I provides additional
information about the U.S. Strategic Command's missions.
Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and
distributing the FYDP, which DOD uses to formulate the estimated
projected resources and proposed appropriations to support DOD
programs, projects, and activities, including those related to the New
Triad. The office is also responsible for coordinating with DOD
components any proposed changes to the FYDP's structure, such as
updates to existing program element titles and definitions. The Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has responsibility for
the annual budget justification material that is presented to Congress.
These offices work collaboratively to ensure that the data presented in
the budget justification material and the FYDP are equivalent at the
appropriation account level.
The FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is
updated and published at least 3 times a year to coincide with DOD's
internal budget development activities and annual budget submission to
Congress. It provides projections of DOD's near and midterm funding
needs and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal
year. The FYDP includes data on estimates for the fiscal year reflected
in the current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years.[Footnote
9] Both detailed data and a summary report are generally provided to
Congress with DOD's annual budget submission.
The FYDP is used as a source of data both for analysis and as an input
to alternative ways of displaying and portraying actual and programmed
resources. It contains data related to the forces, manpower, and total
obligation authority for each program element. The FYDP is organized
into 11 major force program categories, comprising combat forces and
support programs, which are used as a basis for internal DOD program
review. The major force program categories include strategic forces,
general-purpose forces, research and development, and special
operations forces. The FYDP is further arranged according to the
appropriation structure utilized by Congress to review budget requests
and enact appropriations, which includes major appropriation categories
for procurement; operation and maintenance; military personnel;
research, development, test, and evaluation; and military construction.
Therefore, the FYDP's structure serves the purpose of crosswalking
DOD's internal review structure with the congressional review
structure.
In 2003, DOD began implementing the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process to identify improvements to existing
capabilities and guide development of new capabilities from a joint
perspective that recognizes the need for trade-off analysis. The new
process is designed to provide an approach to defense planning that
looks at the broad range of capabilities to address contingencies that
the United States may confront in the future. When fully implemented,
JCIDS is intended to provide an enhanced methodology utilizing joint
concepts that will identify and describe existing or future
shortcomings in capabilities and identify integrated solutions that
meet those capability needs. The system is also expected to provide
better linkage to the acquisition process and improve prioritization of
validated joint warfighting capability proposals. Specifically, it is
intended to provide a broader review of proposals than did the previous
planning process by involving additional participants, including the
combatant commands, early in the process. The analyses conducted during
the process are to result in a set of potential solutions, including
additional resources or changes to doctrine and training designed to
correct capability shortcomings. These solutions are then incorporated
into roadmaps that show the resource strategies to develop and acquire
the needed capabilities.
DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP:
DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in
the FYDP to date. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming
strategic capabilities, decision makers need to have the best and most
complete data available about the resources being allocated to the New
Triad in making decisions on the affordability, sustainability, and
trade-offs among the efforts to develop and acquire capabilities. The
FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and
Congress about resource data relating to these efforts. While DOD has
identified some New Triad spending in its analyses and in relevant New
Triad documents, our notional analysis of New Triad-related program
elements indicates that overall projected spending for the New Triad
through fiscal year 2009 could be much greater when other program
elements that provide New Triad capabilities are considered.
Additionally, the current FYDP data structure does not expressly
identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that would allow
identification of New Triad spending, and the program elements included
in the FYDP's existing major force program category for strategic
forces do not fully capture the broader range of strategic capabilities
that were envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review. DOD does not plan
to develop a complete and approved inventory of New Triad-related
program elements in its FYDP because DOD officials believe that it is
difficult to reach agreement on the program elements to be included in
such an inventory. However, an inventory of New Triad-related program
elements that provides a more complete and clear identification of the
projected spending currently planned for the New Triad could help DOD
and Congress make decisions on the affordability and spending needed
for programs to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities.
DOD Has Not Fully Aligned Projected Spending with New Triad
Capabilities:
While DOD has identified some program elements related to the New Triad
in documents and internal reviews, it still has not fully identified
projected spending associated with the New Triad. DOD documents related
to the New Triad, including the Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear
Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the Secretary of Defense's
fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report to the President and the
Congress, broadly describe the capabilities of the New Triad and
indicate the range and types of activities and weapon systems that
provide these capabilities. DOD has also identified and directed
resources for some New Triad programs. For example, as the Nuclear
Posture Review was being completed in late 2001, DOD issued guidance
for preparing its fiscal year 2003 budget that identified 12
initiatives that were considered key to developing the New Triad, such
as programs to provide capabilities to defeat hard and deeply buried
targets.[Footnote 10]
In anticipation of a potential requirement to identify New Triad
program elements in the FYDP, DOD's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation conducted an analysis in 2003 that identified a list of 188
FYDP program elements, which accounted for about $186.7 billion in then-
year dollars of projected spending for fiscal years 2004 through
2009.[Footnote 11] The office identified another $17.4 billion for
programs and activities that are not readily identifiable in the
FYDP,[Footnote 12] bringing the total to about $204.1 billion. However,
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation officials told us that the
analysis included only those program elements that supported the
initiatives identified in DOD's programming guidance or otherwise
clearly provide New Triad capabilities. The officials said that the
list of programs identified in this analysis was never agreed upon and
approved within DOD and there are no current plans to update the
analysis.
