Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas
Gao ID: GAO-05-680R June 27, 2005The Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern about the use of military construction budget authority for projects at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete due to changes being considered by DOD military services as well as the need for a more complete picture of future requirements than is typically available in annual budget requests. Accordingly, the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to prepare detailed comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure requirements for U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands. In that regard, DOD was required to provide a baseline report on these plans with yearly updates on the status of those plans and their implementation with annual military construction budget submissions through 2009. Additionally, the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report required those plans to identify precise facility requirements, the status of properties being returned to host nations, and the funding requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities between the United States and cognizant host nations. The Senate report also directed us to monitor the master plans developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense committees with annual assessment reports through fiscal year 2008. Our reports are to include an assessment of the status of the plans; the associated costs; host nation burden-sharing implications; and other relevant information involving property returns to host nations, including residual value and environmental remediation issues. This is our second report that responds to the reporting requirements contained in the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report. In our prior work, we found that the overseas regional commands we visited at that time were awaiting decisions on the integrated global presence and basing strategy, as well as final guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) before completing their master plans for overseas facilities. OSD provided initial guidance in February 2004 to aid the commands in developing their plans. However, that guidance did not include requirements to address environmental remediation, multiple U.S. funding sources available to support infrastructure changes, or residual property values--information that others and we would need to track the commands' progress in implementing overseas basing changes. Accordingly, we recommended in our July 2004 report that OSD include these requirements in its final guidance to the overseas regional commands. In issuing further guidance in October 2004, OSD included requirements to identify information on environmental remediation in accordance with status-of-forces agreements and on multiple U.S. funding sources available to support infrastructure changes, but not residual property value issues. For this report, we completed a more extensive assessment of that guidance and its use in developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to Congress on March 2005. This report discusses the extent to which (1) OSD has provided sufficient guidance to overseas regional commands to meet the reporting requirements contained in congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO; and (2) overseas regional commands complied with the reporting requirements and in doing so, provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, and whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed.
The scope of OSD's guidance issued to date generally exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress for the comprehensive master plans and included most additional reporting elements previously recommended by us, except for residual value. We believe that where the guidance requires overseas regional commands to provide greater specificity than identified by the congressional mandates, doing so is appropriate and adds value because this provides a more complete picture of future infrastructure requirements and associated funding levels. However, OSD did not include residual value in its guidance to the commands because officials continue to believe that residual value--which is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nation, and often diminished by actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs--cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master plans. We believe that, without fully explaining the challenges commands experience in obtaining residual values for properties being returned to host nations or the implications, if any, for U.S. funding requirements, Congress and other users of the plans do not have a complete understanding of the potential impacts and limitations of residual value on future funding levels. The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting requirements defined by OSD, and by extension of Congress, but varied in the extent to which they provided complete, clear, and consistent information in their master plans. This is due, in part, to the limitations in information that could be provided because of three key factors we identified: ongoing negotiations with host nations, continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategy, and differences in interpretation of OSD guidance by commands. Opportunities exist to improve the completeness, clarity, and consistency of the commands' reporting of various items--host nation agreements and funding levels; U.S. funding levels and sources; environmental remediation and restoration issues; population levels; and facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and insular areas in the Pacific. Also, the plans do not yet provide a definitive picture of future U.S. funding requirements, particularly for new locations. Specifically, the master plans did not provide information on U.S. funding sources in addition to military construction appropriations that may be used for ongoing and future infrastructure changes. Still, master plans that provided a greater degree of information encompassing the various sources of U.S. funding or, at a minimum, total funding levels by type, would better assist users in monitoring changes in U.S. funding levels due to changing infrastructure requirements. Also, examples of better reporting by individual overseas regional commands on selected data elements provided insights into how collective reporting among all commands could be enhanced to provide more complete, clear, and consistent information. Specifically, the detailed reporting by the European Command (EUCOM) of individual construction projects according to military service, country, and base category at the installation level provided a more complete and consistent basis for tracking progress and annual changes in its master plan. Also, the Central Command (CENTCOM) provided a more concise depiction of the anticipated strategic end state in terms of the expected sites and capabilities to support its objectives as of 2010. Without more complete, clear, and consistent reporting by individual overseas commands in the master plans, Congress and other users lack the best available data on which to track infrastructure requirements and changes from year to year and between commands.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Brian J. Lepore Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-5581GAO-05-680R, Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas
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June 27, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master
Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas:
After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
the U.S. military's overseas presence began to change. Force structure
was reduced or relocated and the number of overseas military
installations was decreased, often dramatically. Much of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) remaining overseas infrastructure--installations and
facilities used to support U.S. forces overseas--remained organized
around Cold War strategic concepts, even though new threats, new
deployment concepts, and new geopolitical realities have emerged.
Recently, DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review Report[Footnote 1]
addressed, among other issues, further reorienting the U.S. military
global posture. The report called for developing a permanent overseas
basing system that provides U.S. forces greater flexibility in critical
areas of the world, as well as providing temporary access to facilities
in foreign countries. In 2004, President Bush announced what was
described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. Closely thereafter,
DOD issued a report entitled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense
Posture,[Footnote 2] also referred to as the integrated global presence
and basing strategy, that outlined adjustments in the various theaters
overseas. While the strategy is intended to enhance flexibility and
achieve efficiencies, new facilities totaling billions of dollars will
be required according to DOD plans.
The Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern about the use
of military construction budget authority for projects at overseas
bases that may soon be obsolete due to changes being considered by DOD
military services as well as the need for a more complete picture of
future requirements than is typically available in annual budget
requests. Accordingly, the conference report[Footnote 3] accompanying
the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed
DOD[Footnote 4] to prepare detailed comprehensive master plans for
changing infrastructure requirements for U.S. military facilities in
each of the overseas regional commands. In that regard, DOD was
required to provide a baseline report on these plans with yearly
updates on the status of those plans and their implementation with
annual military construction budget submissions through 2009.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction
appropriation bill report[Footnote 5] required those plans to identify
precise facility requirements, the status of properties being returned
to host nations, and the funding requirements as well as the division
of funding responsibilities between the United States and cognizant
host nations. The Senate report also directed us to monitor the master
plans developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and
to provide the congressional defense committees with annual assessment
reports through fiscal year 2008. Our reports are to include an
assessment of the status of the plans; the associated costs; host
nation burden-sharing implications; and other relevant information
involving property returns to host nations, including residual
value[Footnote 6] and environmental remediation issues.
This is our second report that responds to the reporting requirements
contained in the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction
appropriation bill report. In our prior work,[Footnote 7] we found that
the overseas regional commands we visited at that time were awaiting
decisions on the integrated global presence and basing strategy, as
well as final guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) before completing their master plans for overseas facilities. OSD
provided initial guidance in February 2004 to aid the commands in
developing their plans. However, that guidance did not include
requirements to address environmental remediation, multiple U.S.
funding sources available to support infrastructure changes, or
residual property values--information that others and we would need to
track the commands' progress in implementing overseas basing changes.
Accordingly, we recommended in our July 2004 report that OSD include
these requirements in its final guidance to the overseas regional
commands. In issuing further guidance in October 2004,[Footnote 8] OSD
included requirements to identify information on environmental
remediation in accordance with status-of-forces agreements[Footnote 9]
and on multiple U.S. funding sources available to support
infrastructure changes, but not residual property value issues.
For this report, we completed a more extensive assessment of that
guidance and its use in developing the overseas master plans DOD
submitted to Congress on March 2005. This report discusses the extent
to which (1) OSD has provided sufficient guidance to overseas regional
commands to meet the reporting requirements contained in congressional
mandates and as suggested by GAO; and (2) overseas regional commands
complied with the reporting requirements and in doing so, provided
information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, and whether
improvements in guidance and reporting were needed.
To address our objectives, we met with OSD officials to discuss the
level of guidance available to the commands to facilitate consistent
preparation of overseas master plans and whether those plans meet the
requirements for information contained in congressional mandates and as
suggested by GAO. We also visited overseas regional commands--the
Pacific Command (PACOM), including U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces
Japan; European Command (EUCOM); and Central Command (CENTCOM)--to see
firsthand selected installations and military construction projects and
discuss OSD's guidance and the various factors that can affect U.S.
infrastructure requirements and costs overseas.[Footnote 10] Once the
master plans were issued, we reviewed them to determine the extent to
which they complied with the reporting requirements and provided
information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, and discussed
whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed with OSD
and command officials.
We conducted our review from October 2004 through May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See
encl. I for more information on our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
The scope of OSD's guidance issued to date generally exceeded the
reporting requirements established by Congress for the comprehensive
master plans and included most additional reporting elements previously
recommended by us, except for residual value. We believe that where the
guidance requires overseas regional commands to provide greater
specificity than identified by the congressional mandates, doing so is
appropriate and adds value because this provides a more complete
picture of future infrastructure requirements and associated funding
levels. However, OSD did not include residual value in its guidance to
the commands because officials continue to believe that residual value-
-which is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host
nation, and often diminished by actual or anticipated environmental
remediation costs--cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not
be assumed in the master plans. We believe that, without fully
explaining the challenges commands experience in obtaining residual
values for properties being returned to host nations or the
implications, if any, for U.S. funding requirements, Congress and other
users of the plans do not have a complete understanding of the
potential impacts and limitations of residual value on future funding
levels.