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that the team
conducting the first strategic capability assessment for the New Triad
performed a subsequent survey of current program elements in the FYDP
to determine the capabilities these program elements would provide for
the New Triad by 2012. An Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
official said that the survey included all of the program elements on
their list. However, the official did not know whether the survey
identified any additional program elements.
In addition to DOD's projected spending in the FYDP for the New Triad,
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
identified $41.7 billion for nuclear weapons activities for fiscal
years 2004 through 2009 in its Future Years Nuclear Security Program
prepared for the fiscal year 2005 President's budget submission. This
agency is responsible for maintaining the infrastructure to support
nuclear weapons capabilities, including the refurbishment and service-
life extension of currently deployed nuclear warheads.
New Triad Spending Could be Much Greater Than DOD Has Currently
Identified:
DOD's analyses of FYDP program elements did not include many of the
program elements that make up several capabilities identified for the
New Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review, such as special operations and
intelligence, or those that provide capabilities that are needed to
perform New Triad missions but also have wider military applications.
If these additional program elements are considered, the overall
projected spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD has
currently identified in New Triad-related documents and in either of
the analyses conducted by its Office of Program Evaluation and Analysis
or strategic capability assessment team.
We conducted a notional analysis to identify any additional spending
for New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP. Our
notional analysis considered a broader range of FYDP program elements
than either of the analyses conducted by DOD's Office of Program
Evaluation and Analysis or strategic capability assessment team and
included many elements that provide capabilities for conducting New
Triad missions, but also have wider military applications, such as
communications, intelligence, and special operations program elements.
Using available DOD definitions of New Triad capabilities, we reviewed
each of the FYDP's 4,725 program elements to determine to what extent
the elements provided capabilities needed for New Triad missions. We
further distinguished the program elements we identified as being fully
dedicated to the missions of the New Triad or not fully dedicated to
the New Triad because the capabilities provided by these latter program
elements could be used in a wider range of military applications than
just for the New Triad.
Compared to the 188 program elements and $204.1 billion in then-year
spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 identified by the Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation, our notional analysis identified a
total of 737 program elements in the FYDP that are aligned with New
Triad capabilities, with a total associated spending of $360.1 billion
over the same period, or about $156.0 billion more than the DOD
analysis.[Footnote 13] Of the 737 program elements that we identified,
385 program elements provide capabilities that would be fully dedicated
to New Triad missions, such as program elements for weapons of mass
destruction defense technologies and for the Joint Theater Air and
Missile Defense Organization. The other 352 program elements we
identified provide capabilities, such as special operations, that would
be used in conducting New Triad missions but could also be used for
other military missions. Figure 2 shows the number of New Triad program
elements identified by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
and the number of additional program elements identified in GAO's
analysis.
Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements Identified
in DOD and GAO Analyses:
[See PDF for image]
[A] In its analysis, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
determined that the capabilities provided by about 7 of the 188 program
elements it had identified, or 4 percent, were not fully dedicated to
the New Triad. However, using the criteria we developed for our
analysis, we determined that all 188 program elements were fully
dedicated.
[End of figure]
Of the $360.1 billion we identified in projected spending for the New
Triad, $231.8 billion was for programs that are fully dedicated to the
New Triad and $128.3 billion for programs that are not fully
dedicated.[Footnote 14] As table 2 shows, we broke out the spending
into the New Triad's four capability areas-offensive strike; active and
passive defenses; responsive infrastructure; and command and control,
intelligence, and planning-and created a fifth area for program
elements that supported more than one capability area. Our notional
analysis shows that projected spending for offensive strike and
enhanced command and control, intelligence, and planning capability
areas almost doubles when program elements that are not fully dedicated
to the New Triad are included. The offensive strike capability area
represents the largest amount of the projected spending, $156.0 billion
in then-year dollars, and the command and control, intelligence, and
planning capability area is next with $108.0 billion in projected
spending. Together, these two capability areas account for 73 percent,
or about $264.0 billion, of the $360.1 billion total projected spending
identified in our analysis. Most of the $86.3 billion of projected
spending for the active and passive defenses capability area is in the
fully dedicated category. Appendix III provides additional information
on the results of our analysis.
Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New Triad
Program Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2004-2009:
Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars.
New Triad capability areas: Offensive strike;
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $82.4;
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $73.6;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $156.0.
New Triad capability areas: Active and passive defenses;
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $85.2;
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $1.1;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $86.3.
New Triad capability areas: Responsive infrastructure[A];
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $1.3;
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $0.1;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $1.4.
New Triad capability areas: Command and control, intelligence, and
planning;
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $56.6;
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $51.4;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $108.0.
New Triad capability areas: Multiple capability areas[B];
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $6.3;
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $2.1;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $8.5.
Total;
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $231.8;
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New
Triad: $128.3;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $360.1.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.
[A] Spending amounts do not include $41.7 billion from fiscal years
2004 through 2009 in the Department of Energy's Future Years Nuclear
Security Program for nuclear weapons activities.
[B] Projected spending associated with program elements that support
more than one New Triad capability area.