The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting
requirements defined by OSD, and by extension of Congress, but varied
in the extent to which they provided complete, clear, and consistent
information in their master plans. This is due, in part, to the
limitations in information that could be provided because of three key
factors we identified: ongoing negotiations with host nations,
continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategy, and differences
in interpretation of OSD guidance by commands. Opportunities exist to
improve the completeness, clarity, and consistency of the commands'
reporting of various items--host nation agreements and funding levels;
U.S. funding levels and sources; environmental remediation and
restoration issues; population levels; and facility requirements and
funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and insular areas in
the Pacific.[Footnote 11] Also, the plans do not yet provide a
definitive picture of future U.S. funding requirements, particularly
for new locations. Specifically, the master plans did not provide
information on U.S. funding sources in addition to military
construction appropriations that may be used for ongoing and future
infrastructure changes. An OSD official explained that though some of
these data were initially collected, they were too voluminous and too
detailed to be included. Still, master plans that provided a greater
degree of information encompassing the various sources of U.S. funding
or, at a minimum, total funding levels by type, would better assist
users in monitoring changes in U.S. funding levels due to changing
infrastructure requirements. In several other instances, the lack of
supplementary narrative to better explain the assumptions used or
reasons data were omitted diminished the usefulness of the plans. Also,
examples of better reporting by individual overseas regional commands
on selected data elements provided insights into how collective
reporting among all commands could be enhanced to provide more
complete, clear, and consistent information. Specifically, the detailed
reporting by EUCOM of individual construction projects according to
military service, country, and base categor[Footnote 12]y at the
installation level provided a more complete and consistent basis for
tracking progress and annual changes in its master plan. Also, CENTCOM
provided a more concise depiction of the anticipated strategic end
state in terms of the expected sites and capabilities to support its
objectives as of 2010. Without more complete, clear, and consistent
reporting by individual overseas commands in the master plans, Congress
and other users lack the best available data on which to track
infrastructure requirements and changes from year to year and between
commands.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that are
intended to make future comprehensive master plans more complete,
clear, and consistent to facilitate annual review and oversight by
Congress and other users of the plans. In comments on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with four of our recommendations and disagreed with
three. Specifically, it disagreed with our recommendations that (1)
overseas regional commands briefly explain the status and challenges
for host nation negotiations and results pertaining to host nation
funding levels, including those for special bilateral agreements; (2)
overseas regional commands report voluntary environmental remediation
and restoration initiatives that support planned infrastructure
requirements; and (3) PACOM provide information on facility
requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and
other insular areas in the Pacific in future comprehensive master plans
and updates. We continue to believe these latter recommendations have
merit and have added a matter for congressional consideration regarding
them.
Background:
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining
overseas basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military
flexibility to combat the conventional and asymmetric threats
worldwide. U.S. military presence overseas has been converting from a
posture established on familiar terrain to counter a known threat to
one that is intended to be capable of projecting forces from strategic
locations into relatively unknown areas in an uncertain threat
environment. In September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial Defense Review
Report, which addressed, among other issues, reorienting the U.S.
military global posture. The report called for developing a permanent
basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in
critical areas of the world as well as providing temporary access to
facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and
operate in the absence of permanent ranges and bases.
In August 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the
end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no
longer needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S.
forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in
strategic locations around the world. Closely thereafter, DOD issued a
report entitled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture, also
referred to as the integrated global presence and basing strategy. This
strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies including the
overseas basing and requirements study, the overseas presence study,
and the U.S. global posture study. The most recent military
construction appropriation request for fiscal year 2006 included
approximately $5.9 billion for military construction and family
housing, nearly $1 billion (16.9 percent) of which is designated for
specific overseas locations, mostly comprising enduring installations,
and not for new and emerging requirements outside existing basing
structures.[Footnote 13]
For several years, the Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed
concern regarding the progress DOD has made in updating the overseas
basing structure to reflect the new realities of an uncertain threat
environment. The committee also expressed concern about the use of
military construction budget authority for projects at installations
that may soon be obsolete due to overseas presence and basing changes
under consideration, as well as a history of changing requirements that
sometimes occurred following changes in command leadership.
Consequently, in the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2004
military construction appropriation bill, the Senate Appropriations
Committee directed DOD to prepare comprehensive master plans
identifying the infrastructure requirements for U.S. military
facilities in each of its overseas regional commands. Subsequently,
similar action was directed by the conference report accompanying the
2004 military construction appropriation bill. The conference report
also required DOD to provide a report on the status and implementation
of those plans with each yearly military construction budget submission
through fiscal year 2009.
The Senate Appropriations Committee also directed GAO to monitor the
comprehensive master plans being developed and implemented for the
overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense
committees with a report each year through fiscal year 2008 giving an
assessment of the status of the plans; associated costs; burden-sharing
implications; and other relevant information involving property returns
to host nations, including environmental remediation issues and
residual values. In July 2004, we reported the overseas regional
commands were awaiting decisions on the integrated global presence and
basing strategy and final OSD guidance regarding the development of
detailed, comprehensive master plans, and that they continued to
develop and implement plans for installations they believe will have an
enduring presence in future years.[Footnote 14] Additionally, we
reported various factors, such as residual property value,
environmental remediation, and the availability of multiple U.S.
funding sources, that affect the cost of U.S. infrastructure overseas
as well as the development of comprehensive master plans. We
recommended the overseas regional commands address these factors in
their comprehensive master plans and the extent to which they may
affect implementation of the plans.
Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics was tasked with fulfilling the reporting
requirement of these congressional mandates. In turn, the Under
Secretary assigned the overseas regional commands responsibility for
preparing detailed, comprehensive master plans for their area of
responsibility. The guidance instructed the overseas regional commands
to draft plans identifying precise facility requirements, status of
properties being returned to host nations, funding requirements, the
division of funding responsibilities between the United States and
cognizant host nations, multiple U.S. funding sources, and
environmental remediation.
OSD Guidance Generally Exceeded Congressional Reporting Requirements:
To its credit, the scope of OSD's guidance generally exceeded the
reporting requirements mandated by Congress and included most
additional reporting elements suggested by us, except for residual
value information. (See table 1.) However, we continue to believe OSD
should require commands to report on residual value or, at a minimum,
the issues associated with obtaining residual value returned to the
control of each host nation, because of the potential implications for
U.S. funding requirements.
Table 1: Comparison of OSD's Guidance with the Reporting Requirements
Contained in Congressional Mandates and as Suggested by GAO:
Mandated requirements: Report on: Precise facility requirements; OSD
guidance: Precise facility requirements (on a regional basis)[A]:
--Broad purpose and planned capability;
--Equipment and aircraft;
--Estimated U.S. military population (permanent and rotational
capacity--specifically surge).
Mandated requirements: Report on: Status of property returns; OSD
guidance: Status of property returns.
Mandated requirements: Report on: Funding requirements; OSD guidance:
Funding requirements:
--Projects and costs proposed for fiscal year 2006 military
construction bill;
--Projects and costs proposed for fiscal years 2007-2011 (cumulative).
Mandated requirements: Report on: Division of funding responsibilities
between U.S. and host nations; OSD guidance: Projects funded by host
nations.
Prior GAO recommendations: Report on: Multiple U.S. funding sources
available; OSD guidance: Funding requirements (breakdown by military
construction, operation and maintenance, etc.)
Prior GAO recommendations: Report on: Environmental remediation issues;
OSD guidance: Environmental remediation issues[B].
Prior GAO recommendations: Report on: Residual value issues; OSD
guidance: Not included.
Source: GAO analysis of OSD's guidance, the fiscal year 2004 Senate
Military Construction Appropriation Bill Report, and our prior
recommendations.
[A] Commands have the flexibility to define regional as installation,
town, country, and geographic area or in a way that is most effective
and applicable to communicate their situation.
[B] To the extent there are any environmental remediation issues in
accordance with requirements of status-of-forces agreements, they
should be addressed.
[End of table]
OSD's guidance generally exceeded the reporting requirements mandated
by Congress, and we believe that those instances when it requires
overseas regional commands to provide greater specificity than
identified by the congressional mandates are appropriate and have the
potential to provide a more complete picture of changing infrastructure
requirements overseas. For example, the guidance requires the overseas
regional commands to provide greater specificity in precise facility
requirements in terms of reporting details on military capabilities and
population changes than identified by the mandates. Similarly, the
guidance requires the commands to provide greater specificity in
funding requirements for military construction projects proposed for
the fiscal year 2006 military construction budget submission, than
identified by the mandates. In addition, the scope of OSD's guidance
included most reporting elements recommended by us in our prior
report,[Footnote 15] except for information on residual value issues.
According to an OSD official, residual value, typically received in the
form of construction services, was excluded from the guidance because
it is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host
nation, which is limited for most categories of military facilities,
and is often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental remediation
costs. Consequently, it cannot be readily predicted and therefore
should not be assumed in the master plans. However, since these issues
vary by host nation and may not be clear to all users of the plans, we
continue to believe OSD should require commands, at a minimum, to
explain the issues with obtaining residual value in each host nation
and report the implications for U.S. funding requirements.
Commands Generally Complied with OSD Guidance and Congressional
Reporting Requirements, but Varied in Completeness, Clarity, and
Consistency:
The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting
requirements defined by OSD, and by extension the congressional
mandates for reporting, where information was provided.[Footnote 16]
However, the plans do not yet provide a definitive picture of future
funding requirements, particularly for new locations, because they
varied in the extent to which they included complete, clear, and
consistent information. This is due, in part, to the limitations in
information that could be provided because of ongoing negotiations with
host governments, the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing
strategy, and differences commands had in interpreting OSD guidance--
which provides the commands flexibility to define regional as
installation, town, country, geographic area (e.g., southern Europe),
or in a way that is most effective and applicable to communicate their
situation. Also, reporting by some commands was better than others for
selected areas and offered insights into how overall reporting can be
improved.
More complete, clear, and consistent reporting by individual overseas
commands on selected data elements could further enhance future
comprehensive master plans and their implementation. For example:
* While several of the planned infrastructure requirements reported are
not based on finalized, negotiated agreements with host nations, none
of the commands fully explained the status of negotiations or
challenges for finalizing these agreements, or provided complete data
for host nation funding levels presented in the plans. These agreements
depend largely on the political environment and economic conditions in
host nations. Such arrangements can impact the extent of host nation
support--access or funding levels--to U.S. forces, and accordingly, may
increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future infrastructure
changes. This year, the EUCOM master plan referenced locations that
have not been fully negotiated with host nations. While this type of
information was useful in presenting a picture of potential
infrastructure sites in the future, EUCOM did not provide explanatory
information regarding the status of negotiations or challenges for
finalizing these host nation agreements. Another command referenced a
multilateral project, but did not identify any host nation funding in
its plan or fully explain the reasons for this omission. Also, the
magnitude of expected host nation funding identified in another
command's plan appeared questionable, absent any narrative explanation
regarding status of negotiations given the historically low host nation
funding levels in the region compared with the projected funding
requirements identified in the plan. Lastly, PACOM's schedule of host
nation funding did not fully incorporate projects and funding levels
initiated through special bilateral agreements negotiated with host
nations, such as those that established the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa and Yongsan relocation plan, or fully explain the reasons for
these omissions. Without explaining the status of negotiations and
challenges for obtaining host nation agreements and fully reporting
host nation funding levels using common time frames, it is difficult
for users to determine the extent to which reported infrastructure
changes and associated costs are likely to occur and whether reported
host nation funding levels are realistic or complete where funding
amounts were provided. Until all planned infrastructure requirements
are agreed to by the affected host nation or nations, overseas regional
commands will remain uncertain of total future infrastructure
requirements and associated costs.