[End of table]
Officials with Program Analysis and Evaluation, Policy, and
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the U.S. Strategic Command stated that the methodology
we used for our notional analysis was reasonable. Officials from the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and from U.S. Strategic
Command told us that the program elements we identified were consistent
with the capabilities defined for the New Triad. Officials from the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation also said that our analysis
used a more systematic approach in identifying New Triad-related
program elements included in the FYDP than was followed in DOD's
analyses. The officials added that when they were compiling their own
analysis of New Triad-related program elements, many of the documents
that GAO used to identify relevant programs had not yet been published.
Therefore, while DOD did not include many program elements that are not
fully dedicated to the New Triad in their analyses, the officials told
us that it was not unreasonable to include those program elements in
our analysis. As our notional analysis shows, including these program
elements not only provides greater transparency of the projected
spending for the New Triad in the FYDP but also identifies many
additional program elements that provide capabilities necessary for
carrying out New Triad missions.
New Triad Spending Is Not Readily Identified in the FYDP's Structure:
While the FYDP is a report that provides DOD and Congress with a tool
for looking at future funding needs, the current FYDP structure does
not readily identify and aggregate New Triad-related program elements
to provide information on current and planned resource allocations-
including spending changes, priorities, and trends-for the New Triad.
In conducting our analysis of FYDP program elements, we observed that
DOD has not created any data fields in the FYDP's structure that would
expressly identify program elements as being relevant to the New Triad.
According to DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, there is no
plan to modify the data fields in the FYDP structure to allow the ready
identification of New Triad program elements and associated spending
because they have not received direction to do so. Additionally, these
officials told us that if DOD were to modify the FYDP structure to
allow such identification, it would need to develop an approved list of
existing New Triad program elements to allow capture of these elements
in the data fields.
Additionally, as we have reported in the past, the FYDP's 11 major
force program categories have remained virtually unchanged since the
1960s.[Footnote 15] Our notional FYDP analysis indicates that the
FYDP's definition of the existing major force program for strategic
forces[Footnote 16]-one of the key major force program categories
associated with the New Triad- does not fully capture the projected New
Triad spending for the broader range of strategic capabilities that are
envisioned for the New Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review. We
determined that only $55.6 billion, or about 15 percent of the $360.1
billion of projected spending that we identified in our notional
analysis of FYDP program elements, is associated with the FYDP's
strategic forces major force program category, which largely captures
projected spending on offensive nuclear capabilities. The remaining
$304.6 billion is dispersed among the other 10 major force programs.
For example, program elements for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile, which is an autonomous, stealthy, long-range, conventional,
air-to-ground, precision cruise missile designed to destroy high-value,
well-defended fixed or moveable targets, and the Patriot missile
defense system, which contributes to the defense leg of the New Triad,
are included in the FYDP's general- purpose forces major force program.
Similarly, intelligence-related program elements for hard and deeply
buried targets and to support U.S. Strategic Command are part of the
FYDP's command, control, communications, and intelligence major force
program.
In the past, DOD created new aggregations of program elements and
changed the FYDP's structure as decision makers needed information not
already captured in the FDYP. For example, a recent aggregation allows
data that relate to every dollar, person, and piece of equipment in the
FYDP to be identified as being in either a force or infrastructure
category. DOD has also made it possible to identify program elements in
the FYDP that are related to activities to capture the resources
associated with specific areas of interest, such as space activities.
In 2001, DOD established a "virtual major force program" for space to
increase the visibility of resources allocated for space activities.
This is a programming mechanism that aggregates most space-unique
funding by military department and function crosscutting DOD's 11
existing major force program categories.[Footnote 17] The Commander of
the U.S. Strategic Command, who has key responsibilities for
implementing the New Triad, told us that creating a virtual major force
program for the New Triad could help align New Triad capabilities with
the projected spending in the FYDP, identify responsible organizations,
reduce ambiguity of the New Triad concept, and provide better
visibility and focus for DOD efforts to develop and acquire New Triad
capabilities. The Commander suggested that it could be necessary to
create more than one virtual major force program, possibly one for each
of the New Triad legs, because of the diversity and scope of New Triad
capabilities. Some Office of the Secretary of Defense officials also
told us that creating a virtual major force program could provide
Congress with more visibility of DOD's efforts underway to develop the
capabilities needed for the New Triad. Until such time as a tool such
as a virtual major force program becomes available that can capture and
categorize the projected spending for the New Triad in the FYDP, we
believe that DOD will be limited in its ability to guide and direct all
its efforts to develop, acquire, and integrate New Triad capabilities
and Congress will not have full visibility of the resources being
allocated.
DOD Lacks a Plan to Fully Identify New Triad Spending:
DOD has not established a requirement to develop a complete and
approved list of the program elements included in the FYDP that are
associated with New Triad spending. Office of the Secretary of Defense
officials told us that DOD has not established such a requirement
because the diversity and scope of the New Triad make it difficult for
DOD officials to reach agreement on a complete list of programs. They
also told us that because the New Triad is an ambiguous concept, the
program elements included in such a list would change as the New Triad
evolves and becomes better defined.