* Although required by OSD guidance, the regional commands did not
provide information on U.S. funding sources in addition to military
construction appropriations that may be used to finance current and
future infrastructure requirements. An OSD official explained that some
of these data were initially collected and judged to be too voluminous
and detailed to include in the master plans. Still, inclusion of these
types of funding data in future master plans or, at a minimum,
reporting totals by funding type, would provide users a more complete
baseline to better monitor all U.S. funding sources that may be used to
finance current and future infrastructure requirements.
* Although required by OSD guidance, none of the regional commands
identified environmental remediation and restoration issues in their
master plans. While we recognize OSD guidance limited the reporting
requirement to those matters in accordance with the requirements of the
status-of-forces agreements, command officials told us during
subsequent discussions about a number of voluntary environmental
remediation and restoration initiatives that will entail substantial
funding--some may total more than $1 million--in support of planned
infrastructure requirements outlined in the master plans. Without their
inclusion or an explanation for their exclusion, it is difficult for
users to compare and comprehend how environmental remediation and
restoration activities and costs have varied by location and from year
to year, and how these costs may impact planned U.S. funding levels.
* Several of the reported actual or projected population levels at
specific locations appear questionable when compared to the applicable
base categories and funding requirements identified in the plans.
Specifically, CENTCOM's plan did not provide an explanation of how its
seemingly smaller bases could accommodate large numbers of people
without a corresponding increase in facilities. During subsequent
discussions, CENTCOM officials were able to explain that many of its
reported population and funding requirements are based on real-time
conditions at the installations and on the seeming different
interpretations of identified base categories, such as forward
operating sites and cooperative security locations. Still, without an
adequate explanation of these conditions, users are unable to determine
whether facilities and facility funding can adequately support the
reported population--stationed or surge. Given the seemingly
differences in interpretation and usage of terminology related to
forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, additional
narrative information regarding how each command is interpreting and
applying these basing concepts would provide users a clearer picture of
the infrastructure requirements at these sites.
* In compliance with OSD's guidance defining overseas locations, the
commands reported on requirements and funding for U.S. facilities in
foreign countries and, thus, excluded the 50 states and U.S.
territories. Based on the guidance, PACOM included Japan, South Korea,
Diego Garcia, and several other countries located in its area of
responsibility and excluded any detailed discussion of facility
requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and
other insular areas in the Pacific--strategic basing locations in the
theater. Officials explained that Hawaii and Guam were excluded in part
because they were included in DOD's ongoing base closure and
realignment process. However, the omission of these locations does not
provide users full representation of U.S. military presence,
infrastructure requirements, and associated U.S. funding levels in the
Pacific. Given that they are increasingly integral to achieving PACOM's
strategic objectives and that the base closure and realignment
decisions will be finalized later this year, their inclusion in future
PACOM master plans would provide users more complete information so
they can comprehend the full magnitude of facility requirements and
associated costs in the Pacific.
Further, instances of better reporting by individual overseas commands
on selected data elements provided insights into how collective
reporting among all commands could be enhanced to provide more
complete, clear, and consistent information. For example:
* The detailed reporting by EUCOM of precise facility requirements
regarding planned construction projects provided a clearer and more
complete basis for identifying requirements for fiscal years 2006
through 2011 and tracking progress and changes from year to year than
did the other commands. Specifically, EUCOM listed projects by military
service and base category[Footnote 17] at the installation level, while
PACOM rolled up projects into three broad regions--Japan, South Korea,
and Diego Garcia--or by base category. As a result, we could readily
identify estimated costs for EUCOM's construction projects at specific
localities, to the extent information was available and provided, but
could not complete a similar analysis for PACOM's projects.
* The detailed reporting by CENTCOM of an anticipated strategic end
state of its overseas basing infrastructure as of 2010, although not
specifically required by OSD guidance, provided a clearer and more
complete basis for tracking progress in meeting its infrastructure
objectives for the region than did the other commands. Specifically,
CENTCOM provided a concise depiction of expected locations and
capabilities to support its objectives as of 2010, while EUCOM
highlighted infrastructure consolidations and troop movements and PACOM
limited this type of analysis to South Korea. Such information would
have been useful from each command, but would require additional
guidance on this issue from DOD to ensure consistency in reporting.
Conclusions:
To its credit, DOD's completion of this year's overseas master plans
provides a more complete picture of future facility and funding
requirements for changing U.S. defense infrastructure overseas than is
available in other DOD reports, documents, and annual budget requests.