However, without a complete and approved DOD list of New Triad program
elements included in the FYDP, there is some uncertainty about the
total range of programs and projected spending that are being pursued
to achieve New Triad capabilities. It also will be difficult for
Congress to assess DOD's progress in achieving the goals identified in
the Nuclear Posture Review without having complete information on the
resources being spent or needed in the future to meet those goals.
Additionally, the broad scope of the New Triad concept and large number
of organizations with New Triad-related spending responsibilities makes
it even more important to have complete information available on the
projected spending being provided for each of the New Triad capability
areas and for each of the many organizations developing and acquiring
New Triad capabilities. For example, our notional analysis identified
as many as 23 defense organizations, including the military services,
offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
several combatant commands, and defense agencies, with FYDP spending
related to the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials
told us that having an approved program list would promote a common
understanding of the New Triad and benefit future department program
reviews. Additionally, an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
official told us that an approved program list would aid DOD in making
resource decisions for the New Triad. In preparing DOD's fiscal year
2006 budget, the official told us that an approved list of programs
would have made it easier to evaluate the effects of programming
changes proposed by the military services on capabilities being
acquired for the New Triad.
DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment Approach
for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities:
While several New Triad documents and DOD's recent strategic capability
assessment identify investment needs through 2012, DOD's near-term
investment direction is incomplete. Additionally, DOD has not yet
developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach
to identify and plan investments needed to acquire and sustain
capabilities for the New Triad. A long-term investment approach is an
important tool in an organization's decision-making process to define
direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future
budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. Although DOD
recognizes the need for a long-term investment approach, it does not
plan to develop one until nonnuclear strike and missile defense
concepts are mature. DOD has not identified a specific date for when
this will occur. The new JCIDS process could complement any long-term
investment approach developed for the New Triad by providing additional
analysis and discussions to support New Triad investment and the
development of a plan.
Long-term Investment Approach Is a Useful Tool to Establish Priorities:
In our past reporting on leading capital decision-making
practices,[Footnote 18] we have determined that leading organizations
have decision-making processes in place to help them assess where they
should invest their resources for the greatest benefit over the long
term. These processes help an organization determine whether its
investments are the most cost effective, support its goals, and
consider alternatives before making a final selection. A long-term
investment approach is an important tool in an organization's decision-
making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with
current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve
goals. Our analysis of several investment plans showed that such an
approach includes information on future investment requirements,
projected resources, investment priorities and trade-offs, milestones,
and funding timelines, and is intended to be a dynamic document, which
would be updated to adapt to changing circumstances.
In the past, DOD has developed and maintained long-term investment
planning documents for major defense capabilities-such as the Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027 and the "Bomber Roadmap"-to provide
senior decision makers options in the development of broad strategies
that will define future DOD force structure and help with the resource
allocation process.[Footnote 19] In 2003, DOD also published an
Information Operations Roadmap, which supports collaboration of broad
information operations efforts and endorses the need for the department
to better track information operations investments.
DOD's Near-term Investment Direction for the New Triad Is Incomplete:
As noted earlier, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us
that New Triad documents-including the Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear
Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the first strategic capability
assessment-identify some of the near-term investments needed to provide
capabilities for the New Triad. However, this investment direction is
incomplete and does not address long-term affordability challenges that
DOD may be faced with in sustaining and developing new capabilities to
implement the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials
told us that the strategic capability assessment provides a near-term
investment approach by identifying priorities for focusing resources to
keep investment efforts on track to reach New Triad implementation
goals for 2012. According to the officials, the team conducting the
strategic capability assessment developed a list of capabilities that
were needed in key areas, such as strategic strike and missile defense,
from the Nuclear Posture Review's vision of the New Triad. The team
then reviewed current operation activities, acquisition programs of
record, and a potential range of new technologies to determine any
capability shortcomings. Based on this review, the assessment team was
able to determine whether initiatives to develop New Triad capabilities
in the key areas were (1) met or on track to be satisfied by 2012; (2)
on track, but would not be met by 2012; or (3) not on track to be met
by 2012 unless additional funding was provided. Office of the Secretary
of Defense officials told us that by determining the status of meeting
capabilities in each of the key areas, DOD would be able to better
prioritize future investment decisions for the New Triad.
However, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy officials
acknowledge that the first strategic capability assessment provides
only a limited, near-term investment approach for the New Triad. These
officials told us that the assessment did not review and assess some
key capabilities of the New Triad, such as cruise missile defense,
information operations, and passive defense, and may not have fully
surveyed existing capabilities in the areas that were included in the
assessment. Further, it does not address the potential for further
investments to replace one or more existing nuclear platforms that will
approach the end of their useful lives. These officials told us that
they expect future strategic capability assessments to include New
Triad key areas not reviewed in the first assessment. Additionally,
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that while the
assessment's recommendations are not binding on DOD programming and
budgeting decisions, the assessment was used during the department's
last program review in developing the fiscal year 2006 defense budget.
DOD, in its 2003 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, called for
the creation of an overarching strategic planning document for the New
Triad that would establish the strategies and plans for developing new
strategic capabilities to meet national security goals stated in the
Nuclear Posture Review. The plan also was to provide broad guidance for
integrating the elements of the New Triad as new capabilities came on
line and for the development of future forces, supporting systems,
planning and the creation of a responsive infrastructure. However,
Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy officials told us that while
a draft plan was prepared, they decided not to circulate the draft for
comments because they believed the results of the first strategic
capability assessment would result in too many changes to the plan.
Instead, the officials told us that the strategic capability assessment
process would develop the strategy, plans, and guidance that were to be
provided by the plan.
DOD Does Not Plan to Develop a New Triad Long-term Investment Approach
Until Concepts Mature:
In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need
for a long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to
the plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing
an integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities,
defensive capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and
missile defense concepts are mature. Policy and Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense told us that there are several concepts related to New Triad
capabilities being developed, including the Strategic Deterrence Joint
Operating Concept and concept and operational plans for global strike
and integrated ballistic missile defense. The officials told us that
once nonnuclear strike and missile defense concepts are developed,
specific programs could be better identified to implement these
concepts, including new programs to develop capabilities that do not
currently exist. These officials told us that they recognize the
importance of a long-term investment approach for the New Triad to
provide a basis for decisions on resources for future capabilities
initiatives. However, they do not believe the development of the
nonnuclear strike and missile defense concepts are far enough along to
begin the study leading to development of a long-term investment
strategy. These officials did not provide us with an estimate for when
these concepts would be considered sufficiently mature to begin the
study.
While we agree that some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that
new systems are still under development, we do not believe that these
circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan for the future of the
New Triad. For example, although DOD is still developing concepts for
missile defense, it is planning to spend billions of dollars over the
next several years to develop a range of missile defense capabilities.
As new information becomes available, we would expect to see
adjustments in DOD's plans-that is the nature of long-term planning.
Further, without the context of a long-term investment approach for
acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of its aging
systems that provide New Triad capabilities, DOD will continue to
invest billions of dollars on capabilities that will affect the long-
term composition of the New Triad. DOD is likely to face significant
affordability challenges in the long term as some existing nuclear
weapons platforms begin reaching the end of their expected service
lives within the next 15 years and as missile defense capabilities are
expanding. Given the length of time to develop and acquire capabilities
for the New Triad and the need to consider long-term affordability
issues, DOD is also at risk of not considering the best approaches to
developing and sustaining capabilities needed to provide the broad
range of military options for the President and Secretary of Defense
that are envisioned for the New Triad. DOD is further at risk of not
effectively integrating the wide range of diverse New Triad
capabilities as they are developed and being able to effectively
determine future investment costs and the priorities and trade-offs
needed to sustain New Triad implementation. In our February 2005 report
addressing the challenges that the nation faces by its growing fiscal
imbalance in the 21st century, we stated that DOD's current approach to
planning and budgeting often results in a mismatch between programs and
budgets and that DOD does not always fully consider long-term resource
implications and the opportunity cost of selecting one alternative over
another.[Footnote 20]
JCIDS Process Could Complement Any Long-term Investment Approach:
The new JCIDS process could play a role in any long-term investment
approach that is eventually prepared for the New Triad by providing a
forum for additional analyses and assessments to support New Triad
investment decisions and ensure that those decisions are in concert
with DOD's overall investment priorities. The JCIDS process is intended
to provide a means to ensure that new capabilities are conceived and
developed in a joint warfighting context. The process intends to (1)
focus on achieving joint operational capabilities rather than on
individual weapon systems and (2) provide a systematic means to
identify capability gaps, propose solutions, and establish roadmaps for
future investments to acquire needed capabilities. Capability
assessments, developed through the process, are designed to have a long-
term focus, consider a wide range of potential materiel and nonmateriel
solutions across the military services, analyze trade-offs among
different solutions, and identify areas where existing capabilities are
redundant or excessive. The process offers proposed solutions that are
intended to be integrated and prioritized and would eventually be
incorporated into resource roadmaps that show the investment strategies
to develop and acquire the needed capabilities.
JCIDS also intends to involve the combatant commanders early in the
decision-making process to provide a strong warfighter perspective in
identifying capabilities and resource priorities. The U.S. Strategic
Command has created mission capabilities teams within its Capability
and Resource Integration Directorate that closely align its missions
with the JCIDS process to strengthen its ability to more effectively
advocate for the capabilities needed to perform its missions. The
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command told us that his intent is for
these teams to play an active role in identifying and developing New
Triad capabilities.
New Triad capabilities span most of the functional areas established in
the JCIDS process, including command and control and force application.
Officials in the Joint Staff's Office of Requirements Assessment told
us that the JCIDS process does not currently identify and track joint
warfighting capabilities as capabilities for the New Triad and Office
of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that there are no efforts
at this time to crosswalk the JCIDS' joint warfighting capabilities
with the New Triad. However, Joint Staff officials said that
organizations with New Triad responsibilities, such as the U.S.
Strategic Command, do participate in the working groups and other
activities throughout the JCIDS process to ensure that their equities
are addressed. The JCIDS process could provide benefits to defense
planning, but because the process is still very early in its
development it is unclear whether or how DOD plans to use JCIDS to
address its New Triad investments.