It is obvious that the preparation of the master plans required
significant effort on the part of OSD and the overseas regional
commands. Still, opportunities exist to improve the guidance and term
definitions to help overseas regional commands provide more complete,
clear, and consistent information and present a more definitive picture
of infrastructure and funding requirements, particularly for new
locations, in the future. The less than definitive picture in this
year's plans was due, in part, to the limitations in information that
could be provided because of three key factors we identified: ongoing
negotiations with host nations, continuing evolution of U.S. overseas
basing strategy, and differences commands had in interpretation of OSD
guidance. Since we have previously recommended that overseas regional
commands address the extent to which residual value issues could affect
U.S. funding requirements in our prior report, we are not including it
again in this report. However, since residual value issues vary by host
nation and may not be clear to all users of the plans, we consider it
an open and continuing recommendation from our prior report.
Additionally, without more complete, clear, and consistent reporting of
various items--host nation agreements and funding levels, including
special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding levels and sources in
addition to military construction funds; environmental remediation and
restoration issues; population levels; and facility requirements and
funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular
areas in the Pacific--across future master plans, users do not have the
best data available to facilitate their annual review and oversight.
Also, individual master plans provide examples of how selected data
elements could be reported to enhance future plans and their
implementation. Specifically, without the detailed reporting of
individual construction projects as EUCOM did in its plan and the
anticipated strategic end state of the command's overseas basing
infrastructure as of 2010 as CENTCOM did in its plan, Congress and
other users do not have the best available and consistent data on which
to track progress and changes from year to year and between commands.
In many of these instances, providing supplementary narrative
explanation of the assumptions used or reasons data were omitted could
improve the usefulness of the comprehensive master plans.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve reporting of and make future comprehensive master plans and
updates more complete, clear, and consistent to facilitate annual
review and oversight by Congress and other users, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to
require that:
* overseas regional commands (1) briefly explain the status of
negotiations and challenges for reported host nation agreements and (2)
fully report host nation funding levels, including those for special
bilateral agreements;
* overseas regional commands report information on U.S. funding sources
in addition to military construction appropriations that may be used to
finance current and future infrastructure requirements or, at a
minimum, the totals for these other U.S. funding sources;
* overseas regional commands report environmental remediation and
restoration initiatives that support planned infrastructure
requirements outlined in the master plans;
* overseas regional commands briefly explain any significant variances
in population levels and usage of terminology related to the three base
categories--main operating bases, forward operating sites, and
cooperative security locations;
* PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding levels
for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the
Pacific;
* overseas regional commands follow the presentation of individual
construction projects as EUCOM did in its plan; and:
* overseas regional commands follow the presentation of the strategic
end state of their overseas basing infrastructure using a common date
as CENTCOM did in its plan.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
On the basis of DOD's comments on our recommendations, as discussed
below, Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD in future
comprehensive master plans and updates to (1) briefly explain the
status of negotiations and challenges for reported host nation
agreements and fully report host nation funding levels, including those
for special bilateral agreements; (2) report environmental remediation
and restoration initiatives that support planned infrastructure
requirements outlined in the master plans; and (3) provide information
on facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S.
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment concurred with four of our
recommendations dealing with the presentation of U.S. funding levels
and sources in addition to military construction funds; population
levels and usage of terminology related to the three base categories;
individual construction projects; and strategic end state using a
common date. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense did not concur with
three of our recommendations that (1) overseas regional commands
briefly explain the status and challenges for host nation negotiations
and results pertaining to host nation funding levels, including those
for special bilateral agreements; (2) overseas regional commands report
voluntary environmental remediation and restoration initiatives that
support planned infrastructure requirements outlined in the master
plans; and (3) PACOM provide information on facility requirements and
funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular
areas in the Pacific. We disagree and believe implementation of our
recommendations would improve the reporting of and make future
comprehensive master plans and updates more complete, clear, and
consistent to facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and
other users.
DOD stated that the master plans are not the appropriate vehicle to
report the status of negotiations and the results of agreements
pertaining to host nation funding, including those for special
bilateral agreements, and noted that these types of data are maintained
at the Departments of State and Defense levels. We disagree. Since the
status of negotiations and the results of agreements pertaining to host
nation funding, including those for special bilateral agreements,
directly affect overseas regional commands and their plans for changing
their infrastructure, we believe the master plans are an appropriate
vehicle to report these types of data. In addition, the master plans
are classified documents whose distribution is limited to U.S.