Conclusions:
It is important for DOD and congressional decision makers to have the
most complete accounting possible of the projected spending planned for
the New Triad over the next several years as they deliberate the
budget. Until DOD reaches agreement on the program elements that
comprise New Triad spending in its FYDP, and creates a way to aggregate
spending, neither defense officials nor Congress will have visibility
over all of the projected spending planned in the near-term for the New
Triad. Importantly, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who
has been assigned significant responsibilities for coordinating and
integrating New Triad capabilities from a warfighter perspective, will
not have the resource visibility needed to effectively carry out this
new role. This information is needed to accurately assess the
affordability of the various activities and weapon systems that make up
the New Triad, and to make timely and informed decisions on the funding
required to develop, acquire, and integrate the wide range of diverse
New Triad capabilities.
Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment
approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges,
future funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is
not fully known. While DOD believes it is still too early to develop a
long-term investment approach, further delaying the start of this
effort puts the department at risk of not developing and acquiring
capabilities for the New Triad when needed. As a result, the President
and Secretary of Defense can not be assured that DOD has the broad
range of military options envisioned in the New Triad. Although New
Triad concepts are continuing to evolve and mature, laying the
foundation now for a long-term investment approach would provide DOD
with an additional planning tool for future development of the New
Triad concept-a tool that could be continuously improved and updated as
better information becomes available and as changing security and
fiscal circumstances warranted. The need for such an approach becomes
increasingly important as existing nuclear platforms begin approaching
the end of their useful lives and decisions to replace one or more of
the platforms are required. Additionally, without such an approach,
decision makers lack information on projected costs, spending
priorities and trade-offs, resource requirements, and funding timelines
in making decisions on the spending commitments needed to sustain New
Triad implementation. Further, without a long-term investment approach,
the large number of New Triad stakeholders, such as the military
services, defense agencies, and combatant commands, will lack the
direction and focus they need to effectively prepare future funding
plans to develop, acquire, and integrate the capabilities. Lastly,
while the new JCIDS process is intended to provide a better approach to
identifying solutions to capability shortcomings and strengthen the
role of combatant commanders in making decisions on capability
investments, it is yet unclear how the process will be used to
specifically support investment decisions for the New Triad.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen DOD's implementation of the New Triad and provide greater
transparency of resources that are being applied to developing,
acquiring, and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions:
* Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to (1)
develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements
in the FYDP, which support activities for developing, acquiring, and
sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to establish a
virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating new data
fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New Triad-
related program elements to provide increased visibility of the
resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year
the funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the
department's summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of Defense
should direct that these three actions be completed at or about the
time when the President's budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to
Congress.
* Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated long-
term investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision
makers with information about future joint requirements, projected
resources, spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding
timelines. As part of developing and implementing this approach, DOD
should leverage the analyses, assessments, and other information
prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System process. The Secretary of Defense should direct that development
of a long-term investment approach be completed in time for it to be
considered in the department's preparation of its submission for the
President's budget for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated, as
needed, to adapt to changing circumstances.
Agency Comments:
On April 28, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to DOD for review
and comment. As of the time this report went to final printing, DOD had
not provided comments as requested. However, DOD did provide technical
changes, which have been incorporated in this report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512-
4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff
members who made key contributions to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Signed by:
Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: U.S. Strategic Command Missions:
U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the New
Triad, advocating for the development of New Triad capabilities, and
supporting its missions. It derives these responsibilities from
missions assigned by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Table
3 describes U.S. Strategic Command's current missions.
Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions:
Mission: Strategic deterrence;
Description:
* Plan, target, and employ during wartime intercontinental ballistic
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers;
Basis of authority: Assumed the mission in June 1992 from the
disestablished Strategic Air Command and Joint Strategic Target
Planning Staff.
Mission: Military space operations;
Description:
* Develop desired characteristics and capabilities;
* Plan, advocate, and conduct military space operations; and;
* Serve as the single point of contact for military space operational
matters;
Basis of authority: Change 1 of the Unified Command Plan,[A] effective
July 2002.
Mission: Global strike;
Description:
* Provide integrated global strike planning and command and control
support to deliver rapid, extended- range, precision kinetic and
nonkinetic (e.g., elements of space and information operations) effects
in support of theater and national objectives;
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective
January 2003.
Mission: Integrated missile defense;
Description:
* Advocate desired global missile defense and missile-warning
characteristics and capabilities for active and passive ballistic
missile defenses for all combatant commands; and;
* Provide centralized planning, coordination, and integration of global
ballistic missile defenses, missile warning systems, and battle
management, command control, communications, and intelligence system
and architecture;
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective
January 2003.
Mission: DOD information operations;
Description:
* Integrate and coordinate DOD information operations (including
computer network attack, computer network defense, electronic warfare,
operations security, military psychological operations, and military
deception) across geographic areas of responsibility;
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective
January 2003.
Mission: Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance;
Description:
* Plan, integrate, and coordinate intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as
directed; and;
* Task and coordinate command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in support
of strategic force employment, including global strike, missile
defense, and associated planning;
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective
January 2003.
Mission: Combating weapons of mass destruction;
Description:
* Plan, integrate, and synchronize DOD efforts with the efforts of
other agencies;
* Integrate other U.S. Strategic Command capabilities (e.g., global
strike) and provide operational support to other combatant commands and
organizations conducting combating weapons of mass destruction
missions;
* Synchronize DOD operations for combating weapons of mass destruction
with the intelligence community;
* Advocate desired capabilities for combating weapons of mass
destruction;
* Sponsor relevant joint doctrine; and;
* Provide military representation to U.S. national and international
agencies;
Basis of authority: Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, effective
January 2005.
Source: Unified Command Plan:
Note: Change 1 and Change 2 incorporated), April 20, 2002, and
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, January 6, 2005, designating
responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction to
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
[A] The Unified Command Plan is a classified document approved by the
President, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
addressed to the commanders of combatant commands. It establishes the
combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility,
assigns primary missions, defines authority of the commanders,
establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise
of combatant command.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
fully identified projected spending for the New Triad in its Future
Years Defense Program (FDYP), we reviewed key DOD documentation to
identify and define the New Triad's capabilities and determine whether
DOD had identified specific, related programs in the FYDP.
Specifically, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents on the New
Triad, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture
Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year 2002
Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board's February 2004
report, Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings by DOD officials, and
relevant programming guidance. We also obtained the results of an
analysis performed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
that identified New Triad spending in the FYDP, and discussed the
purpose, scope, methodology, and limitations of the analysis with
officials from this office. In addition, we interviewed officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including officials from the
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy,
the Office of Strategic and Space Programs in the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of the Deputy Assistant of the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We
also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force
headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to gain an
understanding of their role in implementing the New Triad. We met with
officials of the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss
the command's missions that are relevant to the New Triad.
As part of our effort to determine the extent to which DOD has
identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP, we
performed our own notional analysis of the FYDP to identify resources
associated with the New Triad. In doing so, we examined the FYDP's
structure and related documentation to determine whether the FYDP was
designed to capture information that would identify specific program
elements as being related to the New Triad. We met with relevant DOD
officials to discuss our approach, and reviewed the analysis performed
by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. We also reviewed
prior GAO work to gain a better understanding of whether the FYDP has
been modified to allow for new program element aggregations. In
performing our analysis, we assessed the reliability of the FYDP data
by (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2)
reviewing existing information about the data and the system that
produced them, (3) interviewing a knowledgeable DOD official about the
data, and (4) reviewing data reliability tests on these data previously
performed by GAO. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional details about how
we performed our notional analysis are presented in appendix III.
To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a long-term
investment approach to identify and manage future investments needed to
achieve the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad, we
interviewed officials and reviewed key documentation to determine
whether DOD has taken steps to develop and follow such an approach.
Specifically, to identify best practices for a long-term investment
approach, we reviewed relevant GAO reports, and identified and reviewed
investment approaches of other organizations. We then compared DOD's
approach for the New Triad against these elements that we had
identified in other organizations to determine the extent to which DOD
had these elements in place. In addition, we obtained and reviewed
relevant documents, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the
Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense's
fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board's
February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings
provided by DOD officials, and relevant programming guidance to
identify investments and investment priorities in building New Triad
capabilities. We also met with officials from the Joint Staff's
Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments to discuss
the development and implementation of the department's new Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System, and to determine
whether the New Triad's plans for achieving desired capabilities were
aligned to this new system.
Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and
Space Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the
Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We also interviewed officials
from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
headquarters, and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration to gain their perspectives. In addition, we visited the
headquarters of the:
U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and met with command
officials to discuss investments needed to acquire capabilities and
implement the command's missions.
Our review was conducted between December 2003 and April 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected
Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program:
To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend on
the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending
associated with New Triad capabilities. This analysis identifies 737
program elements that are either "fully dedicated" or "not fully
dedicated" to the New Triad. "Fully dedicated" program elements provide
capabilities that primarily execute or support New Triad missions,
whereas "not fully dedicated" program elements provide capabilities
that have wider military application than just the New Triad.
Our notional analysis is based on certain assumptions, which we
considered to be relevant and reasonable, about how to align New Triad
capabilities to FYDP program elements. For example, we assume that:
* All program elements in the FYDP that are not defined as "historical"
are currently active and valid for analysis, even though there may not
be any spending currently associated with the program elements over the
fiscal years 2004 through 2009 time frame.
* Certain FYDP field values, or combinations of values, can be used to
identify groups of program elements as being related to the New Triad.
For example, certain combinations of Force and Infrastructure Codes and
Defense Mission Codes can be used to identify particular New Triad
capabilities.
To ensure that our assumptions were reasonable, we discussed our
overall approach with budget experts at GAO and the Congressional
Budget Office and with DOD officials. Generally, these officials agreed
with our approach to identify the projected spending associated with
the New Triad included in the FYDP. However, DOD officials cautioned
that identifying program elements that are not fully dedicated to the
New Triad can be difficult because of the subjectivity required in
deciding on the extent to which a program element provides capabilities
for the New Triad. Therefore, our notional analysis suggests a
methodology that can be used to conduct a comprehensive accounting of
the spending plans for the New Triad, and is not meant to provide a
definitive accounting of projected New Triad spending. We recognize
that the assumptions we made are subjective, and that other analyses to
identify projected spending on New Triad capabilities in the FYDP may
use different assumptions and obtain somewhat different results.