officials with a need to know the status of ongoing negotiations and
the results of agreements pertaining to host nation funding. Also,
while this information may be maintained at the Departments of State
and Defense levels, in practice overseas regional commands monitor the
status of these negotiations as indicated by several of the planned
infrastructure changes being reported in the current master plans--some
of which are not based on finalized, negotiated agreements with host
nations. Since none of the commands fully explained the status or
challenges for finalizing these agreements, or provided complete data
for host nation funding levels, these omissions make it difficult, if
not impossible, for Congress and other users of the plans to determine
the extent to which reported infrastructure changes and associated
costs are likely to occur and whether reported host nation funding
levels are realistic or complete.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics revise OSD's guidance
to require overseas regional commands report voluntary environmental
remediation and restoration initiatives that support planned
infrastructure requirements outlined in their master plans. DOD stated
that its environmental policy overseas allows for remediation efforts
only to eliminate known, imminent, and substantial endangerment to
human health or the environment and does not authorize voluntary
remediation initiatives. However, as recognized in our draft report,
what actually occurs overseas is not reflected by DOD's comments. In
reality, command officials told us about a number of voluntary
environmental remediation and restoration initiatives they plan to
implement that will entail substantial funding in support of planned
infrastructure requirements. Indeed, DOD policy grants overseas
regional commanders discretion to perform additional remediation to
protect human health and safety. In any event, since these actions
affect overall costs in these rebasing efforts, we continue to believe
it is important to reflect these costs in the master plans. In
addition, as we previously noted in this report, OSD guidance requested
overseas regional commands to report information on environmental
remediation and restoration activities taken in accordance with the
status-of-forces agreements. Because none of the regional commands
identified environmental remediation and restoration initiatives or
costs in their master plans, it may lead Congress and other users of
the plans to conclude incorrectly that regional commands do not incur
any environmental-related costs even though they have voluntarily
undertaken such initiatives in the past and may plan do so again in the
future. Accordingly, we believe that a narrative explanation of these
initiatives and associated costs would provide a more complete picture
of all activities associated with the U.S. defense infrastructure
overseas. Therefore, we are amending our recommendation to state that
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics should revise OSD guidance to require overseas regional
commands to report all environmental remediation and restoration
initiatives that support planned infrastructure requirements outlined
in their master plans whether they are required by DOD policy,
international agreement, or are performed under the authority granted
to overseas regional commanders under DOD policy.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation to require that PACOM provide
information on facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii,
Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific. It
stated that Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific were no
different from other U.S. facilities within the continental United
States and that it was inappropriate to include them in overseas master
plans. We continue to believe it is important to include this
information, as the omission of these locations from PACOM's master
plan provides Congress and other users an incomplete picture of the
changing U.S. military presence in the Pacific and only a portion of
the infrastructure and funding requirements associated with these
changes. For example, in September 2004, the Commander, PACOM,
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the command
was collocating the Stryker with high-speed vessels and airlift in
Hawaii, deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam, stationing
submarines in Guam, and had proposed moving an additional carrier
strike group forward somewhere in the Pacific. Both Hawaii and Guam
have been discussed as the potential site for this additional carrier
strike group. In light of this, and because these locations are
increasingly integral to achieving U.S. security objectives in the
region, we believe that the inclusion of Hawaii, Guam, and other
insular areas will provide a more complete picture of PACOM's
infrastructure requirements and associated costs in the Pacific.
The Deputy Under Secretary's comments are included in enclosure II of
this report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and members; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and
Unified Combatant Commanders. The report is also available at no charge
on GAO's Web Site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Alissa Czyz, Mark
Little, Ricardo Marquez, Donna Rogers, and Nelson Torres were major
contributors to this report.
Signed by:
Barry W. Holman, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Chair:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs: Committee
on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James T. Walsh:
Chairman:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs, and
Related Agencies: Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which OSD provided sufficient guidance to
overseas regional commands to meet the reporting requirements contained
in congressional mandates and suggested by GAO, we compared and
contrasted OSD guidance to the reporting requirements provided in the
congressional mandates and suggested previously by GAO. We also met
with officials from OSD and each of the following commands and
agencies: PACOM; EUCOM; CENTCOM; U.S. Army, Pacific; U.S. Pacific
Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Force; U.S.
Forces Korea; Eighth Army, South Korea; Seventh Air Force, South Korea;
Army Installation Management Agency, South Korea Regional Office; Army
Corps of Engineers, South Korea; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army, Japan;
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Japan; U.S. Army, Europe; Commander, Naval
Region Europe; U.S. Air Force, Europe; Army Installation Management
Agency, Europe Regional Office; and Special Operations Command. In
general, we discussed the reporting requirements contained in OSD's
guidance, host nation agreements and associated issues, host nation
funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental
remediation and restoration issues, property returns to host nations,
and residual values likely to be obtained by the United States as a
result of these property returns. We also analyzed available reports,
documents, policies, directives, international agreements, and
information and guidance pertaining to these factors. In South Korea,
we also met with an official from the office of the Political Military
Unit at the U.S. Embassy South Korea to discuss the U.S. diplomatic
perspective on potential basing changes in South Korea, burden-sharing
implications, and environmental remediation and restoration issues. We
also met with an official from the Republic of South Korea Ministry of
National Defense to obtain a host nation perspective on the status of
implementation of master plans and burden-sharing implications for
relocation of U.S. facilities in South Korea and to discuss funding and
time frames for decisions by the Republic of South Korea. To see
firsthand the condition of facilities and status of selected
construction projects, we visited and toured the facilities at Camp
Butler, Camp Foster, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, and Yokota Air
Base, Japan; Camp Humphreys, Osan Air Base, and Kunsan Air Base, South
Korea; Army Garrison Grafenwoehr, Germany; and Caserna Ederle
(including Dal Molin airfield, property of the Italian government),
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Naval Support Activity Capodichino, and
Navy Support Site Gricignano, Italy.
To determine the extent to which overseas regional commands complied
with OSD's reporting requirements and provided information in a
complete, clear, and consistent manner, we compared the comprehensive
master plans with the reporting requirements provided in OSD guidance
and suggested previously by us, and compared and contrasted the plans
to each other. To determine whether improvements in guidance and
reporting were needed, we assessed the plans to identify those elements
and properties that provided information in the most complete, clear,
and consistent manner. Also, we assessed the quantity and quality of
one plan's responses for each of the data elements and compared them to
equivalent responses in other plans; formed conclusions as to the
completeness, clarity and consistency of one plan's responses; and
generated observations and recommendations for improving other plans'
responses. We also discussed our observations and recommendations,
specific reporting requirements, and whether improvements in the
guidance and reporting were needed with DOD officials.
While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning
efforts were not specifically included in the master plans provided in
response to the congressional mandates and detailed data were not
available for inclusion in this report. In addition, we did not include
Southern Command in our analysis because this command has significantly
fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the
Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia.
We conducted our review from October 2004 through May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND
LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
JUN 20 2005:
Mr. Barry W. Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: United States Government
Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Holman:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, "DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future
Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure
Overseas," May 13, 2005 (GAO Code 350585/GAO-05-680R).
Enclosed is the Department's specific response to the recommendations
of the draft GAO report. Thank you for the opportunity to provide
comments. My point of contact for this action is Sherry Holliman, who
can be reached at (703) 571-9069.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Philip W. Grone:
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations & Environment):
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO CODE 350585/GAO-05-680R:
"DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future
Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure
Overseas" (Code 350585/GAO-05-680R):
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that overseas regional
commands (1) briefly explain the status of negotiations and challenges
for reported host nation agreements and (2) fully report host nation
funding levels, including those for special bilateral agreements. (Page
14/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The master plans are not the appropriate
vehicle to report the status of negotiations and the results of
agreements pertaining to host-nation funding levels. The status of
current arrangements and plans for future negotiations is maintained at
the State/DoD level.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that overseas regional
commands report information on U.S. funding sources in addition to
military construction appropriations that may be used to finance
current and future infrastructure requirements or, at a minimum, the
totals for these other U.S. funding sources. (Page 14-15, Draft
Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD will examine guidance to Combatant Commands
for preparation of overseas master plans, address requirements to
support facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization, and apply
such models as necessary to arrive at estimated infrastructure
requirements.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that overseas regional
commands report voluntary environmental remediation and restoration
initiatives that support planned infrastructure requirements outlined
in the master plans. (Page 15/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. DoD environmental policy overseas allows for
remediation efforts only to eliminate known, imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment (or to maintain mission
operations). "Voluntary" remediation initiatives are not authorized
under DoD policy (DoD Instruction 4715.8).
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that overseas regional
commands briefly explain any significant variances in population levels
and usage of terminology related to the three base categories - main
operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security
locations. (Page 15/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD will provide information except where the
information may compromise national security or host-nation
sensitivities.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command provide information on facility requirements and
funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular
areas in the Pacific. (Page 15/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific are
no different from other U.S. facilities within the Continental United
States (CONUS) and Alaska. It is inappropriate to include them in
"overseas" master plan requirements.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that overseas regional
commands follow the presentation of individual construction projects as
the European Command did in its plan. (Page 15/Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment. In the update of guidance for
preparing overseas master plans, we will strive for consistency across
the Department for common business practices, subject to unique
Combatant Command needs.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that overseas regional
commands follow the presentation of the strategic end state of their
overseas basing infrastructure using a common date as the Central
Command did in its plan (Page 15/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. In the update of guidance for preparing overseas
master plans, the Department will establish a common date for a
strategic end state.
[End of section]
(350585):
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2001).
[2] DOD, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 17, 2004).
[3] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003).
[4] Although not specifically requested in the conference report, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the overseas regional commands
to prepare comprehensive master plans for their areas of
responsibility.
[5] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
[6] Residual value is the negotiated dollar value of U.S.-constructed
or improved facilities that are turned over to host nations. DOD policy
is to obtain the maximum residual value permissible.
[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure
Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-
04-609 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004).
[8] DOD, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, Overseas Master Plans (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).
[9] Status-of-forces agreements determine the legal status of U.S.
armed forces stationed abroad, often including some provisions for
environmental remediation of U.S.-generated requirements.
[10] For the purposes of this report, we did not include Southern
Command in our analysis because this command has significantly fewer
facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific,
Europe, and Central Asia.
[11] Although Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas
technically were not considered overseas locations for this year's
master plans, in this case several of these locations nevertheless are
important components and factor significantly into future strategic
considerations within PACOM's area of responsibility.
[12] DOD's Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture provided new base
category definitions--main operating bases, forward operating sites,
and cooperative security locations. Main operating bases, with
permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure, are
characterized by command and control structures and family support
facilities. Forward operating sites are expandable "warm facilities"
maintained with a limited rotational U.S. military support presence and
possibly prepositioned equipment. Cooperative security locations are
facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence and will provide
contingency access while being a focal point for security cooperation
activities.
[13] These figures exclude the amounts requested by DOD for the base
realignment and closure process and unspecified sites, which include
funding for minor construction, planning and design, operating
expenses, and other construction-related activities.
[14] GAO-04-609.
[15] GAO-04-609.
[16] While CENTCOM generally complied with the reporting requirements
defined by OSD guidance, it excluded any discussion of Iraq.
[17] See note 12.