Our Methodology for Identifying FYDP Program Elements Related to the
New Triad:
To identify DOD's definitions of the four New Triad capabilities--
offensive strike; active and passive defenses; responsive
infrastructure; and command and control, intelligence, and planning--we
used relevant DOD documentation, such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review, the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary
of Defense's fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report, and the Defense
Science Board's February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike Forces.
We compared these capability definitions with information about each of
the 4,725 FYDP program elements[Footnote 21] we reviewed. When we
determined that a program element was related to one or more of the New
Triad's capabilities, we categorized it according to the particular
capability that it supported.
We then determined whether the program elements that we identified were
either fully dedicated or not fully dedicated to the New Triad. In
making this determination, we assumed that all of the program elements
identified in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation analysis
were fully dedicated to the New Triad. Table 4 summarizes the criteria
we used to identify and categorize program elements that are linked to
the New Triad.
Table 4: GAO's Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program
Elements:
Offensive strike:
Description: Kinetic (e.g., advanced conventional and nuclear) and
nonkinetic (e.g., information operations) systems that provide the
ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration and extended-range
attacks to achieve precision effects against highly valued adversary
assets. Includes special operations capabilities;
Fully dedicated program elements:
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation analysis;
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that provide or
support conventional, nuclear, and information operations strike
capabilities;
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements
that mainly support special operations, cryptology, and certain
counterintelligence capabilities.
Active and passive defenses:
Description: Programs designed to defend the U.S. homeland, allies, and
forces abroad. Active defenses include (1) ballistic and cruise missile
defense capabilities and (2) air defenses. Passive defenses include
measures that reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal,
redundancy, deception, concealment, and hardening; warn of imminent
attack; and support consequence management activities;
Fully dedicated program elements:
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation analysis;
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that provide or
support missile defenses, defense of U.S. airspace, and passive
defenses, particularly consequence management activities;
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements
that mainly provide headquarters support and certain counterdrug
activities.
Responsive infrastructure:
Description: Programs that address the ability of the U.S. technology
base to deal with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and
timing of potential strategic threats, the capability of the technology
and industrial base to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and
responsiveness of science and technology programs related to possible
future strategic capabilities;
Fully dedicated program elements:
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation analysis;
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that support the
upkeep of important test ranges and facilities;
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements
that support activities at key facilities that support or execute New
Triad- related missions.
Command and control, intelligence, and planning:
Description: Programs that (1) provide or support nuclear, national,
and global military command and control systems, including key
communications infrastructure and platforms; (2) provide "exquisite"
intelligence of an adversary's capabilities; and (3) support adaptive
planning;
Fully dedicated program elements:
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation analysis;
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that historically
provided nuclear command and control capabilities;
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements
supporting a broad range of command and control, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the national level,
including space-, air-and ground-based surveillance and reconnaissance
platforms.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.
[End of table]
We then used the FYDP data to identify the projected spending
associated with these program elements for fiscal years 2004 through
2009, and expressed our results in then-year dollars. The data for the
projected spending are current as of the President's budget submission
to Congress for fiscal year 2005.
Projected New Triad Spending by FYDP Major Force Program:
The FYDP's strategic forces major force program, one of 11 major force
programs in the FYDP, includes $55.6 billion in then-year dollars for
the New Triad for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, or 15 percent of the
$360.1 billion of total spending that we identified. The offensive
forces and weapons systems in this program are primarily nuclear-
focused. As indicated in table 5, the remaining $304.6 billion, or 85
percent of the projected spending that we identified, is dispersed
among 7 of the remaining 10 major force programs in the FYDP. The
command, control, communications, and intelligence program accounted
for the largest share of New Triad-related spending--$133.5 billion, or
37 percent of the projected spending that we identified. We did not
identify any projected spending on the New Triad in major force
programs for central supply and maintenance; training, medical, and
other general personnel activities; and support of other nations.
Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force Program
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009:
Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars.
Strategic Forces;
* B-52 Squadrons;
* Minuteman Squadrons;
* Service Support to U.S. Strategic Command;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $55.6;
Percent: 15%.
General Purpose Forces;
* Tomahawk Cruise Missile;
* Tomahawk and Tomahawk Mission Planning Center;
* Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $29.7;
Percent: 8%.
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence;
* E-4B National Airborne Operations Center;
* U.S. Army Space Activities;
* Defense Reconnaissance Support Activities;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $133.5;
Percent: 37%.
Mobility Forces;
* Special Operations Forces;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $3.5;
Percent: 1%.
Guard and Reserve Forces;
* B-52 Squadrons, Air Force Reserve;
* F-16 Air Defense Squadrons, Air National Guard;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $4.8;
Percent: 1%.
Research and Development;
* Army Missile Defense Systems Integration;
* Space-based Radar;
* Next Generation Bomber;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $98.2;
Percent: 27%.
Central Supply and Maintenance;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: n/a;
Percent: n/a.
Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities;
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: n/a;
Percent: n/a.
Administration and Associated Activities;
* Management Headquarters, Missile Defense Agency; Total obligation
authority in billions of then-year dollars: Total projected spending
for New Triad program elements: $0.9;
Percent:
